Created: 9/25/1984

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Director of (eot ml loiclliacnce

Policy in East Asia

Nationalce nee Estimate


lOBT 9





The following Intelligence organizations participated In the preparation of tha Estimate:

Tha Control InteCgenc* Agency, the Deferoe loit&gence Agency, the Ncnloool Security Agency, and Ihe intefioenco wooniiaticn al Iho Deportment of Store.

Abo Participating

The Auatontol Slolf (or Irrtvftgtncc.l the Army The Director of Novo! Inic&gence. Departrr*ot of tht Novy IKe AiiHlcnl Chief of Sloff, Intctfcgenee, of the Air Force The Director of liilelSincnee, Heodovortcrt, Marine Cor pi





How the Soviets See the Balance Sheet in East

Soviet Strategic

Thc Problem of Comr>eting

Thc Track Record: Soviet Inslrurnents of

and Their Impact

Soviet Military

Soviet Economic

Soviet Political

East Asian Perspectives on Soviet

Prospects for tbc

The Most Likely






With this Estimate, thc Intelligence Community takes its first look ever at Soviet activity and policy across the entire East Asian region. The issue is of increasing significance to US security interests Inecause of the buildup in Soviet military power in the region; the salience of the US-Sino-Soviet relationship for US global strategy in dealing with the Soviet Union; the question of Japan's future political-military role in the Pacific; the future security of South Korea; the stability of Indochina and Southeast Asia; and the renewed emphasis on Asia in US foreign policy priorities. Such problems will become increasingly complex for US policymakers during the period of this, even though much of thc East Asian area continues to enjoy remarkable prosperity and relative stability.

A source of concern is tbe potential political ramifications of continuing buildup of Soviet military power in East Asia and thc Pacific. Clearly, the Soviets have tnet of wartime tasks for these forces, and probably intend for them to serve certain deterrent functions as well. For the most part, however, we address the peacetime relationship of Soviet military power in East Asia lo the panoply of Soviet goals in Asia. What kinds of benefits, political and economic, can Moscow buy with its substantial military niight in Asia? What price is it willing to pay? What risks is it willing to take? How will US interests be affected? 1

The geographic designation of East Asia comprises:




and the various Island nations in thc western Pacific Ocean area.

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The primary Soviet concern in East Asia is to achieve superior military power, and toward this end all other Soviet interests inthe (economic, andbe subordinated. The Soviets probably see increasing challenges, including an improving Sino-US relationship, growing Chinese military capabilities, intensified US pressure on Japan toreater security role in northeast Asia, evolving Sino-Japanese trade and political ties,ommitment by thc United Stales to increase its military posture in the region. We further.believe the Soviets will focus much of their attention on the United States as the key obstacle to increasing their power in the region.

The principal strategic objective of the Soviet Union in East Asia is to increase Soviet power while containing China and reducing US and Japanese influence. The USSR's strategy in pursuit of these goals generally subordinates ihe achievement of local objectives and better relations with individual East Asian nations to its overriding strategic concerns. In pursuit of their strategic objectives the Soviets will:

Protect against Sine-Japanese-US strategic cooperation byfor military advantage againstorst case contingency.

Deter, through diplomatic and other means, thc formationino-US alliance or substantial Sino-US military collaboration.

Seek to erode the US alliance system in the Far East and develop countervailing friendly relations with states in the area.

We believe tliat Soviet policy toward East Asia will continue to emphasize improvement of military capabilities. The Soviets have strengthened their military position but have thus far been unable to translate it into intimidation sufficient to develop substantial political influence. We expect this shortfall to continue over the next five years.

We expect further additions lo Soviet nuclear deployments,land-based missiles capable of striking at Asian targets, andlo nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarinesnuclear-capable aircraft. The mostercent increase sincebeen thethentermediate-range ballistic missile force deployed

The present disposition ot" Soviet forces in East Asia and Irends in key measures of miliiary capability indicate that:

Qualitative improvements in ground, air, and naval forces and lhc related command structure in Asia are likely to continue. The rapid quantitative growth pattern ended for these forces in.

Lortg-term planning to meet worst case military contingencies seems to drive the Soviet force improvements.

Some Soviet weapon systems in Asia, especially aircraft, arc increasingly being modernized at roughly lhc same pace as in Europe.

The Sovietselatively low price for their forces opposite China.

Soviet naval and air developments are increasingly oriented toward Japan and thc South China Sea.

Soviet forces at Cam Ranh will be significantly augmented.

We anticipate persistent Soviet efforts to detract from US and Western influence in East Asia. The components of such an effort, which would probably rely heavily on thc use of both coercion and inducements, might be.

New chplomatic initiatives designed to show Soviet flexibility.

Encouragement of pacifist, antinuclcar, anti-Westernespecially in New Zealand, Australia, and Japan, which, if successful, would greatly complicate US strategy.

Implicit (and on occasion explicit} threats regarding targeting of Sovietnd other nuclear forces, linked to regional arms control proposals, confidence-building measures, and othersecurity plans.

*Economic inducements, including offers of economic assistance lo developing countries as well as proposals for joint resource development and industrial projects.

The Soviet military buildup haservasive sense of suspicion of ihe USSR on the part of nearly all East Asian countries With varying degrees of concern, they believe that the USSR is intcnl on becoming an Easl Asian power by using ils military capabilities to build political influence. The general East Asian desire to avoid closer polilical and economic links with Moscow should persist as long as Asian leadersredible US deterrent to Soviet power.


While the Soviets probably will seek to expand trade with non-Communist states in East Asia, they have relatively little to offer tbe countries of the region. Soviet economic assistance is important only for Indochina and North Korea, among all tbc states of East Asia.

The Soviet presence in non-Communist East Asia has grown over tbe past decade but, in terms of tbe overall numbers involved, still appears quite low. We believe it is unlikely to increase markedly In the near future, principally because of regional suspicions of Soviet intentions.

Thc relatively small leftist political elements in non-Communist East Asia are neither politically influential nor responsive to Soviet wishes Nonetheless, on occasion they engage in local actions that further Moscow's own goals in the region

We regard it as possible but unlikely that the Soviet political posilion In Easi Asia will be substantially strengthened during the period covered by this Estimate. But. even if unlikely, it is worth flagging those areas where changes are most possible. Developments that would favor increased Soviet influence include:

growth of antlnuclcar sentiment in the region, as typified by New Zealand, and concern over vulnerabilityuclear strike by countries hosting US forces, could further the Soviet objective of "neutralizing" the area.

Substantial improvements in Sino-Soviet relations could increase pressures on non-Communist East Asian nations to reachwith thc Soviets.

Escalation of Sino-Vietnamese hostilities could increase Hanoi's dependence on Soviet military assistance. In return. Moscow would almost certainly demand and receive further military concessions from Hanoi, including additional base rights.

Continued political and economic instability in the'Philipnines could provide Moscow with new opportunities to curry favor with cither thc Philippine Government or the opposition

Markedly improved relations between Pyongyang and Moscow could increase Soviet pressure against Chinaf"

Alternatively. Moscow's relations with various East Asian nations might suffer decisive setbacks under different conditions;

A continuing Sovicl militaiy buildup, combined with certain other developments such as Soviet aid to local opposition movements, couldramatic hardening of East Asian Perceptions of Soviet intentions.

A sharp rise in the level of tension between Moscow and Beijing could leadajor rupture in relations US-Japanese-Chinese cooperation could improve accordingly.

A Sino-Vietnamese rapprochement could prompt Hanoi to decrease its dependence on the Soviet Union, with areduction of Soviel presence.


tho Soviet! See lhe Balance Sheet in East Alia

he primary Soviet concern In Easto achieve superior milituy power, ind toward this end all other Soviet interests In theandbe subordinated. Tlve Soviets probably toe increasing challenara. including an Unproving Sino-US relationship, growing Chinese military capabilities, Intensified US pressure on Japan toreater security role in northeast Asia, evolving Sino-Japanese trade and political lies inimical lo Soviet goals, and US commitment to Increase Its military posture in the region. To meet theseMoscow not only will continue Its steady improvement of defensive capabilities, but alsoon upgrading its ability lo carry out offensive operationsombination of potential(See"

Successive Soviet leaden have maintained that Ihe USSR must be recognizedajor player on the Asian pobHcal scene Traditionally. Soviel loreign policy relies heavily on military instruments lothe USSR's strategic and regional obsectives These include deliveries of arms, the use of allied and Soviet forces, and the employment of military aspects of active measures' Thus, while Moscow's military presence has confirmed its roleajor regional power, it has detracted from oilier long-term Soviet foreign policy objectives, primarily because of the widespread regional rjetception of the Sovietshreat. An apparent inability to use effectively other instruments of foreign policy--diplomacy, economic abd. trade, and culturalhindered Soviet efforts to increase iheti political influence

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oviel leaders probably believe that certainoperate to Moscow's benefit in East Asia:

Tbe Soviets havee facto military base In Vietnam which has enhanced their strategic position In the region.

Certain conditions tend to limit better relations between the United Stales and East Asian states. For enmpje. lhe Soviets frequently stress the Taiwan question in Sino-US relations andfrictions In US-Japanese relations.

A perception In some East Asian countries thai China isotential threat to regional security

4 On the other hand, Ihe Soviets also believe that tlie United Slates and China will remain key obstacles to Increasing lhe USSB's power in lhc region:

United Slates doubtless appears to theto have moved beyond its hesitant post-Vietnam phase and onore assertivestance in the Pacific and East Asia.

in Sino-US relations have not resulted in greatly improved Sino-Soviet relations, and Sino-US cooperation in economic and technical fields has expanded toilitary

The Soviets arc, disappointed in their failure to make any real new political and economic in-roads'in Asia, and in their Inability to attract Japanese (and US) development capital Into


Soviet Strategic Objectives

hc principal strategic objective of lhe Soviet Union In East Asia is to increase Soviet power, while containing China and reducing US and JapaneseSoviet strategy in pursuit of these goals generally Subordinates the achievement of local objectives and belter relations with individual East Asian nations lo Its overriding strategic concerns


In punull ol their strategic obivxrives, ihc Soviets wul seek tot

againit SiDO-Japanese- US iltatecicby driving lor military advantage; ifauuJorst case contingency. The Soviets seek toilitary capability In East Asia that is viable against tbe potential combined farces of these adversaries and conferssignificantIfombination does not occur.

Deter, through diplomatic and other means, the formationino-US alliance or substantial Smo-US miliury collaboration. "Normaliring" relations with China and restoring SovietIn the US-China-USSRey goal.

Erode the US alliance system la the Far East and develop countervailing friendly relations with states In the

Soviet objectives include buildingand political ties withattracting Japanese capital and technicalfor development of the Soviet Far East;growl ii of Chinese political Influence;iteration of the United States, China, andSouth Korea; and developing regionalfor cipMiting ocean and seabed resources.

Iho Problem of Competing Objectives

and competition among Sovietpolitical objectives, and regionalarise, presenting Soviet decisionmakerspolicy choices. We believe thatweigh most heavily In the Sovietas they have in the past, and that thosebear most directly on US-Soviet globalwill continue to receive the highest priority.of Soviet relations in East Asia suggests tothe Soviet policymakers will continue to preferthc adverse near term politicallarger strategic concerns are believed to bebecause thev may believe that thesesetbacks will eventuallyet come.

9 Soviet policies toward China. Japan. Indochina.

and North Korea illustrate the problem of competing objectives;

Smo Scnwl Hcldfscru. Moscow is not likely lo bargain away ihe military, political, andfootholds it has stained in Asia for the sakeino-Soviet teconciliation The Soviets have

consistently maintained that their relations with third parties are not subject lo bilateralwith Beijing. The SovieU also Insist that the military situation along- kilometerwith China can be discussed only afterrelations have been normalized and Beijing hasillingness to be flexible. The Soviets have tried to encourage more rapid forward movement In Sino-Sovietfarproposalsooaggres-isoD pact, mutual force reductions along the border, and confidence-building measuresprior notification of military eierctses and troop movements along the shared frontier.

and the Northern Territories. Japanese officials have repeatedly emphasized to thethat bilateral relations will not Improveuntil the Soviet Union at leastthe existenceerritorial issue- But for Moscow, even such partial cotsgessions could lead to new vulnerabilities for Soviet nuclear-powered ballistic missile wbmarioes (SSBNs) in the Sea of Okhotsk. Thus, the Soviets sec more losses than gains in corKCSsfotu, and apparently hope their broader "peace offensives- and pressure tactics will allow them to sidestep the contentious Northern Territories issue. The Soviets haveinstead proposals oBcnsibJy designed to enhance "regionalthey try lo sidestep altogether the Issue of Soviet-Japanese boundary disputes dating back to the close of World War II. The package of con fidemeasures, notiaggresstOn treaties, and no-nuclear-weapons agreements the Soviets have repeatedly offered the Japanese since thei designed to promote neutralism in Japan Byapanese chadlenge to the toristatus quo, lhe Soviets preserve the control of areas lhal Moscow deenu militarily significant and avoidrecedent for reopening territorial claims by otber neighboring nations. Including China.

and Indochina Vietnam's occupation of Kampuchea has damaged Soviet relations with member countries of thc Association of Southeast Asian Nationsas becoine one of the pi inc. pal obstacles to teal progress in Sino-Soviet -reconciliation, and has cost tlie Soviets in world opirisoo. But the USSR continues to support Vietnamese efforts to dominate Indochina, both



of lhe strategic pressure the Moscow Hanoi relationship applies lo China and because this supportaecondilfon for lhe Sovicl access lo strategically impoctanl mililaiy facilities in Vietnam- Thus Ihe present advantages of their relationship with Vietnam far outweigh, in Soviet eyes, any likely political benefits that would accruee notation of Ihe situation in Indochina.

North Korea. Two important Soviet obieettves conflict in policy toward North Korea- the desire lo avoid being drawnar with the United States in Korea, and the drive for an advantage In thc competition with China for influence In North Korea. Strategic concerns about thefor conflict with the United Slates on the Peninsula appear to influence Soviet actions. The Soviets up to now have refused lo supply the North Koreans with such miliiary Items as ad-vartced aircraft This stance has cost Moscow in its competition with Beijing over Ihc past decade.

Iho Track Record: Soviet Instruments of Power and Their Impact

Soviet Military Instruments

uclear Force* Soviet nuclear deployments include eatensive deployments of land-based missiles capable of striking Asian targets and steadyto SSBNs and intercontinental nuclear-capable aircraft. Tlie most dramatic development1 hat been anercent increase in thertferrnediate-range ballistic mimic (IRBM} forceeast of the Ural Mountains. (Seeurther addlllons'sre likely. Continued replacement of Badger medium-range bombers wtth Backfire

bombers adds to the threat of weapons of mass

desiiudion in Fast Asia

bro nuclear-powered ballistic misnle subma rinc* are conducting patrols In Ihc Sea of Japan Previously. Ihese were normally deployed in theagainst targets in the continental United States From thc Sea of Japan,lass submarines can cover targets throughout East Asia, while remaining within the protective umbrella provided by Soviet naval and air assets ISees lhe responsibility oflass units for targets in the United Slates is gradually taken over byiass units, we believe lhatlass units will be assigned

theater nuclear role Also, wc cancel lo see the deploy-mcnt of nuclear-tipped land-attack cruise missiles on board submarines off Asian coasts In tho next few years

he Soviets may also believe lhal nuclearcan add weight lo thoIa1of their military presence in Asia. This btrue of lheissiles; as in Europe, lhe Soviets have tried to use ihem at instruments of political intimidation as well as important miliiary farces. Possible political benefits of these deployments might include encouraging both Beijing and Tokyo tothe risks and benefits of their relationship with the United States To date, however, deployments have had the opposite effect, encouraging both nations to accept expanded cooperation with Ihc United States on Asian security Issues.

Theaterhenowalanced force structurewarfare. Soviet optionstrictlya land and airfiom large-scale conventional operationsobjectivesull-scale Invasion ofnortheastern Crura supported by nuclearthe event of simultaneous wars with NATOhowever, tho Soviets' priority effortbe against NATO. We believeavokdhe Far East thatSoviel efforts touick victory

present disposition of Soviet forces Inand trends in key measures of military capability

improvements in ground, air, and t naval forces and the related command structure

in Asia arc likely to continue The rapidgrowth pattern ended for these forces in


planning to meet worst case military contingencies seems lo drive the Soviet force improvements The continuing qualitativeovcmenls ol Ground and Air Forcesto counter cither US or Chinese forces is one consequence of Soviet military policies in East

'Thisiaard onoetrr Mrirreny Fercei tn the fa, Kwi Mmwaee rswially Ihr lo thr Estimate on "Savin Force Structure In Aab and thefteiei

and Mi Mom "

These cortlinuing qualitative improvement!designed to picpare Soviel forces to fight simultaneous wan with NATO andombination of US,ndforces.

Soviet weapon systems In Asia, especially aiicraft, arc Increasingly being modem! red at roughly tlie same pace as in Europe Althousih the gap between the capabilities of Ground Forces units In East Asia and those facing NATO has narrowed somewhat, for tbe most part Soviet forces in East Asia are still equipped with older weapons.

The Sovietselatively low price for their forces opposite China. Tbe annual outlays for the more highly ready forces opposite0 have consistendy been more than double those for Soviet forces in East Asia.

Soviet naval and air developments are maeas-tngly oriented toward Japan and the South China


Soviet Economic Instruments

hile the Soviets probably will seel to expand trade with ison-Communlst states In East Alia, thev have relatively linle to offer the countries of thc region. Arms make up their main ei ports worldwide, but East Asian nations now purchase their weapons from the West or manufacture their own. Trade between the USSR and ASEAN amounted to onlyercent of Ihe group's total foreign trade2he USSR did not serveajor export marketource of importsingle ASEAN country. From Moscow's perspective, trade with ASEAN accountedotalter cent of all Soviet tiade with developing countries In thend had been consistently lessercent oi total Soviet foreign trade. (Seeoscow, however, recently made overtures for erpancled trade with Indonesia, playing on Indonesia's desire tonotiluel commodity exportseceased world market. In return. Moscow is demanding fewer restrictions on Soviet visits to Indonesia.

oviet trade with Japan has never accounted for moreerceni of Tokyo's foreign trade and loo Is less promising today lhan at any time since then the Soviet side,erceni of Soviet trade wtth industrial!ted states2 was with

Cons Ranh Bay

The Soviet faculty at Cam Ranh Bay. Vietnam, aconcnracdalrs the la rant conotntratloo of Soviet naval use's currently deployed outside the USSR (Soviet depkrymeots to Egypt inere larger; even with expected expansion, the Soviet presence at Cam Ranh wiD not match that la Egypt In thosehe Soviets cow have In place mlasile leading and handling equipment, ordnance ranges, aircraft maintenanceand communications and InteUigence facilities. Ia addition, tbe seven surface combatants and fourusually present are supported by seven navalomposite aircraft squadron ofadaers, TUBS Bear Ds and TU-H2 Bearhas been at Cam Raoh Bay staxeSee figure A) We eipect these forces lo be itouficnntiy augmented and an cperxstsooal aquadraa organization established for tbe surfaec/rolcaartne uwts sCaOoord there over tbc nest five yean Cam Ranh Bay, unlike other facilities abroad, provides the Sovietsase from which they could sustain combat operations to the South QtXot Sea In the initial Cageseneral war. Soviet forces there could be used to

Counter Ckusor SSBNs

Attack Western facilities In the Pullpntnet

Artael Westrn sea of glBgsl (SLOCa) In tbe South Ouna Sea,

Augment the Indian Ocean Squadron.

The Soviets probably regard Com Ranh Bay at an

Important facility with growing wartime utility;they undoubtedly realtor their ability to defend Iioncreted attack by Westernery bruitedn wm)

Japan- After steady growthilateral trade decreased byercenthe decrease stemmedombination of diminlslied Japanese demand for Soviet resources, the Impact of economic sanctions,eveling off of Soviel demand for Japanese steel and construction machinery. In lhe future, Moscow might steer major contracts to West European countries, which have complained that their bilateral trade deficits are in effect financing Japan's exports to tbe USSR. An intcrruistioo of Persian Culf oil supplies is one event thai could rekindle Japanese interest in Soviet resources, particularly the Sakhalin offshore liquefied natural gas prosed

espite recent increases.rade lags substantially behind the volume of Sine-Japanese or

trade. Moscow and Beijing have spoken of IS billion as an annual total lot Sino-Soviet tradechievement of thai goal is unlikely. Some Chinese leaders have suggested that (ho USSIt canupplemental role In China's economic modernization. Soviet assistance In lecquippiiig Chinese factories built with Sovietee ins being explored.Soviets are pushingong-term tradeto solidify this economic link. The Soviet market for Chinese (eidles and consumer goods isby China's need for the fertiliser, timber, and machinery that the USSR offers

Despite concerted efforts over the past decade to expand trade relations in Asia, the Soviets have significant economic lelollom wtth only thestates of Vietnam. Laos, Kampuchea, and North Korea. Moscow remains Northargest trading partner, but Soviet determination to reducetrade-and-aid debt to themillion as of the end oflimits to an expanded relationship on the Soviet side. Vietnam is the USSR's only other major Asian trading partner. In some instances the Communist states are themselvesof the rawandcompete with Soviet exports.

Among all the states of East Asia, SovietastUtance is important only lor Indochina and North Korea. (Seeut the Soviets have expressed their dissaltslaetlnu with the way these slates have managed economic assistance and have been less forthcoming over the past few years In terms of both

the amount of aid and the credit terms extended, Soviet reservations about the value of aid to thc NorthP'yongyang's political independence andkept Moscow fromthe major economic assistance that P'yongyang would like- in thc case of Vietnam, the previous mismanagement of Soviet aid argues strongly against increases except for Infrastructure development that enhances Vietnam's ability to meet exportto the USSR. Soviet economic assistance is nonexistent for ASEAN andenewal of large-scale Sino-Soviet aid agreements is unlikely.

Soviet PoGlico! Instruments

he Soviet pretence yn non-Communist Eastas the penetration of the political, economic, and cultural life of the region by means of official representatives, access to local shippingscientific and cultural exchanges, and thehas grown over the past decade but, in terms of the overall numbers involved, still appears quite small [Seec believe it is unlikely to Increase markedly in thc near future, principally because of regional suspicions of Soviethisin the number of Soviets in East Asia parallels the expansion of the Soviet presence in other parts of the worid. Thc overall profile Is still small compared io that of the United States and otlter Western nations.

1 Ovti ihcears, the Covtmraeoti of laoaa. Thailand. Indonesia, and Malaysia hive taken Hootimit the Soviet ctoutvm bv dprlllnr oftloUb,Illegal activities have been firmed ant) denying imuoii (or iheir rrtrtirrarmt

Table I

USSR: Economic Aidast Asian

/ Laos

Ficvre* ihown arc actual deliveries, these ire rattle as corrirniiracnts.

Table 2

Soviet Presence la East


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examination of the bends revealsfeatures:

Major chances in the military and politicalin Indochina account for most of thechanges in Moscow's Asian presence The Soviet presence inIndochinaexpanded dramatically since the.

triking increase in SovietIndoubling of personnel2thc perception of Moscow among the Japanese Is substantially morethan ilecade ago. Elsewhere, for example the Phlhppiries. large propotuVsna!are explaiised by the virtual absence of any diplomatic rehtions ot cultural contacts until the

the period of this Estimate, thcis likely loimited instrumentinfluence in non-Communist East Asia forof reasons These include, among others:

suspicions of Soviet intentions andThese have been reinforced hy such events

as thc Invasion of Afghanistan, Soviet support of Vietnam's drive for hegemony in Indochina, thc shootdowrt of the Korean Air Lines plane, and Soviet threats of retaliation. Such threats have been direct (against Japan in, Indirect (the rernarks in Singapore in3 by Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Kapitsathe option of Vietnamese aid toin ASEAN countries).

TheCommunist andAsian nationsthe Soviets as "outsiders'" racially, culturally, and politically.

The ability of non-Communist nations in the area to obtain military and economic assistance fiom the West, and theit disirscsWkm to turn to Moscow for this purpose

he relatively small leftist political elements in non-Ommunist East Asia ate neither politicallynor responsive to Soviet wishes. Nonetheless, on occasion tlsey engage In local actions that further Moscow's own goals In the tegion:

Japan, the Japanese Communist Party fJCP) has been openly critical ol both Moscow and


Beiti"t: Despite signs of an agreement lo Isold "ln>:li level"is summeroordinated antwuclear campaign, tlic visit in Apriloviet party ddegation produced haidline Soviet rhetoric on thc Northern Territories thatarsgered the JCP and encouraged it lo renew its cpcii criticism of Moscow thb summer Thc Japanese Socialist Party (JSP) has moved more quickly to repair its ties to Beijing andthan it has to improve relations with Moscow The sponsorship of the antinucleat campaign in Japan by the JCP and JSP in response to US Tomahawk deployments parallels to some extenl Moscow's propaganda campaign aimed atJapanese pacifist sentiment

Moscow also lacks strong ties to leftist opposition groups In other non-Communist states of the region- The Soviets consequently believe that their Interests are belter served by cultivating state-to-state corrtacts, wblch they haveover the past two decades In the Philip [arses, despite indications of growing tics between the Communist Party of the Philippines/New People's Army (CPP/NPA) and someopposition groups in the wake of tlie Aquino assassination, wc have no reliable evidence ol Soviet iTtaterial assistance to thc CPP/NPA.

hc Soviet Union will continue to expand its propaganda effort and use of active measures there lo disrupt US rebtioos with friends and allies and lo promote Soviet interests. Clandestine radios such as "Ba Yi" will try to rxocootc discontent with the United States and China. The Soviets will promotewith respect Io US nuclear weapons deploy-meats in East Asia* to create animosity toward thc United States in Japan and other countries. Moscow on occasion will also continue to engage in certain Qthei illegal and subversive activities to piomotc instability and exploit regional vulrierabililies, but with limited success.

thc principal ihrcat to their own security. They view the steady buildup and modemiration of Soviet forces in tlse region as consistent with these objectives. Nearly half of China'silliondeployed toward the Sino-Soviet border and opposite Mongolia where Soviet armored forcesirect threat lo Beijing. Wc believe that meat, if not al, ef China's small nuclear missile force ts also targeted against the Soviet Union. China's defense doctrine, while currently designed loong war of attrition against the USSR's better equippedforces, will gradually change over the period of litis Estimate as modern]ration of the Army occurs.

pposition to Soviet expansion probably will remain tlie keystone of China's strategic policies.esult, the Chinese are unlikely to reduce theirsupport for Afghan rebels, and are iricreasing their support for the insurgents fighting againstVietnamese ally in Kampuchea. They see these as cheap ways of keeping pressure on the Soviets and helping to isolate Moscow pcJiUcally. Beijing almost certainly will continue to insist that the SovietsChinese security corscerns in at least one criticalas withdrawing support fromin Kampuchea or reducing Soviet forces along their mutualpolitical relations can improve appreciably. Incremental improvements in trade and cultural affairs will probably continue, but, to general, Beijing re mains highly skeptical that Mos-


Asian Perspectives on Soviet Power

he Soviet military buildup haservasive sense of suspicion of the USSR on the part of nearly all East Asian countries. With varying degrees of concern, Ihey believe that Moscow is intent on becoming an East Asian power by using Its military capabilities to build political influence.

hile Sino-Soviet relations have improved in recent years, thc Chinese regard tlw Soviet Union as


esponse to the buildup of Sovietlhe last few years has been to tightenwith the United States, ImproveChina, and gradually strengthen the



South Korea's bitter rncmorfes ol Moscow's support forong's invasion of tbe South0 keep* Seoul wary. This distrust of tbe Soviets is fed by Moscow's moves outside the PcriinsuJa. including Its support for Vietnam in Kampuchea, and thc invasion of Afghanistan- Esnsandcd Soviet naval capabilities in Asiaotential threat to South Koreas access to resources and export markets. Seoul also has focused attention recently on SovietJeploymenb within range of South Korea.

P'yoiiKvang probably is ambivalent regarding tbe Soviet buildup because il wants to maintain good relations wllh both Beijing and Moscow. We believe that it derives reassurance from tbe challenge Soviet activity presents to the United States and its allies. The North Koreans, however, do not want any Soviet buildup to provoke an even stronger US presence in Northeast Asia, to strengthen US military tics with South Korea and japan, orcourage China to deepen its strategic tics with the United States.

he ASEAN states are less concerned with global aspects of the Soviet military buildup than they are with Moscow's support for Hanoi and the arcrwing Soviet naval presence in the region. The ASEAN leaders do not believe the Soviets will apply pressure on thc Vietnamese to compromise on the Kampuchean problem, ASEAN thus far has supported Thailand as the frontline state working with thc Chinese to provide military' and political support to the Kampuchean resistance forces

Prospects for Ihe Future lhe Moil likely Scenorio

e believe that Soviet policy toward East Asia will continue to emphasize improvement of military capabilities. 'Ihc Sovicls have slrenssthcned their mill-taiy position but have thus far been unable to translate it into intimidation sufficient to develop substantial political influence. Wethis shortfall to continue over the not five yean Thc acliievement of grcatei Soviel political influence will depend on better use of other instruments of policy besides military power We do not eipcct to sec this shift ovei the next five

egative East Asian reaction la likely lo continue to undermine Moscow's efforts:

varying degrees of concern. East Asian countries will continue to believe thatntent on becoming an East Asian power by using ib military capabilities to build political influence.

the coming years, ooo-Communist Asian countries and China will probably opt fordefense capabilities or closer ties with Washington

e expect limited increases in tbe Soviel noo-mUltary presence. They now probablyresence sufficient toore activist policy in many places, but opportunities for fuither expansion may be somewhat constrained by Asian governments as woll as by other Soviet priorities; Likely areas targeted for gtowthare

Japan, where the Soviets will seek to bring In as many olfldal personnel as they can. and where their aggressive efforts In the area of active measures and illegal technology transfer will undoubtedly continue.

The ASEAN nations, with Increases in diplomatic and trade mission personnel and cultural ai-chanae programs to the eitent possible to create sympathy for Soviet goals.

Indochina, in part targeted on tbc directof economic and military assistance to Laos and Kampuchea. The Joint Soviet-Vietnamese oil exploration program will abo bring In additional

Soviet technicians.

The Island nations of the South Pacific, where they will redouble. their efforts lo spur the growth ol the antlnuctear

The Soviet Union probably will seek to expand its regional influence through Increasedshipping and other commercial activities within Asia and lo expand Soviet access to ship repair and resupply facilities in areas distant from the USSR

e anticipate persistent Soviet efforts to dettael from the US and Western influence in East Asia. The rompoocnts of such an effort, which would probably rely heavily on the use ol both coercion andmight be:

designed to show

Soviet fleaibility. for instance: vague proposals


a political Kttlcnient in Indochina; efforts to establish diplomatic reUliorti tliroughoul the South Pacific, an increase In thc level ofto events in South Korea; higher level diplomatic contacts with Japan,ro-myko visit to Tokyo.

of pacifist, antinoctear. anti-Western sentiments, especially in Japan,and New Zealand. Similarly, Moscow will encourage stronger Asian participation In thc Nonaligned Movement. The growth of Sovietmeasures {son footnote on pageo foster these trends is to be expected.

Implicit (and on occasion explicit) threatstargeting of Sovietnd otber nuclear forces, linked to regional arms control proposals, confide nee-building measures, and othersecurity plans.

Economic inducements, including offers ofassistance lo developing countries, as well as proposals for joint reaouice development and industrial protects. Al thc same time, Moscow may seek lo develop modest leverage over liadc In key commoditieseans of applying economic, and hence political, piessure.

The general East Asian desire lo avoid closer political and economic links with Moscow tlwuld persist as long as Asian leadersredible US deterrent to Soviet miliiary power.

We furthei believe the Soviets will focus much of (heir attention on the United States as thc key obstacle to increasing iheir power in the regionihey feel threatened by the prospects ofUS conventional and nuclear weaponsthere. Moreover, problems in Si no-US relations have not resulted in greatly improved Sirao-Scrviet relations,ere seems little prospect that Sino-US cooiieralion In economic, technical, military, amifields will soon dissipate

e do not foresee any major rrevaluation of Sovicl East Asian policy bv Ihe top leaders over the neat lew years Equally important, Ihe Iwo recent successions have given no indication thai lhe degree of influence of Second-level officials in the Soviet party and Covcrnmcnt charged with Ihe conduct ofAsian policy has changed. Meanwhile thegroup of policy advisers and second-leveltill rciati-dy young bv Soviet Standards, is likely to be around (or some time to come, andore of early nicer exiMnicnces that apparently crystallised its haidline thinking on East Asii.

e expect the Soviets to continue theiron qualitative rather than quantitative miliiary improvements However, increases in Ibe number of theater nuclear forces in thc Far East will bo an integral pari of the Soviet buildup throughoutcontinued trend toward improved mobility forces, more out-of-area force deployments, and better operational integration of force elements. The Soviets will coniinue to focus on efforts to control access to the Sea of Okhotsk. Accordingly, we do not believe the Soviets will give up their military positions on Japan's Northern Territories.

e expect to sec increased Soviet use ofal Cam Rsnh by naval and naval air units, including increases in the level of submarineduring the period of this Estimate, Thesewillrowing threat for other countries in the region, especially China. In addition, we believe the Soviets will seek access lo other military support facilities throughout Ihe region, while seeking to limit US access

Alternative Scenarios

Closer Ties. We regard il as pratuhle. bat unlikely, that the Soviet political position In East Asia will be substantially strengthened during lhe period covered by this Estimate. But. even if changes are uriiikely. it is worth flagging those areas where they are most possible- -

Developments that would favor increasedtnfliscnce include, among others:

The growth of antinuclear sentiment In thc region, and concern over vulnerability lo astrike bv counlries hosting US forces, could fuifher the Soviet objectiveeutralizing" tbe area

Sino-Sooiet Relations. Substantial improvements in Sino-Soviet relations could Increase pressures on non-Communist East Asian nations to reach accommodations with the Soviets

Indochina. Escalation of Sino-Vietnamesecould increase Hanoi's dependence on Soviet militaiy assistance. In return. Moscow would almost certainly demand and receive further miliiaryrom Hanoi, includingbase rights

Philippine* Continued political and ecoooanic instability in thc Philippines could providewith new opportunities to curry favor with

either the Philippine Government or the


Peninsula. Markedly improved relations between P'yorxgysne and Moscow could increase Soviet pressure aesinst China and could Irrtimi-date Japan.

eterioratinglternatively.relations with various East Asian nation! might suffer decisive setbacks under different conditions:

ontinuing Soviet militarycombined with certain other developments such

as Soviet aid to local opposition movements -couldramatic hardeniisg of East Asian perceptions of Soviet intentions.

- Stnc-Sootetharp rise In Ihc level of tension between Moscow and lleuing could leadajor rupture In relations, and US-Japanese Chinese cooperation could improve accordingly.

lno-Vicliumese rapprochement could prompt Hanoi to decrease its depcrsderice on the Soviet Unionommensurateof Soviet presence.




Policymakers on East A

Tbc Folilbuio of the Communist Puty of thc Soviel Union nukes muai foreign poller dccisiotis, with Inputs from other party and date oruanizations. Other imtilutions involved in shaping Soviet foreign policy include some Central Committee departments, government ministries, tlie military, and academic speciallsts.

ithin the Central Committee, the International Department (which deals with non ruling Communist parries! the International Irdormalioc Department (which handles foreign propaganda and promotesimagend the Liaison Department (which handles relations with Communis! countries) play the most prominent roles. Two ol the thtee department chiefs sit on tlie Party's Secretariat. The departments provide much of the staff work oo which the Politburo and Secretariat base their decisions. They also tap various academic research institutes for Input on foreign policy questions.

ertain officials within the Central Committee, by virtue of their positions and expertise, appear toey role in shapina Asian policy. These include Oleg Bakhmaninhina expert who is first deputy chief of the Liaison Department) and Ivan Kovalenkoapan eipert whoeputy chief in the Interna -liorial Department).

A Within the Foreign Ministry, the influence of Asian specialists is strong Mikhail Kapitaa. tlie most prominent China expert In the Foreign Ministry, was promoted lo the post of Deputy Foreign Minister shortly after Andropov became Cencral Secretaiy,

reportedly having impressed Andropov with his caperlichev. the other Deputy Foreign Minister vdth the responsibility for Soviet relations with Asia, has had substantial eirtcrienee negotiating with thehinaikhvinsky. has been In

charge of thc Foreign Ministry's diplomatic academy

believe that Soviet militarya major role in shaping Soviet policy towardNevertheless, the role of specificIn the policymaker's process is not

academic research institutes andthc Soi'tct academic community spccialiringaffairs serve as advisers to Sovietwe are uncertain of their Influence Thethc Far East, beaded by M. Sladkovskiy. servesAcademy of Science's chief body for researchpolitical and economic development in theespecially on China and Japan- TheInstitute^ which probablyesserrole, is headed by Ye. Primakov and focusesareas in addition to Asia. Neither of theappears to have substantial researchdealing with Southeast Asia or the Koreas

7 Soviet Asia analysts share certain basicbut we have recurring evidence of differing views on relations with Asia, especially oo, thefor closer ties to China. The extent andof these differences are unclear. In any event, it appears that the hardliners continue to have the ear of the top Soviet leadership


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Trend Indicators for Soviel Policy in East Asia


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