ol Plnochet'a Strategy
rackdown on public demonstrationsecision lo Impose la* ifafe of stageorambsr reflect Ala datlra lo raafora ffta Chilean political system fo whefrea beforeuthority wee virtually- wncAef/eriged. His actions have aal bee* prospects for an accelerated transition to damocracf. By further dividing Chilean aocloty, ha probably haa atrangthened the likelihood that Increasing numbors ot Chllaana will aee ermad atruggle aa the only way to aatabllah democratic government
in adnotlng his present course. Pinochet is driven by his anger about leftist terrorist actions, whlcn have Included bombings of government buildings and attacks on police units. He is also concerned about the ability of radical leftists to foment violent protests In slum areas. In addition. Pinochet sees an opportunity to exploit the evident weakness of moderate opposition groups, which are no longer able to enlist much popular support for their peaceful protests
Although hit effort earlier thrs month to remove moderate interior Minister Jarpa was blocked by junta members disturbed by the Presidents tough methods. Pinochet moved rapidly to restrict the media and public assembly. He also ordered preventive arrests of leftist leaders and slumdwellers and deployed security forces In large numbers to forestall antlregime protests..
Evaluating Pinochet's Strategy
Pinochet currently appears to face no serious challenge from the junta or the armed forces in continuing to root out terrorists and to crush violent protasis promoted by radical leftists. The middle end upperprobably most of the general population--are not opposed to this aspect of Pinochet's poackw. although most Chileans stm want an accelerated transition to democracy, fjfjj
The onset of the summer vacation periodew weeks favors Pinochet. It he adopts no new measures against democratic oppositionposition evidently was not strengthened by this week'sIn the junta probably will issipate. Moreover, if the President gradually relaxes the state of siege and gives Jarpa leeway to resume the dialogue on transition. Pinochet wilt once again have fairly solid control by
Pinochet refuses lo relax the state of siege and instead takes new harsh measures against the democratic opposition or continues to resistesumption of the transition dialogue, his support in the Junta and the military wlfl begin to erode. Moderate Junta members and some senior military officers would oppose extending Ihe state of siege beyond early next year or any continuation of hardline policies against those who are not terrorists
Should Pinochet hold Arm, he wouldonfrontation with elements In the military that have the power to oust him
Proapecte lor Ihe Radical Lett
undermining trie credibility of centrist polilical groups, the President will strengthen tne appeal of Ihe radical left, which argues thai violent tactics offer the only reallslic means of challenging the regime. Evenajorecruitment, there Is little likelihoodetup in terrorism In the coming months.|
The principal groups responsible for the recent actions are the Manuel Rodriguez Patriotic Front, which Is the armed wing ot the Chilean Communist Party, and the pro-Cuban Mi Revolutionary Left.Original document.