Created: 10/25/1984

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" Iniellistmc

Warsaw Pact Nonnuclear Threat to NATO Airbases in Central Europe





In/ormalisn available alctober

Ii'ioi ol thai

Eit Unite,approved bv tbe NaUonal Foieltn intdllrence Board on

lhal dala.



The following intelligence organizations participated In the preparation of tho Estimate:

The Centrol Inlelligence Agency, the Detente InreSgenco Agency, tha Nottonol Security Agency, ond tha Inlalllfjaneeuiot'-on ol the Otpoclcrvant ol Slot*.

Also Participating'

The Atiittont Chief of Stofl for tnialligance. Detriment of the Army The Direclor of Novol IntcEigenee, Deportmentthe Novy The Attitlon! Chief of Slaff, Intetbgence. Oeporlmont of (he Air Fore* The Direclor ol Inleliigeoce. Headquarter i. *Awine Corpt





Pact Conceptsar Against NATO






Conlrol. and


F The Air

C. Future



B Force

Force Structure In thc Western

Missile Storane and

of Future




D. Employment of Special Purpose Forces in thc NATO



if. i.





C. Airfield




Theory Versus


C Reconnaissance Strike Complex

D. Surface-lo-Air





Future Soviet AirBcld Attack

ANNEX: Selected



Sovicl planners regard NATO's tactical air forces in (he Central Regionormidable threat to their ground, air. and naval forcesonventional conflict. The 5ovicls recognize that NATO's air assets provide lhe bulk of the NATO theater nuclear capability and thai thc success of NATO ground force operations is dependent upon tactical air support. The Soviets consider the early attainment of air superiority and the deslruction or neutralization of NATO's theater nuclear forces to be critical to the Pact's chances for victory in Europe

The Soviets plan toheater Strategic Operation (TSO) against NATO in Central Europe, an area the Soviets describe as tbe Western Theater of Military Operationst would beby multiple, successive front operations supported by the Strategic Air Forces, tlie Strategic Rocket.Forces, and the Baltic Fleet, and controlledingle high command of forces in lhc TVD. Wethe Soviets plan to complete this operationeriod ofoays.

We would also expeel that, concurrently withSO against NATO in Central Europe, the Soviets would attack NATO's northern and southern regions to keep NATO from shifting forces from the Hanks lo Cenlral Europe and to compel commitment of NATO reserves. We would expect some limited simultaneous air operations against key NATO airfield complexes in Norway designed to establish air superiority over the Norwegian Sea and adjacent waters in order to reduce the vulnerability of air and naval operations in the area.

Pact miliiary planners assign their air forces three general tasks for conventional warontinentalgain and maintain air superiorily, to dcslroy the nuclear delivery capability of the enemy, and to support the ground forces. Other theater support roles for the air forces would include close air support, nculralization of enemy reserves, aerial reconnaissance, electronic warfare, airdrop/airlanding operations, and airlift of supplies.

To accomplish their ghats, thc Sovietsonnuclearconcept, the airesigned lo neutralize NATO air. air

1 Vim the purpoaa ot ami Euinule lhe lata "lhe alt operation- rrfcri lo the Initial all erxration Involvingined atr raldieriod ol teveral din dailnihwot hortil



- top mmn

dcfense. and theater nuclear resources during (he 6nt several days of hostilities. Surjporting forces could include short-range ballistic missilespecial purpose forcesirborne, and othet assets

Tlie Soviet Ceneral Staff, acting as eiecutive agent for tlse Supreme High Commandould perform the initial planning and allocation of VCK assets, ensure slrategic reconnaissance isand reallocate air forces among TVDs, if necessary. Thc High Command of lhe Western TVD would perform the dclailed planning and direct the ihealer air operation.

Pact planners regard destruction of NATO aircraft as the primary way of gaining air superiority and expect airfield attacks lo account for many of the aircraft NATO would lose during the air operation. Key to the neutralization of NATO air assets would be the destruction or degradation of NATO aiYbases. In an attempt to destroy or neutralize NATO's nuclear capability, the Pact would roncentrate attacks on those bases from which they expect nuclear delivery aircraft to operate and would also assign high priority to bases housing air defense fighters. The prevention of thc early use of these assets might well bc enough for the Soviets toreemptive air operation as having fulfilled its obiectives.

Wc believe these lo be thc principal characteristics of an air operalion conducted against NATO's Central Region:

The Pact would most likely commit elements of two to four strategic air armies, three to five front air forces including non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) air forces, and various air defense, transport, and Baltic Fleet naval aviation unitseries of major air raids designed to achieve as much tactical surprise as possible.

Each major raid would beginoncerted effort to establish corridors through NATO air defenses, which Pact aircraft would then use lo attack airfields, surface-to-surface missile launchers, nuclear weapons storage facilities, command, control, and communications facilities, and other priority targets.

encers and Soviet medium bombers would constitute the primary force for attaching airfields and possibly nuclear storage facilities.

Fighter-bombers from the air forces of the fronts would be used to suppress air defenses and to attack fixed installations (to include airfields) and missile launchers. Other tactical and

stralegic aircraft would provide fighter cover, escort,and radioelectroiiic combat missions. NSWP air defense fighters would provide strategic air defense of their homelands.

Aircrafl operations would be supported primarily byof SRBMs. artillery, and Spetsnai to atlack crilical surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites, command, control, andsites, and airfields within range.

Some Soviet and NSWP bomber, fighlet-bomber, and fighter aircraft would be withheld for nuclear operations

We believe that the Pad could haveixed-wing aircraft for operations against the NATO Central Region and lhat it probably has contingency plans for initiating the air operationariety of different postures. For offensive air operations in Central Europe, the Warsaw Pact could draw from:

Strategic Aviation.

Soviet Air Forces of the Grnupj of Forces in East Germany and Czechoslovakia and the three Western military districts.

National Air Forces of East Germany. Czechoslovakia, and Poland.

Baltic Fleet air forces.

The heart of rhe air operation woulderies of daylight airfield attacks designed toortion of NATO's air forces sufficienl to establish strategic air supremacy and to reduce substantially NATO's nuclear strike potential. Airbases housing fighter-bomber wings with nuclear strike roles generally are the top-priority targets in Soviet exercises because their destruction would simultaneously satisfy both obiectives. Fighter bases also would be attacked. Soviet military writings note that front aviation also would make small-scale atlacks against NATO airfields between the massed air raids in support of front objectives.

We believe that, if aircraft attrition rates were substantially higher than expected, thc Soviets could be forced lo cancel thc air operationcr only one or two massed airit accomplished its objective of attaining air supremacy. Factors affecting attrition rates would Include:

Higher-than-expected survivability of NATO's ground-based air defenses.


airborne warning and control system aircraft and look-down/shootdown fighters limiting opportunities (or Pactto evade NATO defenses by Dying at low altitudes.

The Soviet reliance on deep attack by medium bombers, which arc relatively large and un maneuver able, and hencevulnerable lo SAMs and fighters unless properly supported.

The lack of fighter escort for any bombers used in atlacks against tlvc United Kingdom

The proliferation of hardened aircraft shelters at NATO air-bases would force the Soviets to concentrate on closing runways, which would require more air raidsonger period of time and hence greater exposure to NATO air defenses.

The Soviets do not have enough hardened shelters to protect most of the aircraft that would deploy forward from lhc western USSR in the eventassive reinforcement. We doubtarge-scale reinforcement by second-echelon front aviation would be likely under most circumstances, however, unlil the ground forces of the affected second-echelon fronts also deployed forward

If the SovieU chose to start the war with thc air operation, weachievement of tactical surprise would be difficult. Warning of the attack could allow NATO sufficient time to launch most of its aircraft, exacerbating potential Pad aircraft attrition and making the NATO airfields less lucrative targets.

Wc believe the large number of aircraft that thc Soviets would use in thc massed air raids combined with the loss of control facilities during combat would strain Pad airspace management capabilities and lend to some confusion. Deterioration of command, conirol, and communicatioru resulting from NATO air attacks would also lead to greater confusion during subsequent raids. Additionally, bad weather would limil lhc size and effectiveness of the air raids or even force the postponement of the air operation.

Wc have no evidence that the Soviets would plan to employ chemical weapons1 during the air operations in the nonnuclear phasear with NATO. The use of chemical weapons istandard,feature of the nonnuclear phase of war. The Soviets probably calculate that large-scale use of chemical weapons would cause NATO to retaliate with nuclear weapons. However, because of the significant Sovicl offensive capability, the prudent planner cannot discount their



M HA TO. .miIT-aS. SoWM Owl Bk*Oftr*Jr-wu

use While wc judge chemical weapons would bc employed massively only in (he context of transition to thc nuclear phase of war. should the success of the air operation be jeopardized by the use of conventional munitions only, the Soviets would consider the uie of chemical weapons against selected targets during the nonnuclear phase.

Through thchc air forces of the Military Districts and Croups of Forces (MD/GOF) are expected to remain stable in overall sizelight decrease in numbers of fighters and some growth in ground-attack elements Though the current MD/COF organization will remain mostly stable, thc Soviets may introduce improved tactics and pursue expanded objectives within the context of the air operation.

Future air operations will reflect the advances in air technology and in operational art and tactics, and are expected to differ from current operations only by degree. Wc believe the new-generation ground attack aircraft willreater threat to NATO airfields because of their ability to carry improved standoff munitions, low-altitude penelration capabilities, improved onboard and escortwarfare systems, better navigation systems and sensors for adverse weather attack, and air-to-air refueling capability for extended range. This enhanced attack capability will require fewer aircraftchieve desired target damage criteria/norms. In this way. thc air operation will be able to maximize the effectiveness of aircraft available to the Soviet planner.

Concerning munitions, we believe future Soviet tactical air-to-surface missiles will have increased launch ranges, improved accuracy, and improved night and adverse weather capability. The Soviets will deploy more effective munitions for airfield attack,ual-stage runway-penetrator bomb for increased runway damage, aerially delivered mines to hinder runway repairs, and precision-guided bombs with electro-optical seekers for attacking high-value point targets.

We believe the Soviets will continue to face complicated command and control problems In mass air operations in the Central Region, with future air combat control requiring real-time knowledge of the status and location of both friendly and enemy aerodynamic assets.oviets will increase bolh the capacity and capability of their air communications by large-scale use of digital data communication systems coupled to onboard computers and displays, and will continue to advance those technologies necessary to allow direct communication satellite access from airborne platforms, with emphasis upon expanding the number and types of aircraft with communication satellite


The current SRHM nonnuclear threat lo NATO airbases ijTliend thc Scud misiile lack sufficient accuracy to be effectiveonventional airfield altack role Further, theould notignificant threat lo airfields because limited numbers wdl reslricl il primarily to the nuclear role While thc more accurates available in sizable numbers and continues to be deployed, its short range restricts ils participation in lhe air operalion lo attacking the forwardmost elements of NATO's all defense system

The SltUM threat will grow during ihe5ith theof lhe improvedhich will have thc rcquisile range andeters CEV) to atlack airfields. The degree of this threat will depend on the numbers of the system deployed, on other competing targets, and on whether specialized airfield attack munitions arc developed. Improvements lo the SRBM force will give the Soviels an option to employ itin-down attack against some critical airbases and for neutralization of air defense sites in penetration corridors. Such attacks could significantly improve the chance of success of the initial massed air raid. Overall, while SRBMs will probablyreater role in thc air operation, we do not believe they will become in Soviet eyes the primary instrument for gaining air superiority in thc NATO Central Region.

We believe that, during the period of this Estimate, Soviet special purpose forces in thc WTVD willignificant threat to the airfields of lhe NATO Central Region, and would be inserted prior to and during hostilities lo conduct missions of reconnaissance andagainst NATO airfields, air defense, nuclear delivery forces, and other associated facilities The vast majority of Spetsnaz will not cross lhc border before thc beginning of conventional hostilities, and the Soviets would rely on the confusion of war. aod thc opening of penetration corridors during the air operation, to allow insertion of Spetsnaz bv aircraft.

We believe iheir primary missions are to search for difficult-to-locate mobile missiles and command posts, to monitor preparations at airfields for nuclear strikes by NATO, and to assess the effects of Soviet air and missile strikes. Consequently, wc believe Spetsnaz direel attacks would be limitedew airbases In thc Central Region. If these forces are to perform their other, high-priority missiuns

We believe airborne ailacks againsi NATO main operating bases during the early phases of lhc air operation arc unlikely unless thc Soviets obtain air superiority over ataior segment of the Central Region More likely would be attacks bv air assault troops on

small civilian and military airfields iust in front of advancing Soviet forces to secure airheads. Although live VCK might opt for an airborne operation on thc first or second day ol the air operation, wc believe tlve Sovicls would wail until a|r later lo ensure some degreeuperiority and availabilily of transport aircrafl.

A significant development in operational employment and combat organization of Soviet Ground Forces has been the development and employment of lank-heavy eipJmtation forces at front and army levels called operational maneuver groupsconcept intended for high-speed offensive operations deep into the enemy rear area. OMC operations are planned to disrupt the stability of the enemy rear and the movement of enemy reserves, to destroy major weapon systems, and to facilitate the advance of the first echelon and the commitment of the second echelon. Specific targets include nuclear delivery systems and depots, airfields, critical terrain, river crossing sites, and command posts.

While the OMCajor component of Soviet combined arms ope.-ations. we do not believe itajor threat to NATO main operating bases in the early days of an attack. The OMC wouldhreat onlyeriod of daysuccessful commitment.

Although the Soviets are developing two significantly different types of long-range land-attack cruise missiles, current evidence leads us to believe these are nuclear equipped By the. Soviet long-range cruise missiles will probably have improvedoeters with area correlator update! Cruise missiles with nonnuclear warheads would facilitate attacks against airfields, air defense systems.

and command and control facilities, but we cannot assess the likelihood

at this tine.

Wilhin the last several years the Soviets have been experimenting with the reconnaissance strike complex (RSC) system, which appears designed to counter US long-range artillery systems deliveringmunitions or subnotions We believe it is unlikely that the Soviets would use RSCs to attack NATO airfields Virtually all NATO military airfields already are known to the


Although unlikely, certain Soviet SAM systems could possibly be employed in emergency situationsurface-to-surface role. Surface-to-surface use would be inefficient and severely constrained bywarheads and limited ranges Wc believe the limited surface-to-

surface capability of tbe Soviet SAM systems docs not presentlyonventional threat to NATO airBclds

ln summary, wa believe that, for the period oflimale, lhc air threat will continue to be the single most significant threat to NATO airbases of the Central Region, followed by the SRBM and Spetsnai threats. We believe that in the future thc Soviets will be able to project airpower deeper into NATO's rear areas through advanced aircraft and weaponry operating under more effective and higher capacitycontrol, and communications syslems.





This Estimate examines lhc Warsaw Partthreat to NATO airbase* in the Central Region. Succeeding clupleri address the lineal posed by Pact air forces, surface-to-surface missiles, special-purpose forces (SpetsnazX cruise missiles, and airborne and air assault forces. Thc final chapter integrates the various threat elements in an illustrative scenario, deplctiruj likely Pact action* against NATO airfields in the early (nonnuclear] phase of an attack. The Estimate, also projects the threat intoo illustrate how il may evolve as the capabilities of the various threat elements develop

Soviet planners regard NATO's tactical air forces in llie Central Regionormidable threat to their ground, air. and naval forcesonventionalThe Sovieis recosniie that NATO's air assets provide the bulk of the NATO theater nuclearand that the success of NATO ground force operalions is dependent upon tactical air support. The NATO Central Region contains the greatestof airbases, air defense, and tactical nuclear assets in Western Europe. There are approximatelyeacetime NATO airbase* includinguclearbases, nine air defense bases, seven aerial ports of debarkation,umber of colocated operatingSeedditionally, there are other air defense, nuclear, command, control, andand logistics facilities that will abo be competing targets. The Soviet* consider the early attainment of air superiority and tbe destruction or neutralization of NATO* theater nuclear forces to be critical to the Pact's chances for victory in Europe. (See

The SovieU recognize thai NATO would have to depend upon its tactical air forces to redress the imbalance In ground forces. In addition NATOair forces arerimary nuclear delivery means which the Pad would want to neutralize during the nonnuclear phase of the theater conflict- The Sovietsonnuclear operaUonal concept, the air

esigned lo neutralize NATO air. airand theater nuclear resources during lhc llrsi several days ol huitillilcs The air operationombined aims operation with lhe air forces as Ihe primary ihreal lo NATO airbases. Supporting forces could include suifacc-to-surfacc missiles, artillery, Spetsnai. airborne, and other assets. While the Soviets would hope to destroy NATO air and nuclear assets, the prevention of the early use of these assets might well be enough for them toreemptive air operation as having fulfilled il* objective*.

have no evidence that the Soviets wouldemploy chemical weaponsuring thein the nonnuclear phasearThe use ol chemical weapons is not aintegral feature of the nonnuclear phase ofSoviets probably calculate that large-scale useweapons would cause NATO tonuclear weapons. However, because of theSoviet oflensive capability, the prudentdiscount their use. While wc iudgewould be employed massively only in the-of transition to lhe nuclear phase ofthe success ol lhe air operation bethc use of conventional munitions only, theconsider thc use of chemical weapon*targets during thc nonnuclear phase.

B. Worsaw Paci Conceptsor Against NATO in Europe 1

So-icls plan toheater(TSO) against NATO in Central Europe, an

' Foi llw OUDOM al iki Fj*Uiu>U. ih*air optrattarT raten la ite liiUUl ili amUrtJvln* multlplr muted ilr nidi

amdixlfld overpen-kid of lavaolrlnc th* InMul phue of


NIEKr SooUi Ojmi'M CSfrnioJ'Aimi laIKt. SooUl CJwmkW aruf KULirxcalrogram

'Foe mote detailed di>cw>lon iA Wane> Pad raimUraiNATO In Europe, ofanlutlon ufnd nx&mandir. relet lo NIEI* warui* rtn Form OnxatU NATO, January.f Wcfmb rod ForeNATO. Jul. IMS

Figure 2

Peacetime Locations on Warsaw Pact Air Units Opposite NATO Central Region (Fixed-Wine)


the Soviets describe as lhc Western Theater(VVTVDJ It would beby mubiplr. successive front operations, vithno pauses, supportedForces.

Strategic Rocket Forces (SRFl and lhe Biliic Fleet It would be conductedidthilometers sndepthmingle high command of forces in lhe TVD. The Soviets plan to complete this operalion Inoa VI

fi We would also expect lliat. concurrently wildheater strategic operalion against NATO in Central Europe, the Soviets would launch attacks against NATO's northern and southern regions. We believe that the Pact would be unlikely to altack with maior ground offensives against all NATO regions simultaneously. However, the Psct almost certainlv would conduct secondary offensives or hold Ine actions In the flank areas to keep NATO from shifting forces from thc Banks to Central Europe, to compelof NATO reserves, and to weaken NATO forces on the banks In anticipation of further operations Similarly, we would eipeet some simultaneous air operationi against key NATO airfield completes in Norway, although more limited than those aaairnJ the NATO Central Iveapoo. Such actions would beto establish air superiority over the Norwegian Sea ind adjacent waters to reduce the vulnerability of air and naval operations In the area.


A. Tosks

act military ptariners assign their air forces three general tasks for conventional war Ineontinen talgain and maintain air superiority, lo destroy thc nucleai delivery capability ol the enemy, and to support Ihe ground forces. Soviet theorists believe Ihe Initial task is to obtain air superiority; however, the destruction of NATO nuclear delivery meant and associated facilities would be cairled out simultaneously. Although the Soviets recognize tliat lhe battle for air superiority would be continuous, the first several days of hostilities appear to be critical in their punning. During tins period they would commit the bulk of their air forces to the air operationheater wide attack against NATO airfields aad air defense installations as well as attackssurface-to surface missiles, nuclearartillery, and com-

mand, control, and communication, facilities Olher theater support roles for tlie air lorces would include close air support, neutraliration ol enemy rcseives. aerial reconnaissance, electronic warfare,operations, and airlift ol supplies

S The Soviet Ceneral Stall, acting as eiecutive agent for the Supreme Hick Commandould perform the initial planning and allocation of VCK awii conduct strategic reconnaissance snd reallocate air lorces among TVDs, if rsccettary The Highof the Western TVD would conduct the detailed planning and direct thc tltealei air operation.

act planners regard destruction of NATO air-cralt as the primary meant of gaining air superiority, and thev expect airfield attacks to account for many of the aircraft NATO would lose during the airIn an altempt to destroy/neutralize NATO's nuclear capability, the Pact would concentrate attacks on ibose bases from which It eipecU nucleai delivery aircraft to operate. Pact planners would also assign high priority to hues housing air defense fighters.

he principal charaetrsriitics of the airagainst NATO's Central Region are likely to be:

The Pact would most likdy commit elements of two to four strategic air armies, three to five front air forces. Including non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) airnd various air defense, transport, and naval aviation unitseries-of major air raids designed lo achieve as much tactical surprise as possible

Each major raid would beginoncerted efiort to establish corridors through NATO air defenses, which Pact aircraft would then use to attack airfields. SSM launchen, nuclear-weapons storage facilities, command, control, andfacilities, and other priority targets. (See3>

encers and Soviet medium bombers would constitute the primary force for attacking airfields ind. possibly, nuclear storage facilities.

Fight cr-bombers from the air forcei of the fronts would be used lo suppress air defenses and to attack fixed Uutallalions (to Include airfields) tod surface-to-surface missile (SSM) Uuracbers. Other tactical and slrategic aircraft would provide fishier cover, escort, reconitalssancc and radide-Icctronlc combat (RF.C) missions. NSWp airGnhteii would provide air defense of their homelandi


Aucralt operations would bc supportedby employment ol short-range ballistic missilesrtillery, andacks would focus on critical surface-lo-air missile (SAM) sites, command, control, and communications sites, and airbases within

Some Soviel and NSWP bomber, fjghtcr-bombei. and fishier aircraft would be withheld foroperations

n general, the Pact would haveixed-wing aircraft to draw upon foragainst thc NATO Central Region (sec tabic If The number of aircraft available for the first massed raid of the air operation would vaiy according to thc extent to which the Pact moved additional tactical and strategic air units within range of NATO targets. The Pact probably has contingency plans for initiating the air operationariety of different postures ranging from employing ui-place forces to moving additional aircraft to bases within striking range of NATO targets prior to. coincident with, or after launching the Initial assault. During the execution of the air operation, most of the air support for front ground operations would be provided bv helicopters.

variation of the air operation that the Soviets call an air defense operation. Its purpose is toajor NATO air offensive and attrlte NATO air assets, thus creating favorable conditions for the airwhichntended to complete thc defeat of Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCEJ. We estimate the

a beliefThat under certain circumstances an offensive air operation might not succeed

n air defense operation differs from the air operation in that iteai-maximum air defense effort conducted simultaneously withattacks of smaller scale against NATO airbases. The defensive portion of thc operation wouldarge segment of the Warsaw Pact fighterhird) engaging the lead elements of

lower Spinnclude! Warn- Peel ititnlt oi Central Europe, tndodinc the leasha ind SOioleask Atr Armies. Ihe Balllc Flo* Naval Air Force, and Ucneal aastU of East Ceraiaor. Poland, aod CreehodovaVla. The htiher SaurcOO) Include! used of theweHcm MPs and ihe Vinaitua Air Annr. Not Included an thr NSWP atr defense Interceptorslrcralte wirhheld lor nuclear reserve initially could rsnfe fiom Sio IS percent These percent!ould increase deprndkic on Soviel pcicrplioni of (he Imminence, of nuclraf escalation bv either iii!*

Tabic I

Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Combat Aircrafl Available for Use in lhe Air Operation in the Western Thealcr of Miliiary4



CCF. Lrtntci AA

AA. ISaMf Fleer, and Cm Cerman. Potiih. Ciechoilavak larttcil AU

boom ben



pafllcipaM li not fommiutd lo SWTVp

Air Army


r-rtldouiu If Soviet Seeood-Echdon Fronlpallcipales

Military OwrSd.


MlUury Dutrtd. Carpiihlan Military Diiiiin



Cerman. Follih, Cieehodovak atr deffcuc


Only abouleromi of those lotah -oold be available for

iust lined opcratlm.

NATO's altack force as it entered Pact airspace. Most of tlie other Pact fighters and part of the fighter-bombers would be used to Intercept subsequent groups of NATO aircrafteries of sequential Intercept lines extending to tbo depth of lhe Pact rear.

eanwhile. Pad ground attack aircraft would attempt to cut penetration corridors through NATO's

forward air deleiiscs and lltcn mine or crater tlie runway* uf key NATO airbases. The bulk of live Pad ground-aitack aircraft would then be directed from aerial holdings zones to allack reluming NATOin ihe openinns le airfields.^"

ilitary writings indicate the planner*air defense operalions could continue lor at many ai ni days However, tl mint be noted thai the air defense operation laces-problems in execution. These include command and control and Umilcd endurance of current Soviet aitack aircraft.

IA and NSA believe thai, given Soviet miliury doctrine which stresses the Importance of tlieInitiative, and surprise to the success of military operations, the SovieU. faced with impendingplan lo employ an offensive air operation against NATO rather than allow NATO air forces to attack

"fallowing NATO air force*iusck ant and eoriiTud follow-up raids for two to ihree days has lhe potential lo severely degrade Soviet command,and communications and aircraft assetsoint where the Soviet ability lo make lhe transitionassed offensive an operation would be In doubt Furthei. additional executionuch a* lhe lackookdown/shootdown fighter force to engage NATO low-altitude penetraton and the absence of an air refueling capability for ground attack aircraft In the holdingreclude the effective employment of this air defense concept

B. Forces

or offensive air operations in Central Europe, the Warsaw Pad could draw from

Strategic Aviation-

Sovid Air Forces of lhe Croups of Forces in East Cermany and Czechoslovakia and lhe three Western military district*.

National ali forces of East Cermany,and Poland.

Baltic Fleet Air Force (tee table 2J

The High Command of Form in lhe WTVO would leorive the support of lhe strategic aviation aircrafl assigned lo lhe 4lh VCK Air Army in Poland and the Baltic Miliiary Diitnclh VCK Air Army in various bases In lhe western military distrids, and In some cases elements of llie VCK Air Army (mostly in (he Kiev. Belorussian. and Carpathian MDs) and possibly some ol lhe 3'lh Air Army (bases throughoul thc USSR) Wc believe that dements olh VCK Air Army as -ell as aircrafl of the Bullic Heel air (orce probabli would be employed in Opcra-lium against NATO's Central Region in lhe first daysATO-Pad conflict. Although some air units of thc Baltic, Beloruxsla. and Carpathian Militarycould be moved forward to support the initial air offensive, we believe il probabU lhat the majority would remain in the western USSR at the outbreak of hostilities,en move forward as required

C. Command. Control, and Communications

e believe Ihe SovieU continue lo face compii-ealrd command and control problems in mat* air operalions in the Central Region The current Soviet Air Force command andupported bv HF, VHF. and UHF communications systems. Future air combal control will lequire real-time knowledge of the statu* and location of both friendly and enemy aerodynamic assets. An integrated targeting network would be required for targe! tracking, hand off.ngagement The Soviets will continue toigorous research and development program toiheir command, conlrol. and communications systems and emphasize communication security

e expect the Sovieu will increase both thc capacity and capability of their air ootiimvinicatioru bv large-scale use of digital data communications systems coupled to onboard computers and displays. Airborne use of communication satellites will enhance airEdibility and permit high-capacityto take place over paths longer than currently obtainable with ground-bated line-of-slght communications0 millimeter wave air-to-air communications systems could be available to provide range-limited Uansmlssiorvs within such formations as fightet attack groups

he SovieU will continue to advance those technologies necessary to allow direct communicaHon satellite access from airborne platforms Futurewill be pUced on espanding lhe number and types of aircraft with communication satellite capibtl-

Table 2

Warsaw Pact Fi.ed-Wing Combat Aircralt Available lor Use in lhc Air Operationhc Western Thealer o' Military Operations.4







4SS '





Mib*ary DWiirt

MlUary Dlnrlct

Military Out-id



Carman StnttaX lainir&on

StriOcK lr*mtr*on

h-nlmat Siiairttc InifKcttm




hat .pprailmatal. ICOand Blind*!by DlA torimary flrlV* rotaand rcco-inaliunct

6fuiei reflect DIA/CIA diOerence*

The advent of direct broadcast satelliles. expected shortly, will enable aerodynamic systems to pass dala lo individual ground units over almost limitless ranges.

D. Conventional Munitions

oviel conventional munitions designhas traditionally emphasized simplicity, minimum eipente, reliability, and gradual evolutionechnology base adequate to develop more cotnplei

and costlier weapons. We eslimate that the more complex weapons will be introduced In anmanner. In, there will be smaller, smarter ordnance with increased eSectiveneas (see chapter VIII)

tl. Eombi. The Soviets currentlyide variety of gravity bombs. They have standardized Iheir various bomb families into six weight classes.ilograms) ofxmost frequcnl-



used. Genera! purpose and fragmentation bombs are available in both low.diag and high-drag versions. Tlie high-drag versions are retarded by ballistic drag rings or parachutes 'Ibe parachute-retardedre believed to be suitable for release from SOeters above ground level

he Soviets are assessed tounway penetration bomb consistingarachuteassembly, booster roolct.oncretewarhead the retardation assembly serves lo orient the bomb downward lo minimirr ricochet and lo provide for0 meters) operation The rocket motor, possibly ignitedyrotechnic delay, burns away thc parachute and accelerates theThe warhead Is designed lo perforate thc pave ment and descend Into Ihe bate below. The warhead, providedhort delay train fuzing, is expected to detonate below the pavement, producing extensive cracking, buckling, and heaving of the runway. The assessed physical characteristics and performance for the runway penetration bomb are presented in table 3

he Soviets areies snd to haveg semiactiveguided bomb using the same technology (for eiample. optics, guidance, and control) as is used with lhe ASuided missile. This bomb can be employed withround-based or air-borne target designalorapable of beingin level flight,ive, orive toss maneuver. It could be used wllh any aircraft capable ofOO-kg store and It assessed toAB-SCO bomb warhead and to be capable of CEPso

Table 3

Estimated Runway Penetration Bomb Characteristic*





(TrJTl weighr


mctcn per lowed

nl iirwct





roS reefers

of pavement damaae *

to IOmeter.

eter reinforced concreteeter la bate belo-.


eters The guided bomb is Intended for use against high-priority targeti whore accuracy is needed to ensure destruction The Soviets are also assessed to Iiave operational fuel air eaploslve (FAE) bombs in-g clasi (hat arc assessed to be compatible with ii mu Soviet aircraft

actical Air-to-Surfact Niiiifci1 the Soviets hive produced and deployed eight tactical air-lo-surface missiles (TASMI employing an-llradiaiion. lenumtive laser (SaLI beam rider, command, and recently electro-optical guidance systems The current Soviet TASMs will probably be usedaseline (or the evolutionary developenent of future TASM systems possibly em-ploying bber optics, solid-state eleclroeucs. and more advanced electro-optical guidance systems as well as improved propulsion. Between now ande expect lighter weight missile structures to beprovidingigher warhead mass. Future TASM warhead design features will probably include shaped charges, self-forging fragments, reactivesmart mines, smart sub muni lions, and rocket-boosted kinetic energy prnctrators. These systems and future TASMs could provide thc Soviets an improved conventional ilr-to-surface missile capability forNATO airfields and sir defense systems and command, control, and communications facilities (see

be Soviets are now striving to develop new TASMs that provide greater launch ranges, lower bunch altitudes, launch and leave, televisionImproved accuracy against fixed and mobile targets, the ability lo attack higher frequency radar and communications systems, all-weather operation, and Operation!ountermeauxires environment The Soviets continue to emphasise TASM antiradia-tioc. munition (ARM) developrnents directed toward attacking surface-based air defense (AD) weapons and systems As ARMs become smaller, lighter, and more economical, they will probably be considered (or use againsi emitters such as Iroposcattcr communications systems, other communications systems, battlefield surveillance radars, countermortar/eourrterbatteryjammers, navigational transmitters, and possibly airborne emitters as well (for example, early warning radar and data links)

E. Logistics and Support

oviet logisticasedumber of assumptions Including live belief thatwar In Europe would involve ettremely high personnel and materiel losses, especially in thc initial phasear. as well as

Table *

Current Sovietir-to-Surfacc Mim'lei (TASMl)



it. (mfirrr,













Fitatfoot-a um-t




aircr.it (nailnt-ian)

Him ! 1








rV-juvi FUUi-t


consumption rates lor supplies, particularlymunition and fuel The Soviets also assume that supply lines would be extended and vulnerable to enemy air attacks and long-range weapons. Soviet los-istlcare governedumber of basic principles Including centralized plajuiing. priority to combat supplies,ribution, use of all possibleand general reliance on rail UansportarJon

he Soviet air kjgiitic system is geared tohort-term (less thanaysX hixh-lntensilv war, and relies heavily on peacetime storage and stockpiling of ammunition. POL (petroleum, oil. aodnd airpplies. Over the past few years,ubstantial Increase in POL and ordnance storage capacities at airfields and In roar-area depots has greatly enhanced the capability of the

Soviet Air Force to support sustained com bal Throughout the West em Theater of Militarythe Soviets haveetwork of fixed depotshave been assessed to contain sufficient supply stocks to support an initial three-frontand subsequent operations for at least three weeks of intensive combat operations, though with iteadlly declining sortie rate* Reserves from central depots in rearnot requiredbe available to support sustained combat operations for about three months

JAelieved that most Soviet airbases In tbe forward area are capable of logisticaiJy sustain Lng three to seven days of combat operations.ombat situation. POL wiD rsaost likely be trsj^sported by eiistlng or temporary tactical pipelines to airfields


POL sloragc site* located on aitfields usually are bunkered or partially underground to minimize the damage from aitack. Most of (he main operating bases have been equipped with hydrant refueling,ihe need lo refuel aircrafl bv (ruck Inon. most later model aircrafl bunkers allow for lhe fueling of aircraft wilhin the bunker.

mmunition stockpiles are dispersedthc Soviel Union and Croups of Forceshc larger facilities are holli road and lail served with reveted open storage areas, warehouse/sheds, orWe believe that ihere may be three to four air-to-air missile loads (or each aircraft at agister bases, and one to two air-to-surface missile loads for each aircrafl at tactical airbases with ground attack aircraft thai have an air-to-surf ace missile (ASM) capability.

is distributed to air units inprimarily by rail, either directly to the airfieldadjacent railheads, and by truck and airboth rail and road systems are vulnerableIon. air transport, including hehbecome more important in wartime toresupply of air units.

The Soviet Air Forces rely heavily for aircraft spare parts on the distribution of spare torts kits with each aircrafl as il is delivered from the factory or overhaul facility. These kits include all spare parti and special tools required for normal maintenance up to (he time of general overhaul, after which new kit* are issued Individual item requisitions are limited lo replacing only those parts that fail, malfunction, or are damaged before lhe ei pi rat ton of their guaranteed service life.

Common problems experienced with the supply of parts include Inadequate spares toigher-than-anticipated consumption rate, poor distribution practices, low production quotas, and long leadlimes usociatrd with ordering new parti. During wartime, operational all units would attempt to alleviate such problems by stockpiling parts whichigh use rate and resorting to cannibatiution. particularlyhort war.

F. The Air Operation

he SovieU rail regard lhe air operation as the primary means of establishing air supremacr and destroying or neutralizing NATO's nuclear capability. Overall responsibility for the alioint Forces operation. Is assigned lo the high command in

the Western TVD Nonet he less, the primary role in destroying NATO's air forces in conventional waifare remains with the Warsaw Pad air forces. '

34 Location and Timing of

|at least (he bis! lew massed air raidsonventional air operaUon in llie Western TVDwould be concentrated in the mid-Europeanrone and thc North Sea Most primary NATO targets lie in ihu area within ISOm of the West German-East Cerman border and could be struck by strategic and naval aviation mediumflying low-altitude defense penetration Bight pro files and by Fencers deployed or based in the forward area

hc Soviets also may intend to attack deeper targets, such as key airbases in France and lhe United Kingdom during the conventional air operationmiliiary writings stale that the operation would cover an aream deepmwould include almost all ot BriUln and most of France The Sovieu probably envision cooduding most of the attacks against the deeper targets during the later phase* of Ihe operalion,because according to Soviet pbrsaing fad on. the only USSR-based aircrafl capable of participating without first deploying lo forward airbases would be medium or heavy bomben

he timing of lhe Individual massed air raids would be influenced by several operationalSoviet military writers often have noted that achieving some degree of tadical surprise could be critical to success because It would allow tbe Pact to catch substantial numbers of NATO aircraft on the ground during the airfield attacks and would reduce Pact losses lo NATO air defenses. Even though the Soviets have expressed interest in conducting air raids atwhich strategic aviation uniu haveenhance surprise and impair NATO's airilitary writers repeatedly have resected ihis poaiTbtlily Thisecause of front aviation's very limited training and targetfor offensive operations al night-QJ

writings have noted that the initial massed raicTcould be spaced as little a* seven hours apart, however, with ihe limiting tador being thc lime required for the preparation and transit of theforce to their Urged.

he heart of lhe air operalion woulderies of airfield attacks designed toufficient portion of NATO's air forces to establish strategic air supeemacv as well as substantially reduce NATO's nuclear strike potential. Airbases housing fighter-bomber wings with nuclear strike roles generally arc the top-priority targets^"

^Fighter bases also would be attacked. Soviet military writings noic that front aviation also would make small-scale attacks against NATO airfieldsthe massed air raids in support of front


thc Outset of war with high eapcctalioniuccessful Outcome should France fight with NATO or the Uniied States deploy significant reinforcements to Central Europe. The Soviets' perceptions of the air balance are strongly influenced by their judgment that most Western aircraftignificant aualitstivc advantage over their Soviet counterparts

e believe that if aircraft attrition rates were substantially higher than the Soviets eipcct. the Soviets could be forced to cancel thc air operation aflcr only one or two massed airit accomplished ils objective of attaining air supremacy Factorsattrition rates would include:

eeled survivability of the ground-based segments of NATO's air defenses in the face of suppression attacks involvingSRBMs. aod artillery

NATO alrborrie warning and control system (AWACS) aircraft and lookdown/shootdown fighters limiting opportunities for Pact aircraft toNATO defenses by flying at low altitudes.


^thepreferred targets at NATO air6elds would be aircraft in the open, but the proliferation of hardened aircraft shelters has caused the Soviels to concentrate much of their emphasis on cutting runways. They also appear to recognise that resorting to closing runways probably would require more repeat attacks to keep them closed. Their writings have Indicated thataircraft shelters would be attacked as well, but we believe that such attacks probably would bcto the later phases of the air operation because they require large numbers ofone attack aircraft per shelter. Airfield attack plans In some cases also have included key base supportsuch as maintenance, fuel, and ammunitionareas.


oteniiale believe the Soviets would find It extremely difficult to amass enough force totrategic theaterwjdc air operalion at

Soviet reliance on deep attack by medium bombers, which are relatively large, unmaneu-verable, and hence particularly vulnerable to SAMs and interceptors unless properly

The lack of fighter escort for any bombers used

in attacks against the United Kingdom

proliferation of hardened aircraft shelters at NATO airbases would force the Soviets toon closing runways requiring more air raidsonger period of time and hence greater exposure to NATO air defenses

Soviets do not have enough hardenedto protect most of the aircraft that would deploy forward from the western USSR in the eventassive reinforcement. Wc doubtarge-scale reinforcement by second-echelon front aviation would be likely under mosthowever, until the ground Torces of the affected second-echelon fronts also deployed forward.

If the SovieU chose to start the war with the alr operation, achievement of tactical surprise could be difficult Further. If USSR-based medium bombers participated fn the first massed air raid, they would have to take off from rear area bases onealf to


Iwo hour) before thc from(orcoi ind could be detectedomblnation of signals and inlfared intelligence. Additionally. NATO AWACS couldPad aircraft as far as Poland, depending on' thc cubit Warning of the attack could allow NATO sufficient time io launch most of it* air ci alt.potential Pad aircraft attrition and making lhe NATO airficldi leu lucrative targds

f NATO were able to launch large numbers of aiicrafl before ihe Paci allack, lhc Pad would have la rely heavily oil tighter sweeps and escorts to destroy them Pad an (orce* are poorly equipped to conduct fighter sweep* over NATO rearowever,of limitations in the air Intercept radars aod missiles on theit Flogger and Fishbed fighters. This problem could be partially rectified in tliendith the deployment o( substantial number* of thclanker (andesser extentulcrum) AWACS aircraft. Candidnd an all-aspect infrared-guided air-to-air missile,

inally, 'he large cumber of aircraft that the Soviets intend to use in the first mused air raid probably would strain Pad airspace managementand lead to some confusion. Deterioration of command, conliol. and communications resulting from NATO air attack* would lead to even greater confusion in subsequent Pact raids. Additionally, bad weather would limit the lire and effectiveness ol the air raids or even force the postponement of the air operation

G. Future Developments

hrough the5 the air lorces of the military district* and groups of forces are expected to remain stable in overall sizelight decrease in numbers of fighters and some growth in ground attackhough the current MD/GOF organization will remain mostly stable, the Soviets tnav introduce improved tactics and pursue eapanded objectives Most changes in the MD/COF aviation force* will be evolutionary In itature and occuresult ofweapon syst'iin technology and Ihe Sovietof the changing threat.

ome of lhe factors we estimate the Soviets use to plan the site. Structure, and objective* of their future aviation forces Include:

US strategic air force capabilities

US and NATO cruise missile capabilities.

NATO ladlcal air force capabilities.

NATO air defense capabilities.

NATO tadical and ihcatcr strategic nuclear force capabrhtics.

Emplcmenr of Sovietn offensive role

Sovad airay aviation capabilities lor close air support

New Soviet aircraft capabilities.

- Thc adoption ol new tactics

The Si no-Soviet competition and lhe Chinese general purpose force capabilities

Soviet aerial refueling

n the principal area of concern. Westernthe SovieU will continue lo give high regard to the capabilities of lhe NATO tadical air forcer, which tbey credit with the potential lo blunt andarsaw Pact combined arms offensive aimed al NATO. Wc believe they will maintain thU view through thcnd conlinuc to rnspond with the planning and refinementoie extensive and efficient air operation.

Future air operations will reded Ihe advance* la air technology and in operational art andut are eipected to differ only by degree We believe Ihe enhanced attack capability of new MD/COF and Strategic Aviation aircrafl will require fewer aircraft to achieve deiiied target damagen this way. the air operaiion will be able to masimife lhc effectiveness ol aircrafl available lo lhe Soviet planner.

Another (actor which is expected lo influence Soviet tailoring of the air force* will be the advanced design features and performance capabilities of the new aircraft deployed between oowe believe these new-generation aircraft will pose athreal to NATO airfields because of their ability to carry improved stand-off munitions, low altitudecapabilities, better navigation systems and sensors for adverse weather attack, and air-to-air refueling capability for extended range Improve-menu In aircraft reconnaissance ivstcms are expected to include the espanded use of remotely piloted veh ides/drones.

uring lhe neat decade rnore Soviel aircrafl will be equipped with onboard self-protectionwarfare (EW) systems. In the escort role, the imminent deployment of electronic countermeasures (ECM) Fencer will give theore credible capability to provide EW support for air raids In



real ureas. Tho combination of improved onboard and escort KW systems willnhance Soviet penetration cnpabilitic5

SI During the neilears we believe tlie Soviets willemphaus tn reeoiiiivneni of the Soviet air forces based in East Europe, and in this penod we expect Use rson-Sovset Warsaw Pact coon!no gradually to modernize their forces as well The pace of the NSWp modernization will be much Dower and limited to those systems the Soviets are willing in rrleav/scTI to their Ess* European allies and winch ihey can afford lo purchase However,anticipate pro-cress in phasing out the older generation aircralt and bronder introduction of newer aircrafl. We believe the NSWp counlries will receive the new generation Fulcrum aircraft aboulhe NSWP countries will alto attempt to expand andtheir ground attack capabilities In order tobetter support for tlicir own ground forces


believe the number of aircraft Inand figJifer-Usmber re-omcnls for almost allnew generation aircraft will be reduced but thatrcglinenta! structure will remainand type of aircraft per regiment will be

determined by the Soviet estimate of the efleeaveness of the new aircrafL Aircrafl inventories (tablef the

diffcrcnt types of units will vary according to the type

aircraft assigned, but the required ooerational readiness

rate will remain at leastercent-


the panears, lhe Sovicl Unionto improve the range, accuracy, andits SRBM syslems. In lhe, thethendrovided most of the Cround Forcespower throughouthe, ihc Soviets beganof iwo new SRBMs. lhendhend Scud B. and then

Jf.ii ike Sooted Usok ia deplov Improvedf th* SS-le Sevrf-fl munlelhe lale KSOi. Thilt ntuf larrrtvu probably JMoe improvedand malnlaxnablUlt. and one of ihem pxobahl*anee of SCO km. Funhtmott. CIA Ulurott lhal Seudt art irlO In prod<*aion and torW remain In itrrMt Umo iht IBOOj

'The US Weaporu and Spice Synenu In-ellisrncc Committee propoaei la retire theniaiUe avdecn desienaror and antinndericnaton to lheheeaiirulee would be auimcd lo tlir Improved aeeuracy -arlint ol Iheji earned lheaiarudx.

impioved version of lhchese three systems are more capable than Iheir predecessors (seend two of them, thendre now being deployed They can all deliver nuclear as well as noon net est warheads (Imchemical high'Caplosi<e. and improved conventional munitionslthough nuclear deliveryaior role. SRBMs wirh improved accuracy and withwarheads become more coTective and attractive for use attains* nied and mobile targets In mduoV airfields and an defense facibiics.

_Jlhe Soviels

are confinuinciheii elfoits lo ificreaie STIBM lyslem eHedivenius


^terminalmay be incorporated Into modernized versions SRBMs now in production, and almost certainly will be incorporated lalo follow-on SRBMs al leasthe current reaction limes (completion of road march to launch) of lhendrc assessed to beoinutes and IS toinutes,ay be able to launch in as few as sii minutes from the road march and can probably displace In three minutes or less Wc estimate the Scud may he able lo displace in three to five minutes. Tbeay be able lo displace In four minutes or less However, individual crewmay lengthen or shorten ihese times.

B. Force Developmont

he Soviets classify missiles primarily byrange. Tactical missiles (or rockets) include thc FROC series and theperational-tacticalinclude thc Scud scries, thend the

Thc Soviels have committed substantialto the development of new or improved SRBMs employing Improved Inertial or terminalpropulsion, and warhead technology. Available data on these syslemsefinite trend toward improved accuracy, greater range, reduced reaction time, increased reliability and survivability, and broader warhead options, particularly withmunitions.

Through thc, Soviet writings emphasised that the principal role for tactical and opera! tonal-tactical SRBMs was as thc main nuclear

op Seo-ct-BWr-

Tabic 5

Warsaw Pad Fixed-Wing Combat Aircraft Avail foi Use in lhc Air Operation in Ihc YVettcrn Theater of Military5









Military Diitrld

Military Dot fit!

Miliury Dittrlet



Strategic IrBerowKori


Stratetic Inurcnxon

SuateiW loiwonlori







OIA/CIA diBceiKd.

means of lhe (round maneuver forces.by Ihe, an additions! role of SRBMs could be noted in Soviet theoretical writings. Although nuclear delivery remained the primary role, serious consideration was being given to lhe employment of SRBMsonventional role as well

rom the Soviet boot entitled Atiifcy end Bockeu fed Marshal of Artillery KasalovXre listed these benefitsM armed missiles in terms of range and dmtrudive efJccf:

Replacement-g warheaduantity of submunitions of total equal weigh!

the total area of drjtructioningle


mor piercing, shaped charge, incendiary, smoke, and others.

Tlie destructive effectingle ICM warhead equates to thc simultaneous salvo ofr more artillery pieces


The submunitions may be of tho most diverse types and destructive power: Iraumentalion. ar-



Tup 3w

thai must bc neutralized, with nuclear assets, air defense sites, and command, control, andand airfieldsigh priority.

CM warheads are referred to as 'cassettes" which could in-ludelosive, armor andpiercing, mines, and chemical submu nit ions/

f theserc in the Soviet lorcesrc in the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact lorces (Sec

HOC orattalion is normallyto each unit or motoriied rifle division and normally has two firing ballei.es. each with two TELsotal of four TElj per battalion. Some NSWP FROG battalions have only two or three TELs.


urrent Information indicates that the Soviets plan for "multiple roles and fire support missions for their SRBM force. Their ability to employ SRBMsroad target array and obtain the required or desired target damage Is dependent on such factorshe technical characteristics of the missiles,and ground supportvailable forces andogistics posture, including support units and missile and warheadarget detection and location capabilities;control, and communications system thatfor the timely allocation of assets and csecution of strikes againsi operational requirements.

C. SRBM Force Structure in thc Western TVD

ithin the Western TVD there are SRBM transporter-erector-launchers

owei SS-lc Scud brigades arc subordinate to armies andominal Seud brigade has three firing battalions. Each bring battalion lias two tiring batteries, each with two TELs In actuality, Scud brigadestructureii-TELin some NSWP brigades,igh ofELs in the two CSFC front-level brigades. When initially deployed, tlserobably will replace the Scudne-for-one basis.

hen peacetime is subordinateilitary district or Croup of Forces and in wartime will become an asset of the theater of militaryor front. In the fallhe Soviets indicated plans to establishrigades In Central Europe in response to NATO's Gelding Pershing If and ground-bundled cruise missilesince then, one brigade has been established in Czechoslovakia and two in East Cermany, at least one of which isTEL brigade.

ithin the Intelligence Community there are varying opinions concerning thc Initial operational


Western TVD SRBM Launchen


Mod 2



Mit.iarr Diiirie.

Miliury Dislriel

Militar, Dairies











cai.jiril.lvl lhcnd thelOCs of the improved versions of thendhe SnilM uroiections reflect lhe posuions of DIA and Army. CIA. and (he Air Force (see table S)

using dedirtled transport bclore or at lhe ousel of hostilities Missile and warhead Irarisraort capability indicates that Iwo missiles and two warheads (an initial Riliti'i! and one reload missile) are immediatelyper TEL foraunch brigades Available information indicates lhal. when live brigade vacates ils aarrison, each TEL willissiie lo tho dispersal area These same sources have Indicated that one missile (or each TEL (without warhead) is stored on nr near tlw TEI. within the





RBM Missilo Storogo and Transport

oviet readiness fxocedurcs call for all units to clear garrison areas and assemble at dispersal points,

ntern vA be eaiilnrd lo tax iracbrdlamal opartIfa tudaod 'o haveataviiin. aaeinptuhal vm Ualnlna.l anic ot on an operational platform,apable of perform-lot Hi iiiHuooa (aa defaod bv lhe WipaoimiomnHiecl

" CM Mlkft HM.IIa fotlovitm le lheeriuJ an

i*ir carta ni


70 We currently assess lhe number of missiles in launch units lo be Iwo immlo per buricher for Scud units, four missiles per bimcher for FHOC units, three missiles per launcher fornits, and two r- 1per burtcher forrigades. On the basis of anof the carrying capacity ol Soviel and NSWP support units wilhin llie Western TVD, estimates of four to ui minila available pa Scud andour to eight per FROC, and two perunchen arc reasonable. This Includes missiles In bunch units, mobile rocket technical base (PRTBsl iridependerit missile transport battalionnd front Rocket Technical Base (HI lis) Therefore, multiplying Ihc number of bunchen by these ranges, we arrive at an assessed missileavaibbleay thai would be in bunch units and the rear area support structure (sec lable 9)

he warhead types associated with SRBMl are nuclear, unitary high explosive, subprolectile ICM. enhanced blast, and CW (see. The possibility abo eiists lor the deployment of ICM with runway penetrators, small and large area denial mines, and small antipersonnel bomb lets. Any system capable of

dispensing chemicals would be capable of dispensing

biological agents.

arhead Allocation. Information on missiieead mii and stockagc practices is very limited.

Table S

VVeiiem TVD SRBM Launcher Inventory Projectioni





Ar- .




Arm i


Mad 1

U Imwo-rd

et-nee lhc NSWF -IE1 imlm f fl' if*od

1 Mod t

and Army Mice lha Improvednd lha Improved S>

reach IOC3 and lhal rhera -illora iradual

ricaiMtoa to IS TH. brigade* lhaa pretfOrd by CIA. Air Fore*

brTVr-ta lhelo IS TIL brigadtaerrr, net. fradual CIA and AH Force hoVd lha IOC lor lhen ihe,

believes itwa tatl be ateSS-M

IVi li |awa>>


Tablc 9

Assessed Missile Inventory in tbe Western TVD Availableay (August IW)


of Forces






Miliury District




Table 10

Currently Assessed SRBM Warheads


Warhead Nuelear/HE NucJear/HE Nuclear/HE



Qlt is assessed that, as the sire and capabilities oFthe operational tactical missile force increase, the percentage of ICMs In the warhead mi< will increase.

E. Impoct of Future Systems

lthough information on SRBM warheads is limited, future sytems could employ any number of warhead types currently assessed to wist for other

Soviet delivery systems but not yet identified or associated with SRBMs. Cuncnlly. there is no direct evidence of the Soviets' developing "smart" submuni-tlons for their SRBMs. however, precision-guided(PCMs) are available for aircraft and artillery systems.

The development and deployment of Improved SRBM airframes, guidance, improved range,and ground support equipment will provide more reliable, responsive, and ficilble systems with enhanced survivability, enabling Warsaw Pactto Increase the role and missions of their SRBM systemsigher assurance that operations can be executed successfully without the employment of nuclear weapons.

In terms of an air operation in the Western TVD. the Warsaw Pact will recognize multiple gains


with the protected deploynvni of lhe improvedhen lhe Soviets develop effeclive munitions lothe projected terminal guidance (SO-meter CEP) capability of the improvedinr ol NATO's air defense aircraft could be pinned down for significant periods of timeirborne aircraft could be forced lo recover at bases lhat may not have shelters or appropriate support (acilities. The sxKcessor to thes projected to be available only in limited numbers, and Is primarily assessed to be employed In the nuclear role. Its range capability could allow the Soviets toew ol the highest priority obiectives in the eastern part of the United Kingdom

lthough the new generation of SRBMstlie Soviets with targeting capabilities notavailable, there are weaknesses to the missile system operations which potentially can be exploited.

Command and Control. The eomplerity ofoperationsajor burden on the command and control system. The scale and scope of Soviet operations are predicated upon complete Integration of the forces, meticulous planning, eaact liming, andcu lion. If

execution of Ihese plans could be disrupted, il is possible thai the entire operBtaoai would bc

The Soviets, in an effort lo deal with the com-litemi of iheir opcriiKJtu. appsicnili arcthc com inu meat Ions capabilities of lhcir SRBM forces, beginning with therigades, and have increasingly computerised thendala lnw Reliance on thisdata liaieurden on llie computetand data toime-sensitive battlefield If the computer system should fail, detailedfor thc planning process would have to be done "bvetracting from lhe Soviets" ability to eiecule their plansast-changing battlefield.

Support Opera (tons The requirement forunits to keep pace during rapid offensive operations could degrade the capability of the support structure lo provide ready lo-6ie rounds Front PRTBs and central depots are highlyon rail transport for receiving slocks Irom the rear. Successful interdiction of rail lines could seriously degrade the resupply of missiles for follow.on operations, although missiles and warheads can be delivered by air undercircumstances.

BattUfatd Crowding/Ottpotiilon To bring to bear sufficient mosaics loay strikes against priority targets in the NATO rear area, missile units would have lo be deployed well forward Because of geographic constraints, these systems could be heavily concentratedtlie heavy support structure required lo service lhe missile units would be located in the prosimlty of other support units.

F. SRBM Threot Assessment

he current SRBM nonnuclear Ihreat to NATO airbases is marginal Thend the Scud missile lack sufficient accuracy to be effective In aairfield atlack role Further, theould notignificant threat to airfields because limited numbers will restrict it primarily to tberole While the more accurates available In sizable numbers and continues to be deployed, its shot! range restricts its participation In the air operation to attacking the forwardmosl elements of NATO's air defense system


SKCM Conventional Worheodi II) UnitaryiWoe.l

mproued Conventional Munltioai^

CM Fuel-Air Etr>loiioet (FAElfc

rea Denial Mine ICM.fc ^

unioai/ Penelrator


Chenwol Worheudi

General. The Sovietsffective chemical ijt'nti lo* mod tactical rcquuereeala. The primary woe agent) are (Dana*(GDIurln (Crt) andfpt agent Soman it available ihieLeaed wiih o-eiocniethrierylalr (PMMA) andby (hc Soviets alype aientj The mca* probable chemical igciiu available lot SUBMaie VR-SSroe acrati(he "lain" mode, and CD lo* audace Or near-surface eWi-eiy bv tubmunltioiii Ii iithai llie Scud imuilehemical waiheadotlchemicalrhead containing lhe same agent piobably hai been drugIt- ikearhead

b "Oifpioleo CAcm.Vol Warhead Cheraclrnitici


"Tlheie aie Indication)ossible chemical warheadandunitary bulk GIL

(I) CXemfco/he moat likely uHliemical cassette would be an ageal such as soman. Puling could be impact or tow-altitude (leas tliane*en) proiimity.apoi and aerosol>eter-diameter impact pa Hernesult ol thc turfac* oe near-surface dispersion, very little of lhe agent would be lost due to evaporation, and atmospheric drill would be minimised, and depending on wind velocity an entire area could be contaminateda mailer ofoag-tero inhalation haiaid could peraisi lot three todan

nitary Warhead. This Ivpe warhead would probably be filled with bullvpe agent (pouibiv binary] and fured-etr( Iwitht-of-biaist (HOB) This would produce an area ofi nation of5 kilo grams per hectare) At nominalo E) degieei CI contamination would persist lor one to ihree (MM

Tbe SRBM threat will grow during tbeith the deployment of the improvedhich wdl have the requisite range and accuracy (SO meters CtP) to attack airfields. The degree of this threat will depend on Ihe numbers of thc system deployed, oo other competing targets, and on whether special lied airfield attack munitions are developed Improvements Io the SRBM fore will give the Soviets an option to employ Itin-down attack against some critical airbases and for neutralization of air defense sites in penetration corridors. Such attacks could iign'6carstly improve the chance of tucceas of the initial massed air raid. Overall, while SRBMs will

probablyreater role In the air operaiion, we do not believe they will become In Soviet eyes the primary instrument lor gaining air superiority In lhe NATO Central Region


A. Introduction

oviet Special purpose forces constitute athreat to the airfields, nuclear delivery forces and storage lacilities. air defense, and command, control,

communications, and intelligence of the NATORegion In wartime, thev are intended toenemy lines, irwjepervient oi regularlor eilendedoi time, cond-seting recon-

n>usance, ubotage. and/or destructionc variety of key (aigeti The lerm Spetsnaz it most commonly used in reference lo tlierpnv forces of Ihe Chief Intelligence Direclorate (CRU) of tlie Soviet General Staff CRU Spetsnaz brigades arc assessed to be in II nfiliiary dnlrtclt. in list* Croup of Soviet Foices In Ccimany, und probably ihc (our Occts The Cential and Southern Croups of Forces and selected armies have Spetsnaz companies. Total peacetime itrungth of active Spetsnaz units is estimated0. with the potential wartime strength as high

B. Missions

primary mission of Spetsfiai troops inwar is to reconnoitcr and report on activityairfields, nuclear storage sites, nucleardelivery locations, and associated facilities.lo accomplish this. Spetsnaz teams, whichcall special purpose leconnaissanceattempt to infiltrate Into lhe large! areaprior to and al the outbreak of hostilitiesseek to position themselves near their targetsreconnaissance or direct actionagents already in ihc target areaintelligence and logistic support to the teams

transition lo wartime opera booswith reconnaissance of predeterminedreporting back via radio to the FronlThe decision lo employ Spetsnaz teamsdirect action role would be made byat the front level or higher andupon circumstances, Including, fornature of tbe target, Ihe battle situation,of other resources (rocket, artillery, orto respond rapidly, (he value ofreporting for repeal strikes by othertbe chances of the enemy immediatelyweapons. Some SpeUnai teams may beassigned targets for sabotage rather lhan forAlso, teams assigned reconnaissanceagainst mobile nuclear targets areto allack these targets if bunch


C. Or rjcarti ration

ach military ditln. lhalront in wiiiiticnelsnar hricaili- Al least ihirc brit^dc*talc conecm to tlic NATO Central Region (figurepctsruulto believed to be present in rhe Baltic Military District hoi is yet to be peeendv located Spetsnai brigades are reportedly organised as shown In fagurehe headquartersed entirely by extended-termthat is, officers and warrant ofliccrs. They are the best linguists in ^he brigade and are highly trained In sophisticated survival techniques. Soldiers of thiscould be assigned to assassinate or kidnap key military and civilian leaders

petsnaz unit strength is related to lhe various theaters ol military operations in which they will operate. At present, the strength of an "average" brigade Is assessed atersonnel. During wartime. Spetsnai brigade personnel andsupport agents fur large fronts, such as CSFC. could number as manypetsnai brigade at front could haveeams of five tooldiers each. Army-level companies arc assessed as having as many asubordinate teams. Thosebrigades in the Western MDs and the CSFC that will form fronts againsi tlse NATO Central Region appear to be the largest. Considering that suable NSWP special-purpose forces exist, albeit of mixed capability, we issess there could bepetsnaz-type teams available for deployment against the NATO Central Region

mployment of Special Purpose Forces in Ihe NATO Control Region



mall number ol agents will be Inserted covertly, disguased as civilians, before the beginning ol hostilities. However, the vast majority oi Spetsnai wilt not cross the border before the beginning ofhostilities. The SovieU rely on the confusion of war, and the opening of penetration corridor* during the air operation, to allow Insertion of Spetsnai by aircraft. Moreover, the detection of armed Spetsnai inserted by aircrafl before coovesttional hostilities could resJt in the loss of operational ssirprise.


lthoughimited evidertce concerning Ihe methods ofpetsnai unit might use against airfields, one source has revealed severaltaught at lhe Leningrad Military Academy. In lhe firstpetsnai platoon of aboutembers was airdropped as close to the target as posslblo In the early evening hours The unit was dividedommand team and four operations teams, each team with specific responsibilities including capturingand personnel for the purpose of infiltrating the target. Mines and Block Strelas (figureereduring llie night near the ends of the landing strip and other airfield facilities. Early in the morning, two learns from each end ol the airfieldapid altack against exposed aircraft, personnel, and facilities. As aircraft began lo take off. the impUced mines were automatically activated, destroying tbe aircraft in the air. The teams very rjuickly departed lhc target area, abandoned the captured vehicles, and hid In the woods during lhe day. During the night lhe


wu resupplled with munitions ind armament* by airdropreviously arranged location. Similar actiow were repealed again the following night.

econdpetsnai company (ap-peoaimatelveams of five toen) operatedeavily defended airfield. The company could not get closerm to (he target During the first night Block Strelss were isosltioned as dose as possible to either end of the field, and then attacks were Initiated againstpower lines, communication lines, security personnel, and crews heading toward the airfield. The intent was to create the impressioncruficant force within the area-No activity was conducted during the second day or

night. During the third night itrikes were conducted against aircraft in the open and against fuel dumps with standoff weapons (rockets) received during

ission is complete, the teams may link up with follow-on forces, be airlifted out of the area if possible, or eifiltrate separately or In small groups back to their linos, destroying targets of opportunity along the way The compositionpetsnaz team and the weapons and equipment used are dependent on the mission, means of Infiltration, the nature and significance of the target, lhe security provided to thc target, the amount of dispersal available in therear, and the depth of the operation within theear.

lap llVtt-

Fiturc 7

CRU Special Purpose Troops (Spctsau)




H rid quint it Torn pan


ocarni each or* icp Sanden) PJJ0 (alio peiM 4ji.uKatarov





A. General

tM. Airborne and air isaok opera! Sons couldhreat to NATO airfields, air defenses, and associated


lacililies within lhc NATO Central Region. Karly in thc host ili tic. largels would include for ward-de ployed forces and river crossing sites, and in thc later stages of the offensive, targets would be deeper in the TVD lbc employment nf the airborne divisions would be controlled by the Supreme High Command, and would be dependent on limited Soviet militaryaviation lift capacity. Also, air superiority and the nature of the objective would influence the sire of the airborne Inrce lo be employed

pposite thc NATO Central Region are four front air assault brigades in the western MDs and CSFC, and nine air assault battalions. These units provide the theater, front, and army commanderslexible, well-armed force that could be used earlyonflict against targets in NATO's tactical depth, such as air defense assets, command, control,and intelligence systems, and helicopter forward area arming/refueling points (FAARPX as well as occupation of key terrain and the destruction of tactical nuclear delivery systems.

B. Employment

^Although theopt for an airborne operation on the firstday of the air operation, we believe theyuntil atr later to ensure someair superiority and the availability ofThe Soviets might be more inclined toan airborne operation early in hostilitiesNATO flanks, where NATO air and airlesshreat, in order lo prevent NATOdiverting and shifting. The Soviets haveincreased the ground mobility of theirAll regiments now have the BMDvehicle, which gives each division in excessarmored fighting vehicles. In addition, eachis assigned its own artillery regiment as well asair defense

increases in mobility and firepowerturn. Increased Soviet airborne (VDV) liftThough Soviet transport aviation (VTA) hasthef Its transport Beet, VTA'sdeployment of more capable aircraft hasto expand its lift capability. Thb expansionto continue throughout the period ofcompensating for the increases in VDV

heaviness. Currently, it takes apnroximalcly four to five VTA regiments to lift one airborne regiment. Because preparations for airborne operalions provide significant indicators (marshaling oftroops and aircrafl, command, conlrol. and communi-catlonsX we believe fulure airborne operations will probably be of regimental sire to reduce dcteclability and maintain the element of surprise. Becauseoperations are less aircraft intensive than are division-size opeiations. these operations will also ease lhe demands on VTA assets. This does noi negate the fact that ihe Soviets couldivision-size operaiion if they deemed that the benefits of such an operation outweighed the inherent risk.

ir Aitauttront- and army-level air assault units wiD be used early in the confiic. to secure key terrain, raid command, control, communications, and intcJIiecncc installations, and destroy nuclear delivery and air defense systems. The depth of employment may be up toilometers in an army-controlled operation

limited fixed-wing transport assets at front leveland competing requlre-menls for VTA would influence the size of the operations. At present, the principal aircrafl al front for conduct of an air assauli operation are lheip and lheook.

C. Airfield Attack

attaeks can be made by airborneforces, depending upon the distanceforces.^

j combination of an airdropped or heliborne initiaTassaiill (orce and an airlanded main force. Prior to Ihe airborne assault, fighter-bombers or atiack helicopters would provide initial preparation fire. The assault force, lighllv equipped and armed, would drop, secure the runway, and eliminate remaining point defenses. Then thc main body of the force would be airlanded, would complete elimination of resistance, and would secure the base

allacks on NATO main(MOBs) are regarded as unlikely unlessobtain air superiority over at least aof the Central Region. More likely would be


attack* by air assault troops on small civilian and miliiary airfieldsionl of advancing Soviet forcei lo secure airheads.


A. Generol

he OMConeer* for operations trended lo ewiduei highrsflctistvc operaliom deeii into the enemy rear area. OMC operations are planned to disrupt the staltility ol tlie enemy rear, destroy major weapon systems, and facilitate the continuing advance o( llie first echelon ami the commitment of ihr second echelon Specific targets include nuclear deliveryand depots, airfields, critical terrain, riversites, and command posts Tbe OMC abo may bc used to interfere withi ration and the movement of enemy reserves. Tho OMC can be employed at army or front level. It may be designated prior to an operation as part of the Initial plan or during an operation to exploit an unforeseen opportunity The OMC will normally be committed prior lo theof second-cc lie Ion forces.

B. Missions

he OMC is normally committed through penetrations made bv the first echelon In the enemy defenses with lhe mission of executing rapid and deep exploitation early in the oHensive. disrupting enemy lateral maneuver and reinforcement; disruptingcontrol, and communications and logistics; and selling key objectives that will ensure the rapidof the main forces. Tnese tasks require accurate and timely target reconnaissance and closebetween OMC elements and otber frontal fotces

airfields are

probably important targets for OMCsT particularly their air assault elements.

C. Employment

n army OMC may be committed on the first day or early on the second (aboul the lime the first-echelon division is expected to break through tlie mainront OMC piobably wilt be committed on the third or fourth day (when the front's: first-echelon armies attain their immediatebe manner in which the OMC wilt come through the enemy's tactical defensive tone (firstin) will varylhe OMC may be introducedingle force dispersed in width and depth, il is more likely thai the

OMC will come through lhe defensive tone in at least two locations simultaneously to fragment enemy first-echelon forces and increase the difflcultv for lhe enemy commander lo adentdy lhe main atlack This tactic is irMended to reduce lheulnerability to enemy air und nuclear attack

here are Iwo maior offensive variations in how thc operational maneuver group may beAn OMC may act somewhat in isolation, conducting mx-rations well apart from liar axes of lhe main effort and separate Irom lhe second echelon and reserves. An OMC may aho bc employed to execute encirclement operations

oviet military planners stress that assault by airborne and/or hetlborne unils is essential to the early success of deep operations by OMCs These units must be inserted in sufficient numbers to secure critical objectivess airfields, road ri net ions, bridges, and fording sites along the principal routes of advance of OMC forces and to disrupt the cohesiveness and integrity of enemy defenses. The Soviets anticipate that thi* activity would facilitate the OMC operations

D. Copobililies: Theory Versus Proctice

ighspeed deep operations by front andled by operational maneuver groups such as are required by Soviet doctrine would be eikernel*for any commander to eiecute successfully The timing of commitment, lhe dispersion, and lhe rate of advance envisioned for deep operations pose very complex problems for commanders and staffs In the areas ol command, control, communications, andand logistics. Intelligence must bcgood if the group is to be committed when and where the enemy is least prepared lo oppose it. Likewise, it will be extremely difficult to maintain command and controlorce that is widelyin width and depth as it is committed, is deployed into subunlts each with separate objectives, or attempts to link up with air assault units and with other groups moving oo converging axes deep in enemy territory. Resupplv of the OMC will require consideiable air and ground cargo transportationdetailed logistics planning, and reliable ground and air-to-air defense to keep open supply corridors to OMCs on the advance.

E. Force Developments

hile there appears to be no fixedfor an OMC. lhc New Type Army Corps (NTAC) mayossible solution and piobably would




hi tbcSLCM variant may also be hcidcd Tbe estimated payload. accuracy, ind ranee ol* ihese miiules lead mt to believee nuclear equipped (Sec table*


hould one or (wo additional NT AC* bein live WTVI>rontal operations, the NATO Central Region would be faced with the prospect of additional highly mobile forces thai could beearly in an atiack to facilitate the fronts plan of attack against NATO high-priority targets, such as the airfields, and lo eapiou weaknesses in NATO defenses

hough not the primary ihreal. OMCs could attack NATO alrbases in the early days of the war This would occur il ihe airbase is within lhe OMCs zone of opciation and ihe OMC advances sufficiently to reach tbc buse. This could happen as early as day three or lour of the war for an army OMC and day five or iliront OMC


A. Current Devetc^smenis

he Soviets are presentlynificantly different types of long-range land attack cruiseoth of whichli forattack. Oneamily of subsonic low-allitudc cruise missiles with an estimated range ofilometers The. second typeupersonic-capable cruise missile L

uiure Developments

112 By Iheoviet long-range cru.se missiles will probably have betteroders with area correlatoronger ranBcs.il infrarednd inipmvril engines and fuelonventionally aimedplosive)cruise missile would facilitate allacks against airfields, lii defense systems, and command andfacilitieslosive warhead ishowever, the range of Ibe missilee reduced because of the heavier payload weight By ibe, development, mightighlyconventional warhead lo destroy run-ayselayed action warhead to deny the use of runways. Chemical warheads could abo be developed for these cruiseI--.

urrently,o evidence to indicate lhe Sovieis are testing and developing medium-range cruise missiles. We believe, however, lhat by thehe Soviets probably will have tested andmedium-range cruise missilesesult of spinoff technology from the current long-range cruise missile programs ll is possible that land aitack cruise missiles aimed with conventional warhead) could be assigned lo theater force* to assist hi suppression of air defense missile sites and airbases. but we cannot assess lhe likelihood ai this time

C. Re^orvnoissonce Strike Corrspla. Svstem

ithin the last several yean lhe Soviets have been experimentingthe reconnaissance strike comple. (RSC) system which appears designed to counter US integrated systems for targot acquisilion and (irc coriliolf_J

1 mitt

hc I.

here aie three subsonic cruise missiles: theea-launched cruise missile, theround-bunched cruise missiiend Iheir-bunched cruise missile (ALCMJof tbeeganith thendipected. The supersomc capable SLCM.ill probably be deployed

* lauMg ia NIE

he RSC appears to have been developed out of Soviet concern for the threat posed by US long-range systems capable of delivering precision-guSOed munitions or submunlnons and canefor for ward-moving elements. It can engage mob-le US long-range conventional tutlc lystemi. and can operate as an autonomous brt entity to engage ad hoc largeti


t it unlikely that the Soviets would use BSC: lo atiack NATO airfields. Airfields are large, fixed sites, and live locatioiu of virtually all NATO miliury airfields already are known to Ihe Soviets.^


D. Surface-to-Air Missiles

Although il is unlikely, certain Soviet SAM systems could possibly be employed in emergency situationsurface-lo-surface role. Wc have no evidence, however, lhat the Soviets have conducted exercises or liave tested Und-based SAM systemsurface-to-surface role. Evidence Indicates only Ihendtrategic SAM systems are capable of operatingur lace-to-sui face mode but atlimitedlhanilometers. Neither theor thetrategic SAM systemsurface-to-surface capability and as such does nothreat to NATO airfields, although thetrategic SAM system, such as deployed within CSFC. could be targeted against critical NATO airborne assets (AWACS.B-U

The effectiveness of Soviet SAM systems is fully realized when utilized asacquire, track, and destroy airborne targets. Surface-to-surface use would be Inefficient and severely constrained by inadequate warheads and limited range. Wc believe Ihe limited surface-to-surface capability of the Soviet SAM systems docs not presentlyonventional lineal lo NATO airfields.

- Top-Swi-flUPf-



A GcoccJ

he Wjru- Part threat in NATO airfieldsubset of brger questions of cunirol of the an and control over NATO's nuclearitption Pact planners bdseur that NATO's tactical mi fnrco andlie Genual Region wouldormidable threatuccessful Pact offensive Conseiiucnlly. thev consldei that thc Pact's early attainment ol nuclear and air superiority would he esscnlial The Warsaw Pact plans lo achieve alt superiority and neutralize much ol NATO's nuclear delivery capabllily byoordinated theaterwide noiuiiiclnai air operationas much as the Oral week ol llie wai.

air operationombined armsconsistingeries of massed air raidscoordination with artillery, air defenseattacks, electronic warfare, Spetnuz, andassaults by airborne and heliborne troops.air raid would be planned to achieveof tactical surprise and would becorridors cleared In NATO air defenses,by frontal assets

B. Thc Air Operation

general, the Warsaw pact wouldiied-wlng aircraft to drawair operalions (seenn theSoviet writings and eiercise activity, we believewould group and peloritiie targets by typeis, nudear related, conventional air, sircommand, control, communications, andfor thc air operation. This plan calls forof air assets of the first-echelonof the Legnica and Smolensk Air Armies,of tlse Baltic Fleet. In addition, weprobably would redirect the Vinnitsa Airllie Southwestern TVD and could alsomajority of the units of the fronl air forcesWestern MDs Initial Soviet efforts would focusabout four main corridors through NATOFront and army assets, lo includerockets, artillery, and radioelectronicwouldajor role In air defenseand the estabUmment ofn)

"SteThteti AaaasaaaawC

ce XiiHle (UlIM.1

n the (list day of the war, two massed laids arc likely to be planned, but three raids would be possible. The main attack force would be strategic aviation units. Tbe interval bclween lhe time oneil .nr raid commences and On next reaches NATO airfields could range Irom seven loouis However, additional attacks, primarily by frontal air lorces, could occur during tlie interval The number ol massed raids would be reduced to one per day alterirs' iwo or itirrv data ul confttd.

lw allocation of assets against specific obicc-livcs is determined not only by lhe lelative priority of Ihc objective bui also by the abilityarticular weapon system to reach the objective (in terms of range and defense penetrationhe sequence of employment of systems is determined by thelo deliver ultimately the greatest possible amount of firepower necessary lo destroy or neutralize live highest priority targets. Thus, while nuclear-rebted objectives are the first priority for atuck, the Pact would seek lo suppress NATO ah defense assets before using fighter-bombers and bombers against nuclear objectives Therefore, front assets will provide principal support against air-defensc-rebted objectives. Thc main strike force of fighter-bomber and bomber aircraft will be targeted againsi llie high-priority nuclear and air superiorily objectives.



Dunne tin- air operations, current SRilM sys-temi could poiethreatelected number of NATO airfields and associated facilities Seudi and possiblyniployed rust prior lo the initial massed an raid coulds or teniporanly disrupt NATO aireralt attempting tohe SonetContinued SRBM attach could affect both sortie generation and recovery operations of selected NATO airfields The short range of lhe SSnd PltOC prrienl their uie againsi aiifivldt in llieBiipon at the beginning ol tlie war Currently, only aboutercent of NATO airfields could bc engaged with IheRBM systemnd aboulercentT*

ATO airfields may aho be suppressed or neutralired when in range of Other indirect firesystems (artillery and multiple rocket Uunchers) and, as shown inhere are NATO airfields which would be vulnerable to opposing forces artillery attacks within tlvc first several days of the conflict.

e have no evidence that the Soviets would plan to employ chemical weapons during thc air operations in the ncxinuclear phasear with NATO. The use of chemical weapons is root aintegral feature of the nonnuclear phase of war. However, we cannot prudently discount tlie possibility of selective use of chemical weapons under certain conditions Improvements in weapon systems might cause the Soviets lo perceive lhat the selectiveol chemical munitions in conjunction withmunitions could assure the successful and early neutralization of NATO airfields and air defense systems. The selective employment of chemical muni-lions might be against only those air defense systems In the penetration corridors, specific airfields (air defense and ground attack! nucleai delivery systems (missiles andommand and control systems, orthereof. The Soviets may perceive that lhe risk of NATO nuclear retaliation would be offset by their own nuclear capability, leading (Item to the conclusion thai NATO would not respond wllhweapons lo lhe Pact's limited use of chemical weapons The Soviets probably appreciate thatemployment of CW could facilitate penetration of NATO defenses and assist in achieving thc high rates of advance they consider necessary forhort war Also, they might see superiority In CW as providing themecisive advantage In an area in which NATO could not catch uphort period of rising fusions The protective posture and retalia-

tory capabilities of the enemy would figurein Soviet considerations of tlie likelihood of the successhemicalhemical attackATO airfield ill prepared for such anlis vim: the proper chemical protection andequipment andseverelyoperations if not entirely prevent them. On the other hand, they may determine thai use of improved conventional munitions will provide better results while avoiding such consequences as lhe requirement to Operateontaminated environment, lhcof chemical weapons, or thc risk ofan immediate nuclear response by NATO. Thc possibility of Soviel selective use of CW in thc non-nuclear phasc of war justifies serious consideration in any assessment of the Warsaw Pact threat to NATO" "

C. Summary: Future Soviet Airfield Attack Capability

eneral. Current Soviet airfield attacksuffersumber of weaknesses. The first Is thc limited capability of current Soviet fighters to provide cover to their attack force. The secondis thc limited capability of sensors and weaponry of currenthird problem area is the marginal capability of current SRBMs in the airfield atuck role. The fourth weak area involves thc limited Soviet ability to direct the air operation. This Is caused by deficiencies in thc current command and control system that limit the size of the force that can

" this nibjaet wll be addressed in lhe upec-mirujk* So^ti Ofinite* OyvrXceJ Wer/of Threat lo NATO.lv)

" On rhe betU ol the reporting of ttruUlot sources, CMnlikely that the Sooieu aaovtd resort to the ut. ofaemon had baen made to tntltote nuclear um/ere Earlier ur of chemical oxepom vould force the Sorted ro balance the bmued poteniial adiantege ofa thtmloal altack agatmi ihe more dangtteui probabilityATO noeUor reiponit.nalilot lovosffcal ihe offemtoe we of chemicaloae/eer of iludy ai higher Socttt military aeademlet^.

CIA abo btlltvn that ihe SooCete' ute of iht longer range mUtilea tlluitieied In fgwe II lo delloti chemical munitions mould deplete their inventory of potential nuclear delivery lyittrm etime that they were mceaitng lha bkibboodATO nudear rarpente. Bv the tlmt lhe ihorltr range mttttle delivery lyitema bod mooed lo vtlbln range of iht aithtldthott obftettoei loould bt under tuck contcnllonal thrtal lhat chtmlcol weapon, would be of marginal bentfil. Hortcttr. employment of chemical wtaponi at that range could doio lhcdtanc by contaminating lhe bitlt/fald and mondattae duptnal In anticipation ofa NATO nudear ttioonte

Scere* (tUH-



effectively employed and directed, especially onide ofIA.believe theare aware of these deficiencies and will make every effort to correct them

irere/l. TV numerical lire of the air threal to NATO airbases will not chanie significantly5 (Seeowever, there -ill be major qualitative upgrades to the (orce. which will resultignificant increase in tlie capability of both the aii-tii aii and ground til lncl foices to carry out the airfield aitack mission, particularly opposite NATO's Central "legion

ighter t. While we eapect lhc number ol dedicated fighters lo decrease slightly, this will be more lhan compensated (or bv qualitativewhich willore offensively oriented fie titer force. Fighters deployed tn theill be primarily Machircrafl. with highable to conduct both close-in and beyond visual-range attacks. These new fighters will possess lookdown/shootdown and multltarget d engagement capabilities Addilionally, the newwill be armed with significantly improved air-lo-air missiles. Future air-to-air missiles may feature ranges upilometersemiadive radar and Infrared sensors will probably continue lothough there will be increased emphasis on fully active seekers There Is also the possibilityotally passive radiometric seeker to counter stealth aircraft- Further, the Soviet fighter threat Is eipected lo be enhanced by the development of an aerial refueling capability These technologicalwhen coupled with improvements in Soviet pilot training, evolving Soviet doctrine, and theof lhe Mainstay AWACS could leadignificant Soviel capability to protect fighters deep into NATO airspace. This couldrofound impact on the threat to NATO alrbases by increasing the penetrability of thc Soviet allack force.

ighter-Bomber/Bomber Force. The Soviel aitack force is expected to benefit Irom some growth in numbers However, as In lhe tighter force.improvements will be more important. In aircraft, the primary improvement wdl involve the deployment of new aircraft with Improved sensors which could allow accurate night /ad verse- weather attacks. These aircraft will be capable of employing standoff, all-weither, precision-guided weapons Future ground atiack aircraft will also feature gieater range and payload. and probably will be an refuelable enabling

Table U

Warsaw Pact Fixed-Wing Combat Aircrafl

Available for Use in the Air Operaiion

in lhc Western Theater of Military Operations



<x'. aa. Siiwlr.ul AA. lvalue Fleet

Eail German. Polish.

Cieclioiliivat lad Kit Air


Fencer lipe



panicipaM if not oceunined toSWTVO

Air Army



rarlieitanu rl Soviet Second Echelon Froot

Military Dutrlel

Beloruulin Military OtHiiel

Military Dutrk*





Cerman. Polish.Weroe aircraft


Onlv about BS pernerrt of these touk would tie available to<


I Dual Go-ire* reflect DIA/CIA dlBcrenos



strike* Iu be conducted Moreover, lhe penetia-bililv of lhe siilicld attack force will increase duemproved EW capabilities These improvement will comist of mote capable escort EW aircraft and more capable internal EW suites on Soviel aircraft.

ectieeifWiWri We bc'ieve future Soviet TASMs willnominal ranees In cicess of SO lilometers with improved accuracy and improved night and adverse-weal her capability. Tlie missiles will leaiuie lower hiuncli altitudes aitd liiiiitch-and-leave guidance for increased aiicmll survivability, fncreased target Irequency coverage will allow Soviet, antiradlallon missiles to attack both higher frequency radars and corninuiiications syslems These TASMs would bc supplemented by Sovset bombers carrying improved air-to-surface missiles and conventionally armedsides

e estimatewill deploy more effective munitions foraltack,ual-stage runwayfor Increased runway damage, aeriallyto hinder runway repairs, andwith electro-optical seekers for attackingpoint targets. With the expected deploymentweaponry, when combined with Improvedair altack remains (he primary threat lo

Ballistic Minitei/CruheIn the future. SRBMs will supiilement thetn NATO airbases iii the Central Region.threat, while currently marginal, willthe Improvedommencesthehis missile willthe range and the accuracy to attackdegree of ibis threat will depend on thethe system deployed snd on whether or notairfield attack munitions are developed. Because

of the limited range, the currently fieldedill continue tohreat to only the for ward most

elements of NATO's sir defense systems. (Sec tablelie Soviels may also develop cruise missiles

optimized for nonnuclear airfield attacks, bul this is

unlikely toignificant threat in lhe period of this


ommend. Control, andaior Improvement In this area will be lheof Ihe Mainstay AWACS. which will enhance Soviet air battle management This system will give the Soviets the potential lo extend low-altitude radar coverage deep into NATO territory This will not only Improve their potential lo defend their territory, but

Table 15

Western TVDauncher .Projections5



1 Modi



AU Fere Mew

tht NSWP ait

ht mUmd with the SS-il

I Modi.

kttltwt Iht rnefon'r/ht Scurf II Id be an

< OIA anal Army Wiew lhe Improvedttch

IOC3 and lhaldlUt8

TEL bntadei Air force bei'tewi rAe ttoanium lot bt miiiiwi lo Smati /'oni-levn' brifdti duHnf iht ptnodol thu

lutmalt CIA amd A- font hold the IOC h* lhe ImwtvdSS* lA*0

latsHaj iSavefcr Hgwoj


also, If used In an ofiensive mode, could Improve lhe Soviet capability to project airpower deep Into NATO's rear, especially bv enhancing the ability of escort fighters to engage NATO air defense aircraft The Soviets will also improve their command, control, and communicalions capability by continuing to em-phi lire communicalions security and resistance to jamming by fielding new technology. They wdlto Improve both the capability and the capacity of Iheir air-to air communications. Thev will probably employ airborne use ol communications satellites and extend lhcir communications coverage into unused parts of llie electromagnetic spectrum. Tlicof tlse AWACS and Improvements Inwould give tlie Soviets an Improved capability to project and direct airpower over NATO's alibases.

- ftoV-W-



I. Thii document win cfasem.no led by iht Directorate of Intelligence. Because olsensitive -oirfc ol mok source material reflected herein, nil copy i; lor ihe( Ihe recipient only.

doeumont may bo retained, or deilroyed by burning in oicordance withregulations, or returned to the Directorate of InftBigence.

thii document a. disseminoted overseas, the or*iN< recipients may retain It fornot In excess of one year. Al the end of Ihii period, llw document should boreturned to the forwarding ooency, or pevivdtiion uvw,fc) be recfueited of thelo retain ft in o< cor donee with

he till* of ihii document when used leporatefy from Ihe teit it unclassified.

Original document.

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