NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FOR TUESDAY 5 MARCH 1985

Created: 3/5/1985

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In Brief

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Group in French Caribbean departments plans conference at Apri on "Liberation of Remaining Colonialxpectsban. USSRttendance woutd increaseeinal influence on independence movement.

President Ouarte and military aeriously considering resort from Archbishopuerrillas want to surrenderould be major propaganda bonus (orarlier such offers thrcugh Churcn failed to materialise. easVLs*

Uruguay's new President Sanguined! has legalized Communist Party and other groups banned under militarylanning amnesty for most political prlaoneripposition parliesctal amnesty.eassBBav

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5 uire- ites

Abu

parliamentary delegation Inirst such visited by obscure People's Congress Standing Committee vice chairmaneijing agreed to trip during Soviet Deputy Premier Arkhlpov'sLjfsjafj

Iran claims Iraqi atircrefl bombed steel plant and gasoline pumping station near Aftvax. also says traqi Exocol missile fill near nuclear power plant atay respond with air raids or shelling o! Iraqi border towns

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Bombing yesterday in Soutn Alrica ol ruling party oftices probably work ot African Nationalnly second bombing by group In sixtilt recovering trom.operational problems caused by expulsion trom Mozambique, aajfaast

Special Analysis

War in the Cities

Fighting In Afghanistan's dries has continuedigh level over the past tear, despite Soviet and regime sweeps and stringent security measures. The Insurgents ere active day end night In the second' and thlrd-lergest cities In Atghentstan, Herat end Qandanar. They are aOle to operate at nleht even In Kabul. 1

Tne chief. Insurgent commander In Kabol Province saysamong guerrilla groups has Improved markedly inyear and mat the men are mucn better armed. Onsucn as trieh anniversary ol the lounding olAfghan party, he says ihe Soviets and ihe Afghan regime naCexlraofdinary.security measures to prevent costly actions by

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Condition* in the Cities

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'Kabul is tree o' insurgent activity In tne daytime but thai rocket attacks on the olrpori and on tne Soviet Embassy and military headquarters are common atare assassinations and small firelights. Last momn the .nsurgents

idrfarly heavy attack against Soviet positions at Kabul

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danar at rvohl eWo'ien roam freely Mly stay Inarrisons ouiside the taiiatory bombings by theo bring Heratn danar brief per iocs.

the two cities haseducing the populations by more ontrast. has tripled as lighting In tne ors not inclined lo ilea to Pakistan to

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continued

.Toss^ecret

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Inharif and Ghaini. security vanes by season, villi the insurgents generally less active in the winter and during sowing and Itarvesting seasons. Jalalabad is usually quiet because of the large Soviet military presence there(3)

Uroan civilians give tne insurgents vital support tor operations in tneir cities, particularly Dy proviainc. intelligence on Soviet and regimeaaossm

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Limitations on the Insurgents

Tne guerr<l'as cannot establish sustained control over major cities

Because o' the dsyhme security patrols and superior firepower of tne

Soviets and tne Kabul regime, tneir sizable troop presence, and

Soviet and regime intelligence networks. The insurgents' lack of

expertise with explosives ano tneir periodic'shortages of appropriate

weaponry and ammunitionimit the scope and effectiveness ol

their operations, as do political, religious, ethnic, and tribal differ" esssaaas,

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Outlook

The war in the cities winto frustrate Soviet attempts to consoftdaio power In Afghanistan. It will Increase Moscow's costs by tying down forces that otherwise could be used to maintain supply I'rtes. protect airfields and other installations, and eomoat insurgents in ihe countryside. Tho visibility of the guerrillas' presence In the cities will help keep international attention on tne Alghnn conliici end thereby incieeso the political costs for the

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Special Analysis

on Major Parly Debate

The Yugoslav parly plenum that opens today Is Intended to conclude- en unprecedented eight-month debate on the country's economic end political problems, but It almost certainly will not unveil many solutions, factional and Interregional disputes are likely to copt/flue to block eltectlve decisions on key Issues.

disparities if

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Alter three years ol decline, the Yugoslav economy last year recovered modesily with an expansion Ot industrial production, imports, and exports. Nevertheless, foreign debtsillion, inflation hovers aroundercent, and one worker in six Is jobless. Incomes nave been cut AO percenlnd large disparities In

wealth remain among ihe republics and provinces.

a new IMF loan paves the way lor pnvaic OncToTriciai rescheduling, there is lime evidence of any progress In making long-overdue systemic changes in the economy lo lower inflation and assure economic growth and debt repayWmm

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Federal Versus Regional Power

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Tne leadership has been deeply divided over whelher lo strip regional olficials of some ol meir poiiiical and economic power and over whether to modify (he multicommittee political structure, whose rotating leadership has not provided firm direction. Tito himself created this system lo relieve concern thai one or two nationalities would dominate the oiher ethnic groups

A majority of Yugoslavs, become highly suspicious, therefore, whenlargesl republic and site ol ihe nationala stronger federal rde In some economic decisionmaking and more centralism in the party. Slovenia and Croatia. Ihe two richest republics. ob|eet because they realizeore even distribution of wealth= al melr expense.aJH^

On me oihor hand, some regional officials from less developed areas support strengthening central autnorlty, despite their tear of greater Serbian nationalism, because they wouia^flcnefitystem that distributes resources from the certte- fSjjBjpjf*-

continued

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European politicians who argue (or strong central controls are normally Orthodox Marxists, while pro-reform tigitres generally are thought to be liberals. In Yugoslav-athebreakdown is more along ethnic lines and is more gj

Serbia favors more central pariy and government power lo carry out the economic siabtli2alion program but at tne same lime urges market-oriented reforms in the economy. Slovenes objectentralism because their economy functions well now. Croats, on the other hand, fear their limping economy would sutler greatly from measures advocated by Serbia.Saaeaaat

The dispute Is furtner complicated by the debate over ihe limits of openness and democratization In publicconflict heightened by the recent dissident trial. The Seroran leadership and most intellectuals argue thai some political liberalization must accompany economic reform. Slovenes also generally favor political moderation.

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mainly from Croatia and Bosnia, reject boih liberalization and economic changes as threatening ihe party's power, esffssa, ^

Military leaders are openly worried that deepening political rifts are dividing me officer corps. Defense Secretary Mamula and Army party chiel Jovicic have spoken out against disunity, but they also have called (or steps to ensure discipline. They warn that extreme and Isolatedhin the military are unacceptable and will not be

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Prospects

Elhnic rivalries will conlinue to override all issues in Yugoslavia, making some officials appear authoritarian on some Issues and democratic-minded on otners. But mererowing appreciation thai the system of government is not working well enough to correct the country's economic

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Moreover, increasing public Intolerance of IMF-mandatedcoutd undermine tne country's leng-termprogrsm. The Army probably will continue to criticizein the party while concentratingts pi*within its own rank!

is

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