WESTERN EUROPE: THE DECLINE OF EUROCOMMUNISM

Created: 10/1/1985

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Western Europe: The Decline of Eurocommunism!

Directorate ol InirMiiencr

Western Europe:

The Decline of Eurocommunism

InlclllRcncc Assessment

European Analysis- llfor Operations. Comment andwelcome and may be directed

(REVERSE BLANK)

Western ,

The Decline of Eurocommunism^

Eurocommunism, the effort by West European Marxists lu flourish within democratic institutions and revitalize indigenous non-Leninist Mamti tradition, haa failed to brine. Communists much closer to power and is in deep decline. Eurocommunism nourished in, whendcicnic helped the image of all Communists. It has suffered ink j* dctcmc has wilted, and Soviet behavior in Afghanistan has revived the perception of Soviet threat. Wc believe the turocommunists overestimated their electoral appeal and underestimated public suspicion of theircredentials In addition, many supporters found it difficult to reconcile revolutionary lore with democratic practice, finally, when Euro-communist leaders have achieved power ut the local or national level, their tendency to engage in "politics as usual'* has left rank-and-filedeeply disappointed. In short. Eurocommunisis in office have fjilcd lo meet their followers' expectations of radical change or even marked improvement in governmentalsituation that has robbed these parties of much of their distinctiveness and appeal

esult. West European Communist parties are rent by ideological splits while their influence over (heir traditional workmg>clats constituency is declining. French and Spanish Communist electoral strengths arc ut historic lows, and the Italian Communists havecries of recent defeats at the polls. West European Communist hardliners have gone un the offensive, attacking the Eurocommunism for abandoning revolutionary goals and demoralizing the rank and file f

The malaise of Eurocommunism is evident ir, almost universal declines in membership among panics espousing the concept. Youths today are attracted to groups espousing causes such as envircnmentalism and feminism rather than Communism. Socialistlie ularly in France andproven better able to aim iheir appeals at Ihese issues and to adapt to the shift in the West European labor force toward the service sector and away from heavytraditional MaraisiMembership in Communist trade unions is declining both absolutely and relative toother leftist unions!

Communist leadership problems alsocon:iasl with socialist leaders'Italian Communist leader Enrico Berlinguer has died, his Spanish counterpart Santiago Carrillo has lost hii power and recanted his Eurocommuntst faith, and French Communist boss George Marchais has,

ten tyiei*!m?

jn ourbecome more clearly perceived as hypocritical andBy contrail, socialist leaders have proven skillful at siphoning off voters and union members from the Communists, and Socialise Felipe Gonzalez. Francob Mitterrand, and Bcltino Craxi have all assumed their countries' highest political officJ

The decline of Eurocommunism has accelerated PCI efforts to forge common security policies with West European socialists, and theantipathy between PCI and PCF leaders is worsening in the wake ofFrench Communist support for Soviet policies. On the other hand. Italian and French Communists agree on the fight of local parties to control their own destiny and arc helping the Communist Party of Spain fight for survivalro-Soviet rivalf"

Wc believe lhat the decline of Eurocommunismixed impact on US interests:

On the positive side, ihe concept failed to provide its advocatcavay out of the political ghetto, and those parties lhatjrown more Critical ot' lhe United States have also become less influential.

On the other hand. Eurocommunisi criticism of the Sovietin our view hits more credibility among Wcsi European leftists than pronouncements by lhe United Suites ur West liumpeuit giiwiimcnlN now it less vociferous and carries less wcightj

In our view, the Question of their relations wiih Moscow pose particularly difficult Questions for Eurocommunisi parties because of the priority they place on winning non-Communist votes. Polls confirm that non-Communist voiersenerally negative view of the Soviei Union. Many voters were willing to give Moscow the benefit of the doubt inut far fewer do so since the invasion of Afghanistan. The immobility of Sovietpolitics mayhave hurl recruiting efforts among younger

ealth of local Communist* Wc thin* there jrc some sign* Ihjl Moscow ha* deeded to pay lipvrrvicc to the West European particVhey issue in [articular for the PClJ

Moicative Soviet domesticthose giving (he impression of greater flexibility in economicabo. wc believe, improve Moscow's image in Western Europehole and would be welcomedroccmmunists in particular. Even if the USSR loo* these actions, however, wc think that the Eurocommunist* would be hard pressed to enhance their political standing significantly Such anin our view, wouldumber of factors, all of them citheror not under the Communists' conirol. for esample

A major economic setback in Western Europe, whkh would.bringrotest voles to the Communists.

A sophisticated Soviet propaganda offensive that consinccdhole that the Soviet Union was more deeply committed than Washington to arms control and disarmament

An end to factional squabbling within Communist party leaderships

Greater attention by Ihc Communists themselves to environmentaldifficult shift given the tensions between cnvironmenialism and traditional Maraiit ihctiicsj

(REVERSE BUNK)

Contents

Pate

Key Judgments

Scope _Notc

Introduction

Definition and Background Theory

Practice

Ideology and Morale

National Difference*

raciics rind

Disappointed

lhe DeclineLosing Voles _

Members

Tbc PCI"

The

The

Decline in Communisi Trade Union6_

for the Decline

. 'Competition Wiih the Socialists

and

The Importance of

Policies

PCI and PCF Divergences

1 9

Relations Withontinuing

"Soviet^PCI bidI

PCF: Choosing Moscow, Not Independence Security ISSUCS

Worldwide Communist

17

" 17

Implications for Relations Wiih Moscow

(REVERSE BLANK)

Western Europe: The Decline of Eurocommunism

Eurocommunism,ew years ago promised (Of ihreatcnedl to bring West European Communist par-lie* into the mainstream of political life. isin deep decline. Most of the parties that espoused it are rent by splits, electoral losses,ecline in their influence over iraditional working-classOf the three leaders most closely associated with ihe concept. one-Italy's Enrico Bcrlingucr-is dead:SantiagoIm hi* power and moved sharply away from Eurceommun. ism: and theGeorgespulled hi' parry bach toward orthodoxy and political

-

This1 analyze the poiii'cal problems posed by Eurocommunist theory, assessing the role ofstrategy, internal fissures, and demographic trends in the hard times faced by those who espouse it. In addition, it will analyze the tarnished Soviet model and examine the premise that theleadership in Moscow may restore some luster lo independent CmnmunUm

civilization

-hen he wd.Marxistovemenl is ihe offspring of Western culture snd civ

From this reminder that Western Europe -as Ihc center of Marxist thought before the Russianilhod jump io the theory thai developed capitalist counlrtcsemocratic Communism altuncd to the openness of Wester ft societies. This step was taken when the invasion ol Czechoslovakia8 sparked openbetween Moscow snd ihc West European parti-

Practice

Theoretical rejection or Leninist tenet* led. in the Western Europe of.cceptance or the democratic road as the likely path to power. Thus, while Claiming allegiance to revolut.onury goals. Eurocommunists renounce the classic Marxist stress on violentrait thai distinguishes ihcm from orthodox West European ponies, which conicsi elections bul remain enamored of the barricades. In oddition. Eurocommuntsis olien criticize Sovietthe rightational road io Social-

and Background Theory

heoretical concept, ihe termdenotes ihe search for the correct relationshipthe Soviet experience and ihe non-Leninist Maralst tradition of Western Europe. Ambivalence toward the Sovietantipathy toward Soviet repression (particularly after Khrushchev'son Stalintruggling againtt residual respect for ibc homeland orWest European Communists to rediscover non-Russian Marxist thinkers who predated Lenin and shared neither his disiuue for democracy nor hb obsession wiih vonirnratoriul politics lulian Communist Part) tPCIl leader Alcssandro Nana recently echoed ibis

> willing rivalsf

Eurocommunist leaders retain one importantsimilarity withdo noidemocracy in .heir own organizations. Although ihey have differing attitudes toward "Democratichey permit only limited internal dissent iind-a* evidenced by recent paroxysms In ihe Finnish and Britishare as willin* as orthodox Communistsurge factional

Ideology and Morale

We believe that two central coniradiciions limited the overall popularity of Eurocommunism even ai its height in, causingin Spain

an.

luln BtrBapur,

tiiraut fCI Irtfl'

.VlilfStntt lit*

irst is ihe contra-diction between the millennial ideals traditionally assoclaied wiih Communism and the capcdlcAl lacilcs cmphsured by Eorocom muni sis. Party militants, in ewrfound it difficultetain enthusiasm once ibe apt and downs of electoral politics replaced the heady atmosphere of revolutionary agitation at the standard for political progress.esult,set in once voting patterns, demographic trends, and relations wiih other leftists all turned

-

elieveontradiction betweenpolulcal strategy and intolerance of Internal dliieiii Iltnlled the jwpulur appeal ul llurovommgn-ism Moderates ia all tunics had their public calls foj internal democracy resected by parly leaders and sometimes found themselves removed from positions of power. Communist hardliners and leaders of non-Cominumtl parties pointed out the hypocrisy of the Eurocommunisi s' penchant for ngginc coniretscs an< dctiuici in traditional Leninist sty

of Antonio Gramsci. who substituted the concept of working elan "hegemony" lor the more authoritarian 'dictatorship of tbe proteiariaiGramsci's concept meant lhal workers could rule in eoepcraiioA with Other progressive dementi of society Palniiro To-gliatti, the -ileader, built on thisunderscoring his parly's independence frompolicy, and convinced many Italians ihai the PCIona fide democratic party. Tbe mayariiy of PCI leaden continue to seek power throughmeans and stress then itsdeivndence of Moscow publicly and in cqvate communications with other parlies]

Differences

Within these broad outlines, we believe that the depl| and durability of each party's devotion tohai varied according to political tradition anj domestic contest. In our view, historical difference* help eifdain why the PCI has remainedwhile the Spannh and French forties have noj

L

TacriVs aad ffitfury. Italian Eurocommunismatural development in line with PCI histoe) and lore. Wl lojalisis lean on the pre-World War II teachings

leaders, who came to share power in many important Italianas unable as other politicians to solve tbe chronicand inequities of Italian urban life. Their followers eipressed to pollsters and journaliststhat Communist officeholders seemedto conduct "politics as usual.

lotemial coal it it

Italian Camntunlsii look Ihe thirdupporting Chriitianin the hope of eventually Joining aThii did not occur and the PCIapotmon. The porly leaderihiprani-and file criticism for foiling lo gainduring ihii period, and ihe PCI

ould probably leek firmer oiiuoiacrr from its

coalman partners before trying ihis strategy

M-thslt. toi*

St*ae#>

Gtm'M Iilrliat

k 1 farm* Kl

Ihr Decline

The Eurocommunisi s. by driving Tor pomemoeraise arena, enabled supporters aad opponents alikeeasure their progress bv tradiiior.ailhanWhile these panics achieved tome degree of popularity in, their vote totals never reached levels high enough iohallenge for political power Wc believe lhal West European Communist leafletthe electoral appeal of Eurocom murium and underestimated publicn that Communist parties, whatever their stripe, really did noi support democracy. In our judgment, as failures multiplied and membership drives fizilcd, more and more people inucc and outside the parlies came toeriously fia-ed concept. The Earooom-mumtl parties fatal even to hold their position among their tradllional working-clim constituency- lite backbone of any Communist party lhat relict on popular appeal rather than rcvolulionaiy fervor.in our view, led rank-ind-fUc party members to Question whether their leadersr reconcile the revolutionary Marust-Leninist tradition withdemocraticloss ofparty so far seems able to ameliorate

Vole*

Eurocommunist proponents are reeling in ihe wake of setbacks tnat have tumbled PCF and PCE popularity to historic lows and created doubts among lialian press commentators over the PC fa political prospects

m

.1 Table 2

if , ,Membership Figure*

Electoral Performance in

Leglilalive Election*

PCI

ia*

no

'wi

in

11

10*

Jl

l.ooo

Internal Fiencb Communiit Party poll* currently place party ivppori alba* half the pa'i)'i ciniomary postwar total Spanish poib tuggcit ihai the Spanish Communist Party would farepoorly imit when ii polledercent ot Ihe volt The PCIecline from6 peak hat beea leu traumatic because ihe drop itself hat been less strep and because its Christ tan Democratic rira have siainaled as wel|

West European Communiit hardliners, such as the POT* Armando Ccnttitta. have publicly attacked the obseisada with elections as lhe LhrrxummunlstV Achilles' heel. We find persuasive their argument ihai the Eurocommunists fight on terrain chosen by the enemy, demoralizing the rank and file by forgetting their differences with other parties. We believe that the Fiench and Spanish Communis! leaders who have rcadopted hardline posilrws in the wake of electoral defeat agree with this aaalvusj

Losing Members

nurocommunisi panics, became they mobilizedusing traditional democratic means, depended on matt membership drives to undctpin iheir political strategies. They renounced Lenin's preference for small revolutionary parties in favor of large orgs nil*-iiom capable of broad publie appeal.c believe, declining party mem ben hip anpressed concern ofajor indicator of decline

The PCI.he Italian Communisi*embers, more than any Other Italian patiy except the Christian Democrats,ropcarl

teat

tarty lilini

L'Uity iiutu tu Jiiuci new members in ihe norlh; membership figures Irom the "redhePCI heartland in Tuscan v. Emilia-Romaena. and Umbria. bear this out

leaders were iiing younger mem-

lariiy eumrnieu avuu bers. The respecieu non-Communisi paper La Siampa reportedhal the parly ists typical number ul thai limeear-tiId mule. The US Consul in Trieste reported in3 lhat many younger members felt that the leadership had losi touch with ibctnl-

The US Embassy in Rome reported lasi February lhat the PCI-affiliaied youth federation -consisting of supporters undershrankin0 al the time of its recent congress. The party, in response, reportedly isIhe federation greater autonomy. This tactic, however, has had some embarrassing results,members voted at its congress to pull Italy oai ofosition at odds -nh the PCI't laoeort for Italian membership In the Alliance

sS**t^

Table 3

Spanish WorkerAffiliation

miaunlii Trade Union Suppon In countries where Communiti parties have adopted Eurocommunlim, the Cocnmunisii art alio losingn the trade union movemenl Membenfeip in liahaa aaionihole has declined sincer0a. but, while the largely Communistlargest Italian trade61he Socialist andleaning UIL increaicduring the same period Academic andommentator* believe lhat the UIL'* growth rcsutti direcily from itt ad;unmcnt io theul tervict

tawriuiill varim -at

umjiiiinu Tueja* PCI willingness to vi.'niK'e negotiating pontion* foe the Vile of deal* wiih .uhefUiue itui ariics directly from theeffort* to plj> the democratic

Reasons for Ihc Decline

hese statistics measure the decline and alsoause ii; they advertise th* troubles of Eurocomnvun* ist paniei to electoral constituencies and tho- piecipi-iaie further decline. Bui the causes include othei

ill

i_

lhat. in our judgment, underscore ihe chronic nature of the Euroeommunisl retreat An important cause of the Eurocommunist parties' decline has been the ability of other political pariies-cspeciall, theadjust to demographic change andihe economic inicrcsis of lefi-ing .otcrs better lhan their Communist rivals. In addition, feminists and ccologiit*iphoned off suppcriers more concerned with specific Issues than wiih millennial Marxism. Eurocommunism provides no guidance on issues such as these. Finally, we believe ihai ihe changing international political environment has seriously danjaaedjheprospects of West European Communist J

CompelKlon With (he Socialists

West European press and academic commentator* argue that failure to compete succesifullyajor reason for the decline of Eurocommunist parties^ According to thesehe Socialists haveished democraticwhereas West European voicrs lend to identify even Eurocommunist parties with Soviet repression. We believe that, while ideologists clearlybetween Eurocommunism and Stalinism, they never did so between Eurocommunism and social democracy. Socialists in France and Spain havetheir Communist rivals in votes, power, and membership. While Uerllnguer and Carrillo have departed the scene and Mnichai* has tin our view) proved his incompetence. Socialists Bettino Craxi. Felipe Comalez. and Francois Mitterrand have risen in the highest political offices in their countries and haveaneuvered against their Communist counterparts

The Socialist* did not just rely on theirn our view. They also adopied police* that -on votes:

The Socialists have consistently based iheir polittcaV itruiegies on appeal* aimed at satisfying workers' economic demands. The Eurocommunist decline of theoincided with economic prosperity in Westernwith ihe coming to powerlin Europe of Socialist governmenu claiming credit lor lhal prosperity On the other hand, recen economic problems, while redounding against tne

ave helped conservative opposition parlies rather than the Com muni sis-cipeci ally in France, where PCF cabinet ministers shared respondbility for the Mitterrand government'* policies until4

. We hcliccajor factor in successfultrade union competition wiih Ihc Eurocommun. ist* was the Socialists' skill al adapling lo changes in ihc character of theEuropean work force. AccordingECD figures for Italy. Fiance, and Spain, the blue-eollui worktraditional constituency of ihcdeclining relative lo tlic scrvicc: sector (reflected "as olbcr" inn

Greens and Feminists

In our judgment. Eurccoromunist parties Facefrom eeoiogiiis. feminists, and other non-*ectarian leftist* who may attract more young Wusi Europeans lhanxi*ls -whether hardline or Eurocommunist. Officials in virtually all CommUmst parties have publicly expressed concern thai youihs are attracted more to Green movements lhan to Communism. Wc believe that this clash of ideological priorities is an enduring source or conflict in ihc West European lef

Th: problem so far ha* manifested iiielf more in northern Europe, where ihc (ircon* Iiiivctheir major gains, lhan io Italy. France, or Spain. For example, the Belgian and Dutchrent by hardbne/Eurocommunistalso being lorn by debates over ihe relative importance ofclass struggle themes and rival feminist and environmentalist strategics. Even in Italy, however, the Green* for the first limeercent of the vote in the recent regionalain lhat wc

believe came at the expense of the PCI. Votersjn

Florence elected iwo Green ciiy councilmeo

Tht Importance of Detenu

We believe thai the Eurocommunists flouriihed inartly bceaoie East-West detente, by dulling lhe notionoviei threat, softened lhe public image of ill Communists and helped make voting forredible democratic option. In our view, declining public concern with the Soviet threat led togrowing belief thai both superpower! were morally cquivaleni (and equallyn impression ihai melded well wiih Eurocommunisi argument* that European!hrow off the domination of both lupC'rwwe'

brutality ihai had virtually disappeared after the US-Soviei arms conirol agreements of ihe. Although Eurocommunists Siressed theirfrom Moscow and at times strongly attacked Soviet foreign policies, wc believe that Wcsi European publics tarred local Communists with the Soviet brush.r-

1k* eksr iial imere-oJ rd.ne.il bei-ei".mi Meteo- -ouM wive ihrConnwBius' popiiIink. Mom*.',etiiom -iih SocUS*aiw.'i-ili> ihai ihe Uuei (eulO si ih( lame lime clilm so beir-erpendem ihm ihtii Cem^ai rivili ir4 lake trolii lot idiio! taa>Wm nUtim I

the unset of detenic facilitated the Earoeominuniii appeal, fronier East-West relations reversed this mo-menium. In our judgment, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan relnvigoeated public concerns over Soviet

ITV*

Stvttt"

loMrnatlDual

egree of solidarity still cints ore one issue; the right or local Communists to organize and legitimize national panics. Both ihc PCI and the PCFried to help their Sruniih comrades fendhallenge by the newly createdparty, in our judgment because both think the PCE's eel-taraebe rurmfal to ibcRiserm Marchess.met wiih PCE Secretary-GeneraI Iglcsiui innd refused to join the Warsaw pad and Greek Cnmmumst panic* in support lite the new

Thr panics identified wiih Eurocommunismdiverged ia Iheir cslcrnal polities sinceol ihe concept. Inhe> made asolidarity with each other. The solidaritymy deep, and it has long since evaporated.continues its contact with West Europeanpamci and its relatively evenhanded criticismsuperpowers the basis of its internationalThe PCF. by contrast, shuns lies withparties aad trumpets itshe PCE ii loo deeply embroiled withto pay much mention to outside issues.ihe parties, ihc issue of their ties to thetnehich appearave no

nd PCF Oats**nets

The PCI feels isolated by PCE electoral

PCI foreign policy has been complicated by doubts

thai Nana hai Ihe Skill to earn the international

licves that the KCb Willhui lc defeat" in ihcelection unless ihc Carrillo-lglcsias fcuding

that, i

.hein o" surrou ded_ splintered Communist ponies

fre believe thai Natla. aware oTTWproo- Jb Irying to drape himself in the Eurocommunist mantle. He is pushing his predecessor's Third Path" idea: the notion lhat Europeans. East and West, should assert traeir ialeresu when necessaryVt tape rowers, j

ressing for improved relations withrather lhan with weakened Eutocommumsts in other West European countri

[ PCI Foreign

Ietwork of tics no longer

These concerns arc not unique to panics that have been identified with Eurocommunism. Even theCommuniiis appear uneasy wiih Moscow'sthe hardline revolt agaimi ihc

PCE/" _fCP

officials, while opposeo io tne rt.es Mroeommuniti line, recstgnire it ai the only legitimate Spanish Communist pany. PCP officials reportedly are irying

of ties no longer Communis!r

Relations Wiihontinuing Dilemma In our view, ihe question of iheir relations with ihc USSR pose particularly difficult questions forpanies because of ihe priority they place

attempting io resurrect _

wiih Ihc Weit German Social Demociats thatsince ibc

Ai PCI and PCI' policies diverged, eiprciiions of mutual contempt became Ihc order of Ihe day. Inj. the KI newspaper LHmmax.itPCI electoral incngth tnocietytate of political, cultural, and moralVnlio

tiiuhigh-level Soviet ilemma

"l'l*-

oo "inning non-Com mutual vole* Poll* confirm that noo-Communis', votersa generally negative wc-ol* lhe Soviei Umoo Many voters wereo give Moscow the beneTu of ttsc doubt in the socniiev but far fewer do to since the invasion of Afghanistan The immobility of Soviet domestic policies may also have hurt recruiting efforts among younger constituents. We believe the commcnu of Marceleading PCF reformer, accurately state the problem "For souag people we are not ibef human rig V. andre not the parly of democrats sociahvm. We are the parly of the gulag and Afghanistan. |

Bui the tactics thai show the most promise with non-Communists, such as sharp criticism of Moscow, risk confusing and offending the party rank and file. In particular, wc believe lhe ups and downs in Soviel-PCI relations over ihe last three or Tour years arc due partlyCI fearank-and-file backlasN

Smwi-PCI Bad Bipod

Thepoint in the PCI'a relationsMoscoo came in the wake of the Polish ensa, when ihe PCI firmly supported Solidarityurocommunisi" experiment1 Berlinguer publicly compared the Ruistan and French revolutions, asserting that both had run iheir course Inn response to strong Prgtda attacks. PCI leaders declared thai the Soviet model had exhausted itself and spoke openly ofschism in rtafty-to-narty retalionsj

Polemics cooled by ihe fall, however. We believe that PCI leaders, in the final analysis, raw luile valueormal spin and fearc* lhal pro-Soviet PCI leader Armar-Jo Cossutta could rnobaiiic significant rank-and-file oppositionreak wiih Moscow. Indeed, according to press accounts, the party leadership had difficulty explaining its hostile aiiiiudc toward Soviet policy to the rank and file In1 the US Consul in Tnestc reported that Cossutta had local support for his criticism of the PCI line, la Jane thei. reported lhaterceni of the La no PCI federation hadote on that line out of iciidual loyally to the USSR. In July the Ligurii federation rejected the party line

Moreover, ihc PCI's ami-Soviet positionPoland apparently did noi improve ihe parly's public image Accordingoll in ihe weekly PowmnWerceni of ihc respondenis had more conrieence tn ihc PCI following ihii confroniaiion.ercent hadHalf believedhe PCItraditional" Communist party

, ,wa* concerned about Soviet fence local PCI organizations through

II TUTIV

propaganda and financial assistance

think these factors help explain why Italian Communist leaders carefully avoided polemics after ihe Sovieis shot down the Korean airliner in Scptem1

tsj . I'.

-TCTvpoHeiman called ibe actbuttime to Soviet claims of US responsibili

Most observers believe that the PCI's prc-Soviei faeiion repreients at mosto IS perceni of ihe natty leadership. We believe. Ivowever. thai ihere i* considerable latent peo-Soviei sentiment among theand file, and vse think PCI leader* arc vary of stimulating it-or examplt

1 3

its divergence. Ihc party did oppose INF deployment verbally and dtd lupport some demonstrations, bul wc believe the Italian Communists pulled iheir punches on tie issue, permiiiing the Italian Government lo accept ill allotment of cruise missilesinimum of domciiica Augustibc nev>l> installed Ccrnmaeni mayor of Com no.ra or missile me. prarr.iscd SO rcaiotaia 'correct- rcLiHosu with ibe base. He did so until the fjl' of hisearlier this year. Embassy and other reliable sources have reported9 thai Ihc Sovieii have esprcssed displeasure to PCI leaders over ihe biter's polio|

INF

Similarly, the PCI has failed to give much backing to ihc Italian Peace Movement. Press and US Embassy reports have noted PCI efforts io maintain credibilityinfluence wiih "peace" activist* by supporting

he PCI

H3nan pontes if ii got too close. We believe that ihe Communists intended to maintain an image ofthat would support the party's claims of loyally toward the lulian role in Western sccurityj

Stcurtiy Iiwt '

We belieie KCurily Uiue* iuch a* INF and the Strategic Defenie Initiative (SDIl are Mcocowriority in (he region. No Eurocommunist policies on security isiuc* have been entirely satisfactory to Moscow, but the PCI again is unique in the degree of

Wc believe the parly so far haiimilar posiisaa on SD1 Nana, in praising Gorbachev's initial speech ai General Secretary, said he'important'" lhal Osxbnvhcv hud avoided polemics over "starccordingS Embassy reports, at least some PCI officials were fascinated wiih ibc US bticfingi ea SDI last January, bclieviag that Washingtonogent rationale for the program. LViuta, ia February and March,elatively objective terie* on Ihc issue, reportedly ewer the objection of foreign policy expert Gsancarto Pajetta. who considered one article tohc face of thehe PCI has since criticized the SDI initiative, but so far hai not launched any major propaganda or parliamentary campaigns designed to ruci Italian participation in the programj

eu European Communist pa run. in our vtew. no Sanger oppose ike prineipk ol later national Com-maaot pant conferences. sbovU Moscow choose loorIndeed,ihe PCFeeting in Pari* last Juneiscuss politicalwithin ihe European Community, delegates fromarite* lurried up although ihc PCI nnd PCF could not agree onatters! This con-irasis sharplyegional party meeting hosted by Marcbai on tecumyhen Ihe PCI. ihc PCE. several smaller West European parlies, and the Ro manian and Yugoslav panic* embarrassed the PCF by refusing to mend|

In our judgment, this change encouraged ihe Sovieis during Chcrnenko's last month* to drum up support for Ihc first worldwide Communist conclave inoscow encountered opposition from ihc PCIIndication that the Italians were far. from giving the!

A Worldwide Communist Conference

In our view, ihc decline of Eurocommunism presents Moscowhoice of either attempting io isolate the PCI by insisting on renewediuropeaa Comrr.mun.it loyallyjriet policies, or improving rclaiicau wiih both Socialists sad Ccenmuaitts by paying lirnervicr to iheir iisdependence. Wc believe thai evolviai Soviet policies toward convening an iniern.iii.mil Commumsi parly meeting indicatei preferred the former road during the Cher-nenko era. but may have chosen ihe latter time Gorbachev'i accession!

Sinceon ihe Soviets have dropped thei' public calls for international Communistund have Increased iheir favorable comment on Soviet ties to West European Socialists. Wc believe Gorbachev may recognize thai past imeriuiicsul Communist meetings have generally becomefor dissent rather than for solidarity. PCI Directorate member Gianni Cervciti, who diicuised his meeting with Gorbachev2 May LVntia interview, expressed ihe view that Moscowlobal conferenceasyaJd thathange in Soviet policy, wc bebeve lhat itrelieving PCI concernsommunist meeting and supporting 'u 'merest in better relations with West Europeantt concrete step toward better Sovici-PCI relations

'the Uuidc" nicciueoccuiicd. bvi the Chucx

Codiuii Miiitwui; ihc tin mceiin*acIvOc ihe Chi

mt plani]

m

Gorbachev

Wc believe ihii Weil Uuropcin Cixmniunliii are pleasedounger man finally hai emergedead the Soviel Union.eean Cocimunisis reacted to Goebachev'i elevationopeful, if cautioui, mannerharp contrail to the coolness e> pre tied when Chcrrvenko luccccdedhey probably hope Gorbachev will be more willing lhan hit ptcdecesiors lo treat *hh respect the ideai of Communtili living in developed capitalist societies L'Humaiuit on I) March called Gorbachev's"an important developrneni ia the life of Ihe SovietCI ipokcuacnpositivelthough they csprcssed doubts lhalelations would change right away.

The recent endallsorldwide Communist

party meeting is one of several indkaiions that

Moscow is courting ihc PCI idihui Gorbachevavorauw impression ihe PCI delegation io Chernenko's funeral

pntta and

"JapancM Communist I'retinidfll iiuitinanrepresenting another party at odds with Moscow) were the only Com marom eon-ruling partiesmereeeting with Gorbachev during the Chcrnenko"evelopmenl that wc believe humiliated the PCF. At Andropov's funeral, Chcrnenko did not meet any non-ruling Communists, while Andropov met only wiih Marchais at Brcrh-nev's funeralonths earlier Beat the Japanese and ihc US Embassy in Moscow believe thatmeeting the PCI and Japanese Communin leaders indicates Soviet initrcsl in improving lies to thesetwo most formidable forces among independent, non-ruling Communist partici Al ihc

funeral^Vmm*osition thai wc btiievc could help Moscow improve its relations with many WestCommunist parlicj

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Sonet-PCI relat-aa. Millog hey are cordial.; we agree withf ib<IIRook that the, -ill improve greatly in ihe short run even ifore forthcoming In our view, the PCIs luke-arm opposition io US INFDIst.ll irritate Moscow In addition,ugust LVmu reported that the PCI delegation io the recent intertuiwnal youth festi.al In Moscow had clashed publiclyj*!th_ their hosts over Soviet policy in Afghamstar

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Moreover, forpanics, Euru-eontmunismoncept they arrived at late, and the element of hypocrisy was all too apparent. The main eiception in this regard is the PCI. the most successful of the West European parties and the one wiih Ihe deepest roots in Eurocommunism. We believe the PCI will remain the one major party adhering to Eurocommunisi concepts. PCI leaders will continue to criticise Soviei as well as US security policies as long as ihey believe Washington is willing to puisue arms control and suspeci Moscow has military designs on Weiiern Europe. They will also, we feel sure, try to

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peddle ihepath" "Sea to WaM Earonean.to Easilooking foralternative to the laperpo-erv Theesnphawre iheir eoniacis with French.and perhacn SpannhndEuropean governments; we think ihey willinterest only in those West Europeanthaiignificant degree offrom

We also think ihai the concepts of Eurocommunism haveegacy even in those parties lhat do not cipousc il. Continuing ferment wlihln the PCF. for example, is due not just to lhe iniensill.it> of the patty's leaden bul to the continuing slrenglh or -Eurocommunisi" ideal. We also find it noteworthy lhat neither the French nor the Portuguese Commit -msu have gone along wuh Moscow'. efForls toa pio-Sovici rival to the PCESpam. Apparently there arc limits to what even Moscow'. allies ia Western Europe consider permissible, in other -ores, the notion has uken root ia Wcsiera Europe lhat Communm patties ought to be allowed a

las. however, the dediae ofamisiakable la our view the Ccdinerjicd effect on US interests. Oa the pnsilive ode, ihe concept [ailed to provide It* advocatesay mil of the poliiical ghetto, and those parties lhat have returned tohaveore critical of the United Sutes-have also become lessOn the other hand. Eurocommunisi criticism of the Sovietin our view has moreamong Wesl European leftists thanby Ihe Uniled Slates or West European govern-ments-now is leii vociferous and carries less weight.

Implications foe Relations With Mown* The decline of Eurocommunism, in our view, presents Mosco- wiihopportunities lo improve relation* wiih Wesl European Communist parties. We believe that bream, most West Europeans mil link local Communis is -ith the Soviet Union, certain Soviet

policies could enhance even Ihe Eurceommu rusts"ppcil. Some of ihe mow effeclire policies, in our view, would have"Eurocommuniti" tinge

In ibe international sphere, leu Sovielcould five Weal Euiopcan panic*bcoM.ew initineei of Soviet bruuliiy wosM almost certainly speed their decline Weritical aspect of ihis Soviet imiie would be forther appearance of willing nesi to respect ibc local panics' independence.

More imaginative Soviel domesticthose living the Impression of greater ticaibil-ily in economicalso improveimage in Western Europehole and would be welcomed by Eurocommunism inWc think there would be no need for the Soviets io liberalize their human rights pobcici; oneobserver noted before Cherncnko's death that East European dissidents feel abandoned by the Eurocom munis is Raiher. the impression thatis reforming ill economy would be SufficicM to up the residual lympaihy moat Communists feel for the Soviet cipc'icncc. la short, West European Communists applaud experimentation and would react favorably to the perception that the Soviet Union once moteiant social and economic -la bora lory,

Even if ihe USSR took theseowever, we thmk the Eurocommunist* would be hard pressed to enhance their political standing significantly Such an improvement, in our view, wouldombina-tion of factors, all of ibera either difficult toor not under Ihe Communists" control, for rumple.

A major economic setback in Western Europe, which would bring many protest votes lo the Communlit*

A soohiiiicaled Soviet propaganda offensive thai convinced West Europeanshole thai the Soviet Union wai more deeply committed than Washingtonrms control and disarmament

An end to factional iQuabbling within Comma nut pany lesderthipi

Greater attention by lac Commun.it> ihemvclvonvironmentalshift thai would eipcoe tensions betweensm and classicihemeil

is

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