SOVIET POLICIES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA (NIE 11/70-85)

Created: 2/1/1985

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Director of

Central

Intelligence

Declassified and Approved for Release by ihe Central Intelligence Agency Dale:Q

Soviet Policies in Southern Africa

National Intelligence Estimate

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5

soviet policies in southern africa

iotormatioa available at ef5 waa otea Id lb- preraarattori of ihb Eniroitf.imrovodby tlie NiDooal Foream LateQjctoor Board oa th* dais

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CSCH6T

this estimate is issued by the director of central intelligence.

the national foreign intelligence board concurs, except as noted in the text.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate!

The Central Intcfugence Agency, the DetenteAgency, me Notional Security Agency, and the intcSgence organization ol the Department of State,

Also Participating:

The Aislstarrt Chief of Staff for InteJigcncc, Deportment ol the Army The Director of Novo! InrtJBgence, Deportment of ihe Navy

Tht Atslltont Chief ol Staff, Intelligence, Deportment of the Air

The Director ol ImeWgence" Heodcpwrlert, Marine Corpi

CONTENTS

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Page

SCOPE

KEY

Soviet Involvement in Southern

Soviet Views on

Relations With SWAPO and the

Elsewhere in Southern

Botswana and

South

Disinformation and

Regional Developments and Likely Soviet Responses;

The Nert 18

The Cuban

In

Possible Openings in Zimbabwe and

Scenarios With SWAPO and the

Outlook and Implications for the United

in

titCHfc 1

SCOPE NOTE

This Estimate assesses Moscow's currentpolicies in southern Africa, the variables which may shape those policies, and the USSR's likely response to various changes and developments over the comingoonths. Specifically, it examines:

Soviet objectives in southern Africa.

Moscow's response to the military and diplomatic challenge posed by Pretoria, particularly as the challenge affects Angola and Mozambique.

Moscow's likely response to scenarios that could develop in Angola, Mozambique. Zimbabwe, and with regional insurgent groups.

The Estimate also discusses the implications of regionalfor the United States. Although this paper discusses Soviet ties to opposition groups in South Africa, it does not examine the domestic situation there or the likelinood of change in South Africa.

For the purposes of the Estimate, "southern Africa" is defined as including the following countries: Angola, Zambia, Malawi, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Namibia, Botswana, Lesotho, Swaziland, and South Africa.

KEY JUDGMENTS

Recent developments in southern Africa pose the greatest challenge to Moscow's position there since the USSR's major entry in the area in the. The USSR's key objectives in southern Africa over the nextonths are:

To ensure its continued influence with the governments of Angola and Mozambique.

To preserve its access to Angolan military facilities.

Toamibian settlement linkedubanfrom Angola, particularly one that docs not provideamibia dominated by the South-West African Peoples(SWAPO).

To undermine South African- and US-sponsored regionalwith the aim of isolating the United States and South Africa from black Africa.

To encourage black African suspicions of South African and US "perfidy."

The Soviets realize, however, that theyimited ability to influence events in southern Africa. Moscow appears increasingly concerned that it could be excludedegional settlement in Namibia, much as it was in the Lancaster House talks on RbodesianA significant further diminution of tensions between South Africa and Angola or Mozambique would reduce Luanda's or Maputo's need for additional Soviet military assistance, Moscow's key instrument of influence building. Such setbacks in turn could undermine Soviet efforts to support Namibian and South African insurgents. Diplomatic solutions and reduced security tensions strike at the heart of Sovietfailure to provide significant levels ofassistance and its inability to play an active and positive roleegional settlement that includes South Africa.

Moscow's position in southern Africa will continue to depend primarily on the USSR's arms relationships with Angola, Mozambique, and regional insurgent groups. Angola will remain Moscow's main priority in southern Africa. Soviet officials clearly state thai Moscow has more credibility at stake in Angola than in Mozambique and that the USSR is in for the long haul in Luanda. In Angola, Moscow's objectives

continue to be well served by the presence of0ilitary personnel who help to prop up the besieged regime. Military and economic assistance accords also have enabled Moscow, its East European allies, and Cuba toarge advisory presence in the region, includingilitary advisers0 economic technicians, most of whom are in Angola and Mozambique Moreover,he Soviets have delivered someillion in military assistance and20 million in economic assistance, and Cuban combat forces have been augmentedroops. Soviet influence is further buttressed by political and ideological accords with the ruling parties In Angola and Mo2ambique.

The Soviets probably believe that South African intransigence will undermine the recent diplomatic gains engineered by the United States, and thai the continuing South African-supported insurgencies in Angola and Mozambique will sustain tbe need for Soviet military and security

Thethe fate of currentwill seek to maintain leverage byontinued Cuban troop presence in Angola. The Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) leadership is likely to be susceptible to Soviet arguments thatresence is needed to guard against US and South African perfidy, to protect the MPLA against insurgent attacks by the National Union for the Total Independence of Angoland to train Angolan forces in the use of Soviet weaponry.

Should prospectsegotiated settlement thatamibian settlement and Cuban troop withdrawal become more likely in thef severalbelieve the Soviets, as they have done in the past, would try to derail it Ultimately, however, we believe that Moscow would accede to Luanda's wishesettlement, working behind the scenes to maintain influence with the MPLA by encouraging Angolas suspicions of Washington's andmotives,uban troop presence, and continuing to supply ntUitary weapons. Given the inherent uncertainty of coups, we believe Moscow would be unlikely tooup by MPLA hardliners.

Under these circumstances, Moscow would seek to make the bestad situation. It would claim thatindependencea victory for the USSR and Cuba. The Soviets presumably would seek to ensure MPLA dominance in the coalition with UNITA and to expand their contacts with at least tlte MPLA (action in the coalition. They would try to protect their military access to facilities in Angola, to retain the military supply relationship, and to press the MPLA to retain

ore Cuban presence of alroops. Whileo cultivate Luanda, the Soviets would turn their attention toa SWAPO electoralpursuit of new opportunities for influence and penetration.

We believe that the Soviets, facedontinuing deterioration in the MPI-A's positionis UNITA and/or South Africa, with no prospectecisive shift in the military rialance, would find theirwere limited and that Moscow would continue its current tack of lx)Litering Angola's defense capabilities.

A steady or moro rapid deterioration of the country's economic inflastnicture would create serious problems for the MP LA and its Soviet patrons. Theouldrisis in confiderice within the local populace, if confronted wilh increasingly successful UNITA sabotage of key economic sectors, such asinda oil facilities, diamond mining operations, and basic water and power supply sources serving Luanda. Under these cuY^inistances, the Soviets would have almost no choice but to provide technical and training support, perhaps through the dispatch of East European security advisers, to help combat sabotage activity.

A dramatic military shift in UNITA's favor within the nextonths, however, probably would force the Soviets to urge the Cubans toore direct role in the fighting as well as to request thatCuban forces be dispatched to Angola. In addition, Moscow would be likely to step up deliveries of additional military equipment, such asinds and fighter aircraft, in an attempt toilitary equilibrium The Soviets probably would also increase their advisory presence andarger role in the planning and direction of Angolan operations.

A new South African incursion into southern Angola probably would lead the Soviets tothey have in thean upgrading and strengthening of Angolan defense capabililics. The Soviets also would seize the occasion loassive propaganda campaign aimed at exposing South African and US perfidy. They would also step up public demonstrations of support, such as ship visits, to bolster the regime

A final decision by Moscow on how far it is prepared to go inthe MPLA regime probably has yet to be made Comments from Soviet officials suggest that Moscow docs not believe Angola is of such importance as to warrant the direct engagement of Soviet combat forces and prestige. Moreover, whatever importance Moscow attaches to Angola, it probably realizes that only massive numbers of Soviet forces

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could decisively alter the military balance and evenhasactions could not guarantee the defeat of UNITA forces.'

In Mozambique, the Soviets are unlikely to writeovernment dominated by the Front for the Liberation of Mozambiquealthough they have been dismayed by the extent of President Machei's accommodation with South Africa. Although they haveless ability to influence events in Maputo than in Luanda, the Soviets will seek to exploit Machei's frustration over the National Resistance of Mozambique (RENAMO) insurgency and his continued need for military assistance. Despite Machei's turn to the West, for example, Moscow has continued previously contracted arms deliveries.

Moscow evidently hopes that the process begun by the Nkomati Accord with South Africa will break down. Soviet propaganda will continue to focus on the "bankruptcy" of the accord and allegations of continuing South African support for RENAMO. Over time, Moscow hopes that the continuing military challenge from the insurgency will strengthen hardline elements in FRELIMO and cause Machel to reverse his commitment to Nkomati.

As Machel seeks to expand ties to South Africa, the West, and China, the Soviets are likely to pressure him by encouraging hardlinewithin FRELIMO and disparaging his leadership to other black African leaders. Moscow, however, probably recognizes that dramaticas tbe ouster of Machel by partybenefit RENAMO and lead Pretoria to renew economic and military pressures on Maputo. This in turn could prompt requests byfor major new military and economic aid commitments from tbe USSR. We do nol believe that Moscow is any more willing than in the past to meet Maputo's immediate economic needs or to subsidize its long-term development programs.

Elsewhere in southern Africa, the Soviets will try to foment andnew tensions that will urtdermine South African and, US diplomacy and sustain the struggle against white minority rule in Pretoria. The Soviets will seek to channel additional assistance to the Namibian and South African insurgents whenever possible, though this would be Increasingly difficult without Angolan and Mozambican cooperation.

Tht Dtrtetot, Dafeata Inlettttena Areacv. belieeet lhat Uoicowuledonr direct Soettt military roleriagoU. although, lha USSR probablt tooaU Hap inert of tendhxg SoeUt graW combat fottet. In kit oiew. Ij additional Cuban Iroopt aad $ot*rt atmi and odium tettt unable loarther deterioration ol the KIPLA't rmlltetv Muatian, and IU turchal became urtoudu threatened, ihe thaw* ol additional Sootei intervention(ndudfnr dir. altr mlktarg teeviitvtnertme. Ifuth action would be attended not lo defeat ihelMtartlt but la thaw Moaaaw't eommllatent. to free up additionalforoa for aombal. and to tun pttaan on the partial Inooleed laolitical tetilemeni.

-stcnci

The Soviets will seek Io exploit any openings in Zimbabwe^ stemmingeteriorating security situation or South African^ meddling. While President Mugabe would not overcome his general distrust of tbe USSR, such problems could enhance the appeal of Soviet arms. Similarly, Moscow will continue to try to exploit resentment in Zambia, Botswana, and Lesotho about South African pressures to reach accommodations.

The Soviets will continue to use propaganda and disinformation in their efforts to retain influence. Such efforts will attempt to play on black African fears of Pretoria and to portray the United States and South Africa as partners seeking to impose solutions upon southern African states.

The pressing economic problems of the black African states will continue to work against long-term Soviet efforts to solidify their influence in the region. Moscow's failure to provide meaningfuland developmental assistance will hamper its efforts to limit South Africa's and the West's roles in the area, and could open newfor expanded Western and US influence.

Any US diplomatic successes also will heighten black African expectations. Washington, for example, will face increased pressure to push for changes in Pretoria's domestic policies and to expand its economic commitments to the southern African states. Failure of tbe United States to "continue moving ahead" could provide Moscow with new opportunities, as more radical black leaders push for change in South Africa.

Black Africans will look to the West for increased economic assistance. Greater economic involvement with the West could lead Angola and Mozambique toore truly nonaligned posture, further reducing Soviet influence. However, the political andaccords and continued security ties to the USSR are extensive and will assure the Soviets some degree of presence and influence. Short of the demise of the MPLA or FRELIMO governments, this rektionsbip with Moscow is unlikely to change dramatically unless Western powers are willing toa par with and at competitive'military and security aid currently provided by Moscow, or are successful in reducing the need for such aid.

discussion

Africa remain Important to Moscow's Imagelobal superpower, although It Is largely peripheralore Soviet security interests and of lower priority than, for example. Sooth Asia and the Middle East Angola, in particular,ymbol of the USSR's capability and willingness lo extend Itslo distant shores The Soviet-Cuban intervention in Angola inasdidhe beets of Washington's recognition of Moscowi military parity and equal superpower status during2 US-Soviet summitMoscow'sneelobal power asserting its claims to the rights and perquisites of superpower status At the same time, Soviet actions In Angola reflected an element of opportunism In Soviet calculations, as Moscow moved to exploit lhc openings afforded by the collapse of the Portuguese empire.

Modern Soviet policy In Africa has evolved since Moscow's initial Involvement in thend is dow aimed atumber of broad

To supplant or undermine Western and Chinese pnitttfj ecooomic. and military Influence in the region.

To obtain, or deny to the West, air and naval access; to monitor US military activity; and to facilitate Soviet transport of assistance to friendly regimes.

To respond to broader ideological Imperativesrxeninism by promoting pro-Soviet or

- leftist change that lo turn lupnorts Soviet claimsrowing shift la "the world correlation of forces'* inavor.

To gain an enlianced role for Moscow in tbe resolution of regional issues, thereby rcmforcins Soviet claims of superpower status and Usdispens-ability in the settlement of major Internationa! issues

To gain political support and influence among African stales for Soviet policies and initiatives in international forums

To enhance over the longer term Soviet access to the region's strategic raw materials and to create the potential to hinder Western access to those

resources.

facilitate the polarization of black versus while Africans, and to seek to Isolate the United States as the defender of the white South African Government

To achieve these aims in southern Africa. Moscow has sought lo consolidate the recuses In Angola and Mojambiyue, to bring the South West AfricanOnzani.Mh.ui (SWAPO) to power In Namibia, and, ultimalely. to bring down the white minority regime In South Africa.

USSR's key objectives in toutliemthe next IS months are:

To ensure IU continued influence wilh tbeof Angola and Mozambique.

To preserve its access lo Angolan military faclliues.

Toettlement linkeduban withdrawal from Angola, particularly one that does not provideamibia dominated by the SWAPO.

To undermine South African- and US-sponsor ed regional initiatives with tbe aim of boUting the United States and South Africa from black Africa.

--To foster black African suspicions of Southand US "perfidy."

Soviets' ability lo pursuecctivesAfrica fa enhancedomber ofincluding

Tbe fundamental, long-term regional conflict between the black Africans and the whiteregime In Pretoria.

The availability of allies andasenable the USSR toole without committing substantial resource* and personnel.

Black African perceptionsose relationship between the United Slates and South Africa.

The capability to provide Quickly and cheaply weapon systems lo exploit black African security fears and needs.

appealing blueprint fot action and politicallot newly independent stales and liberation movements.

The self-imposed limits on US military and covert involvement in soul ban Africa.

A number of political instruments andcultivated and developedong period of time aod generally responsive to Sovietsuch as the South African Communist Partynd pro-Soviet factions and individuals in current and former liberation movements

S. The Soviets, however, are not withoutincluding:

South Africa's military and economic dominance of til- region, including Pretoria's willingness to take military action, directly and through third parties, against black African neighbors.

Moscow's unwillingness or inability to helpand resolve the fundamental economic dilemmas facing economically beleaguered black African states

The recognized failure of the USSR to provide humanitarian relief in response to regional crisescale comparable lo the West

Moscow's unwillingness or inability to rcapotsd to emergency famine situations and the clear and damaging comparison with massive US

Tbe Wests continuing dominant economic role in the region

Traditional African cultural ties to the West

African recognition of Soviet inability to broker negotiated solutions to regional conflicts.

ttractiveness of tbe Soviet economyodel for African devclcgment

Sovief Involvement In Southern Africa

6 During, tlie Soviets exploited major opportunities afforded by tbc collapse of tbeempire, black African security fears, and the national liberation struggles in Rhodesia and,easer degree, in Namibia and South Africa. Moscow's efforts are abetted by0 Cuban and East European military and civilian personnel in theprimarily in Angola and Mozambique. (See the tables on pageshroughreakdown of

Soviet-Cuban-East European presence as well as data on Soviet military and economic' assistance to the region00 Cuban troops in Angola remain essential lo tbe efforts of the ruling Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) to defendrowing insurgency threat

Gfettory

ANC African National CratgnSH. Insurgent South African poetical movemenl. banned in South Afrtca0

FHEUMO Prom for the liberalm of Mourn-btomt. Farmer ruernlla rrxwensent led by Sanson: that currently rules Moombiqoe

MPLA. Popular Movement foe (he Ubttalton ol Angola. Former Insurgent awvernent that currently rvJea Angola, led by leae Ednrdo dea Saratos.

RENAMO- Notionalf Mozambique MoramUcan Insurgent group formerly backed by South Africa.

SACP.Soa> Communistoscow-oriented party banned in South Africa since the lOSOs that has eitensive Lnks to the African National Congress.

SWAPO. Sown-Wmt Africa Paepla-'i OieaMtaiion. The major (munent movement in Nscubia.

UDF. United Democratic Front. Legal antlgovern-ment multiracial iivieiatian ofrganization* in South Africa formed

UNIT A.miom far the Totalof Angola. Aragolari iramrgent iiicverneat led by Jonas Savimbi and bacied by South Afrtoa.

ZANU. Zlmbabma Africa* National Umiom. Led by Robert Mugabe, thb former guerrlHa tnovement has erne rand as the ruling and dominant poutkal party

rlno* IrarlepeasrJenoe.

ZAPU. Zimbolm* African PtooUt Union. Led bv loshuaOne of the rnaior guerrilla groups that fought the white in Ironegirrae in Rhodesia before independenor0 Now an opposition party

sizable Soviet Bloc ami Cubancen-(ral Importance lo Sennet interest* ant)give* Moscow access to and influence in the military and civilian bureaucracies, in pan byependence on the important technical servicesbv these advisers. Various party-to-party accords and cadre training programs, lor example, further enable the USSR lo identify and cultivate strongly pro-Soviet elements within the MPLA and the Front for the Liberation of Mozambique (FBOJMp)-

Ii centralcocow'i pursuit ofobjectives. It affords the USSR entreeto theemaining liberationNamibia and South Africa, servingonduitaid and training to SWAPO and AfricanCongress (ANC) insurgents. The Soviets alsoof monitoring,lotting orin ing Zaire from Angola.

The USSR has ertenslve and regular access to air and naval facilities In Angola, and Luanda provides logistic support to the Soviet Navy'a West Africa patrol andtaging base for Soviet long-rangeaircraft. Although Mozambique does not permit Moscow as extensive access, Maputo continues to permit Soviet ship visits and port calls

The Soviet-Cuban Intervention in Angolaarks the start of Moscow's higher profile in southern Africa.rowing regional role was underscored by the development of aims supplywith Angola, Mozambique, and Zambia, as well as material support for guerrillas during the Rhodes!an war and for those now operating inand South Africe-

Beginning with the negotiated settlement of the Rhoderian conflict inowever,regional influence began to level off: relntions with Zambia did not appreciably expand. Robert Mugabe's electoral win over tbe Soviet backed Joshua Nkomo checked Soviet inroads in independent Zimba-

and arm soles to Botswana failed to gain the Soviets any appreciable Influence. Moreover,tough policies vis* vis the reckons remaining national liberation movements further duzumshodopportunities. On the plus ride, Moscow's growing involvement in Angola and Mozambique seemingly assured the SovietsesrUirrmrrg role in southern Africa.

he decisions by Angola and Mozambique in4 to sign military disengagement and nonag-gressfon pacts, respectively, with South Africa cart Into question tbe USSR's role and influence In Its two key

Tha NVomosi Accord -

Onm. MszasuStoue and South Africa signednonagrculon port (Utlrij tl.it noil Iterwould allow (ti territory in be used to prepare acts ofagainst the ether. In prssxical teraaa,agreed tb stop rurinoiting the Moxambecanflnsutance insurgent* in return lot Mapulo'i pirdjee to prevent luerrilu attacks from Mozambique against South Africa by tbt African NattoneJ Ceesares

Th. lusokoe*l

Tbe agreement of IS1 between Angola and South Africa calk for the stated withdrawal of Sooth Africanax suothau Angola in exchange for aa Ancoian ummruueot not lo show the Naxnibian guerrillas of the South West Africa People's.to operate la the area vacated by South Africa. Pretoria and Luanda agreed loointCeeaaataata la pence the div warmer* area and prevent SWAPO irifihranon of Mrthecr. Namibia

strongholds. Angolan and Mozamhican efforts lolies lo the Weat in recent years haveMoscow's concerns about the vlabihly andof lb key chenls In southern Africa.

eneral Srxretary Chemcnko offered ihe most autltoritative Soviei comment on these agreements in4 when he implicitly expressed grudging approval of the accords but criticized Washington and Pretoria for exploiting African desires for peace and stability lo impose iheir solution! on the region, Chor-nenko voiced doubts as to whether Angolan security and Nxmihian Independence arc "truly" guaranteed and reaffirmed the USSR's support for Angola,and regional liberationoviet media commentaries further reflect Moscow'sPolitical analyst Alehsandr Bovin. for example, candidly rated tbe factors and benefits that hadLuanda and Maputo to reach agreements with Pretoria- Bovin nonetheless questioned the utility of the records, saying it was "naive" to think lhat Pretoria's dests bill ration efforts could be stopped by "treaties and agreements

oscow has seized upon the stalled Southtroop withdrawal from southern Angola andNational Resistance of Mozambique (RRNAMO) activities In Mozambique lo step upof the Lusaka and Nkomali Accords. Soviei commentary has argued that these 'Violations" reflect Pretoria's realbring down Ihe MPLA

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and FRELIMO regimes. These accounU eueisistcnlly argue thai ihe region's funds mental problems are all linked lo Ihe exigence of ihe while minority readme ina need for continued armed struggle.

Angola

ngola remains Moscow's main priority in southern Africa. Soviet officials erjOldtly state that Moscow has more credibility at stake In Angola than in Mozambique, and that the USSR is "In for tbc long]n support of the MPLA. Tbe Sovietsthat the United States seeks to oust the MPLA from power and "cut the USSRf southerneipressed deep suspicions about USfor wanting toamibian settlement. Soviet statements about "hanging tough" In Angola for several more years reflect this broader desire toa US administration thai the USSR perceives as trying to "push tbe Soviets back- around the globe

t the taroe time. Soviet officiab repeatedly have argued lo US officiab that neither ihe United States nor the USSR has "vital interests" al stake ic southern Africa. In this vein, Moacow has further asserted thai US-Soviet confrontations In the area need not develop and thai southern African issues should not complicate broader, more important issues in US-Soviet relations. Nevertheless, Soviet officiab have stated emphatically that Moscow has no intention of compromising on such basic positions as lu opposition to apartheid and support to the MPLA goversunent

n balance, such comments suggest that the USSR clearlyilitary stalemate lhat sustains Luanda's dependence upon Moscowettlement tbat could bo perceivedoviet "withdrawal" under US pressure New Soviet economic and military Bid commitmenU to Angola substantiate Moscow's professed commitment to preserving the MPLA In power. For eamptr.2 Use Soviets agreed to pledgeillion in eernomic aid to Angola, but little has been delivered. On tbe military side, tbe Soviets have delivered impressive amounts of militaryaturing this period, the Soviets have upgraded Angolancapabilities through the introduction ofndurface-to-air missile systems.elicopter guruhips,ighter aircraft, andmbeis into Angola, and deliveries of previously provided weapon systems continue at high levels. In addition. Soviei advisers haveore active rale in transport and logistics structures within the country.

oscow probably sees continuingay to help turn arouneT the worsening security situation and erasure its continued Influence in Luanda Abo, this aid demonstrates Moscow'sand will strengthen the Sennet-becked hardliners in Luanda, thereby limiting President dot Santos's political rnancuverability. Furthermore the provision of sophisticated weapon systems to Angola serves to bolster Soviet warnings to South Africa that future South African attacks willeavy cost

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aim

Although Moscow views tbe current Angolan talks with the United States and South Africaotential threat to its position, It remains oonvioced that South Africa is unwilling to relinquish Namibia to SWAPO rule and that this will ultimatelyettlement even if otlter related issues are resolved. In addition, the still-Incomplete South Africanfrom southern Angola has somewhat diminished the security threat to the MPLAthreat that first prompted the Soviets to send record levels of arms to Luandaoreover, should the present situation persist, the Angolans and Cubans would betronger position to focus their energies on the National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) insurgents. Finally, while the Soviets may have misgivings about the Lusaka disengagementconstraining SWAPO military activity,tlie reslme In Luandaore Important priority.

In this light, the Soviets continue to call for implementation of UN Security Councilnd to condemn any formal "linkage" formula that ties the South African presence In Namibia to the Cuban troopngola. In reality, however, they have tacitly accepted some linkage by publicizing proposals made by President das Santos in Septemberwhich callhased withdrawal of0 Cubansluee-year period after UN Security Council Resolutions initiated and the South Africans reduce their troop presence in Namibia to some I

This is the first time such disclosures have appeared In authoritative Soviet and Cuban media, and the disclosures suggest that the USSR and Cuba see several benefits to going public with tlie "fine print" of Luanda's current proposal. In particular, it places the burden of continuing the Namibian process upon Pretoria, pressures the United States to validate Its claim to be an objective broker between South Africa and the black Africans, and enhances Angola's image by demonstrating Luanda's willingness to make0

UNSCHcallshased withdrawal of South African forces from Namibia, ind the esubUshmcntN force to oversee preoaratioos for Ninuhian elections.

oamo and ihe Namibia Peace Proeeti.

pursuit of Namibian uuloprndence. As itch, Moscow and Havana probably arc_antos's public duckaure makes it more difficult to conduct private negotiations Moreover, the disclosure forced Pretoria to go publlo with Its counterproposal. Miwcow probably hopes the process will be complicated and that each side will find It difficult to make new concessions without losing face. The Soviets andmay believe that these disclosures serve to lock dos Santos into his current position and limit his maneuverability asnegotiations develop further.

Soviet Views on UNITA

ncreasing candor In the Soviet press about Angola's precarious reeoornJcin part by UNITAsuggests thatrecognize* that the MPLA may have to take some dramatic steps to get out of an increasingly untenable pemtion. Recent articles In (Vew Timet.ubexhom. and Komtomoltkaya PtaixU noted Angola's alarming predicamentercent of the country's bridges andercent of IU transport facilities have been destroyed by thehat "tens of thousands of teenagers were drafted Inhat "Luanda ishortage of food and other essentials as its population has doubled due to the influx of refugees bom thend that "not only the territorial integrity hutndependence of the young republic has beenuch media revelations also probably are designed to signal the long-term nature of the Angolan problem and the continuing need for Soviet support

The Soviets are wrestling with the question ofuture role In Angola. During the past year. Soviet crfhriia privately acknowledged for the Erst time that neither side can prevail militarily and that peace can only befgh some form of internal rccondlUtloo. The Soviets have not indicated any willingness, however, to support an MPLA effort toialogue with thebecause the MPLA would beistinct disadvantage inituation because ofresentand political strength. Moreover. Soviet officials across tbe board adamantly reject any MPLA deal with UNITA leader Jonas Savtmbi who theyfear would easily dominate any such arrangement At this time there Is no evidence to Indicate that this judgment does not reflect views of the MPLAparticularly among the pro-Soviet faction

We believe the Soviets thus see the continuation ol the military struggle as their only real option until such time as Savlmbi Is either gone or UNITA's

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strength it otherwise diminished. Bv the same token. Moscowuban tioop withdrawal before the military balance shifts in laianda's favor as simply forcing the MPLAuicide pact-Relations With SWAPO ond the ANC

tecenl diplomatic moves in Angola have sparred increased Soviet Interaction with SWAPO leaders, and Moscow appears to be trying to stiSen SWAPO leaolvc against any temptation toeal with Pretoria.inroads In Mozambique. More important, fromperspective, il diminisboV the already limiled capabilities of the ANC and thus obstructs the USSR's long-term objective of undermining the whileregime in Pretoria. Moreover, the Nkomati Accord has jrarnaiseant implications for more important Soviet interests in Angola. One of Moscow's chief concerns about tbe accord has been that Ihe successfulof FREUMO's insurgency problem through negotiatioo could encourage the MPLA to do tikewise.

JSucli statements also add to the pressure on Luaiiaa. since SWAPO leaden increasingly express the fear that Luanda will sell out SWAPO to achieve an accord with South Africa. Similarly. Nujoma's two-week stay In Moscow during the US Angolan talks in4 may have served to remind Luanda thatntent on Reding SWAPO's interests and stake in the ongoing negotiations

2fl. For their parts. SWAPO and the ANC probably arc cot keen led lhat Moscow may sacrifice theirin order to strengthen its position in Luanda and Maputo. Allhough these liberation movements have been upgrading Iheir ties to the Chinese, ihey will have little choke but to become even more dependent on the USSR should the Angolan and Moxambican aarreeroents with South Africa take hold. Indeed. SWAPO and the ANC probably attach greaterto Soviet backing than ever before unce tbey may be able to translate Moscow's continued support to Luanda and Maputo into leverage for sustaining assistance to tbe liberation struggle.

of implementation ofrobablyrotracted militaryNamibia so they can establish greaterSWAPO. From Moscow's perspective, whilestrategy offers little hope of near-termit does succeed in prolonging regionalblack African antipathy toward Pretoria.

Mozambique

Samora4 clearly undercuts Soviet interestsand opens new opportunities for Western

3aid commitmcrru have not matched Maputo's economic needs, however, and the Soviets have shown no inclination lo increase economic assistance enough to dissuade Macbel from talking with tbe SouthIn Ihe past few years, for example, Moscow has failed to respond to Morambtcan calls for greater economic aid and has rejected Maputo's application for membership in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance

Machel's willingness lo reach an agreement with Pretoria most certainly was influenced bydismal economic prospects Maputo's long-standing economic slide has been seriously eiacerbat-ed by expanded RENAMO activities and the onset3evastating famine These security and economic difficulties presented Macbel wilh hiscrisis since independence, and in the face of Moscow's unwillingness to provide substantialassistance left him little option but to seek out new potential sources of bdp as well as to curtail South African support to RENAMO.

Tbe Soviets have acquiesced in Macbel's policy shift, at least in partto Soviet official* -Moscow's stake and obligations Inare lets than In Angola,oviet and Cuban intervention brought lo power andthe MPLA. Sovietot linked as closely to the survival of the Machel regime. Soviet influence is considerably less in Maputo than in Usanda;^"

evertheless. Moscow Is unlikely to write off Mozambique President Machel received high-level attention at the Andropov funeral in4 and the Pravda account of his meetings with Soviet Premier Tlkhonov and Deputy ForeignH'ichev noted that prospects for furtherof bilateral relations were favorable. Moreover.

U

(he SovieU ate actively cultivating Mozarabican imll-Uryoiambtcan militaryas warmly received in Moscow inndof previously coo traded Soviet military equipment have continued since the accord with South Alrfcaoscow alsoi cod to sellabout half of the oil it requires

Etsarwrvere in Southern Afrtca

he Soviets continue to seek lo improve and bohter their bilateral tics to oilier slates in the region. These efforts have taken on added sigruficance since thef the Nkornati and Lusaka Accords in eathile many African leaden may view the accords as limited tactical moves and arc not inclined to attach broader significance to

Zimbabwe

he Soviets continue lo seek improved lies with the Mugabe government. Stillorn Nkomo's electoral defeatoscow has graduallyties to Harare1 byumber of media, cultural, and trade accords Inn agreement toASS link inwas signed as part of Harare's effort lo present reportInsi of world events from both Eastern and Western perspectives.ong delay. Zimbabwe also has opened an Embassy in Moscow. Moreover, after numerous postponements Prime Minutermay in the near future make his first visit to the USSR.

beo are con! inning efforts to exploit and highlight diSerences between the United States and Zimbabwe. On Moscow's plus side, the Soviets appear encouraged by Mugabe's professedto MarxismLeninism, and in4 theyelegation to tbe Zimbabwe African National UnionZANU's) second partyby Praoda as an "important stage forevel-opment along the path of Independence and socialhe Soviets also gave great media play to US reduction of economic aid to Harare following its abstention in the UN vote on the Korean Airline shoot down in

he Soviets will confront longstanding ZANU memories of Soviet support to the rival Zimbabwe African People's Union (ZAPU) movement during the liberation itruggle. As in other countries, possible

Soviei offers of militaty aid couldreater Soviet Influence, although theto date has favored British. North Korean, and other suppliers over the Soviets.

Zambia

oviet inSueoce in Zambia remains limited and is unlikely to increase significantly in the abort term because of Zambia's need for massive economicand the lessened security threat perceived from South Africa. Despite the Soviet arms relationship estabbslted with Zambia, Moscow'i position in Zambia has not substantially improved The Soviets mainlaio an advisory and maintenance presence in Lusaka wilh regard to, but thb relationship has not given Moscow significanl political Influence or leverage. The lessening of Zambia's external security problems following the conclusion of tbe Rltodcsian war has allowed President fcunda to pursue his longstanding policy of rtorudignrnent Indeed. Kaun-da's willingness to talk and negotiate withunderscored by his role in facilitating theaccord between Angola and South Africa, as well as similar talks between SWAPO and Southivergence in Zambian and Sr/viet Interests. Following Kaunda's boating of tbe meeting in4 between SWAPO aod the Namibian internal parties, for example, Moscow turned down hb request to visit tlie USSR. Kaunda's desire to play the elder statesman and regional peacemaker has probablydiminished Soviet short-term hopes for greater influence In Zambia

tbe Soviets have had limitedestablishing links wilh various groups infrom the standard Friendship Society set upthe Soviet Ccenmunbt Party has anwith Zambia's ruling United NationalParty (UNIP1 Thb has ledumberexchanges and delegation visitsIn addition, some members of Kaunda'sofknown to be pro-Soviet In outlook. Moscowviews these linksseful mechanismand cultivating individuals within theelite

Botswana and Lesotho

Soviets hive stepped up efforts loand Lesotho as well as other stalesto South Africa, These moves have had onlyhowever, because of the ties these states have

CLGH6T

the West and thnii fear ul South AfricanMoscow attempted lo build an armsCabot one in theus, and1 signedaccord, primarily for armored person-

nel carriers and SAowever, Botswana'swith ihe quality and maintenance ofled Gaborone lo send the Soviet support personnel boose when tbe one-year service contract expired Nevertheless, Moscow has succeeded ina large diplomatic presence in Gaborone; there reportedly are someersons at ihe Soviet Em ha sty.

uture Soviet opportunities may well depend on the state of relations between Botswana and South Africa, Recent South African pressuressecurity pact" have irritated President

"^For their part tho Soviets have attempted to avoid antagonizing President Masire.Q

Lesotho's Prime Minister Jonathan hasomewhat dramatic "turn to the East"3 In order to draw Western attention to his country's problems with South Africa and lo elicit additional foreign aid and assistance from all sources. The Soviets have seized on these Initiatives to expand their links wilhoviet delegation headed by aof the Soviet State Committee for ForeignRelations visited Maseru in4 to discuss economic and technical cooperation issues. Inesotho's Minister for Informationedia cooperation accord with TASS officials InA landing right* agreement lor Aerofiot Bights is reportedly soon to be ccoeluded as well The Soviets presumably would post officials and technicians to Lesotho to oversee im plernersratkon of these accords in ihe near future. Lesotho's Foreign Minister Maihcse aho visited the USSR at the invitation of the Soviet Committee for Solidarity wilh Asian and, African Countries. Prime Minister Jonathan has alsothe departure to tbe USSR of sometudents In late

Pretoria probably will move to clieek theof mayor Soviet gams In Botswana and Lesotho. Pretoria's piecmptlvo moves against local ANCin Lesotho leave little doubt about its willingness to take forceful measures to combat perceived security problems in neighboring countries. Moreover. South Africa's links to local insurgents of the LesothoArmy probably will deter Jonattian from any maior eapansion of relation! with ihe Soviei Union.

South

Moscow views the undermining of the white minority regime in Pretoriaong-term proposition. Inasmuch as Moscow has no formal relations with Pretoria, it has no opportunity toiplomatic presence lo assess tbe local situation or to contact leftists witliin the country itself. Ivooetbeless, the USSR has sought to ensureole by cultivating various groups that seek Ihe violent overthrow of theas tbe ANC and tbetraining and arms.

The Soviets probably will demonstrateas new opportunities emerge for change In South Africa.

""Vbat me USSR is broadening its Interest fn groups beyond the banned ANC to such organization* as the United Democratic Frontn this context, it is noteworthyoviet scholarly journal recently described the UDF as beingin many respects" with the ANC program. Tlie same article argued, moreover, that the reason South Africa had moderated Its foreign policy was toon the growing liberation struggle within its borders.

Disinformation and Propaganda

egion where the Soviets have limited influence over events. Moscow has relied heavily on propaganda and disinformation to convince black gOvernmenU lhat neither South Africa nor the United States can be trusted- These efforts generally play on black African fears of Pretoria and seek to undermine US negotiation efforts. Over tbe past few years,has targeted much rhxtnforxnaliQn about alleged US-UNITA collaboration at Luanda, presumably to raise doubts about the Intentions of the United States in its dialogue wilh tlie MPLA, Most disinformation efforts try to portray Washington and Pretoria as military and political allies. Inortory-'later followedenial after disclosure that the piece was producedoviet newsin the Zimbabwe Heraldthat the United States planned to test and deploy cruise missiles In South Africa. Tbe Herald also fell preyoviet forgery that indicated that Washington was recruiting helicopter pilots to serve in South Africa, Another forgery claimed that the United States had offered to sellighter aircraft

As part of this propaganda effort, the USSR has reinforced black African antipathy toward Pretoria by publicizing the various aspects of South Africanpolicies, focusing particularly on those issues

where iheyouuiioti position wilh Ihe black African states. Tbeor example,oint ANOSWAPO press conference in Mali to dbcuss ihe plight of blacks in Namibia and South Africa. Soviet media also have highlighted the calk of all the black African leaders thai South Africa implement tbe UN plan for Namibia without linking ituban troop withdrawal from Angola.

Regional Ocvclopcncnli and likely Soviet Responses; The Next IB Months

Angola

5tt Scenario: Deteriorating SdeuritV Situation. Facedituation La whichontinuing deterioration in tbe MPLA'* positionb UNITA and/or South Africa, with no prospectecisive shift in the military balance, we believe Soviei options are limited and that Moacow would continue ib current tack of bolstering Angola's defense capabih-ttes. Sinceor example, impressive leveb of arms have been delivered by tbe USSR, and Cuban combat forces have been augmented by atroops.

teady or more rapid deterioration of the country's economic infrastructure would create serious problems for tbc MPLA and its Soviet patrons Tbe MPLA couldrbb In confidence within ihe local populace, if faced with increasingly successful UNITA sabotage of key ecooomic sectors, such as the Cabtnda oil facilities, diamond mining operations, and basic water and power supply sources serving Luanda. Under these circumsUnora, the Soviets would have almost no choice but to provide additional technical and training support, perhaps through the dispatch of East European security advisers, to help combatactivity.

A dramatic military shift in UNLTA't favor within the ocitonths, however, probably would force the Soviets lo urge tbe Cubans toore direct role in the fighting as well as to request that additional Cuban forces be dispatched to Angola. In addition, Moacow vrould be likdy to step up deliveries of additional military equipment, such asinds and fighter aircraft, in an altrsmpt toilitary equilibrium. The Soviets probably would also increase Iheir advisory presence andarger role in the planning and direction of Angolan operations

A new South African incursion into southern Angola probably would lead tbc Soviets loas thev have tn ibean upgrading and strengthening of Angolan defense earubuitiei The Soviets also would scire the occasion Joassive propaganda campaign aimed' at exposing South African and UShey would also step up public demonstrations of support, such as ship visits, to bolster the regime

final Soviet decision on how far Moscowto go in supporting the MPLA regimehas yet to be made. Comments fromsuggest that Moacow does not believeof such importance as to warrant the directof Soviet combat forces and prestige.realizes that only massive numbers ofcould decisively alter the military balance,then, as Afghanistan has proved, suchnot guarantee the defeat of UNITA forces.'

The Cuban Factor

Cubans and Cuba's response remainin all itcnarios. Althoughikelyultimately to Moscow's wishes, arole does robe the possibility of socialunrest in Cuba Such an eventuality,bleak military rprospceU in Angola, couldto reevaluateommitment lo Luanda.

here are Indications lhat Havana bthe situation in Angela, and some Cuban officiab have acknowledged that Havana might be amenableithdrawal of some of Its forces from Angola if MPLA control were assured. Castro appears sensitive to tbe domestic uabilities oi continued involvement In Angola as Cuban casualties have rnounled in recent years. Moreover, to tbe falluthoriUtlve Cuban media released all the details of Prtmacnt das Santos's proposalshased Cuban troop wrtlvlraw-al once tbe taplerneratation ofegun, such drscWes have heightened popular expectation! coocernJnK the return of troops from an incrcasinzlv unpopular foreign adventure.

ThteiUmv.ttUott lha. Ha. cow hat mat nJadore eWt SaaUt ntOaat, mUAngola, akkamgkWW arahabW moald mo* dmort al mondtm* iaala* ataanJoa-nhtt fata* I- to rWw. additional Cmtam boot* aad Sorter arm. andoather delertorvHon ol tht UPt.A'i mlhutyaad tit turvtaat became MnW* thtotltnad. thtf additional Saatat tnteeoen Um-aoatikk,t aVtW.| aeoarti,nlended not io dtftol the opvatUkm mttUaiily bat toUoKOiat eoenmumtal. to Are up additional Aatotaa/Caban /ana. forand to torn tretaart anahtial aritlemtnt

t the same time, however.ikely tootal withdrawal or other actions that would be

perceiveduban "defeat" In Angola. By fUppOCt-Ing dotinost recent proposals foe aand phased- withdrawal of Cuban forces fromAngola, Havana has signaled that it Is prepared to "hangt least over the short term, and to hold to maintenanceignificantroopin northern Angola.

cenario: Diplormatic Bread: through onAn agreement by tbe dos Santos coalitionotal withdrawal of the Cubans, Intended to bringroader Namibian settlement, could prompt drastic action by the Soviets toettlement. The departure of most of the Cuban combat troops would cost the Soviets much of their leverage Inunless the MPLA continued to pushmilitary solution" to the UNITA problem that wouldeavy dependence upon the USSR for militaryMoscow, however, could not be sanguine about therospects, given Luanda's inability to defeat UNITA even00 Cubans on its side

f the MPLAonsensus to take action on the US Namibian package and comepolitical solution" lhat included reeewiliarion with UNITA, the Soviets could:

Step up disinformation and other active measures lo eiplolt Luanda's fears that Pretoria andare working together loNITA seizure of power.

Press SWAPO to increase activities inside Na-mlbta In hopes of turningPretoriaamibian settlement.

Acquiesce to MPLA-UNITA reconciliation talks, with ihe objective of entrapping and eliminating Savimbt and his lieutenants

oup In Luanda, In hopes that. If the pro-Soviet hardliners came to power, Angola wouldore confrontational approach toward South Africa and the SWAPO issue

Each of these options has Inherent limitations and varying degrees of risk. To the ealenl Ihe options require African involvement or acquiescence, Moscow has limited ability lo mSuenee events, Disirdormsticn could have some impact, given the historical suspicion and distrust between South Africa and lis blackneighbori On ihe other hand, ft would probably be Ineffective if both Luanda and Pretoria were determined toettlement. Tlie Namibian insurgents might welcome additional Soviet armsto step up their actirines, bul Moscow would have difficulty supplying SWAPO withoutoviet at tempi So subvert aaccord that enjoyed the support of most Africans could jeopardize Soviet credibility and equities among other black African state*.

limination of the UNITA leadership seems highly unlikely. Savinrtai is unlikely to give hissuch an opportunity, having witnessed MPLA assassination of UNITA officials during lha period of the Aivor accords5 when both sides ostensibly were coortersting.

oup by MPLA hardliners could bring to power more pro-Soviet leaders dependent on Soviet aid lo hold power. Given the com pier oftribe, ideology, andshape MPLA politics, however, Moscow could not be certain thatuccessful coup would have the desired result Tensions between the contesting MPLA factions could further weaken the miliury and thus strengthen the hand of Savimbl and hb UNITA Insurgents. Should the coup fait, Moscow could find Itself with almost no influence tn Angola. Given these considerations, we believe it unlikely that ihe Soviets would crraurageoup.

ny measures the Soviets pursue would fall to take Angela beyond the basse dilemmas that prompted Luanda to respond lo South African overtures in the first place If the USSR succeeds in derailing current negotiations. South Africa has the option of resuming pressure on Luanda by reentering southern Angola and stepping up aid to UNITA. This, in turn, wouldecurity crisis much like the one thatMoscow to send record levels of arms to Luandahile Moscow may be prepared to up tbe mililary ante as II warned the South Africans inhewhose financial costs arc minimized by Luanda's oilunlikely lo pick up the economic assistance burden If the Angolan economyotal shambles

n balance we believe thai if tbe Angolans resolve their Internal debate on the Cuban withdrawal and decide to proceed with the US packageif It leadseconciliation withSoviets would try to dissuade them, but would uhamatdy bow lo their wishes. Under these circuinstances, Moscow would seek lo make the bestad situation- It would claim thatictory (ot the USSR and Cuba. The Sovieis would Dresumablv seek to ensure MPLA dominance inelirion wilh UNITA and to eapand their contacts with al least tbe MPLA faction in the coalition. They would Iry to protect their military access to facilities In Angola, lo retain the military supply relationship, and to press the MPLA tp

z renin.

alore Cuban troop presence While cud min: lo cultivate Luanda, the Soviets would turn their attention to independenta SWAPO electoralpursuit of newfor influence and penetration

In Mozorrtbiqye

Moscow's options in Mozambique have been considerably reduced since Machei's dramatic about-face In his dealings with South Africa. Nevertheless, we believe the Soviets will try to sustain the military assistanceat they have in Tanzania andthe recent setback to their interests. Tbe Soviets, for example, accordedriendly reception during his trip to Moscow in4 and have continued deliveries of previously contracted militarv equipment, includingelicopters, since the accords with Pretoria were signed

There are indications that Machel is seeking to furtherperhapsdependence on the USSR for militaryand advisory support

J Abetween FRELIMOand RENAMOlnsurgent leaders would abet this general trend androde Moscow's overall position in Mozambiquetalks ia4 broke down,and prospects for resumption appear questionable

The Soviets are likely to Intensify efforts to play on Machei's domestic and external vulnerabilities as he tries to expand his ties to South Africa, the West, and China. Tbe Soviets couldutoff of military assistance and. while it is unlikely that Moscow would stop the military aid program altogether, thiswould servo to remind Machel of (lie need to consider Soviet interests as he proceeds In hbwith South Africa.

Moscow abo fa likely to seek to pressure Machel by bolstering and encouraging hardline elementsFRELIMO and dbparaglng hu leadership to other black African leaders Q

Moscow probably recognizes that dramaticas the ouster of Machel by partybenefit RENAMO and lead toSouth African economic and military pressures on Maputo WhuVove might strengthen tbe pro-Soviet proclivities of tbe regime. It could also lead to renewed requests for major new Soviet military and economic assistance commitments necessary to offset potential South African military and economic coun-termoasurra Given the Soviets' record Inwe do not believe Moscow would fulfill these requests for maior economic aid.

Moscow evidently hopes that the process begun by the Nkomati Accord with South Africa will break down. Tbe Soviets have long predicted that South Africa would not cease supporting RENAMO. and they see Maputo's growing frustration over theas evidence that the Mozarnhicam are finally realising thatot working to their Interests Soviet propaganda will continue to focus on tbe "bankruptcy" of the Nkomati Accord and allegations of continuing South African support for RENAMO. Over time. Moscow hopes that the continuing military challenge from the Insurgency will strengthen hardline elcmenb in FRELIMO and cause Machel to abandon hb commitment lo Nkomati.

Possible Openings in Zimbabwe ond Zambia

instability inby well equipped dissident guerrillas orIncreased threat from South Africa,Mugabe's arm's-length attitude towardMugabe would not overcome hb generaland wariness of the USSR, stemming fromsupport for the rival ZAPU, asituation could enhance tlte appeal ofcheap Soviet arms and fast delivery times.reportedly sent one shipment of small armsIn

toamibian-Angolanwould have some effect in Zambia favorableinterests, as disiUusiorirnent with USrenewed political support to SWAPObv Lusaka, and security fears of possibleSouth African paramilitary actionsand ANC elements ir, Zambia couldto seek additional Soviet military assistance.

With SWAPO and the ANC

3

outh Africa's diplomatic maneuvers ind st rams in Soviet relations with Angola and Mozambique will

continue lo complicate Moscow's efforts lo cliannel additional assistance to SWAPO and the ANC Never-tfseless, Moscow is hkeiy lo encourage SWAPO and the ANC to step up their activities, partly in hopes of sour inn South Africa on prospective agreements with Luanda or Maputo,

uch efforts have little chance of success,if Pretoria and Luanda and Maputo are intent onettlement. The Angolans and the Mozam-bicaos an- likely tooviet band in any future actions by SWAPO or theas terrorist attacks or bombings in Namibia or Southought undermine their accords with Pretoria.public emphasis on tbe need to continue tbe Uberetion it niggle is likely to compound such|

problems for the Soviets could arise in other southern African states, which, despite their public professions of solidarity with SWAPO and the ANC, are reluctant lo provoke South African reprisals. In tum. the ability of SWAPO and the ANC to continue the armed struggle will be seriously hampered without access lo camps and transit points in Angola,or other southern African states.

Outlook and Implkolloni lor- the United States

espite the advene trends of recent years, the Soviets will work actively to maintain their position in Angola and Mozambique while seeking newelsewhere in southern Africa. As In the past, Moscow's main weapon will be continued military assistanceanda andhe USSR will move quietly, behind tbe scenes, through pro-Soviet elements in Luanda and Maputo to sow suspicions about South African and US initiatives. This approach reflects Moscow's belief that South African intransigence ultimately will destroy efforts toegional peace and that serious insurgency problems will sustain Angolan and Mozambicaui dependence upon Soviet military and security assistance

t the same lime, ihe USSR will look for new opportunities to build influence in the region Given the area's Inherent volatility and current economic situation, such openings could develop quickly and with little advance warning Although recent overtures to Zimbabwe. Botswana, and Lesotho have had only limited success, increased security tensions with South

Africa could make these resumes more receptive to Soviet offers of military and technical assistance.

n the other hand, continued economic bard times in the area, coupled with Moscow'a failure to provide substantive economic assistance, will work against Soviet efforts lo solidify long-term Influence. Persistent famine Inits outbreak elsewhere in thewill only serve to highlight for economically beleaguered black African states Moscow's lack of economic help and make more attractive"turn to the West" As such, tbe ptospect of increased Western ecoaomic assistance to andin the region will remain perhaps the West's most powerful lure aod counter lo Soviet moves.

the extent that the black Africansseriously participate in US-brokeredregional problems, Moscow's position will beNew US and Western openings arerisk, however, andcollapse or failurenegotiations could seriously damage USWashington also will be susceptible toit merely sought to protect its interests Inand deeply held black African perceptionsUniied States exercises considerable leveragewill fuel suspicions about US motivesAfrica drag out negotiations or initiatepressure to promote its regional objectives.situation, the Soviets couldeceptiveby reminding black Africans of Moscow'sabout the futility of cooperating

US diplomatic successes also willbbsck African expectations. Washington, for example.

wilt face increased pressure to push for changes in Pretoria's domestic policies and expand its economic commitments to the southern African states. Failure of the United States to "continue moving ahead" could provide Moscow with new oppcrtunities as more radical black leaders push for change in South Africa.

Africans will look to tbe West foreconomic assistance Greater economicwith tbe West could lead Aristolatoore truly riorulignedfurther reducing Soviet influence. However,ol political and Ideological accords andtics to tlie USSR is eilensivc and willSoviets some degree of presence andof the demise of ibe MPLA orthis relationship with Moscow ischange dramatically unless Western powerstoa par with and atmilitary and security aid currentlyby Moscow or are successful in reducing: thesuch assistance.

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