SOVIET GLOBAL MILITARY REACH (NIE 11-6-84)

Created: 11/1/1984

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Director ol lniellip.rnrr

Soviet Global Military Reach

Nadoruil iQlelllgmce Estimate

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW PROGRAM RELEASE AS SANITIZED

369

1 SOVIET GLOBAL MILITARY REACH

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS EXCEPT AS NOTED IN THE TEXT.

Tbe lowing inteUigence organhalhnt participated in the preparation of Iho Estimate:

Th.IS. Cl^u. Intone. Aoency, tho Notiono! Security

Agency, and tho rnlefcoenc. orgonlrotioni of lhe DoportnenK of Stole and the Treowry.

articipating:

Ih. Aniilonr Chief o' Stall (oel the Army Ih. Director ot Navolepoftm.nl ol th* Nov,i.mn.frt^nl ol the Ai. Force Th. Orectoe of letetcw. Heorfo^rt-n. Marin. Corp.

" neur

CONTENTS

SCOPE 1

KEY 3

7

Purposes ol Soviet Global Military 7

Soviet Coals and 7

Previous Uses of Sovicl Forces In Distant 8

Limitations on Deployment of Soviet Forces in 9

Scope of Soviel Foreign Military Involvement

How Is ll 9

Soviet Allies; What Are Their Main Contributions to the USSR's

Global 21

Regional Military 22

Mediterranean and Middle 23

Indian Ocean. Persian Culf. and East 26

South China Sea and Southeast 30

South Atlantic and West Africa

Soviel Capabilities: How Do New De

Global Military Reach?

Aerial Refueling

Merchant Fleet

Airlift

37

80 42

23

Caribbean and Central ind South 33

Soviet Naval

Airborne

Special-Purpose

Tactical Air. .

Global Command and

Military Significance of Soviet Forces and Facilities

Future

Potential Soviet Gains and

The Base

Alternative

Annex A: levels of Soviet Foreign Military

Annex B: Inventory of Major Foreign

Annex C: Soviet Airlift Operations in the Third

Annex D: Selected

SCOPE NOTE

Soviet capabilities to project military power in the areas around the immediate periphery ol the USSR are far superior to Soviet military capabilities in more distant areas. Formidable Soviet forces have long existed for operations in areas of Europe, the Far Easi, and Southwest Asia that are contiguous to the USSR. Beyond this zone, Soviet military activities have traditionally been limited principally to militaryand support for foreign forces. Over the lastears, however.foreign miliiary involvement abroad has increased significantly. Soviet forces have made greater use of support facilities overseas, Soviet naval and air presence at longer ranges from the USSR has been more frequent, andew occasions Soviet forces have become direclly involved in combat overseas. This Estimate is concerned with Soviet military capabilities in those more distant areas over the next five toears.

This Estimate distinguishes between what we term "global miliury teach" and the more common notion of military "powerim essential distinction between military reach and power projection in this Estimate, is the nature and scope of military operationsunder each concept. Military reach is associated with smaller scale operations, often in the context ol supporting an allyegional crisis. Power projection envisions the deployment of major combined-arms formations, usually against substantial opposition. Whereas tbe projection of US military power, especially to Europe, is vital to USSoviet defense does not require thc deployment ofilitary forces abroad. Indeed, for the Uniled States all major wars in the last century have been fought beyond American shores. Soviet wartime experience has been just thc opposite. Therefore, it is not surprising that the two armed forces have been developed with differing requirements. By our definition, the forces and operational concepts usually associated with power projection include pre-posi-tioned equipment, rapid deployment and amphibious forces, foreign staging and logistic bases, aircraft carriers, and aerial refuelingThese char act eristics liave generally been lacking in Soviet forces. Instead we note growing Soviet military involvement abroadifferent nature, not closely associated with the NATO conHngency. Thiswc call globalprovision of arms, dispatch of military advisers, acquisition of air and sea access abroad, and small-scale deployment of Soviet forces.

i

The military significance of Soviet access to foreign facilities is the key issue addressed in this Estimate. More generally, this Estimate:

Examines Soviet miliiary involvement in areas beyond the range of tactical aircraft based in the USSR.

Describes trends in Soviet access to foreign facilities over the past two decades.

Examines new Soviet military developments that affect capabil-ilics for distant military operations.

Identifies lhc roles of elieni governments in Soviet foreign military involvement.

In conclusion, discusses the type of military threats that Soviet forces operating from foreign facilities are likely to pose for US and friendly forces during the next five to JO years.

A companion Estimate,he USSR and the Third World, provides the broad political context of Soviet involvement abroad. The reader may also wish to consult the National HUMINT Collection Plan:oviet Power. Projection Capabilities.

The foregoing Scope Note is Unclassified.

KEY JUDGMENTS

The steady increase in size, capability, range of operations, and scope of activity of Soviet forces abroad over the lastearslobal military reach that Moscow did not previously possess. The miliiary significance of Soviet forces beyond the periphery of the USSR already has been demonstratedariety of ways. In peacetime and during regional crises Soviet forces abroad haver

Intervened in Middle East conflicts in defense of allies.

Supported the intervention of Cuban forces in Africa.

Directed foreign forces in combat operations.

Collected intelligence and conducted reconnaissance andtxiissions.

Provided support to Soviet allies, including arms, advice,and demonstrations of force.

Protected the Soviet fishing fleet and other interests abroad.

Resupplied or provided new military equipment rapidly to Soviet allies involved in hostilities.

Evacuated Soviet personnel.

ilitary presence in new areas and, at times, increased an already existing military presence, thusthe military planning of adversaries.

In all of these regional activities, however, thc Soviets have been careful not to challenge directly either the United States or other strong regional powers. This Is because, beyond thc range of its land-based airpower, Moscow would have difficulty In rapidly mounting oristant power projection effort even in thc face of limited Third World opposition. Soviet forces deployed abroad are thinly spread, are vulnerable, and lack offensive punch. In particular, they lack adequate air defenses, antisubmarine warfare capabilities, at-sea logistics, staging rights, aerial refueling capabilities, and tactical air support.

Despite these weaknesses, Soviet forces abroad arc becoming more significant factorsossible military confrontation with the United States, particularly just prior to hostilities and during thc early stagesonflict. For example, they could:

Western naval targets at the onset of hostilities.

Provide targeting information and intelligence.

Delay some reinforcements.

Divert some US military resources.

Disrupt some shipping and air routes.

For (he next five toears. Soviet military deployments abroad will not overextend the USSR, but may stretch the United States. InUS military planners will be faced with the problem of how best to deal with hostile foices operating well beyond the Soviet periphery. As detailed below, ihis problem will be compounded bv three persisting developments: first, Soviet capabilities for distant miliiary operations will improve, although Soviet forces are not likely to be deployed in substantially larger numbers; second. Soviet use of current foreign

facilities is likely to be more extensive even tliough there probably will notignificant expansion in Soviet military access abroad and

perhaps it will even decline; third. Soviet regional allies that act in

support of Moscow's interests abroad will become increasingly capable

as they are provided with modern Soviet arms.

Sovici Copobrtiti'i

Several new developments over the next 6vc toears will improve Soviet capabilities for distant military operations, including:

Introduction of aerial refueling for fighter and transport aircraft.

Improvements in airlift and sealift capabilities.

blistunentlobal command and control systema new airborne warning and control system aircraft, along with space-based communications, intelligence, andsystems.

Deployment of more capable submarines and surfaceespecially the large, nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.

Even with these Improvements, however, Soviet forces abroad will continue to have serious limitations. They probably will remain modest in numbers, including only aboutercent of the Soviet Navy. Transit delays and other factors could limit the rapid augmentation of naval formations. In addition, many of the foreign facilities used by Soviet forces will lack adequate repair, refuding. and storage capabilitics. Also. Soviet airlifts to distant areas will encounter problems In overflight clearances. landing rights, and refueling.

Over the next decade. Soviet military forces still will not be able to carry oul substantial combined-arms operations against major military

4

- SCCStT-

opposilion in areas distant from the USSR Soviet intervention in Third World conflicts probably will be restricted to situations where the risk of escalationar with the West is judged to bc small and Sovietto perlonn higher priority strategic missions would not bc seriously degraded. In general. Soviet miliiary intervention would mnsi likdy involve naval maneuvers, or (lie dispatch of pilots, air defense units, or small contingents of Sound forces to bolster local defenses Such intervention it most likely in the Middle East, where tlic slakes are hitch and the region clow lo the USSR.

Wc do not believe dial Soviel forces abroad currentlyajor role in Soviet miliiary doctrine for general war, which remains focused on Ihe Iraditional mission of strategic defense of the homeland. Soviel forces routinejv deployed abroad are now. and will remain for the period of thi^Estimaic. too few*lnd loo weak to allow the SovieU toin distant power projection.

Soviat Use ol Fceaign FcKBtiei

Soviet capabilities for distant miliiary operations have generally improved with increased access to foreign facilities, allhough the Soviet Navy continues to rely primarily on its own auxiliaries for logistic support The USSR nowilitary presence in most major regions of the world. Soviet naval forces nowontinuous presence in lhe Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the South Atbntic off the coast of West Africa, and the South China Sea. Access in Vietnam has grown to Ihe point where lhc Soviets haveaval and air operations Jiid logistics base at (lum Ranh Bay. (See

Even though much of the past Soviet success in gaining access has been due to circumstances that are not likely to be repeated, instabilities in the Tliird World are likely toew additional opportunities for Soviet exploitation, and Moscow will continue widespread probing for additional access. The Middle East region will remain the top-priority target. In addition to tfibsc countries where the USSR already enjoys routine military access, others may permit more extensive Soviet access, most notably Seychelles or some counlries in West Africa. On the other hand. Moscow could also lose military access, as for example in Angola, Guinea, or Ethiopia.

Regardless of these gains or losses, increasing use of foreign facilities to.^ich the Sovietsjjjready have access can be cxr>racted. particularly inouth China Sea naval squadron has probably been established. The number of submarines, surfaceand naval aircraft deployed to Cam Ranh Bay will continue to grow. Soviet fighter aircraft also are likely to be deployed to Cam Ranh Bay. In the Caribbean. Soviet aircraft and ships probably will make

5

more frequent deployments, bui wc do not anticipate the introduction of any new Soviet-manned offensive weapons in Cuba.'

li p.

Soviet arms transfers will continue to improve substantially ihe military capabilities of several Soviel allies Moscow will export modern weapons to selected Third World allies, in some cases before they are made available to non-Soviet Warsaw Pact forces. In addition, joint military exercises could improve the potcnli.il for coordinatingmilitary operations.

Certain Soviet allies, most notably Cuba, will be willing to act in support of Soviet interests short of direct confrontation with lhe United Slates. By funneling military supplies and providing troops and advisers. Cuba can mask the full extent of Soviet involvement abroad.

1 The Autnani Chief of Sla* foe Inlelligence. Depanmeni of ihe Army. belleeei thai, alihoogh "

currently unlikely lhal lha SooteU would placen Cula Ox lhe near future, lha poaibtlllv lldl Cltlll

and, booamaa of lhe great danger ll poaci. loarrontt conlUHint oonnderaiion fo> elaboration eflhtx etaw. tee pi.S)

The foregoingate Secret

Figure I

Soviet Military Presence Abroad

6

t.CCB6f

DISCUSSION

of Soviel Global Miliiary Reach

Soviet Goals and Objectives

oviel activities in the Third World are designed largely Io complement Moscow's strategy lowaid the United States, the West, and China. Although the pattern of Soviet involvement in the Third World has been subject to ebbs and flows, overall Soviet goals have remained fairly constant: to gain politicaland. In particular cases, increase Soviet military potential. Important obiectives in support of both of these goab Include:

To promote Third World responsiveness to Soviet interests and Initiatives.

To gain recognition of the Soviet Union's statusuperpower with global interests and reach.

To promote the establishment of regimes closely allied with the USSR.

To increase access to military facilities.

To diminish Western, especially US. and Chinese influence.

To deny military access to the West.

To increase the potential to hinder Western access to strategic resources.

Since Its first major forays Into thc Third World in the, the USSK has made impressive gains toward ensuring, as Gromyko saidhat no question of substance can be decided withoutof Soviet interests. The USSR has treaties of friendship and cooperation withhird World states and at least onehave been agreed to in principle. Moscow has continuing military aid relations with nearlyountries ln the Third World, and0 military advisers arethroughout the Middle East, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. In addition, Soviet forces enjoy accessumber of facilities Id the Third World.

While the growth of Soviet overseas presence and Influence over the last three decades has beenit has not been without costs and setbacks. Two

friendshipEgypt andbeen abrogated. In each instance, the Soviets lost access to important naval and air facilities While thev have tried with some success to offset these losses, thev have yet to fully recoup, especially in the eastern Meditenanean

Moscowariety of instruments to gain and maintain influence in lhe Third World and lo secure facilities of military importance. The more successful approaches Involve arms exports, theof advisers, training in the USSR. and. on occasion, the use of allies. Economic aid has generally notajor tool of Soviet influence, except for Cuba and Vietnam, which receive major tradeIn addition to military and economic assistance, the Soviets maintain military forces In the Third World. The bulk of thc forward deployed forces are from the Soviet Navy. They include aboutrincipal surface combatants,ttack submarines, several company and platoon-size detachments of navalandooviet naval aviation aircraft. Soviel army deploymentsrigade in Cuba and two regimental-site air defense units in Syria

In addition to military and ecooomic toots,employs other means to further obiectives in the Third World including clandestine or "activeThese are designed to penetrate foreignsupport opposition groups, and disseminate propaganda and disinformation. Active measuresthe use of Insurgencies, ethnic or separatist groups, and other armed resistance elements (some of which engage In terrorbtn addition, local Communist parties, Soviet-owned commercialSoviet embassy staffs, foreign intelligencevisiting officials of various Soviet educational, trade, social, or other organizations, students trained io the USSR or other Communist countries, labor,or other mass organizations, and worldwide front organizations have been used clandestinely. Plans for such use of active measures are coordinated among the International Department of the party's Centra)tbe Committee for Slate Securitynd sometimes the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the

Chief Intelligence Directorate (CRU) of (he Ministry of Detente

6 To an important degree the USSR's dramatic advances in the Thiid World were due to aof citcumslanccs that aie not necessarily icneat-able. Thc coincidence of the collapse of the Portuguese empire and thc Ethiopian monarchy in Africa, the upheaval in Iran, and US reluctance to become deeply involved in the Third World in tlie aftermath of Vietnam provided extraordinary opporiunities for theiability and lunnoil aie likely to prevail in much of the Third World, providing not only an abundance of opportunities lor Sovietbut also impediments to consolidation ofgain*

oscow noweries of Third World allies to protect in order to prevent important reverses in the "correlation ofhe Soviet leadership isto varying degrees in tiding the defense of pro-Soviet regimes in Afghanistan, Cuba, Vietnam,Angola, Mozambique, and Nicaragua. Many of these governments are eonlrootlng severe economic problems, active insurgencies, or other problems for which Moscow has found no ready solution.the Soviet leadership will probably have to choose between devoting more energy and resources to -defending their allies against domestic challenges or accepting local compromises that risk utiderrnlning Soviet access orituation thai already may be emerging In southern Africa

S Soviet strategy In the Third World Is likely to be increasingly affected by the USSR'l espandingreach In the past two decades this reach began to extend beyond the range of land-based Soviet aircraft, yet Soviet capabilities are in no measure eofflparable with those of the United States. Moscow would have difficulty in rapidly mounting andistant power projection effort even In the face of limited Third World opposition because of thc Soviet lack of adequate air defenses, antisubmarine warfare (ASW) and aerial refueling capabilities, rapid deployment forces, tactical aircraft, at-sea logistics, snd staging rights. If time and opposition were not constraints, however, the SovieU have the capability to move large numbers of troops, armor, artillery, and crated tactical aircraft by merchant ship to any part of tlie globe- Wc do not know of any overseas country In which the stakes are so high tliat Moscow would be willing to deploy substantial military forces that now have the primary mission of defense of the homeland

ver the neil decade. Soviet military forces will not be able to carry out substantial combined-arms

military opcralioiii successfully against major Western military opposition in areas distant from the periphery of the Soviet Union Even as new opportunities arise in the Third World for Soviet intervention. Moscow will have to calculate above all the intentions andof the United Slates. However, (lie presence of even small numbers of Soviet militaiy lorces in distant areas can pmr special problems for US planners, especially in times of crises when they couldhreat to US interests or operations

Previous Uses ol Sovicl feces inos

ariety of Soviet forces have been used to respond to crises in thc Third World, Including:

Navalaval surface ships andhave provided the principal means toSoviet military lorce In distant areas. For example.oviet combatants andwere deployed to thc Mediterranean during3 Middle East war. Soviet ships also have provided escort for merchant ships delivering arms during various crises.rsuppliea for beleaguered Ethiopian forces at Mits'twa were provided bv Soviet ships escorted by Soviet naval combaianU This timely intervention prevented tbe loss of this viul port lo the Eritrean injur-genuoviet naval task groups,cruisers, destroyers, and submarines,to the South China Seahow of force during the Chinese attacks on Vietnam. Intoonflict In Lebanon, the Soviet amphibious capability was augmented, probably to assist In evacuation, should that have become necessary. Soviet naval forces alsothe Cuban interventions in Angola and Ethiopia in the mid- and.

Air De/emt Forcei. Significant Soviet combat losses have at limes been risked by providing air defense support to embattled clients Such help has included surface-to-air missiles (SAMs).and other equipment, as well as pilots and other combat personnel- The largest directcommitnvolved the deployment of0 air defense personnel to Egypt0 to defend against Israeli airstrikes. At the same time, Soviet pilots flew combat patrols for Egypt. Toward the end of3 Middle Eastovietir defense missile unit was deployed to Syria. Againwo SovietnlU withersonnel were sent to bolster Syrian air defenses and have remained in Syria

8

uring7 Arab-Israelioviet airlift that eventually involvedircraft Hying 3S0 sorties was begun within three days of the opening ol hostilities. Another Soviet combal tesupply airlift was implemented four days after3 Middle Eastbegan That airlift involved aboutercent cf the Soviet medium- and long-range transportand included round trips ol upautical miles Other emergency airlifts have included support to Ethiopia, Angola, andduring times; of crisis.escribes Soviet airlifts to the Third World.

Forces. Other than the brigade deployed to Cuba in, major Soviel maneuver units liave not been deployed beyond thc Soviet periphery. However. Soviet airborne units have been placed on alert during several crises. Also, in Ethiopia, Soviet genera! officers have directed major campaigns even (hough Soviel troops were not involved.

Limitations on Deployment of Soviel Forces in Crises

Lack of offensive punch is the main limitation of Soviet forces abroad. They are not capable of protecting power ashore against significant military Opposilion, but thev are capable of interveningariety of ways in support of sn ally abroad. Moscow would piefei touppori role by providing military equipment and supplies quickly to aclient. Should direct involvement of Soviet foices become necessary, in most cases it wouldtake thc form of augmentation forces, such as pilots and air defense forces. latherajor Mpedltlonary force-

Moscow's ability to expand naval deployments substantially could be limited by transit delays,in logistic aod maintenance support, and the potentially adverse impact on higher priority defense requirements. Reinforcement of tbe Mediterranean Squadron byourface combatants fiom the Black Sea could be accomplishedeek Augmentation of Soviet forces In the northwest Indian Ocean with modern combatants from Vladivostok wouldinimum transit of two weeksknot speed of advaiiee- For naval forces already deployed ln the vicinity of Vict nam. however, transit time would be about one week.

Soviet airlifts to distant areas abo facelimitations. The main problems are possible denial

of overflight clearances and landing rights, along with limitations on refueling. Also thc crcw-to-alrcraft ratio in Soviet military transport aviation (VTA) is low, about half that of thc US Military Airlift Command This limits thc Soviet ability to conduct sustained jirhll operations

of the foreign facilities used bypose further (imitations on more ambitiousMoscow. In most cases, Soviet forces lackOvci tlie facilities. Many poit* andadequate maintenance capabilities and storageammunition, and fuel sufficient tooperations With important exceptionsSyria, and Vietnam, most of these facilitieswell defended.

major limitation is thc lack ofmilitary equipment stockpiled abroad forubstantial amount oftootal of twotanks, armored personnel carriers, andrecently been identified in Angola. Ethiopia,However, this equipment bCuban personnelf the type andwith Cuban, not Soviet, troops. It isunlikely, that In other countries Sovietto allies could be available for Soviet use.in Libya, substantial equipmentapparent local needs, but most of theis composed of older models no longer usedunits. It is neither well maintained lonor configured according to SovietFurthermore Libyan stockpiles arclocated to facilitate rapid Soviet use. Similarunfavorable conditions prevail elsewhere, sothat those foreign-based militaryfar identified are for host country or clientare unlikely to be planned for use by SovietRanh Day is the best prepared of theto support Soviet military operations. Buttime, only small numbers of alr-to-surfaceand spare parts are believed to be stored there.

Scope of Soviet Foreign Mililory Involvement: How Is ll Chcmciing?

military Involvement beyond theperiphery has Increased substantially over thedecades both in geographic scope and varietyinvolvedbe USSR now haspresence in most major regions ofli" extent of this involvement rangescountries (Cuba. Vietnam, Soulh Yemen, Ethiopia.

9

and Angola) where Soviet forcea arepresent, toountries which currently receive varying degreesSoviet military assistance- Inthese levels of involvement weoviet military advisory presence inountries, of whichegularly host port calls and seven permit major replenishment and some repair of Soviet naval ships.escribes the various dimensions of Soviet military involvement in more detail.

v most measures, Soviet foreign militaryhas increased dramatically over the past two decades. Soviet military assistance has increased nearly tenfold during this period (figureince the Soviet military assistance program beganquipment deliveries have totaled about JS5 billion Over half of these deliveries have been nudeargelyesult of increased military assist-

ance, the total number of Soviet military personnel outside the Warsaw Pact territory and Afghanistan has more than doubled in the past decadehese military personnel are mainly advisers and technicians who are now found in nearly twice as many countries as was Ihe ease inureoviet military advisers and technicians in the Third World now outnumber their US counterpartside margin:0 SovietS military advisers. In addition to US military advisers, however, US private companies also provide many thousands of technicians abroad In support of military sales. Soviet military advisory groups <MAGs) withr more personnel have been established inountries. In addition,0 Third World miliury personnel have received training in thc USSH or Other Communist countries over ihe past three decades

10

he ability toide range of military equipmentimely ban* and at low pncesreat asset in cttablisbini and maintainingin the Third World By establishing arms relaoscow gains access to important officials in Third World counlries, particularly officers in the armed lorces Moscow tries loependency on continued deliveries of Soviet equipmeot and spare parts. Ultimately. Moscow could use influencein these ways to gain mihtary access, displace or offset Western influence, or aggravate tensions inof importance to the West

espite some significant leverses. Soviel arms programs have been successful in producingmilitary relationships with some key Third World countries and with many less vital ones.he USSH signed agreements with, or made arms deliveries to, someountries outside Europe. These range from regular Soviet customers such as Cuba, Syria, India, Algeria. IJbya, Iraq. Ethiopia, and Vietnam, with annual transactions sometimes reaching several billion dollars each, to intermittent customers soch as Bangladesh and Burundi, with sales ofew million dollars Theeriod of particularly rapid growth In lhe arms program as Moscow exploited the ability of several key customers to pay higher prices and to pay in hard currency. Since the. Moscow has generally maintained the high arms eiporl levels reached in the, and new agreements for future eiports indicate Soviet arms eiports will continuerow.

oviet military assistance has been instrumental in upgrading ihe armed forcei of several Third Workas Cuba, Vietnam, andthe point where (hey Iiave become major regional powers-Some of Moscow's best customers also occupygeographic locations. Soviet success fn translating this military assistance Into political Influence oradvantage, however. Is less clear. In somenotably Cuba. Vietnam, andand ability to supply arms have clearlyto iu gaining Influence and access to military facilities In otherinSovieU have reaped no direct military advantage and onlypolitical influence. Finally, in some cases arms relationships may actually have drawn Soviet leaden Into Situations they would have preferred to avoicl Libya, for example, provides an unwanted public linkage between Moscow and international terrorism. Similarly. Iraq's dependence on Soviet arms has made it difficult for Moscow to keep avenues open lo Tehran

he desire lo earn hard currency hasignificant secondary motive for the Soviet armsprogram In lhe period8lmost three-fouithi of the arms delivered went to hard currency Middle East customers Soviet earnings from arms sales currently account for aboutercent oi Moscow's annual hard currency receipts. In the last few years, however, declining od revenues havethe ability of many customers to pay for arms, and competition from lhe Wesl has mcieased This has causedto mate sigiiibeani concessions,lhe eipoit ol some of the most modern Soviel weapons and the offer of more attractive financial terms Nonetheless, Moscow continues lo leaphard currency earnings from Its arms sales

Tlse pattern of Sovicl armsn any assessment of Moscow's intcresU In (he Third World. Most major reclpienu lace activeinsurgencies or are engaged in conflict with or are threatened by neighboring states. Most are confronting foes supported by the West. Geographically, thcconcentration of Soviet arms recipient! extends from North Africa eastward to the IndianAlgeria. Libya, Syria, Iraq, Ethiopia. South Yemen, andgenerally situated along major air and sea routes

While most of lhe nearlyountries that receive Soviet military assistance diversify their sources of arms.ely almost entirely on the Soviet Union (tableii of these countries have proved to be the most willing to provide access for Soviet naval ships, aircraft, and other activities. The extent of access varies in each case.rovides aof the extent lo which fadllUes In variousare used by Soviet forces. Several countries, such as India. Peru, and Algeria, receive substantialof Soviet arms yel do not permit Soviet military access to their facilities. Thus, we do not expect that reliance on Soviet arms will itecexsarily result In such access

n addition to Increased military assistance. Soviet naval forces also haveajor part of tbe growing Soviet involvement abroad-oviet naval deployments have risen sharply, from justnnual shipdayi out of home waters to0be most dramatic Increaseore gradual rise having occurred since that timeodhese trends alsodder ranging Soviet Navy. Regular

Tbw* fccwwml SSBNi. .ij Rcdc-

Table I

Milhary Reliance*

8

Soviei Naval Deploymenl Patterns ISMadijs out el heme *ilen.

LA,.

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Aiujob

fituooj

Thaw ouKiic rcUaS oo So- wt BOoc or Fan Ewoceu wen forM patent el OW aibarrthe*tbe Ua

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Figure 7

Trends In Sovicl Naval Deploymentsmi)

I I I I I I

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laaHa* of faa*

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Mi

naval operation! were launched In the Mediterraneanhe Indian Ocean Squadron wu formediills by task groups to the Caribbean began0 the West Africa patrol began operating; andegular Soviet naval presence was established in the South China Sea

15

Ai the Soviet rea of operation! has expanded over the pad twohere hasorresponding increase In calks on foreign ports.hird World port calls are now made annually by Soviet navalainly to aboutountries. Porlx in four countrlei have becomein supporting expanding Soviet naval operations. Vietnam receivedoviet port calh by Soviet naval vessels last year; Syria hostedisits: and Ethiopia and South Yemen each had abouloviet port calls (see lalifchis access supports long, distance deployments, but it is not an operalionjl necessity.inor repairs and upkeep at convenient locations enable Soviet naval sliips tofor longer periods without returning to distant home ports. Soviet ships at present have access to naval facilities lo Yugoslavia. Syria. Tunisia, and Libya to support the Mediterranean Squadron. Soviet ships alsoontinuous presence at ports In Ethiopia. South Yemen, and Vietnam to support their forces In the Indian Ocean and South China Sea. The West Africa patrol Ls supported out of Angola, and Guinea provides some replenishment to Soviet ships In the South Atlantic. Soviet intelligence collectors oS the east coast of the United States replenish In Cuba, as do the naval task groups periodically deployed lo the Caribbean (figure H>

2

Frequent

Navy Port

AtU

item or

Africi

JO

St

Tenxn

21

Data Include vutu by eooiUur u, ACIs. and axil rubordlniird aaeechant ihlra aodlilca, but do not Include vines by Soviet space, event arroort ilupt

Figure 10

Soviet Naval Visits

17

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Ponvjiitcrf

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Thc Client of So-let access to these counlries varies in each case, bul it includes several of the following characteriitics:

Frequent or overlapping visits so that at least some Soviet ships or aircraft arc preseniearly continuous basu.

Freedom from normal entry requirements orin entry procedures.

Reserved access lo ship berths and aircrafl ramp space In some cases. Soviet logistic shins arein port, reducing Ihe demand for berth space in congested harbors. Floating drydocks lhatthc Soviet Navy are located in Ethiopia and Vietnam. Others in Angola and Motambique are used to support the Soviet fishing Beet.

Fresh water and provisions.

Workspace, housing, and recreational facilities for Soviet personnel

Storage for ports and fuel.

Use of repair facilities.

Soviet control of access to facilities that they use.

The way in which thc Soviet Navy functions in distant areas minimizes the requirement for access to facilities ashore. Unlike the US Navy, the Soviet Navy relies primarily on afloat logistic support for warships operating in distant waters, using navaltankers, cargo ships, tenders, and repairships under naval contract. Therefore, the Soviet Navy deploys far more auxiliaries outside home waters than do Western navies. Frequently the auxiliariesSoviet warships deployed. Fuel for Soviet ships Is rarely purchased from foreign countries, even In Uie Middle East. The Soviets conserve hard currency by transporting fuel from distant Soviet ports. Maintenance of warships outside of home waters Is minimal compared with that of other navies and is performed by Soviet repair ships.

Nonetheless, the Navy's operational flexibility can benefit from the simplicity of performing logistic support in friendly ports, fromonvenient stopover for crew rest or rotation and mail call, and from accessocal source of fresh water and perishable provisions. By performing pee transit and posttranslt upkeep or msdde-ployment maintenance at such facilities, the Soviets can extend the deployment period of individual units.

Whore no access to port facilities exists, the Soviet ships often use sheltered anchorages in international waters for logistic purposes (figure IIJ. The Soviet Navy mayooring buoy, station auxiliaries there, and bring in Other naval ships for replenishment and upkeep.

A number of such anchorages have been established in the Indian Ocean and iu the Mediterranean. On occasion. Soviet ships use anchorages in preference to localFor cample, despite their access in South Yemen, Soviet ships sometimes refuel or undergo repair priorntering Aden.

In part, the Soviet Navy can function with the combination of afloat support and limited shore-based support because its activity level is lower than that of Western navies. The Soviei Navy emphasizesand in-port or iu-area training rather thanat-sea Operations. Even Soviel naval units deployed out of area spend about two-thirds of their time at anchor or in port, thus conserving fuel and limiting wear and tear. To the Soviet mind, it apparently is more important to be ready to go to sea than lo be at sea Under this system, operational experience and some degree of crew proficiency are sacrificed to achieve high materialLimited Soviet access to overseas ports may contribute to the minimal routine activity level of Soviet ships, but this probably is not the decisive factor. On balance, then, access to local port facilities has been an important convenience but has notecessity

The most dramatic change in Soviet forcesout of area has been the increased use of naval aviation. The deployment of naval aircraft has increased about eightfold9 (figureshey routinely By out of Cuba, Vietnam. South Yemen, and Ethiopia, and occasionally out of Angola, Syria, and Libya. These flights conduct intelligence, oceanand ASW search missions Inodest aliacli capability has been established with the deployment of five Badger strike aircraft and four combat support aircraft to Vietnam

Another significant addition to Sovieteries of Soviet Intelligence facilities that have been established in Cuba. Vietnam, and South Yemen. The Lourdcs facility in Cuba, withersonnel, represents the largest Soviet SIGINT collection facility outside of the Soviet UnionT

"jThls

facility not only provides intelligence support "to the Soviet military forces in Cuba but also serves as the principal Intelligence collection facility In the Western Hemisphere, The second-largest Soviet-occupied SICINT facility is at Cam Ranh Bay. Vietnam. Q

"^Thc Soviet facility in Aden monitors US and allied forces in the Indian Ocean. In addition. Soviet SICINT equipment, and In some cases Soviet SICINT advisers, have been provided toMozambique, Cuba. Vietnam. Laos. North Korea,

Figure 12

Soviet Naval Aircrafl Deployments' (Aircraltdajs dealorcd)

c/ dayi

Figure 13

Naval Aircraft Deployment Patterns Aircrafi-

tfe played

0 iwo ji i* it n w

brie decrease hi deployment dayi abroad in Acs rtflocii lhe lent of aeccit to alifitMi in Ejypl Na*alloynemi. Ethiopia, South Ytmtn. and Viclnno bet an talc in the decade

Libya, Syria, and Nicaragua. We know that in some cases cooperative arrangements eaiit under wliich inteUigence collected In these countries it ihared with the USSR.

dditional access has included the establishment of Soviet communications laellitiei to support their naval forces and their military advisory groups. Currently, Soviet military communications facilities are located in Vietnam. Cuba. Angola, South Yemen. Ethiopia, aad Syria. In some cases, these facilities are relocated with Soviet SIC1NT sites.

oviet miliury airlift aircraft also have been rnore frequently utilized in the Last five years to provide support to Soviet allies VTAub contingents are currently deployed to Angola. Vietnam. Madagascar, aod Moambique, providing needed airlift support for the interior cf these countries Soviet airlift deployments have been particularly Important In support of military operations In Angoland again. and during the early stages of Vietnam's occupation of.

3S. In addition, the Sovietirline. Aeroflot. has expanded Its International service toountrieserofiot ali craft, persooneL and facilities have supported mlutary airlift operations, deliveredsupplies, and collected inteUigence. Soviet officials have deliberately misrepresented Soviet military airlifl

i

Figure 14

3 International Route Network

as unscheduled Aeroflot flights. Also. Soviet miliury transport aircraft often are disguised as civil aircraft. For example, allndssumed to operational VTA units bear Aeroflot markings

Soviet Allies: What Are Their Main Contributions to the USSR's Global Reach?

Soviet military involvement abroad Isby the efforts of its Warsaw Pact allies and Cuba. These countries are dependent on the Soviet Union, but appear to pursue their own goals In the Third World. Nevertheless, their assistance complements that of the Soviet Union and. whether by Intention or not, furthers Soviet goals by providing additional resources and skills. Moreover, their efforts tend to mask the full extent of Soviet involvement.

For the USSR. Intervention by an ally offers several advantages over the direct use of Soviet personnel or resources: there is less risk of military confrontation between the superpowers: tbe ally may have greater understaisdingarticular region; and the ally's presence sometimes It more acceptableoviet presence. Finally. Soviet prestige is not fully engaged, making it easier for Moscow to extract itself should its ally ultimately fail

Specific roles vary, but the SovieU themselves typically occupy senior advisory positions in key party, Koveinioe.nl, and military bodies. This facsliUtei Soviet penetration of thc main power bases In many Third World countries. East Cermans frequently work with police and internal security units, anderve as military advisers overseas. Other East Europeans are involvedesser extentariety of roles.0 Cubao military personnel are Involved abroad.0 Cuban dvilian advisers, technicians, and eonstriiction workers assist In agricultural, media, and rural development programs.

Cuba has been the most active Soviet ally. Castro has0 combat troops in Angolaroops in Ethiopia. In addition, thereuban military advisers In Ethiopia and anotheruban military personnel in Nicaragua. Castro's willingness to send large numbers of troops into combat situations has been most useful to Moscow.-In addition, Castro has been willing to provide an indirect conduit for Soviet military deUvcrfcs. Id Grenada, for example, military weapons being tunneled through Cuba pointedajor military expansion toorce ofersonnel Secret Soviet military assistance agreements with Crenada were valued atillion over five years. Cuban forces can aboap In situations where local foices may bc too weak to

-MCtfer-

alone and dliccl Sovicioi desirable ot ii limilcd. such ai in Angola and Etliiopia

n addition to Cuba and Ine Warsaw Paci eoun-tries. othcf enonlries iKal thaie similar world views and aie highly dependent on Soviet aid mav cooperate with the USSH in the Third World Vietnam hit these criteria; however, we do not expect lo ice Vietnam involved outside of Southeast Ada North Korea's grow inein the Thirdoi able. Moreorth Korean military advisers are ooeratirif abroad, but to date there is Irltle evidence of direct coordinationMoscow and Pyongyang

oviet allies probably arc of greater value to Moscow in peacetime competition, or in regional crises, than Ihey would beeneral war with Ihe United States Cuban troops. In particular, serve as convenient substitutes lor Sennet military pejjormei. often without risking the kind of Western rrarwnse that might occur with more direct Soviet involvementeneral war, however, Soviet allies abroad would probably bo lefl to fend for themselves as their lines of communication lo the USSH and Cuba would probably be severed

Regional Military Implicolions

lie Soviet Union hasilitaryin most major regions of the vrorld. Soviet naval

forces nowontinuous presence in Ihelhe Indian Ocean, tlie South Atlantic off the coast of West Altica. and the South China Sea. In addition. Soviel forces use facilitiesariety of purposes inoxen countries beyond theof the USSR (table 31

his combiiiation of access and military presence is useful to tbe Soviel Union for political and military purposes during peacetime and in regional crises, Wbetlvot tlse Soviets would, or could, use these forces and facilitiesilitary confrontation with lhc United Stales hingesumber of factora. including the military utility of forces operating in distant areas, the threat to specific forces, the need for these forcesand Ihe likelihood that they could be successfully redeployed Moreover, the ability lo conduct suchwould require at least the tacit support of Third World leaden whose countries host Soviet military forces. Each leader would have to calculate the consequences of nding with the Soviet Union against the United States and opening bis country to miliury retaliation

evertheless, continued Soviet probing formilitary access can be expectedariety of purposes The Middle East-Persian Culf -Southwest Asia region is the top-priority target, principally because thb Third Worldo near to tlie USSR and Is more critical than any other to the East-West balance of power.

Tabic 3

Soviet Military Involvement Abroad

AvUtfon

boni

FaoUities

Air Defrnao DcWcWnl 1Mb

c

-

Yemen

Seeor more detailed dtscwatoaj of lhe nature and ealem ol* Soviet mUlUry aeoon.

Asia ii next in importance llseful base lor exerting pressure on China and Japan and has the potential to threatenlanes to tho Indian Ocean. Latin American and southern African countries have intrinsic poliiical and economiclo thc USSH. and also arc of Interest to Moscow in ternu of their potential to distract and disperse US political, economic, and miliiary resources

Mediierronaon ond Atiddb Easi

he Middle fjit -Mediterranean region is the only area beyond the Soviet borders where Soviet combat forces have been directly involved in conflict' But the history of Soviet military involvement in thc Middle Eail-Mediterranean region has beenfor Mcacow. Soviet naval forces were deployedontinuous basis beginning4 (see7 Arab-Israeli war, Soviet forces gained access to Egyptian ports and airfields.9oviet reconnaissance. ASW, and strike aircraft flew Mediterranean maritime patrol missions from Egyptian airfields. Soviet use of all air and most naval facilities In Egypt was terminatedowever, resulting in the loss of their investment in building the port of Mcrsa Matruh.oviet use of Aiexan-dria for naval combatants, particularly submarines, also was terminated by Egypt- These air and naval facilities liave ivcvei been adequately replaced. In addition to mch losses of military access, Soviet allies repeatedly have been defeated on the battlefield, despite massive aid programs fiideed. Syrta blamed its defeat at the hands of Israel2 on lhe poor performance of Soviet weapons.

oviet military involvement is most ei tensive in Syria aod presentlyersonnel. The Soviets have operated missile sites while tbe Syrians control the country's other air defenseincluding lhe early warning and command and control systems, thendissile sites, and fighter aircraft. The Soviets train and advise tbe Syrians on these systems, advise other combat units, and Instruct pilots- We believe thai the Soviet military advisory personnel assigned throughout the Syrian air defense system can become Involvedreater extent in the conlrol aspect If thereeed. The Soviet role In Syrian air defense goes back3ovietrigade was deployed toward the end of3 Arab-braell war. Following that

Moreow hu beenuk Imamluf Uvolvnl In oamRkl ebewhere, however. For eaamulr, Soviel lorom Inwere PMeeitUltv ot rtik Inim. So-WI VTA deUctunsrt.iupowted hofl enurVry romtwiin Vietnam. Aneolt. and

Ethiopia

Ih* Soviet AAocalarrcaiaon Situodron

The Mediterranean Squadronuch more imooitx'ii conventional wartime role than do other loulinelv forwird deplored Soviet naval lorces The normal composition of thebouthips including nine atiack tubmannea, nine rurlaec combat-ants, and aboutther ihipa and auxiliaries Surfaceare clro-wed rnamlv (roaa lhc Black Sea Fleet and nrbrrurlrjcs usual, come from the Nonleet The Squadrons peacetime roles are so monitor Weslern naval lorces.oviet rruktary pretence in the area, patrol choir points, provide support lucttenU. and be positioned lor possible combat operations Squadron units Spend CO lo TO Dec cent of their lime al anchor. Continuous Soviet naval deployments to lhc Modi terra-near, began4 and. oiler7 Arab-Israeli war, the force became formallyhe Fifth Eskadrak

During regional eonet t. particularly Arab-Israeli wars, the Squadron bas slwayi beenut it has notombat role

In3 Arab-braeli conflict, (ha Squadron rose touiorubaurlnov During ibis conflict. Ir provided escort lor Sovietl abipo carrying rolhUry lupplMa to Syria* aad Errptuo ports, and rrjinuuned aurvriflanor of Uss US StxW Flee*.

Soviet naval activities in rtacoraae to the2 Israeli Invotion of lebanon wc much mote low keyed The Squadron was augmented with only &vr combaianU and one submarine, even though the Siith Fleet was Increased In tlie. Again. Soviet units monitored US naval units, and other Soviet mafor surface units polil piolonged pari visits lo Tortus. Syria, In part to deter braeti attacks.

conflict, therigade was withdrawn and tbe Soviet personnel adopted an advisory role. But, during the2 war. Soviet advisersirect role in air defense operations. Subsequently, more advanced air defense missile systems were deployed with Soviet personnel, and an integrated air defense network was established under Soviet tutelage There are recent indications that the turnover of theystem may have begun, although the Syrians probably will not have full control until at leastevertheless, the Soviets probably willtrong advisory presence at the complexes. Soviet naval units off the Syrian coast ate capable of providing general targeting data to air defense units In Syria. Despite amilitary dependency. President Assad retains

ies wtth Western countries, especially France, and moderate Arab states, such as Saudi Arabia. These factors, coupledecreased threat of Imminent Israeli attack, could eventually result in more reductions of the Soviet military presence In Syria, but we believeubstantial Soviet presence Is likely to remain there for at least the nest Eve years,ajor change in Syrian policy.

n addition to the extensive Soviet involvement in Syrian air defenses. Soviet advisers are found in most, if not all. combat and combat support units down to battalion levels, as well as at base worksliops and all of the military schools. Soviet advisers also serve with Syrian Air Force scjuadrons at radar sites and airbases.

acilities In Syria are used mainly to support Soviet naval activities In tlteoviel storage barge Is continuously stationed at the port of Taatus and provides upkeep for Soviet submarines in the Mediterranean. Also. Soviet auxiliaries shuttlespare parts, and supplies from Tart us to Soviet combatants in the Mediterranean.oviet naval reconnaissance aircraft have deployed to Tlyas airfield four times, three of which have been sincehc first three deployments were concurrent with Soviet Mediterranean SquadronWe expect Soviet use of naval and air facilities In Syria to continue at about the current level.

As the largest and most important Arab state. Egypt has been and will continue toajor target of Soviet Interest. Many Egyptian officials, however, remember the problems associated with thc previous extensive Soviet access to Egyptian facilities8hus,udden political change In Cairo, there Is little prospect for renewed Soviet access to Egyptian military facilities.

Soviet access In Libya Includes Sovietaval reconnaissance aircraft that have periodically deployed to Umm Aitiqah airfield. In addition. Soviet naval combatants show the flag at Tripou and are replenbbed and repaired at Tobnik, using Soviet support ships.

The constructionoviet-designed military airfield at Al Jufra has raised concern about Its fuiure use. Soviet strike aircraft, li deployed to Libya, couldajor threat to naval operations ln theHowever, we expect Al Jufra to be used mainly by Libyanombers and transportWhile Soviet aircraft could use tbc airfield, it is

loss conveniently located than Umm Aitiqah forpatroU. Also overflight restrictions bystates could impede VTA staging from Al Jufra directly into the African subcontinent.

rms sales have been the main feature of the Soviet-Libyan relationship. In thc past four years. Qadhafi has signed arms agreements with Moscow for averillion. The Soviet military presence has increased7 and now totalsersonnel, although thereumber of indications since lasl spring that tlse number has declined,because of Libya's financial difficulties. Bothand Tripoli have been wary in the past of too close an entanglement. In recent years, however, Oadhafj has suggested in threats aimed at the United States that he might permit further Soviet access to bases In Libya. Although tbe SovieU presumably would like more extensive access to Libyan port facilities and perhaps contingency use of Libyan air-bases, wc believe on balance lhat Qadhafi will resist such arrangements unless be believes bis regime li seriously threatened by the United Statesegional enemy.

Algeria has slowly, but steadily, distanced itself from the USSR over the last five years. All three of the Algerian armed services have been equipped and trained by the SovieU. and,he Soviet Navy conducted repair and replenishment activities in Annaba harbor. They used Soviet support shipsthev were not allowed to use Algerian shore facilities.igh-level pressure from Moscow, including visits by then Chief of the Ceneral Staff Ogarkov. backfired when even use of Annaba harbor was denied. Since that time. Soviet access has been limited to occasional port calls. Algiers has been diversifying IU sources of arms, purchasing equipmentumber of Western countries over the past few years, and we anticipate that thean Soviet advisory force will decrease accordingly.the Soviet Navy is unlikely to gain access to naval facilities in Algeria over tbe next five yean.

In Yugoslavia, Tivat has been used regularly4 for repair and refurbishment ofSoviet submarines and submarine tenders. Moscow has. on occasion, pressed for wider access, but the Yugoslavs have not been willing to expand the support of Soviet naval ships to other ports. Nonetheless, Soviet probing for facilities will continue and. even at current levels of use, Tivat provides important support to tlte Mediterranean Squadron.

stem

Tunisia. Soviet naval vessels have beenseveral calls each yearhese portvisits to Tunis. Safaquls, and Susah to showfor provisions, and lot crew rest.hips and submarines began to use theshipyard in Oiicrtc for repairs Sul inTunisian Covernmenl banned repair of allInowever, this ban wasa Soviet submarine entered the yard foruse of Tunisian yards complements Sovietat Tartus, Syna. Therefore. Moscow willto maintain access to Tunisia, especiallyrepair.

Moscow also is interested in Malta. The Soviet Unionons of POL storage spaceATO-built terminal in Malta, but Malta's policy on naval calls and the terms of0 neutrality agreement with Italy limit direct Soviet militaryso the fuel is used by the Soviet Gibing and merchant fleets. While Moscow could abuse the lease agreement and use merchant tankers to dispense fuel from Malta to Soviet naval ships, the risks would outweigh the gains in all but the most extreme

Sooiel Mililarv Reipomes in lhe Middle Eait-Mediterranean Region. Almost all crises in the region have involved at least one US ally. Therefore, in Middle East and Mediterranean area conflicts, the Soviet leadership is quite sensitive to the potential for escalationirect confrontation with the United States. Consequently. Soviet miliury roles at sea and ashore have Involved resupply and defense ofallies, while still maintaining the capability to Impede US military activities. Nonetheless, the Soviet naval presence affects US options and could serveeterrent in certain situations In the region. In future regional crises, the Soviet naval forces probably would be augmented and naval reconnaissance aircraft could be deployed to Syria and Libya, if they were not already there

But Soviet options In lhe Mediterranean are severely limited- Aside from the US Sixth Fleet, several other countries In the region have sufficient air and/or naval forces and, by themselves, probably could severely damage Soviet naval surface units. These countries include Spain. France, Italy, Creece. Turkey, Israel. Egypt, and perhaps Algeria, as well as British forces deployed to thc region. In addition, direct Soviet airlifts could encounter overflightwith Turkey or Iran (seeor aof previous Soviet airlift routes) Also. Moscow

would have difficulty protecting air and sea lines of communications.

To date, lhe most successful Soviet Interventioniddle East crisis was0 when Soviet air defense forces deployed lo Egypt and raised the cost of Israeli deep penetration air raids lo such an extente was agreed to in

Should war between Syria and Israel break out acatn. some Soviet military response is likely This response would probably not include: any directto suppoit Syrian forces in Lebanon because Moscow has made it clear that ihey are not obligated to protect the Syrian presence there. Should another major air confrontation occur. Soviet pilots already in Syria mighl man Syrian aircraft. But it wouldrequire the deployment of ativisionignificant impact upon airpower In the region. Moscow has never practiced such deployments and would require one or two months to deploy, train, andupport base for rdfeetive air operations in Syria.

ar, it would be difficult to deploy andarge Soviet combat force in Syria For esample, deploymentubstantial intervention force of an army or army0 men) probably would require about two months, during which time the outcome of any confliel might have already been decided. However, upivision of airborne troopsoken lorce of naval infantry could bc deployed relatively rapidly, but thev are neither equipped nor trained to conduct independent operations against the modem combined-armsthat the Israelis Geld. Furthermore, the airborne forces would have to fly in without substantial air cover.

An Israeli ground attack into Syria couldoviel Intervention. Any Soviet deployment would be designed to deter Israeli advances deep Into Syria, rather than to become actively Involved in military operations. But Moscow would have great difficulty in protecting its lines of communication. Even without opposilion, it would require about three to four days tooviet airborne regimenten equipped with armored personnel carriers) and ateek to send an entire airborne divisionen) lo the area. Thc Initial combat battalions,could be In Syria within twoaval infantry forceen from the Black Sea Fleet could be scalifted to Syria in about five days alter embarkation; however, preparation of the unit,ol transport, and loading couldew addi-

tr-

lional dart. One O* Iwo0en)the brigade, usually afloat wiih the SovielSquadron, could be landed almost irnrnediateiv il lhe squadron were positioned ofl the coast ot* Syria

n peacetime. Soviet naval aii support lor the Mediterraneanimited to occasional de-ploymenU of reconnaifiance and ASW aircraft to Libya and Syria This posture Is well below the levels deployed lo Egypt Inime frameSoviet awls in Syriaeasure of combat Debility if Syria sided with Ihe USSR. In any major East-West conflict:

Soviet pilots serving ai advisers In Syria could be used to Oy reconnaissance or combat mbatons. Aircrafl manned by Soviet pilots could reconnoi-lo'r the eastern Mediterranean and conductagainst Sixth Fleet units or NATO air assets at Inclrilk airbase In southern Turkey, near the Syrian border.

The Sonets would probably also attempt lo use Syrian airfields to deploy reconnaissance and, possibly, strike aircraft

Soviet missile air defenses in Syria could be used to inhibit US operation! off the coasts of Syria snd Lebanon (figure IS) While theould cover locirlik only al thc higher altitudes, tbcy arc transportable and could be moved farther north. While not sufficient lo deter all US Opera-lions, the Soviet SAM threat wouldajor consideration In air operatiotu around Turkey. Lebanon, and Israel

Ports in Syria and Ubya. and possibly incould potentially be usedsaiehaven" for any Soviet unit which would survive initial hostilities, but none of tlse ports In these counlries could provide Soviet ships with moreimited capability to icpair damage sustained In battle.

For its part, Syria would probably attempt to deny Soviet use of Syrian airfields for strikes against NATO assets and would attempt to limit Soviet combat forces to defensive missions only

f the Sovietsrisis were leadingossible NATO-Warsaw Pact cortflict, they might augment the Mediterranean Squadron with additional surface combatants andhe nature of any augmentation before hostilities would depend onfactors. These could include: the size of the

Mediterranean Squadron when tensions began to build; the nature of lhe Western naval presence, particulaHy the number of US carrier battle groups in Ihe area, and lhe degree of emphasis placed by the Sovietsovert transitionar footing.on the circumslances. there might be either little or no augmentation of the squadron or as manyozen surface combatantsew submarines might be deployed Under any circumstances,llie amount of augment at inn during the period of tension probably would be constrained by llie need to retain forces in the Black Sea to provide support for operations against the Turkish straits and for possible subsequent Mediterranean operations. During lhe pre-hostiltties phase, thc squadron would increase itsof US naval units and pass targetingto higher naval headquarters.

a general war with NATO, tlie SovietSquadron would attempt to destroytargets at sea. At the onset ofand submarines, in conjunction with strikeflying from thc USSR, would attempt to:

Destroy Western nuclear delivery assets,aircrafl carriers, cruise missile platforms, and ballistic missile submarines.

Destroy amphibious assault ships and other naval forces that threaten both the Warsaw Pact ground campaign in the area and tbeUSSR-

Indion Oceon. Persian Gulf, ond tosl Africa

The region around the Arabian Peninsula has been an important target for Soviet foreign military involvement. The primary Soviet goab In the area are to mlnimiie or eliminate the US military presence and to promote regimes responsive to Sovietong-range Soviet goal Is to enhance Soviet Influence in the Persian Culf area to the end that Moscow could exercise some degree of control over Persian Culf oil with resulting leverage over Western Europe and Japan Soviet naval operations In the Indian Ocean began8ime when British forces were being pulled back from cast of Suez. Ashore, the USSR has concentrated on Somalia. South Yemen, and Ethiopia. After being expelled from Somalia. Soviet support forces were moved8 to Ethiopia and the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY or South Yemen) Both of these locations providesupport to the Indian Ocean Squadron- (See box.)

Shore facilities in the region enable the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron lo conduct more ertended

26

Theceon Squadron

he slie and cotnpouilon ol Soviei naval force! in (li- Indian Ooan have Cud titled widely Theae fivcfuataont are driven by ihe number and Ivpei ol US naval lorort deployed lo lhe ret-on aiai by Sonet Interest! ihere. When OS naval feecea tnereate or

dccrraie. lhe Sov veil lend lo follow mil When Soviei inleretli aie al ilaLe. Soviel naval loiea have been

augmented and have aided Moscowlients Forduringgadenllie miadron was

increased lohips and provided dure! tuiipori to

Ethiopia

For lhe pan year or SO. the squadron generally has consisted of abouthip* (ndodine Iwo io four principal turiaee eorabataots; up lo Iwo attackone ol which may carry cruisene or two amphibiousine warfare ship, an toteDigence collector; three or four research shlpi, and aboutuxiliaries. Tlie squadron stiffen from the same gmeral defects of other Soviet naval forcea deployed to diitant areas: lack of adequate air defense, limited logistic support,oor capability for aMuubmarineIn the past, the squadron hai al limes been auernentedtaxs attack submarine! and cruise missile submarine! thatreater threat to US naval forces

During normal peacetime operationi. the Nuadron monitor! Western naval forces in the Indian Ocean, patrob the Straits of Hormui and Bab el Mandeb. provides mpport to Soviet friendi. and serves toa Soviel pretence in lhe area.

deployments and moderately reduce relianceil iaries by allowing repairs, substantial replenishment, and crew rest Tlie regions airfields enable periodic monitoring and surveillance of maritime regionsthc Arabian Peninsula In support of the squadron Communications sites support command and control for ibe squadron,IMT sitesIntelligence on targets of local interest.

n Ethiopia. Moscow has gained access to Dah-la. island In the Red Sea and hasmall naval air reconnaissance presence at Johannes IV Airfield nearhese facilities are austere, but provide refueling, repair, and staging bases for Soviet naval and air units. Dahlak has become the primarynd repair facility for the ships of the Soviet Indian Oceanoatingoviet depot ship, an auxiliaryater and fuel

'Two Sextetar aircraft were destroyed by Uuurgeou

Johanna IV In May lOSa and have ve! lo be replaced.

baige,tores ship are stationed ihere.mall naval infantry contingent provides local security.al the former Soviet naval base al Bcrbera. Somalia, there has been little Invert men* in

facilities at Dahlak Instead, the SovieU rely on their

auiihjry ships

oscow has repeatedly sought lo upgradein Ethiopia and substantially increase ihr number of personnel on Dahlakmall Increase in Suvici nersnrinel on Dahlak has occurred, butofficials have refused to allow Soviei upgrading of the poris ol Aseb andariety of irritants plague thc reUuoruhip between Addis Ababa and Moscow These includeontinued failure to repay ils debt to the USSR, currently estimated atillion; Moscow's efforts lo increase iu influence in the new Ethiopian Communist Party, and Ethiopian resentment about Soviet efforts to dictate military strategy against the Eritrean and Tigrean insurgencies. Nevertheless, both partners continue to receive benefits from the rdationshlp. and we do not anticipate any major changes In it over lhc next few years.

n South Yemen, the Soviet Indianuses the port of Aden, but lheb considered too open, congested,for dockside use by Soviel combatants.nearby anchorages are often used. Also.Naval Avialion aircraft make use of facilitiesYemenay aircraft conductmissions Irom Al Anad. In addition. Ihecommunications facility that was originallymoved to Adenlite lhat allows continuous monitoringthroughout the Middleregion was esublisbed1 at Salah adSoviet high-frequency direction-finding siteYemen, coupled with tbcforms part of thc Soviet oceanCommand and control communicationsIndian Ocean Squadron also are served byIn South Yemen.

e believe that, over the next five years or so. Ethiopia and South Yemen will continue to be pressed to expand facilities for Soviet useesult, aulotin-tial improvements le communications and SICINT facilities could be achieved with continued use of transportable Soviet equipment. Abo. pressure totlie capacity of Dahlak and Aden to provide more effective support to the Indian Ocean Squadron can be cipected. Soviet-sponsored prolciti to lengthen

tUCKCT

runwiyi al Aden could result in Ueai loconnais-sance or ASW aircmll deploymentsove would brine nearly (he entire Indian Ocean within the range of Soviet surveillance aircraft Eventually.trike aircraft could be deployed lo the region, but this would encounter opposition from hoil countries and neighbors, as well as inviting possible US counterdc-ploymenlt

espite already corusderable use of facilities in South Yemen. North Yemen alsoarget for Soviet penetration. Moscow will continue to oHer military aid to North Yemen as an inducement to improveriendship and Cooperation Trade was signed inurrently, ihereoviet military advisers in South Yemen andn North Yemen Each of these small countries has received over SI billion in Soviet arms.

everal Soviet naval ships have called alevery year since thc country became Independenthen only one navalresearch shiport visit. Vidting ships take on water and provisions, but not fuel. Mauritian permission for official Soviet port calls has varied acoordiiiK to the state of Soviet-Mauritian relations.he Mauritians began negotiating with thefor deliveryerchant ship. and. subsequently. Soviet naval vessels were allowed port visits. But. other than port visits and provisioning, any greater Soviet miliiary access to Mauritius Is unlikely to be allowed. The Mauritian Cover nment has stated that It will allow periodic deployments of US maritime palrol aircraft to theproposition which the Soviets must viewolitical setback after long efforts lo gain influence In Mauritius

oviet attempts to gain additional militaryalong the Indian Ocean littoral have focused oo Mozambique. Seychelles, andeftist government, depends upon Soviet military aid to wardrowing Insurgency, uses two Soviet-piloted VTA transports, and cuirently hasoviet advisers Although Maputo permits numerous Soviet naval port oalb. lhe Moiainbicaru have turned aside Soviet requests for increased access to air and naval facilities. Bilateral relations have cooled since4 wlien Maputo signed an agreement with South Africa to limit support, for resistance groups In both countries Tlio USSR has criticized the move as well as Maputo's expanded ties to the West. Moramblque remains dependent upon Soviet military assistancereakdown of the agreement with South Afiica could again increase the threat to the Machel regime, leading lo

new requestv for increased Soviet and possibly Cuban military assistance

oscow's influence in Seychelles has increasedhen Soviet military assistance was firstn* small Soviet Embassy in Victoria has expanded to aboulersonnel as the USSR has become the primary source of arms. In addition. Soviet landing ships with nival infantry have made port visits at times when President Reneoup. For MiKdw. Seychelles servestopover point for VTA and Aeroflot flights en route to southern Africa. Soviet technicians also have restoredon-capacily oil storage tanks and may have filled them. If so. this fuel could be used by Soviel ships in an emergency

We believe that there is an even chance that Soviel naval reconnaissance and ASW aircraft will gain use of facilities in Seychelles. Any decision by Rene to allow such access will necessarily take Into account economic assistance from Western nations, especially France, and the Importance to the islands' economy of Western tourism. Sitould the Soviets gain access lo Seychelles, this would improve Sovietto monitor US activities in the Indian Ocean and on Diego Garcia. We also eipect somewhat more frequent visits by Soviet naval combatants, butontinuous Soviet surface naval presence in thc region.

In Madagascar. Moscow would like to use the former French naval base at Diego Suarex. However, use of this facility has been denied to all foreign warships. Also, the Soviet military advisory presence was reducedargely because Madagascar hu failed to repay its heavy debt to thc USSR for arms purchases Nevertheless, some Soviet advisers have been assisting inmall number of SICINT sites, probably to monitor regional military communications. Overall, tlie prospects are poor for Soviet military access to ports and airfields in

Soviel Mililanj Rciponiei in Ihe Indian Ocean Region. In the past, Soviet naval forces have been variously used In the region to implementforeign policy. For example,3 Moscow sealifled troops and equipment from Aden to support tbe Dhofar rebellion In Oman. Also. Soviet naval forces have been dispatched In shows of force to bolster local regimes: South Yemennd on numerous occasions in Seychelles9 on

but when faced with the possibility of awiih Western, particularly US. naval forces.

SCCBCi

Sovicl response has been ambiguous, is was ihown bv (he USSH'* action during the Indo-Pakistani war1hc number of Soviet cruise missile submarines and surface ships wu Increased from two to sii at lhat time Dut these units arrived on lhe scene after the crisis wat over and wereactor militarily. Nonetheless, the Indian leadership probably was told that Soviet naval forcesS intervention on the side of Pakistan

he level of Sovtet naval operations in future conflicts would depend on the strength of US and Western forcei in thc region and Moscow's evaluation of whether theieignificant riskarticular conflict could escalate

eneral war with the Weal, tbc Indian Ocean Squadron probably would not be augmented. The Soviets believe' thatar would be precedederiod of tension or crisis.risis looked as if It could leadATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, and the level of deployed Western major naval forces was low or was being reduced. Moscow might abo reduce its naval presence In the Indian Ocean. As long as the United States retained one or more carrier battle groups In the Indian Ocean, we believe that the squadron would not be reduced. The primary mission of the squadron would be to attack Western naval forces, particularly carriers and submarine-bunched cruise missileecondary role could be to disrupt some shipping, divert US military resources, and delay Western reinforcement Soviet navalwould be enhanced in the northwest Indian Ocean by tracking data provided by (he Sovietand ASW aircraft stationed In the region. These aircraft could abo be augmented, but this Is unlikely because of higher priority Sovieton other fronts.

oviet military involvementegionalaside fromlient, would hingeariety of factors. These include Soviet political stakes In tho situation, the attitude of other states In the region, and Ihe nature of US Involvement Also, the operational envlionment for thc Indian Oceanand olher Soviet forces in the region has changed over the last several years. Many of these clianges have been unfavorable for Moscow. The situation In Iran has led to greater cooperation among the Culf nates, and the United States has eiparaded its naval presence and broadened military relations with states In the region. In addition, Moscow mayilemma In regional conflicts. For eiample. in the Iran-Iraq war, Moscow and lta allies have provided arms lo both belligerents This creates friction, and, despite Urge

quantities of Soviel arms, Iraq has not moved sign in -canlly closer lo lhe Soviel Union.

f escalation of thr Iran-Iraq wai resulteduildup of Western military forces In support of Iraq, Moscow would publicly caution ihc West against attacks and linn would attempt lo take credit (or preventing attacks on Iranianignificant increase in Western airpower in lhe region probably would lead lo air and air defense units in the southern USSR being placed on alert Limited Westernagainst Iranian airtVeldi or ports probably would result in increased Soviet air and air defense activity and the alert of Soviet airborne and ground forces in the miliiary districts bordering Iran. Before the Soviet Indian Ocean Squadron could seriously challenge Western naval forces in the area, threaten US sea lines of communication, oreaningful contribution to any Soviet land campaign in the Southern TVD, It would require substantialHowever, any Soviet Incentive to Intervene with Its naval forces against the West would also bcby their concernonfrontation could lead to broader bostilitles with the West, and thai such hostililies could escalate beyond the region.if the West deployed additional aircraft carriers to tbe region. Soviet cruise missile unils might also be augmented.

risis. Soviel naval airare likely to be significantly increasedbe augmented by morer evenD patrol pUnes stationed In Ethiopia andWhileew Boar D's would bewould enhance lhe over-tlic-horizon trackingcapabilities of the Indian Ocean Squadron.of Bear D's hat both benefits and risks:Soviet military credibility and the tackingregimes, but It also carries the riskother Arab states touildupand Otber Western forces oo their territory.

South Chino Seo rand Southeast Asia

9 Sino Vietnamese borderhasignificant buildup of Soviet,in the South China Sea, and Hanoi hastbe establishment of an important Soviet airlogistic and operations base In Vietnam.Soviet forcea have used facilities at HoCity, Da Natig, and Haiphong, thc focus ofhas been at Cam Ranh Bay where theysupport facilities for submarines,naval aircraft, communicalions. andton From this bate In Vietnam. Soviet forces

South China Sao Squadron

The number ol Soviet Navy uibmarines and wrface shies deploved lo Cam Hanh and lhe Soulh China Sea hai crownspecially durin< Iheran In IMS. Some! lore* lech ia ihneined aboul (our lubau'ioea.lo three surface com't and I* lo IS auiihaiiu The submarine form have ineludod nultrai-poweredmimle. nuclear-powered Inrpedo attack, and diesd. powered torpedo atljol lypcl In mid IBM.patrol hoaliSW liicates were deplored lo Cam Hanh. Improving capabilities (or eoaital defense

Construction al Cam Itanh Day continueswo pieri have been refurbished and four floating piers have been installed An athletic recreation area has been buill adiaccnl lo (be piers,earbysed for Soviet navalisi ration and limited Iwlletint; (amiiruetKMi al (be aiifceidunitions storageOLissile Storage area, cipansaon of the motor pool area, and barracks lhal coulddepending on how lhc Space is distnbutedsiiMjgc and iHilitmw

monitor US and Chinese military forces in thc region and support Soviet deployments lo lhe Indian Ocean. The offensive poteniial of Soviet forcesUS miliiary planning in the region.

oviet naval aviation capabilities also have been substantiallyomposite squadron of eight long-range Bear aircraft la now stationed at Cam Ranh, twice the number deployedhis squadron includes foureconnaissance aircraft and fourSW aircraft Abo. Inquadron-sized unit ofadgers deployed to Cam Ranh. This second composite squadron currently includes five Badger missile strike aircrafl. twoone reconnaissance variant, and one electronic warfare support variant. Some air-to-surface missiles and loading equipment have been identified inThe arrival of lhe Badgers not only expanded Soviet reconnaissance capabilities, but also constituted the first deployment of Soviet bombers with air-to-stirface missiles outside the Warsaw Pacthese bombersew dimension to Sovietcapability In the region (See)

be Soviet Navy base at Cam Itanh nowtbe largest coocentralion of Soviet snips routinely deployed at any facility outside ihe Soviet Union. Tbis typically totalsohips. Rather than const rue* ins extensive facilities ashore, the Soviet Navy generally reliesroup of depot and support ships lo provide replenish ment and maintenanceheof support ships and craft lias grown and nowepairtores barge, fuel barges, oceangoing tugs,ubmarine tender,alvage ship,e perming ship.'

* DeittiBUoe rnlm-raifnehe lUnaiuir ul ihlia. dim rrduc-

Iflfl their ebaim ol hrtm ilrfeel'd

J

a SICINT site was track US forces in the South China Sea, Philippine Sea, and eastern Indian Ocean Subsequently, two additional SICINT sites have been established in Vietnam.

A small naval infantry security force abo has been stationed at Cam Ranh Bay.aval infantry obstacle course has bren constructed there for training The growing Soviet presence at Cam Ranh Baylhal the Soviet naval infantry security force there may be cipanded

Despite disagreements, the Soviet-Vietnamese alliance is unlikely to rupture any time soon. Vietnam Is heavily dependent on the USSB for military and economic aid and for backing againsi China.oviet miliiary and economic aid lo Vietnam has never totaled less thanillion per vcar However, there are some drawbacks for Moscow to thcSrMet-Vlet names* military relationship Ita substantial economic burden as wellignificant obstacle In Sino-Soviet relations. It also undermines Soviet efforts to improve relations with those Southeast Asian nations that are threatened by Vietnam's Increased military capability. On the other hand, most Southeast Asian nations, particularlyconsider China to be the long-term threat. Although concernedrowing Soviet military presence in the region, ihese counlries rely on lhe United States to counter the Soviet threat

oviet use of Cam Ranh Bay will increase More naval units will be deployed to Vietnam, and an operational naval squadron has probably been formed. Construction Indicatesomposite regiment ofoircraft probably will be stationedase of this sire and scope would require additional air defenses; therefore, deploymentoviet fighter squadron is likely. More advanced training, including

*

Figure 16

Soviet Naval Air Coverage rrom Vietnam

(Kv ol bombing ranges, is probable. Wc abo mas see increased stockpiling of supplies, fuel,and weapons in support Soviet forces in Vietnam In addition. Soviet ail operalions mav use additional airfields such as Plan Rang, An increased Soviel navallso may include additional submarine dc liim mciils and njvnl repaii (ncililieir wm)

<J> licvond Vieinam. the prospectsaddilioiwl Suiicthc liast Asia-Pacific region arc poor. Soviet naval ships call on Kampuchea from lime to time, but Khmer ports arc poorly developed and noi writ located so there is no seiious Soviet interest in Stationing Iwccs tn the country. Soviet probtria foiand economic access in the South Pacific

12

is likelyontinue, but these efforts are not likely to be successful, and we do not anticipate Soviet military access elsewhere in the region.

Sooie* Militant Rerponsci in the Southeast Alia Region.imited conflict involvine only regional powcis such as China and Vietnam. Soviet forces could till the balance- From Cam Ranh. Soviel aircraft and naval forces could threaten the southern coastal areas of China and deter or defend against hostile Chinese naval operalions in lhe South Chinaan assault against the Spralley Islands.

eneral war. Soviet forces in Vietnam could not prevent US military operations in lhe area. Soviel forces in Vietnam axe not well defended. However, they could provide monitoring and targetingto other Soviet forces. Badger aircraft could attempt limited strikes against US forces in the region at the outsetar. Soviet submarines and surface combatants also could attack US forces and shipping. These combined actions could disrupt important sea lanes,ignificant portion of US and Western strike forces, and delay military actions elsewhere.

Caribbean ond Central and Soulh America

is the hub of Soviet involvement inHemisphere, and continued Sovietof facilities in Cuba seems vhtually guaranteed,at current Jeveb, in view o( Castros dosewith the Soviet leadership andheavy debt to Moscow. Withoutaid and trade subsidies. Havana wouldpressed to meet even basic consumptionneeds. This economic support,overillion annually, ls equivalent to overof Cuba's real output and exceeds thesupplies to all other Third World clientMoreover, virtually all of Cuba'sand supplies are provided by the

n recent years, the Soviet focus in the region has been on upgrading Cuban military eapabililies. Soviet military assistance to Cuba jumped fromillion72 millionuba has receivedetX air defense command and control equipment, three diesel .attack submarines, twofour modern Und-based ASW helicopters,issile attack boats, nine Tuiya-class hydrofoilboats, and two amphibious landing craft,ide variety of other weapons

oth thc level of Soviet military presence and thc scope of Soviet activities In Cuba have steadily increased over the last two decades. Following the abortive placement of missiles and bombers in Cubamall Soviet Ground Force contingent was gradually expanded to brigadeoviet sis nals intercept facility was establishedurdes in thend has grown to become the largest and most Important such facility outside the Soviet Union. Soviet naval task group visits began9 and typically involve two principal surface cumbalanls. an oiler, and.ubmarine, deployed to thc Caribbean aboutear. The most recentincluded for thc firstoskva-classcruiser and an Udaloy-clast ASW destroyer. Soviet naval aviation deployments to Cuba beganuch deployments now typicallyair of Bear D's.air of Bear F's. which generally remain for two to four weeks and conduct several missions per deployment.eparate facility for supporting up to eight Bear aircraft was established at thc Cuban Air Force airfield at San Antonio de las Banco.oviet militarycurrently arc in Cuba, includingdvisers Direct communications with the SovietStaff are maintained using both satellites and long-haul, high-frequency communications.

OS. Several types of military activities areIrom Soviet facilities in Cuba, induding SICIMT. airborne naval reconnaissance and ASW missions, and naval ship replenishment.^

INT site probably will continue to grow wboth size and Importance.

ovieteconnaissance andSW aircraft deployed to Cuba periodically conductrecormalssance missions and collect intelligence. They also monitor US naval exercises, traffic from some US east coast naval bases, and US missile tests at

33

Cape Canaveral In addition, they conduct training and collection mission* ana inn Trident SSBN. in local operating area* olTBay, Georgia These Soviet aircraft can provide timely intelligence on US military movement* fromm and ports Soviet Bear deployments lo Angola also have been staged through Cuba since thc loss of air access rights to Cuinea7 Weradual increase in the frequency and number of Soviet naval aircrafl deployed to Cuba.

he Sonetuba serves mainly loymbolic military presence in the absenceirmer commitment to defend Cuba. It abo provides local security for Soviet Installations. The brigade does not assist in training Cuban forces, although it has conducted joint exercises on at least one occasion. We do not believe lhat the unit has any broader roles In the region. Construction activities indicate that theikely to receive addittotul equipment and probably will slightly Increase In size toroops In the near future.

A major Soviel interest tn Cuba is to protect the Castro regime Therefore, bold changes In the Soviet military posture in Cuba could beThey would significantly alter neither the balance of strategic forces nor the regionalbalance. Furthermore, upgrading Cuban forces provides many of the same benefits that might be derived from staging more capable Soviet forces in Cuba, withouttrong US response, ll also sustains Castro's dependence upon the USSR, assuring his continued cooperation in providing militaryto pro-Soviet regimes

Soviet peacetime naval deployments to Cuba will probably increase In scope and frequency.may test US thresholds of acceptance by more frequent submarine port calls and extended submarine deployments to the Caiibbean Minor logisticresulting from increased deployments of Soviet cruise and ballistic missile submarines off the US coasts could be eased by calls in Cuban ports. But as long as the US response lo early Indications of any future probing remains as fiim as it wase believe thai Moscow will coniinue to bc dissuadedolicy of supporting missile submarines in Cuban ports.

We do not anticipate the Introduction of any new offensive Soviet manned weapons Into Cuba that would increase the threat to US fences. In particular, emplacement of ballisticighly unlikely. Instead, we espeet that the Soviets will continue to provide Cuba with more modern defensive weapon

systems, including coastal naval units, fighters, and SAMs Unless the United Stales makes strongMoscow may well provide Cuba withong-range SAMs In any event, as Cuban defensive capabilities ineiease. the costS Strike against the aland will increase cor ics pood ing it "

here is an additional view specific to the obviously very confrontational Soviet option to placen Cuba Although It is currently unlikely that the Soviels would placen Cuba in tlie near future, the possibility still eiisls and, because of the great danger which It poses, warrants continuinc consideration. There is stillralionale for suchalthough they are not likely until after the US electionhe Soviel leadership, while aware of the potentially great risks Involved in deployingo Cuba, is abo cogniiant of, and might be tempted by, the significant political (andesser extent military) gains lhat would be achieved if the United States were forced lo back downecond Cuban missile crisis. Furthermore, given the sumificantly different US-Soviet military balance today comparedovietight anticipate tbat another Cuban missile Crista, In conjunction with renewed Soviet declarationsesire to negotiate, would prompt West European leaders lo pressure the United States to withdraw thu Pershing II missiles and would split US opinion rather thantrongin favor of US military actlon.Q

3

Apart from any roleS-Soviet conflict, Cuban capabilities for regional power protection are improving Currently. Cuban airlift and sealiftandupport several thousand troops In Central America. These capabilities will Improve with the introduction ofeavy-lift transport aircraft, and will represent an increasing threat of intervention and intimidation to other countries in thc region. Allhough majorwould be unlikely If Castro anticipatesUS military opposition. Cuban forcebv themselves may force the United States and other countries in tlse region to Increase further their own miliiary capabilities.

Elsewhere In Latin America, we expect to see song-term Soviet efforts lo support revolutions and.

wr. Uihrar* Suat&ov Oyasaru /or

1 ThUaMrUor Ckltj ef Sag for fnlefff-gence.of rfcr Army

where thev lake hold, attempt lo prevent iheitSalvador and Nicaragua being examples ol these two approaches. Direct involvement of Soviet combat forces in the region Is highly unlikely.Soviet military assistance, at well as political and economic activities, can provide importantDiplomatic and commercial activities arcaspects of Soviet efforts to support revolutionaries The Soviet diplomatic presence in Latin America has increased byersonnel over the past decide, whileoviet commercialhave been added.inimum, this growing Soviel presence improves intelligence collectionand potential for subvertion.

Moscow's cautious approach toward Nicaragua has been most apparent in the way thc Soviets base handled their arms relationship with the Sandinistas. From the first secret visit of Soviet generals toone month after thc SandinistaMoscow has sought to obscure and play down its military dealings with Nicaragua.

Soviet military equipment deliveries tohave been under waylthough this equipment frequently Is transported by third parties. The initial deliveryanks, for example, was made by Algerian ships. Since then. Soviet tanks, armored personnel carriers, and other equipment have been delivered by Bulgarian merchant ships.elicopters, small arms, and military-relatedhowever, are usually transpoited by Soviet vessels.

While taking steps to minimize and obscure tlieir direct involvement, the Soviets nonetheless seek to provide the Sandinistas with enough militaryto sustain and consolidate their power.oviet military and security advisers continue to work with the Sandinista security service and the genera) staff. Moscow presumably views such assistance as essential in the struggle against the anti-Sandinbta insurgents anday of further consolidating thc leftist regime in Managua against potential political opponents

The completion of tlie large airfield at Punta Hueta. Nicaragua, will give the SovieU additional options for military access. The alrbose will be the largest In the region and capable of accommodating any aircraft In the Soviet Inventory. Including heavy transports and reconnaissance aircraft. Should the Sandinista regime provide access, thc Soviets would be

able lo deployeconnaissance andSW aircrafl to Nicaragua within lhe next year. However, such basing would only add areas west of Mexico and Central America lo ihose regions already accessible lo Soviet maritime patrol aircraft We do notit litis limited military advantage is sufficient forto risk thc US response inherent in this step.

The increasing militarization cf Centralwill be among the consequences of Soviet. Cuban, and Nicaraguan activities In suppoit ofCoveren is will be compelled to spend more on security and this will compound already difficult economic and social problems, furthering Soviet goals of fostering instability in llie region

Moscow will attempt to improve relations with olher Latin American governments through arms sales, but the prospects for closer military ties are not good. Since the US rescue operation In Grenada, Suriname and other countries have become wary of developing dose ties with the USSR. Abo, thc loss of Crenadaotable reversal for Moscow.

Currently. Peru is thc only South American country that has bought Soviet arms, and continued generous Soviet arms offers will probably result In additional purchases, particularly for the Army.on foreign military purchases placed oo Peru by thc International Monetary Fund have made it difficult for Peru to buy Western arms, even though lhe military leadership in Peru, for the most part, prefers to diversify arms sources and buy from the United States Even wiih additional arms purchases from the USSR, the military relationship with Moscow is unlikely to grow to the point that Moscow will gain military access to Peru during the period of this Estimate

IH. In Argentina, Soviet assistance in developing two 6shlng ports could have future militarySoviet designs reportedly call for depths that exceed those normally required lor liming vessels. These ports are to be used extensivdy by Soviet fisliing vessels. We believe any Soviet military ute of thesextremely remote, however, since It wouldajor change in Argentine policy toward the Soviet Union.

ocVel hlilSlaru Retponter In Ihe Lalin American Region.The use of Cuba by Soviet forces offers Moscow significant Indications and warning, air and surface tracking, and some targeting information In peacetime. In time of crisis, thb Information would be even more vital, but Castro might restrict the more visible forms of support to Soviet ships and aircraft.

33

Tablc 4

Selected lirmi in the Cuban Military Inventory-

Ire*

diB

iV.'n

tuiiol boo.

I

elm

ttus

M(l)

II clj

oo elm

14

DC

Alraacs

ISI

eptember IBM

idiliilonjl VO eaHr-inoddt- In am

MIC-tS tnonon.

' Cut*u thee*nd ae-enl ooaea mill rwHh-

i, with cither Air Force or CubanlrtinrUnci

'T-oIL-6E, ud amoa Lrur Iron iht USSR

lOrdr Iwo or lhror of lhe IL-li. ar* oparuloaal

> Dra not twtatfe cat Welur. rvbaurto* that hi

risis we would eipect neither the deployment of Soviet naval combatants to Cuba nor the renforcement of forces already deployed there.eneral war. il is doubtful that Soviet activities more vblble lhan passive SICINT support could continue under tha threat of US military force. Soviet Cround Forces already deployed to Cuba would be difficult to withdrawar, and have little potential for combat

side from the Soviet forces ln Cuba, the Cuban forces themselves have become an increasingly Important factor In theists major items In the current Cuban air and naval Inventory

ME< TV Cmbmm Mater. aWaW Ortim.formmn rawaotetf aasstssaafcaiti

.oinAID-Wim. . i

Cuban mcderTiizabon raises the coats of US military responses. It could require diversion of considerable air and naval resources to protect US reinforcements to Europe. Any resulting delays could be critical in Europe.

n thc eventaior NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. Moscow is likely to try to persuade Cuba to interdict US sea lanes in the western Atlantic and thc Caribbean. While Cuban foices may engage In low-level harassment and sabotage. Including covert efforts against the Panama Canal, they are unlikely toovert major strikes against the United States or Its forces unless provoked. In Castro's view, overt actionthe United States would probably result In national suicideajor US-Soviet conflict.Cuba is rnore likely to maintain silence or proclaim neutrality.

-tXKntr -

Atlonlic ond Weil Africa

lthough Sub-Sa ha ran Africa it of limited economic and stiategie value lo the USSH. II docs provide some payoffs: acquisition of com modi ties, gaining Influence wllh retional slates at the expense of the West and China; and. especially. gaining access to naval and air facilities.

oviet forces first became involved in West Africa in response to crises Naval units resporvled lo Ghanaeizure of Soviel fohang vessch9 and reacted to frequent requests for support bvresident Sekou Toure frdlowing raids by exiles0 ihere hasontinuous Soviet naval presence in thc West African waters of the south Atlantic. (Seeoscow usuallyve- lo seven-ship West Africa patrol in the south Atlantic. In addition. Bear II naval teconnalssance aircraftfly from Luanda Into patrol areas off thc African coast that range as far north as Gabon, as far west as Ascension, and as far south as the southern tip of South Africa. Soviet VTA aircraft abo stop over in Cuinea en route to Angola Altogether. Soviet military involvement in the region serves several purposes including: protecting lhc Soviet fashing Beet;shipping passing around the Cape of Good Hope; providing support for the continuous Bow of Soviet military assistance to Angola, demonstrating support for the Angolan regime; facilitaiing tbe transit of Soviet forcesrisis, and supporting Soviet efforts to establish pro-Soviet regimes In the legion.

Support to Angola has been thc top Soviet priority in this regionhen the Popular Movement for tlte Liberation of Angola (MPLA) came to power with eileruivo Soviet and Cuban military assistance. Angola Is important to Moscow for several reasons. The Kremlin would like to install leftist governments throughout southern Africa, and Moscow values Its access to Angolan nulitaiy facilities.

Moscow hasonsiderable degree of influence over the Government of Angola, butcorioniic and counterlruurgency aid and tbe support of0 Cuban troops in country have been insufficient lo maintain internal security In lhe face of an active insurgency. Thus. Soviel access to Angolan facilities may be In Jeopardy. Both Cuba and lhe Soviet Union have had to Increase tJvetr military assistance to Angola. Within tlte last year Cubaroops, and several thousand additional Cuban military personnel in Ethiopia may redeploy toSoviet assistance abo has been upgraded in thc last few years For canmple, fiveitter aircraft

West Airlco Patrol

Tlw West Africa patrol dales0 and usually includes one or two surface combatants, one altack submarine, one amphibious unil. one mine-warfare ship, one or Iwo research slnpi. and several auiitiaries. The minesweeeper mainly pal rob lhe fishing areas off northwesi Africa. The patrol provides demonstrations of support for friendly regimes and conducts ceremonial port calls that, on occasion, include transiting Soviet ships. Thef Luanda provides llie primsrv source of loczitic support for llie Sovid Navy's West Africa patrol, and Luanda's airfield servestaging base lor Soviel long-range reconnaissance aircraft thaipairol Ihe South Atlantic Ocean

were provided inltogether,oviet military advisers arc posted to AngcJa-

The complex situation In Angola couldImpelithdrawal or stepped-upon the part of Cuba and the USSH. Currently there are no signsithdrawal If the security situation deteriorates further, Moscow probably would stop short of sending its own ground combat troops to Angola during the next year, butossibility it would send additional advisers. The chances ofSovielincluding pilots and air defenseincrease if, in the long run. Cuban forces are unable to stabilize the military situation. Overall, Moscow realizesajor test of its ability to champion Third World Marxist nations has taken shape in southern Africa.*

The death of President Sekou Toure4 raises the possibilityurther reduction ol Soviet access to Cuinea. Soviet support for Toure0mall naval presence that eventuallytbc West Africa patroL3 periodic naval reconnaissance sorties were flown from Conakry, but these were terminated by Toureoscow is likely to retain landing rights for VTA flights en route to Angola and replenishment of Soviet naval ships at Conakry. But Soviet reconnaissance flights fromare unlikely to be reestablished under the new regime

In Cape Verde, the Soviet Navy has shown continued interest in acquiring access to port facilities and airfields, including requests toomplete Soviet naval base. Soviel military access to Cape Verde, however, is unlikely because of the strong ties of thc blatids to thc West

'See SNIEnaola- AWrermuraary

otcatr

oscow .Iso Im* made overtures lo Benin. Ghana. Sao Tome and Principe, Congo, Equatorial Cuinea. Guinea-Bissau. Central African nepubtlc. and Mali in atlempts lo develop additional access in thc area. Of these, Ghana holds the most promise, but to date, none of the Soviet eflmis have met with success.

Soviel Capabilities; How Do New Developments Affect Soviet Global Militory Reach?

126 Soviet force modernization has resulted in improved capabilities for distant military opeislkmS-However, the priority of the European Theater in Soviet military planning limits the foices available for deployments abroad, and (he preponderance of Soviet forces are trained and configuredar with NATO In Europe. Nevertheless^ the newer. Urge surface combatants sueh as the nuclear-poweredcruiser and the Kiev-class vertical takeoff and landing (VTOL) carriers enhance Soviet capability to concentrate military power beyond the periphery of the USSR. Abo.5 the Soviet Navy hasapability for amphibious assault lilt to distant areas and improvements have been made In Soviet airlift capabilities. UnlU thehere were no heavy lilt transport aircraft in the Soviet inventory- Since then, theas been introduced, and the airlift capacity has nearly doubled. Two hospital ships have been acquired by thc Soviet Navy and are used to suppotl naval deployments in the Indian Ocean and South China Sea Such hospital ships could provide valuable supportegional conflict. Additional developments will further improve Soviet capabilities for distant miliury operations. Some of theseare discussed below.

Arriol Refueling

oviel aerial refueling capabilities arcand Include developmentalandid tankers and Soviet laclica! fighter aircraft configured for air-to-air refueling. With appropriate staging rights, thii capabilily could facilitate distantof fighter squadrons. It could lead to anIn Soviet capabilities to provide air cover for distant mihtary operations, such as In the Mediter-ranean serial lefueling has not been dasaaasstgkldfor power projection purposes, and refueling will providearginal improvement In Soviet capabilities for distant deployments over the neat five toears

lher early applications ol aerial refueling probably will Includeainstay airborneand control system (AWACS) aircrafl Miliiary airlift airciaft aho may be adapted for aerial relueling in order lo eitend their reach Both the AWACS and tanker appbcationi could be involved in future Soviet distant military operations. We estimate llulanken will be operational*5 Theybe an important addition to lhe current Soviet tanker force, which consists ofir Force Bison and Badger bombers plusavy Badger bombcri lhat were convened lo provide aerial refueling to (he aging Bear and Badger bomber force.1'

Mereheml Flqei

he plans and activities of thebip Soviet merchant fleet. Morflot. are closely coordinated to ensure the rapid transfer of merchant shipping for mihtary requirements. Soviet merchant ships In some cases are built to military standards. Incorporateelectronic equipment, and participate In military eicrciseterchant ship was(or VTOL operations.

merchant ship has since been reconverted, but "if thc Soviets were lo lake up the program, there are overoviet RO-RO ships that could be slmilaHy modified. However, there areInsufficient VTOL aircraft In the Sovietlo provide moreoken effort foriogram

he Central Military Transportation Dnector-ale (VOSO) coordinates the military use of merchantomputerized management system is used to maintain control and location data on all Soviet merchant ships worldwide. Every Soviet shipping agencyaval headquarters contingent to plan and coordinate rapid conversions oF merchant ships for military use. For example, during3 Middle Eastoviet merchant ships were rapidly mobilized and deliveredons of military cargo to Libya. Syria, and Egypt In aboutays. Similar, though much smaller, emergency sealifts de-livered military suppi.es to Angola5 and to Etksiopiaoviet merchant veaseb have delivered miliury cargo to Third World ports, some ol which are unimproved.oviet ships

" Itetudiiia [uutm wrre removed IromUh il* Untied Staler to limit lhe MraconllncMat poltMlalllie BaokBre, bul ihey could be rrinriakVrf In aboul iii

houu

-SECftCT-

onboard cargo-hand ling capabilities lorcargoeavyton Soviet medium tanks In addition.assenger ships have been used to rotate Soviet and Cuban lorces abroad. Soviet merchant ships under naval subordination abo providef the logistic suppori to deployed Soviet naval ships. Q

3

Airlift

he number of aircraft in the Soviet Military Transport Aviation's inventory has stabiliied al. However, lhe range and payload capabilities of the VTA fleet have improved sigrsificantly over ibe last several years. These improvements have been mainlyesult of the introduction ofandid

transport aircraft to replace the agingubheimilar to thend is becoming the backbone of the VTA. It can carry twice the payload weight lo about live times the range of anhich is similar to the. Over SOock aircraft abo are included in the VTA inventory. Thehe only VTA aircraft lhat can carry Unks or tracked missileIn addition, we anticipate the new Condorwill enter production7; is expected to liave characteristics similar to thcA. VTA capabilities for personnel transport are augmented as needed with Aeroflot aircraft

uring the past two decades, the Sovietto rapidly Initiate large-scale, long-durationoperations throughout the Middle East and Africa has been demonstrated cm several oceaiinm This was

-fcfcnef--

Figure 19

Soviet Military Transport Aviation Maximum Payload Capacity

Thousand! of Kilogrami

?1

particularly evident in the operations mounted by VTA in support of the Arab states in73 Middle Fast wars. In both instatves. theveete performed almost exclusively by VTA transport aircraft. Involved round trips of upautical miles, and were launched on abort notice, Maior Soviet airlifts to the Third World are summa-riled in annex C

onetheless, problems will continue to limit Soviet airlifts Soviet air access to most of the Third World involves overflight of Yugoslavia. Turkey, Iran, or Pakistan Thus, denial of overflight could present major problems for thc USSR. Soviet aircrafl have been forced to adopt longer, less efficient routes when overflight clearances were denied. In particular.Iran, arsd Pakistan have sometimes been reluctant to grant clearances for Soviet military transports- In some Instances, loch as the emergency airliftoviet aircraft disregarded overflight instructions from local authorities. SubseQuendy.Southwest Asian states lefused to grant clearances for unscheduled Soviet flights lo Vietnam This forced

tlie rerouting of several flights lo Vietnam through llie Soviet Far hail lo thc Pacific Ocean, addingO nm to the route from Moscow. In addition. VTA AN'-l'i due lo be rotated back to the USSR were forced to remain in Vietnam well beyond iheirtours because of overflight clearance restrictIn general, however, most states essential for overflight want lo remain on correct terms with Moscow and would be reluctant lo deny overflights oi inspect suspicious cargo in transit.

3

size and limitations posefor Soviet airlifts to Ihe Third World.line capabilities often are the majorin conducting airlifts Most of theused bv Soviet miliiary aircraft havefuel Storage toajor militarybecause of lhe large axe of transportquickly exhaust parking (pace, limiting lheof aircraft that can be on the ground at anyLow aircrew-to-aircraft ratios in VTA unitslimitation, along with the inability ofaircralt to carryed cargo such as Unkslaunchers. But many of tliese problems wiilwith expected Improvements In VTA.

without overflight restrictionsadequate refueling en route, the VTAcould airlift the combat and combat supportof one Soviet airborne division to Syria into Aden withinays, aadaysingle, unopposed lift Thefor surge delivery of an airbornem because of thelimits of the VTA force. Thus, It is Lnpcxlarrt

"d vW UN IfTl US all Litkraal, fual AaUrn became enUral at tr* alrtVtoV At taka AJrfiaU In tbe Amen,owe

etric torn ai lurl -era uod dally diirtivj the peakf

lbc airlift,. the linrcn r. of aircraft ant ine tn

tiiael on anv one Sayo it'llnn ol materialsraelorn ot lurl

Ioi (lie VTA (oroc lo have refueling local ions availablem for long range operations.

Soviet Novo' Infantry

137 Over the past four yean, the Soviel NjvalSNI) has been leerranirre! and provtded with more sophisticated SAM systems, additional tanks, armored personnel carriers, and artillery.esult, the firepower available at the brigade level hasby overercent There also hasrowth ofroops In each SNI brigade; however, the Soviet Navy gill lacks adequate assault lift SNI capabilities also have improved with lhe introduction of two Ivan Rogov-clasi large amphibious ships with complement! including five helicopters and two large air-cushion vehicles. The construction ol these ships proceeded slowly and ended because of design problems after the second unit was bunchedlie SNI Is expected to eipand from00 men lo0 men over the neat Evee believe that the anticipated construction ol* amphibious assault ships still wiB not provide adequate lift for tbe SNI. In tome eaercises. however, the Soviets have used, in addition lo assault hit ships, modern merchant ships to cany SNI troops. Soviet amphibious ships with SNI aboard are routinely deployed to the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean, thc South Atlantic od West Africa, and Vietnam. SNI forces have participated in ibint landingwith South Yemenyriaietnam and possibly Ethiopia4 Future SNIarc likely to continue to be small,en on board amphibious ships, althoughan Ivan llogov-class ship deploys withaval infantry. There arc shore-based SNIat Dahlak Island. Ethiopia, and Cam Ranh Bay. Vietnam, for local security. The detachment in Viet-nam may be expanded in the near fuiure

Air borne forces

oviet airborne forces currently total at0 troops and are organized into eight divisions (seven ready divisions and one trainingne entire ready dlvbion from Vitebsk and the majority of units subordinate to another division, headquartered at Fergana, are deployed to Afghanistan Soviet airborne divisions are directly under the operational control of the Soviet Ceneral Stall aod thus readily availableariety of millions. The primary mission of Soviet airborne forces Is to conduct operations In enemy rear

" Thu coeipaiM toritiiharlnea

areas. Significant improvements in organic firepower, mobility, and air transporlability of those forces over lhc laif several years have enhanced their capability to conduct their primary mission and to be usedower protection role.er ado. however, are Outpacing lhe capability of VTA lo move these heavier airborne divisions Airlift support for either lhe para-drop or air landing of Soviet airborne troops and their equipment it provided by VTA.TA aircrafl sorties are required lo Irani port one entire airborne division or thc combat clcrnenls of sii HMD-equipped regiments

oviet airborne forces could have important potential for distant miliiary operations against limited oppositionilitary response Is required on short notice- Soviet airborne forces were called upon during the invasion of Hungarynd of Afghanistanhey have been alerted during various crises In die Middle East, and emigres have reported thath Guards Airborne Divisionontingency mission there. Airborne forces could bc partuture rapid deployment force that one Soviet source has reported is under consideration in Moscow. Such forces most likely would be used toetcagurcd client or tooviet ground combat force presencerisis area before the West can respond, thus railing tbe stakes for Western intervention.

b not likely, however, thai Sovietnaval Infantry forces would conduct maioroperations against modernoutside tlie contesteneral war.training, and doctrine generally focususe as partarger combined-armsSoviet expectations that airborneoperate In conjunction with other forcesindependent airborne operations intoareas are highly unlikely if serious resistanceunless such forces are sent lo deter

Special-Purpose Forces

USSR maintains several types oforganized, and equipped special -that could contribute lo Soviet power proThe Soviet special-purpose forcescomponent elements of the inteUlgeoceservice* or special military unitsthdr control, and Include: MVDof special designation; KGB, Departmentand sabotage teams; selectedunder operational control of the KGB; and CRU

42

Intelligence Directorate ol (he Ceneial Staff) Special-Purpose Troops (Spetsnai) The bullc ol the special-puipoie (wees is composed ef aboutRUome Soetsnaa troops are organized into brigadesen assigned to front and arms' levels Other Spetsnai brigades are found in most military districts and groups of forces and in each of the four Soviet Beets. The main missioni ol these troops are Inielligence TOHection and direct attacks against sole:led targets in the enemv rear area. They also have been usedimited extent In special operations und to provide unconventional warfare training to Third World insurgents and to some groups that conduct terrorist operations. Spetsnai troopsinitial Soviet operations in Afghanistan and are still active there. Teams were deployed to Kabul sii months before the actual Soviet invasion and prepared the way for the Invasion by sdiing Afghsncenters, arresting key miliiary officers,tho palace, and killing many members of the Presidential Guard and President Aniln's personal staff during the assassination of Amin by the KCB. It is unlikely, however, that Spetsnai forcea would be employed In the Third World in Isolation without the commitmentarger Soviet military force, except to provide training and technical assistance or to conduct highly specialized operations, such as rescuing hostages

Toe Ileal Air Support

actical air support for distant militaryhasajor Soviet shortcoming but several developments will improve the situation. For example, Moscow has been exploring ways of providing ship-based air supportarge navallev-clasi carrieroskva-class helicopter cruiser provided modest air support for thelanding. In,ton nuclear-powered aircraft carrier designed for conven-tional takroff-and-landing {CTOL) aircraft will offer improvements over tbe limitations of the Kiev-class carriers. For example, thcoTOL Forger aircraft on each Kiev-class carrier are neither all weather nor air refuelable. are subsonic, carry little ordnance, and seldom train In air-to-air combatThe new elan aircraftstimated to bc capable of carrying fromoigh performancelso, the InDoduction of the Helix Bauault helicopter will improve the Soviet Navy's capability to provide gunfire support. In addition, the introduction of aerial refueling for some tactical eir-

"ii;>w, io aboutiraafl onennedy dan nntei

craft with longer ranges would marginally increase Soviet capabilities lo provide land-based tactical aii support

Ctebol Coovnond ond Control

ince tl* th. Soviet military com. manders have had available communications andsystems to control military operationslobal scale. Part of this system Includes Sovietcommunicalions farilities in support to MACs and in mine isei, Soviet naval and ground forcea, In Cuba, Vielrum, Syria, Ethiopia, South Yemen, andariety of developments over the next decade will significantly enhance the Soviet command and control network. AWACS capabilities have been improved with the introduction of tbe newodel which could be sent to crisis areas to bolster local air dele rues, to demonstrate Soviet concern, and to augment existing lone-range air reconnaissance, efforts. Secure, rdlable, and redundant globalare Increasingly available to Soviet units and miliiary advisory groupscries ofcommunications and data relay satelliteAirborne command posts can communicate wtth foreign deployed Soviet forces. Byeosyixrirorsous global navigation system (CLONASS) will aid ships and aircraft In determining theirto within abouteters anywhere in the world Also byew geceynchronous weather satellite system will provide timely data far global forecasting Over thc next five toears, Improved photograplile and SICINT satellites pluselectro-optical imaging satellites will provide nearly globs! intelligence collectionore timely basis. In addition, Soviet allies will increasingly benefit from Soviet space systems. Satellite coaimunication ground stations, for example, have been provided to Afghanistan. Cuba. Vietnam, and Laos. Nicaragua and Irao arc expected lo receive satellite ground stations in the next few years.

Military Significance of Soviet Force, ond Facilities Abroad

e do not believe that Soviet forces abroad currentlyajor part In Soviet general war mihtary doctrine, which remains focused oo tbemission of strategic defense of the homeland. Nevertheless, the steady increase In size, capability, range of operations, and scope of activity of Soviet forces abroad over the lastean provides global mllilarv capabilities Moscow did not previously possess and which must now. be considered in any future

-rStOttl-

--MOrfcf-

However. Soviet forces routinely do-ployed abroad are now. and will remain for the period of this Estimate, too few and too weak to engage in dbtant power projection as dcGned in thb Estimate.

ilitary programs and operational patterns thai are intended mainly lo support Sovici poliiical goab in tlie Third World also haveilitary significance thai varies considerably from place to place. The significance also varies with changing conditions of peace, crisis, and war. In peacetime competition with lhe West. So-icl forces and facilities abroad generally.

Prnvide intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance.

Provide regime suppori tu Soviet allies, including arms, advice, training, and demonstrations of force.

Protect Soviel interests abroad, especially (he large and wide-ranging tubing fleet

Conduct training against potential adversaries.

Support military research and development

risis or regional conflict, perceived as unlikely to escalateirect US-SovietSoviet forces abroad could:

Provide intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance.

Protect rapid resupply and military equipment delivery operations.

Rescue and evacuate personnel.

Plan and direct military operations by foreign forces.

Intervene with Soviet or allied military forces,

egional crisis, it may be difficult to detect tlie transition from military assistance and advisory roles to direct Intervention by Soviet forces or their allies. Crises are often characterized by Soviet airlift and scalift to provide large quantities of military equipment For example, in3 Middle East war.ons of military supplies were provided by Soviet ships to Egypt, Syria, and Libya within aboutt limes, military deUverics have also been accompanied by Increases In the Soviet advisory presence. L_

ilitary confrontation wild lhe Uniled Slates. Soviet foices currently depiovcd abroad could-

Western naval forces al lhe onset of hosililities

targeting and intelligence support.Delay some reinforcements

Divert some US military resources from priority missions elsewhere.

Disrupt some shipping.

However, we believe tliese efforts could not be long sustained

a crisb or military confrontation withSlates, we do not believe tho Sovietsany across-thc-boaid decisions onor the use of forces abroad.decisions svould be made afterof the;

Requirements for the forces elsewhere.

Miliiary utilities of operating forces from their prewar positions.

Threats to thc specific forces.

Willingness of host countries to allow Soviet -military operations or continued presence.

Likelihood of being able successfully to pull back forces or deploy additional forces to new

In any conflict involving the United States and the Sovietoviet forces deployed at long distances from the USSR would be most useful during thc transition lo war just prior to the opening of hostilities. Soviet intelligence, reconnaissance, andcapabilities abroad, as long as they survived and were not blocked by the host countries, could provide critical information on US forces.ar with the United States. Soviet forces deployed abroad are too few and too vulnerable to be militarilyduring prolonged combat operations, and, lo avoid becoming involved In an East-West conflict, many host countries would seek to deny the SovieU use of their facilities.

We believenlikely that Moscow would significantly reinforce its forces deployed abroad in live faceajor war wiih tlve West because of

riorinions close to liome. It alto would be difficult to susuin such forces because Utile Soviet miliiary equipment is stockpiled abroad

152 Although locae Soviet forces abroad might be withdrawn in the faceaior war. most would probably remain. Soviet and Cuban ground Iroops in foreign countries would probably remain because of the difficulty of transporting them out of foreign installations and their usefulness In performingintelligence functions Some air or naval units probably are in place abroad to conduct combat operations at the onset of hostilities. Soviel submarines, surface ships, and aircraft will strike high- value naval targets, and may attack sea and air lines ofthus forcing the United Stales to use lengthier routes or to divert combat elements Soviet forces could abo perform diversionary functions, seeking to distract, delay, and degrade Western forces to thc estent of their capabilities. Such efforts couldisproportionately large share of US strike resources tbat otherwise could be directed against targets in the Wanaw Fact

ajor war with the United Stales, Soviet responses would vary from region to region. Inwe would i

lhe Mediterranean, Soviet forces probably would be augmented with additional surface combatantsewhese forcei, supported by aircraft In tbc region and Irom ihe USSR, would quickly attack htgii'value targets at sea. Soviel air defense in Syria could provide additional support

the Indian Ocean. Soviet surface andforces probably would not be augmented.ircraft already In theontinue to Bv ASW missions. Bear Ds from the USSR could provide over-the-horizon targeting data to Soviet cruise misiile submarines to attack any Western naval forces In the region.ower priority mission, some forces could attack sea lines of communications (SLOCs) and oil routes If no US carrier task groups were present, the Soviet Navy might withdraw some naval forces.

rfwWiWarJ*r

m;lagSM Inoirltmuklam amfrymlium

Untied Sum bowUam antraldltnattd tn pauer'pht St ana" let. AanvdmrrV. etaragraph Ci. (here could be tubtUntul. Iirrte. or no omen to run of tht

Snuiin" depending on tin tltunulantn.

In Iht South China Sea, Soviet forces could provide monitoring and targeting Information, and Soviet lubmariflcs. surface combatants, and aircrafl also could attack US forces. US bases in lhe Philippines, and Western shipping, but could not prevent US military operations hi the area Nevertheless, these actions could disruptsea lanes, divert some US and Western forces, and delay mihtary actloni elsewhere. If no US carrier task groups were present, thc Sovicl Navy might withdraw some naval forces

lhe Caribbean, any Soviel naval surface task group near lhe area would be withdrawn to safei watcri if possible. Bear aircraft already deployed to Cuba would continue to operate as long as possible The SICINT site and other intelligence collection facilities would continue functionlnc unlil neutralized. These sites, along with Soviet reconnaissance aircraft could provide Indications and warning information to Maacow plusand targeting Information.

all other instances. Soviet deployed rjval forces. VTA contingents, and naval aircraft will piobably remain In tneir prewar locations and carry out missions at long as the risks are assessed to be acceptable.

Future Outlook

Potential Soviet Gains and losses

bc list of Third World countries that allow some significant Soviet military Involvement or access may change slightly In the next few years. The number of countries Is not likely to grow significantly, however, and could even decline. Nonetheless, the Soviets still view the Third World as the Achilles' heel of Ihe West, and will persevere in their efforts to enhance their power and influence there. The key instrument which Moscow uses to gain entree to the Third World will continue to bc miliury aid. Thc USSR canide range of military equipment at attractive prices and provide quick dolivery. These military assistance arrangements are oftenby Soviet advisers, technicians, and Instructors. Continuing needs for spare parts and maintenance create additional mihtary relationships Factors which facilitate Soviet entree arc

Insecurity- Soviet or Cuban military support provided to meet internal or citernal threats could evolve Into Soviet access to air and naval

farilities Thoountry relics oo the USSH and faces local threats, the ir rater wiD be the opportunity (or Soviet military access.

AmrWiton Some regimes tee* Soviet support for their own foreign ambitions, auch at Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea and Laos

n addition to those count no where the USSR already enjoys significant military access, Seychelles may permit the Soviets more eatensive military use of its facilities- Also, in West Africa there is potential for additional Soviet military access Elsewhere, inatsbility in the Thud World could lead to other opportunities, but we cannot predict where with anyew new countries may see value in accepting Soviet military assistance, while others are likely la become dissatisfied with theit relationships with tbc USSR because of the lack of economic aid. the age and sometimes poor tjuality of Soviet equipment, the costly maintenance arrangements, the unavsnlability of spare parts, or ether reasons. In any event, militarydoes not necessarily translate into Soviet military

ost countries will continue to prefer not to allow tlse Soviets military access. Theyoviet presencehreat Soviet ofSciab often areand thought to be KCB or military intelligence (CRU) operatives engaged In espionage andClose association with tlse USSR could also jeopardize economic and military ties with the West. Similarly, Third World countries often consider any foreign military presence inconsistent with national independence, particularly when their borders aie not threatened. Even thenly an effective inducement because these sums are not available from preferred source! or are available from Moscow at significantly less cost

l is by no means certain that aD pro-Soviet regimes can maintain power in their own countries.oviet client regime were to be overthrown by anti-Soviet insurgents, orompromise with the internal opposition by ousting Ihe Soviets, thefor Soviet picslige In the Third World would be advetse, but hard lo assess at thb stage We believe that, among those countries already per mil tine eimiliury access to the Soviets, setbacks are more likely lo occur in Angola, Guinea, or Ethiopia.

Ihe Bote Cose

ell into. Soviet forces deployed beyond contiguous arras will continue to lackoflensivc punch Political and military leaden in

Moscow will continue to consider NATO iho primary ihreal and prepare accordingly Thus, out-of-area naval deployment! will involve more capable uniti but remain modest, representing only aboutercent of ihe Sovietontinuout Soviet naval ptcaencc will be maintained in lhe Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean. llw South China Sea. and olf the coast of West Africa. Elsewhere, the Caribbean and the Philippine Sea are likely to have increased Soviet naval presence, although the presence may not be continuous Some additional strike airciafi probably will be deployed to Vietnam and perhaps elsewhere In particular,would like lo improve military access In lhe Indian Ocean and littoral Seychelles affords the best prospect for this In lhe Mediterranean region, token visits by Soviet strike aircraft to Syria and Libya are possible, bui neither routine not susUinedare likely. In the Western Hemisphere, we do not anticipate the introduction of any new offensive Soviet-manned weapons into Cuba thai would increase the threat to US force*."

lthough Soviet foreign deployments arclo be significantly more threatening over the neat decade, overall Soviet eapabililies for ditUnt military operalions on behalfoviet ally will improve subsUntiilly. VTA and Aeroflot capabilities to airlifl cargo and troops long distances will giow significantly. Sealift by amphibious and merchant shipsmproving Tbe Soviet Navy's capability for distant, sustained operations will be improved with Several new classes of principal surface combatants and submarines. Further improvements in naval ulr Suppori will be realized with the IntroductionTOL carrier and theeaborne assauliThe introduction of an aerial refuelingfor Soviet fighters, fightertransports, and AWACS aircraft also will add new potential for distant miliiary operations.

ven with these improvements, however,Soviet military intervention in Third Worldprobably will be lestricted lo situations where the risk of escalationar with theudged to be small and Soviet capabilities to perform higher priority strategic missions would not be seriouslyBecause of tbe Soviet stakes in the Middle East and live prorimlty ol tlse region lo the USSR, Moscow would consider military Intcrveiiticni there even when

"Dw AHttlavM Char/Slog forOepavtmealthi. tUkomt* IIvr

Svstrli momli pLot Si SUi la CJm mt ihth* potttbtJUt tttB rrtilrImtut of thr ftai danfer ll pomu.ronllnulncFor rUbonltOnof thU litem in

. otfeSl.

-StOftEi-

risks were somewhat higher. In most cases. Soviet militarywould uke lhe form of air defense units or other types of units to holster local defense. In any event, lhe Soviet Navy will continue to provide support to its allies in the Mediterranean. Ihe Indian Ocean, the South China Sea. and off the coast ol West Africa Such support could be fn the formhow of force air defease, radar early wi route or even 'navale believe il is highly unlikely, however, lhat Soviel naval intervention lorces would be deployed to the Western Hemisphererisis

Alternative Futures

hc Soviel force posture will continue to be designed primarilyATO corKirigeraey and the dangerwo-front war Involving China. Third World concerns will remain secondary and, even with the force improvements protected over lhe neatSoviet forces abroad will probably remainlo those of the West In the Mrdltorronean. the western Pacific, and the Indian Ocean Nevertheless. Moscow could concentrate additional nulrtarybeyond those protected in the base case, and, In conjunction with lhe buildup of certain allies, attempt toavorable local military balance

ther developments, which, in our judgment, are Quite unlikely but potentially more threatenine. are possible The most significant change would be the developmentore viable forward strike posture Such developments are currentlyelatively low probability for several reasons- eilstlog Soviet mihtary resources may be considered inadequate for priority missions around the periphery, and thus few could be spared for more distant deployments; Soviet forces abroad are vulnerable and host governments may be unwilling to risk becoming involved asand the costs of substantial increases inforces may not be justified by thc potential (benefits of marginally Improved Sovietand Third World gains. On the other hand, there are arguments In favor of improving Ihc wartime potential of forward-deployed Soviet forces. These include the potential benefits of diverting dispropor-tionalelv laiger US strike forces that otheiwisc could be used against bases in tlse USSR. Furthermore, Soviet use of certain foreign facilities could EonuAgMBI Soviet efforts lo extend their defense perimeter.

oviet inleatfons to develop more ambitious miliury roles abroad.ore viable forward strike posture, could be suggested by the following

Indicators:

Deployment of ships with equipment pre-pou tioned for rapid use by Soviet or allied forces

Construction of large lueJ storage capacities at airfields klely to be used to support Soviet airlifts

Installation of coastal defense missiles andof small combatants lo defend Soviet naval facilities abroad

--Construction of submarine support facilities al foreign ports

Construction of ah snd naval missile storage and handling facilities overseas.

Increased Soviet training combined wiih Third World forces.

Organiiationapid deployment forcewith supporting communications units

Increased production of long-range aircraft and nuclear-powered submarines.

hould Moscow opt (or more substantialdeployments, these would bc likely lo Include more attack subinaruyes. more strike aircraft, and possibly an AWACS aircraft These would probably bc somewhat older models that become available ax new equipment is mtroduced for primary roles, similar to the pattern when the introduction of Backfire bombers into the Pacific Fleet made some Badgers available for use in Vietnam. If the Soviet leadership decides lo increase the miliiary poteniial of foreign facilities, several additional roles for forward deployed Soviet forces could emerge

Counter Power Projection. Foreign bases could facilitate the "Interposition- of Soviet forcesUS forces and theirai the risk of war. The Soviet base in Vietnam would best support tlie development ofote Soviet lubmarine* or aircraft could altack shipping in important sea lanes. Mines could block key waterways, and cruise missiles with conventional warheads could be forward based. Such forward deployments would still bebut Soviet naval doctrine emphasixesand preemptive strikes against carrier battle groups before they can launch airstrikes. In peacetime, more substantial Soviet deployments abo could have important political benefits if Third World leaders perceive the correlation of forces In their region favors tlie Soviet Bloc.

Integrated*oviet forces havelimited training exercises with Syria, Vietnam, Cuba, South Yemen, and Ethiopia. Such exercises could lead to better militaryHowever, they would have to be slgnif-

tSto J

icanlly laigci. mote complex, and more frequent to produce significantivision nl laboi could be worked out whereby Soviet ships or aircraft provide early warning and targeting information to local interceptorir detente units, and coastal detente miiiile units Such integrated military operations could help offset weaknesses* in Soviet power protectkxi capabilities. For example, tactical air support could be provided by local forces, with Soviet AWACS support.eparatestrucluie could be established to deal with rapid deployment of forces for distantShould Moscow decide to expandfor distant military intervention, pre-posi-

tioned equipment ships mightoreoption thin land-based stockpiles on foreign territory.

Battlefuzld ItoUlion. Future Soviet foreigninvolvement also could be designed to preclude outside intervention in situations where Soviet clientsavorable military balance-Soviet intervention inole would be predicated on olimales that Soviet forces would notaior poweregional conflict occur, Soviet lorces could attempt to blockade opponents' ports and preclude lesupply byetwork of upgraded ports and airfields would facilitate such an option.

nventory of Major Foreign Facilities

eitenl of Soviet military recess to foreign facilities varies considerably. Therefore this anno describes the nature and frequency of Soviet use of the moreforeran facilities as well as the general characteristics of these facilities. In addition lo ihe facilities described in this amies, repair facilities also have been made available to naval nooccenbatanUore limited scale in Tunisia. Singapore. Crccce. and Sri Lanka.

The following facilitie* are described in this anner (asterisk indicates less than continuous military use):

Cuba

Havana Port '

San Antonio de lot Banns Militaryienfuegos NavalourdesINT Compter Santiago dc las Vegas Military Camp El Cabriel Communications Facility

Guinea

Conakry Port *

1 aiiai la

Luandauanda Airfield

Ethiopia

Dahlak bland Johannes IV AlrDold *

Libya

Tobruk Port '

Umm Ailiqah Airfield '

Al Mrs Airfield "

Vietnam

Cam Ranh Bay Port Cam Ranh Bay Airfield Ton Son Nhut Airfield Da Nang Airfield *

Svria

Tartus Pott Tiyas Airfield

South Yemen Aden Port Al Anad Airfield Aden Interna lional Aliporl Salah ad Din Communication! Facilities Socotra Island Anchorage

Moromhie/ue Maputo Port Maputo Airfield

Yurotlarie Tivat Port

1!

Soviet access to Cuba is extensive. II dales (torn thend includesroops in the only combat brigade deployed outride the Soviet periphery. The brigade headquarters and bulb ot the troop unils are located at Santiago dc las vcgas Thc largest foreign-based Soviet SICINT complea has beenat Lourdcs This site includesoviet technicians and is secured bv elements of the Soviet combat brigadeddition. Soviet satellitestations liave been establislied at El Cabriel and Lourdcs. providing direct contact with Moscow. Soviet oceanographic research and inlelligenceships on patrol along the east coast of thc United Stales are regularly supported oul of Cuban ports. These vessels make aboutalls on Cuban ports each year for reprovbloning. rest, and recreation.oviet oceangoing tug or salvage ship'has been deployed to Cuba. Soviet naval combatants Erst visited Cuba9 and now call aboutecline from the more frequent visits of the early and. These task groups usually consist of two principal surface combatants and aii oiler, and oftenubmarine These deployments establish a

periodic Soviet naval presence in thc Caribbean and Ihc Culf of Mexico. They also arc used for faint training exercises with thc Cuban Navy and Air Force Soviet warships calling on Cuba generally berth at Havana and Cienfuegos. The visiting combatantshttlc shore-based support- Exccr* forSoviet ships do not use Cuban shipyards for repair, and refueling is accomplished fromSoviet oilers.

oviet Naval Aviationeconnaissance aircrafl have regularly deployed to Cuba-hese reconnaissance flights werefrom Havana's International Airportarge militaiy airfield at San Antonio dc los Banospecially secured and revetted area for Soviet aircraft was created. Beginninghe Bear deployments to Cuba also includedSW aircraft. Bear aircraft are deployed to Cubarequent basis, and reconnaissance missions are flown approximately weekly. They can monitor US naval exercises, traffic from some US east coast naval pases, and US missile tests. They also conduct training and collectionagainst Tiident SSBNs in local operating areas off King's bay. Ceorgia.

53

Havana Port, Cuba

Havana, Cuba's matin porl, contains more thanockiiig complexes designed for wear, molasses, grain, fertilizer, and POL cargoes. Shortage ol equipment, frequentnd inefficient management conibiiK* lo add to the congestj vaua. however, and frequently there arerups waiting to offload. The portivilian shipyard. Mambisa. which could repair ships up to thc size of small destroyers in its drydock Plans for continuedof Havana focus on Mpgradirur cargo-handling facilities

The naval base across the bay from Havana'sport is the main repair base for the Cuban Navy. Upgrading of the naval shipyard, which is colocaied with Mambisa Shipyard, look place in thc. Cranma Naval Repair Base Is capable of servicing diesel lubmaHnes and small frigates but has never repaired Soviet combatants. Thc naval base receives some of the combatants delivered by the USSR.

Havana Port Facilities

cwiineitial ti'gii irfii

Deeihi

eiers, ar0 metrrt al Quays, ranee ud lo ID merer*

iiui-e

for primirv ear-

ui .iu,.

BQUlplMfll

i.iwi al maax ouaii oonialncr RO/RO Iwlilic .

vd Hid -aler

and dlearl oil .nibble at docU and by barge.

Ik it ii lei

diidoul lor veaaeb ui>eierseliable repaii ihoD is auodared wltb Murobjj

54

CftCf-

Antonio do los Bonos Military Airfield. Cubo

Cuba hai several airfields lhal could accommodate Soviet Bear aircrafl. but these aircraft currently use the military airfield at San Antonio dc los Banos. Construction before the arrival of the Bears included renovation ol eight hardstands Additional upgrading has included runway extensions, construction offor fighter aircraft, renovation of existing parking areas, and improvement of support facilities for both expanded Soviet deployments and the tiiajradiiig nf Cuba's Air force The Soviets use an isolated, fenced area of ihe airfield. This area includes an operations building and personnel bunkers and is close to the POL depot which is more than sufficient for Soviet and Cuban needs. The main airstrip was resurfacedossibly in anticipation of thc arrival of thc Bears.

San Antonio dc los llano* Airfield Facilities

Main

itirwrs Xmeters

bind, resurfaced sine,

runwiyi

tibctlooeach less lhan

*1 -1

t tiiHace area iretjdYi

supportin <mM ralSciii Ms oulniriune*

Brin are

at, aaalo

bail liana lnH tardstiaai

taaafrtaaaare the anaka

parkaaf area ftat*an aircratt ahdwri

are wwl^i oanalnarfua. TVs. |> a

b-jil)tni unAri onvtructnn ior oiamlr. la lhe rartine area aa.rth.rW,

56

"1

Cienfuegos Naval Base, Cuba

Cuba's second-largest porl is lhc Cienfuegoswhich iiidisdes Iwo commercial port areas and Cavo Loco Navalhe naval base lias been expanded1 Ionrpedo and missile-handlius;upport, arid riiaintenaiiceand additional berthins and repair space The base is thc home port of some of Cuba's patrol boats, but is not suitable for major combatants because of ils muddy, shallow approaches Uneradins continues atco. but its expansion potential is limited physically by proximity tu the congested commercial porl.

Of the Iwo commercial porl areas, Cienfuegos Northwest is the most suitable for Soviet naval ships. Soviet ships have made relatively short visits toNorthwest and the smaller commercial area, where there are two piers infrequently used for arms deliveries.

Construction at Punta Movida Naval Base south of Cierducgos began7 and included the Installation

0 Sovid invol-emenr. tnif rhe nival base and deliveryargei associated willi avoport ol nuciear-poweiedto Cknfwapxrotest by rhe UnKod States Subseaueolly or* lamereoesloved

of two new piers eaoablc uf berthing (our submarines and constructionaval ordnance depotlerestory building for lorpedo and missile handling. There are no repair facilities al Ihc base, however, so Cuban submarines will continue to use Havana Naval Shipyard for servicing. Punta Movida could accornino-dalc all but the largest Soviet combatants, but it is most likely to serveome port for Cuba's diesel submarines.

Cienfuegos Port Facilities

Berth.

berthing treai

hi

entrance charand.eters, al

wfen

coolniaeiU

for buli: eartd

i

and dlrael oal bankers require

noUce; tiah ii aviliable

all piers

licUlUa

repairs only.

r

Sonliogo de los Vegas Miliiaryiublo tratrJng area border* the northern

i of ihc camp(

Santiago de las Vegas Military Camp Lt live

Quarters and major garrison for (he Soviet combat brigade stationed in Cuba. The camp has beenoccupied bv Soviet troops since theurrently the garrison includes one tank battalion, two mechanized Infantry battalions, one multiple rocket launcher battalion, and one support battalion; and smaller reconnaissaisce, air defense, antitank, and artil-

3

62

Guinea

Soviet access Io Guinea tl limited and tenuous, and the death ol President Sekou Toure4 coo Id Lead to reduced access. Soviet naval viati to Guinea began0 witli support to President Toure in the wakeiierrilla laid.uineaalls by Soviet naval ships. Conakrylacks adequate provisioning. lefuding. and repair capabilities. The port ts sheltered bv islands and break waters, but must be continuously dredged to keep the harbor accessible to destioyer-size ships. Doth berthing and anchorages ate in short suppiVoviet Naval Avialion Dear L> reconnaissanee aircraft began periodic deployments lo Conakry Airtjekt. from which point tbey could moral or rrtajor IranulLantic shipping lanes, bauinea denied further access to Bear aircrafl, and Soviel maritime aerial teeonnais-sance operalions off West Africa shifted to Angola.

67

-secne j-

Porl, Guinea

ort fadie) are on the seaward tide of Tom bo Island in southern Guinea The portatural basin sheltered by Ksssa and Tamara Islands and two protective breakwaters Several Quays could accommodate destroyers or small cruisers, but tie alongside berthing of larger ships would be risky, andperennialrecorded depths somewhat unreliable Dredging operation! keep most of the harbor and channel accessible to destroyer site ships, and there arc limited anchorages outside the port for them. As an eaport port (or bauiite. iron ore. and aluminum, Conakry Is equipped to handle heavy cargo and processes arms shipments for Cuinea and Other African nations.

Conakry Port Facilities

Bnthi

ticnK.ni nouaneii o! -diil ipaoc

entrance. Stl nwen. aiI natters.

uiaer

0 maten.

oa triors three ID-ton lorklifu

Wavailable. Water can be obtained al all bonbt bul nor berom Oeeeir-ber lo April

Ha

M

r

-SCgBC-f-

Arvgolo

Angola ts Currently (he only country in West Africa supportingoviet air and naval presence. Soviet naval access dales6 when substantial support was provided during thc Angolan civil war. Continued Soviet access is closely tiedos Santos regime that Is highly dependent on Cuban and Soviel support for Its survival. Soviet ships have called at all three Angolan ports, but Luanda Is the most frequently visited.3 there wereoviet naval port calls to Angola,allask group lediev-class carrier en route to the Pacific Fleet. Luanda can provide replenishment services but no repairs for major combatants. The port of Mocamcdcs, now called Namibc isishing portuay that couldingle large cruiser, but the few Soviet combatants that do call on Namibc prefer to anchor outside the port Lobito is an excellent natural harbor, shelteredandspit breakwater. Its two quays can berth and rcprovislort several Urge cruisers and oceangoing tankers. The port also houses Angola's only shipyard, although its production is limited to only small craft Sinceloating drydock (FDD) has been maintained at Luanda to support the Soviet South Atlantic fishing fleet but it has the capability to conduct minor repairs to naval ships. The Initial drydock was replaced3 withon lift FDD equippedloating workshop.

The Soviets use the maintenance facilities al Luanda Naval Base to support their West African Naval Patrol in the South Atlantic. This patrol generallyestroyer, one to two minesweepers, two lo three merchantepair ship, and an ampliibious ship with naval Infantry embarked.

Soviet naval reconnaissance aircraft have,eriodically deployed to Angola. From Luanda, they can monitor Western naval movements from thc Cape of Cood Hope to as far north as Senegal and west to Ascension Island. Luanda is located too far south to permit aircraft to cover the main sea lanes from the Uniied Stales lo Europe Soviet forces in Angola have direct coniact with Moscow through satellite

Beginningoviet VTA rotationalof twoub aircraft was stationed at Luanda. Sincehe detachment has been increased toircraft. Together with Cuban and Angolan transports they provide logistic support to Angolan forces in their counterinsurgency operations

-SCCWfrF-

Luanda Airfield.

Airfield Fm-iliues

Luanda Airfieldoint civd/rnilitary facility which provides luppotl lo Sovietecoiiniis-sanoe aircraft Tlieocated on the southern

edc* of the city of Luanda It has two asphalt runways

capable of supporting heavy military aircraft The iwim X

aiifieldivilian supportaintenance OuW mm

ilitary supportoviet military aircraft

parkin, apron, an ammunition storage area, and a

POL facility Currently, the airfield is defended by

three sit-po-ilion antiaircraft artillery sites Navigation systems at thc airfield permit all-weather, day/night operations

77

* -

Pari. Angola

The port ofnsideprotcctivr barrier formedong, narrow uland roughly paralleling Ibe coast The commercial por! facilities on Ihe main land, which have been undcrifoing erpansion since, can accommodale ships up lo lhe lire of ihe Kie*-class cruisers al lhe main pier and adjacent quay Vessel) of any size can anchor in the harbor, and there itarge backlog of merchant ships- The naval installation on Ilha dc Luandaharf suitable for one ship Ihc sizeiev-class cruiser or Iwo small destroyers More ships can beif they moor sternhe Quay as Ihe Soviets do Luanda can provide replenishment services, but no repairs for maior combatants

1-uand* Port Facilities

Berth.

brrUu al ni pirn and one uuav

eooiaincial port;neter oler

naval Use

entrance.

meter* alt,eteu

ipscc

0 squire meteu

oo-ipiitcU

10

crane,on crane; mobile

ee*-

of container canto.

tm

Is available irom oiaJor od cornrn-

Freakvailable, but only

1 Qtaa-tjtiet at the offshore tank'

termlnaL

o taUowayi and

il-or hull work and botSn ctoaaliu Small marine nlWayi al theate.

-

Ethiopia

Since die. Soviel ship* have had almost unrestricted access lo Dahlak Wand,ormer British prison camp has been renovated for use by Soviel logistics and security personnel. The facilities arc sparse and lack [rcsli water. Dahlak's derelict airfield has helicopter pads, but has not beenfor use by fixed-wing aircraft. Dahlak serves primarilyecure anchorage for support auxiliaries. During deployments in the Indian Ocean, virtually every Soviet naval combatant calls at Da lib I; at least once for repair or upkeep. Soviet logistic unitsloating drydock can provide minor repairs for small cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and patrol craft. The Soviels alsomall naval infantry security detachment and navigational aids on Dahlak Island. Soviet naval ships rarely call at Ethiopia's two maior mainland ports. Aseb Ls the maior arms delivery port and Mltsiwa serves to transship arms to northern Ethiopia. However, both are vulnerable to guerrilla attacks and President Mengistu has resisted more extensive use.

Sovietay ASW patrol aircraft haveIn pairs to Johannes IV International Airfield, near Asm era. sincehese aircraftstop en route at Aden to refuel. Ethiopian airfields are vulnerable to guerrilla attacks: two Sovietay aircraft were destroyedebel attack in4 and have not been replaced. The high elevation of Johannes IV Airfield and its short runway would inhibit tlie deployment ol Bear aircraft.

77

Oahlok Island. Ethiopia

Dahlak Island has two loafing fingerboularehouses and administration buildings, an open storage area, and Iwo POL storage areas.on Boating drydock was brought to Dahlak from Aden in8 It is tbe primary maintenance and repair facility lor Soviet naval units operating in the Indian Ocean It also occasionally serves Ethiopian and South Yemeni naval units. In addition, an Amur-class depotoryn-dass auxiliaryophvo-ciats water and fuel barge,'M. I Hi stores ship appear to bc permanently ilationed here. An Ugra-class submarine tender alto is periodically deployed tomalt Soviet naval infantry contingent is stationed on Dahlak Island for local securily.

Dahlak Island Facilities

hi

eKrt 1

ipaee Eight repaired Oiiluh building! andr morebuildings lerve as aocarn and homingoWel Horn barge ii metered

eouipmem

and -aid

POL ftoraae areai probablr store fuel lor lehiclex and mill support iblpi or limited anuuiti ofThere are no retooling faeilitlei and alrnotl ro frahard oiler brtnrs (od to Dahlak from Aden; tup-plica and itcome fiom Ethiopia by helicopter.

repair ihio and gSCO-ton grating drvdoot

78

Johannes IV Airfield. Ethiopia

Juki'in.'- IV serves as bothmllitarvcivilian airfield. The military area, located near the northern end of the runway, supports one helicopter and two fighter iqusdions of lhe Ethiopian Air Force. Support facilities for these aircrafl include an underground FOI. storageeapons storage area,asic maintenance facility for helicopter and fighterAn all-weather navigation system lias been installed by Ihn Soviets for their IL-3fli In addition, the airfield has two oilier navigation systems. Iwo early warning radars,eight-finding radar. Thc Soviet IL-3Ss use an isolated parking apron between the mihtary and civilian areas. Johannes IVl Airfield has adequate parking, maintenance, and storage space to support Soviet reconnaissance aircraft, but Its high elevation prohibits deployment of Dear D's. No ground-based air defenses have been installed

Johannes IV International Airfield Facilities

Main runway

l oinen

BladlOP

runway!

.SSJ-tixltr black top Mio.

maintenance, and niopoo fadluie*

haacan, rii blacktopom. four ammunition iloragc alxdi. more ihano pealoruootal aad lour venial POL lanit

80

Libyo

ovietircrafl haveew limei annually lo Unim Aitlgah Airfield inonstructionaior military airfield al Al Jufra in central Libya hat raited concern* about its possible future use by Soviel aircraltthnic ucs sucjicst (bat ihis facility Is ol Soviet desisn. if not of actual Soviet construction. Il includes facilities for handiintl tactical air-launched missiles.evetted fiardstandi similar to those associated with Soviet inter media re-range bombers, hardened aircraftcapable of accommodating aircralt up lo lhe sire ofoibals,ctcr all-concrete runway (the only one In Libya) Whenit would have the capability to handle both interceptors and intertntxe bombers. However, weAl iufra will primarily be used for Libyan bombeii and transports

Currently, Libyan ports ofler little logistic support to Soviet ships.sed most often, rather than more noticeable visits to tbe main commercial port of Tripoli Tobruk was usedoviet repair ship twice3 to repair Soviet cjulse-misaile-armed, diesel-powered submarines3 there were onlyoviet naval port calU in Libya

83

Tobfuk Naval Base Pod Facilities

can accommodate all but the laigesf cruisers at its naval breakwater, lis naval rcpati (acilitics have been improvedhey aie suflicienl foe Umilcd lepatis lo issue! boatsass submarines There are no Soviet shore establisho coordinate naval rails or compensate for deBeieneios of Libyan ports, and Soviet ships do not make use ol the Libyan naval POL facilities

wO (iifi't. one mbmi-

rirw. one dealrotar. 11

Iwo patrol erall berth*.

Dactka

naval bcilhi. deptlu rangeo

mrtoi

pscc

warahoutoin re roe-

of covered storage ai the eomrner-

port.

to cQuipment

mobile cranr* and one float-

- to tOtoa capacltr)

ad "Mci

availability.

(aeititsoi

(tOOCMociossibly

operational

B *

Umm Ailiqah Airfield, Libya

Ummt Airbeld (formerly Wheelus Air Force Base) hai navigation facilities thai permit all-weather, day/night opera ttom Libyan aircraft usuallimm Aitiqah includelindeiirjscighters.ranspoilt.url9 Albatross trainers, andandid transports. The airfieldircraft maintenance areas, three POL storasteunition* storage area.ouote-bav hardened aircraft slielters, and support andfacilities Soviet) May aircraft periodically deploy to Umm Aitiqah for maritime reconnaissance patrols over the Mediterranean Umm Aitiqah abo serves at the primary assembly facility for Hip heu-copteit and other used-wing aircraft purchased Irom the USSR. Umm Aitiqah is heavily defended by Libyan antiaircraft artillery and surface-to-air mis-si lei

Uiiiih Aitiqah Airfield Facilities

Main

0 metcri

3 monrt

ieter taaiwar could be

unway.

alpha tt.

til.-

86

-

Jufra Airfield, Libya

In3 Al Jufra military airfield became operalianit It was constructed Io Soviet designwo-year period Al Jufra is an advanced airbasc capable of supportingday/night fighter, interceptor, and bomber aircraft. Iteter bveter concrete parallel taaiway that could be usedun-ray. The airfield includesox bat-capable hardened aircraft shelters, anFOI. storagetouung/administrative area. Also, there areevetted hardstands capable of handling aircraft of up to medium-bomber size. The alrbaseactical air-to-air missile storage facility, an air-to-surfacestorage facility, and ground-control Icd-intereept and grou nd -controlptcoeh systems. Theseare similar to those found at medium-bomber bases in tlie USSR. To date, Libyan aircraft al Al Jufra have been limited tour) transports andoxbats. No Soviet aircraft have deployed to AI Jufra, and no air defenses are evident,

Al Jufra Airfield Facilities

O. aaoters

'lelneiiii

cooperation between Hanoi and Moscow has increased substantially since the Chinese invasion of Vietnam9 Withinays of (he Chinese invasion. Soviet combatants called on Vietnam.facilities at Cam Itanh Bay have been steadily upgraded and expanded so that tlie port lias become the Soviet Navy's most frequently used foreignCam Ranh Bay now routinely supports thc Soviet naval contingent which operates in the South China Sea. Cam Ranh Bay is preferred because ol its size, includins berths forhips and deepwalcrfornd its rather remote location, which enhances security. However, there are nobunkering facilities ashore and thc oil pipeline remains unusable. Also, shore-based repair facilities are lacking Soviet Pacific Fleet auxiliaries have been overhauled at tbe Ho Chi Minh City shipyard after similar access to Singapore shipyards was denied foi-lowing9 Soviet invasion of Afghanbtan.

Tho Soviets maintainoaval units at Cam Ranh Bay and in the South China Sea. These usually consist of three to four general purpose submarines, two to three surface combatants, one to two mine warfare ships,o IS auxiliaries, and one research ship. The presence of Soviet naval unib in the South China Sea enables the Soviets to reinforce moretheir Indian Ocean Squadron in thc eventrisis by cutting the steaming time from Vladivostok from two weeks to one week at an average speed ofnots.

Soviet naval aircraft Initially used the airfield at Da Nang. but shifted operations to less crowded facilities at Cam RanhOL storage was addedround control approach system was Installed for all-weather operations. Thc Cam Ranh Airfield usually hosts four Bear reconnaissance and four Bear ASW aircrafl plus nine Badger aircraft (five strike, two tankers, one electronic countermeasuiesnd onen addition, three SICINT sites and two communications satellite stations also have been established In Vietnam

Sinceoviet VTA detachment ofubs has been maintained at Ton Son Nhut Airfield. Initially the detachment Includedircraft and was extensively Involved In suppori of Vietnam's operations in Kampuchea.1 the detachment has been gradually reduced to three aircraft that mainly support the Soviet advisory effort in Laos and Vietnam. They often deploy to Da Nang airfield for suppoil missions in Laos.

91

uMf-

Ronh Bay Porl, Vietnam

Cam Hanh Hay iiensive dccpwafer harbor wltli the ciccllent natural protection ot" surrounding pen ini and islands It is easily secured because of the absence ol any large town or commercial activity Ships up to ihe sire of the largestcan berth at the principal pacts or use the mote thaneep-water anchorages in the Inner and outer harbors Ouay space is limited to ships llie sire of small frigates Two of thc piers can handle bulk cargo

9 the Soviets have icfminified lhe old piers located near the naval training center and havefour floating piers, one of which is used mainly by the Viettianveseater supply System installed since0 provides fresh water lo at least four of thc piers. Heetnc power may abo bc available since new generators were delivered inuildings constructed near the new piersadditional maintenance, storage, or

There are two POL piers to the south of the naval training center, and some POL storage tanks arc intact Thc pipeline, however, is unusable, and the Soviets have taken no steps to reconstruct itother Ihan those thai can be performedmall boatyard near the POLlimitedoviet repair ship stationed tn port ormall Goat ing dock that has been al Cam Itanh sincehe dock, which is normally used io transport submarines, can accommodate smallor diesel submarines for minor repairs.

Cam Ranh Bay Porl Facilities

lied pirn ami ilt.ee Ooalingii viil. aboulerths; *0 anchorages

deep-aiero It mctcri, al

eters; al POL berth, 12

mrlnl.

0 squire merer* ia dere-

her USrehouse! and new noi ace

;., :in in pier am.

Cargo ecnii proem

Iwo pirn can handle cargo

and water

oil pipeline Is uoarrvlceablc. Wairr la BBpplied by pipeline al (our piers.

facilities

boatyard, mall Boating drydock

9?

Cam Ranh Bay Airfield. Vietnam

Cain Ranh llay Aii fieldiliiary airfield capable of handling all heavy miliiary aircraft The airfield is wilhin four miles of the Soviet naval facilities al Cam Ranh Bay. The area surrounding Cam Ranh Bay ii heavily defended by Vietnamesendiles Navigation facilities al lhe airfield permit all-weather, day/nlghl operations. The airfield includes support facilities lor Soviet Bear and Badger deployments

Cam Ranh Day Airfield Facilities

Miin

i mclc-i

.

concrete uilwayi an be

u runwtyi

94

Ion Son Nhuf Airfield, Vietnam

Ton Son Nhut Airfield, located on the nortliwesi edce of Ho Chi Minh City, is the ma rot civilian air terminal in southern Vietnam It is capable af support ing large Soviet aircraft. The Vietnamese nationalfacilities al Ton Son Nhut to service all tbe US-built aircrafl in Its inventory. Ton Son Nhul also servesase for lhe Vlrtnarnese Airth Transport Regiment andth Helicoptermall Soviet VTA detachment alio operates out of Ton Son Nlmt. Extensiveand support facilities were built during the Vietnam war, many of which are no longer in use These facilities includearge hangars and many smaller hangars and shops. Other support facilities ai Ton Son Nhut include extensive POL Borage, astorage area, andndividual aircraft shelters. Electronic navigational aids at the airfield malepossible at night and in poor weatlicr. There are six Vietnamese antiaircraft artillery sites located around thc airfield.

Ton Son Nhut Al

Facilities

lunwav

runwayi

96

Dairfield Facilities

Oo Nang Airfield, Vietnar

Da Nuns Airfield it located on (he southern coast ol Vietnamilometers Irom Da Nang Naval Bate, where Soviet or mi shipments lo Vietnam ire offload

ed- The airfield hatelet concrete runways

capable of luptxxtnsg operation! of large Soviet air- Wj.ii

'rbk i?

acilities at Da Nang include extensive

POL storage, maintenanceunitions storage area,arge aircrafl hangars,ndividual

aircrafl shelters Navigational aids at Da Nang make it possible to conduct operations al nighl and in poor

weather One Vietnameseite is located 35

kilometers from the airfield

Most aircrafl eiported lo Vietnam Itom lhe Soviet Union are assembled and lest Down at Da Nang Airfield. Thus, Soviet personnel probably are present at the airfield to support this activity

J

j

Syria

Syria permits Soviet nival luiiliarie* to operate emeootiriuooitorn the poet ot" Taitut Thete thi pi provide support to the Soviet Med it emin Squad-ron. which typically numbersepot ship lhat provides routine upkeep on Soviet dieselin Ihe Mediterranean is moored in Tartus. and other auxiliaries shuttle waler, spue parts, and other supplies (rom Taitus to combalanls moored orelsewhere In the Mcdilcirancan Soviet thins also call at Laiakia, but Taitus is the pielYirrd purl

Soviet aircraft have used Tivas AirfieldTA detachment ofub ECM aircraft was withdrawnSW aircraft havedeployed to Tiyasnd. on one occasionour Badger reconnaissance aircraft were deployed there.

101

Tortus Port, Syria

Thc poll of Tartus. which is north ol the city af Al Mins, wu built in thc. It consists ol several picnurning basin protected by two break wj ten. Thc harbor houses Syria's main naval base The port is heavily congested,one-term eipaiuion program includes the constructionew basin and the completion of the central breakwater Because Tart ui has no repairhipyard and drydock have been proposed

Tart us Purt Facilities

U-rtlti it u> pwo.acboi-

Iruiite it* break waters.

hiihoi enlfance ind turning baiin

lo II lol piers. *

erer i

won

-HIT.

ojuipnicD!

lean-

ne.

and wafer

nilUDpficd by true*.

Qiiin Oil terminal to the north can

one lOO.COO-lon unlet.

ladliiie.

102

liyos Airfield, Syrio

i ivis Airfieldajor bite for about SO Syrianand fishier-bomber) Il also serves as an assembly base for new aircraft delivered to Syria. In addition, li provides support for Soviet Cub Iraniport and May antisubmarine warfare aircraft oo theit deployment; The Cubs transport supplies and ecruip-rrient to Syria, while the May deployments conduct maritime reconnaissance and ASW operations over the Mediterranean

Tiyas Airfield is located SO km west ol Palmyra. In addition to the main asphalt runway, there are four graded earthas taxiways. crash strips, and parkingvary in lengtheterseters There areompleted, hardened aircraft shelters, and four others in various stages ef const met inn around the airfield There are also three large and six tmall revetted furdstands. The airfieldaintenance area, control tower, operations building, motor pool, uisderground POL storage facility, and an air-to-air missile storageNavigation systems at lhe airfield allowday/night operations. Theefendedyrian surface-to-air missile brigade that includesndissile batulioiu-

Airfield Facilities

Miiomaeti X

Serf

Thir nbh ti Seen!

lOt

South Yemen

Trie Soviets liave an extensive militaryili Soutli Yemen. On the ground,oviet military personnel serve throughout the Yemeni armed forces Inoviet communications facility ami SlClNT site have been established.

The Soviet Navy began to use thc port of Adenollowing ils expulsion from Somalia. Al lhaloviet floating drydock was transferred from Somalia to Sn ith Yemen, en route to Dahlak. Ethiopia. The port of Aden is well equipped andof accommodatingarge shipsime. However. Utile use is made ol tlie port facilities by Soviet naval ships. Most often, Soviet ships remain in (he outer harbor, where minor repairs and refueling can be performed by auxiliary ships. Soviet ships also use

anchorages near Socotra Island, but tbe island Itself has Utile potentialaval base. Thc waters close to llie island aie baiardeuS year round, lhe shoreline is mountainous, and ficsh water is scarce.

Soviel naval airmail have used lhc lormer (loyal Air Force base at Aden (also known as Khorinaksar) and now make use of lhe more remote, renovated airfield at Al Anad. The runway al Aden has been extended and could now accommodate Dear aircraft. Currently. Iwo Sovietav aircraft deploy to Al Annd. although previously four aircrafl were rotated lo South Yemen. These aircraft regularly deploy and conduct ASW patrob and aerial reconnaissance In the western Indian Ocean.8oviet VTA detachment of twoircraft also was deployed to Aden

107

Al Anod Airfield. South Yemen

Al Anadew lie lit ft base, supporting two squadrons of Yemeniishbeds. Sovietav aircrafl have alto uted lhe batebe airbase ll located in an liolated, arid, region aboutm north ol Aden. Al Anad has navigation equipment for all-weather operations. Fighter abctafl pari in diiperted. revetted positions located near theend of the runway* Moat of tbe POL storage and maintenance/repair facilities are also located near this area. Thcarkeparately secured area near the northeast end of theearby support area was constructed to provide housing and calcnsive support for the personnel attached to the airbase. Curtently, there are no ground-based air defenses at lhe airbase.

Al Anad Airfield Facilities

0 mam

Alpha It.

108

seetGF

. aecmr

Porl. Sourh Yemen

Aden il an improved natural harbor that canabout SO large shipsime, iricludiror the largeU of Soviel combatants. Adenell-equipped commercial port, but much of Ms cargo handling CQuipancnt and man, harbor craft are aginc III small repair far. lilies are kmitedack of skilledraw materials, and spare parts. The Sovidi do not appear to be involved in upgrading its facilities When using live inner harbor. Soviet combatants normally moor at berths opoiitc thc oil ftotagc tanks The small naval harbor that houses the South Yemeni Navy can accommodate ships only up to thc size of an LST.

Aden Port facilities

thanuoy and dolphin berth),

il bunlerinc berthalor small ihlpa li atQuay, Ma'alah Wharf, .ndlolly.

9n bar-

bor. IIS meteo. al beiltn. Irom S3 melcrilo

0 square oiolan of cov-

ered

equipment

mobde cranosons;1 oo andton

nne; noimef".

and water

pipelines served by naWr

eornpaaiica provide fuel, banes sup-

water. One pier can rupoly water

oceimoinr raiek

I - h

o.ttag drydock alDockyard Company slipway forcocobataMi

110

Adon International Airport, Soulh Yemen

Aden International Airport, also known as Khor-maksar.ombined military airbase and civilian airfield located on the outskirts of Aden. Soviet heavy military Iransport and civil aircraft frequently use this airfield. Tlieell supported by radar, electronics, ind communications equipment for all* weather operations. The miliiary area of theeparated from the civilian area, and eatensiveand support facilities ate present in both areas Buried POL and munitions areas adjoin the military operations area Currently there are no ail defense* at lhe airfield

Aden International Airport Facilitie

etes Xmeitii

11?

Moiombiquc

Moiambaque ii the moil frequently used stopover fot Soviet ivivil ship* in the southwestern Indian Ocean. Soviet nival ships have called it Maputoast year there wereisits.allask (roup lediev-class carrier en route to thc Pacific Fleeton ftoatin* drydocl atis used by lhe Soviet fashinc Beet, but facilities for more extensive repair are LackTA contingent of twoircraft abo is deployed to Maputo to support Moiambican forces in eountcrinsurgeneyTheie detachments deploy to Mozambique via Soulh Yemen and Seychelles The airfieldlacks adequate navtiational facilities to support all-weather, day/night operations

Maputo Airfield, Morumbiquo

Sovieiandid.ndurl tiaris-porl aircraft use Maputo Airfield in the People'j Republic of MnrambiQue. Thev deploy to Maputo via South Yemen and Sevchellei Maputo Airport isivil and mihtary airfield located al tlte southern Hp of Mozambique. The airh:ldeter byeter railway that could be usedunway. All runways are capable of supportine heavy military aircrafl Currently, there are no nivigaiion systems at lhc airfield for all-weatherorn Mdi-tary areas at the airfield include lacilitics to support Soviet and Mozambican transports and occasional deployments ol Moiambtcanresco fighter-bombers Currently. Maputo Airfield it defendedinm antiaircraft artillery site.

Maputo Airfield Facilities

Miin .nil-ji

mcloi Xniderl

run-ayi

3S aneWrs

122

tout:

Yugoslavia

According lo legtslalton passed4 on lhc usecan have only two ships

repaired in any one port simultaneously. Also, they can use only yards designated by tlte NationalRepairs are limited to warshipsons or auxiliaries0 tons Ships must ofBoad al! weapons, disembark one-third of their crew, and lirrut their stay lo sii months Yugoslavia prohibits tbc Storage of foreign fuel or equipment

Currently. Tivat in Kutor Uay is tlie only port designated for foreign naval repairs Yards at Rejlka. Split. Zadar. Sibemik, Trogir. and Pula could also service naval ships. Tliese generally have extensive construction, repair, and bunkering facilities, but the* already are extensively used for overhauls of merchantof them Soviet.

125

Port, Yugoslavia

Thehave used Tivai regularlyormally, ihey rotatelass submarineul.-'innr lenderta month repair period,which boih usually are teraped and painted, and interior work is done on the submarine SinceS0 the Soviets have liad an additional naval ship villi Inn in port when llie lender arrives. By law. Yugoslav laborers do all repair work, allhough lhe Soviet crewmerTtbers remaining aboard may takeof lime in port for inspections and repairs

The harbor entrance limits entry to small destroyers, frigates, or diesel submarines. Sava Kovaccvicat Tivat is the Yugoslav Navy's main repair yard. Repair facilities at Tival include three floating dry-docks, lhcoviet-built dockift capacity0 torts. Since Iu deliveryhe dock has been used only by Soviet lenders andalthough It could accommodate combatants as largeresta-IL The shipyard abohip lifting basin fsyncrotift} to move small combatants and sub-mirincs {ahhousjhlass SS s) ashoreon dock that provides warranty set-vice forlass submarines The halb and shops associated with the yard appear to have the capability to repair all ships' systems.

Tivat Tort Facilities

lo 10

eters: aielen.

scaee Mm

eouit-meni

portal lib crane;co Boalint

ion iheairjte.

and -aler

and water available at se-eral teiih-

ale and capacity unknown

(pair facilities

Boatirui drydocks. capa cil lei etli-

0 toro, plus a

railwayip-tiliinc bmn

12o

ANNEX C

Airlift Operations inhird World

tniUi)

gvpc *nd Syti*

BttMi inUyv

of ii^blWaA faction io Noetb

ItiJiU it throe oiootlu Ftn^iKflt dttutvoni from Kkodultt,

i^Wk^iu

atgno labc SoiooU ooeniiocv tapartinttoof ovenM operation*

Uowtftf

to Peru

pfoblcmt Otrnfioo of

Oolr ofcaoJu-od fl.*hfc

Id tin aoatltt. Om AN-tt cnaSotL Opm*

ol Etm* and SyrU

indiyi.Uhuor twoNo oortit^iil kraa. Soooca

aid to AatoU

Ai*hu ia four months. Maximumigfoi per dir.

S*nc fuelfxritna-

fJdio Exa4op*a

<CO>

ia ax month*etnaoe problem^

(Lgtai iniyv Somo ovtrfitta cttorinoe probtooii. Smooth operation.

Wots in lW day* (moolkM it four^oJaotaurtaf tnt nltM CrutUl to^ of ctcttU operation.

of Sym

or diy it peat Smooth

n kvw diyv &Mv <ot.ar*rtcv

elfiHMi Of liriurrw dfvinoc totoi, i5

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129

r

DISSfMiNATiON NOIiCE

Kil document wos disseminated by Ihc Oireeloroli! of Intelligence. Thii copy ii (o< the information Odd use of live recipient ond ol peitani under hit or her prrioTclioneed to know basil. Addilionof essential dissemination may be oulhoriied by lhe following oflictoli within Iheir respective deportment!

Bureau of Inlafligeoce ond Reieoreh, for rhe Deporiment of Stole

b Dired or. Defense tnfefcgcnce Aoency, for the Omot of rhe Semetary ol Delenie

and the orooniiotion ol the Joint OmIi oliiiilanl OweI ol SloH lor bitetWaertce. lor rf* Deportenenl ol theirecior of Novo! inieJigence, for the Department of lhc - Aiiiilonl Chief ol Sloff. Intefcgence, for Ihe Deportment of the Air force

of Intelligence, for Hoodquorttri, Marine Corps

Assistant Secretary lor Intelligence, foropcrmenl ol Energy

Direcior, foi, for Ihe Federal Bureau of Investigation

ol NSA. for Ihe Nationol Securily Ageoey

I Special Asiilton' lo the Secretory for Nolionol Securily. for the Deportment of the Irealury

h. tht Deputy Director lor Intee-nente for ony olher Deoor'menl or Agency

Thii document may be retained, or deitroyed by burning in eccordance with applicable security regUattem. or returned to the Directorateetg*nce.

VVhonl -xiitTwri ii dJueminoted overseas, the Mmm recipient! may retain iteriod not In eiceii of one year. At the end ol Ihit period, the Document ihould be destroyed or relumed to the for wor ding ogency, or pormiition ihould be requested ol lhe for wording ogency lo retain it in occordonce wllh,

line ol ihis document when uied leporalely Irom the rent is unclaih'ned.

Original document.

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