ETHIOPIA: POLITICAL AND SECURITY IMPACT OF THE DROUGHT

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Ethiopia: Political and Security Impact of the Drought^

Ad InldligciMC Aurumml

Ethiopia: Political and Security Impact of the Drought I I

Judgments

ie."Jmrrf i- "perl

continuini drought has presented the Mengisiu regimeuman crisis of monumental proportions. Hundreds of thousand! of peasants from Ethiopia's northern regions diednd ai leasl as many are expected to die from famine-related causes this year,assive outpouring of aid from ihe iniemaiional communily. Eslimaies of peopte at risk probably will rise by midyear. To ibe estent (his occurs, more pressure will be placed on aid donors to increase the earning level of effort.was itself based in part on earlier Ethiopian rejections.

In our rudiment, ihc crisis has not yet underminedmilitary power base, and the stability of hb regime does not appear seriously threatened thus far. Mengisiu. tvevertheless. is almost certainly mindful of th: role famine played in the overthrow of his predecessor, Haik Selassie, and concerned over potential challenges to his rule. He has attempted to shield his vital miliury and urban constituencies from (he full effecis of the drought, while monitoring both closely fot signs of disconieni.

Mengisiu. in facl, has attempted to use the famine to strengthen 'position, especially in the longstanding conflict with the Erilrean and Tigrean insurgents. He reives on iniemaiional donors to support the rural population in government-controlled areas of the north but vehemently opposes all efforts lo provide aid to the drought victims in regions held by the insurgents. At the same lime, he is trying to moveillionfrom the contested northern regions to western and central Ethiopia. His stated raiiosuk of relocating peasants from iheir devastated homeland to more fenik lowland areas has some merit, but his coercive tactics emphasize his polilical intent lo undercut the dissidents' base of support and perhaps hasten colleciiviralion of agriculture. The prog ram, however,wo-edged sword.ecure resettlement program would hurt the rebel cause by disrupting its support base, tbe insurgents are likily lo Iry to rally support by playing lo the popular opposition stirred up by the prospect of forced resettlement.

Nowhere have the polilical and security aspects of ihe drought been more obvious lhan in ihe issue of cross-border feeding operations byorganisations. Wc believe Mengisiu is prepared lo use military force to disrupt the Row of food from Sudan to the rebel-held northern areas, as welt as to stem ihe lide of refugees inlo Sudanese relief camps; indeed, both these flows have been exploited by the rebels to sustain theirby feeding their people and recruiting among the refugees From the

insurgents' viewpoint, any diversion of these Sovu would hamper Iheir miliury capabilities Dei pile lhc poieniial for both government and rcbel-ini listed flsrrups of ihe fighting in Che norih. however, wc believe the military tiluaiion there ia unlikely to change dramatically

So far. ibe srorsl famine-related reobkems have beca limitedural areas where Mengius cava play off coodtuora in government-urgent controHed areat at tttk cos: to hbe The intensify! sg feeders ewer the corning (tar. howcer ikely to head to worsening food shortages ibe cites, forciai the government to adopt more win gem austerity measure* lhat could affect Mengistu's political bate Wc believe the urban populaUon probably will idjuit iloically to increasing hardline, but, if civil disturbance! occur, theoil certainly will turn la Ihe army fnr luppOrt.

We believe lhat Mangitiu probably willhe unit politically, mi rainedombination of Western humanitarian assistance and Soviet military and security aid and supported by ha. own military and scCar.tyndeed, Mcngisii will remain dearly tasd to the USSR, despite itsconomic poiscies. since be perceives Moscow's miliary sirpport aswn survival AChoogh the United Slates and other Western donors have poured in enormous amounts of aid, reailions between the West ami Ethiopia are unlikely to improve significantly. In the case of the Untied States, tensions with lhc regime over aid to the notth al-rnosi certainly will increase and are likely to leadurther deterioration in relations. Mengiltu views the United States us his main threat and is convinced ihai Washington nol only directly supports lhc rebels, but alto encourages umilar assists neehem by Sudan and Somali*.

Despite Moscow's broad prsliticaI-military commitment to tbe Maraeii Mengistu regime, ike Soviets have aot come forwardccxsocrc asaisrince to. probably because ihey believe Western willingness to foot the bill will not alter Ethiopia's military and pohiiealon Mcaeow The minima. Sovietin the tramport sector and in support of the resettlementreceived eatensise publicity in Ethiopia. Wc believe the Soviets harbor some concern that Wesiern generality could undermine Utcil position, and are encouraging Mengistu's deep suspkrons of US motives in supplying aid.

3 6

Kthiopia: Poliiical and Securily Impact of the Droughtj

nil navel-on

Crisli

Tie Mania regime In Ethiopia 'aces growingfrom ihn worn drought and famine inof thousand* of peasant! died fromemailnd. given ihe poorconditions olmati eaiair.lv will worsenThe northern regions. Csce map followingsilt of longstandinghus farihe brum cf lhc tragedy and have becameof iniernaiional tMention- factors thaicomplicated Mengistu's prosecution of ihecrested ccoortunities to weaken insurgentFamine.induced migration has worsenedrepliant with neighboring stales,increotiag dependence onassistance has raisedproblemsegime that is deeplyihe United States and closely allied -tth theThe nest sit months pose diftculiMengistu at he attempts to placate iheolatile arban population,protected from ihe

Scope of Ibe

Recurrent drought hu plagued Ethiopia in recent years, particularly in the stnfe-tom northernwhich traditionally have mi produced enough food io feed their pccwlation. While the specter of hunger ii always, present, ihe failure of tbe midyear rains4 aggravated Ethiopia's chronicallyfood situation and created famine coodilionsarge part of the country. Estimates by interna-lioetal observers of the people threatened with death by starvation ind reined causes varydhon

Mi ignited Policy tnittatirei

Counterproductive gottmnieni policies. In our }udg-men have ribe problem! of drought, deformation, ml degradation, rapid population growth, and primitivefarming technique! lhatbare made tihiapia susceptible to famine By cmphaiiilag eollrctiriced agriculture and staie-run farms and by keeping food prices low in order ta maintuin urban rapport, the Mengistu regime has reduced incentifs for private farming. Statemainly uifJ to grow corn and nheot for urban caeaumen and cotton ond sugar for efailed to pick up the slock. Boor management, lock of skilled personnel, ond equipment breakdowns hare limited output, and mosl state farms hate beea financially tmiaceesifttl. Moreover, transportation difficulties on inefficient marketing system, and in-adequate storage facilities hair further hampered pntiuctiiity

Ethiopia, which until therew manof 'ill own food, has become Increasingly unable to feed itself.esult, dependence on food imparls mostly aid from Western governments, privateargnnizaii'mt. an! mtiliilveral organizat'nni.

bur overburdened

gottinmentmbitious irnlr/gj

rathtr than cummrniaigrowncoffee production in pan cawed by Addiiaw producerlimited ihe amount of foreign exchange available foe evencommercial food purchases. The regime'salso hare compounded budget problems because of the need lo cover the operating costs 'if inefficient slate-run enterprises and maintain urban food tupsl-dVej Finallf- policies have comrtbuted to increased migration io the elllei. which has caused rural labor shortagei. inciraiing urban food demand, and strains on ike social sen

9

[WillS)

9 million-'that

kihiuoiin GovernmentVowci ihn" international donor ^'otcl-ini ofd utlji* and irea riie

B|>juiiI of (Vtw itTeonl by ibc famiac lire ir Ibcan) el thut nron* arcia or pmrni toxrf ibe cities, lowni. and 'ecd-ng tiaimct of ihrproincci ihal ut under ibc ccaiirol nf Ihc Mcngiilu regimeirgr number arc crossing Ihe border lino relief rami* in Sudan, according in ihe

rcportsihairdiefcrTorK in the

hampered si road in meet the region is vulnerable io attack from nd iasurecai forcei. Authorized

Atillion, however, have iciuairieu inent reeled territory. Food *up-piy ii particularly critical in Ihc northern pnxinteiof Eritreara. snd In Welo. northern Shewc. and pans of Gender,n

througkou both

deliveries of Suppkes IO government-control ted popu-laiion center) arid feeding campsfrequentlyumil Urge aimed comoyt are formed: even ihcn. vehicles can operate only during daylightn the other hand, crassborder international relief effort* into insurgent-hen) arcai. as well as insurgent food and refugee convoyi, mint iror al night to avoid government sir at lack*

The northern provinces sre not. however, tbcaffected; thedrouglt also Us spreadin southeastern Ethiopia It cspcciilly

ently IK HcJ yet ll oaonrcgHTgrB Sacua,andmo. but ihc IT arc likely torougntIns ires last October found

thai rani ut. imp uroductkM. and food and livestock supplies were below noratl snd that food aid soon won Id Ie needed. Ass itiaace in ihe southern regiom has been lagging, lowevtr. because dcnori have been concentrating on the hard-hit aoribj

The ipicnding drought andrefugees have made II especially dihVsill to determine the level of food ihorlfalh In DecemberlhiopuS Relief and Rehabilitation Commissionorgs ni rat ion monitor lag ihcannounced that food requirement!end be II million metric ton* I'm! Ihal Ibe ccuntiv abo needs logaiicVah ng ii-'ifr andigher enimitfvirt likel).as Ibc criiM m'.eiaifie^l

Nonfc Anaenca. Wasstta lavage. Australia, aad Japan bavtbrunanc rcaef effct AporcaanatclrO0 leeine ion el relief aid meneUwarad sufaia October tit Decernnd foreign doners haveCOloro for IMS. accorMag so World Food rVognm ualistics in FebruaryFssibc* have conceniraiod the- response on boosting the capacity of IS* irempori letinr UN official* havef* cited ihtir belief ihal international food aislitance will meet flhopiasneeds wc ditagrec. ho-eicr aniltbe basis of the itiiag populaiMn attignifeani ibortfsll bei-een projected aid levels and aciutl

As fur us the internal logistics arc concerted, the United States reached an agreement -ith themerit ol Eihiopu lati fall lha; kit ibe RRC hand* US Governir*nl assistance directly In addition,ount* of food relief nre being dlurihutcd by ihc FAO's World Food Program and throughorginiialkms inch as the InternationalOf the Red Cross. Catholic Rclier Serviect. Save the Children Federation. Lutheran WorldChurch World Sernccs, Wmk) Vision, and Oifaml I

Mrngtita't Strategy

Mengittj'tills clearly "ill be severely tested over ihe coming year by the drought-induced crisis. Althoughelieve the lublbsy of theis noi imnKdiiicly threatened. Mcngittu almot.

+

it ton^cma) over potential challenge* io hu rule aed it miadfulimilar crilis emtnbu led io ihe outlet ol Hailc Sclstiicciuli. ue taped him to ailcmpi lo ihidd imports al constthe military and tbc potent rally volatile urbanthe full cITcct) uf (amine by sltocaiing scarce ictouiccs and. if neees-iary. diverting famine relief luppUct. This is noi tothe urban areas will to unscathed fbe retime Isausterity measuret tbat will affect thcciiics. Even to. caoti of ibc burden will fall on ihc eoantrytide where Addit Ababa it content lo let interna lioaal relief cfforti take care of tie politically leu influential rural population and lbut help prevent refugees from furtherurbaa area* In our judgment, the gevernmeai alto will contlaue to focus iu energiesastivc rural resellrogram dctigncd to cipoad Addit Ababa't control over the cou.nryside sad lo advance agricultural collect!af- 1

Tbe Miliary

Ethiopiai 2QQ.OOQ-strong armyervasiverunning tbc counttyand is ihe backbone ofsupportihal the armed

forces damn lie nil hp Mimjiisn Workers1st! September otientibly to lay iheforCommunisi tociety. and officers loyalhold most key senior government

morale is UuW'gllieie pilMliil Uinmet ia the north aid ihe inability of government troops to win major victories. | |

Given tbe its' importance of military suppcci. ihe regjime's prior ty almoii certainly is lo emu re Ihc army's knahy by perfecting it from food shortage* Soldiers and their families receive raium* of bos* foodstuff! from Ihc government, including commcd-ities no longer available to civil tint in the capital.

e believe.

| that tbe military jcms port sated commercial-

TiT ram? ]

ly by Ihe regime and tome agricultural ccrnmodiiici supplied by farmers and Male flrmi to nteelquoias)

We believe Mcngiilu "ill cunilnue io placaical ihc cipente of other tcciors of theso.enlorofficial recently

Famine ana* 'tr Fall of Halle Selassie

Man obsmrri have iwed iltat lite Mcngiilu regimeamine Umllaim thai wbith ciinirAutrd in

i, ihr downfall, ullerears in pimre. if

Emperor Hash Selassie. Despite some parallels, tune-ever, including tbe current foodelteye otherahseni ia Ethiopiae'ec imporiaal. Q

Ihe Ethiopia* moliilton occurred as modrrmtatlim processes test accelerating, creating presunei that ihe conservative monarch could not contain. The Arab-Israeli warJ ledharp rise ia petroleum prices beyond Ethiopia's ability to pay. tn

addition, theitlnesiaf the irown prinre raised putdii

unctrtat'li aboul the agingiicrruorj

The revolution itself began in4 at an army mutinyNegele over poor food and water Military mutinies over issues at law pay and living condition!to olhir troops in ibe Ogadeti. Eritrea,ntually Addis Ababa itself. As the same time opposition to fuel pace increases, tow salaries, and curriculum changes throughout thr educational system sel ihe stage for repealed tonfron-talions betneen numerous pressure groups and the government. Indtntr thai ihr retime was suppressing mi of the severe famine la the northernby iht endad claimed between IOOOOO andies la only two of the Imritrti hit returns. Tigtay aitd ll'rfu led to sesere critlcismfrom Ethiopians both inside and outside the government. Teachers, students, workers, and nrnin-allydemanding higher pay and beiieradopted other causes such at land reform and faminend finally insistedm polilical sysiem. Haiir Selassie proved unable to reassert his cannot and was deposed in

personnel thai the (Overnmeai probably tilt nave cimculiy providing itiBkieaj food io the army luicr ihis -ear as available tiocki ore cahnuticd.

4 4 1

International observer! have beet triable lo wtnianU*frtcruent rumors lhat relief aid is being, divertedbe rmfalary. Iiui Meqlsiu almost certain I) uould anther ire tbe militaryiphon off food aid covertly il shortages he came crmealj

McngUiu also "ill continue in iclionsupportnsure his control of iheSotiet mililary officii Ii period iciliynnd Soviet military advisers arc attachedF.thiflpjaa.tloisicra

rhiiram [it urc to anna owing ine fo miunder lin-

Hilary backer. | |

In Ihccvenl lhat dissatisfaction trnrrgei dcmie Mm gistu'i efforu to ensure the loyally of lhc military, at bebot he witt nas hesitalt to use morer-ras.tes. Mengistu aad his ccassssswiderv areenUtnehe threat ihai anltra ted. c* ameatlous nsautary poses to thend mate ritennie ase of ihe net*ak ol tataeai ccaasassssarsie irmed forcesf Hiisani

-tav meeting same cf lhcemanoathe pan twhay aad rtduclag IM numbar of Cabar troops In Fthiapia ii has aho btan evict to arrtsl aadpecled trouble matin lo avert serious disorder

TW Urtnn Pawulalion

While Mengistustrsiagr fo* dealing with tne ad-icrse poltucal conseouanccs of the food ihctices focaita an the ttuhtary. bt alsoPaettSStjt with iulating iht poetntially retine tuba" nupuit'.ioa from lhc inn Dticiioraiiaigcoaditnrts.pKtraoed acatbttu oealiCt. sad the Itcrranag Scwel role iteadycontributed so aradaaa arbaa ooooiaf saggort far MtvgiiiB.f-

!

aiww. kowevtr. thairewda adteyaa te feed stc-plws (or Iht citita, lha rttgsrna'i pervasive sccaniy apparatus, aad Ike public'i meirsey af Ihe bksodyf ihe "red terror"ill continueeter artun unrtsl.r" |

In iufforu to inaulatc lhcfromcots ofhe regime hai ovtn liedetc lunge io bu> food for urbanhu asked lhc LMlod Slatesoan olthe L'S)rogram feeAddis Ababa

resent i) arranged toetric Ions of wheal from France for urban consumption thii yea', tn addition, troajo bast been used lo ptevml refuiccs from entering Addis Abnba. and those few thai straggle inia Ihe capital aie late* promptly to camps outside Ibt an The gcerntneii-eem-oiled media ocjio:all> upon on elf urn lo osmbat the drought it4 jn furciga ref nf ctMMbtsltoaa partiealarly from tbt Soviethave not -onlad the aciaal tsssgsswad* af is*n wbtn ic-rrixm onY-ctats aniui.ag refute sar^pi -etjgw

We benorvc. howeverer*iUi wdl hsse ground ia his effori io sfelte' Iht urban Mpulaiion Already lav fall, it *a> publiclythai lAc auihcity Of Ihe IrOWrrghborncod aiseeiallona to which all urban Ethiopians belong) wai bting tsptnded.Inrecti nan uf dislribuiloa probttmi There-gune closed private bakanta in November and lurried bread sales over to Ihe tebtltl. making receipt of Ihe bread ration dependent on iilcndnnce records al eesmpuhoiy poliiical meetings.

liiVdnnounced

Iuither taslenly meaiv'aa thai (Karl)affect city dwellers. Workeri nr to beational dmigbt relief lai oavaliag one monih't pay. and all Eikaoeaam ore suiecaed so larv* loan at leStf skelters and reset tSemaivj eaaaea In addvtioci. lhc regzrre at teamred thai, lo Snout tbe drawdown oforeign eicHangt. ngoini so cat impOris. including auiortsobtles. luaury goods, sod tea tiles and irsspose eesroicam rauonina ill stops that affect themost directlyi

1 In January, iht sponubillly for tha distribution or fruits and vegela-blet to aiban residents Eveneporu thai sotnt food ihorl ckirod. and in mid February Mentis"

Putnl ilauintwlul

mud aid kOM.V

sntciitli bicaiina lit ml rfO* iitcrt

tnuCini io Wtsitrn alMi'm I I

J.

i ilratcgi For dealingihosc moilatTccted brawe aioa ibe ana toibap at neenei iac face) aaaetipcaxMi Tbe regime hai euablvihedal major cities aad unwentre!north, but hu refuted to autho it iherelief suppUn io insurgent held ntrai andla-traalirmal effameach ibote meatWe believe

AddoAba bat pltmat-^nta BlnHf list, March UN Coafireace oa The Lfnefencyaaiun iaeipaad fecefcagj la thelileiey to eju>el Western devrof government famine policy. In addition. |1 ** 1 lira* government cavein Soviet Mips Tntintanuj military cargo at leanIn January at the einenie of Wctlcra relief thl nmcr.lt. | |

After agreeing but fallow Wcaerao provde food sal io ail parti ol tbc tmairy. Add it Aoaba martat made0 Ihe LniUjJ Statu oei pr.riic down'tniomcaa* ialo inwigsnihcld territory from Sada* and hai Implied It could not giaractee the ta'cty of Interna-lloml relief workers ia Ihc region. I* January.luces boarded ui lean three shipshlopon pom to aciae relief shipments detuned for ihc erot*-horde' effort and Mengittu penonally and public ty-itourdemon lor u'tri yihi (am af their

MDbc uiiracwl

we beuca the btruopttra are coirwaeeTflkaTBS aiutancamendedtrengthen ihe regime's

and further weaken uthe north.

lUrngmvl Kiiettlemiat Plan

The regime toailnuei ro implement i'iet-

tlemrm pita ie moreilllom noeihmrtn ta

more fertile orrat ta writer* aedanthe country bi thr end of IMS Voder tbe pro-

parm an etpamameheme from ihe

gawaffirm alreadyeople itneraccordingpressEthiopian, and foreign

donorInt tdfMtrJIU hai touirdeant of breaking the oWe ol famine and drought in the north, an area moil obienrri agree is unable to feed lis population, la our Hutg* Addis Ababa alto beltrets 'hat man eg pearom the cue jar arret mitt cut deeply into ihe direct support prodded it ihet uell Ol prtssuug ike 'eteitted former)Hiih colleeine forte* and teatom anacianoni thai are uted bi the tmrrnmene af political and economic control V

It lhatart)hotf to itrganlti tbe ]

routes for theseveral siran

Mcngiilu bat publicly rejected repeated calhfoodhe regimereparedte force, including airstrites.eep supplies from reaching Insurgent areas and to disrupt refugee Ikmudan, which has long provided tafehavon and

i have it-

htopian Air Koiec last Novemberarge group of refugeei moving toward Ihe Sudanese border in ibe companytall group of armed Insurgentsording torelief workers, in March allocked up idrarm) centeri along the major refugee route.I-

onilmttng emphasis ott Ihe reiaeo ttoet

i'ktlilienate further ibe rural fopeta-tiau, hath lhat* being etered and thole harUaj to

aeetn men-arrivali. For example, ihe ihu tettlerg. ruoitty Ambarat and Ttgrran<ong barnas colom'ieri bi the Oromo inhabitant* af the southern tgkm lit oddtliim ta rekindling ethnic

leaxrsnt. the rrlacaiio*uiH shmpe* rampr" turn feen ibe gvtermmena appet^eieaet tradrr land* tor the northerner*

mi

While Mengrsiu ii apparently uying to weaken the insurgencies by interfering "lib relief effoni. olhcr actions of his may trig dvptcnilv h(

Foreign Rtlalloais

Inn aa Mcngaiu's dcunesiw strateg) for deal tag with Etrneowa't drought aad ftaume goes well besond sarasph meeting the food sends for tbe se palace, so

SOO, da flfiKtui Ive-fn lelatmn- Vrng Vu tpeeari

lo be adt|iil) wing Western bamannarian gestures to siipplv needed foodountry unwilling loolitical quidt the same time, he neons praise on Moscow for an occasional bagatelle to acknowledge Fiolilrcil and misiliry dependence r_

The USSR aadatas renseaaashsp wul tbtregime. Sonet load flfjiv-enes last yearto IOJOD ions erflo thein

n So/let rormtx asn inset tne rmirf of the

northern imurgcnl u'giiiiiaiMins. for iheiralto been wing ihe famine and relief effeaiiawn paipOMi The Relief Society ofan aim of the ligiean I'oopto'i(TPLFl. hai helped move Urge numbersto Sudan alXOo US Embassy Kasrtas in Sudan The(he refugee campsrovide lantlaary.food, and muM> in lis tgMen and theirof *hgm weultha

"jManyujUf "ciinu""

recarn to EiSops gericdKali "it* topples Some funds that inrgta rarwea air rtruag for relief open wet aareveal ofworld pusbese-ity. are alaseMbesag dwelledrposes Moreover, the gsscrrjlei probably have re-Ceiled additional troepa frara among victims of ihe famine antesult of thru control of ibe refugeeudan The rebels' ab.lii) lo absorb the new recruits, however, will continue lo be leilnciedtallage ef weaponi aad olhei nulltaty lapp'tes Their miliury activities okw are hampered by thr need lo divert troops to guard refugee convoys and deliver food Supplies wilhin Ethiopia. In icinational relief officials now fear ihai thet hindering move-mem of refugees to government-cent rolled arena to Induce more ligvennsWt in Sudan

wcseitt crisis have been largely in to* iraivspor! sec oruse Sovcts rsavt so*" Ir importbat ran be ased not only for feed eelrverj but atso for owaury (wresaa The uveas and aircraft are ttatg atsstaSnyad nrssssarsry inie meat pragmas.]

ports Moscow hu dtmandtu iwai nouir nuiia rn for Soviet fad and personnel rapenses incurred in transporting relief supplies the Sovins alsoobile hospitalO medical personnel inlodudden trip io Mencoiv tail December Fast European counlriesEast Germany andprovided some relief aid. including airlift assistance For its part. Cuba has limited its assistance largely us the military sector, despite Meogatu'i rcqueu for dsn iac his vtui st> HartaaDecern Cubans eaeene tad It increase the lumber of Cuban decori but eipisined thtyconstrained bi iheir own economic difficulties frnm Ocvng more.

Despite us low level of food aid. Moscowiocs tract rniinnumoubbcity from its minimal relief activities in Ethiopia, undoubtedly hoping lo boost its credibilityeliable suppo'ici of Client stiles and to detract from Western relief ctlorts

Sana-Ethiopia* Hu

i iilliawr ml* .treurou ptottdti him Ihr military equipment (turf advisory tiunllul in

combat Ik* northtia tnfr-grnii and COUmler Somali

'.- alntoti certainly mi no alternative iomrxt ol lupply. W* heUeve that Mengitiu alio look i

Stuart Unionodel forrm

lOffi totrotit'unal tt

a*rf traaVOrm tht ttanamnnd1 poliiical order and to I'Vjy lotal noil Hi al ctnt/ealmall leU appotnttd Itadtihp group |

for ft! Mrf. Motcow fainti Hi rtlaiiotuhtpttauit ii provides merit la natal facilities ufOr iht Indian Ikton Oml iht Ptttian Culf ninth tahantri Satin capability to prafeti are and natad pomt* In ih* ft pan and beyondhrrobohly im ftajfotttm.at tp*inpbaard /rata which to iufi or ptunotr other lefiiuttai in Africa ] |

ai provided tht Mengiitu rtt/mt with over

orth af military atliitanit j

OtipiirAbabo't heair dependence on Muieoiv.

longilaiding diflertncti ptrtat in trvtrti aeiat.jtraitg' fat resatrirgthe Ertlrtom tnimrgeney

anal Ibt competitiontrVusfIMaertit LtatntUI

orkers Pottr evohliihed lorn fall Thearty aemumird hr tmhant-btttnit It might hat been an eoiier one to rathe' /Panrmed form prncmnrl. ai wai engineeredngi'ilu.|

hough probably disappointed ourSoviet responseis country'sheaped praise on ihe Sovieis and literlargely ignoring Western relief efforts ] reports thai each donation from Moscow

ano its allies is pubcioiird throeihe timen delncry. and again al distribution.

jCjaagjitrntnt. i

We believe, however, the Sovieis are at leastwhai concerned that Western generosityosition in Ethiopia 1

Seuttt

With ih* Wai

Ait levin Ethiopia hai soreptcdounis of,*aiii>ljil) US. limine assistance, itlaiioon< Meagisiv regnwc and UK *bi Nk tt iirpra-ed ugnihcaiuly MO. indeed, appear tu bt dcltilmalinaure rohwf foe all Of

tlhiOPla.

lhc Uniied States as lhc main ihreaievolution and the driving force behind ibveri it.

Ababa recently thrcairaetltatlisZs wilhSuit) if WtsSaigion fdlOwi through onto increase fOaiaat tally reliefke not Bern. mc*>l> rebel ne Id rigiornMengiitti and niher hey government

Mingnd his key already aids insurgentirectly, cms relief eflctii to thasrcl idiniqna' ad to iht rebels and encourages Sudan and Somalia in assis; them

Mengistb appeari leu hostile toward most other Western countries tnd probably doci nol new intmbruti ihreaiever iketess. aceorgirga US Embassy, the government continues to ctacr light limits on Western donorit lhc contesied regions of the northhas ihreai. enrd so patron thr Bab el Mandeb strait to interdict

fortaga I'uea cany <agdtii.ncdaubrp

meni to rebel-held areas In addition. wtu*<has afforded some publis.il) to internalefforts, il has publicly charged Ihil theu the rauU of lie madecatr responsecountries us Addas Ababa's tasrac*the seriousness of ihe drought Whileia obstructing Western relet"efforts indonors

and international donor eeganiraiiont operating in bltvopia have beta oatweaehed by gtwtratueat cttV Cta to aid the resettlement program. Thus far. howrvtt. only Iht United Nation's hood andOrgan! ration, the Caiholk Church,greed. aliSwughnch as Canada. Norway, and Wotnaa tatitianct for that* already letettfgtl^^

Nnghborlag Stale.

Tatattan ir. otas asiliiarias* test coascqu(ryee>uf lha fiPsaipun drought stcuru thai ike country't neighbor! fice severe refugee problem* in

add it-inhrir own food shortage! Thii iibilaicral teauoni nrujwt belle'c. nnaU ihrcalcan ibe Horw j

Relations bci*ttn Ethiopia aid Sudan hate long beenmainlj over ihe vucoori tachfor the other's msuigcncy. The Fritietn ind flgrtan rebels have iheti headeunritrs in Khartoum and useterritory for supply rousri imo artai ihey control nsOe Ethiopia, according so several relltbtr sources. Mrsgiiiu 'ceetal) coademnri publicly Svdan and mSer Arab sitsas- toriieolirti Saudi Arabia, fortiHtgcnu. following ih*anuary of the merger of ihree nunc Eritrea* thtonantl arcurpa.|

. butublie staiemcnts suggest he is convinced thai aid to the insurgents from tbe US-backed government in Khartoum and Sudan's Arab'rlends is responsible Ic* the failure of his northern rrilrtnry campaigns. In torn. Addis Ababa, in eioseccooeration with Libya, suppliesand training io Sudanese dwidenis andbem to Operate against southern Sudan frcan buses in southwestern Ethiopia, accordin

The enormous new influi ofainly from Fnireu andSedan over the past sia monthi will mam irliiioMur view.uarterrsgaw" Eihiopasn re/ogeesonverged or. Sudan sane latendite thai up0 peooit crota tbe border duly. Mengotu hat poblicl) ciprewntl enncera thai the rtfugee camps in Ssdan offer levtile ground (or rebel recuitrient and that crou-boroar relief efforts art readi intended BJ aid tbt rttel fortsnt Tbe govcrament ibicateaed as January lo iaaa aciiow against counlries involved ia "hosi.le and tonseartio-rial acts" against Ethiopia tnd has said It would attack ari ieb'1 imul iiixiar activity it coukl locale

and uigtt-j

e Add*ket) IS

uwniary action to end relief caTotts to the rebel-reus. larticu'arly when rroil-border programl ore

increased. I

r

huge refugeehas inuriiol ihc buidcn or Ihc frigile Suilancscnu. which has droughtfamae problem! of Hiindgrowing mcrceacy ii the tovi" The iaflua of someCCC E'Jwopuat and nanniaii c< Vr Mliooalitict. accent

taepannacaicncariliewedorgan-

Iff

prcoer aacitalion and hoavng. aed locate art coti triPuting lo an alarmingl) high death rate In the relief Camps. President Nimel'i hat uomptaincd lo US off cult thaiam continueccept massive number) of new refugee* and hai called for inlcraa-lional effoitt to stem the flows from Ethiopia and Chad The US Embassy in Khartoum estimates thai by this summer, if the influi eoniinaes unabated,illion refugees "ill competeitaoa hungry Sudaoesaecrcauag supply of food lada competition for scarce resources thai can easy mandate fwihcr uraiSueaaaj )

ther neigheoit eh* face refugeefood ihctt.jc. thai ih-aaitn -caWal

AbaM inn ftfirol bowiaT lartesilitary threat and believes US aasUtance intouragttciignt oa thr Ogeckn While many ir lugeei from the I'll Ogadea war ind1 drought wereto Ethiopia from Djibouti and Somalia over the pail year. Mogadiihu and Djibouii fear that menyef

IHtse people "ill rei-rn in! lai oveitwirdenedScans in..

cial problems plagua both cewaaruta.Somali* aas* faces growing Elhuapaaa-iupeavied dissideat ac-tivuacs ii tbe north Ke-ya. nli.-ecgi sot threatenediaHU' refugee(cars lhat Addisdomestic rescitttmnl program mightedote lo in bcreet and increase icgM

en nam.

with most observers ihal Ethiopia't food WkIyIC wpnen over the coming year.!-

normal ruins do return more people cou Id ds

Proipeets and Implication)

Wc

cntli It likely io worsen over the

levin if no

undreds of ihousandi t

ehokra will spread. Even if I'edrtiughi ends, barvesti probably will be small for some time became or labor migration away from agricultural regions, ihc letl of agricultural inputs, and continuing marketing and Iruasport problems. Morrow. Addis Ababa faces seitcui difticaliies in making the newly resettled peaunis quickly productive aad is unlikely to change lit generally counterproductive socialist agricultural policies f

Tbe regine is likely lo facefood tbortaget in ihu cities that cotud icark *M* unreal ccstuie gwertaaseait price csnirnU aad tbe lapaiasioai of su-Okonry cx> lead daunbttioa la caw aadgment. the regme will tt able to provide aaeac food hut -if have ta rely increatmgly oa Ihtinvolved ia every aspect of urbanmaintain order Mcagitiu mi) be forced lo caller fun heraetter eiicnt by theunder the pretense of solidarity with ihe famine ilrickcD rural population [_

In our judgment, the deepening food crises alio nay intenufy tbe conflict in Ih* north We believe that Addis1 lc thai the famine in4 resulting diversion of inewgswelief rlTcru bane uacreucd the valaerabibiy of the rcbebay taaa tit has bang pripnnr ft norther*

tic military ana den IcrllBr"

ihe hcpninMg significant ncaasSSI thai would enhanceirit an and attectiem from ihe growing load i

Ibcor iheir pan, are likcl) to retisi ttrongly in order to safeguard iheir access to relief luppltet. as well us lo obstruct governmentattheir bate of support. As Addit Ababa increases pressure on the rebels, and as each side maneuvers lo blame the famine crisis on the other and publicisedier efforts to win puNK tapport, we believe that ihe potential fot bitter fighting in the north will rite Additionally, the risk toforeign reliefthe region is bound io grow, particularly if McngiStu carries out his threal to attack unauihmlwd relief efforts, thai it. relief to rebel-he Id arcai

year and thai diseases tuch as roeailei and

S(*rtt*

the likelihood ol intensified fighting.believe ihe miliury Situation In the norlh It unllhd) to dm rip dramatically. Evenovernment offer-iiv: were successful, -hich we think it unlikely because cf inadequate training, poor Jojulici. ind Id* morale, lie insurgent* would not be defeated. The effects of the resettlemeni program, in our lodgment, wai be only temporary, as over lime many of those moved probably will filler back Into ihe northern reeinris Irom Ihe resettlement treat, in addition to rewmint refugees from Sudan. Moreover, the tesei-ilcoyem program could backfire on the government by spread ing ihe insurgeacies into new |

Over the tonsin Ihe absence of maior etiing el In tht regime's economicwe believe Ethiopia >ill luffer recurrent famines resulting from oericdlc droughts. Although recurring food crises wll| ittu to rely on Wcitcrn tvumtnittrian assistance to survive, we doubt thai Western general ity will yield signitcani poliiical gains in Addis Ababa. Mengistu. in oar view, will remain clottry Ind to tbe USSR, despite its tlghiAsied economic aidinceiMnjpwi miliuryiwl to hit owi surVnil I

On thereest, wc believe Mengistu probably will weather ihe current crisis wiihoai serious oopoa. lica. ever though we opect growing discontent threvghut Ethiopian tode-.y. The regime "illto moiitor the military closely for signs of dissenl aad. in our judgment, will move iHikkly and crTectrn-ly againti potential troublemakers. Even if mount mg food shonages lead to disorder in the capital, the kr&elcs and tbe army probeblj could maintain order, at Wit initially Moscow is likely to continue its unwavering strpport of Ihe Mengistu regime and. alcag Mill ihe Cubans, probably wonldisiiianctontain any teiioui threat to the |

Under ttest circumttances. we see scant prospectignilktel improvement in Ethiopia's relations withleast as long as Mengistu remains la peer. Roationi between the two countries arc likely to rwiaia rocky is Washington continues to criticiu regime poficitf. including Addis Ababa's conintiimcni to lesetilement and iit rcfuul to allow aid to retch insirgent ireas Eihiceoan attacks on cross-border relief convoys no doubt would aggrautc tensions, particularly ifany foreign personnelvred or killed- Mcrtoier. Mengriia may aiiempi to use the United Stalescipaacol 'c an fa.ted policies as ihe famine situation wnrw. In ou' judgineai, hew. mi. E'feWpi*to carry cuteral to break rotation -ith the Laned Stares ever ancuM craaa-borckr ore'i beet on ofependence on Western ecoaomic ami humanitarian aid Addis Ababa might nonetselo* ciprl some US EabBtty officials to indicate its tJapkaturaj

Ethiopia Wlibout Mnaglsru

In our judgment, despite increaiiag coup rumors in Adda Ababa, it is unlikely that v irjnhrowa.cruia tnnli coaV cQancrgc tocccufa! coup II (irolongefidtwr-der tcccarnaMd mtjetaulueeyihe nerih. Mr-ajrita ntl lose crechbalaye moreto coupemptstcceiter ieg<ir> prabably also would be pro-Soviet, the iwabilily in lM cumiryew government could oonMadaie ill powei would offer some opportunity Torrelation) with the United States. Neveftheatu. ai longddis Ababa

the northerncriovt ltiteaJ_iL will be unlikely to looara its tics lo ihe USSR

Since MeitgnU hat already meed against any"heirsew

ai.nost certainlyoarxKdower

straggleifee military. pmiiNi among

ra'i iniar circlt Wh.lt dtiailtd itformatun about Ihnm led. tha amy's actions to date svgaeitaocaaaoraaoat haafy woaM reevaia Biptaliat oa lha USSR for secant) asts-lanccakenmg a! Eiiiccuar anili-ii't ooweiintnu'igt both the inmieeaiis and Somalia to increase ihrir nnwr I

Barring ihe unripe.led ctntrgenceadal-lypc leader, we brhevr il nnlikelyecceuw regime atuta make mtw changes in tthtonih's .r pro-So-iet or idol ion The iwiiiy'i mililary dependence

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