THE CHANGING SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

Created: 6/1/1985

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MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS

4

THE CHANGING SINO-SOVIET RELATIONSHIP

Iu olSheui fcJttmafe. vhwh ni

Bowd oom ima

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS. The following mteOlgorKO organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate,

The Control Intelligence Agency, tha Deleeoe latefaYaonca Agency, tha Notional Security Agency, ond thaceooniiation of tha Daportmant of Sterta.

Aho Participalmg:

Iha Aiaiilonr Chief of St off foe Intsilitjeoce, Daportnant of tho Army

Thn Director of Novo! InreUioarxe, Deportirant of tha Novy

The Aaatrant Chiaf of Staff. IntelXQonee, Dapcaimeot of the Air Force

"SKftt.

t

SCOPE NOTE

This Memorandum to Holders covers the remaining two-year time frame oft examines the incentives and constraints on improvement in Sino-Soviet relations and indicates probable future developments.

i

KEY JUDGMENTS

Several significant events in Sino-Soviet relations in the past year have led us to reexamine the conclusions ofompleted inn spite of the current leadenhip tensions apparent in Beijing and the recent succession of Mikhail Corbachev as Secretary General in the Soviet Union, we judge that tbe Estimate's major conclusions are still valid:

Moscow's and Beijing's fundamental strategic outlooks will remain at odds.

Tbe basic differences at the root of their animosity for more than two decades will remain; each side will continue to be deeply suspicious of the long-range Intentions of the other.

The Chinese leadership will continue to see the positiveand strategic vahie ofelationship with the United States,

There willurther warming in the atmosphere of the relationship and expansion in trade, scientific, technological, cultural, and educational ties.

The advances in the relationship over the past year have been generally consistent with the Estimate's description of the most likely course in Sino-Soviet relations: the level of hostility between Moscow end Beijing will decrease, and there will be additional agreements on trade and economic and other such secondary matters. These changes have come,ittle more quickly snd haveittle further than the Estimateear ago held likely.

Both Beijing and Moscow probably genuinely desire ways to lower tensionsariety of domestic political and economic reasons. Each side appears to be testing the other's flexibility andto determine whether something substantial can be attained at low cost Moreover, overtures by both sides earlier this year probably were also intended for the benefit of third parties, partlcuUrly the United States. Deng Xiaoping, for example, has sent signals that he wants more USIn helping to bring about reunification with Taiwan.ositive gestures to the Soviets could be partly designed to pressure Washington to be more responsive on this issue and less receptive to Taiwan's interests in receiving more modern arms

We probably will witness continued advancement io the secondary aspects of the relationship as well as limited party-to-party contacts that may gradually takeore formal character:

Additional trade, scientific, technical, educational, and cultural agreements will be signed: the Soviets will helpew factories built with their aid during

An agreement to open at least two, possibly four, consulates probably will be signed; additional border crossing points will be opened

There will probably be additional state-to-state contacts, such as parliamentary exchanges; there may be consultations between Foreign Ministers and possibly Premiers.

There could be some agreement on Confidence Buildingalong the border, such as mutual advanced notification of troop movements or exercises.

Neither Moscow nor Beijing, however, will make the concessions necessary for their reUtionship to go beyond the bounds outlined above. They almost certainly will not make any significant progress on matters Tclated to Afghanistan or Indochina We now believe that talks on border territorial issues are more likely to resume than the Estimate predicted. However, even if border talks do begin again, we judge that resolution of the border territorial disputes as well as regional security Issues will remain elusive. An understanding to "thin out" or withdraw some forces from the border is slightly more possible

Tbe most likely course of Sino-Soviet relations will not harm any significant US interests. We Judge that for tbe next two yean and probably longer Beijing will not move to an equidistant position In its relations wilh Moscow and Washington. Chinese leaders keenlythe United States' valuetrategic counterweight lo Moscow andource of much-needed economic and military technology.

There are, however, several uncertainties that could affect our analysis:

Moscow, under Gorbachev's new leadership, couldreater-than-expected effort to accommodate Chinese security concerns, which might leadore substantialr oc bemen t.

A power struggle could erupt within the Chinese leadership before or after Deng dies. We believe that disagreementsumber of issues, primarily the pace and scope of economic reform and leadership changes, have strained relations among

senior Chinese leaders- Questions concerning relations with the United States and the USSR have become part of these debates Given our uncertainty over the outcome of these debates, we cannot rule out the possibility of Beijing's taking steps sooner than we anticipate to. further improve relations with Moscow.

Deng's ambitious economic reforms could experience serious problems, which could leadeakening of his political position and that of bis chosenetreat from the goals of Deng's economic program would diminish one of the Chinese motivations for good relations with the Unitedthe need for US technology and investment. However, because the Soviets are not likely to nuke major force reductions along the border, or to back away from their goals in Indochina and Afghanistan, any new leadership in Beijing would face the same strategic situation that currently limits close Sino-Soviet political relations.

A deterioration of relations between the United States and China over Taiwan could lead Beijing touch more even balance ia its relations with the two superpowers than currently exists- We do not believe, however, that in loosening tics to the United States the Chinese would move substantially closer to the USSR

Crises ovei Afghanistan, Pakistan, Indochina, Thailand, and other areas could leadew estrangement in Sino-Soviet relations-

Soviet moves to draw North Korea closer could intensify Chinese suspicions of Soviet Intentions.

If our most likely scenario proves wrong and Moscow and Beijing go substantially further in improving their relationship, then US interests would be directly and adversely affected. Moves such as rapidly establishing more formal party-to-party contacts, an agreement to withdraw or draw down Soviet forces on the Sino-Soviet/Sino-Mongolian border, and resolution of the border territorial disputes wouldowerful impact on international perceptions. Other countries might conclude that such developments meant that the United States wastrategic asset and that Moscow had eased the threatwo-front war, thus strengthening its positionis NATO. More important. Soviet leaders might conclude that the general strategic danger to the USSR had eased, leading them to adopt an even more aggressive attitude toward the United States-

discussion

Hea Hopptfed

taWaVanl events have occurred since the EsOrnnte was completed in April of last voir (for details, see Chronology in tbeTwo of these events have been pivotal In further wanning the atmosphere of Sino-Soviet relations and mtreasuig trade and economic ties

Flnt Deputy Premier Arkhlpov was received in Beiiing inaking him tho highest ranking Soviet official to visit China Inean'

Morbachev was appointed SovietSecretary after the death of Chernenko

ooutive atmosphere and ensure the success ofisit. Beiiing made unusual effort* tuch as remaining silent oo the fifth anmveru-ry of the Soviet invasion of Aloharuatan and briefly withdrawing troop* from the Si no-Vietnamese border. The visit was described by both ridesuecew. Moscow and Beiiing signed an expanded trad*phas new agreements oo economic cooperation

and eschansrs in science and technology. Moreover. Vice Premier Yao Yilin was quoted by the official

Chinese news service aa calling Arkhlpov "comrade,"

and Chen Yun alluded to the socialist nature of both

count ric*

3 Followingeath, boththea series of symholic naturesesire to Improve relationsi acceptance speech called for seriousat reiinoru with Chinaeciprocal butt Unlike the hut speech attributedebruary USSR Supreme Soviet electionGorbachev's remarks did not mention "seriousdifferences" dending Moscow and berjing.'hu. Cbtraae National People's Cungres Standing Conunittee Chairman Peng Zhert called Corbachevrivate Chinese request, Gorbachev met with Vice Premier Li Peng, who oonveyed party Camera) Secretary Hu Yaobang't congratulatoryTha was tbe lint Chinese partyro-party menage

Lae* Pnaaaer aiekarv lowgia area*airport nopover8 and ulkari waa Iba lata ftaoalur Zona Fadal

Results othlt.U

Aarted toa aSt year iraoe accord dosing rha fint half ofaimed at ratattg the level of trad* to US ISillion0 and increasing trade5 by abouto TO percent.

Agreed toeant coram mee ca rconamkr. trade swottBc end trrhnacaJ coennaooa io taper -iiv and implrment agxeernems and peotoouk

Agreed to Oichaoie acionnBc and leehlUal know! edge and groups, ichcJan. and exports, as well as train earn other 'i technical Dtnoenai.

Agreed to discuss Soviet bearefurbuoingbinh with Soviet aanlUnor during the WCa and to eichanae and mutually study production techooloRy.

Agreed to bold Utateral eccaaaraK talks atenato- le*al in8

Amen! to comtderultural coupe.ranon aareement-

inbo referred to the USSRsocialist" country for tbe fLrst time sincend eapresaedwillingness to raise tho political dialogue to the same level as the dialogues on ecotann-Ics. culture, and technology This scries of important gestures led us to reexamine Irenda in Sino-Soviet relation*

Chinese ond Soviet Motivcrriorti

A. Wa have little reporting about either skle'iaad caicukstlora In this latest round of symbolic gesture* We beheve thai both sides probably have been engaged in tactical maneuvering, testing each other's flexibility and intentions and determining whether something substantial can be attained at low cost. Both Beijing and Moscow probably genuinely desire to lower teirstons forvariety of domestic political ind economic reasons

s. We believe thai the recent shifts in atmosphere arearge extent also intended to influence the

Mao ZedWs death. Hat Sovietsamtohich IbeAd sat aorrpt or irtTti JSije.

-Se&fiai.

behavior and perceptions of third parties, particularly tbe United States. China would lite to obtain greater room for maneuvenraj between the United Suites and the USSB whilelone run eatabbrJune. itself ai ihe swing partner In the triangular relsliomhlp beinog does not want to appear lo be standing still in the tripolar relationship while the other two aldeaInstead. liening probably decided to tee If its bend could he strengthened in dealing with bolhSince December, Deng haa sent signals that he wants more US coooerauoo in helping to bring about reunification with Taiwan. Chinese grsKtires to the Soviet* could be deragned In partrelude Io pujiuheg Wasfungton oo this issue, orieni to test US nncepobdiry to such preawre Tbe Chineae ney abo hope that on improved relationship with Mcecow would enhance Beijing's contacts and infju-ence with Moslem Europe and other Soviet allies.

6 Chinese domestic policy disputes and political frictions probabiv also haveart In China's poolrJv* gestureshe Soviet Union In March. Weumber of reports that suggestumber ofthe pace and scope ol economic reform and leadershipu rained retabons among feasor leader] Questions concerning rektlon* with the United Stales and the USSB have become part of theac debates We ore lea clear about Deng's late in the pnarttve gesture* toDeng was merely placatingcritic* or whether Deng also believed the time was right for more balance in relations with the superpowers. In either case, we have no convincing evidencelearly defined group In the Chinese leadership that Is pushingajor reorientation of Chinese foreign policy or thatery different strategic outlook We strongly believe, moreover, that no specibtellv pro-Soviet faction enits In the Chime leadership Debate* in Belting probably focus on the degree of "tilt" toward the United States or the USSBon how lualance that beat solves Chinese

n the Soviet side, we have Utile haid evidence concerning Gorbachev's foreign policy agenda. Initial Statements by himesire Io Improve relations with China The Soviets have been ossiduouslv coin vadog Gorbachev'sbat aho for foreignynamic, active Iratder. Cor-bochev has alreadyar more demanding schedule of meetings wtth foreign officials than either Andropov or Chernenko. Moscow may view relations with the Chinese as an area of opportunity toore activist foreign policy at tha perceived espense of Washington. At the same time, we have good reporting that tbeoder ohm wonts to establish an image of toughness and Immunity to pressure toward all tbedvenartta, clients, and allies This aim constrains Soviet Benbtbty la dealing with the reel secunty issues that concern China We bebeve Moscow Is looking for modest improvements :ri rein note wtth BeUuig, but only in areas that would not necessitate fundamental Soviet concession!

a Each tide appean to doubt that the other is prepared to offer substantial concessions Wa have several Mcecow Embassy reports that stsggeat Soviet officuis are optimisticurther wanning in reUnons bat saeprieai that Betting's snsturo* will lead to substantive changes. For their part, the Chinese have also confided that they believe it will be several years before Corbachev will have enotsgh power, cveo if he has tlie desire, to reorient Soviet policy toward Beijing

Strategic Corotrcantj and Alted Concerni

here is no evidence that Other Belling or Moscow has ahered its fundamental strategic outlook toward the other We ore confident that the baste difference* at lb* root of their anlmosllv (oi more than two decades remain and lhal the underlying nines that divide China and the USSB, as ouilfned In theare still valid Thus:

Each views the other aspa niton title ambitions that clash with Its Own regionalu piralioiu.

Ideological estrangement and nationahsltc hostil-tces persist.

Beijing still ha* some bitter memorial of the high coatsery close association with Moscow

lie three obstacles posed byoccupation of Afghanistan. Soviet support to theIn Cambodia, and Soviet forces along the Chinese border and inremain aconstraint on improvement in Sino-Sovietrelabooi We coodode that the Chineae were trying to maiimire their negotiating room before the recent Siith Round of Talks in Moscow, cither by omitting all reference* to the three security issues or by elh'ptically mentioning only more amoral "obsta-cleo.'T-

tx.

we have learned lhat Chinese rtegc-Tsatofs aTFhe talki did raiie ail three issues once again. Moreover, while the talks were In session andDeng Xiaoping and Hu Yaobang reiterated the Importance of removing these obstacles We bebeve there statements were Intended, among other reasons, to put pressure on the USSH to respond to Chinese security concerns.

ll lo recent years, top Chinese officials have tinted Moscow to accommodate them on at least one of tbe three issues. This suggests China's willingness toreUtiona further if the Soviets begin to deal with one of the isaues, without the Chinese dropping their demand that the USSB give them satisfactionon alt three. Lately, Deng Xiaoping. Foreign Minister Wu Xueojan. aad Vice Foreign Minister Qien Ocben have all reiterated the Chinese pees tion that Soviet support to Vietnam In Cambodia might be the "easiest" one to solve or is the tnoat important of the three obstacles. The Chinese probably made such recent remarks In pert to encourage Vietnamese luipi-cioru of Soviet intentions.

n rhe Soviet side, there are fundiine-gal lnbi-bnborn to making coixessslnris regarding rhe three obstacles. On Afghanistan and Indochina, agreeing to nesrotiate or to compromise by any degree would undermine the legitimacy of these Soviet intnwsts. while major concessions would blunt Moscow's efforts to protect its influence and power in Asia. Although the Soviets have some room to maneuver on farce deployments near thepoenhle economic incentiveshlrtrung out of activevalue Ihe existing force balanceource of pressure oo Chinese behavior. In return for easing that pin sure, the Soviets wouldignificant political concession rather than lust reciprocal military moves Irom the weaker party.

oncern for the perceptions of allies and other friendly counlrtm is yet another constraint on tha pace and nature of improvements In Sino-Soviet relations The Chinese have made special efforts to reassure tbe United States and other friendly countries lhat no dramatic change In policy toward the Soviet Union Is expected, and that they are pessimistic about progress on polllkal and security issues. Beijing is awareignificant breakthrough In Slno-Sovlet rehUonssucb private reassurances would strain tela lions with tho United States. Japan. Thailand. Pakistan, and ethers. If relations wtth the Soviet Union move too far. too fast, Beijing run* the risk of undercuttmg its effort to obtain US technology and weapons and enhancing Taiwan's leverage wttb Washingtoo. Moscow bconcerned about the possible damageelations wtth friendly countries and allies, mostVietnam. India, and North Korea

Tha Sbtth Round of Talks

he Sixth Bound of Talks, which was held in Moscow from '9 toApril was the first formal opportunity ttooe Corbachev's accession for Moscow and Beijing to engage In concrete bargaining On the hosts of public press reports and private officialwe conclude that the talks did not result in any ngmftcant concession* by cither side '

ini oca

rJeijirsgsnd Moscow were disappointed" that the talks were sc. utrtr present mora rather than real exchanges China's dissatisfaction with the outcome was apparent tn its official press account of Vice Foreign Minister Olon Oichen's irjeeting with Foreign Mrmster Cromv-ko. Xinhua, tbe official Chinese press, highlightrd (Jlan'i reminder that Moscow hadish for "signirjcantn relations and thatwaits for the Soviet Union toove in this regard."

he Soviets repeated in the talks their previous callundKal document" gtrveraing reUtionsilateral declaration of principles)esumption of border talks They offered to discuss mutual troop thin outs along these common bonier hut refused to talk about their forces in Mongolia The Chineae parried these uiagcstloos by Insulins that there must first be progress on outstanding regional issues. No dote was set for official talksigher level, such as between Foreign Ministers.

here were, however, two new wrinkles. First, both sides agreed toilateral conferenceto the Slno-Soviel rjorder. We do not know tha agenda of the confeieocc. Tho Soviets have been pushingesumption of the border talks that were ttisTseisded at Chmose Initiabve InH Wo believe the Chinese may have agreed now taonference in order to probe for Moscow's possible proposah before deciding whether to -jastscipete in the border talks once again

oint press statement carried in TASS following the talks' conclusion mentioned, for the first time, that progress In "political relations" wu ex pec ted in the future Beijing expressed interest in

better political ties when Vice Piemlor Li Pens met Gorbachev atuncial Mention ol this point (oUowinc the talks reflects in unproved climate tn relationa We iu*urne that both sides are leavinK the portability open for more movement during theyear, perhaps during Vice Premier Yao YUtn's vitit to Moscow this Mr or at tbe Seventh Hound of Talks tins fall. The Soviets, ia particular, have gone out of their svay since the talks' oondosaon to reaffirm their tnteiest in Improving ties through positive recent itatcrnenli bv both Gorbachev and Politburo Member Aliyav.

Whot's Ahead

Tht cfavalopments lisleu in the inset are rhon wc nidge will occur over the nest two veer* In addition, we beheve that there will be additional party to-parly contacts and that these contacts mav graduallyore formal and routineIn pursuing aoMiliona) party-to-party contacts, both sad os could agree to reestablish trade union tie* and exchange propaganda officials and/or press deJc-tatsoos During future leadership vara, teeming mention could be made of part*and -ntten as well as oral party greetings could be exdianaed.

In conversation with US officials, the Chinese continue to claim that party-to-party relations with the Soviet Union will not be roaumed We are somewhat skeptical ot these rtatesnents in light of Hu Yeobsmst'i greetings to Gorbachev and the (out press statement fllt-llH the last round of talks But. because of these reassurances to tbe United States and other friendly countries, as well as for other reasons, we believe that Beiiingoleliberate. ambiguity concerning the character of their party contacts with Moscow (or the next several years.

The resumption of Sino-Sovset party relations would clearly enhance the imageloser overall relationship The real content of that relationship is another matter, however. Considerations of ideology and leadenhip politics could intrude lo complicate tha relationship in new ways. China has embarked on an ambitious course of liberalizing: rconotiiic reform ihat is politically contentious- The Soviet Union under Gorbachev ts. at Ibe same rime trying to hammerew. probably much more conservative, course of economic revival that is aho bound to be politically controversial Soviet elites arc certainly watchingreforms, tome hopeful and others (earful of their success. Interest bv each side in the others leadership

s4op*veots intations In the Meat Two Yeerrs

The bras term trade egreetneof will he signed this July

The Soviets will help rofe- factoriesdurmg the iafiO*

There -fl be sddStWnalon economyand cultural marten

There wll) be addruonal state-lo-rtate contacts, such as parliamentary aachangni; there may be consultations between Foreign Ministers and- est hly fDMfi.

ass agreement ba open two, possibly lour,tes wiD be sarnrd. iddihciml bonier crsassbsg points wiD ba opened

Tbeof Soviet rawicaiuc and lechnical advisers In Chin* "tH (Dcreasc. (We ire unsure bow many. If any. Soviet advisers are cumotly sun coed in China.)

The number ol Sno-Soviet stucWnts wiB tacrine (Apprcaleaawlv TO Soviet students cvnreastly sre in China andhinese itudents ta tbe Soviet Union. Io compartson. for tbr academic5 Ibere0 Chinesrbe United Slain.)

could lead to the same sort of sussaetons about internal pobttcal mreefcronce that bedeviled Sano-Soest*in the IfiSOs. Internal disputes over economic reforms on one side could lead to the use o( the other side's performanceolemical foil.

producing new ideological frictions. China hat before it the tricky doctrinal problem of explaining how a

'socialist" USSR can also be hegemotiitt. Historical susptciom and conaseting tfistegic interests will tend to make operated party ties as (factious as tbe overall

relationshipat oration of such tins oooiduna greater freedom to expand contacts wtth pro-Soviet parties and lo compete with Use Soviets for

Influence within tbe Communist movement.

ccordingecent report, the Chinese have agreeconference to discuss border relatsona Therefore, we now fudge thatore probable (ban the Estimate predicted (hat the border talks onal issues will resume. Such orio*iat)oets may lead to agreement on Confidence Building Measures such as mutual notiQcatton of troop exercises along their

coramon border Even if border talks ream, we bobeve ibe current stalemate oa the :eriitorial lima wtD continue ihrough Ibe next two vo*ri

e further aao* (hat resolution of broader security cooewnun*in elusive and (hat tbe following situations will continue:

Soviet pretence in Afghanistan and support to Vietnam

Chinese support to Afghan insurgents,to the Khmer resistance, and military pressure on therwse border

An Alternative Otitcomo on the Border

Vhlh)fa highly unlikely that Moscow ud Belnng will make significant progris* on tbe Afghan or Indoehineso issum in tha nest two ynars, tt is somewhat more likely that they could reach an understanding to reduce forces along the Sinn-Soviet and Sine-borders The constraints against such moves as listed in theas the limited room to pull back Soviet forces because of the presence in the easternmost sector Dear tbe border of large vulnerable cities sod the Trans-Siberianstill valid. However, the military imbalance favoring the Soviets gives them the option to make some conciliatory gestures. If thev choose to do so. while retainm* their military superiority.m pie. the Soviets could withdraw one or more of dielr division* stationed In the Soviet Far East near the Chinese border or to Mongolia Tbey could abo thin out various units by reducing manpower or relocating selected equipment

ost important, theo-Soviet triangular relationship probably wiB never be really "balanced" as long as both Beiiing and Washington believe the Soviet Union is Ihe primary threat to their security Sine-US military contacts haveetback with Ibe postponement of the US port call to Shanghai However, as long as the US relationship with China, tn reneral continues to progress and tbe Chinese do not lurid*mentally alter their strategic outlook, Moscow

24 Likewise, an asreetnent on tbe territorialwould require strong leadership In both capitalsillingness to compromise. We do not know how such negotiations mightconccs-sions might be offered by each sade and bow the other might 'tr-fr We believe, however, that the Soviets might be willing lo concede some of the minor islands in the Amur and U'tsuri Rivers as well as to acree to sonar compromise on the Pamirs: but they would be less likely lo yield on ownership of Tarabarov and Bol'shoy Usrurtysk Islands (called Hei&uzj by thepposite the Soviet city of Knabarovskection of the Trans-Siberian Railroad The Chinese, in rum. would probably want lo consider any cornpre-benslvn territorial border settlement in conjunction with Soviet force withdrawals, particularly of tome divoions in Mongolia, and admittance by the Soviets of theature of the Tsanstey

find il hard to me China at an tdfective "card" <nlh the United States, and it will be difficult for China to play ihe USSR against tbe United States.

n the comingeusitt: may try to pees* Wajhingtonore directreajsoting negotiation] for Ihe reunification of Taiwan. We dolrve. however, that the Chinese want the Taiwan issue to impede overall relations withand they will not revert to former confrortta-tionel. badgering tactics unless thev perceive theStates as violating its commitmentOne China" pohcy or ogreernents on arms taJes toeterioration of retalwn* between the United Scales and China over such issues couldInn. toar greater balance lo As relations with the two superpowers lhan currently exists This could lead the USSft to be more demanding toward Beijing, however We do not believe that modestly inn eased fnctsuni with the United States would move the Chinese substantially closer to the USSB.

iven our uncertainty over the outcome of current policy debates us neung. we cannot rule out the poartbslity of China's taking additional step* much sooner than we anticipate ta improve relations with Mokoweijing and Mcecow do go lurtber thanexpect in imptovinst relations, then USwill be affected. Moves such as reaching aoo border Issues involving aIn Soviel forces would probablyreale: irnpect on international petcepaom than the actual substance of such agreements or ties should merit. Other (OuntrUM might interpret such developmenU as meaning the United Stales wastrategic asset while the Soviets were lessening the threatwo-front war and, thus, ttrangthening ibeir positionU NATO. More important. Soviet leaden might abo conclude that the nrstcgic danger to the USSR had eased, and this might leadssore aggressive attitude toward Ihe Unitede do ootevolution of Sino-Soviet difference* over Afghanistan and Indochina in our rime frame.US interests would be served to the extant that the

Soviets in pursuitloser relationship with Beijing made concessions reading these issues.

e also do not rule out the possibilityewuso-Soviet relations over the rasat twoevelopment could spring from many sources^ an increase in Chinese support to the Afghan resistancescalation of Vietnam's military ram pa am in Cambodia aad along the border of Thailand, Soviet move* to draw North Koreaore overt Soviet military threat to Pakistan oria Moscow's covert atteinpts to (iaslabihjeZia. as wellariety of other potential crises around the world Upoint, the United States benefitsore hostile Sino-Soviet relationship. Beijing would probably be more receptive to US policies and cooperate more fully against Sovietaround the world.

inally, our analysis might be altered:

ower struggle irrupts within tbe Chinese leadership before or alter Deng dies that irsults In tbe vreakening of his chosen successors

If Deng's ambitious economic reforms eirseri-rtDce serious problems, which In turn leadeak coital of Deng's political position or those of hu chosen successor*.

If Moscow under Gorbachev's directionreaterrcled effort to accommodate the Chines*

A retreat from the goats of Deng's fcoootnic program would diminish one of the Chinese motivations for good lelotiom with Ihe Unitedhr need lor US lechriology and investment This retreat could be accompaniedurge of anU-Westernism that might be directed particularly against the United States However, because the Soviets are not likely to moke major force reductions along the border, or to back away from iheir goali in Indochina andany new leadership In Beijing would face the same strategic ntuabon that cvrrenlly inhiinti close Sino-Soviet political relations.

annex

sino-soviethronology

Fourth Bound of Slr*>Soviet Tali* cwntna4

rotocol on sludeatigned inIncreasing tbe number of students eligible to travel between the two nations from

4

President Reagan arrives in China.4

Soviets, angered over positive aspects of Reagan's trip. Increase media criticism of Beijing's policies

44

TASS critic lie* Chinese "military provocations" oo theVietnamese border

94

Soviets cancel planned visit of First Deputy Premierlaiming theot prepared for me talks. Chineae interpret cancellationesult of Beogeni vnat, recent activity in Vietnam, and Sovietogl.ttn*

IS4

General Secretary llu Yaobang meets with President ofk.'hi* League of Communists Drogodav Mowkovic and indicate* thai the territorial aspect of the border dispute with thr USSB is minor and can be easily settled This itatrment washinese diplomat.

4

Chernenko meets with Vietnamese party leader Le Duan and Piemier Pham Van Dong, critidzingforeign policy with sorne of the strongestused Once2

une4

Chinese Defense Minister Zhang Aipfng visits the Unitedrance, and lapon

4

Soviet photo exhibition opens In Mcecow. highlighting Chinese 'aggressive activity" on the Suin-Vietnamese

4

Chinese Vice Foreign Minister Oton Qlrhen, Beuings top Soviet eiperl, arrive) la Moscow for talks with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Kapitsa.

4

Bcliinu press assaili Chernenko'* foreign policy,it isettructive force slowing the course of Sino-Soviet nrinnallratlon aad derailing US-Soviet arms talks."

4

Chineseoviet article on the Nomligned Movement

4

Betling accuses Soviets of navigation violations on the Ussuri River.

4

Fortnga Ministers VVU Xueqian and Andrey Gromvko during UNCA. talks aie calm, but not

4

Fifth Round of Sino-Soviet Talks convenes in rieijing.4

Soviet journal /nlemolionai Lifttrongof Chinese domestic and international politics

4

Bilateral trade agreement signed increasing tbeme of trade to about3 htlion

64

Chen Jie. headhinese trade delegation to Moscow, signs5 goods exchange and payment agreement based on the HO November trade

4

First Deputy Premier Arkhtpov arrivesighly pubucired trip to Beijing. Three agreements signed, calling for bilateral economic and technicalbilateral sewnrloe and technical cooperation: and the establishmentommission on economic, trade, and scientific and tecrinscal coopers**!

4

rJiaUeralincrraie the volume of trade

illion todl.on is

ef^oce by the Chinese to Aeu concern, over Ihe 'three obstacles' unltl the Sixth Round of Talks convenes in

..wi-esU-

Staff, arrivea ui Chine.

anuary

Chineso Ambassador to Banna, after only one month in the country.rivale dinner lo. the high-ranking officers of the Soviet Emba-y; the Ambassa-dot chums the dinnerssible because ofrelations between Use two countries.

qSIIZ rse- Arrsrsr-ador and DCMtooth ol whom are eajjerseoced Soviet hands

5

Ixosutivaard-mtting anti-Cbitsese crUwue typifies irscreared Soviet media cfltjcinn of Chinese policies.

U5

Orrnenko-sspeechoreWe* on Slno-Sovet relations, initiating ao easing ot Soviet

5

Chinese National People's Congress delegatscm vssu Moscow, tbe Orst parliamentarywo decades.

MarchSoviet leader Konstantin Crswnenko dies; MlkhaU Corbachev Is named his successor

March

Gorbachev states in his acceptance rpeeehlM the Soeietjenous improvement in relations wain China, given reciprocitv in the talks

While'^nlr^coodokw book at Soviet Embassy. NPC Standing Committee Chairman Peng Zheo con-gratulaie* Ccebachev. callingomrade

Pen,'ZZ CWnkoi funeralev. ranking meeting between the two countriesmonveys General Secretary Hu Yaooengs congratultfory message and calls th- Soviet Union acountry. Li state. China, hopes for an improvement in "political relations"

5

Foreign Minister Wu Xueedan meets wrthI.om the European Economic Commun.lv claha-in, that the messages to Co.ti.chev were prtrtocol in nature,al tba. atm<sst>rvcrics are taprovir*

5

Under Secretary cf State for Political Af airs Arrwcost neet.Foreign MimsterOirhen; Osiriese rtt. that IIIII snll expends on resolution of tbe three chatackes-

Vlce Foreign Minister Qiao Qlchen and DeputyMinuter Mikhail Kapils- both attend the UN Economic and Social Commission (or Asia and theeeting in Bangkok

5

Commlssson Vice Mirnster Zboo We.eb.ng rrseets -ah ArkUpov to discuss bilateral transportation issues.

5

Chinese Invite officials fromnstitute of the Fa. Fart, once renownedotbed of anti-Chinese propaganda,eception in Moscow.

Soviet Pohtburor^tkrenng discusses ooeslsoo. relatedurtherot uade and economic ties with China and note.of such progress.

Second high-level economic delegation led byortorruc Cornmission Vice Minister Wang Lei travels to Moscow to discuss Soviet economics and pnesng teehruouea

Soviets brief the Chinese on Scrwhi-Cromyko inert ing, in Geneva; Soviets state hope, lor reciprcotythese talks.

45

Sovset friendship delrspUion arrives In China and onpril signs plan5 Prograni

Lu^.i'prot^ sismed in Beumg cadltfl, forhaneetudents and trainees duringcademic year.

95

SUth Bound ol Sinc-Soviet Talk, convenes in Moscow.

5

Party General Secretary Hu Taobana meeti with Hong Koraf press, cUimlng lhalilling lo upgrade, iha level of official contacts as the Soviets desire. He cites the possibility of futuro meetings at the Foreign Miruster/Prime Minuter level

5

flenmm Rtbaoront-page interview with Hu Yachong. Hu announce* tbe upcoming US naval ship visit and states that Chin* has received US Assurances that only conventional ships will make the trip.

5

COCOM meets to discuss adopting less stringenton exports to China

alks with Australian Prime Minister Hawke, flu Yaobang stares that "threat* to China's borders must be removed oo matter whether the threats are Ln th* north or tbe south."

Ineporter's question. Deng Xiaoping mentions the gravity of tbe three obstacles and stales (hat the Soviets must make some effort to remove then if they hope toomplete normalization of relations. This ia the first explicit mention of the three obstacles sinceeng abo identifies Irxlcchms as Ihe "easiest" obstacle for the Soviets to overcome.

During talks with former Prone Minister Heath. Dengthat the three obstacles must be removed before relations with the Soviets will Improve, and that tin-Soviets could slut by removing lust one of them. I5

Penghairman of the Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress, arrives in lapanine-day vSatt.

tt5

Sixth Round of Sino-Soviet Talks concludes in Moscow. TASSoint statement Ulentifvlna among other areas "political relations'" as an Issue for improvement S35

Wang jiacfaong. Vice President of the All-Chinaof Trade Unions, announces that China may restore relatione with tradehe Soviet Union and Eastern Europe- These relations have

a3

b>speech celebrating Lenin'5 th birthday. Geydar Aliyev, First Deputy Chairman of the Council of Ministers, states that the Soviet Union is striving -seriously for an improvement of relations with China based on reciprocity

entral Committee plenum speech, Gorbachev reaffirms Moscow's commitment to improved ties with Beijing without mentkontag "reciprocity "

Fraodaoint communique tigDed by the Sovieb and the North Koreans Of particular interest is

DPRK's signal in an official document of its growing divergence with Chinaumber of Issues,Cambodia. Grornyko aho accepts sn invitation to visit P'yongyarxt If hee would become the brat Soviet Foreign Minister to visit tbe nation

8-lt5

Soviets aad North roeeara mark VE Day withof air squadrons.

5

Visit to China by Japanese Vice Defenseune

Protocol signedhort-term exchange of TASS and Xinhua staff members.

What lies Ahead Early5

Vice Premier Yao Yihn is scheduled to visit Moscow andive-year bilateralmerit.5

5

USSR Supreme Soviet delegation may vtut BeUIng.5

lapanese Defense Minister may visit China.5

Foreign Ministers Wu and Cromyko may meet at the United Norton* in New York.

5

Seventh Round of Sino-Soviet Talks will convene in Bourne

6

Possible port calls by Japanese naval vessels

Original document.

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