Created: 3/1/1985

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Soviet Naval Strategy and Programs Through

National Intelligence Estimate


iflgr 29



lafoniurioc. available aa ofed ia the prtpaiauOn of thti Enim.le. which was appnwed by the National Fceeto InteBieence Board oa that dale.




The following inleOigence organizations participated in the preparation of tho Estimate:

The- Oolfd InreEaeneo Agency, the Dofome InrcJCaenee- Agency, the- Notional Security Agency, and the inteaToence oroonrxotion of the Deportment of

Also Participating:

The Auiitont Chief of Staff for Inielligence, Deportment of the Army Ihe Director of Novol IrrteJIie/ence, Deportment of Iho Navy lhe Atiiltonl Chief of Staff,epartment of the AirIho Director of IntclCgeocc, Heodqoorlen, rVvor'ne Corpt





Composition, Organization, and




Materiel Reliability and

Aspects of Military


Soviet View of General

Soviet Wartime

Protection and Support for

The Role of

for Land Theaters of Military Operations

C. Interdiction of Sea Linesmuriication

H. Naval Diplomacy In Peacetime and Limited


Clobal Reach/Overseas

I. Trends in Naval



Principal Surface



Smalt Combatants and Mine Warfare


Other Maritime Suprwrting Forces (Merchant. Fishing,

Intelligence, Research, and

J. Trends in Naval

K. Command. Control, and

L. Soviet Ocean

M. Radioclectronic



and Economic



Domestic Political

Issues Facing Soviet Naval Planners

Protection and Use of the SSBN

Soviet Naval Land Attack Cruise

Strategic ASW Agaiast Ballistic and Land Attack

Cruise. Missile

Antisurface Warfare

Antiair Warfare (AAW) at

Air Power at

Surveillance and Targeting

Protection of State Interests in Peacetime and



Courses of Development


Strategic Arms

Severe Economic

A Shift in Soviet Military


During the two years that have elapsed since publication ofrogrammatic trends in the Soviet Navy have become more evident, and several notable developments have occurred. The Soviets have, for example:

Shifted emphasis in submarine construction from strategic ballistic missile to general purpose nuclear attack (SSN) units, and introduced three new SSN classes, all of which probably incorporate substantial advances in sound quieting.1

Begun construction of the first unitew class of probably nuclear-powered conventional takeoff and landing aircraft carrier.

Continued the modernization of their surface fleet through construction of four classes of large cruisers and destroyers with improved war-fighting capabilities.

Begun at-sea testingecond family of long-range nuclear land attack sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs)ew submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).

Improved their global military reach, particularly bytheir first true overseas base at Cam Banh Bay, Vietnam, with an airfield for sui^eillance and strike aircraftome port for the newly formed South China Sea Squadron.

Made qualitative improvements in antisubmarine, antisurface, and antiair warfare weapons and sensors; command, control, and communications networks; battle management systems; ocean surveillance capabilities; and radioelectronic combat

The continued allocation of substantial resources for such programs underscores tbe recognition by Soviet leaders of the value of naval forces in the attainment of wartime and peacetime goals. Coupled with recent Soviet writings on the nature and conduct of modem warfare, and trends in major exercises and overseas naval operationshese programs also raise questions about the future use of such forces

more detailed (riormitton on Soviet muourima, we SNIE. Se-uiet Submarine War/die Tttndi.S.

and whether their development indicates basic changes in Soviet naval doctrine and strategy.'1

Many aspects of Soviet naval developments have already been addressed in publications by individual departments and agencies, particularly technical studies and short-term assessments. In contrast to those studies, the major focus of this Estimate, which updatess on the overall significance of current and projected programs for Soviet naval strategy in thend the decade of, including some of the major options open to thc Soviets for performing critical naval tasks. We continue to limit our analysis of Soviet wartime strategy and force employment primarily to the initial stageseneral NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. This is mainly because any meaningful discussion of subsequent naval operations would be too scenario-dependent and would require estimating the outcome of initial combat. Moreover, regardless oi bow the Sovietseneral war wouldany contingency plans they have forconventional, limited nuclear, and/or protracted strategicbelieve their naval force employment in the initial stages would be as described in this Estimate.

Thc groundwork for our assessment is laid by outlining the Navy's currentmajor tasks and the forces that would seek to accomplish them. In addition toasis for examining future developments, an understanding of current forces is especiallyfor naval estimates because of the long time needed to developsystems and the long service life of ships and aircraft. Most of the submarine ond major surface combatant classes and many of the aircraft that will be in the Soviet Navy0 are in the late stages of development or already in service today.

The Soviets recognize that theJi Navy is facing severe challenges to the performance of its missionsesult of improvements In Western naval forces, particularly quieter submarines, longer range SLBMs, greater numbers of SLCMs, and improving defensive systems. To meet these challenges, the Sovietsariety of research andefforts. Many of these programs have been identified, and we can make some evaluation of their capabilities based on knowledge of past Soviet programs and current technological state of the art. By

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exlrapolatiiiR from such inforinalion. lhc general nature of future Soviet naval weapons and sensors can be discussed. Such extrapolations may prove wrong, however, because assessments ot evolutionary technical progress may be upset by "hrcakthrouglis" that cannot be predicted on the basis of an understanding of the current state of the art. This isimportant in those aspects of the Soviet effort, such as nonacoustic antisubmarine warfare and space-based oceanthat involve innovative solutions to naval problems. This Estimate considers some of the potential consequences of such breakthroughs in key areas and speculates on bow thc Soviets might attempt to exploit their successes.

Finally, the development of the Soviet Navy will occur within tlic broad context of changes in thc Soviet system and the international environmentetailed treatment of these subjects is beyond the scope of this Estimate, some of thc possible relationships between such factors as the posl-Chernenko succession, economic problems, arms control negotiations, and an increased emphasis on influencingin the Third World have been sketched out, especially as they might affect force procurement.




Since this Estimate was last producedhe Soviet Navy has continued to evolvealanced fleet increasingly capable ofull range of wartime and peacetime tasks. This evolution has been supported by new weapons and sensors, an ambitious naval construction program, substantial advances in submarine sound Quieting, heightened use of overseas facilities, and additional operational experience We have carefully reviewed these developments and other evidence rjerrairurtg to future Soviet naval strategy and programs. We conclude that the major judgments of2 remain valid.

Soviet naval construction programs continue to emphasize larger ships with increased endurance and technologically advanced weapon and electronic systems which have enhanced the Navy's capability for sustained combat and distant area deployments. Within tbe Soviets* overall wartime strategy, however, the primary initial tasks of the Navy remain:

To deploy and provide protection for nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in preparation for and participation in intercontinental and theater nuclear strikes.

To defend the USSR and its allies from strikes by enemy ballistic missile submarines, aircraft carriers,nuclear cruise-missile-armed ships and submarines.

Accomplishment of these tasks would entail attempts to control all or portions of the Kara, Barents, and northern Norwegian and Greenland Seas, the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk, and thc Northwest Pacific Basin, and to conduct sea denial operations beyond those areas toilometers from Soviet territory. We continue to believe that virtually all of the Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleets' available major surface combatants and combat aircraft and some three-quarters of their available attack submarines would be initially committed to operations in these waters. Other initial naval wartime tasks are: support of ground force operations in the land theaters of military operations (including countering naval support to enemy operations in peripheral areas such as Norway) and some interdiction of Western sea lines of(SLOCs).


. iir- .


We still believe this wartime strategy will remain essentially unchanged through this century. Strategicstrikes by SLOM-armedof SSBNs. and strategic defense against enemy SSBNs. aircraft carriers, and other major platforms capable of nuclear attack on Soviet territory will continue to be the Soviet Navy's primary initial wartime tasks. We expect thesethe need to counter Western units armed with the Tomahawk laud attack cruisehowever, drive the Soviets to expand the area in which their Navy would initially deploy the bulk of its Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleet forces for sea control/sea denialoutilometers from Soviet territory.

A principal portion of thc strategic defensedestruction of enemy SSBNs before thev can launch theircontinue to pose severe difficulties for the Soviets. The deployment of ftard-target-capable US SLBMs. improved British and French SSBNs, and the first Chinese SSBN probably will increase thc importance of this task. The Soviets also will have to contend with Trident II SLBM-equipped SSBNs operating in much expanded patrol areas. We do not believe there is apossibility that tbe Soviets can deploy inystem that could reliably detect and track US SSBNs operating in the open ocean. We therefore expect that Soviet naval anti-US SSBN operations will continue to be modest, with relatively few attack submarines stationed fn the approaches to US submarine bases. Operations against non-USwould become increasingly vulnerable to improved Soviet anirstibrrtarine warfare (ASW) in the lateincrease.

Wc believe thc Soviets will continue to regard destruction of Western aircraft carriers operating in Soviet sea control/denial areasritical initial wartime task, requiring coordinated strikes primarily by large numbers of missile-armed aircraft and attack submarines. Recent evidence suggests the Soviets believe destruction of US carrier battle groups, with improved antiaircraft and antimissile defenses, ismore difficult during the conventional phase of hostilities.

The potentially most significant aspect of receni Sovicl naval developments has been an extensive program to improve USSRwarfare capabilities. Progress in Soviet submarine quieting,in the O-lasses. and sonar and signal-processing improvementsr

attack force will be composecTof quiet submarines, however, and hence the US submarine force will stillignificant overall acoustic advantage in submarine warfare into the.


The qualitative improvements we now project for the general purpose nuclear submarine forcewith otherthe Soviets by theo reduce somewhat the number of SSNs dedicated to protecting the SSDN force. We believe any such frontline submarines freed from this mission would probably be used primarily to increase the density of ASW barriers in the forward areas of expanded sea denial zones and/or as SLCM carriers-Some could be assigned anti-SSBNew older SSNs could have an anti-SLOC role.

We remain convinced that Soviet procurement of naval weapons, platforms and systems over the period of this Estimate will be driven primarily by requirements stemming from tlie strategic offensive and defensive tasks outlined above. We therefore expect the following developments:

size of the modern ballistic missile submarine force will remainhe. The number of SLBM warheads is Hkely to increase substantially from the deployment of new missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs).

Soviets will deploy long-range nuclear-armed land attack cruise missiles capable of being launchedariety of naval platforms. We believe they will be deployed primarily on newer nuclear-powered attack submarines for use In theater strike roles and also against some targets in the continental United States. Deployment of some SLCM-armed submarines patrolling off US coasts willermanent feature of the Soviet peacetime strategic posture. These units probably will augment and could eventually supplant Y-lass SSBN patrols near the continental United States. They offer the potential dividend of complicating US defensive tasks andajor investment in expanded early warning/air defense systems to counter them.

The first unitew class of nuclear-powered conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) aircraft carrier probably will become operational by

Tlic number of principal surface combatants probably will decline somewhat, but thc trend toward larger average size, increased endurance, greater weapon loads, and moreweapon and electronic systems will continue.

The overall number of general purpose submarines will decline, but the ratio of nuclear- to conventional-powered units will increase substantially.

Navy's overall amphibious lift capability will increase Kradually. Wc expect an increase in the size of the naval infantry from0 to00 men.

--One or more new classes of underway replenishment ships may be introduced, but construction of such ships probably will continue toelatively low priority. The increasingly modem merchant and fishing fleets, however, will remain Important factors In naval logistics.

number of Soviet Naval Aviation (SNA} combat aircraft will Increase significantly, with the major change being the first at-sea deployment of high-performance CTOL aircraft. Tbe continued production of Backfire bombers and the introduction into SNAackfire follow-on or. less likely, the Blackjack inill be an essential element in the Soviets' attempts to expand their sea control/denial efforts against Western surface forces in vital areas such as the Norwegian. North, andSeas and the Northwest Pacific Basin Naval Aviation bombers will alsorincipal feature of Soviet antisur-face capabilities in other areas such as the Arabian Sea. The maritime strike mission will receive increased emphasis within the Soviet Air Force in coming years.

technical improvements in Soviet fleet air defense are likely. New surface-to-air missiles, guns, and laser weapons probably will be introduced.ighter and/or fighter-attack aircraft operating from the projected new aircraft carriers willew dimension to the Navy's air warfare resources.

of both sea control and sea denial operational areas will be supported by gradual improvements in Soviet capability to surveil Western surface units and provide targeting assistance for anbship missiles, particularly withinilometers of thc USSR. Much of the improvement probably will involve space-based electro-optical and radar systems. These sensors will enable the Soviets to locate, identify, and track most large surface units under favorable conditions; however, optimum lactical exploitation of the Information so provided probably would be difficult to achieve The Soviets' lack of anycapability to detect deployed submarines, especially in open-ocean areas, probably will remain Ihcir major surveillance weakness.

The acquisition of more technologically sophisticated and capable weapon systems and sensors haswill continue toability lo wage war al sea. Nevertheless, certain other factors that impact on overall Soviet naval readiness will degrade their

capadty to make best DM of this hardware. For example, the Soviets still have problems in:

Personnellargely conscript force hampered by stereotyped, narrowly specialized training.

Materiel reliability andQuality control, human engineering, and shipboard maintenance.

Wartimeafloat logisticcapability and limited shore-based support.

The Soviets clearly rocognire these problems. Their modern combatants are being built to have, among other things, increased sustainability. Training and exercises are becoming more realistic. We nonetheless judge that these aspects of Soviet naval readiness are negative factorsthat will be only partUlly rectified by the

possibility of more protracted general warfare. At the same time, the Soviets are clearly improving the capability of their forces to operateider variety of potential wartime scenarios. We do not believe, however, that this portends any significant change in tho Soviets' plans for employing their naval forces in the initial stages of general war, regardless of their expectations of its likely course. Initial conventional operations would be conducted with an eye toward escalation; and readbvess to conduct SLBM/SLCM strikes and attack enemy sea-based nuclear forces will probably remain Moscow's major concerns under any foreseeable drcurnsances. The importance of the anti-SLOC inissioii would increase in the eventrolonged prehostil-ities mobilization period or if conventional conflict with NATO became protracted. These situations could lead the Soviets toajor open-ocean anti-SLOC naval operation. They would almost certainly want to defer any such operation, however, until after they had successfully completed their critical sea control/sea denial tasks and had weakened NATO's capability lo defend its sea lanes. Also, through, we believe the Soviets will still have insufficient assets toajor open-ocean anti-SLOC operation in the early stagesATO-Warsaw Pact war simultaneously with their strategic offensive and defensive tasks, even if such were operationally feasible. Hence, thc relatively low priority of open-ocean SLOC interdiction as an initial wartime task probably will not change substantially in this century.

In addition to ils wartime tasks, the Soviel Navy will continue to play important peacetime roles, ranging from routine show-the-flag port visits to support for distant-area client states during crisis situations


and limited wars. Given the likelihood of continued instability in the Third World, the use of such naval diplomacy and power projection tcchniaues probably will increase during.

In this regard, there has been heightened Soviet use of foreign military facilities, especially for reconnaissance and ASW aircraft. The most significant development has occurred at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, with thc probable establishment of an operational squadron of ships and submarines and the basing there since3omposite air unit. Nonetheless, most other overseasand support services to sustaincontinue to be of limited wartime utility and will assist primarily reconnaissance and intelligence gathering tasks. Moreover, although the Soviets willto seek access to Third World facilities, we do notubstantial expansion in access in the near term in areas where there is notoviet presence. Despite their limited war-fighting contributions, Soviet forces abroad areore significant factor because they complicate US planning and potentially could impede, disrupt, or delay Western military operations.

One of the most notable changes in the Soviet Navy during theof this Estimate probably will be the introduction of its first aircraft carriers equipped to handle high-performance CTOL aircraft We believe that the primary mission of such carriers will be to help expand Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleet sea control operationseneral war. The carriers will also give the Soviet Navy for the first time an ability to project significant power ashore in distant areasimited war. Together with other force improvements, they will provide the Soviets the option of using naval forceumber of Third Worldagainst all but the most well armed regional powers. We continue to believe, however, that major Soviet Navy task force participation in Third World conflicts would be restricted to limited war situations in wliich the Soviets judged thc risk of escalation to war with the United States or NATO to be small.

Our best estimate, on the future of the Soviet Navy reflects our judgment that the trends we have observed in ship construction, naval doctrine, and strategy over the pastears will continue. Among the variables that couldifferent course for the Soviet Navy ofre:

A major ASW sensor breakthrough that gives the Soviets the capability to detect and track enemy submarines in the open-ocean. Although unlikely throughout the period ofreakthrough would substantially increase the Navy's ability to perform thc critically important strategic


defensive task of destroying enemy ballistic missile and land attack cruise missile submarines before tbey launched their missiles. It would probably lead to major clwnges in the way the Soviets would deploy their general purpose naval forces before and during general war.

control negotiations, which could play an important part in determining the role within Soviet strategy and the force composition of tbe Soviet Navy in. For example, severe restrictions on sea-launched cruise missile characteristics and/or deployment woulderious maritime threat to the USSR and eliminate much of thc pressure to conduct seaoperations at greater distances from Soviet territory.

economic problems, which could leadeduction in Soviet defense spending in.eduction would be likely to result in cuts in the Navy's budget, perhaps falling heaviest on major surface ship programs such as the new aircraft carrier, nuclear-powered cruisers, and large amphibious and replenishment ships. The net result of such cuts wouldavy with less capability than the one projected in our best estimate to control waters beyond the range of land-based tactical aircraft and to project power in distant areas. Programsessential to the Navy's primary strategic offensive and defensive tasks probably would suffer few, if any. cuts.

A shift in Soviet military doctrine toward increased emphasis on protracted conventional war.hift would not change the priority of the Navy's primary strategic offensive and defensive tasks but would probably increase the attention paid to SLOC interdiction and naval sustainability issues.


Figure I

Major Soviel Naval Forces'

Aircraft BomOa'dment Ground attack


Mafor Surface




Submarines Bams tic misaae Ctuita misfireack

Soviet Union


urface Comb

Kiev-class an emit



Submarines Batiishc missile rtiuise missile torpedo attack




Major Surface Combatants

Came'S Crwiers


K.ev ctass eiicatt 2

8 62


Ballistic miastie Cruiseroeisn attack

asi4 These ligu'es Oo not includeii reserve Among trie other units in thc Sonete<wri: l'? patrol combatonlt.mohlUauB war tare stiioS. i'S3 mine wa'tjiu shipsKiaerway-'epieni&nmem Ships, lher combat aircraft (reconnaissance

Caip.jr Sua Viol's Naval infantry consistsn in tne Pacikceet and one brigade In each of the three





A. Introouction

henimatc was lastlhe Soviet Navy lias continued to evolveodern, balanced Beet capable ofull range of wartime and peacetime tasks This evolution has been supported by new weapons and seniors, an ambitious naval construction program, substantial advances in submarine sound quieting, heightened use of overseas facilities, and additional operational cipeticnce- The following paragraphsour understanding of Soviet program and current naval slralegy, particularly how Soviel fotces would be employed Initiallyeneral Hii


B. Force Composition, Organization, and Readiness

2 The primary forces of thc Soviel Navy consist ofallistic missileeneralrge surface combatants, andaval combat aircraft. They are organized into fourNorthern, Uaitic. Black Sea. and Pacific Ocean Fleets (see figurehe Soviet Navy maintains three standing deployed forces: the Mediterranean Squadron, which draws its forces primarily from the Northern and Black Sea Fleets; and the Indian Ocean and South China Sea Squadrons, drawing forcesfrom the Pacific Ocean Fleet Additionally, sincelie Soviets have maintained about mi ships off tbc wnit coast of Africa.^


Probable Soviet Ocean Theaters of Military Operations CTVDs)

ontrol of the armed (orera of Warsaw Pact countries In wartime would be transferredoviet Supreme Hitth Command (VCKX with the Soviet General Stall at its executive agent To give this centrali/aal vommand structure some flcjihtlrty, the Soviets have divided areas of anticipated military action Into geographical entities colled theaters of military operations (TVDsX including probably four ocean TVDs {see figureigh commands established in these TVDs probably would directly control those forces within their respective areas, eicept for those forces remaining under tbe control ofk.

believe the Northern Fleet commanderall general purpose military operations in the Arctic and Atlantic TVDs. Some units, such as those Involved in amphibious operations in the Northern Fleet area, probably would beto Ihe command of the Northwestern TVD, emphasizing operations against Norway. Wethat, for efficient command andigh corn as id could be created for this TVD. We also believe that the bulb of the Northern Fleets forces would operate within the Arctic Ocean TVD, encompassing all sea areas north of the Grr-enlindKingdomS) gap. StrategicSSBNs, aircraft on strategic missions, and some SI-CM armedIn these ocean TVDs would be under the direct control of the VCK for weapon system targeting and launch control

subordination of Pacific Ocean Fleet forces and the responsibility of the fleet commander iyr>rrlHr are similar to those of the Northern Fleet We believe the Pacific Ocean Fleet Corn-mariaVrrwould control all general purposeoperations In the Pacific Ocean TVD. Some units, such as those planned for operations against China and the Japanese binds, probably would be controlled by the high command of the Far East TVD. Forces to the South China Sea would probably be subordinate to the Pacific Ocean Fleet The Indian Ocean Squadron would also be subordinate to the Pacific Ocean Fleet-possiblyeparate Indian Oceana high command were formed Ln the Southern TVO, In which case, the squadron would be responsive to the high command. As In the Northern Fleet, forces performing WrategicIn the Pacific Ocean TVD would be tinder thc SrnCoVgrce of direct control.

Tbe Baltic Fleet, as partombined fleet with thc Polish and East German Navies, would be subordinate to tbe high command of the Western

TVD. This theater would encompass primarily operations against West Germany. Denmark, the Benelux countries, and France, and against NATO and other forces In the Baltic and North Seas.

The Black Sea Fleet, as partombined Beet with the Bulgarian and Romanianwell as forces of the Mediterraneanwould be subordinate to the high command of tho Southwestern TVD. encompassing primarily operations against Turkey, Greece, and Italy, and NATO forces in the Mediterranean.

! Kr.i'firien Philosovhu. Although Soviet naval presence has expanded globally in the pastelatively small portion of the Soviet Navy Is still regularly deployed away fron borne waters.argely due lo the Soviet approach to readiness, which differs markedly from that ofnavies Generally speaking, the Soviet readiness philosophy stresses readiness to deploy for combat oo relarjvclv short notice rather than routine Deployment of large forces. Toaximum forcecapability In times of crisis, the Soviet Navy emphasizes maintenance and in-port/In-area training rather than extended at-sea opera Hons Even Soviet naval units deployed out of area spend much of tbeir time at anchor or In port To the Soviet mind, itore important to be ready to go to sea than to be at tea. Under this system, operational experience and some degree of crew proficiency are sacrificed to achieve high materiel availability.esult of thb readiness philosophy, the Soviets,ew days' notice, probably would have more than half of their submarines and major surface combatants available for combat. That figure would climb to aboutercent within three weeks. We estimate that given several days' wanting, Soviet Navalwould have more thanercent of lb aircraft available, although this percentage could be sustained forhorti

ornbof Readiness. Tbey has greatly improved Its combat capability over the pastears, but problems remain that are likely to hamper Its readiness to perform under varying conflict scenarios. In particular, the Soviet Navy has been traditionally postured to engagehort intense war occurringeriod of tension which provides ample notice to prepare and deploy. This emphasis, coupledeluctance to maiimlre at-sca operations, has resulted inWesternnavalproficiency, materiel reliability, and combat sustainability. The Soviet Navy has recognized these deficiencies and has taken steps to correct them. We

beh'eve thai these stops arc improving overallbut Ibal, In comparison with some Western navies, many ol these deficiencies remain rearing ones, which could constitute important disadvantagesar lasiaTigtmoreonth or two.

ersonnel Froficiencv. Much of the Sovietpersonnel problem steins from tbe relatively low proportion of careersomeercent. While naval personnel are selected from tbe better amseripts. disciplinary and morale problems continue to be noted. The Navy's three-year conscription period is insufficient to provide the training and eaperiervce required to take full advantage of increasinglyweapon/sensor systems and naval opesatioos Conscriptften simple and narrowly spc-Csaliied. with little teaching of theory and virtually no exercises coping with the unexpected. Periods spent at sea are probably inadequate to acquire fullwith equipment or more lhan rudimentaryof Its tactical employment These problems and others have been addressed extensively In Sovietliterature, and numerous measures have been taken to overcome them. Advanced simulators are being used more extensively In training, com peon Dos somewhat for limited at-sea operations. Perhaps the most effective steps to improve proficiency have been tbe increasingly demanding and reabStk fleetconducted In recent years. ^


Navy has also stressed exercises Involving more combat support and readiness evolutions, as in the large4 exercise in the Northern

ellahllllv and Maintenance. These factors have been persistent weaknesses In Soviet naval readiness. We know the Soviets are aware of these problems and have tried to Improve equipmentcontrol In manufacture and preventivein thc fleet. These efforts appear to be bearing fruit In the newer and more Important fleet units, but casualties are still common. Particularly sophisticated technical equipment on certain units otters require officers to operate and maintain. Tbe highlyA-dais submarine, for instance, is alleged to be manned entirely by officers. Introduction of ever more complex systems and unfavorable demoeraphic trends vrtlfprobably exacerbate this problem io the future. We thus believe lhal materiel reliability and maintenance are and will continue to be negative factors in the Soviets' ovciall naval readiness equation

and probably would impose sicmheant limitations in protracted conflict, particularly if shore-based repair is infusible or unavailable

S. SusfdmobihlF. Historic Soviet doctrinalon short war has ledavy Ill-suitedone conflict Although there It some evidence that tbe Soviets are examining protracted conventional war as another contingency option, this factor ti not evident in the overall design of their fleet or in the systems we project for the future. Certain newer frontline units are Indeed more capable of sustained engagements, as evidenced by Increasing use of nuclear power for propulsion and the Incorporation of greater weapon loads on new ships and submarines. Nevertheless, they have little afloat logistic support, and reliance on shore support Is Inefficient and Impractical These problems are exacerbated by the limited endurance of most afloat naval forces. Most large Soviet combatants can operate foreek or so without refueling, and onboard munitions are generally pimrlent for only one intense erxgagernenl These shortfalls are mini-mtied in peacetime by relying on tbe merchant fleetarge measure of logistic support Most merchant ships, however, arc Ill-suited for operations in aenvironment. We thus believe that, except for the more modem units which will constitute Ion than half of the Soviet fleet by the, sustairsability willeakness for the Soviets In any conflictalor deficiency In an extended war.

C. Key Aspects of MEtcry Doctrine

Unified Strategy. The Soviet militaryoperatesingle national strategy,by tbe politico-military leadership of tbc state, to accomplish wsirttoe goals- Thb strategy Is oriented primarily* toward continental Interests and requires tbc coordination and integration of all branches of the armed lorces to achieve the USSR's politico-military alms. This unified strategy, with IU emphasis on inter service coordination and mutual support, is the basis for the Soviets' "combined arms" approach to war fighting. Tlie Soviets thereby seek to create mission-specific combat groupings with war-Gghtine capabilities cseceding the simple sum of their

Soviet Viet* of General War. Tbe Soviets' military writings indicate that theyar with the West would bee global in scope, and probably escalate tonuclear conflict. Tbey generally depictar beginning In Central Europea period of rising International tensions, with

hostilillcs initiated by NATO, although (hb last point may be foi internal political ponwses latheriue reflection of Soviet expectations or plans. The war often spreads to the Far Cast, as China enters to take advanUgaaof Soviet involvement In Europe. In tlic Soviet view, the conflict would probably evolve through four stages'

A conventional phase InATOb checked by the Warsaw Pact,act counterofferuive is bunched

A transitional period of limited theater nuclear war In wluch the Pact detects NATO rxepara-tloni to use nuclear weapons and preempts.

A decisive phase with large-scale use of nuclear weapons, bothnd within theater.

A fourth phase in which residual nuclear and conventional forces come into play.

Since the, and continuing to thc present, the conventional phase usually has been described as lasting only several days. In the past few years, however, there have been Indications the Soviets mayore protracted, but still relatively short, conventional war phase. Descriptions of the duration of the fourth phase also have lerigthened-

egardless of the length of the conventional phase, the SovieU doubtar with the West would be decided at the conventional level Tbdr Initial conventional operations would therefore be conducted with an eye toward escalation. During the initial phase of operations, both sides would attempt to destroy wtth conventional munitions as much asof the enemy's theater- and tea-based nuclear weapons and supporting facilities The SovieUdo not believe that the destruction of potential strategic assets, such as SSBNs. during the conventional phase would by itself trigger an escalation to the use of nuclear weapons.


Socle* Wartime Talks. V

"fallows us to estimate the Soviet Navy's initial wartime tasksood deal of confidence, it also permits an understanding of the SovieU* relativeinar wllh Ihe West Since,

offensive and defensive tasks to be peiforrned concurrently during the first stagesar with NATO. These tasks are:

deploy and provide "combat stability" (that is, protection and support) for ballbtic rnisdle submarines In preparation for and participation in intercontirienlal and theater nuclear strikes.

To defend the USSR and its allies from enemy sea-based strike force*.

To support ground force operations in the land theaters of military operations, includingPact sea lines of communication andnaval support to cnomy operations Inareas such as Norway.

To conduct some interdiction of enemy SLOCs.

he pattern of implementation of these tasks undoubtedly would vary from fleet to fleet Tbe Northern and Paelfic Ocean Fleets would Initially be concerned with deploying and protecting their SSBNs The Baltic and Black Sea Fleets, oo the other hand, would initially concentrate on supporting operations in the land theaters. Combating enemy strike groups, especially SLCM-carrying platforms and carrier battle groups approaching the USSR, would alsoajor initial concern of ill four fleets.

IS. The SovieU realiseonflict may not unfold at they expect. In thb case, thev would be prepared lo reexamine their initial force allocations to tiscse tasks. Readiness to conduct strategic strikes. Including the protection of their SSBN force, and to attack enemy sea-based nuclear forces, however,would remain their major concerns, regardless of scenario or length of the convenllonal phase.

trologic Strike

he Soviets regard strategic strike against enc-land targets as tlie primary naval task. This


stems from ihc Soviet beliefai wiih the West probably woald escalate to lhe Urs^scaJe use ol nucleif weapons and Irom the capability olballlstie missiles (SLBMs) lo striaeBjpfrtant Urgent Accordini to Fleet Admiral of Ihe Soviet Union Corshkov. SLBMs give navies, for Ihe first lime In history, the capability to directly affect *'the course and even thear. The Soviel Navy'scxSeso SSBNs. over half of which are Typhoon-lass units capable of striking lhe continental United Slates whilo remaining in homo waters,otalLDMi. oruclear warheads (as ofhiiaboutercent of the USSR's estimatedstrategic warheads.

he day-to-day disposition of Sovietoverned by the wartime requirement to generate maiimum force levels oo short notice. The Soviet Navy seeks lo maintain about three-fourths of Its SSBNs In an operational status, with the remainder in long-term ropairf_

^To maintainstate ofelatively small portion ofSSBNaboutercent otkept deployed at sea.nitsigh state

of readiness in or near home portf"


iixeT S< thc

iass SSBN presence in patrol areas near lhe US_or>isls and have frequentlylass SSBNs afor Inside the landward boundaries of those nominal palrol areas. An effect of those anomalous patrob has been to reduce missile flight time lo US targets to roughly Ihat of the Pershing II missiles aimed at the Soviet Union from Western Europe. Those perturbations in Soviet SSBN deploymentsolitically motivated "analogous response" to NATO INF deployments In Europe At current levels they will not appreciably affect Soviet SSBN force readiness before aboutfter which lhe adverse effects would rapidly become significant.

e believe most SLBMs would beadministrative centers, communicationsartd^ Industrial and soft military targets,thev do not now haveof

accuracy and yield to destroy hardened milltatySome SSBNs, particularly lhe forward-deployed D's and Y's. probably would participate in initial

strikes against llie continental United Stales. Thc allocation ol SSBNs to inllla) strikes could increase somewhal if thc Sovietsard-target-capable SLBM. Now and In thc luturc. however, many SSBNs probably would be wilhlield for subsequent strikes oresidual strategic force. The Soviets probably intend lo reload for follow-on operations some of their SSBNs that have participated In the Initial nuclear strikes. Wc judge their capability is limited, however, and any reload operation would involveew SSBNs. Moreover, any SLBM reload operation would face such difficulties as pre-pc4inc4unB reloading equipment, delivering missiles, warheads, and propel-lantsi conducting the operation under threat of attack or collateral nuclear effects, and retargeting. Hence, thc contribution to Soviet striking power of anythat could reasonably bo achieved would bo small, making It unlikely that SLBM reload figures prominently in Soviet war plans. According to an alternative view,ikely that the Soviets' reloadven less lhan the limited one assumed above and, therefore, unlikely that reload figures in their war pirns evenmall way. Tbe holder of uYs view believes that tbe Soviets experimented with the concept of SSBN reloads bast decided not toit Into their war plans. Furthermore, this view holds that the Soviets have not chosen to increase even this small reload capability.'

Protection and Support forhehave long been concerned with the vulnerability of their submarines to ASW forces. Soviet authorscite tbe experience of lhe two World Wars to reject the notion that submarines can ensure their own survival through concealed operations. Rather, since at least, tbey have discussed the need to use general purpose forces, including large surfaceto protect and support orombat stability" to ballistic missile submarines. Such writings strongly imply that providing combat stability to SSBNs is viewed as critical to the success of the strategic strike mission and the most important Initial wartime tasktem Scant number of Northern and PactBc Ocean Fleet general purpose forces.

We believe that tbc Soviets plan io support and protect their SSBNs through an echeloned defense in depth. Thb defense would likely begin while the SSBNs are still In port and continue as they are dispersed and enter assigned opeiating areas. Surface combatants, mine wiriare ships, and ASW aircraft

Tht hotdtr o, ihu clew II lA*urton eiand Reiearoh. Penal ment of Stale.


would be usednitizeransit routes. General purpose submarines probably would escort transiting SSBNs and, along with aircraft,barrjorjtatrob in the approaches to SSBNarea? Surface combatant task groups abo would probably operate in the vicinity of such areas to assist io combating enemy SSNs and ASW airerafL

rotection of SSBN operating areas entaibto control all or Urge portions of the Kara. Barents, and northern Norwegian and Greenland Seas as well as the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk and tbe area off the Kamchatka Peninsula. It also involves sea denial operations beyond these areas toilometers from Soviet territory. Some facets of thc echeloned defense, such as the operation of attack submarines In proximity to SSBNs and the protection of the waters near the loo edge, would serve ooly one mainprotection ofthe only Western units likely to be In such areas would be those attempting to attack the SSBNs. Most of tbe units involved In the echeloned defense, however, would also contribute to other important tasks, particularly the defense of Soviet territory from atucks byforces and the prevention of naval support to Allied operations in peripheral areas such as Norway and Korea. Attack submarines, aircraft, and anycombatants operating nearK gap, for example, would seek to destroy any Westernor major surface combatants detected, thereby protecting both the SSBNs and tbe Soviet homeland. Forces operating In these waters, therefore, would be accomplbhing several important tasks at the same time.

o believe that virtually all major surfaceand combat aircraft available in the Pacific Ocean and Northern Fleets and some three-quarters of their attack submarines would be initially committed to conducting "sea control" and "sea denial' operatiorts in these waters (seend accompanying texteaving relatively few units available forin areas such as the Central Pacific and North Atlantic Given the recent Soviet emphasisote protracted conventional phase of hostilities and the likelihood that many SSBNs will be withheld from initial strikes, the requirement to protect SSBNs could tie down substantial assets for an crtended period. The SovieU probably would be reluctant to releaseforces'from this task until most missiles had been launched, they perceived that the threat hadlessened, or the course of live conflict dictated increased emphasis on otlser tasks.

here are indlcatioru the Soviets have also made some changes to the organization of their forces, probably to improve SSBN protection, by taaataaal SSBNs and general purpose forcesingle commandleet, forces have historically been organized In major surface force, submarine, naval aviation, naval infantry, and naval base (region)Tbe naval base commands were essentially coastal defense related and had smaller ships and craft assigned. It appears that some base/region commands may hss been reorganized and given expanded roles and geographic areas of rcsponslblHty. These now or^nizatiuminiicdoups with surface ship and submarine assets, Inducting SSBNs. Although tbe subordination of aircraft in peacetime Isikely that some naval aviationparticularly short- and medium-range ASW aircraft-would come under operational control of tbe "mited force" commanders during wartime

These dcvcloprnents suggest that duringa fleet's assets not assigned to deployed squadrons or "independent" operations relatively far from the Soviel Union would operate as "mixede do not fully understand Itow tlse operations of tbe general purpose forces, normally under fleet control, will be meshed with those of theCK asset Wc believe, however, that the dbpersal and deployment of SSBNs will be governedrecise, predetermined General Staff-approved plan. The force commander probably would be responsible for the Implementation of SSBN dispersal and protection operations by the general purpose forces under his command. Tbe fleet tatstaaaaanJii probably would be responsible fortbe operations of tbe separate forces. We believe actual firing orders for tbe SSBNs would come directly ftom the VCK The Soviets probably intend that this reorganization will result Inartime posture. Improved responsiveness to rapidly developing situations, and Increased flexibility In resource allocations, particularly In the support and protection of SSBNs.

Thc Role of SLCMi. New sea-launched, long-range nuclear land attack cruise missiles (SLCMs) will enhance Soviet offensive strike capabilities. Twoare under development. Thesintended primarily for theater targets in Europe and Asia; but we behove the Soviets probably will deployquipped SSNs near-tbe United States as early5 Such deployments would be consistent with Soviet statements concerning ato NATO INF deployments- Deployment ofn submarines wouldrade-off in

Figure 3

Current Initial Soviel Operating Areas in the Pacific





capabilities since they could then carry fewer ASW and antlship weapons The Soviets' second SLCM under development, ibeiobahly will he deployed on dedicated SSCNs Initial operational capability (IOC) is expected6 We have no direct evidence, but believe the mission of theill abo include coverage of both US and theater targets. Il the Soviets employ SLCMs to attack US targets, the missiles tnlghl be able to avoid detection by the current USand warning systems, although new sutveil-la nee systems such ason radar and airborne warning and control system (AWACS) air-

craft probably are more capable of detecting them Launching submarines would be subject to detection by ASW systems We have no evidence cortcerning Soviet doctrine lor employment ol SLCMs against US (or other) tatgels Hut Soviet planners could not be sure that ihr bring submarines were not being monitored or the weapons detected during flight They would therefore risk losing lhe advanlage ol surprise, giving the enemy warning of the attack Tbe subsonic SS-NX-Z1 wouldarticularly long time of flight, making It unlikely the Soviets would launch lhal missile against US laigets prior to ballistic missile laund

Figure 4

Currentlniu" Soviet Operaling Areas in (he Western TVD,

would expand or oont.aci lo lake intooo>aM>lc

loreseach fleersued ai Ine Glint (Greenland-Iceland-


eo Control and Seo Dcraol Oporottons

Ienn>control" end "re. eVanal" ate wbject to eafeSety ol rrtopreUlieos. CewettflvafatoJi cortnderrd to have "at* cwrtreT an aa areable to itotaln surface combatant and rnerehant rhtpthere with relative security.oruitkred to exercise "tea dental- li Ii rweventsf tha area bv luoprjooent

The terms "seand "tea dceuaJ" are ward In tiki! Estimate to Indicate the type of naval efiort the Soviets rxobaUr espect to conduct In various rrsarHlrne areas at tha be^nrancATO-Warsaw Pact war. Areas labeled "re. con foi" are thea- io which the Soviets probably Intend to operate foroea, as well as submarines and naval aircraft, for an indefinite period. Areas labeled "sea denial" tie those to -Wch use Soviet. Probablythe malar share of the combat to be conducted by rubmartoe, and umd-baaed strike aJrcraft Surface ship operaaon* la these waters will be either ncoeristen. othort dorauoo at the of hWihrkt Tbe terra "leas urtcoaivesed toower level of efiort. prirnartly by rubcaarines

The daaaaattfoB of these areas Is heavily toflwooed by tl* imrwct of rwapbr on Soriet navd ornabona. The Baltic and Black Sea Fleets are separated horn ooen-ooean areas by narrow straits Ural would ba ravder Western control at the bodnnlr* of be-iWes. Northern Fbct unit, would have to transitTaaeh themoe,i* IWBe iiK amtVafiar ian-Oon -th only

Ocean _

orthernajor cor adoration In Northern Fleet operations is NATO crwtaul of the parages betweenIceland, tbe Faroes, and tbettilted Klrurfotn, Soviet wartime opesattooe to tbe rnEtoTof these water, would bo likely to tovotvc primarily wbrriarines. wluch would attack NATO forces attorripting to eo<


territory and counterltu Western naval wpcortNATO force, to Norway. This .re. prcrbabiy wouUbe tbe locussbio orxraoom by Backfirewhichmod. better suited than the ride. Badger, to deal with the likely air defense environmenl In this area. Abo. Backfire and other bomber attacks opeotcd on ASW. early warrdrsg. aad air defense laciUrk. to the tap area Ooeraboro within the tea oontrol area are likely tourfaceubrriarines, and strike aircraft. Farther north, the Soviets probably Intond to use geographic features such as Qfe Tee edge and Soviet tsland. such as Novaya Zemlya lo leeUttate the coeranooei their forces. isarUc-ularty thetr SSBN. and tupporting aeneral purpose forces

7Tic Battle fleet. Opci.tlom of llse Baltic Fleet to wartime would be heavily Influenced by Western con trol of the aaurow Danish straits and by the prorimlty ol the Baltio to major cround aad air operations In Central Europe. It Is likely that (he major efiort of Ihe Fleet and lha East German aad Polish Naviesbe directed at eer*rolltog tbe rssdOe tUwarh the use of aurface units, mbrnarinea,ariety of aircraft. Including naval Bglwer-borrvbers. The Pact would also attempt to deny NATO llse use of the North Sea as an ooeratto* area for aircraft carriersransit arearoup, and logistic onits The principal weapon to such operation, probably would be medium and tactical bombers, allhough they would have to overfly NATO territory to reach their Urgeta Because ol It, narrow etrata anden. tbe Balticartscolartr good area for the employment of mooes,

The Black Sea Fleet The SovieU and their Hotaa-rvtan and Bokpuua .Dies would employ surface,and afc aaaets In sea rasotrol or^rartom wftassst IsW Black Sea. See denial operatioos by the Soviets la the eastern Mediterranean couldhosoiitlesof Iheir criedlterranean SQuadron. Unlera Ihe Pact actually enrrtreJW the Turkish straits, however. SovseJ attempts to continoe seacretioas to the eaatern Mediterranean would be hampered by tbe difficulty of retolotcioa tho Mediterranean Squadron withorfaoe ihlos and aubmarinet once buries bad begun. Air operation* to tbe Medilon. ocas, would also be cowualocd by UK need for aircraft based on Pact territory lo penetrate Western air do-lenses. Altrwogh riznlGeant numbers of Soviet surfer*

Prcbabh oTeZ eapecTuW wouH^ursHTrTirromw daya Tlse brufflthe wbsoQuent tea rleaial effort would bo carried byand aircraft.

Tke Pacific Ocean FUeL Soviet ceotrol of the Sea of Japan and ths Sea of Okhotsk would depend on lealtog off severalor-ays, ranging from tho Koreala tbe south lo the Kuril Strait at Use tip of the ItoM. PeraramU Dense defensive rrur-field. iKobabl, would be laid to these waters. Sea control operatiom would also be conducted east of thePeoliuula to protect lhe approaches to Petropav-tovsk. the only major Soviel naval base with direct acres to tbe open ooeaev Sea denial operaboos would also be eordueted to tbe East China Sea. thePacific, and possibly the northern PWIippirjr) Sea. The outer edge of the aea elcnlaless eortly defined than to ether fleet areas because such efiort. cannot be focused ert narrow waterway, through which Western units must pass


E. Slrotogic Defense

nti-SSBN. Thc Soviet Navy's most criticaltask ts lhe destruction of enemy SSBNi before ihey can launch iheir mrssles Thr Soviet* rccosmre. however, lhalide gap between lhe importance of this task and the capabilily of Iheii current forces lo curry it out Soviet writings ot.knowl-cdge the enormous firepower present iningle Western SSBN and recognise lhe desirability ofsuch unit* during the conventional phase ofo recognire. however, thai ihey do not now have the capabilily to detect US SSBNs operating in open-ocean ateas or loassive trailhance detection occurs The deployment of Ihe US Trident missile system, whose greater range opens up even larger ocean areas that mint be searched, funher cornphcite* the Soviets task The Soviet Navy, realizing the magnitude of the pngilem and ill own shortcomings, probably will concentrate Us anti-SSBN efforts on choke poinls and the appiojches to enemy SSBN bases, rather than attempting lo search larger ocean areas. On occasion, surface combatants, attack sobmanoes, intellijjrnce wsbectors (AGM, and aircraft have conducted ioiM ASW operations off the Bockall Bank, west of the US and British SSBN bases near Holy Loch, Scotland, during malor eretcises We

have also seen operations off SSBN bases in lhe United Slates bv AGls operating with SSNs and b>SW aircraft easting Irom Cuba We therefore behove lhal tbe Soviets would attempt lo have intelligence collection snips, nuclear attackSW air-crafl, and possibly even aurface combalanii offbases in thc period preceding hoslililies and attempl to detect and trail SSBNs leaving port Once hostilities commenced, they -ould attack anyihey held in contact Some of Iheir besl ASW submarines probably would be used in this effort, although ihe number would be small relative to the number committed to protect Soviet SSBNs

nlieamer/AnliSt.CM/Anti-ALCM. Thecontinue to have great respect forS naval strategy Thevi earners a* not only the backbone ofpurpose naval furces. but also anreserve force thai couldignificantdetermining the outcome of the final phases

Soviet* eipect US carrier battle groups to undertake vigorous offensive act tons in the maritime approaches lo the USSR They believe lhal cairler battle groups would attempt to use Ihe Norwegian, the North, and the eastern Mediterranean Seas and the northwestern



tlx- Dock bo

4 IlllO

(beimproved Soviel strike capabilityNATO surface (eras Because of the hath-speed sitio-njrisce ralnile tt carries, lis vuisble flightits maneuverability, and Its hinlicapabilities and electronic counter measures (KCM) equipment,reater probability of peoetrattrai or avoiding NATO naval air defenses aad attacking tanjets In lbs open ocean than does Ira- Badger.

ircraft are In sesviee withnd additional aircraft are beingat the rate of aboutoer year. Tbeof tbe improved performance Backfirehave occurred aad production of tbe Bhas censed. SNA Backfires are currentlyinto five complete rcgiirients (two in theone in tbe Black Sea. and two In the Pacific)opmtsons, tbe Soviets would deployaircraft from their peacetime locations tofroca wfuch they could beat operateesc surface uruU, especially US carrieraad SLCM-arzoed platforms. Tbe SovietsBackEros from one fleet area "to anotherparticular. Baltic Fleet aircraft annually

deploy to Northern Fleet bases. -

Although the Backfire is capable ofariety ofbombs andprincipal anlKhlp weapon Is Ibeissile The

armed wtthooventiorul or nuclear warhead,peed oflus, aadm mum range ofocaneters, although la trainingired from raiach shorter ranges, in wartime, each SNA ISicklire would carry one or two of these mimics, depending on the range to the target To concentrate their firepower, the Soviets probably would allocate at least tworoagfalyircraft) to attack each carrierattle group. In lbc past two years. Backfire onerauoas over ocean areas have become more frc-iinho Grit use of tile BackfiretmuUted strikeS carrier battle group occurred when Pacific Ocean Fleet units operated against two US carries! east of tbe Kurd Idinds. Backfire aircraft subsequently conducted open-ocean operations during the worldwide eiercise of3 and4 spring eiercise, ranging as far forward asK gap In the Atlantic and south of the Kurd laiaods in the PaetSe

The Soviets oadcasbterDy view the Backfireital part ol their strategic defense forces to keep Western carrier battle groups and otber SLCM-armed slilps from striking Important targets within the Soviet Uridrosis. The Backfire will continue to be aafeature of Soviet innavrtace earsahfllOes la areas such as the Korwesaaii. Mediterranean, aad Arabian Seas aad the Northwest Pacific Ocean

Ocean to attack Warsaw Pact territory,naval forces Including SSBNs and theirforces, and Pact ground force operations. Destruction of aircraft carriers, then,ritical elernenT^sr^severaJ. important Soviet naval tasks.

ruise missile submarines and strike aircraft carrying air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) are tlse Soviets' primary anticarrier weapons. In addition to moreaval Backfire (seend inset) and Badger strike aircraft, some elements of the Air Armies of tbe Supreme High Command (AA VCK) are abo assigned maritime strike tasks (seeA VCK.ircraft have routinely been involved In simulated strikejnlssiocis against naval targets during Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleet ezerrises. AAVCK Backfires. Badgers, and Blmden have abo been Involved in antiship oacrclses Additionally, the first overwater attack luluiug byencer tactical bombers probably subordinated to the AAVCK occurredne squadron ofircraft has been modified to Bear C's and now carries the AS-4tbe same missile carried by the Backfire. We believe all of thcoAVCK's will be

modified for thb capability by the.

n wartime, these forces would attack carrier battle groups crossing Beet defensiveilometers from Soviet territory.ssile-equippcd surface combatants would abo be used In areas where they are In proximity to US carrier battle groups at the outset of hostilities or as carrier battle groups approach Soviet sea control areas. Soviet doctrine emphasizes preemptive or "first salvo" strikes against carriers before tbey can launchThr Soviets would attempt to use tactical surprise and coordinated multiple missile strikes on different threat axes to overwhelm battle groupRecent evidence suggests the Soviets believe the destruction of US carrier battle groups, with Improved anUaircrafl and antimissile defenses. Is becoming more difScult during the conventional phase of hostilities

he deployment by llie US of sea-launched, long-range, nuclear land attack cruise missiles inand surface ships poses an additional dilemma

scent i

2 n?





i I

In ill


fllili I









for iho SovieU. The potential destruction thesecan cause and tho range from which thev can reach targets in the Soviet Union will ensure the SLCM-armed force isriority at least equalf aircraft carriers. In the case of surface ships, the Soviets would attack these units in much the same manner ihey would aircraft carriers. SLCM-armed submarinesore difficultcompounded by Soviet inability to clistlnguish those units armed with Tomahawks from the rest of the Western SSN inventory. We have no evidence to Indicate what specific measures the Soviets would undertake to destroy these submarines. Extension of the sea control/denial areas farther from tbe Soviet landmass, augmented ASW barriers, and attacks in or near their bases are measures that could be employed. Wc believe the Soviets most likely would attempt to ameliorate this threat primarily by extending farther seaward and increasing thc density and depth of their ASW barriers.

ith regard to the national air defense role of the Soviet Navy in general, and Its anti-ALCM role in particular, the Navy and Air Defense Forces (ADF) arc developing an operational relationship to improve both air defense of tbe fleet and tbeajor impetus behind thb effort to extend seaward their air defense coverage is tbe threat posed by highly accurate cruise missiles launched from well beyond Soviet borders by US strategic bombers and naval platforms. Tbc Soviets believe they can better counter this threat by extending their air defense capabilities beyond coastal waters. They probably have developed tho capability for direct communications between ADF authorities and Navy facilities and ships; Joist training has thus far been concentrated near shore with the ADF responsible for coordination andof air assets. We believe, however, theof integrating each service's air defense assetsohesive force have not been resolved. Further, the lack of appropriate, continuous Joint force training, competing mission requirements, and the failure to implement any comprehensive doctrine or command structure for long-range Joint operations indicate tbe Soviets apparently are not vigorously pursuing this option. In the near term, we believe Moscow will continue Its practice of according Individual serviceigher priority than joint-forceas the primary means of meeting both naval and homeland air defense requirements. The Soviets are, for example, developing the Air Force Mainstay

AWACS aircraft for forward air defense operations, while the Navy concurrently has two classes ofthe Marshal Node! inrge, nuclear-powered auxiliary designatedsee figurewhich probably Incorporate Dew generations ofcommand, control, and communfcarjoranecessary to extend Beet air defense and battle nunagenacot capability. Similarly, tbe deployment of the large CTOL aircraft carrier under construction will enhance substantially the Navy's ability toantiair warfare at greater distances from tbe USSR. Although these systems and others are being developed to satisfy primarily service requirements, they will offer opportunities for additional andmore effective Joint force air defense operations.

F. Suppori for Land Theaters of Military Operations (TVDs)

lthough the Soviet Navy has acquiredimportant strategic offensive and defensive tasks, support for corn bi nod-arms operations in theTVDsajor respewtbthry of tbe Baltic and Black Sea Fleetsecondary respesssfbility of the Northern and PaeiCe Ocean Fleets. Id wartime, tbe Baltic and Black Sea Fleets would join with navies of other Warsaw Pact nations to form the Combined Baltic and Combined Black Sea Fleets, respectively. The broad objectives of these combined fleets would be to gain control of the Baltic and Black Seas and to help secure access to the North and Mediterranean Seas. In the Baltic, Initial naval operations would focus on destruction of NATO lubmarincs, missile-armed patrol combatants, and naval aviation forces. Western carrier battle groups would become primary targets, especially for aircraft, as they moved Into the North Sea. Amphibious landings In support of ground and airborne attacks on West Germany and Denmark also are likely. In the Black Sea. initial naval operations would focus on supporting the movement of ground forces along the western littoral and assisting in seizing ihe Turkish straits. Romanian and Bulgarian naval forces would be primarily responsible for patrol duties along their own coasts. The Soviet Black Sea Fleet would assist Mediterranean Squadron operations against Western carrier battle groups and amphibious forces. The Northern Fleet would also conductoperations in support of ground forcesagainst northern Norway. The wartime role of

llie 1'aciGc Ocean Meet's amphibious element) is less well understood.forces could be used for the seizure of vital straits such as La Perouse or could be retained to defend Soviet coastal reasons. Additionally. SovirajNjva! Infantry (SND ufoops could conduct limitco objective raids In supportajor around operation (gainst China or reinforce defenses on the Kuril Islands. Forces In each fleet area would also be committed to defending the coastal SLOCs essential to the reinforcement, resupply. and mutual support of the ground forces.

G. Interdiction of Sea lines of Communication (SLOCs)

he Soviets view SLOC interdiction as ainitial task than providing combat StabilitySSBNs and defeating the West'sstrike forces. Tbey believe that Warsawwould defeat the main grouping ofIn Central Europe or the war would escalatenuclear conflict before NATO's seaborneand resupply of Europe or US forces incritical factor.ew

primarily diesel attack submarines- would therefore be allocated to open-ooean SI.OC interdiction from the outset of hostilities. The Soviets probably plan to use such units for attacks on shipping primarily to disperse and tie down NATO naval force* and to reduce the cEdency of NATO mibtary shipping. Initial Soviet anti-SLOC efforts would also probablyombing and mining campaign against European ports by some SNA aircraft and attack submarines. Such actions probably would be Intended to complicate NATO naval operations and facilitateof the Pact's more critical initial tasks. We have oo evidence whether tbe Soviets intend to mine US ports, harbors, or coastal waters prior to or in the early stageseneral war. Tbe Soviets could increase their emphasis on SLOC Interdictionar with the United Stales and its allies in response to their perceptionhanging strategic situation. One circumstance that could motivate the Soviets to widen their emphasis oo SLOC inter arcboo would be the lengthening of the warrotracted conventional conflict. Another circumstance mighton Hid that beganrolonged period of mobilization during which NATO began tlie reinforcement and resupply of Europe hy sea. Inase, lhe Soviets might see interdiction as an urgenl task at the beginning of hostilitlesT Regardless of the circumstances, the Soviets would almost certainly want to defer mounting any major open-ocean anti-SLOC naval operation until after they had successfully completed their Initial sea

control/sea denial operations and had weakened NATO's capability to protect its sea lines.

H. NovoJ Dipeornocy in Peacetime and limited War

n addition to Its wartime tasks, the Soviet Navy is assigned the important peacetime role of serving as an Instrument of state policy or. In more traditional terms, conducting naval diplomacy. Today, Soviet naval forcesontinuous presence In tbe Mediterranean Sea, the Indian Ocean, the Atlantic off West Africa, and the South China Sea. They abo conduct deployments lo the Caribbean (see figurelthough thc level of presence has fluctuated within and between geographic areas, the overall level of Soviet surface ship and submarine presence in distant areas has remained relatively stableby Soviet naval aircraft have, however. Increased considerably9 (see figurend wereby the basing of strike aircraft at Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam, In3 and the neardeployment to Cub* ofincehese out-of-area operations reflect the Soviets' interest la supporting friendly regimes, eax*anding thclr position in the Third World (especially In areas of potential Western vulnerabllityX balancing Western presence, and countering potential strategic threats. Although strategic military concerns remainIn Soviet distant operations, particularly In tbe Mediterranean, tbe Navy Is pert canning Important tasks related to the projection of Soviet power and Influence In tbe Third World.

long with routine show-the-flag deployments and port visits, Soviet naval forces have demonstrated support for friendly nations and sought to inhibit tbe use of hostile naval forces against Soviet aUies. During recent Third World crises the Soviets have augmented their naval presence in the areas of conflict; the Angolan civil warhe; tbe Sine-Vietnamese conflicthe Iranian hostage crisis; Lebanon and Angola. Such use of Soviet navalikely to continue in future distant-area crises. We do not believe, however, the Soviets would deploy major naval forces In responsehird World crisis In an area other than the Mediterranean and possibly tbe South China Sea and Indian Ocean. If tbey judged the crisisgh risk of escalation to general war with the West Tbe Soviets would probably fear that, if war broke out. such forces would be out of position to pethe initial waitime tasks of protecting SSBNs and live sea approaches to the USSR.

Figure 8

Soviel Ship-Days in Distant Waters, by

Figure 9

Overseas Denlojment of Soviel Naval


li. Oi.-u;


I Otna

AHaaa tawa*


Wanin Cmiit la

Ailiwkx. <ai ilni


iftijfi.8 Mi.

South Yemen. IUM Mm


Aiiiuli.- li

5 Bar 0

HIut t



. Althoiiitli Soviet amphibious forces ware developed to conduct assault Undings on thc maritime Banks of the USSB in support ofions, thoy could undertake limitedoperations against modest opposition in many areas ol the Third World- The amphibious landings conducted on Socotra Island ia0 and in Syria in1 demonstrate an interest usascent capability for distant-area prelection. The Soviet Navyhas never conducted large-scale amphibious landings away from the periphery of the USSR. Fjertiscit the Baltic, however,arge-scale amphibious exercise that for tbe first time used ships drawn from all four Soviet fleets Units involved included the aircraft carrier Kiev, the helicopter1-eningrad, and the amphibious assault ship Ivan Rostov. We believe one of the purposes of thb unusual gathering of forces was to test phnrrlng concepts for amphibious operations in distant areas. Despite these developments. It is still doubtfuloviettask force could carryuccessful fording abroad against substantial opposition. In large part because of tho lack of adequate tactical air support, either land- or sea-based.

lobal Rfoch/Otxneaiovietinvolvement abroad rxunariry is intended to help establish and maintain pro-Soviet regimes and tnirn'mirr; US Inlruence. In addition to these oouucal benefits, some military utility also accrues from foreign involvement: selected allies arc strengthened and become more willing to act as Soviet surrogates; Soviet presence enhances the perception of Moscow as an expanding miliiary power whose interests must be considered; and Soviet defenses are su>srijrhenedetirork of Intelligence gathering, early warning and support facilities. Soviet forces now deployed abroad could not tSemsel-esthe outcomeeneral war with the West and areignificant factor in Soviet defense planning. Operating In conjunction with their overseas allies, howevet. Soviet forces in those areasrowing capabilily to complicate US military planning and to impede, disrupt, or delay Western military operations. Modest, combined naval exercises have been conducted in recent yean with Cuban. Syrian. Vietnamese, and South Yemeni Navies. Such enrrcbes with rorne Thud World clients are likely to increase in soplarocarion We also foresee no slackening in Soviet efforts to expand (heir aaceavto foreign facilities, but these facilities. In the near term, will continue to servo essentially as support bases and singing areas from which to wield influence, rdost will lack adequate infrastructure to supporthigh-tempo military operations.

lte Soviet facility at Cam llanh Bay. Vietnam (see figuretheir first true overseas militaryan anomaly In this pattern. Itthe Urges* concentration of Soviet naval assets deployed outside the USSR. Thc Soviets now have In place air-to rurface missile loading and handling equipment, ordnance ranges, and communications and intelligence facilities. In addition, the seven surface combatants and four submarines usually present are supported by seven naval auxiliaries. Tbe combatants and submarines probably now form aa Operationalroup ofadgers (includingf the ASMourear Ds and fourear Ft, andlogger Ciandis based at Cam Ranh Bay. This constitutes the first depldyrnent of Soviet bombers with AS Ms outside the Warsaw Pacta We believe that. In the neri two years, the submarine and surface combatant presence there could double Unlike other facilities abroad, the Soviets could defend this base against moderate opposition and sustain combat operations in the South China Sea from it in the Initial stageseneral war. Soviet forces there could bo used to:

Counter Chinese SSBNs

Attack Western faaliries in thc I'hlfi pptnes.

Attack Western SLOCs in the South China Sea.

Augment tho Indian Ocean Squadron.

The Soviets probably regard Cam Banh Bay as an Important base with growing wartime utility,they undoubtedly realize their ability to defend itoncerted attack by Western forces is very limited and would probably remain so even Ifdefensive systerns were deployed.1

ike Cam Ranh Bay. Soviet access to well-developed facilities In Cuba Isrsoofal case. Such access could enable the Soviets to more easily sustain naval deployments in the Westernleet tug and maintenance and support personnel, there are no Soviet naval forcesassigned to Cuba; however, Soviet naval task forces deploy regularly to the Caribbean and use Cuban facilities for replenishment, maintenance, and support. Deployed Soviet Naval Aviation aircraft routinely conduct reconnaissance and ASW missions against the US east coast from Cuban airfields -Theseserve to signal Moscow's support for the Castro regime, underscore Soviet interest in the region, and provide naval training and surveillance opportunities. Any deployed (ones in Cuba, however, would conlrih-

liltle lo Soviet war-fighting capabilityeneral war with the West. Although basing some naval lorces in Cuba, especially missile-carrying subosarines and aircraft, could complement Soviet naval sttatcsjy by diverting US resources in wartime, we believe Moscow will eschewolicy lhe Soviel (and Cuban) leadership probably will continue lo view the risks inherent in the confrontation wiih tbe United Stales that would follow such an action as outweighing the potential benefits. ^

I. Trends in Naval Programs

he Navy's share of the Soviet defense budget has remained barscaDy unchanged in recentaboutercent Much of thii share has been devoted to ship construction programs,ariety of surface plulforms ranging Irom small patrol crall to large cruisers The lion's share of the construction budget, however, continues to be devoted to(seea^^

he most notable trend over thc past decade has been an evolution toward what Admiral Corshlcovavy capable of fighting at both Ihe nuclear and conventional level as well as protecting state interests in peacetime. As late

as the, thc Soviet Navy could be describedeet with capabilities maximizedhort, interne war that rapidly escalates ro the use of nuclear weapons. The small weapons loads and limitedof most surface combatants severely limited lhe Navy's ability for sustained combat. In, however, new classes of generally larger, more sophis tkated ships incorporating greater endurance, larger weapon loads, and extensive communication andwarfare systems began to enter service, resulting in enhanced capabilities for sustained conventional combat and distant-area deployments^^

n recent years, the salient feature of Soviet naval program development has been Moscow'son modernizing and upgrading thc general purpose submarine force.eneral purpose submarine construction has accounted for over three-fourths of tbe number of submarines built and aboutercent of the total annual tonnage. Five different classes are now under construction, some units of one other class are being convertedSBNnd wc believe the first units of severallasses will be launched within the nest lew years Annual production over the nextxpected to avet age aboutnits, seven or eight of which will be

Figure II

Soviet Naval Spending


Allocation otNa.alof Sowi Defensei. fci


i i


"S mmim*iitnirmnAfcHm



Figure 12

Major Soviel Surface Combatants in Production'

HtCOM'l nm ijli cauitr

n (CTOl IVA.VSTOt ind hclKooun)

. a

nuclear ind ileim

Load DueUccnentlonij

OC7JflOO 0




e:riivstoi ntni.ficrmm mibl*


AMyanuihtp cruiMtikooMit (Unitmodirieil)


ft.ltkfr lit






; ASW Kbuttin


mnitir drinovri

SNirliioiHf r


Ku dcil iimitr filiate

Figure 13

Soviet Submarines Id Production


DttpUctmcaiOpcniioc (metric ion.)

fowl Me ititaiatre* Sam



roitibKSS NXOI Nucl



FMHcSl-NX-iL ttN-li/SS Nil


SSN iSrtSM It/



nuclear powered. We believe general purposeconstruction will continue lo receive the Navy's top priority In resources ibrough tbe.

SBNi. beginning in ibendthrough lhe, iht) Soviets allocatodlesources lo Ibeir SSBN program During this period, (hc construction rate of Y-lass SSBNs averaged about five per year and accounted for more than half of Soviet nuclear submarine constructmn Although construction rales have tapered oil and SSBN force levels have stabilized to accommodate lhe level agreed lo in Iberotocol ofodern unitsaunch tubes, the SSBN force still receives significant emphasis, at evidenced hy lhe construction ofV and Typhoon classes laaBBaBBB9

lass ser.esV being lhe blest modification) is basically an extensionlaas SSBN

technologylls andV have been bush lo dale. TwoVs are underollow-en lo theLBM. designatedegan at-sea testing in4 The SSs longer ranged and more accurate lhan iu piedecessor and probably is intended forVs and backfit. System IOC could be achieved at earlyince the summerlass submarines have conducted regular patrols near and in the marginal polar ice tone and probably havethrough the Ice to bunchLBMs. Tbe Typhoon is the USSR's first entirely new SSBN design shut the*ji introduced6 (seet is significantly quieter than earlier SSBNs and incorporates ice-penetrating features iu lis design to facilitate sulfated launches from within lhe icepack. Typhoon may already have conducted under-ice ope: iitonv Three Typhoons have been built lo date, and

figure 14

Typhoon-Class SSBN Operatinghe Barents4


unit one Iu; completed an operational patrol.coos) ructionut we now expect only six or seven unitsbe Typhoon carriesLBMs. Thehrcestage. solid-pioixsttia*missile withC

VS) andaccuracy over otber Sovietollow-on to theas been in development since at least

naneuverable reentry vehicle (MaRV) variant Is probably under development. We believeew class SSBN Is under devcloprrsenf and that the first unit probably will be deployed by the.

ho SovieU continue, thus far, to adhere to the terms of thenterim Agreement As new SSBNs begin seaiaB SSBN is dismantled by removing the entire missile compartment.s have been dismantled to date. One unit has boon modified by the addition ofnclined missile tubes and serves as thc test bed for thoong-range, land attack cruise missile. Another unit has rejoined th* Beetuciear-powered attack subrzurrinohree are undergoing conversion, and others are being prepared for conversion. We believe these latter units will be leoonBgured as attack submarines. For at least the near term, the Soviets probably will continue tos la compensation for newly constructed modern SSBNs Even so.ore than half of the currentSBNs should still be la service.

Kc ci Submarines. The Soviets arenew classes ofS, tbe M. aad theof which probablyadvances In round Quieting andcapability. In addition,nof thoIndnitsTJ is asrriincantly quieterforerunners and incorporates the best Sovietand hull-mounted acoustic ASWleastUs probably were equipped withpassive sonar array, furthertheir passive ASW detection capabilities (see

first unit ofass SSN was builtand became operational.lass probably isand possibly deeper diving than theIs evidencelass is probably builtIt is fittedowed array sonar to

augment its hull-mounted sensors, hascm torpedo cubes, and Ls capable of carrying thendSW weaponsandidate for deploying theand attack cruise missile as wcIL We expectlass to be built at Cor'kiyate of about one or Iwo units per year beglnrunseome IS toIassSSNs could be available by theollow-on toass, featuring incremental Irnrjrrrvtarsents, especially in soundU expected in the.

belass SSN was Uunchcdn terms of displacement. It is aboutercent larger thanL Moreover, we estimate it embodies Soviet state-of-the-art technology la propulsion,hull structure, sensors, command, control, and conununicaticeks, and sound quieting.lass probably canarge number of variousladudlng theroducedingle building ball at Severodvinsk shipyard, we projoot that only four or five units are likely to be built before production terminates In the.

Io4 the Soviets Uuocbed yet another SSN class, now designated Akula- Tills submarine, built at KomsorncJ'sk. Is quite sirnilar tolass built at Cor'kiy, but Its long raked tall, double limber boles, twj coram un lea dons buoy hatch Intricate it to be the lead unitew data It is probably Steel hulled. While we are ursoertaln about Akula'i roles and capabilities, we expect Its acourtJo characteristics will be similar to those ofass. Tbe first unit began sea trials In ratee believe aboutnits wiU be built by the.

Diesel suomarines, constitutingf the force, remain an important element of the Soviet general purpose submarine rxogram.of theass continues at two shipyards both for the Soviet Navy and probablyxport We believenits will be built by the. Tolas* SS production terminated2 withts constructed We have no evidenceollow-on class. Although tho percentage of Soviet diesel submarines Is likely to drop to aboutercent of the force by the, we believe Moscow will remain eocnmitted to iwodiKtion of such units, and new SS classes will continue to appear.

Production of the Odass SSCNand two are operational (see. Becausesire and complexity of thedaas.-itswill not exceed one unit every two years.rale, only five or tlx will be available In theand tlie SSCN inventory would begin to decline

Figure 16

O (lass SSCN

' In Ul llf.rC

iiIs and I's are retired Toccreinenl io the overall SSCN force, lhe first unitew SSCN dan displacingow and armed withontishlp cruite missiles, probablyversion of lheill probably appear within ihe next (wo years. Aboutould be built5 We alio prolect sia units ofas* loHow-on by the turn of Ihe century Quieter thanlass. these submarines will be armedong-range antisbip cruise missile possibly Incorporating some signature reduclion technology Yel another SSCN. designed to carry lheLCM. probably is being built and could he launched5 Additionally, the retrofit of therstbhsp cruise nusnle into some1 probably continue We expect mote than haHl foice will be so modified by the end of tbe decade, and tlse modified units should remain in service well into the IIOO.i

e believe this robust general purpose subrna tine const! action program is being driven primarily bs Moscow's intention io close the technological gap bclween Soviet and Wi-stern submarines. Western

advances in submarine none reduction and sensor improvement have made increasingly uncertain the capability ol much of Ihe current Soviet force to cairy oul ils wartime missions Hence, since the introduction ofI-das* SSNse Soviets have steadily reduced the technological inferiority of their newest submarines Progress tn Soviet submarine duseting. evidenced in the O-lasses, and sonar and signal processing improvemrnls

half of thc Sovset nuclear attack force will be cdJ poseil of qmet submaiines, however, and thus the US submarine foice will stallignificant overall acoustic advantage inrfare into ihc. Other factors behind thii Soviet submarine building program probably include

i, in Ihe numlier of submarines re Quired to curry out the wide tango of missions

assigned lo the force. For esample, although the Northetn and Viatic Ocean Fleets probably would use about half of their availablected attack submarines to aid in SSBNsuch units are less capable than SSNs

which can operate In the under ice environment

increasingly used by Soviet SSBNs.

- Obsolescence. About half the current Soviet force is aging and increasingly plagued byproblems.

New mission requirements, represented by the Sl-CM-cairying SSNs and SSGNs we project.

The US naval expansion program, particularly tbe proliferation of land attack cruise missile platforms.

Finally, became of the large numbers we proiect for these new Soviet nuclear attack submarines In tbe

, they should give Moscow additional ffesibility in the employment of its overall submarine force In critical strategic offensive and defensive wartime tasks.

Javal Avialion. Tbe Soviets have embarkedajor program to upgrade their sea-booedaircraft capability. Tbe most visible evidence of this Is thc probably nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, designed to handle conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL)being constructed at Nikobyev on tbe Black Sea (see. The carrier probably willeters long,00 tons, and carry up toircraft, somewhat smaller lhanUS attack carriers. We believe the eventual aircraft com-


plement will include airborne early warning, fighter, and attack (or possibly fighter-attack) aircraft.ASW capability probably will be provided by nellcoptai^Sea triab (or tbe carrier are projectedrimai operational capability could be achievedut full operational capabilityully worked up airnlikely before thc. As many as five CTOL carriers could be constructed by thc turn of the century.

onstruction continues at Saki naval airfield in the Crimea, which wc believe will be used In the development of an aircraft for the new carrier and to train tho initial complement of pilots. To date, the Soviets have constructed catapults and associated steam lines, arresting gear, and supports for an aircraft source appears required to complete the catapult system at Saki. Additionally, one fixed ski jump ramp has been erectedecond, possibly hydraulically powered, variable angle, ski lump is being built. These ramps may be associated with the development of an improved vertical/short takeoff and landingTOL) aircraft to replace

ossiblen the Moscow area. We expecttbe Forger follow-on to have better range, endurance, payload. aviOrucs, and flight characteristics than Forger. Candidate CTOL aircraft for the new abcraft carrier have yet to be positively Identified. Since there are no indications of an entirely new aircraft In development, it Is probableodified version of an existing aircraft will be used.Q

cquisition of land-based Backfire medium bombers continues, and the first improvedC variants have entered SNA's inventory. Thc Backfire force Is supplanting tbes the primary airborne strike arm of the Soviet Navy as evidenced by increased leveb of weapons delivery.

missllc loading, mining, and mobility training. Weollow-on alrotaft will begin to supplant Backfire In tbehat aircraft probably will be^a. new (as vet unseen) aircraft similar In sire and railgelo Backfire.ackfire follow-on (Peripheral Attack Bomber) Is notaval version of the AAVCK's Blackiack bomber coma enter the SNA inventory in the.

ircraft production apparently resumed infterwo-year hiatus due toALCM platform) production ThiswiU enable repbscenvent of tbeod Is and 2's in the Pacific Ocean Fleet Tbes the Soviet Navy's most capable ASW aircraft anda substantial Improvement over theod l's and 2's.perations have included regular deployments to Cuba and occasional forays into the eastern Pacific Tho Sovieu appareotly believe thean be effective In detecting, tracking, and localizing Werternwbmarlnes, Including SSBNs, when properly cued.


he new Helix helicopter ts entering tbe fleet in numbers and has operated from Kiev-class guided-rnissile helicopter carriers (CVHGs) and Udaloy euid-ed-mlssile destroyers (DDGs)s in ASW helicopter cQuipped with dipping sonar, whileearch and rescue/utility version. Helix B. not yet operational, probably is aa amphibious assault support hcBbopfer.

rincipal Surface Combatants. Buildingfor seven classes of major surface combatants are ongoing. In addition to the new carrier being built at Nlkolayev, fitting out of tbe fourth and Last Kiev-class CVHC continues, with sea trials expectedhU unit will have improved early warning radar and close-in air defenseultifaced planar array radar has been Installed which uses advanced signal-processing and data-handlingto detect and track multiple targets. Ther "Udaloy SAM" system probably will be the sole SAM Installed We believe this system willuch Improved capability to engage low-flying targ*jti4uch as cruise missiles. The second unit of thc Kirov-class guided-mlsslle cruiser has entered theof battle. Thetandoff ASW weapon system Is absent from unit two. and theas augmented thchird unit began

constructione believe four units will be built by the. Tlie first unit of tbe Slava-class euided-missile cruiser Is operational, two others continue to fit out slowly in the Black Sea,ourth may be under construction at Nikolayov.the Kiev and Kirov classes, Slavs does notthe Soviets* newest weapons and sensors except for theystem. These ships may be intended primarily for operations In tlte eastern Mediterranean and the Sea of Japan against Western high-value units. The Sovremennyy- and Udaloy-class guided-mlssilc destroyer construct ion programs remain active. TheSovremennyy is equipped with thoupersonic, sca-skimmlng cruise missile, ahelicopter, and twom guns. Four of these antburfaoe warfare ships are operational and six others are under construction The Udaloy class, slightly larger than Sovremennyy, Is primarily an antisubmarine warfare ship It Is equipped with Kirov-type bow-mounted and variable-depth sonars,tandoff ASW weapons, and has the capability to embark two Helix ASW helicopters. Udaloy-classxpected to reachnits before ending in the. As noted, most of these major surface combatants carry antbhip missiles with conventional and nuclear capabilities and rangesilometers. This surface-to-surface missile arsenalormidable standoff antisur-face warfare strike capabilityurface force traditionally lacking effective air cover. Except foresign Grisha class, there are no frigates under construction for tho Soviet Navy. Productionlass based on the standard Krivak bull, designated Krivak III. is under way at Kerch, but these ships wiU be KGB subordinated. The KGB Maritime Border Guard in the Pacific received tbe first of these units Ine are not surehip is largerivak Is assigned to the KGB; however, historically, thishas had responsibilities In coastal ASW, and the Krivaks could serve as command ships for suchTheir sire also allows them to participate in Use protection of theautlcal-mlle expanded economic zone. Figurehows five of tbe seven major surface combatants currently under

mphibious Forces. Amphibious forces in the Soviet Navy have lower priority lhan lhe submarine, air, and surface combatant programs. No new large amphibious ships have been produced since tlie second unit of the Ivan Rogov-class LPD was completedonstruction of LSTs for the Soviet Navy lias continued in Poland,ew, large LST class may be planned. The Soviets continue to pursue an active

piogiam (ot the development and production ol ait-cushion vehicles. At leastnits arc in service and construction ol two distinct classes is continuing. In addition, the threeing-in ground vehicle lacing developed in the Caspian Sea are probably naval subordinated While such units couldide range of mantime applications because of their high speed and load capabilities^

^use in amphibious warfare is the most likely mission. The Soviet Naval Infantry (SNI)9 hasubstantial reorganization and an equipment modernization program. All three SNI regiments in the Western Fleets have expanded to brigades, and combat support units have been added to the Pacific Ocean Fleet division. Manning has increased0 to0 troops. Tne introduction of aitlllery and anti tank battalions as well as new equipment such as2 tankmm automatic mortar has Increased SNI'i organicCurrently, tbo Soviet Navy doea not have sufficient lift capacity to accommodate all ot" tbc SNL The Soviet merchant Beet is. however, the most militarily adaptable In the world. Combiningships with merchant roll-on/roll-off ships (Ro/Ros) and barge carriers (as has been seen inhe entire SNI and more than three motorized riflecould theoretically be lifted. Same ground force units routinely train for amphibious assault landings or. more commonly, as foOowup forces

mell Combatant, and Mine Warfare Unite. Tbe Soviets continue to regard small surfaceand in ine warfare units as important elements of tjjrirhJavy. Those units are particularly useful in tbe confined waters of the Baltic and Black Seas, but they are also assigned important roles In the echeloned defense of Soviet territory anderating areas in the Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleet areas. Small surface combatantseries production include the Nanuchka and Tarantul guided-missile patrol combalants, equipped primarily for entbhlpand the Pauk (seend Muravey patrol boats, whose major role Is ASW. Mine warfare units In production Include the Sonya-class minesweeper and the Natya (now built for export only) The Soviets also are continuing toelicopter mine counter-measuresarge number of these navaladdition to most principal surface combat-fSte-ervd ali combatalso capable of minetaying.

cpteniihmant Shins. Construction of logistic support ships li sporadic and alsoower priority

than that ol surface combatants and submarines. The most important unit built in recent years Is thetoo multipurpose replenisluaent ship completedo further units of thb tumtt have been built, nor are any other underwayships known to be under construction. The number of naval logistic support ships capable of transferring strategic and tactical missiles toremains small The generally low priorityreplenishment ships probably is linked with several aspects of Soviet naval practice andeavy reliance on merchant tankers to support naval operations, the Intention to operate many naval units relatively close to Soviet territory,elief that thenlikely to be so rxokxiged that replenishment at sea would affect lb outcome The Soviets also prefer to Improve thenability of their naval combatants by increased capacities In the units themselves rather than by emphatiling theol auxiliary vessels Thus, new-corsstructioo surface combatants such as the Kirov and Slavsfeatures such as greater endurance (Irsdudirrg nuclear power on the Kirov class) and larger missile loads.

ther Maritime Suppoeling ForcesFishing, Intelligence, Research, andhe Soviet Union operates -elldeveloped maritime supporting forces integral to Moscow's concept of seapowcr. Those forces have an Important role In furthering Soviet naval objectives through intelligence collection, logistic support to naval lorces, andIn naval exercises and operations. Additionally, their daily presence on all the world's oceans msder-soores Moscow's claimajor maritime power, and their generally tinrestrieted access lo world ports prr/vides another means for spreading Soviet uxflueoce-The Soviet merchant Beet, withessels. Is among die largest commercial fleets In the world. In peacetime the merchant Beet provides logistic support to deployed naval forces. Replenishment (primarily fueD of Soviet naval units deployed out of are* is commonplace, and the use of merchant vessels In this role rxnnits Moscow to use littoral ports aslogistic bases. Most tankers and cargo ships are not suitable for operations in contested waters during combat because tliey are not fitted for underway replenishment. Nevertheless. Soviet merchant ships generally Incorporate other design features thattheir nuutary utility. Eaercises indicate the Soviet merchant Beet has an important wartime role as Boating, dispersed logistic bases (including in the marginal ice rone of the Arctic) and Bo/Bo ships in


Figure 20

Pauk Palrol Combatant

inrla sillied

support of amphibious operations. Recent evidence suggests tne Soviet* have operimented with using Ro/Ro ships as VTOL aircraft carriers, and we believe they probably will develop the capability to modify, as required, al least some Ro/Ros fo. VTOL operations The Soviet fishingy far the worlds largest with0 oceangoing ships registering moreillion torn These vessels operate worldwide and provide ancillary support to theintelligence collection Thc mililarv adaptability of the fashing fleet, white less than that of the merchant fleet, is diverse and includes replenishment and mineThe Soviet Navy's intelligence collection ships (ACuJ. somen number, monitor and reporton Western naval forces" locations, lactam, charactertsl ics, and capabilities, ACb routinely patrol In the vicinity of Western SSBN bases lo provide information on movements and to collect signals and acoustic intelligencehe initial Babamelass unil, the fits) ACI built from the keel up at an intelligence collncior. was completed. The second is now operationalhird will be5 Thi Soviet research fleet, large, lhan thc rest of the world-

combined. Includes overivilianaval oceangoing ships, which conduct research of actual or potential military value Information so gathered con tributes lo tbe Soviets' inaeaamgly precise knowledge cf the oceans and helps enable the Navy make opti-mum use of its weapons, seniors, and platforms as -ell as facilitating naval planning Four new classes of research ship have been introduced into the civilian Ot-ctnd eight more shipt,arc under construction or on otder. The KCB Maritime Border Cuardoaital defense force ofen andhips, primarily patrol craft such as lhe Crisha III and Pauk classes In wartime the KCB feet would be subordinate to the Navy and continue Us role of patrdlarag coastal waters: it can function tn both the ASW and anltship roles,n the Baltic and Black Seas The Soviet commitment to maritime supporting forces is not expected lo diminish during the period ol thiiaass^

J. Trends in Naval Exorcises




e believe Soviet naval exercises vrill continue to be corvdocted within the framework of theater requirements lo enhance and refine combined-arms/ joint operations effectiveness. Tlie maritime emphasis in these exercise* will center on survival of strategic forces and command, control, and rommunicatioos systems through dispersal, deployment, and layered defense; destruction of hostile forces entering sea denial areas; and support of ground force operations. Tbe continued Western threat to Soviet SSBNs will ensure substantial emphasis on ASW, bat tbeof US land attack cruise missiles will cause modifications in "defense of tho Iwmeland" doctrine. Platforms carryhese mini lea probably will be ensued outside their maximum bunch ranges. Future Soviet naval exercises, thereiore. probably will be conducted at increasingly greater distances from home waters, especially as new platforms such as the CTOL carrier, Kirov-classtass SSCNsula-class SSNs are fully Integrated Into tbe Beet

K, Command, Control, and Communications

he Soviet Navy depends heavilymoothly functioning, reliable command, control, and communications system for its effectiveness In combat. The extent to which tho Navy will achieve Itscontrol, and communications goab (and, hence, its combat objectives) will be determined by the operational skill of Soviet naval com minders as much as by any combination of technical capabilities and organ Ira tlonal details. Tlie Soviet style of command and control is dramatically differ cot from that of the United States. Russian heritage. Marxist tocology, and Soviet wartime experience have convinced Moscow's military pbumers that they musterious scientific approach to wartime command, control, and communications While tbc US planner is Inclined to doubt that theory will everractical military problem, his Soviet counterpart Is taught thatothing more practical than goodecent series of articles on the theory of the navy. In the

Soviel Journal Idorskov Sbornlk,ood example ol bow these convictions affect thc professional issue: which any world navy must address. This discussiontreatmentelated theory of command, control, and communications. Itselfycar national effort to improve theof Soviet combat forces by refining their theoretical understanding of command, control, and communications.

command, control, andcurrentlyecade lead over thein applying their work to practicalthey appear to have developedrelatively sophisticated techniques forcontribution of command, control, andsystems In practical military terms.significantly enhance tbe Sovietto;

more rational commaivd, control, and

communlcatioiu systems that can function smoothly In combined-arms operations.

Use these systems more effectively in combat

Plan better counterrrreasures to US military systems.

The resultsoviet naval command, control and communications system that, with regard to strategic forces, mdudes higldy centralized VCK control of the use of strategic weapon systems (that is, targeting and launching) and decentralized fleet' control of other aspects of strategic force operations (for example, allocation -of platforms to specific operatingperations of Soviet general purpose naval forces are usually under decentralized control by fleet

decision latitude afforded most Sovietpurpose force commanders, combined withpenchantcientific approach,to use rnathematical models of combat inand execution of wartime plans. Thbdifferent from the US approach todecisionmaking, which relies heavily uponattributes of thc commander. The efficacySoviet Navy's approach Is limitedumberfactors including the availability ofcomputers ondcomputer communications networksJT


Potentially, the use of computer-aided decision support systems offers significant Improvements in the quality and timeliness of naval command and control. Because these systems are intended to ensure that thc commander considers all relevant factors fn reaching an acceptable decision within the context of thc overall plan, the net effect could be to Improve the general Quality of combat decisions. There also Is reason to expect that these systems will improve the tlmdlness with which Soviet naval commanders can plan combat operations and respond to changes during the Implementation of those plans. Although the Soviet approach apparently requires the conimander toa computer In his combat planning andwe cannot predict his behavior using our limited knowledge of his models.

Besides decision quality and timeliness, the designers of Soviet naval command, control andsystems place heavy emphasis upon achieving their greatest possible "combathaving high confidence that forces can be controlled regardless of enemy actions. They expect the United States to attempt to disrupt their control from tlie outset of hostilities through concerted attacks,and deception efforts. They believeof effective command, control andespecially relative to their SSBN force, couldecisive factoreneral war. Soviet designers divide combat stability into three broad categories: survivability, jam resistance, and reliability. Trends In the Soviet Navy's corrunand, control, andsystems reflect years of Integrated planning to achieve gradual improvements In combat stability. The current structure of this system Incl udes features such as:

The continued construction of bunkeredposts at echelons ranging from the Main Naval Staff to flotillas.

Installation of hardened antennas at some of these sites and construction of new very-low-frequency (VLF) communications facilities.

Expansion of the single extremely-low-frequency (ELF) communications facility.

The availability of large numbers of(HF) communications vans at tlieand fleet levels to augment communications and support field-deployed command posts.

a variety o( naval ships wiihcapabilities that provide for flexible seaborne command and control

modification of submarines forrelay. Threelass ballistic

have been modifier] for such use. Further, we believe the Soviets are interested in developing submarine command posts.

development of airborne naval command posts. The first suchodifiedoot, was Identified



DevelopmentodifiedearLF communications relay platfonn forsupport

Development and use of new and sophisticated communications that offer Increased efficiency, relUbility, and security.

Improvement In the survivability and capacity of existing HF irott'latioos.

use of automation to improve tho "efficiency of command and control

L. Soviel Ocean Surveillance

oviet ocean surveillance Is designed to provide Information primarily on the location, identity, and movements of foreign naval surface forces, especially thosehreat to the Soviet homeland or forces. Ib most important elements are land-based SIC1NT stations, space-based ELI NT and radar satellites, ACIs. and reconnaissance aircraft Ships of the merchant and fishing fleets also can be tasked to conductRecent improvements Include:

of land-based SIGINT stations in Vietnam. South Yemen, and Madagascar.

of tbe third and probably last unit of tbe Soviet Navy's largest and most capable ACI class, the Balram. Two units of thb class are in service.

An increase in the number of naval units capable of receiving targeting data directly from

The use of manned spacecraft for ocean reconnabsance.

Continued access to and expanding use of foreignCuba, Angola. Ethiopia, SouthVietnam, Libya, andSoviet naval ait reconnaissance operations. v

Such improvements have reinforced the Soviets' major ocean survdlhuveeability to detect and Identify surface ships, especially aircraft carriers, in the maritime approaches to the Soviet Union.probability against surface ships can still bo reduced by Western cover and deception techniques such as emission control (EMCON)INT collection. Radar satellites are also limited by weather and by the difijculty of identifying contacts.

la neat-real-time Imaging satellite system, which ooulaignificant contribution to Moscow's ocean surveillance capabilities byport areas to provide real-time intelligence on tho arrival and departure of Western naval fences. This new pbooMeconnatssance system probably willoperational in the..


surveillance systemsIt

is doubtful that such* systems could improve "Dieir satellite surveillance capability much before tbe. In any event, the Soviets' major surveillance weakness wiU remain their lack of any significant capability to detect deployed submarines, especially In open-ocean areas such as the central Atlantic and Pacific.

M. Rodioelectronic Combat

he operations of Soviet naval forces and the design of their electronic equipment are deeplyby the Soviet concept of radicclectroolc combat (REC) This concept emphasizes the importance of both denying the enemy the use of hb electronic systems and of protecting Soviet systems fromThe REC concept applies equally to sensors and to command, control, and communications systems. Thb concept has broader application than the Western notion of electronic warfare (EW) and includesintegrated use of:

Attacks on enemy dectronie emitters.

Emission control.


Mullocnwii integration

Redundancy of command, control, anil corn-niunioatioru.

electronic countermeasurcs (fa mining)

Passive electronic count ermcasures {chafl>

Deception, to indude decoys.

The prime focus of thii concept ii to ensure that Soviet forces can operate more effectively than tbeir oppo-nentiommon EW environment Ideally, thb vrould bo accomplished by ensuring tbe reliability of Soviet command, control, and communicationsexposed to Itostile EW through jam proofing and redundancy of the Soviets' own equipment, together with offensive EW and covert tactics to degrade enemy electronic systems. Although the Soviets have encountered problems with both REC equipment and training, tbey regard RECundamental principle of modern, electronically depexaoesit warfare and vital to the success of naval operations.


A. Political and Economic Changes

s Soviet leaders formulate tbeir naval plans for tbe period of the, they face major political and economic uncertain ti>ii Tbey view the fluid international situation astrong naval posture, both to protect established Soviet Interests and to exploit situations in which the use of naval forces canoviet influence. Soviet perceptions of Western and Chinese naval improvements and of opportunities for the use of naval forces In tbe Third World are likely to be among lhe arguments for continued qualitative improvement jn Soviet maritime power. On the Oliver hand, problems In the Soviet economy probably will Increase the opportunity costs associated with defense To maintainodest rate of economic growth, the Soviets must allocate more resources to capital investment and improve labor productivity. Tbe competing demands for eco-ivomlc-resources could be reflected in domestic poliri-cal tension, particularlyeriod of leadership transition

terna'ion of Environment. The Soviets view the International arenahifting combination of threats and opportunities likely to last Indefinitely. They will continue to be concerned about the prospect that the United States will augment its defense efforts.

including major improvements in both strategic and general purpose naval forces. They probably do not anticipate any substantial improvement in relations with China and believe that Instability Is likely to persist In border areas such as Iran and Poland. Tbey probably will continue to view the Third World as fertile ground for the expansion of Soviet Influence and will align themselves selectively with states and insurgent movements In that area. On the whole, tbe Soviets' eipectatlons regarding internationalprobably will support their traditional belief In the value of military powerornerstone of foreign policy. Such expectations probably will favor the continued development of Soviet naval power, for both Its nuclear and conventional wartime value and for Its peacetime role In promoting the imago of the Soviet Unionlobal power and projecting power and influence In distant areas.

Economic EnnVonment. Soviet leaders in theill probably be operating In an environment characterized by increasing economic resource constraint! Poor agriculturallower increase In Laborow rate of CNP growth, labor shortages, and shortfalb In energy production will require tougher choices amongInvestment, and consumption. We projectercent annual average growth In CNPe believe defense spending will grow at about the same rate over the period, and the defense burden will remain at aboutercent of GNP. Tbe regime can, however, determine to an important degree how GNP is distributed. Tbc defense share, for Instance, could be varied fromoercent, albeit with serious implications for economic growth In. We believe the Soviets wiU seek to contlouo tbe policy of tho pastears of balanced and large-scale force development. Even so, any competition among tbe services for resource allocations probably will Increase, and the flow of at least some new weapons Into the stock of Soviet military equipment probably will not be as rapid as In previous decades. An accelerated hbdvtechnology arms race with the United States, such as in space-based strategic defensive systems, could have severe implications for procurement of traditional military equipment and for long-termeconomic growth.

The Soviet Navy's case for justifying Its share of resource allocation is likely to include arguments based primarily on its evolving roteATO-Warsaw Pactneed torowing Western naval threat to Pact territory and forces and to improve the Soviet Navy's capability to strike the


States and its alllc* Naval prociams wiQ also be supported in terms of thoir contribution to the USSR's capability to defend and expand Soviet^ the Third World during- peacetime and limited war situations, but any programs that cannot be solidly defended as essential to tho NATO-Pact scenario are likely to be more susceptible to pruning.

oic Political EnoironmenL It isthat Konstanlin Cbemenko will be in office beyond this decade His departure might resulttruggle for power that could be reflected In defense policies. It is not possible to predict tbe nature and timing ol changes In military policy that could result from changes in national leadership, particularly because Chernenko's immediate successor could well beew generation of loaders.parsethe attitude toward defense of the younger, leading contenders In the succession. Insofar as such inforrnation exists. It suggests they would conrlrrue totrong emphasis on military spending. We have no specific Information on their attitude corrceraing naval issues. During any succession period, variations in policy could occur. It would, however, be difficult to change basic prioritiesew leader could consolidate power. During the Jockeying for power, the defense effort probably would not beedirectcd. Few aspirants for leadership would risk antaconiring the military or placing themselvesosition to be accused of selling defense short Once power Is consolidated, however, severe eorxtsrstrslccould contribute to sharp changes In theof the Soviet dofense effort such as those that took place-opder Khrushchev.

uring tlie same period of transition in tho Soviet political hierarchy there will also be changes in the leadership of the Soviet Navy. Fleet Admiral Chcmavin, Chief of the Main Naval Staff, seems most likely to succeed Admiral Corshkov. Whoever stains the topnlikely to acquire Immediately the high degree of authority lhat items from Corshkov's continuity as commander of the Soviet Navy& The viewsew leader, however, are likely to have been affectedifferent operational background- Although any such officer probably will have had experienceeet commander and will thereby have become familiar with ail types of naval platforrrurand operations,ossible that be will favor some shifts in emphasis In Soviet naval programs and policies.nlikely, however, that theor Individual backgroundsew Soviet naval leadership would cause major near-term changes in

the strategy and prograrru underlying the Navy's role in Soviel military strategy.

B. Key issues Facing Soviet Nerval

rotection end Um aj the SSBN Force, Tbe ability to deploy and rxoteet the SSBN force in preparation for and participation in strategic and theater strike operations will continue to be tho^Hngle most important task of the Soviet Navy thtrsughout the period of thb Estimate. Although sea-launched cruise missiles will expand the number of potential naval strategic platforms, tlie bulk of the Soviet Navy's strategic capabilities will remain in the SSBN form We expect this force to be further modernized and upgraded through the continued productionV-eJass units and the introductionew SSBN by the. By the, Tyrftooo- and Debus SSBNs wiU have largely re-placedass force, resulting Ire

A substantial increase in the number of sea-based strategic warheads because, for example,lass SSBN carries onlyarheads while one Typhoon carriesissiles, which.

A less vulnerable SSBN force because almost all units could strike targets In the ooolineotalStates from within tbe Arctic Icecap and/or from borne waters and someD-IVs (seendbe Quieter.

A significant increase In strike capability with deployment of thend Later thendollow-onmall number of SLBMs couldard-target


hc si/.oof tlieice inould be affected by the status of East-West arms limitation agreements and developments In strategic offensive and defensive technology. If theimitodem submarine launch tubes remains In effect, the number of SSBNs would decline somewhat inlass units would have to be retiredore than one-for-ooe basis to compensate for the greater number of tubes carried by tbc Typhoon SSBNs. In the absence of arms urn! tattoo resttictiorrs. wc believe the Soviets would increase the size of the SSBN force along with Increases in the rest of thelr strategic arsenal. Whether or not the Soviets continue to abide by arms control restrictions, evidence on their


force peoerainj suggests they will doc dgnifi cantly alter Use proportion of the overall stialcex-arsenal assigned to SSBNs in.ossible the Soviets could put crealer reliance on SSBNs. however3ii'T

Their concern for the survivability of silo-based ICBMs, because of Improved capabilities InUS foices, causes them to rely inore on mobileICBMs andwe anticipate.

Thevetter hard-target kill capability lor MlllVed SLBMs than we anticipate, and thus depend more on SLBMs for targeting ICBM silos.

n tbe other hand, tbe Soviets would probably reduce lhe number of SLBM launchers if arms control negotiations resultedreaty requiring substantial cuts In lite Overall strategic arsenal While we cannot predict whether tbe Soviets would reduce their SLBM force more than their ICBM force, SLBM reductions could be more severe if:

The Soviets perceive that US ASW capabilities are so good that Soviet efforts to protect tbeir SSBNs cannot keep up with US advances, and their SSBN force would thus become increasingly vuljv-rable.

The Soviets continue to rely on ICBMs alone for hard-target capabilities, and thus reduce the ICBM force proportionally leu than other force elements.

Tlse SovieU conclude that they can provide adequate enough strategic force survivability through their mobile ICBMaugmented with ABMreduce tbeir dependence oo SSBNs for survivability.

e believe that the SovieU will .continue to regard their SSBN force as vulnerable lo enemy ASW forces through. In this time frame, the SSBN force will consist primarily of older IIlass


, Y-Uss units will compose ovci three-fourths of (be forte,lass units will still constitute well over half of tne force. The peicuved requirement lo protect ind support these SSBlffunlikely lo chance Typhoon and follow-on SSBNs will be quieter'. and thus less vulnerable to acoustic detection Nevertheless,nlikely that the Soviets will regard them as capable of ensuring their own fuivivablllly. Tbe Soviets probably foresee no slackening In Western interest In ASW and expect ihat the positive effects of their quietingwill be at least partially negated byin Western ASW capabilities. Moreover, the Soviets' concept of SSBNased on their apparent judgment tliat all submarines are inherently vulnerable to ASW prosecution, particularly as tbey exit and enter port. If they are not protected by friendly forces. The Soviets, dsereforc, do not regard SSBN vulnerabilityhort-term problem that will disappear as new, quieter classeseduced. Tbe requirement to protect and support SSBNs will thus remain an integral port of the strategic strike mission and the most important Initial wartime taskarge portion of Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleet general purpose forces through the remainder of the century.

e expect thatnd the proiected new class SSBNs would be deployed In wartime primarily in "bastions" close to Soviet territory or under ice in the Arctic. Otber measures to decrease the vulnerability of Soviet SSBNs could Include:

Further Improvement to the ELF cocamunlca-uaVns" system for more reliable communications with SSBNs at patrol depth or under Ice.

Sheltering of some SSBNi In tunnels. Q


tunnel complexes under construction atand Pacific Ocean Fleet SSBN bases which could provide concealment and somafrom nuclear weapons effects for anumber of SSBNs. although protected units could be blocked in thc tunnels by accurate missile strikes.

Wider deployment of self-defense surface-to-air rnisslle systems and decoys capable of being launched from submerged submarines.

Moderate success in broad area search.

"jspaecborneBy theystem could assist in protecting SSBN bastions

against encroaching US SSNs operating aldepths Extensive success in thb or other ASW programs would have more far-reaching implieatioru. which are covered later in this Estimate {see "Alternate Courses ofASW Breakthrough").

Possible inst*Hation of towed passive acoustic sonars to enhance ASW self-protection on die newest SSBNs.

lthoughnlikely, the Soviets might choose toew Typhoons to open-ocean areas In southern latitudes Tbe Soviets ought use such open-ocean deployments to complicate (he USproblem by requiring ASW forces lo conduct open-ocean search In vast areas where SOS USis limited. Thb could Increase the survivability of SSBNs in bastions by dispersing enemy ASW forces. Notwithstanding thb pot entail benefit, theof deploying SSBNs to distant areas would make thb an unlikely option for wartime cleploymejst. In particular, the transit through potentially enemy-con-liolled waters argues strongly ogalnft Typhoonto southern latitudes.

e do not believe that likely changes In Soviet SLBM capabilities or In Soviet perceptions of NATO's ASWll lead lo supaiheant changes in the way Soviet SLBMs would be employed Inubstantial number of SLBMs probably would still be withheld from tbe initial strategic nuclear exchange for subsequent strikes andesidual force. Ono consequence ofithholding policyeed to sustain SSBN protection operations during the nuclear as well as tlie conventional pi use of liabilities. Use greater endurance features evident In tbe Soviets' new general purpose foices will be useful In this task.

be Soviets will probably continue to allocate SLBMs for initial strike operations against soft targets in the United States.ndLBMs launchedlass units andLBMs from Typhoons would assume more of tbe Soviet Navy's initial strike role in thc near termlass SSBNs are retired, converted, or dedicated to theater roles. The Navy's ability to participate In counlerforce strikes will be enhanced considerably if the accuraoy ofmproved to the point where they would be effective against hardened targets such, as ICBM silos-All agencies agree thai the Sovietsigh priority oo achieving Improved accuracy for the SLBMs planned for testing in the middle andnd that thb could not be achieved hy improvements In

current guidance systems. The technologies (or achiev-inc (his include both radio update and MaRVi that use terminal guidance The SovieU will probably adopt one or pajsaMy both of these concepts, butare diBerent mirrpretations of the available data. Oneolds that, by the, the Soviets will have the capability to deploy warheads for theoi low-on which, using an eitemal update to Its guidance system, will achieve an accuracy ofeters. Additionally. In tho, they could begin deploymentaRV systemeter CEP. Another view' holds that thc SovieU are considering the development andof an accuracy MaRV for future SLBM systems. The MaRV. If Gelded, however, would Dot bafor dersloyment before at least the. Furthermore, the first-genera boo Soviet MaRVwould not achieve the full potential accuracy ofeters. AD agencies believe that, despite the Increased utility for Initial nuclear strikesard-target capability could provide, many such SLBMs, If deployed, would probably still be withheld front tho initial exchanges for use in subsequent strikes oresidual fotoe.

Soviet Naval Land Attack Cruise MUrilet. The Soviet Navy Ls developing two tea-launched land attack cruise missiles. One, designateds similar to the US Tomahawk, and the other.arger, mpersoriic missile. If deployed with terrain-matching guidance, both systems couldard-target capability.'

Thes tapected tot is compatible with standardcm torrxdo^bes, although some minor mcdificatjoa to theecessary. We believe thes now capable of carryinguclear warhead and has some form of position update navigationerrain matching system. With this system, accuracieseters are possible. It is assessed toaximum range ofilometers at subsonic speeds.

We believe that the primary application of theill beubmarinelaunclted weapon for nuclear .strikes against theater targets, butrobably will also be used during initial strikes against targeU in the continental United States We believe the initial deployment will be onH submarines A

Tie Maw ef ran Mr* ant tie Dtrersar, Oefmmaa*fXrarta* uf Naval hlrBtermn. DwuatimmllAr


xOaVr ol iMioOoxUrI.KI.W. Cent'at Jafanigntar Agency.

speciallyII has been used for live at-sea tests of thes are equipped with suitably advanced communications and navigation systems but would need additional fire controlto support the depkryrnerst of thehere are currentlydsls In the Soviet op^ri tlonsl inventory.ossibleew could begin opera-rjooaJ deployment with the missilei the SovieU do not deploy theUs, iu deployment will be extremely limited for several years because tlie other candidate SSNs will bo available only In small numbers. Four new classes of SSNs are candidates to carryAkula,SBN. designatedlass.

be Soviets probably have at least two options for allocatingo their candidate SSNs. One way would be to deploy some SLCMs on many such units. This would not only add considerable flexibility to the submarine force in carrying out nuclear missions but also complicate Western defensive problems by converting an increasing number of Soviet submarines into land attack platforms. One drawback to this mode of deployment wouldorresponding reduction In the number of ASW and ASUW weapons that could be carried by SLCM-armed submarines, lessening capabilities in these mission areas Tbe Soviets, on the other hand, could deploy large numbers ofew modem SSNs dedicated to fhe kind attack mission. ThU would ease command and control of these strategic weapons and allow the bulk of the modem SSNs to remain dedicated to ASW andajor drawback to this option would be thc comparatively reduced strategic strike potential of the SI-CM force Further, it would create particularly high-value strategic weapons platforms, which, like SSBNs. would be considered vulnerable to Western ASW effortsSSNs carryingewprobably require protection by other forces. We do not know which option the SovieU might choose in allocatingo their modern SSNs Although the missile could also be Installed in older classes of attack submarines, we believe it less likely because these submarines are required forASW and ASUW tasks, and some ofparticularly the diesel-elexrtricnot have sufficient command, control, and communicationsor space for necessary additional fire control and navigation systems. Finally.ossible that patrolling SSBNs might also carry theo Increase their strategic strike potential. ThU would require,eduction In the number of their torpedoes.

c do not knowoviets >ieersion of theonouclear warboad-C



armed with nonnucloar warheads would be useful against theater targets (such as US SOS US facilities) and for attacks on Iceland, the United Kioadom. Spain, the Philippines, Guam, and other insportani targets that would be difficult to reach and costly to attack with Soviet land-based aircraft. Non-nuclear -armed SLCMs could be employed on current attack submarines with fife control system modification Such deployment, however, would Involve somefor general purpose submarines, reducing their capability to perform traditional aatlship andtasks because:

Eacharried willoe-for-one reduction in the number of torpedoes carried.

In some Instances the operating areas required lor land attack cruise missile launches would differ considerably from those required forASW and antssbip operation -

he Soviets may abo be considering placingn some of their principal surface combatants.

"^Surface-launchedrobably would be limited to strikes against theater targets, although occasjonal peacetime deployments of SLCM-armed surface combatants off the US coasts (for example, to Cuba) might be viewed by the Soviets as having significant political value

he Soviets areecond family of long-range, land attack naval cruise

1 J

^ The SS-

robably will first become ope rational on thelass SSCN6 and liter be deployedew cbaa of SSCN not vet caSserved We have no dn eel evidence, but believe the mission ol theill probably include coverage cf both US and theater targets.

ne further aspect of Soviet SLCM deployment will be as an 'analogous response" to NATO INF modernization Inhen FirstAndropov promised "corresponding Sovietwill be deployed In ocean areas" and their "characteristics will be adequate to the threat

n the Soviets havethe firstpatrob In the western Atlantic and eastern Pacific in addition tolasx patrob closer lo US shores mote frequently. Thesealmost certainly represent part of Moscow's interim sea-based "analogousiass deployments could not be ma Inclined near US coasts beyond about7 without adversely affecting force readiness. Forward deploymentlsss SSBNs indefinitely also is unlikely because of the Increased vulnerability of the platforms to US ASW forces. Moreover, warningot truly "artakagcea" since flight time ofissUes from these SSBNs to US4 minutes or more because depressedot an available option. Hence, while the Soviets couldlass presence for primarily political reasons, we believe these SSBNs will eventually be withdrawn. We expect the Soviets will begin deployment ofI -ecnupped SSNs off US coastsime of flight of theo likely targets closely approximates that of tbc US CLCM deployed in Europe. When operational, we believe thebo will be deployed near US coasts augmenting, or perhaps replacing, continuousatrols. Patrob by SLCM submarines could eventuallylass SSBN patrob In the western Atlantic and eastern Pacific. In Soviet eyes, such SLCM patrob could offer the potential dividend of forcing the United States to Invest in an expanded early warning/air defease system to counter the new threat. In any event, we believe ft highly likely that SLCM patrob within range of US targets willermanent feature of the Soviet strategic posture within the next Iwo yean.

he successful development and deployment ofndoubtedly an Item of high Interest to the Soviel national leadership as well as tbe navalBy giving the Soviet Navy yet another family of

nuclcar-capable land attack sy.tcms, SLCMs could increase tbe nature and utility ol the Navy within the Soviet military/political establishment androulL in tbe provision of additional assets toLCM-carrying units. When deployed, they willew dimension to Soviet Navyand will complicate tho defensive tasks offorces. At the same tunc. SLCMseapon system with significant potential political value lo the Soviet leadership In future arms limitationsIn fact. It Is conceivable tbe Soviets perceive SLCMs partlyargaining chip for US nuclear land attack cruise missiles On the other band, tbe Soviets probably recognize that proliferation of SLCMs could alsofgrutteant Impediment to future arms-control agreements since It would be virtually Impossible to verify which lubmarines were strategic arms carriers.

trategic ASW Atalnit Ballhtic and land Attack Cruise Mittile Submarines- Tbc Soviets rec-ognlte that their strategic ASW task will become not only more important hut Increasingly difficult during. During thb period they almost certainty expect:

Longer range SLBMs to enter service In the US, French, and British Navies The US/UK Tridentkmor example, will greatly Increase the ocean areas from which such missiles can strike Soviet territory (see.

Western SLBMs such as Use US Tridento achieve sufficient accuracy for use against hard targets.

V^steru general purpose submarines to be armed with long-range, nuclear land attack cruisesuch as the US Tomahawk.

Western programs to improve SSBN survivability through noise reduction, mote reliableand better sensors.

China's first SSBN lo enter service

e expect that the Soviets will seek to improve the ASW capability of thoir submarines, surface ships, and aircraft in several ways, especially:

Improved sonar systems, most notably better towed passive arrays, low-frequency scnobuoy fferterhs. and associated signal-processing

Increased emphasis on quieting of all attack submarine classes.

Development ol airborne and suace based non-acoustic sensors.

Such efforts probably will significantly improve the Soviets' capability to conduct ASW in relatively small areas. Tbey could, therefore, be vitally important for the protection of Soviet SSBN bastions againstby Western SSNs. Such Improvements also could enhance tbc capability of Soviet SSNs to detectSSBNs as they exit tbeir bases or pass through choke points.esult, operations againstparticularly rsoo-USIncrease tn the. We do not believe, however, that ruch efforts will substantially Improve the Soviet capability to counter Western SSBNs effectively because none of them arc likely to solve the Soviet Navy's majorInability to detect and track SSBNs in open-ocean areas.

e estimate the Soviets wtQ continue to seeketection capability through the development of sensors whose range or search rate can cover broad ocean areas. We do not believe the Soviets will seek to deploy fixed passive arrays similar to Ihe US SOS US system In Western SSBN operating areas because of the large number of arrays needed to have achance of detecting SSBNsrobable re-qtnrement for several shore facilities in Third World countries to serve as Initial processing points (or the data. Approaches which tbe Soviets may explore in developingapability Include:

Aircraftpace-based system relying on non-acoustic sensors. To bo effective,ystem would have to be able to cover broad ocean areas rapidly aad to relay detection data both to shore facilities and ASW platforms. The develop men! ofystem wouldogical evolution of current Soviet use of satellites lo monitoring the activity of Western surface units. We areabout the energetic Soviet effort toa capability to remotely sense submarine-generated effects from aircraft or spacecraft Although wc continue to improve ourof tbe nature oi the overall Soviet cSort

remain important uncertainlios about tne full extent and direction of the Soviet program. Even If the research effort were to yield an exploitable phenomenon within the next year, funds for engineering development wereallocated, and development proceeded without difficulty,ully operational system could not be In place before thc-


Figure 22

Soviet Navy's View of Potential Search Areas for Iu ASW Operalif



ll^lLrlVoscttce, upper nght; Trident CM Western StSMi wtth lonfiC. ran0es. tPolsrls.


Tho US. Navy by the Yea* joco-

Programs to analyze passively lhe Iow-freqdency acoustic spectrum, which probably will enable the Soviets to detect submarine noise signatures over greater distances.

"future towed arrays, which we project for Initial deployment by the; will

have higher search ratesombination of longer detection range and higher speed If deployed in Urge numbers, ruch as on hundredsresearch shipsrtelllgence collect art, these arrays could theoretically provide initialof older Western SSBNs The arrays,probably would not be effective against the quieter Ohio-class SSBNs, and their capability against even (he older Western SSBNs while patrolling would be very limited. In addition, tactical and technical countermeaiures could(educe the vulnerability of older classes.

The development and deploymentow-frequency, active sonar opctatlngHz.ystem has the potendal for monitoring large ocean areas and detecting patrolling SSBNs Although Soviet research efforts In this area are extensive,ystem Is unlikely to be fielded before the.

c do not believe thereealistic possibility the Soviets can deploy inystem that could reliably detect and track US SSBNs operating in the open ocean. For this reason, we aspect that tho Soviet Navy will continue to focus Its anti-SSBN efforts on attempting to detect and attack Western SSBNs as they esit their bases ot pass through choke points. If. however, through tome technological breakthrough tho Soviets were able to detect Western SSBNs In the open ocean, they would thenew problem of how to attack them. Such attacks might be conducted by the traditional techriique of deploying surface, submarine, and/or air units to the datum Thiswould require thai the Soviets deploy larger numbers of general purpose naval units at greater distances from Soviet territory than Is currentlyIn addition to attack submarines, thesemight involve surface combatants, including carrier battle groups. ASW aircraft operating from Third World airfields could cover at least some SSBN operating areas if access rights were granted and the host country were willing to risk Decerning aUnless thereubstantial Increase In the size of thc Soviet Navy or the detection brealthrough enabled lhe Soviets to provide SSBNs protection with fewer general purpose units,hange In naval wartime deployments would require sacrificing much of tlic^ipibtlity to protect the SSBN bastions.

he Soviet Navy's strategic ASW problem will be further complicated bv the United Slates* plan to arm its newest classes ofhe land attack version of tho

Tomahawk SLCM. Although there are plansonventional variant, the Soviets are undoubtedly most concerned with the strategic Implications of nuclear-tipped SLCMs Tlse employment of. such SLCMs will complicate tbe Soviel ASW problem In two ways:

The number of US strategic-missile-Bringwill triple

Tlie range of tlie nuclear Tomahawk will allow StiZM-aruied submarines to strike Sovietfrom areas where it will be difficult for the Soviets to concentrate ASW forces..

uch of the defensive requirement against Tomahawk-armed submarines would coincide with and overther ASW efforts aga inst Western units within Soviet sea control/sea denial areas. To reach targets deep within the USSB from tlie Norwegian Sea or Northwest Pad Be. for example. Tomahawk-armed submarines would have to approach Soviel territory. In doing so they would pass through at least some of the echeloned ASW defenses tha Soviets wouldlo protect their SSBNs. Some targets near the Soviet coast, on the other hand, could be reached by SLCMs fired from the outer edges of the Northern and Padfie Ocean Fleets' defensive thresholds. SLCM-armed submarines operating In these areas would be able to avoid the bulk of the Soviet ASW defenses In the Norwegian Sea and Pacific Ocean.

ne option available to the Soviets to counter this tlueat could be to extend the area of sea denial operations, possibly out tohe Soviets probably believeapability to conduct more extended sea denial will largely depend on ibeir abtb'ty lo contest thc air superiority and ASWafforded NATO by carrier and bitd-basod aircraft In areas such asK gap. They probably also believe that their ability to contest such airspace will rseccssitate operations by future surface combatant task groups, including CTOL aircraft carriers, at greater ranges from Soviet territory than currently planned Any extension of tlie area for sea denial operation* therefore will probably be accompaniedor respond ing extension of Initial sea controlpossibly as farilornelcn. This would bo more feasible lor the Northern Fleet than for the Pacific Ocean Fleet Civcn improved air cover from carrier-based aircraft innd/or from captured airfields in Norway, tlte Northern Fl^could shift the focus of Its ASW efforts away from the SSBN bastions in Arctic waters southward toK gap. Control of the gap would both sigriificantly Increase Soviet capabilities to contest Western use of the Norwegian

Figure 23

Soviel View of Tomahawk Threat

beHeve lIUi WuMrauoo. altHough puOtlinM In tn uncMutfiad Soviel naval Journal, accurately re aeon Sovietregardingatalareas lormSrniel caption: "this Is Itow NATO lira led its propose using Toma* ^ggpai


Sea as an SLCM launch area and help protectFleet SSBNs from enemy ASW forces. Access to the Northwest Pacific Basin, on the other hand, is not restricted by any choke points that wouldore forward-oriented ASW strategy. The Soviets, however, probably do not believe that lhe threat from SLCMs would be as groat in the Pacific as in the Norwegian, $oa. They probably eipect that theof US SLCM-armed submarines would be deployed in Irjiropean waters from which the more numerous military and economic targets located in the Western USSR could be engaged.

hawfc fr- surface enipsin.nd omund UurtchersiO.

No. S. ItMO 'Artentton: TomaMotJ* Car* Flrsl Rankodlono*

be Soviets believe subrruririe-burKhed cruise missiles can also reach targets In the western USSR when fired from tha central Mediterranean and North Seas, areas where the Soviets plan sea denial operations against carrier battle groups but probably only limited ASW efforts (see. Countering SLCM swbtna-tlnes in these areas could pose some tough choices for the Soviets Any additional submarines deployed to these areas would lessen force aDocaboru for other missions such as SSBN protection, prosecution ofSSBNs. and interdiction of Western sea lines of communication If the Soviets do opt for Increased ASW efforts In the North ard Medllerranean Snas.

they probably would allocate mote diesel submarines lot barrier patrols In the northern entrance to the North Sea and in the Mediterranean choke points such as Ihe Straits,of Gibraltar and Sicily.

TJie Soviets could ultimately decide lhat Ibe requited allocation of resources and the opportunity costs involved in countering SLCM-armed submarines In their patrol areas wore too costly. Given their limited ASW detection caps hi lit ies, moreover, tbe Soviets probably would be rsessirnistic about their ability to counterCM armed submarines in areas such as the central Mediterranean and the North Sea. even if substantial forces were deployed there. An alternate strategy might limit efforts specifically aimed at the cruise missus submarine toew atuck submarines In the approaches to Westernsubmarinesimilar to the Soviets' anti-SSBN tactics. Major emphasis would then be placed on countering tbe missiles themselvesombination of improved land-based air defense sys-tems

Anlisarfacc Warfarelthough the Soviets view Western submarines as the major naval threat to their territory and SSBN havens, theirof the threat from Western surface forces and tlie Importance they attach to ASUW are likely to increase during tho neat two decades. Carrier battle groups will continue to bo perceived as major threats to Soviet and Warsaw Pact territory. SSBN havens, and operations In thc land TVDs. Concern with carrier battle groups will remain high because of:

Soviet exrxcUlions that tbe number of carriers In NATO will at least remain constant and probably in. tj.ik as the result of US plans to expandbatde-group navy; the reemergerscc of sea-based fixed-wing aviation In the Royal Navy, and French, Italian, and Spanish carrier construction programs.

Expected improvements in the offensiveof carriers by equipping their aircraft with cruise missiles such as Tomahawk.

Improvements in the ability of carrier battle groups to defend themselves against attack through such programs as Ihe AEGIS air defense system.

urther, thc Soviets will no longer be able to concentrale-on aircraft carriers as the only Western surface unitsignificant threat to theirThe Soviets are fully aware of US plans to equip major combatants with the land attack version of the Tomahawk missile They realise that thb would result

ubstantial increase in the number of Western surface units capable of striking the USSB with nude ai weapons. This would greatly complicate thdrdefensive task because any major surfacewould have to beotential nuclear threat.

o meet this threat the Soviet Navy will continue efforts to Improve its ASUW capabilities. Of particular inujectance wiU be-

Construction of general purposesuch asaxs SSCNnd Akula -classwith advanced antiship torpedoes and cruise missiles. Such construction Is likely to continue Into.

Construdlon of surface combatants equipped with antiship missiles. Tim number of major surface combatants armed with such missiles Is likely to increase substantiallyesult of current construction programs (Kirov, Kiev. Slavs, Sovrernennvy) and thetr protected follow-ons-vidence, moreover, that theSW cruise missileecondary antiship capability.

Continued production of Backfire bombers for SNA, enough torojectcdegiments by thcrobable new bomber wiih performance characteristics similar to Backfire could be introduced Ino replace the Navy's aging Blirsders andew Strategic bomber inbe introduced Into SNA by thef thc Soviets do not produce the Backfire follow-on.ombat radius of upm.ell suited to deliver large-scale cruise missilo attacks at the outer edge of the expanded sea denial areas we project. Aircraft introduced Inre also likely to Incorporate some low observable {stealth)to make them less susceptible to detect ion.

Deployment of more capable sea-based fighter-bombers, both VSTOL aircraft operating from Kiev-class ships ind CTOL aircraft operatingew doss of carrier.

The introduction ol these new platforms will greatly Increase the number of missiles available for attack and will coincide with other efforts to improve ASUW capability. In particular

are likely in antiship missiles, especially in target discrimination capability,and reaction times. For example the

missiles could be bunched against Soviet territory. Coordination of Soviet submarine and surface ship operations with those of land-based medium bombers is Improved by concentrating ASUW in these areas. Soviet ASUW doctrine is likely to continue itson "Gist salvo"Western surface units during the prewar period of tensions andthe most important of them with maximum force at the outset of hostilities. Tlie Soviets undoubtedly lecogniie that thb goal will become more difficult to achieve as the number of important targets grows with the introduction of nuclear Tomahawk, increases inlhe number of NATO surface battle groups, and tbe wide deploymenJ of improved missile defensivesuch as AEGIS. Thc proliferation of high-valueikoly to contributereater emphasis on ASUW operations of extended duration (days and weeks rather than minutes andndications of such emphasis are already visible in exetcises and In weapons loading features of new units

lthough most ASUW operations will berelatively close to Soviel territory, tlieprobably will seek In theo extend tbe outer edge of the Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleet sea denial area somewhat beyond tbe cuneotofilometers to counter the long range of Western SLCMs. Some attacks at much greater distances from Soviet territory are possible Among the options they might find attractive for such operations are the deployment of nussilc-equipped aircraft to bases outside thethe host country were willing to risk becoming aequipping SNA with long-range bomben. The Soviets could abo choose to employ tbe carrier force we protect lor thegainst Western aircraft carriers operating beyond Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleet sea denial areas. We believe this would be an unlikely option, however, since these few Sovietwould probably be deemed mote useful and survivabteultipurpose role within the expanded sea control/denial areas. While the Soviets probably do not consider the ASUW problem to be as difficult as ASW. tbey apparently expect it toajor and growing challenge through.

e-eaecutton of the ASUW task probably will continue to be primarily concentrated in areas such as tho Norwegian and North Seas, the easternand the northwestern Pacific-thc principal areas Irom which carrier aircraft and sea-based cruise

ntlalr Warfare (AAW) al Sea. Tbe Soviets recognize that tbe ability of their surface ships to conduct ASW and ASUW operations and project power beyond the range of land-based air cover is heavily dependent on their capability todelendagainst air attack. The successful use of sea-slimming antbhlp missiles In thc Falklands crisis probably has Increased the already evident Soviet concern over the proliferation of these weapons In


navies, Tlie Soviets also realize that Western use of radar-cross section reduction techniques will further complicate defense efforts against cruisethe Soviets' air defense efforts were characterized by own shin defense-In-depth withweapon systems of various ranges. Recent Catling and dual-purpose gun systems and tbendAM systems continue this philosophy.

heAM system being deployed on cruisers of tbe Kirov and Sbva classes, however,ong-range system that could provide tbe Soviets their first genuine area air defense capability againstTbe system designube-Dopplei fire control radarigital fire control computer which should permit short reaction times, good target detection and tracking, and the capability to engage sir targets simultaneously. Theesigned to engage low-altitude. low-radar-crcos-sectJon targets, such as antbhlp cruise mlssfleo-P"

weapons prove practicalaval environment, we expect ihem to be deployed oa many Soviet principal surface combatants by thearticularly for close-in and low-level defense against cruise missiles.

oviet fleet air defease capability will be further enhanced by thc introduction of Improved VSTOL aircraft as well as high-performance CTOL fighters on the projected new class of aircraft carrier. The overall effectiveness of the Soviets' efforts to protect their surface fleet against air attack, however, will depend on their ability to integrate the operations of carrier- and land-based aircraft wftb sbjpborne SAM. gun, and laser systems. To thb end. the Soviets have developed an airborne warning and control systemcoordinate their alr defense assets. Wc expect up toainstay In tbe Soviet Air Force inventory by theadaruch improved over that In the earlieross airborne early warning (AEW) aircraft, IT

expected to be less effective, at least in low-altitude, low-radar-cross-section engagements, than older SAM systems. We nonetheless expect that ther follow-on area air defense weapons will be deployed on all future cruisers.

also probably wOl improve tbeir defensive systems' signal-processing capability and will continue lo Improve radar performance. Other likely developments In naval air defease will include improvementi in handling multiple targets, better low-altitude fuzing and target detectionea clutter environment, and additional electronic countenncas-ures (ECM) and electronic counter-counter-measures (ECCM)

US. In addition to continued work in gun and, the Soviets are exploring thevalue of laser air defense weapons. At least two such systems likely are in development at the Sarysha* gan Missile Tosl Center. Itossiblehipborne laser weapon,ow-energy system designed to counter electro optical systems, will be Installed on at least one new ship class by the end of the decade We alsoaval high-energy User weapon may be operational by the. If User

^ Used Inwith new fjghter/Interceptori such as Foxhound, Mainstay could support ab defense operations at greater distances from tba Soviet periphery. Wethat future Soviet carrier-based aircraft will be nude compatible with thearrier-based AEW aircraft is abo expected but no candidate Is yet evident; tbe Soviets may Initially opt to use helicopters for thb mission. We believe the AWACS, AEW, and most new Ggbter aircraft will be capable ofinformation with shipboard ab defense command-en via digital links The Round House and Top Knot data link systems deplored onnd Udaloy-classprovide the capability to establish data exchange and communicaQoos/navuja-tion/identiltcation (CNT) netsore integrated and effective air warfaie system, because of lack of experience In managing complex fleet air defense operations, however, we believe overall Soviet fleet AAW effectiveness will Improve more slowly than the individual oomiionefiti during the period of thband. in the face of Improved Western systems and tactics, it likely loeficiency through Ihis century.

Allocking Western aerial and surface resupply efforts within Soviet sea control/denial areas

In conducting such Operations, Soviet carriers will operate with other surface units and possiblyand land-based aircraft Their lack of experience in such complex operations, however, suggests lhat it will be5easonable standard of operational probciency can be attained.

lthough the constructionew class of aircraft carrier is thc policy of lhe present Soviet political and naval leadership, it It the type of program that could suffer from radical policy shifts or severe economic problems The enormous costs Involved, not only for the shipt ihernselves bul for tho air group, support log vessels, and shore-based infrastructure, could make the program vulnerable to cancellation or delay if the Politburo seeks to reduce or reorder lhe burden of defense expenditures

egardless of Soviet decisions concerning CTOL aircraft carriers, the Soviet Navy probably will introduce improvements InTOL aircraft for the four Kievelass ships and the new carrier now under construction Such Im proven veats arc likely tohipboard ramp for assisted takeofiseplacement for tlte Forger that lias greaterspeed, payload. and air defense capability.

urveillance and Tarcelinc Integration. We have already discussed under ASW, ASUW, androbable Soviet advances th detection andby improvements in sonar; AWACS; and manned, radar, optical, and ELINT satellites. By thehese instrumeoti could provide the Sovietsroad ocean-area capability tor

Differentiate more accurately among small,and large surface ships In moderate sea Hales and weather conditions.

Provide accurate locating inlormatioa and hull-to-emltter correlation on most unitand radar emissions.

locate and track large, fast-movingnear Ihe surface.

uring the period of this Estimate, the SovieU will also improve iheir capability to integrate this sensor ^formation and provide data in near-real tune to selected attacking platforms through theircontrol, and communications systems. Provision of this surveillance information will be enhanced bv systems of advanced satellites providing worldwide, rapid, secure, two-way data link communications and

large military space stations, possibly iu high orbit over tbe Atlantic and Pacific Oceana The Soviet Navy will abo have atwo, and perhaps as many as six, large Ksv^hips that may be used In wartime for processing and disseminating battle information;we ate uncertain of precisely how these ships will he integrated into thc Soviet battle management scheme.

These advances probably will provideapability toeal-time plot in large selected ocean areas of nearly all surface units that continually emit and of most large unitsemission control This plot could be degraded, perhaps substantially, by such factors as bad weather, high seas, crowded oceans, sophisticated deceptive emission practices, and other potential countermeas-ures, including direct attack. We do not anticipate that atmospheric and space sensor and communications advaiaces will appreciably erihance Soviet capability to survcil subsurface targets.

Moreover, despite these projectedIn Soviet maritime surveillance and targeting capability, use of long-range cruise missiles against selected surface targets will continue to be hampered


Number and LnsufBcient srcospapblc spread of pbtforms.

Missilemaximum ranges couldilometers in the.

Probable lack of target position update during missile flight.

Hence, ogsttmum wartime tactical exploitation of the

information provided by surveillance systems onthose beyondwould be difficult to achieve There is little doubt, however. Ihat SSBN protection against surface and air intruders will be substantially enhanced by more capable Soviet surveillance and stuck platforms available in,

rotection of Stale IntereiU in Peace time and Limited War. Although the primary emphasis in Soviet naval developments will continue to be on Improving capabilitiesar with NATO, Soviet writings, construction programs, and exercisesecognition of the value of naval forces In situations short of-^onoral war. Programs currently Identified or projected by the US Intelligence Community will result by then substantialin the Soviet Navy's capability to protect power and influence in dutant areas.

Tbe most important improvement will stem from the construction of aircraft carriers capable oferformance aircraft The Lack ofair support has been the mayor operational weakness of Soviet naval forces in dbtantask force of Iwo carriersotal ofircraft would eliminate much of thb weakness and should provide (he basis for establishing air superiority in many Third World situations in which the United States did not become Involved Soviet writingsthe use of carriers emphasize their value in show-the-flag and limited-war situations.

Ctndual Improvements anticipated inforces also will enhance Soviet capability to project power In dbtant areas. We expect cootioued modest ocqubltlon of naval amphibious ships,additional LPDs and. perhaps, the first LPHs. as well as LSTs and LSMs. The Soviets abo will continue exploring the use of advanced cargo ships such as roll-on/roll-off and oceangoing barge carrier (LASH) ships in amphibious landings. Thc Soviet Naval Infantry (nowtrength ofill grow, perhaps to00ew Northern Fleet SNI facility was Identified east of Murmanske believe thb will be the borne of the second Northern Fleet SNI brigade- Additionalassaull forces will be available in all fioct areas from ground forces units trained In such

We do not believe that these estimatedwill be sufficient to enable tbe Soviets to conduct amphibious operations In distant areasar with NATO. Sucheratlons will continue to emphasize areas on the Soviet periphery. Nor will such improvements make It practical to conduct landings In situations In which Western or even moderately strong indigenous forces would be in opposition These Improvements, however, willSoviet leadersuch-improved capability to overcome the opposition that could be offered by most Third World countries, especially those that were intrinsically weak or beset by internal dlvbions. Such improvements could abo be used lo support client states involved In military operations against other states or internal opponents.

he amount of time spent by Soviet general purpose units outside homeikely lo increase only slightly in the. Constraints

a malor Increase in regular oul-ot-ateailill continue lo include:

The need to retain most naval form close toSome waters andeadinesj condition for rapid deployment to critical wartimeareas such as thc Norwegian Sea.

The fuel and maintenance costs of out-of-area deployments, even at the low levels of activity typical of Soviet units

recognition by the SovieU that the usefulness of deployed naval forces is notirect correlation of size, bul rather mainly involves military capability and the political value of any naval presenceignal of Soviet interest in an aim

Changes in out-of-area deployments are likely to be most significant in terms of tbe capabilities of the units involved (new aircraft carriers, Ivan Rogovs, Kirovs, and so forth) and the areas In which ihey wilt operate Some areas where the Sovietserrnanent naval presence (Indian Ocean. Mediterranean and South China Seas, and West Africa) are likely to undergo further gradual expansion in response to political Imperatives, primarilydesire to support the maintenance of established "socialist" regimes and the creation of new ooes. To support such operations, the SovieU will continue their arterripcs lo achieveaccess to foreign faculties.

n addition to supporting peacetime naval operations, the Soviets probably would seek to use facilirOs Third World countries inar against NATO and other leaser conBicti The most likely role of such faahties in wartime would be as positions from which Western force movements can be monitored during the period of tension before the outbreak of war. We therefore expect to see continued efforts to obtain the use of airfields to supportflights, as well as tbe establishment of SICINT. communications, and possibly submarine-tracking facilities. The Soviets probably will continue to regard the use, especially the sustained use. of facilities In Third World countries In wartime as of questionable value because of their vulnerability and the possible unwillingness of host governments to risk IxcornaOtfcAelligerenrj. The advantages to the Soviet Navy, however, of using such facilities are potentially substantial, particularly In opeaauons against SSBNs and carrier battle groups at lhe outset of hostilities. We think II likely, therefore, that efforts will bo made lo

develop relations with Third World countries that will make wartime use of facilities, especially byore realistic possibility. The Soviets' mux base at

Cam Ranh Bay. Vietnam,rime example of such a



examination of the current role ofin Soviet military strategy,programs, and the key issues lacingenables us toudgment as lo tbecourse of development for thc Navy overof this century Wc recognize,an estimate coveringong periodeconomic, and technological changes mustwith caution. An examination of somebut still feasibie courses of oevelopmentincluded as well These alternative coursesare not meant to be exhaustive butindicate some of lhe types of variables thatour baseline estimate.

A. Baseline Estimato

believe that our asaeasrnent of theof the Soviet Navy Ine also cexctinue to believe that thisbe essentially unchanged through thc turn ofin terms of the major tasks and dieof forces to carry out those tasks Ineneral war with NATO. We stillthe requirement to counter advances Inoffensive capabilities, however, will drivelo expand the areas tn which their forcesdeployed for initial sea control/sea denialTbey will continue to introduce. newand systems Into the Navy and seekImproved war-fighting capabilities for theof antics sited general and aaaxaastj warWe believe,that these changeswithin the framework of tbe Soviets'because thev probably will continueiewoffering thc best chance of accomplishing thoirtasks.

he single most Important task of the Navy will be to participate In strategic strike primarily using SLBMs and probably SLCMs. The importance of

* ForM duousston ol"t nlliUryower Clorul MUVur* ArarA, November IBM.

sea-based nuclear sit ibe assets wiilufl the USSR'smilitary strategy could Brow because:

The pumber of Soviet strategic nuclear warheads aAlgoed to SSBNs will increase as the force is increasingly armed with MIRVed SI-BMi

Some Soviet SLBMs inould beaccurate to be used effectively against hardened targets.

Soviet silo-baied strategic systems may become more vulnerable

New sea-launched, long-range nuclear landcruise missiles will enhance Soviet offensive strike capabilities.

The ASW capabilities of tho new classes of attack submarines now entering thewith other measures to protectenhance tbe perceived survivability of the SSBN force.

Thc combination of increased SLBM accuracy, SSBN survivability. SLCM deployment, and luted ICBM vulnerability will provide powerful incentives for the Soviet Union to continue the modernization of its strategic strike capability.

c nonetheless believe thc Soviets will con tin-uc to regard their SSBNs as vulnerable lo enemy ASW forces throughout the period of this Estimateand support for Soviet SSBNs. therefore, is likely to remain .the most important consideration In the initial wartime deploymentarge portion of general purpose naval forces of tbe Northern andean Fleets. Pacific Ocean Fleet forces would be concentrated in the areas of tbe Northwest Pacific Basin, the Sea of Japan, and the Sea of Okhotsk. The Northern Fleet would deploy the bulk of its forces to the Barents, Greenland, and northern Norwegian Seas, although live outer edge of wliat we describe as the Northern Fleet sea control area probably will espand to include thc southern Norwegian Sea, primarily to facilitate an ertension of sea denial operations beyondK gap This would be intended principally to counter Western SLCM-armed ships and submarines, bui would abo support other operations in theacific Ocean Fleet sea controlwould abo expand somewhat (see. The major mission of Soviet CTOL aircraft carrierswill be to assist in expanding these areas.forces there will continue to appeal lo the Soviets because it will enhance integration of their submarine and surface units with tlie land-based air

support which, even after the introductionew aircraft carriers, will continue to constitute the bulk of the forces of SNA

he Soviets probably will continue to view Western SSNs as the primary threat to thoir SSBN force and will conclude that the best chance of detecting such SSNs lies In waiting for them to enter relatively confined areas where the Soviets willoncentration of forces and where their short-range sensors con be used to best advantage. Expected improvements In Soviet ASW platforms, sonars, and tactics (especially innd fixod-seruor technology, along with Increased use of under-lce patrob probably willSoviet Navy's ability to protect Its SSBNs. These developments could enable the Soviets by theo reduce somewhat the number cf SSNs dedicated to protecting the SSBN force. Any such submarines freed from thb mission would probably be used primarily to increase the density of ASW barriers In thc forward areas of cipanded sea denial rones and/or as SLCM carriers. Some could be assigned anti-SSBNew older SSNs could have on anti-SLOC role. We doubt, however, that the Soviets will view such Improvements as sufficient toignificantly lessened initial commitment of forces for SSBN protection.

ew long-range land attack cruise missiles will markedly enhance tbe Soviets' sea-based offensive strike capabilities- We expect to see them deployed primiiily as part of the weapons load on Moscow's newest SSNs andimited number of dedicated SSCNi beginning in the. They willhave primarily Eurasian theater strikebut would be employed also against US targets. Since operating areas required for theater SLCM bunches would in some instances differ appreciably from those required for optimum defensive tasks, SLCM-armod SSNs would probably operatelhe Soviets' expanded sea control/sea denial areas. During the initial stages of war. those carryingew SLCMs probably would deploy primarily in tbe sea denial areas as part of the Soviets" forward ASW/ ASUW barriers. DecUcated SLCM-ortned SSNs/SSGNs with theater responsibilities would generally patrol within range of their targets behind the forward ASW barricn and could be proteclcd by dedicated ASW assets Development of nonnuclear SLCM warhead options would further Increase the utility of these weapons against important theater targets difficult lo reach and costly to attack with land-based alrcratt-SLCM patrob off the US coasts shouldeinisnent feature of the Soviets" peacetime strategic

Figure 25

Future Iniual Soviel Opcraling Areas iD the Pacific

as early5 and could evenlually supplant the Yclass SSBN presence. These SLCMs will add now diversity and flexibility to the USSR's strategic strike capabilities They also offer the potential dividend of complicating Western defensive tasks and forcing substantial investment in expanded early warning/air defense systems

planners could not be sure of using Ihem inive strike against the United States without losing lhe advantage of surprise and giving warning of the atiack The long flight time of lhe subsonicakes il particularly unlikely the Soviets would launch that missile against US targets prior to ballistic missile launches. SLCMs are especially suitable, however, for

follow-on slitkes against industrial concentrations, command and control sites, and soft military targets

such as botnbet bases and ammunition depots

orthern and Pacific Ocean Fleet operations in tupporl uf the nuclear strike mission will coincide with thoseortionecond important task, strategic delense Such .operations, together with some of those of the Black Sea and Baltic Fleets, will seek to destroy Western aircraft carriers and strategic cruise missile platforms after thev cross Soviet defense thresholds, now generallyilometers from Soviet territory We espect such operations to be of growing importance lo the Soviets because of their

expcctations concerning (he proliferation of Western strategic cruise mixsiW To counter Westera cruise missile* bunched from surface ships and lubrnarinesstarsdoff range those missiles afford oarrier-bascd strike aircraft, the Soviets probably will seek to extend the outer edge of the sea denial areas of the Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleets toilometers

nother portion of the strategic defensethe destruction of enemy SSBNs before thoy can launch theirpose an increasing dilemma for tho Soviets. The deployment ofUS SLBMs, improved British and French SSBNs. and the first Chinese SSBN probably will increase tbe importance of achieving such destruction. The Soviets also will have to contend with Trident If SLBM-equipped SSBNs operating in much expanded patrol areas. The Soviet Navy's ability to detect and track US SSBNs in the open ocean, however, probably will not improve, at least over the neatears. Thisis based on our belief that;

Soviets probably will be unable to deploy an

effective broad-ocean acoustic or norucoustic sensor.

SSNs will not be sufSdcotlyleast throughout the nextengage in covert trail, and Soviet ASW aircraft will not be deployed in sufficient numbers or have adequate range to maintain contact in US SSBN patrol areas.

Overt trail will become increasinglyparticularly in choke points and relativelynew nuclear attack submarines enter thc fleet In number, but the Soviets will still not have sufficient platforms to threaten the US SSBNecision toubstantial number of SSNs In this manner, moreover, would divert them from other missions such asSoviet SSBNs.

There will notignificant increase In access to new overseas facilities for Soviet ASW and reconnaissance forces in the coming years,expansion In operations from presently available facilities will occur.

We therefore expect that Soviet naval anti-US SSBN operations will continue to be modest, withelatively few attack submarines stationed In the approaches to US submarine bases. Operations against non-UScould become vulnerable to

improved Soviet ASW In the late

e believe that Soviet proe^eraent of naval weapon platforms and systems over the period of tills Estimate will remain driven primarily bystemming from thensfve and defensive tasks outlined aliove The Importance of these tasks shouldolid basis for the Navy to continue receiving at least the same share-of the defense budget that it hu received since. Such an allocation of resources means that the Soviet Navy will continue to receive new classes of large surface combatants, attack submarines, and aircraft Tbe production rate will not completely offset the retirement of older units. The accelerating cost per ton of new combatants would make ship-for-ship replacement prohibitively Indeed, considering manpower/maintenance constraints, this may not be feasible. The force In tbe0 will therefore be sotrsewhat smaller than thai of today. Newer units, however, will generally be larger tlian those being replaced and will be equipped with mare sophisticated weapon systems. Tills leads us to expect the folkrwing derveloprnentx

site of the modern ballistic missileforce will remain roughly coexttasat bo-tweonhe. The number of units In the overall SSB/SSBN forceill decline as older units (Colors SSBslass andliss SSBNs) are converted or retired The new units willimproved sound qdeOng. self defense,and propulsion systems, and will carry as many missile lubes as most or all of those units retiredn the absence of an arms-control or reduction treaty, the number of SLBM launch tubes tarried by the SSBN force Is likely to increase. Regardless, the numbers of warheads will grow significantly because of tbe deployment of new MIRVed systems.

first unit of the new classton nuclear-powered aircraft carriers probably will become operational byotal of four or five Is expected by the year

number of principal surface combatants probably will decline somewhat- -to

units. New construction programs are likely to Include one or two new classes of nudear-powered guided-misslle ciuiscrs (CCNsk two

SNA andbe an essential element in the Soviets' attempts lo expand their sea control/denial eflorts against Western surface forces in vital areas such as the Norwegian, North, and Mediterranean Seas and the Northwest Pacific Basin. These lombers will aborincipal feature of Soviet anlistir-face capabilities In other areas such as theSea.

Tlie construction piogtam we project does not overtax Soviet industrial capacity. rVoduetson facilities for naval equipment have expanded by someercent0 and could accommodate substantialin demand, especially for submarines, if live Soviet leadership opted to expend thc capital resources and fully mob iliac the work force.

Ml. We believe thai major technical Improvements In Soviet Beet air defense are likely during the period of this Estimate. New SAMs. guns, and laser weapons will probably be introduced and ndioelectronlemeasures will continue toigh priority. Fighter aircraft operating from the protected CTOL carriers of thc Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleets, probably in cooperation with AWACS and possibly AEW aircraft, willew dimension to Ihe Navy's air defense resources. Fleet air defenses will be bettor coordinated through digital data links between AAW commanders and surface and ab platforms.we expect only gradual improvement In overall AAW effectiveness because of the complexity of man-agiiig and coordinating force air defense, and the paucity of Soviet experience In thata any event, we cannot confidently assess the net effect of these changes on tlie ability of Soviet surface forces to defend diemsctves against air attackar with NATO. Such an assessxneot is highly dependent on lactical variables. The performance characteristics of key systems, such as there not yet fully understood Changes In the Soviet Navy's sir defense it items will he occurring simultaneously with those in Western antiship capability, including thcof large numbers cf cruise missiles. Despite these uncertainties, tbe mator Soviet commitment to the com) ruction of large turf ace combatants persuades us that the naval leadership probably fudges the overall result of changes In air defease capability at sufficient to support tbe wartime deployment of surface units farther from Soviet territoryradual expansion of their intended sea control areas

xnaruion of both sea control and sea denial operations would be supported by gradual Improve-


In Soviel capability to tut veil Westernprovide targeting assistance lorattacks, imptoved over-the-hori ionindividual Soviet uniu to make betterthe ranee oi their mmiles, thereby coveringocean area. Much ol the improvementin surveiiiance and targeting will involvesystems. We believe thai the Soviets willthen improved EORSAT withto detect and Identify additional typesThe newikely to be able tounits with an

sufficient for targetingroader area than is currently possible By tho, we believe further improvements In the EORSAT arc likely to result in near-continuous targeting capability by use of higher orbits, better sensors, and expanded beads ofew RORSAT probably will abo bewith Improvements In probability of detectionider field of probable the Soviets willew radar satellite for Improved all-weather surveillance. We expect that thc improved EORSAT and RORSAT may be used in cooperationatellite data relay system to provide real-time battle management information to commandashore In addition, during tho period of thb Estimate, advances in maritime surveilbnce from manned ipace vehicles can be expected, including routine reporting of naval surface targets. Tbe use of satellites, however, cannot be considered exclusively in the context of Soviet naval operations. Such use will continue to provide one of tin many linkages between navalTppe/atIons and overall Soviet military strategy. The Navy's ability lo use satellite systems in wartime would depend on such nonnaval factors as tbe extent to which antisateflite warfare would be conducted at the outset of war and the ability of satellites to survive Western attack- Recognizing the danger of being dependent on any single system, the Soviet Navy will continue to integrate surveillance and targetingfrom satellites with that from traditionalsuch as manned aircraft and possibly Irom new systems such as reconnaissance drones.

he Soviets probably recognize ihat future operations In areas such as tho southern Norwegian Sea will place greater demands on tbe Navy's command, controiva n3 communications system because of factors such as larger operating areas, rnore emphasis on tbe integration of diverse platforms, and the need to countergreater numlier of high-value targets. We expect Ihe Soviets to respond to this challenge by

improving their capabilities Iu technical areas such as satellite communications, very-low-frequencysupport tond low-probata!Iity-cf-intercept systems, and by striving- for greaterdata system compstibilily. Another major trend will include increased automation to support battle management at all levels ol iho command structure. We believe that the major emphasis in the command, control, and communications system will continue to be on centralized control of wartime operations, but the creel sonixed force' groups could indicate on intention by the Beet Staffs toarger portion of their battle management responsibilities lo lower command levels.

n addition to its primary initial wartime tasks, tbe Soviet Navy abo will continue to be responsible for supporting ground forces In the land TVDs and for interdicting sea lines of communication Anti-hip and ASW operations by the Baltic Fleet In the North Sea and the Black Sea Fleet in Ihe Mediterraneanwill receive increased emphasis to counter the growing capability of Western naval forces to strike targets In the land TVDs from increased ranees Despite Increased capabilities for power praieetioo in dbtant areas. Soviet amptublous forces will continue to be structured primarily for landings close to Warsaw Pact territoryar with NATO. Initial anti-SLOC actions probably wouldombing end mining campaign against European ports by some SNA aircraft

he relatively low priority of open-ocean SLOC intddlclion as an Initial wartime task In Soviet naval strategy probably will not cbange substantially through tbe period of thb Estimate- The Soviets will still have insufficient assets toajor open-ocean anti-SLOC operation in the early stagesATO-Warsaw Pact war simultaneously with tbeir otber, tnoro critical sea cosibol/dcnial missions. The naval Improvements we project might, however, by theermit committing some additional Northern and Pacific Ocean Fleet assets (primarily older SSNs) to open-ocean anti-SLOC actions from tbe first days of the conflict without appreciably weaien-fng their SSBN protection or defense of the Iromeland posture. But we believeore likely under those conditions that frontline forces not required for sea control/denial operations would insteadal grand other tasks such as anti-SSBN missions On tbe cose of submarines) or cornbincdarmi land TVD tasks (in the case of SNA/AAVCKrolongedmobilization periodrotracted conventional


with NATO (that is. one luting moteouple of months) would inctease tho importance of tbe anti-SLOC mission to tbe Soviets and could lead themajor open-ocean naval operation against tne US rdrdoroement/rcaupply of Europe. The Soviets almost certainly would defet any such major open-ocean anti-SLOC operation, however, until after they had successfully completed their seatasks and weakened NATO's capability to protect its sea lanes.

oviet naval out-of-area operations inwill continue to focus on maintaining permanent presence In areas such as the Mediterranean. Arabian, and South China Seas, and off the west coast of Africa. Wc expect the Soviets will atlempt to expand their level of naval activity In areas such as the Caribbean and Philippine Seas, and the southwest Indian Ocean islands. They also are likely to step up efforts to acquire access to foreign nasal support faculties,they are unlikely in tbo near term to gain much access in areas where there ls notoviet presence. Tho Soviets undoubtedly will continue their traditional techniques of naval diplomacy ranging from routine show-the-flag port visits to demorxstra-tions of support for client states during crisis situations and limited wars. Given the Ukdibood of continued instability In the Third World, the use of such naval diplomacy and power projection techniqueswill increase during.

ajor change in the Soviet Navy during the period of this Estimate will be the achievement for the first time of an ability to project significant power ashore irr^irrant areasimited warlhat is. one that does notooirootation between the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Although we believe that Soviet naval programs are motivated primarily by requirementseneral war with NATO, new platforms and weapon systems will help to dose some of the current gaps fn Soviet capability to conduct such distant area operations. In particular, tbe ability loask force around two or three CTOL aircraft carriers will give the Soviet Navy Its first significant capability to provide tactical air support for ground force operations and amphibious landings by Soviet or client forces in distant areas. The new medium-caliber gun and air defense systems on new dasses rxLcur|ace ships and the probable acquisition of additional Urge amphibious shipseaborne assault helicopter (perhaps Helix B) will, also improve the Soviet Navy's capability to conduct opposed

hr^ enhariced carsabilitka will givo thethc option to use naval forceumber of Third World situations against all bul the most well-armed regional powers. Because the Soviets probably will have, at most, five CTOL carriers by rhehey would have to draw on the assets of more than one fleet loorce suBidcnt to conduct an opposed distant-area landing. The assembly oforcereat distance from the USSR would seriously undermine the Soviet Navy's ability loits priority strategic offensive and defensive missions in the event of escalation to general war. We believe, therefore, thai major Soviet naval task force participation in Third World conflicts will be restrict-ed to limited war situations In which the Soviets judged tbe risk of escalationar with the United States or NATO to be small

erhaps the most com polling argumentore ambitious power protection strategy during tbe period of this Estimate Is our judgment that programs directly supporting the Navy's strategic offensive and defensive tasks will continue to receive top priority in the allocation of the Soviet Navy's budget Other factors which cast doubtignificantly- increased power projection commitment In tbe near termthc following:

The naval infantry's growth has been modest Since its reestablish men!3 it has grownurrent strength of

LPO construction has ceased.

Only one Berezina AOR was builtnd no other large naval replenishoizistics units are known to be under construction

ISO. The likelihood of on ambitious naval power rxosectron strategy during thc period of this Estimate is further reduced by the practical difficulties Involved in rapidlyarge number of CTOL aircraft carriers, the most Important instruments ofission. We estimate that the Soviets will continue to construct such carriers at thc same Nlkola-vev shipyard on the Black Sea that built the Kiev-class aircraft carriers Thb fadlity has been speciallyst great expense (induding the installation of the USSR's largest overhead gantry cranes) for the construction of such largo warships. We estimate lliat this yard, if operatingormal construction pace, will be able to launch one Urge CTOL aircraft carrier every three or four yea is. with the first unit being bunchedS. It is possible for the Soviets to construct carriersaster rate by using additional, less suitable shipyard* or by placing construction at


oocrash basis. Neither option is now being ininucd. however, and such practices would be inconsistent with past Soviet espcrience when con-stnjctbw new types of hrge combatants. (Construct ion of Ibe newroceeding at virtually the same pace as that of the first Kiev-class carrier. Kiev's keel was laid0 and sea trials followed almost five yearse believe that the Soviets recognize the complexity of building and operating CTOL carriers and are likely In develop this capabilitylow-but-sure pace For these reasons, we refect the conceptoviet Navy In which power protection by major naval task force*ominant role.

lternate Courses of Oovdopmcnt

Our best estimate on the future of tbe Soviet Navy reflects our judgment that the trends we have observed In ship corjjruction, naval doctrine, and strategy over the pastears will continue. Tlie following paragraphs discuss three variables that could precipitatechanges in the Soviet Navy ofajor Soviet ASWtrategic arms reduction treaty,evere economic crisis thatut In military spending; and,pecialnecessitating such sweepinghift In Soviet military doctrine toward Increased emphasis on protracted conventional war.

An ASW Breakthrough. The development that would result in the most profound change In Soviet wartime strategy from that outlined above would be an ASW breakthrough that gives the Soviets the capability to detect and track enemy submarines in tbe epenbreakthrough derived from ooe of the many research efforts tbey are conducting oa acoustic and nociocoustic sensors. Although unlikely throughout the period of this Estimate, such awould substantially increase tho Soviet Navy's ability to perform tbe critically important strategic defensive tasks of destroying enemy ballistic missile and land attack cruise missile submarines before they launched their missiles. It would abo increase tlie Soviets' ability to protect their SSBNs. because enemy attack submarines could be Identified and attacked long before they closed Soviet SSBN bastions.

Wc believe an ASW breakthrough would lead to major changes in the way the Soviets would deploy theakgaaneral purpose forces, particularly attackbefore andeneral war. Oaring the prchostilitics phase, tbe Soviets probably would opt to deploy substantial numbers of SSNs lo suspected enemy SSBN operating areas, in choke points, and in

likely transit lanes near enemy submarine bases. These nuclear-powered attack submarines would attempt to gain contact and maintain trail on detected Western submarines. Fewer submarines would be available for SSBN protection, unless or until tbe Soviet SSN order of battle were increased Surface and air unitswould abo be deployed farther forward. Planning for these operations probably would leadreater effort to expand access to and acquire foreignparticularly lo support ASW aircraft.

hc developmenteasonable capability to detect and trail Western SSBNs In thc open ocean would provide the Soviet Navyowerful argument for increased budgetary allocations The Navy could argue persuasively that It could notcounter enemy strategic submarines and ensure the survivability of its own SSBNs without aIncrease In forces, especially In SSN production rates. Civen thb choice, the Soviet leadership could grant the Navy increased fundsreater SSN construction effort, perhaps twice as many units per year as the six to seven we currently expect.

f there were an initial detectionwe cannot rule out tbe possibility that the Soviets would explore techniques for destroyingespecially SSBNs, by means other than theeliance on general purpcee navalThere have, for example, been references in Soviet writings to the possible use of land-basedmissiles against submarines In the open ocean. Exploringechnique would be consistent with past Soviet Interest la Innovative solutions lo naval problems-^

3lt would abo be consistent with Soviet doctrinal emplnui oa aapproach to tbc accomplishment of wartime tasks. The Soviets sic probably aware of the myriad technical problems likely to be erKx>uatered In any such use of land-based missiles including:

The need toemote sensor tliat could precisely locate SSBNs in the open ocean and constantly update that position.

The need loystem that could rapidly update tlse trajectoryallistic inissile in flight to compensate tor target movement.

The need lo solve fuzing problems associatedarhead surviving water Impact from high altitude

We arc skeptical that such problems could beat least during the period of this Estimate, and


believe lite Soviet* would be unlikely lo riiad-ouslyourse unless ibey had high confidence lhat the initial detection problem would soon be solved. ^Insuunple Is tnenttoned. however,reakthrough in ASW detection could lead to radical changes, not only in tlte Navy, but in overall Soviel military strategy.

Strategic Arm* Control Arms controlcould play an Important part In determining the role within Soviet strategy and thc force comnoaition oi the Soviet Navy In. For example, severe restrictions on SLCM characteriities/ woulderious maritime threat to the USSR and eliminate much of thc pressure to conduct sea denial operations at greater distances from Soviet territory. Provisions governing strategic ballisticforce levels couldignificant impact upon general purpose force programsubstantial portion of those forces will remain dedicated to pro-tecting Soviet SSBNs An arms wntrol rxovision simply limiting or freezing SSBN/SLBM levels probably would have little impact upon Soviet general purpose programs,we haveconstruction could increase sornewhat as facilitiesto SSBNs shifted to general purpose programs-Plans to protect Soviet SSBNs probably would not be affected bvrr*re/reduetlon. On the other hand, an agreement callingharp reduction in land-based ballistic missile systems, which would be likely to encourage both tbe United States and the Soviet Union toreater percrmtage of their strategic arsenals Io sea. could provide strongfor increased production of ASW-capable general purpose Ibices to protect the increased number of Soviet SSBNsreatymove to sea" were signed, we would erpect increases In lheof SSNs.r follow-on ASW aircraft, and ASW-oriontcd surface ships such as the Udaloy.S move to sea could also Justify an Increased Soviet antl-SSBN effort,o not believe the Soviets would allocate significantly increased forces against Western SSBNs unless they had first achieved an ASW breakthrough allowing them lo reliably detect and localize enemy submarines in the open ocean.

Seoere Kcortornie Stringenciei. The Soviets' ability to sustain Ihc ambitious naval program we project in our baseline eslimato may ultimatelyupoTt thV health of the Soviet economy and the willingness of future leaders to continue the current policy of favoring guns over butter. We have no evidencehrushchevjan inclination within the neat generation of Soviet leaders to bolster thc economy

by cutting miliiary spending. Indeed, we believeut would be unlikely, at least through,a view of the current US militarythe increasing capabilities of Western navies, and tlic possibility of lhe Uniied Stales' developingspace-based defenses against nuclear attack. It nonetheless Is conceivable that Ihe post-Cher nenko elite will be forced to curb military tending,If agricultural perforrnance and thc economic growth rale decline dramatically throughnd/or arms control agreements allow significant ecortcenies

ith the possible exception of tho Strategic Rocket Forces, budgetary cuts driven primarily by severe ecooomic stririgeneies probably would fall on all branches of tbe Soviet armed frxces. Within the Navy, programs considered fundamental to Itsstrategic offensive and defensive tasks, such as SSBNs, attack and cruise missile submarines, and land-based strike and ASW aircraft, probably would suffer few. if any. cuts. Rather, some cutbacks or slowdowns in programs relaling more to distant-area power pro-fection and sea controlas principal surface combatants, amphibious ships, and navalbe expected. It is conceivable, however, that,ombination of factors, budget cuts could fall more heavily on the Soviet Navy, resulting in substantial cuts in surface ship programs. These (actors include;

new pobdcal leadership thatommit; merit toarge balanced navyess Inclined to use naval forces as Instruments of foreign policy to project Soviet power andin distant areas.

new chief of the Soviel Navy who lacks Admiral Corrhkov's influence within the political and military hierarchies and/or docs not fully share his visionlue-water navy in which Urge surface combatantsreeminent role Flee! Admiral Cl^rnavin, Corshkov's most likely suceesiot, for example,ubmariner and could be more inclined to push for the construction of additional attack submarines

advances in antiship weaponry and targeting that convince the Soviets that largo surface ships are too costly and vulrterable. and that ASW snd ASUW tasks assigned to Urge surface combatants can be done more effectively by smaller combatants, submarines, and land-based aircraft.

II Is doubtful lliat tlie leadership that follows Chernenko will be inclined to mike major policy depart ui es such us cutting defense spending growth, at lessor irlitlallecision lo male sumlsaesntin military spending probably would beuntil lhe next generation of Soviet leaden Is firmly in place: one man has emerged as first among equals; and tho perceived "correlation of forces'" permitsove Since this process is likely to lake at Least severalecision to cut naval programs could not be made until the. By that Ume. most of the major surface combatant programs currentlyway should be nearing completion. Any reductions then probably would come In Soviet programs we protect for the. Piogtaxns that could well be deleted or sharply reduced in order to complyignificant cut in naval spending in.'luiie

ton nuclear-poweredcarriers. The first unit ol thb class, and possibly Ihc second, should be too nearto be affectedudgetary decrnoo made in the. The proiecled follow-on class would be subject to cancellation

New classics) of nuclear-powered cruisers.

Now daises of Urge amphibious ships (LPDs and LPIIs) and underway replenishment ships.

In addition, the Soviets may opt for early retirement of some older destroyers and frigates and construct fewei units than originally programed cf new classes to fouow the Sovremennyy and Udaloy DDGx.clearly identified with coastal ASW and SSBN protection, such as the protected follow-on classes tor the Krivak and Crislia frigates, probably would be least affectedharp budgetary culback

he net tesult ol cuts In surface ship programs such as those outlined above wouldavy with much leu capability lhan tlie one projected in our baseline estimate to control waters beyond the range of land-based lactical aircraft and to project power In distant areas. By the, such cub could reduce the overall sire of the surface navy by as much asercent, lessening Soviet capabilities to sustain current peacetime deployment leveb In areas such as the Mediterranean and South China Seas, the Indian Ocean, and off thc coast of West Africa The Soviets probably would attempt to compensate foe anyin surface navy capabilities to perform key stratc-

gic defensive tasks by relying even more on advances In antiship missiles (hit could be launched from aircraft, submarines, and land, and receiva targeting ml.ifir.itmn from satellites. In addition, they might stress non naval solutions to maritime threats, such as land based antiballistic missile and air defense systems to counter SLBMs and Sl-CMs, an oven greaterrole lor the Soviet Air Force, and, possibly, bod-baaed balliilic missiles against surface targets.

hift in Social Miliiary Doctrine. Some open-source Soviet military writings, particularly since the, have dealt with the possibilityar with NATO could remain conventional for an extended but unspecified period. Soviet General Staff exercises and classified writings continue to portray Warsaw Pact-NATO wars as lasting no moreouple of mooths and leadinguclear exchange. Tbe discussion of extended conventional warfare inwritings suggests, however, the Soviets are looking at developments in tbe military balance which could leduce the likelihood of cither sides quicklyecided military advantage which would compel tbe opponent to escalate to the use of nucaeax wcapons

hould Moscow become toorlneed that aconventional NATO waristinctwe would expect to see discussion of this doctrine in classified writings. Eventually, we wouldrend in their military exercises signaling thb shift, and we would find changes In militaryprocurement, and development with an even greater emphasis on sustainability.

o develop the capability to conductconventional naval warfare, aimed primarily at assisting the Warsaw Pact advanceoidingIn Central Europe, we would expect tho Soviet Navy to devote increased attention to

SLOC Interdiction

At-sea replenishment and reprovisioning.

Amphibious warfare and naval infantry

t should be noted that, evenrotracted conventional war, the Soviets would continue totheb two current primaryoffense andthey could not be sure of neutralizing NATO's nuclear threat.octrinal shift would not therefore entail major changes In Soviet force employment for these initial wartime

NtorCj- attention

lasts Nevertheless, wc would expect lo see changes requited by anti-SLOC and sustainabililyThese would be manifested bv:

lo these roles In doctrinal

Open-ocean anti-SLOC exercises and practice deployments.

A significant increase in the sire of the general purpose submarine force through construction of numerous submarines (including new diesel class* es) with tlve following characteristics: fast, long-legged, large conventional weapons toad, and relatively cheap.

Construction of numerous replenishment ships, particularly for submarine support.



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