Created: 3/1/1985

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Soviet Strategic and Political Objectives in Arms Control5




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mi used in Ihc wnuralnn ol tbii Enimjte. which -ai approved bv Ihe Naiional Foielm


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The following intelligence orgonizationt participated in the preparation of tho Estimate-.

The Centrol Intelligence Agency, lhe Oefenie Intelligenceho National Security Agency, and the intefcgenee organization of the Deportment ol Slate.

Also Participating:

The Aiiijtant Chief of Stofl fot InteBgence. Department of the Army The Director ol Naval InteBgence, Department ol the Navy The Artiilant Chiof of Staff, Intelligence, Department of the Air Force The Director of Intelligence,Aarine Corpi







Overall Political

Strategy and Tactics Within the

Soviet Perceptions of Prospects for

Soviet Negotiation

Strategic Nuclear Weapons

Intermediate-Range Nuclear Weapons

Space and Defensive Weapons


Strategy Outside the

Targeting Western

The Arms Control Process and Regional Security

ANNEX A: Influencing US

ANNEX B: Influencing Western Europe and Other US

omestic Factors Affecting Soviet Arms Control


This Estimate examines the Soviet approach to the arms control process through the endnless otherwise indicated, its judgments arc not intended to extend beyond that period. It docs nottoetailed preview of Soviet negotiating tactics or possible bargaining packages. Rather, it considers both the broad outlines of Soviet strategy within the negotiations and the political and propaganda campaign whereby the Soviets will attempt both toUS negotiating positions and to achieve their goals without having to make significant concessions in the talks. It also considers how theview the relationship between their arms control goals and other objectives worldwide.



The USSR's primary objective in the renewed arms control process is toituation in which sustained US military programs undercut Soviet strategic advantages achieved through past and current force modernizations, and possibly give critical new advantages to the United States innd beyond. The Soviets want to protect and. ifstrengthen their own strategic force capabilities while trying to constrain US and NATO force modernisationall. the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI).

The Soviets will probe for opportunities to accomplish this in the negotiations themselves, and they hope to increase and exploit political opposition lo US programs in the United Stales and Western Europe. Their efforts will be directed toward getting the United States to cancel key US strategic weapons programs, and toward dividing the European NATO nations from the United States and encouraging them to put pressure on the United States on strategic issues.

We expect that5 the thrust of Soviet activities will focus on public diplomacy. Nevertheless, we believe lhat the Soviets' failure to date lo block NATO INF deployment and their apparent respect for the US administration's ability lo defend its major weapons programs in Congress will have tempered the Soviets' expectations as to theof their public relations efforts. We should, therefore, not belikely next year lhan thisthe Soviets were to make some changes in their initial negotiating positions at Geneva, particularly as modest demonstrations of flexibility could enhance the impact of their propaganda efforts. US positions in the talks will of course also affect Soviet strategy.

Moscow's arms control campaign will be concurrently aimed atide range of collateral objectives, such asood of detente in Western Europe aimed al securing economic benefits, reassuring East European allies, complicating Chinese efforts to derive diplomatic leverage from US-Soviet differences, and encouragingtolerance of the Soviet role in the Middle East, South Asia, andAmerica.

Soviet strategy and tactics in arms control negotiations over the next year will be shaped by:

A realistic appraisal that the threats posed by the development and deployment of US systems ate noi immediate.

The more favorable prospects for using political means ralher than negotiated agreements to limit that evolution.

The expectation that political and strategic benefits will be realized as Soviet strategic programs now under development Income operational.

The Soviets are unlikely toajor threat to their strategic position stemming from new US systems coming on line during the time frame of this Estimate. Thev also understand thai:

A comprehensive US ballistic missile defense system lies well in the future.

Deploymentumber of major new offensive systems (including MX) is not in the immediate offing, and that in some cases deployment remains clouded by political debate.

Thus, the Soviets are unlikely toeed to Quicklyajor agreement in the Geneva negotiations, although nervousnessossible US technological breakthrough in ballistic missile defense conceivably persuades them that they do not have forever lo attain conslraints on US programs. The difficulties of economic and military planninguture made more uncertain and challenging by US military programs, especially SDI, weigh on the minds of Soviet leaders.eriod of manifold economic problems, they would prefer an environment in which they can sel their own pace of forcewhich existing Soviet programs indicate will be vigorous in any case, rather than additionally having to hedge against new USWe believe, however, that this consideration will not prompt any significant concession from the Soviets during the period of this Estimate.

Initially, Moscow probably intends lo hold firm at Geneva on its present positions while pressing the United States to make concessions that will allow for "realt is likely that initially the Soviets will seek in the talks:

On space and defensivean or moratorium on space-based and antisatellite weapons and hold the prospect of any significant agreemenl on offensive systems hostage to this demand.

On intermediate-range nuclearoratorium onINF deployments and compensation for British and French systems.

On strategic nuclearS commitment to continued observance ofnd II restraints. In addition, the Soviets



will resist any US attempt* lo reduce significantly ihc number of Soviet ICBMs or then throw weight, and they are likely to floatls aimed atnd cruise missileThe Soviets are unlikely to offer substanlial reductions in Iheir stralegic offensive lorces in return for USn SDI because thev probably arc noi yel convinced that SDI is technologically or politically viable and will be very reluctant to trade off systems in being for systems not yet deployed or drployabic.

Moscow'sarch proposed omnibus joint declaration is in line with these judgments

Moscow's overall political slratcgy lor undercutting US policies is broadly shaped by its belief tliai the US adminislration has been under pressure at home and from US Allies lo engage seriously in arms negotiations,umber of US defense programs face strong opposition from segments of the American public and in the Congress, and that there arc conflicts over them wilhin the administration itself. The Soviets aim to build public and Allied pressure on theto demonstrate that it is "serious" in seeking progress in Ccncva by curtailing its strategic programs or making concessions on other arms control issues without Moscow's having to offer any quid pro quo The Soviels will seek to counter lhe administration's argument that support of its defense programs enhances arms control prospects, and to encourage the view that defeat or deceleration of these programs will clear lhe way to progress in lhe talks and even to other favorable shifts in Soviet policies, such as that on human rights, including Jewish emigration (Specific tactics used by the Soviets to implement their strategy will include those described in

In Europe, the Soviels areajor effort lo persuade NATO and other government to put pressure on the United States, the Dutch and Belgian Governments to resist INF deployment, and West Europeans at large that US policies recklessly threaten world peace and particularly the security of Europe besides pressing its arguments through diverse diplomatic channelsarge propaganda and disinformationincluding forgeries, covert press placements, and agents of influence lhe Kremlin will attempt to leinvigorulc the pence movement, court Wesl European opposition parlies, place before European businessmen the incentive of greater export opportunities, establish new propaganda channels, and exploit international gatherings (Soviel efforts toward these ends arc discussed in i'I )

The basic political strategy toward the arms control process outlined above will undoubtedly be modified by the Soviets in minor ways as they assess US proposals and. more important, signals emerging from US and European polities. We believe, however, that the Soviets are very likely to stick to the broad outline depicted above for at least the first six months of tbe renewed Ceneva negotiations and probably longei.

Genera) Secretary Gorbachev's accession to power will nottransform Soviet arms control policies, although he is likely lo use any flare for personal diplomacy In an attempt lo increase lhe political pressure on the United States for concessions. More significant for Soviet arms control behavior, though, will be the power structure in the ruling oligarchy in terms of its stability, its cohesivcuess, and the strength of Gorbachev's authority (These and other domestic factors affecting Soviet arms control policy are discussed in annex C) Soviet hints of "nesv lines" on arms control and East-Wist relations may emerge during the next few months They could be genuine probes for areas of agreement, but they are more likely in the near term lo represent tactical effotts to pity on disagreements in the West



Political Objectives

The Soviet Union will approach the renewed arms control pic* ess. at in the patl. in punuit of political and strategic advantage for theot-cowi familial cewctive will be lo protect and. if possible. Urengthen its own strategic force capabilities while trying to ronsirain US and NATO forceprograms and pursuit of new capabilities -above all. the Strategic Defense Initiativehe USSR serks in the current phase of arms contiol interactions toituation in which II sees sustained US military pingrams undercutting Soviet stialegic advantages achieved through past andfone modernization, and possibly giving the United Slates critical new advantages Innd Veyond

The Soviets will probe for opportunities to do this through agreements, and they hope lo increase and eaplott the political opposition to US programs in lhe United States and Western Europe. Their efforts will be diiected toward getting the United Stales to cancel key US strategic weapons programs, and towardthe European NATO nations Irom live United States and encouraging them lo put pressure on Wash-inglon on slialegic issues.

e rspect ihal5 the Ihiust of Soviet activities will focus on public diplomacy Neveitheless. we believe that the Soviets' failure lo dale to block NATO INF deplo.menls and iheir apparent tespeel for the US administration's ability to defend its mad* weapons pingrams in Congress will have tempered the Soviels' cancelations as to the effectiveness of their public iclalinns effoits. We should, ihetcfote, not belikely neM veai than thisthe Soviris were to make some rlianges in their initial negotiating positions at Geneva. pailMuUrly as modest demonu laixxn of Qoibtlitv could enhance tl* impact of then prop:efforts US pouriOM in lhe talks will of cuuiw aho affect Soviet strategy

4 Wc believe the Soviets are concerneil lhat. if ihey do not nop or inhibit SDI. MX.ubmaiinc-laun.liril balliilu in mile (Sl.liMl intrriiieihate-range

' Suit .VIPflKl.X


nuclear (orcc (INK) deployments, and other US forceefforts, their htng-lerm slralegiccould be seriously threatened To the ealenl they can inhibil ihese developments, al minimal coat lo iheir own programs, ihey protect and enhance their future itlobal power position. The combination of political controversies about militaiy programscomingead in lhe United Slatesotentially critical year in their effort If not stopped soon, the Soviets probably believe thesewill gain further momentum in the future

oscow is especially concerned about SDI. both bv itself and in (he context of olher US forceand policy shifts

SDI has the potenlial to undercut Ihe USSR's strategic war-fighting capabilities

SDIS shift toward lhe deployment of olher war-fighting capabilities that the USSR feats.

Countering SDIotenlmlly severe long-teim technology challenge and economic

- lhe Soviets arc uncertain bul genuinely con-

bout the capabilities it could produce If

uibstantially successful, the SDI program could conceivably give The United States strategicfor some period of lime. Even if less successful, it could imparl major technologytn strategic defense applications and

he Sonets' concerns about US aims are Inflii-eneeil by thmr own views of what they would seek lo accompli ill were they to possess tlie economic ami icthimWn al potential ihey attribute to lhe Unitediui. luilly lor propaganda effect, but aho out of comntinn. llie Soviels reject USbout the ilalnUring intent of SDI and neater termeimration programs, and attributehe United Stales tlie goal ol strategic superiority for which the USSH hai long worked

7 In addition lo arousing genuine slialegic and li-dinolnguiil conwini the symbolism ol SDI will

Sonet Perspective on SOI

MMOM it eipecialry concerned about the US Stale-gir Defense Imitative, both byand in the eonteil ol US force imniovcment* and policy shifts. The Krem lln'i fractions-ears aim to SDI -as immediate ami unambiguous, and to thu day has remained ronslslcntly and totally negative. Tlse SovieU view the Pieiklenf. announcement of SDI as the openingew chapter in an American drive to negate Soviet advantages In Strategic offensive forces Consequently, they have giv en prwril. stilus to the coal of uedermiruri* il

The Soviet reaction has been deeper than iuil an attempt to preserve military-relatedn the Md of space the USSB fundamentally obiectaImi it perceivesS effort to forte the pace iodefense effort! on which tbe USSR has been weckiae, intrtmxlvrum yean

TW Sovieeuildup, -hveh becan in theearly demonstrates that the Soviets have not acceptedotions of mutual vulnerability atdesirable basis 'or tbe US-Soviet strategic relation ihiu Instead, thev have sought loredible war fightingilh both counterforce andrlemcnts Their vast air defenses, civil delonsc program, and anliballistic missile (ABM) re-search and development effort are all Intended lo contribute to ihls posture

Nevertheless, the Soviets lecogniie that (or thefuture each side will remain vulnerabledesitudion at tbe hands of lhe other, evenother tide hairst strike. Unless theyevenrually develop and deploy andefense agatinsl baJjkStk meuiVi. the!.tel. to continue to vahae ihc cotMra-Milhe United Stales by the ABM Treaty, -btchMoscow lo purvae Stralegx defenseand interns at its on pace, and -tech thea> lendirn lo dtssoartr Washington

SDIingiam limited to point defense of US ICllMs and strategic command andun riermming Moscow's ecHinicttoree capairiblv, or al lean ma line ll lubstantully more einensivc to maintain Civen ivlui tlie Soviet* see as the comparative US advantage in esploiliiu; new military technologjes, SDI threatens lo do this while lhe damage-limiting dement of Soviet strategy lags behind

continuestimulate intense hostility from the Soviets.

Theyrog urn whose intended aim Is to "lender nuclear missiles obsolete"olitical and psychologi cal attack on their tNHitiontrategic superpower

whose miliury backbone is its ICBM force. They also see thechoed ogxi! of the pro-gram and its disturbing implications lor many in the United Stales and Europe as inviting polemical attack on the entirety of US military policy and programs.

The Soviets realize, however, that Ihcicwill not all come to fruition in one year oi even four years, andultivear politicalto contain them. They believe there will be future political opportunities lo blunt the US slratcf ic challenge, particularly toward the end of President Reagan't second term and al the beginning of the neit

.I: .

the period of this Estimate, the Soviets will aim to

Prevent US development of SDI components and. where pceaible. limit SDI-rriited research

reeze on further NATO deployment ol intermediate-range nuclear missile, in Western Europe and obtain the withdrawal paiticularlv of lhe Pershing lis.

Block or limit the deployment of new US ollcti-sivd nuclear systems, includintt the MX,LBM. cruise missiles,.

Prevent any deep cuts in theii own currenl strategic forces and preserve itraiegic programs currently under development

Obtain mutual restraint agreements, tacitlant, lhal preserve in major areas esuting Soviel advantage or parity with the Untied Slates for rumple. SALT II and an ASAT motaiwium

these coals, the Soviets will tee*the administration and to influence thethrough public sUtemenU. diplomacy, andof active measures directed at US andTheir arms control political andcampaign will be concurrently aimed atobjectives as well, including:

"Wedge-driving" between the United Slates and iiv Allies.

Reviving hopes lor detente in Western Europe and elsewhere with the aim of secuilti* economic benefits and strengthening political forceswith the USSH

Hrassurios: Soviet East European allies concerned aboul'i' and the breakdown of ptev-ious US Soviet arms talks

The Soviets also will seek to:

Complicate Chinese effort! to active diplomatic level ice liom US-Soviet differences

Encoucagr Western tolerance of Soviet activity in the Middle East, South Asia.Latin

Interrelationship bclween Soviet armspolicy and Soviet domestic (actors, includingsuccession of Mikhail Cor hat liev mis discussed in annex C

Strategy ond Toctic* Within the Talcs

Soviet Perceptions of ProspectsAareements

eiprxiatKms foe the new phaar olarc lower than they were at the onset ol pas!strategic Forces negotiations Moscow'sof thr sul-slantivc positions of the twn sidesgeneral assessment of the Reaganlimited Its cipectatlons of malting concreteagreement The gains the Soviets have made inin their strategic nuclear postureuStates have resulted primarily from theirefforts The arms control process ratifiedgrowth of Soviet strategic power.

oviet strategy and tactics in arms controlovei the neat year will be shaped by

A realistic appraisal that the threats posed by development and deployment ol US systems are not immediate.

The more favorable prospects for using political means rather than negotiated agreements to limit that evolution

The ripectaiion that political and Strategic bene bis will be realized as Soviet strategic programs now under development become operational

in- Soviets are unlikely toawr lineal lo Iheli slrategic petition stemming from new US systems coming on linehe lime frame ol ihls Estimate They also understand thai

comprehensive US ballistic missile defense system kenin the future

umber of ma or new offensive sysirint (including MXot in the immediate ofling. and in some cases deployment icmains clouded by political debate

oreover, the Soviets will seek to exploitin both Western Europe and lhe United Slates ovei the neat year to increase political oppoiition aimed al limit ing development and deployment ol US and NATO systems These include

Congressional consideration ol lherequest7 billion in funding for SDI

Cngrrvional debate on the MX/Peacekeeper 1CRM

Renewed Congressional debate on US testingaunched antisatellite (ASAT) system.

The Dutch cabinet decision, scheduled (oron whether to proceed wilh INF deployments.

President Reagan's scheduled trip to Western Euiope this spring

The Soviets may believe iheir strategic position will become stronger over the neat yean or so as their own sea Lunched cruise missile (SLCM) deployments gel under way and new Soviet cruise missile and ICRM piogiarru come on line

Soviel slralegic force modernization program, also have an impact on Soviet political obfectivei in aims control Tho Soviets will tiy to use thai buildup to make the case that all US force improvements will simply promts! Soviel "responses" and thus will be futile On lhe other hand, there is an inherent tension between the USSR's claims of being lhe leader of the forces nl (rare and its vigorous military buildup We do not. however, eipect Use Soviets to make any sutnibcant changes to their planned modernization programs solely for political impact The militaiy imperatives motivating these program! will conlinue to out weigh any temporary "public relations" henclitv

In light nf these considerations, the Soviets are unlikely toeed to quicklyaior agreement in the negotiations, although nervousnessossible US technologicalallistic miuile defense conceivably persuades them that they do not have forever to attain political oiconstraints on tbe United States The lever age ol tlse Soviet side for getting desiredpace/defense issues lies in the weight of past deploy menlsoviet offensive systems and lhe dynamism of continuing programs in both ofFenslve andareas. As US offensive force mode miration put grami currently still in rievekipmcnl move Into Ihe

SCOt i

ncnt phase, jnd if lhe SDI program bcconun moreechnical reality, lhe Soviets may well (ear Ihal their leveiane, both in negotiations and intcims. will subside

Soviet Negotiation Posture

i it hat emeieed tn both public and matt confidential communications, lhe startinc position of the Soviet side isdemanding: the United Stales should forswear completely the "militarization ofis. cancel the SDI and ASAT programs, in return for which the USSR will negotiate limits and "radical" reductiom on offensive systems in lerim of "equality and equallthough Ihe Soviets have tacitly accepted Ihe fact of some INFthey still insist thai any outcome on oHemive svslems must respect the baue structure of their offensive farces and take account of British and French offensive forces. Some Soviets have hinted thai SDI type research and development) activities might have to be tolerated becnuse iheir cessation following any prohibition agreement cannot be Bul. more frequently and authoritatively, 'hey have insisted thai SDI BAD is itself tantamount to an intent to deploy So far they have nol indicated lhe kind of offensive agieemcnl (hat realistically might persuade the Uniled States to move toward Soviet positions on space/defense issues They merely insist lhat it should do so lo avoid the great dangers and costs ol an accelerated arms competition

oviet strategy in the Genova talks for Ihe period of this Estimate is likely to be one of holding Into to these basic pout ions, while pressing Ihe Uniled Stales to show "good laith" by agreeing to intciim steps, such as an INF or ASAT moratorium, thai would advance Soviet ohieclives without eliciting signlllcant concessions in return Soviet leadership statements have repeatedlyuclearest ban moratorium,all in further missile deployments as "initial steps' Ihal both sides should agree lo in Geneva Hie Soviots will wanl to generate pressure on lhe United Slates (or flexibility, while arguing lhat US military progtamthreat lo progress in lhe negotialions.

oviet negotiators will hold to the position thai progress on slialegic arms leduction talks (START) and on INF depends on reaching some Ivpcolon curbing weapons in {pace Thii approach will be aimed al exploiting perceived US interest in reachTART agreement and For ocean interest in an INF agicemcnt and al using NATO's consultative

processeans of bringing Allied pressure lo bear on Wasl unfit on on SDI The Soviets, however, most balance their lone-term interest in blocking SDI against their interest in limiting ongoing US strategic offensive piogiams lhatear-term threat. Despili- Iheir rhetoric on linkage, they would study carefully any US proposal lhat ihey believed offered promise of achieving the laller objective- They would espectrospective agreement on offensive forces might undermine support for those programs and SDI even though such an agieemcnt had not actually cnlered into force.

trategic Nuclear Wcavons Talks. Thewill continue to aigue thaiad II restraints thould be observed while resisting any US attempts lo impose deep culi in the number oi throw iveight of Soviet ICBMs They will continue to insist that IheCBMALT Il-permittedof lhendrohibited "new type* of ICBM. as the United States charges, and ihey will continue with their denloy-rnenl preparations They probably wilt propose again to limit totalwarheads in order to force lhe United Stales lo offset its deployment ol cruise missile warheads with reductions in reentry vehicles on ICBMs and SLBMs They also may propose lower sublimits on multiple independently targetablc reentry vehicles (MIRVs) and air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) than thev did in START, to constrain lheLBM and ALCM pii

ater stage in the negotiations, lhe Soviets might show some interest in trade-offi between US and Soviet force asymmetries In cruise missiles, heavy bombeis. and land-based ICBMs. They aie unlikely to offer substantial reductions in iheir strategic offensive forces in return for US restraints on SDI because thev probably aie not yet convinced thateclsnologi-cally or pulilically viable and will be very reluctant to trade off systems in being for systems not yet deployed or deplorable. Furthcrmote, limiting theii offensive forces wihout limits on SDI would inhibit their options to respond lo US strategic defenses

ntrrmediateRangf Suclrar VVecsonr Talkt The Soviets will continue iheir efforls lo limit US intcimrdialc-range missiles in Euiope whilea snbstaniial force of. They almml certainly will calloratorium on further inter mediate range denlovrnenti in Europe by both sides early in the talks; accordingeliable source, an official ol the Institute lor the USA and Canada saidTin;iivieive on US INF deploy inrrtls "ould

be "ini.rcli.ifil" nf ihe talks. Thev eurrentlv haveases under construction in the western USSR, however, which they will want to complete under the terms ol"oiatoiium. They also may seek lo use any unfinished bases as bargaining chips in discussing reductions. Thev will continue to insist onlor British and French systems, although the complexity of the "umbrella" talks may provide the Soviets ways to sock compensation for those systems In areas other lhan INF. For example, Soviel assertions that US missiles in Europe arc "strategic" suggest they eventually may address Ibis issue in the stralegic talks, presumably to demand lhat the United States reduce its central systems lo compensate for its missiles in Europe as well as those of France and the United Kingdom.

n the other hand, the Soviets appear to have dropped their demand for complete wilhdrawal of the new US missiles. As pait of their campaign toWest European official attitudes toward the Geneva talks. Soviet diplomats in January formally presented Moscow's version of Ihe meeting between Secretary Shull? and Foreign Minister Gromyko to US Allies The Soviets commented that the objective ol the inlermediate-range talks should be an accord "simultaneously" to stop deployment of additional US and Soviet missiles and 'subsequently' lo reduce them lo an agreed level. Tlve Soviets eventually may focus on securing withdrawal of all or some Pershing lis, while accepting some ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMsJ They initially will use Iheircounler-deploymcnts"argaining chip instead of some ofhey previously had offered to withdraw The Soviets also may attempt to use their emerging GLCM programargaining chip,Iheir basic military requirement forv insisting on trading Soviet CLCMs against NATO CLCMs and. if possible. Pershing Us.

pace and Defensive Weapons Talks. The Soviets ate hkclv to table quickly aa lull Ircatyomprehensive ban on space weapons similar to that contained in Iheir4 proposal for space weapons talks inomplete ban on "attack spaceantaple of current Soviet propaganda, and Gromyko repealed the theme in his press interview ofanuary. Tliey almost certainty will press Inr an early US moratorium on ASAT testinghow ol "goodtcliablc sources repotted in January thai Soviet officials piivately had confirmed Moscow'* intention to laisc this issue, and Cromyko pinbahlv had it in muni tn Ins election speech ofebruary.

when he said the talks could yield results il the United States exercised the "necessary restraint "

he Soviets will maintain their insistence thai the framework of the ABM Treaty be maintained and their assertion lhat the US SDI progiam reflects an intention to violate it. Underscoring the importance the Soviels attach to ihis agreement, an Izvestiya editorial in January called it the "cornerstone" of nuclear aims control Nonetheless, according tosources, two Soviet officials said in separate conversations in January lhat Moscow eventually mighl agreeevised ABM treaty that would allow expanded ground-based "terminal" ballistic missile delense (clearly favoring Iheir own systems now in development) while banning space-based components capable of destroying missiles in the boosl phase or in outer space trajectory.

romyko onanuary seemed lo belhat Moscow mightartial, "verifiable" ban on the more advanced stages of research. In their effort to restrict SDI, the Soviets mayomprehensive ban on allelated lo space Some officials have privately admitted,lhat research itself cannot be veritably banned Hence thev are likely,inimum, to proposevorkablcbeyond2 ABMresearch and system development hit delined and an effective, verifiable ban onlatlcr achieved, perhaps encouraging private andelements on the US side to come upractical approach.

("iriio'ianee Issues. If the Uniled Slates raises charges ol Soviet noncompliance with previous arm* control treaties, the formal Soviet response is likely to be lhat such issues are mappiopriale for the Geneva talks and should be dealt with in lhe StandingCommission In informal discussion, the Soviets are likely to repeal their public denials oficit claim that the Uniled Slates has no evidence lo luck up its assertions, and their claim thaiccusations cast doubt on Washington's sincerity In seeking new agreements They also arc likely to iheir public chaise that the Untied States itself has violated or intends to violate nstreernenls with the aim ol achieving military superiority, and that itsions acvHiust the USSRmokescreen

The Soviets, however, may take US concein compliance into account in formulating their fuliuc uri'.ohiiiiiit; positions and attempt tu appear somesvliat more foilhcominc on the issue of verification The Soviets may at some stage in the negohaltuns attempt


address some particular US concerns, such as ihc Krasnoyarsk radar, in developing iheir bargaining posilions According lo reliable sources, ar Icasl two East BlocSlanislav Memhikov, ol Ihe Cential Committee's Inlernationalindicated in January that the Krasnoyarsk radar could become the sublecl of. negotiations in Geneva

oscow'sarch proposed omnibus loinl declaration is in line with Ihe above judgments on Soviel behavior tn Geneva

Strategy Outiide ihe Talks Torgetinq Wet teen Audiences

oscow's overall political slralcgy in taigeling Western audiences is broadly shaped by its belie! that the US administration has been under pressure at home and from US Allies to engage seriously in arms negotiations,umber of US defense programs faco ilrong opposition from segments of the American public and in the Congress, and that there are conflicts over them within the administration itself The*has piompted the Soviets loioad political and propaganda campaign with the dual aim of influencing the US negotiating position within the talks and eiplotting the resumption of talks loroad range of political obiectives In particular, this campaign entourages US and European opposition to SDI. which clearly has eclipsed US INF deployments in Europe as the target of highest priority foe Soviet propagandists. Nonetheless, lhe campaign also targets othet US strategic progiams as well at INFin Europe

umber of themes have emerged since the campaign began

.The teal purpose of SDI is to achieve "strategicor the United States byhield from behind which the, United Slates couldist strike without fear ofand which exposes only Europe tn the Soviel resiiortsc

with SDI will undermine the ADM Treaty anil could destroy the basis for the arms control process Itself

addition lo being extremely costly. SDI will prove tcchnoloeically Inicasiblc, and in any cute can be countered effectively al much less cost by improving Sovset offensive capability and by implementing Sonet space weapons programs

already undci way: but the result willine

dangerous stialegic environment

US determination to proceed wilh other strategicMidgetLBM,nd Stealth bombers, and cruise missiles of various basingUS charges ol Soviet noncompliance with previous arms control treaties indicate lhe United Slates is appioaching the Geneva talks with the intention of camouflaging on arms buildup and scrapping elisting treaty restraints in an rfJort to achieve strategic superiority

Both US insistence on pioceeding wilhof space weapons progiams and thedeployment of US INF missiles Hi Europereakdown of the Geneva talks

USSR, by contrast, has demonslraled lis "seriousness" about arms control bvomplete ban on the "mtlitailraimn" ol space, bynilateral moratorium on ASAT testing, bv unilaterally pledging not to be the first to use nuclear weapons, byeneral freeze on nuclear weapons, by proposing regional nuclear-woapons-free /ones, and by tabling diafl treaties this year at the Conference on Disarms -tnertt in Europe (CDE) and at the talks oo mutual and balanced force rerluctioia (MHI-'RJ

n support of their claim to good intentions, (he Soviets further note that over the past year theyalled repeatedly for US ratification of lhe Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosivesesumption ol negotiations toward atat ban treaty,hemical weapons ban They continue lo stress the significanceSof tho principles of no lint use of nuclear si cm tons and nomoe of force, and they frequently repeal Ccoeial Secretary Cbcrneoko's call last yearcode ol conduct' among the nudeai towers Betides enhancing the linage of lhe USSRroponent of peaceful relalinm and arms control, these calls almost certainlyehe< that, if the United States were to commit itself to any of these measures, public expectations would be railed and political pressure would mount for delays in US strategic programs and (or US concessions in Geneva to maintain the mom en-lum on arms control, while their reicction makes the United States look "insincere "

trategy is aimed at building public and Allied pressurer* US administration tothat it Is "serious" in seeking progress In Geneva bv curtailing lit strategic protiramt or makingon other army control issues without Moscow's having to offer any Quid pro quo (Specific tactics used

lo implement Soviet strategy will include thosein

Of greater concern to the Soviets than the negotiations themselves, however, will be the falc of major US military programs in the Congress. Tlie Soviets will seek to counter the administralion's argu-ment thai support of its defense programs enhances arms control prospects and to encourage the view that defeat or deceleration of these programs will clear the way to progress in the talks, and even other favorable shifts in Soviel policies, such as that on human rights, including Jewish emigration.

In Western Europe the Soviets will gear their strategy to three kinds of objectives:

Enhancing pressure of NATO governments on Washington lo relax Its negotUting positions, and especially encouraging them to communicate anxiety about SDL

Encouraging NATO governments to believe that distance from US military and arms control policies will enhance their ability to develop favorable relations with the Easthole range of issues, Including trade.

Developing among opposition pailles and publics the view thai the US and their own governments stand in the way of progress in arms control and European detente.

Soviets arc likely to enlist the wholepolitical methods available to serve these aims:

Extensive official and oveil private contacts wilh governments, oppositions, and influential elites

Attempting to reenergize the peace movement with fundi and guidance

Heavy use nf overt and covert media influence.

Exploitation of agents of influence.

heavy preoccupation of Soviel policywith SDI mav wear thin on someaudiences that do not feel this issue to begovernments that either resist the Soviet viewunwilling to expend political capital lo piess itand segments ol European opinionmerit in participation in the long-rangeventure SDI will represent The Soviets will seektlse linkage of SDI wilh Europeanstressing Ihal progress on INK and olhercontrol issues as well as European detentedepend' on satisfaction of Soviet concerns about

SDI The Soviets will continue lo try to implant the nol tun that the intensification of aims competition generated by US military programs will beinjurious to Europe and mav produce new tensions in Europe in the future.

The Soviets will pay particular attention to Britain and France. They will try to exploit British and French fears that SDI will result in an expanded Soviel ballistic missile defense effort, thereby reducingthe value of their national nuclear deterrent forces Thev also will Iry to porlray lhe technological and economic aspects of the US SDI program as injurious lo West European interests

Soviet pulilical strategy abo will give emphasis to influencing the government, opposition, and public ol Westafterhof VE Day, which the Soviets will attempt lu cxploil to give Westeeling of isolation. The Soviets will probablyombinalion of hardline pressures on the government and morehints of possible improvements to all West German audiences to encourage strains between the Federal Republic and the United Stales.

The Arms Control Process and Regional Security Issues

egarded by Moscow as part of the widei political strategic struggle between East and West, the arms conlrol process will intersect with regionalissues In some cases. Soviet activity in relation to arms control will complement efforts lo expandregional influence In oilier cases, the tactics used to pursue the two sets of obicctives may work at cross purposes.

In Western Europe generally. Ihe Soviets doubtless perceive Iheir campaign to build Allied pressure on the United Stales over arms control as simultaneously serving Iheir longstanding goal ofthe NATOood example of then propaganda effort was General Secretary Gorbachev's recent election speech, which paid tribute io the "wisdom" ol West Europeans in wanting to prevent "Europe, our common home" from being turnedTiling range for testing Pentagon doctrines of luiukd nuclearhould the Soviets In- to use pressure tactics on specific European security issues, suchccess to Berlin, thevisk of generating the opposite rcaciinns.

n Eastern Europe, the Soviets probably hope that their willingness to negotiate with the United

Stales, will have allayed some resentment over iheir

alkout dom ihe Geneva talks and subsc-

ounterdcployment" ofissiles in Fail Germany and Cxexhoslovakia. Gromyko and party secretary Rusakov have claimed that Ihe USSR will imr speaking not rust for itself but lor its allies, and thai iheir in itv interests mnvi lie "just as well prolccted' asol the USSR Making at all good on this pledge, however, will require more forthrightwith, or al least Informing of. East European governments about Soviet policies.

n the Middle Fail, the Soviets may believe thai they already have gained somewhat horn lhe easing of bilateral tensions marked by the return to arms negotiations. It was In their preliminary meeting in Geneva that Secretary Shultz and Foreign Miniller Cromvko agreed to resume bilateral discussions of Middle Eastern issues. The Soviets may hope thai their

propaganda campaign lo portray themselvesesponsible international actor in cotyunction with the

aims talks will help reduce resistance to then playing a

roleuture Mideast settlement and indirectly aid

in (heir access to moderate Arab states.

oscow's conduct of its relations with Chinanlikely lo be directly aflected by the arms ronlrol talks, but the Soviets pcobably hope lhat the resump-tim of US-Soviet negotiatlom will complicate Chinese efforts to derive diplomatic leverage from US-Soviet differences

oviet military intervention in Afghanistan runs directly counter to the image Moscow is trying to create lor itself in lhe West There is. however, no indication the Soviets plan lo alter ihelr policies there, and they arc unlikely lo be dissuaded by arms control politics alone from taking steps they deem likely lo improve iheir prospects of victory.

4S- In Centralbelieve the arms control process will not change Moscow's policy of attempting to cipandg km nl influence. At the same time, the Sovieti are aware of lhe special US sensitivity to theit involve ment in ilie area Thus, they might be particularly inclined to avoid certain provocative actions that threaten tho Geneva talks unless there arc unusually high payofls. The SovieU will want to avoid any coiispunous softening of their stance so as not to give iheir clients the impression that Moscow is prepated to sell out theii interestsleal with ihe United States, and to avoid giving Westerner* lhe impression thai the USSR is approaching the Geneva talksosition of weakness


ID Tbe basic political Stialcgv toward arms control outlined above will undoulitedly be modified by the Soviets in minor ways as they assess US proposal] and. more important, signals emerging from the United Stales and Europe We believe, however, llial the Soviets are very likely to slick lo its broad outlines foi the fjist year of the renewed Geneva negotialioni and probably longer During Ihis period the Soviets are very unlikely to make major concessions in the talks toward accomrnodating the basic US aims of reducing offensive nucleai force leveli while keeping open paths toward agreed tolerance ofstrategicnd Moscowlikely io perceive Washington as also unwilling to compromise

he reasons for this prognosis are the following fust, it it hkely to take al least sis months, and possibly more, for the Soviets to determine bow weR or poorly their political strategy il working Although their objectives and tactics ate lamiliar, they are operatingovel environment defined by the intiudiicllon of space and strategic defense Issues, the actualol INF systems as talks proceed, the second trim of an administration ihey regard as deeply hostile lo them, and other factors The Soviets wiD be most attentive to how the US admiiuslration's defenseand programs, especially SDI and MX. (are in Congress Rut outcomes In either direction aro not likely to cause auiek changes in the basic Soviet political strategy Should the administration do well, the Soviets will be inclined to keep to their strategy In lhe hope ol doing better neat year rather than to move ptomutlv toward US positions or back out of the arms

control process. Should lite administiation lose on important piogram? in Congress or confront new roadblocks on INF deployment, Ihc Soviets are likely

to try to parlay these developments Into sustained

trends by political means, rather than jump quickly to

new arms agreement i

econd factor auguring continued near-Ierm ad heir: io the Soviet arms control tactics described is Ihe Soviet internal political scene. Mikhailnow must consolidate his power in lhe midst of personal political rivalries nnd differences on Impor-tanl domestic issues Tbe current Soviet leadeiship ccnsiellation will not suddenly be transformed We believe Sovset leaders may have somewhat different perspectives about how best to hedge against an intensified arms competition, bul ate in Reneialthat little can be eipcclcd ftom this phase ol ihc aims control dialogue with the West. Having seen lhe


meager results of their walkout strategyowever, they probably acree that their best chances of tempering US military policies and achieving other objectives toward NATO lieatient but active engagement on the arms control Iront while avoiding early sulutantive concessions. This strategy willto make senseajority of Soviet leaders

hey grapple over their own status and maior domestic policies Soviet hints of "new lines" un arms control and East-West relations may emerge during this process. These could be genuine probes for areas ol agreement, but are mote likely in the near term lo represent lactical efforts lo play on disagreements in lhe West.


nfluencing US Opinion

Ai the Geneva talks proceed, the Soviets air likely to Intensify their ongoing campaign to advance their objectives by attempting to influence US opinion at various levels This campaign will include

attcnlion to any evidence ol division within the executive branch, prtvale and public attacks on individual officials judged hostile to aims control, and encouragementiew that Progress Is portable if theept in line

fforts through formal visits and ex charges, contacts through diplomats, and other contacts to lobby various individuals such a. members of Congress, suffers, and Congressional research offices against funding SOI and lo limit US defense spending generally

Continuing contact with US scientific otganizo-Itons. think tanks, and influential citizens to press Soviet views and develop an impression that great arms control progress can be made if Ihe United States is foible in the talks and model-ales its overall policies

Effort! to peisuade key business interests thai US-Soviet trade can profitably increase if arms talks prragrrss

Atlcitspls to exploit the US media through leader wip statements, communications with peace groups, presi conferences, and op-ed placement! As the negotiations proceed Dag Soviets will conlinue to hint the negotiations at possi btlilies for modifying their positions in Geneva if the United Stales makes concessions Their aim will In- to encourage lhe US Side lo make Ihe cniierssioni lhat might bring new Soviet position, oul of the closet

he Soviets probably hold litlle hope ol influent ing directly the views of US administration officials They aie. however,ampaign against those whoeheve moat stiongly oppose arms control pemtwns Moscow would like to see the United Stales adopt Soviet media contmue lo devote attention lo alleged differences of opinion within the adminittia-lion and cut Kin- b* name certain officials allegedly

opposed to arms control. This has been accompanied by occasional privale remarks meant to bo conveyed to Ihe administration to the effect that the Soviets believe Ihe President himself is serious about seeking an agreement but fear he may relinquish management of the talks lo subordinates who allegedly aie not. The Soviets and their East European allies will lobby US off:mis in Washington Thev abo will press Iheir case with West European officials in lhe Uniled States

Soviets will continue to attempt In various ways to influence tbe US Congress They probably place the highest value on opportunities lo present their case directly to influential legislator, both during their visits to the USSR and as Politburo member Shchcrbilskiy did as the head of the Supreme Soviet delegation to the United Slates recently. The Soviets will encourage travel to the USSR by US Congressmen and provide Ihem access to Soviet leaders Inthe Soviets aho will attempt to cultivate lhe staffs of key members and committees as well as members ol reseaieh offices serving the Congress Soviel diplomats accredited in Washington will be the principal actors in thn effort,iversity of Soviel visitors also will be used

Soviets abo wdl attempt to iiJiaence mem bets ol important private research centers and urmcrti ties thiriughout the United States Accordingrluble source, for example, six Soviets desenhedenerafitti and diplomats" called on senior professors at LS universities In January fo propound the Soviet view on live Geneva talks. Representatives of various Institutes of the Soviel Academy of Sciences aho have made conspicuous clforts recently to meet with iheir US counterparts and make the case for Moscow's positions, particularly on SDI They may be mow hopeful about affecting the views of those who visit llie USSR, wliere the Soviets control the agenda and can giant the "favot" of access to prestigious inslilutHirs and individuals The Soviets- reading of US media may lead them to conclude that their best direct argument, io inernbeis of Ontirss lie in cihortatmn aboul the cent of new strategic systems and the futibty of them becausee matched with no leal gain lo US secuiits one way or the other

The SovieU also have attempted lo enlist the support ol US businessmen by hintine that progress on arms control would benefit US-Soviet trade At the sameoviet academician told US bank officials that expanded trade would servepeaceful opener" to US-Soviet arms negotiations. Soviet press leporliugolitburo meeting In December noted that Soviel leaders "viewed with understanding" the interest of US business circles in "normalization."

On the other hand, Moscow Is likely to continue to avoid making the pursuit of this concrete interest in trade directly dependent on progress in arms control. The Soviels want expanded trade ties to boost the impression that bilateral relations arc improving and need to be relnfoiced by US "flexibility" in the arms control process The Soviets, moreover, have important economic objectives, including continued access to US grain and technology, that they would not vant conditional on success in Geneva. If there were to be substantial progress in the negotiations on armsthe Soviets doubtless would attempt to use live improved bilateral climate toelaxation ol US restrictions on Irade. particularly the embargo on strategic exports

The Soviets also may attempt to influenceof Ihc US public by holding out Ihe hope that progress in arms control could affect Soviet policies on human rights, including Jewisheliable source recently reported that the director of the Space Institute ol the Soviet Academy of Sciences and the vice president of tbe Academy, frequent visitors to the United Stales, have suggested on several occasions over the pasl six monthsS position on arms control

that cased Soviel security concerns could leadelaxation of Moscow's human rights policies Shorllt alier the Sliulta-Cromyko meeting in January, the Soviets extended an imitation lo the president of lhe World Jewish Congress lo visit the USSR in March This may have been intended lo imply that lhe USSR's (mureoward its Jewish minority and toward Jewish emigration could depend in part on US conduct in the talks II lhe Soviets decide to make tinsajor pari o' their campaign on arms control, thev probably will convey the message directly toJewish oigani rations in Ihe United Slatci

8 The Soviels will continue to attemptlo convey iheir message directly throughThey doubtless will continue thosehave proved successful over the pan veilincreased US media coverage of theirincluding interviews where Sovset leadersinoccasionally inof US correspondents, press conferencesMiniilry spokesman lomeyko andby higher ranking officials, and appearances onshowi nnd televised discussion group) byacademicians, and journalists whoseof the issues, knowledge of US society,ability equip them lo make anAnother means of carrying lhedirectly to the US public will be aol periodic "responses- by Sovset leaders loUS citizens and organizations, and"ordinary Otiaens" to visit the USSR, to

Ihe accompaniment of lavish media attention These efforts will seek to play on US interestbalanced view" and "understanding of others."


Influencing Western Europe and Other US Allies

To achieve its objectives, Moscow is seeking to exploit differing views on arms control within NATOajor propaganda effort, diplomacy, and active measures, lis failure to block NATO's INF deployments to date will temper Moscow's hopes.

Pubtic Posture and Propaganda

During NATO discussion of the neutron bomb Issue and lhe INF negotiations, the Sovietsaioi campaign to derail NATO deployments and tried to eserl pressure on the United States to make corxrwont in the talks Top Soviet leaders played maior roles in Moscow's effort to demonstrate the seriousness ol the alleged threat from Western mihlart programs and plam

Although the Sovteti undoubtedly see further opportunities in the Geneva talks to caploit European CMicerna over INF, ihey have In recent months shifted their propaganda and diplomatic campaign toward raising Wesi European concernspace arm? race Since spring of last year, the Soviets have, in fact,aior propaganda and diplomaticsimilar in scope to that conducted In opposition to INF deployment, but with current emphasis on SDI and the Intel relationship ol lhe three sets ol talks in Geneva.cbiuary, before his death. Ceneral Secretary Chernenko. In the most authoritative Soviet statement on aims eontlol lince Foreign Minister Gromyko*interview olanuary, reafftrmrd tlial lhe Soviets see an organic interrelationship" between nutnd space arms, asserting thai no limitation or reduction of nucleai armsamable withoutprevent the of outer space

4Sovset statements and routinecommentary also have sought to encourage public and governmental opposition lo SDI by claiming that Washington's plans undermine the ADM Tiealy and would leave Western Europe noosed in lhe event of nuclear war. Tlie Soviets have soughi to convey tlie impression thai (he "overwhelming majority" of the population in Western Furone opposes SDI by coosu-icntlv portraying it. as ihey did INF. as being lorocd on NATO by lhe United States


ecause some European leaders have voiced serious concern about SDI, the Soviets seek to persuade NATO leaders to communicate iheir doubts andto the Uniledumber of trips by high-level Soviet officials to NATO capitals alreadv have been set for thisGromyko's recent venture to Italy andan effort to increase pressure on the United States from official European sources. Meanwhile. Moscow will continue its campaign lo delay or derail INF deployments in Western Europe As long as the SovieU believe Ihese deployments arc in doubt, thev will argue lhat US deployments dim the prospects for future agreements.

6 Along these lines:

When West German Foreign Minister Censcher visited Moscow in lateromyko said tn his luncheon speech that Moscow had "paid altention" to Censcher's recent discussions on the space weapons issue in Washington and urged lhe West Geimans to "assess soberly" theand declare their support for using outer space for "peaceful purposeshe general assault on SDI was continued during Censcher's brief trip to Moscow in

In lunc. Chernenko told visiting FrenchMitterrand that Moscow shared French concerns about the SDI program, and he uigod France toinfluence on the United States

With visiting British Foreign Secretary Howe in earlyromykoonsiderable part of his luncheon speech to space weapons.

his trip to the Uniled Kingdom mparty secretary Gorbachev reinforced tliiv llietue in talks with Howe, declaring it 'unrealistic Iu hogse for an end to tlie- 'nucleai irms race unless it can be kept from expanding into outer soace

ollowing the Shu It?-Gromyko talks in January. Soviet diplomatic efforts went into high gear,attention being paid to European countries that had not vcl stalled INF deployments. Soviel anibasM-

dors throughout Weaan Europe delivered demarches on the Shukri Crornyki meeting, cbimlnc lhat Cio-myko had taken lhe initiative in ursine, "measures to stop the arms race" and had stressed that "'Question* concerninge weapons, stiatcgir interns, andnuclear weapons should be considered and resolvedingle complex, in theirIn addition


European diplomat abroad reported thaT in raid-January tbe USSR intended to pursue intensive "polilical work" in ibe IVenelui countries,focused on foreslalllng INKtimer. Dialogue was reporlrdly to fake place at all levels, especially with parliamentary contacts

The US Embassy in The Hague in November reported three instances in which Sovietindicated thateployments might cease in rciponse lo theune INF basing decision. This decision pegs liveol US cruise missiles on Dutch soil to the number ofeployed as5 There are some developments in Ihe Soviet force structure which suggest that Moscow may indeed attempt to manipulate the numbers ofaunchers to exacerbate the Dutch basins decision

In Dcnmaik. Soviet Ambassador Mendelevich, who has an extensive disarmament background, has addressed arms control subiecls on television and in the newspaper, and hasystematic effort to persuade Danish political party leaders that the United States would be to blame for any lack of progress in disarmament talksS official that he planned to bring additional medium-level Soviets to Denmark to discuss Issues with their working-level counterparts.

The French and Soviets conducted consults;ioni on space at the senior eiperts level In Parb inrowing number of

Soviet-French contacts

oscow Ispecial effort loopposition parties, particulaity in

countries wheie it sees little hopehange in the governingtance In West Germany, forcontacts wilh the Social Democratic Party (SPD) frequently focus on disarmament issues



9 Soviet diplomatic effoils to influence armsopinions In Western Europe, moreover, extend beyond the Alliance^

oscow's propaganda and diplomatic efforts during Ihe talks will he coordinated with the timing and substance of its proposals to influence West European optmon Early on at Geneva, we expect the Soviets tooratorium on further NATO deployments and Soviet counter measures, whilethat theirorce has nol increased The Soviets mav go so lar as lo publicly hold progress on INF issues hostage tooratorium In ano influence the Allies Io hall the deployment of US cruise missiles

II. Moscow, however,roblem in itsS diplomacy due to its irssutencc on compensation for British and French systems In recent months, the Soviets have tough! lo assuage concern over thn usuc on the part of the French inthe USSR views as sympathetic on the issue of space weatwnsCJ


he Soviets also are careful lo note to the French lhat "compensation" for such weapons would noldismantlement of tlse Force ie Frappe. ^

Other Pressure* East-West Relations

Soviets have demonstrated Iheir inientthe em rot-and-slick approachidebilateral and multilateral issues in attemptingthe West turopeans on armsrip to lhe United Kingdom in Decembertrip to Italy and Spam in Februaryappear lo have been an effort toat least the atmospherics ol bilateralesult ol the improved East-Westfrom aims talks.

West Germany, on lhe other hand, hasarget of Soviel opprobrium lor supporting US Pershing II deployments on German soil Bilateral economic relations icmain unaffected, but political relations have soured as llie Soviets haveropaganda campaign against allegedoviet Foreign Ministry officials told US Embassy officers in mid-)anuaiy lhat relations between Moscow and Bonn remainhadow" because of the Kohl government's support for INF deployments. This Soviet line may be echoed5 But it is likely to be combined with more vigorous efforts to court West Cerman public opinion and to persuade Bonn that pressure on Washington could earn it significant improvement in Soviet-FBC relations

Moscow not only will seek to persuade West European businessrnen lhat increased trade wdl irsultpositive" arms control process, it aho may attempt to influence them lo newly pressureto allow currently restricted eiports to the USSR on the basis of the renewed dialogue and tttiliiy of such Uade (or inducing greater Soviet Bcxibilily

Moscow has aho prewired its own allies lo weigh in with Ihe West Europeans on arms control Although West Germany has been lhe principal target of thii tactic, olher West European countries are not immune to threats in this regard


Oilier Disormoment Issues

oscow is attempting lo play on Wesiinterest in improving East-West relations through disarmament initiatives outside the Geneva arena

Moscow also has used multilateral arms control forums lo tryontinuing inteiesl inThe Soviets returned toFH negotiatiom last year despite their walkout at STAItT and lhe INF talks, and placed propaganda emphasis on theirin MBFR talks and CDE In recent weeks, lhe Soviets tabled draft treaties al both those forums in attempts to appear forthcoming The proposals offer title substantive progress and arc clearly an effort to demonstraie Soviet intern! in movement in these areas so as to put the onus foi lack of progress on the United States.ebiuars. IzuetUva slrongly criticized the United States for allegedly Irving to block "business like" discussion of the Soviel CDE proposals and to discredit lhe CDE in European eyes

IS. Tlie USSR, moreover, is not averse to using multilateral forumsore negative way. At the end of the last MBFI1 round, for example, the Soviet representative haishly attached West Germany in an apparent attempt to democutiale that Bonn would have torice at MBKR for its role in support of INF rteployments

the months ahead. Moscow will continuea variety of general proposals, such as callspledges on no first use of nuclear weapons andof force, in an effort to enhance its imageEurope In this vein. Chernenkotin death reiterated support (previouslybv Brezhnev and Andropov) for arone

Active Measures

Moscow cleaily would like lo reinvigorate the West European peace movement in the hope lhat it can generate public sentiment against US policies strong enough lo provoke uncertainty in Washington about the wisdom of those policies oi cause US policy to changecsull of Allied government pressures After Ihe initial INF deployments inhe West Eur ii- peace movement lost momentum anderies ol setbacks Since then, rhe Soviets havebtoad front stralegi tn theirwith the West European peace mowmenl Toeasure of influence inCommunist groups, they have dropped iheir former demand that peace groups give unerring support to llie Soviet policy tine, lhe Soviets no* are encouragms tlieir supporters to loin in the formation of broadescn if ihev criticize the USSB

At the umc lime. Moscow bat lupin to drum up supportonfcirnrr ol Cnmrmiriiil paring lo


greater unityorldwide Communist etfoits. The Soviets lustily the needonference by saying that the alleged Western threat necessilatei greater cohesion and discipline on the part of all Communist parties. Moscow seeseferenceay to coordinate the "peace" work of East Europeanand Jtonruling Western Communist parties and to promote cooperation with non-Communist elements of live West European peace movement.


Reliable sources have reported that Communis! and other pro-Soviet leaders in recent months have called repeatedly for increased unity amongcountries and for stepped-up cooperation between Communists and non-Communists as remedies lor tbe current malaise in Ihe West European men! For example

any mainstream elements of the peaceare trying, as suggested above, to identify and isolate peace groups that subscribe to Moscow's policy line. For example.5 European Nuclear Disar mament (END) conference, to be heldS.round rule that will force Soviel-con-trolled organizations to show their true colors

An4 meeting of the WPC, convened lo discuss the "waning of the European peacealled for increased coordination to Improve methods of influencing US and West European groups

ccording to reportingumber of sources, the Soviets haveariety ol measures designed to strengthen the peace movement

Inoscow assignedPact countries differing responsibilities for funding the peace nwverneiil, givingresponsibility for Austria. Switzerland, and southern West Cermany; and East Germany responsibility for northern West Germany.Norway, and Sweden. Moscow maintained control over funding (or the Benelux countries.

3 This rule could force the WPC and other Soviet-sponsored organizations lo associateopenly with official East European peacewhile independent Western groupswill choose as partners dissident Eastern groups like Solidarity in Poland.

ince the Soviet walkout from START and live* INF negotiations, Moscow also has appeared to place Increasing emphasis on the role of organized labor worldwide In the peace movement:

At least twiceelegaies from the Danish "Labor Movement for Peace" visited ihe Soviet Union, according to lhe US Embassy in

J The Labor organized conferences

Movement for Peace has and demonst rat ions throughout Denmark

Other Soviet initiatives involving the internation-

al labor movement in recent months havethe International Trade Union Meeting lor

Peace in Managua, lhe Lisbon meeting which sought "Space lor TtaoV Unionnd the touit statement by the New Zealand and Soviet labor federation, on 'inlcrnaltonalin Asia and the Pacific on peace and disarmament "

ew element in Soviet peace strategy is the "private" peace confeiencc. Such conferences arc scl up. often wilh Soviel assistance, by Westerners having ties to the Soviets but not to Western governments or peace groups For eiample. according to the US Embassy, Dutch btrsinessrnan E. van Eeglicn. whoonsiderable portion of his income from trade with tbe USSR,onference in4 for Dutch industmlnJi and former government officials The focus of the conlerence. as reported In the Dutch press, was alternative defense concepts which, if seriously put sued by thewould weaken the Dutch contribution to NATO defense The US Embassy reported thai Sovietat the meetingelited KGB general, the local KGB chief,esident KCB officer under journalist cover.


he Soviets currently are making prcparaikms for the "Twelfth International Festival of Youth and

o be held in Moscow this July The Soviet-backed religious front, the Christian Peacealso willassive world assembly that month in Prague; its main theme will be US responsi-bilily for lhe arms race.

^Soviet propagandaBoris Ponoenarcv. chief of lhe party's Internationalthat tho festival shouldlhe input of the younger generation in Ihe struggle against "imnerlalist" forces,

e believe tbe Soviet active measures effort dedicated to combaling SDI and supporting Soviet obieclives in Ihe arms control talks is gainingand growing in intensity The Soviets wilttoon broadenactics beyond those mentioned above Onanuary, Peace Commit tee Chairman Zliukov assetted that it would be "utterlyto think that aniiwar foices might "scale down their actions while the diplomats come toudging by earlier Soviet campaigns, we believe thai future Soviet active measures will include:

Forgeries and disinformation that allege that SDI hardware, even In us development and testing phases, presents dangers to innocent populations

Covert press placements suggesting thai lheSlates secki strategic superiority, is abandoning the ABM Trealy. and is willing to sacrificeprotecting itselfuclear war

Use of agents of influence in West European governments and media lo influence NATO policymakers to pressure the Uniled Slates into altering its protected defense nocture At ibis point, however, we have no evidence lhatis using such agents


Domestic Factors Affecting Soviet Arms Control Policy


I. Ihconduct of it* ermscontrol poheies5 will be influenced by recent and piosuective Soviet leadership developmentsodesl degree It is unlikely thai General Secretaryuture posiiions or tbe collective performance of the post-Chernenko leadership willimple protection ol the lone of recent speeches. More significant for Soviet arms control behavior will be the power structure in the rub rat oligarchy in terms of ib stability, itsoess. and the strength of Gorbachev's authotity The Soviet decision to propose new armsairly broad consensus lhat Moscowetter chance of combating (he military and foreign poJuies of the United States while negotiaiiom are going on This consensus has permitted the dehtiltion of firm public positions by the USSR and also probably supports the broad slrategy of appealing beyond the negotUting table to US and Allied governments, legis-latures. and publics while sticking to in flexible banc negolialing positions

2 We believe Ihe Soviets are unified In their broad strategy toward strategic weapons issues and the arms control process The internal political concerns lhal are likely lo dominate lhe Soviet leadership3 wouldonsensus to change arms control policies, and espeiislly to make major concessions required to bridge the gap between opening positions, even more diBieuli lo reach Irian would normally be Ihe case' Should Foreign Ministerominant icJe in Soviet foreign policy, as he appears to have recently, ihis would tend to rabe the odds for an infleaible Soviet performance al lhe negotiating tableigorous pursuit of familial propaganda lines in the public arena Defense Minister Ustinov's death, meanwhile, has removed a figure who probably plated in his lateignilxanl role in integrating

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the inlerests and perspectives of the military and political leadershipsole il important lo policy change in arms control, among other areas, and tbe neit year is unlikely loigure of Ustinov's stature and background emerge to fill ll.


3 long-term economic concerns have helpedihc Soviets to reengage lhe political process of arms control. The multifaceted and protractedof SDI. especially, makes the future much more uncertain than thev like to deal with, the more so when the task of Hireling more familiar mililary needs while trying to modernize the economy and to keep consumption at politically tolerable levels is becoming mote difficult. They would like lo increase ihethai the Uniled States *il) scale back its military challenge, and they would like to increase their access to Western technology, they tee the arms control rproces*eans io encourage these developments We do not believe, however, that these economic considerations will persuade the Soviets lo makeconcessions in the negotiationshe period of this Estimate or present them from seeking in counter US programs

1 The Soviet leadership may hope for some small economic benefit if lhe talks eventually produce an agreement limiting nuclear arms It is doubtful. Iiow-ever, thai Moscow eapects any immediate largelo result directly from agreements. Even deep cuts in strategic offensive nucleai forces wouldelatively small impact because such weapons account for only aboutercent of lhe total Soviet defense budget The Soviels. moreover, want lo pursue their own ongoing strategic research, development, and deployment programs. For these reasons, il is possible lhal some Soviet captations of concern over lhe economic impact ol arms com petition are deliberately csed. to convince Westerners that Moscow is .ipprcut rung the aims talks in good faith because it has lompelhiit economic reasons to negotiate in agiee-ment Other such statements probably leOect naivclc oti Ihe tiait of losvci or middle-ranking officials as lo

the concrete economic benefits of arms controla naivete that the top political and military leaders would not share-

onetheless, there appears to be an element of genuine concern in Soviet statements over thelong-term economic costs to the USSR ofto pursue its strategic goals in the face ofUS programs on strategic offense, strategic defense, and Other military fronts

6 The Soviets appear to view SDI in particular as confronting themevere technologicalin areas where Soviet innovative capabiuties are weakest, including high-speed computers; optics;control, and communication software;hieh-speed electronics, infrared, optical, and nuclear sensors; composiles; and precision machinery to manufacture Ihe complex components of these new systems If Ihe Soviets arc unable to block USof SDl through negotiations or political means tu buy themselves time to improve their technological capabilities, iheir problems in defense planning and resource allocation could also be further complicated. They could be in the position of losing some of the freedom Ihey have had in the past to select the focus and pace of their own military modernization effoits.

he economic aspects of Soviet concern about the arms competition arc tempered by countervailing factors. The Soviets remain uncertain over theeatent of the US military buildup, and especially over lhe long-term suslainabilily and outcome of the SDI program Wc believe Moscow is attentive lo economic constraints that might force the United States lo reconsider SDI Even if the United States goes forwaid with SDI. the Soviels will nol necessarily expand their own SDI-typc programs. They will.

however, have to give special emphasis to developing counterincasures against the US program.'

Military Attitudes

Substantial continuity remains, despite lhenf the (wo principal military figures in Soviet aims control policymaking during the past decade-Ustinov and former Ceneial Staff Chief Ogarkov. Marshal Sergey Akhromevev, Ogarkov's successor as Chief of (he General Staff, was head of the General Staffs Main Operations Directorate during (he SALT II negotiation period. This is the only staff dement -ith access lo all technical arms control information from various Soviet agencies This gives (he military considerable influence in Soviet arms control

Soviet mililary leaders have (endede more strident than most political leaders in arguing that arms control will not change (he hostile nature of "imperialism" or eliminate the dynamics of strategic competition. Since becoming Defense Minister.Sokolov has indicated skepticism aboutl the aims con(rol process. Other Soviet military officials also have labeled the US administration as insincere and have expressed pessimism (ha( thetalks can produce any mutually beneficial result The military newspaper Krosnaya Zvezda lias been the most pessimistic of (he major Sovietregarding the Geneva talks.

c have no reason io believe, however, ihal (lie Soviel mililary oppose tlie conduct of negotiations in the framework of continuing mililary modernization andider political strategy aimed al undermining US and NATO military programs- They would, indeed, see much lo gain from success in such efforts.of skepticism aboul arms control by the Soviet mililary are designed primarily lo remind the public, tlse military establishment, and the political leadership of the need (or vigilance and vigorous militarywhile Ihese political efforts proceed

ot tint (roup ol Soviet scientist*ropaEandi "Utidv" tail mi. bawd on Western litr-nture, (hat outlined in detail iwssible active and patUve tuuniermeaivirei Soviet scler-toi* iltti have indicated iliai ihr USStt might simply Increase the iiieof ilsrsenal lo ensiitt aiOuiuic penetration of US defensive sv-MmsracOon ol Ihe oat ol developing trt SDI system.

Original document.

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