Created: 5/1/1985

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

Iran: The Struggle To Define and Control Foreign Policy! I


or Methods Involved (WN INTEL)


to Criminal Sanctions

PitttaiiMtioa Con nol


releuable lo rordan natxnub


releuible locMiliicion or oonlfKlor/ooatulUalt



and extraction of inform* lion conuolkd by originator

InfOfhu bora auihortw! for kVih io...

vxuca or mctbodi unofred

Dcr)>rd from multiple i

ft* com pi ct memo! oodonxdi are M- MORAYPOKH U AMMA

Iran: The Struggle To Define and Control Foreign Policy

Iran: Th* Struggle To Define mid Control Foreign Polic)

believe thai faciions in ihe Khomeini regime are engaged in an

struggle over the direction and objectives of Iran's Islamic

that will keep its foreign policy erratic and in turmoil. Since the

clerics consolidated their rule inhey have had to reconcile Iran's national interest* with often conflicting revolutionary goals. We believe Iran is movingore pragmatic approach to foreign policy, primarily because of economic pressures and the war wilh Iraq.

These factors have forced Iran io seek tiesrowing number of countries to ease its international isolation, sell iu oil. andteady supply of arms. Iran has expanded relations with the Muslim states of Sub-Saharan Africa and has sought better relations with Turkey andAnkara's secular government and both countries' close lies to the United Stales. Economic relations have been cemented with several OECD countries and with Eastern Europe as well. Iran is even pursuing better relations wilh the moderate Arab regimes of the Persian Gulf as part of its strategy to wean them from Iraq.

This movement toward more normal foreign relations is hotly contested by rival factions in the regime, and the outcome will remain in doubt until the succession to Khomeini is resolved. We believe the dispute primarily involves three groups:

Islamic radicals oppose relations wilh most governments, which ihey consider oppressive and dominated by tbe superpowers. They advocate export of the revolution through subversion and terrorism and believe Iran's mission should be directed at the world's "oppressedhis group is well entrenched in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Revolutionary Guard, and lhc Ministry of Islamic Guidance, lis leaders are vehemently anti-Western but not pro-Soviet.

Conservatives favor normal foreign relations and generally oppose active measures io export Ihe revolution. This group, however, supportsIranian power through propaganda, the appearance of military power, and diplomacy throughout the Islamic and Third Worlds,in the Persian Gulf region. It favors good relations with most Western countries, especially in economic matters, and is hostile lo Moscow.

MM (Pre



A third group that we label pragmalists is willing to do whatever ii deems necessary to further Iran'stheir own. This group, which include* some of the most powerful members of the regime, apparently operateswing element and usually provides the winning margin in policy formulation. When the pragmalists have sided with Ihethey have sometimes been able to curb radical excesses. They, however, have not hesitated to advocate use of terrorism and subversion themselves when they believed them useful in advancingesult, terrorism continues to be part of Iran's policy options despite disapproval from tbe conservatives.

Wc believe therecttcr-than-even chance tbat the pragmatisis will emerge as the dominant force after Khomeini and will formulate Iranian foreign policy on the basis of perceived state interests rather than revolutionary aspirations. Pragmatism, however, is not synonymous with moderation. Terrorism and subversion, for example, are likely lo remain useful tools, particularly for regime attempts to expand Iran's power in the Persiantraditional Iranian geopolitical goal lhat is now imbued with religious legitimacy.

Wc do not believe that there is any sizable pro-Soviet group in Iran's leadership. None appear to advocate closer relations with Moscow out of ideological conviction. There is.trongly anti-Soviettheabhor Marxism not only as atheistic, but actively anti-Islamic. Its members abo fear Moscow's intentions toward Iran. Nevertheless, we believe thai many io the regime wouldimitedwith the SovieU if tbey perceive great danger to Iran. This could occur if Iran's fortunes in the war with Iraq continue to sink or if the perceived threat from tbe Uniied Slates grows.

Relations between the United States and Iran are likely to remain bad and could get worse. Tehran believes thai the US interest in safeguarding moderate Arab regimes in the Gulf is directed against [ran. Khomeini's haired toward the United Stales has been so strong and centralhe rcvolulion thai its legacy will be hard to overturn. Moreover, Islamic radicals who share Khomeini's anti-American passion ore well situated io perpetrate terrorist outrages thai would preclude the development of less hostile relations even if others in Tehran were ready to move in that direction.




Concept tunicBn Policy

cign Policy


Clerics Divided

Trend Toward Pragmatism

Foreign Policy Objectives

East Nor West 8

Persian Gulf 8

and Turkey

Radical States


aod Cuba



Developed and Communist Countries

and Subversion


Iran: Tbe Struggle To Define and Foreign Polii

is now at war with evil.

Cyrus the Great, announcing the formation of the Persian Empire, sixth.

The success of Iran's Islamic revolution9 fundamentally altered the strategic alignment of the Persianationalist regime thatre-Western status quo in the area was replaced by one whose chief foreign policy theme has beenopposition to the United States. The Iranian regime of Ayatollah Khomeini is today the most aggressively anti-American of any in the worldJ

Iran's Islamic revolution shares with other major modernelief in both its historical uniqueness and its universal applicability. In the eyes of Ayatollah Khomeini, the Iranian revolution was toystem administered according toIslamic principles that are timeless and valid for all mankind. Thus, the new regime in Tehran quickly shiftedoreign policy based on Iranianand the extension of Iranian national power to one based on theocratic principles. Iran's clerical regime, for example, early and repeatedly vowed to work for the overthrow of regional regimes whose policies it condemned as non-Islamic and whoseIt disputed.| |

As long as Iran's activist clerics were fighting foragainst the provisional government of Mehdi Barargan and then the presidency of Abol Hasancould remain true to aIslamic ideology. Indeed, they used that ideologyeapon against their opponents who were struggling to impose order on Iran's posirevolu-tionary chaosj

If tbe revolution fundamentally altered Iran'sIt could not change regional realities or Tehran's continuing geopolitical interests. Once in power, ibe clerics and their secular allies had to deal with the problems of governing and with providing for

Iran's security and well-being. Many clerics who had used revolutionary ideology when ii served iheir pur-poses now were ready io reshape that ideology to fit their new positions of authority. Others, however, remained committed lo their revolutionary goals. This issueource of controversy in Iran and is intertwined with the general jockeying for power in anticipation of the post-Khomeini era, resulting in an unsettled and at times contradictory foreign policy.

Khomeini's Conception of Foreign Policy

crusade i

Analysis of Ayatollah Khomeini's prerevolutionary writings and speeches indicates lhat his views on foreign affairs were shaped by traditional Islamic concepts that differ fundamentally from Western politicalesiern ideas place separate,defined nation-states at the center of ainterplay of international relations. Islamicviews the "house of Islam" (dar al-Istam)ingle community of believers in which ethnic,and national differences arc irrelevant. The only recognized division of mankind is between Muslimshe house ofhis division is temporary, as there can be nopolity outside the bounds of Islam, the one true faith. According to classical Islamic doctrine, the Muslim state Isonstant state of war with the non-Muslim world,oly crusade (Jihad) to turn dar al-harb into dar al-lslam.

Khomeini has asserted hb belief in (hit struggle and has often called for "worldwide Islamicpeech on the first anniversary of (he overthrow of the Shah, for example, Khomeini said (kat. "Wc will export our revolution to the four comers of tbe world because our revolution is Islamic, and (he struggle will continue until the cry of 'there is no God but Allah, and Muhammad is his Messenger' prevails throughout (he world.T-

Khomeini sees Iran's revolution as more than justwith the non-Islamic world. For him. it isto purify the Islamic world fromand corrupt rulers. He believes thatio Islam lakes two forms. The first is athe West and their clients in the Muslimcarved up the Islamic community ofa number of nation-stales, an act that isdesign as presented in Ihc Koran. In hisGovernment, Khomeini wrote Ihalimperialists and the tyrannical self-seekingseparated the various segments of thefrom each other and artificially creatednationalistics

against Islam and the good of the Muslims and is among the deceits of the foreigners who suffer from Islam and its expansion."

The second ibreai to Islam from the West is indirect but is regarded by Khomeini to be even moreThis is Ihe cultural seduction of the West's materialism, secularism, and sexual liberalism that leads Muslims away from traditional Islamicersian word has been coinedescribe the poisonous nature of this attraction that is bestin English asor Khomeini, this second threat is particularly invidious because it is an invisible, persistently corrosive influence on Islamic lifcl-^ I

Khomeini views Ihe revolution In Irantarling point for the formationew Islamic order. In his writings he spelled out how the unification andof Islam were lo be accomplished. There would have to be revolutionary upheaval throughout the Muslim world toruly Islamic government:

Weo choice but lo destroy those Systems of rovrrnmrnt thai areid lo overthrow all treacherous, corrupt,and criminal regimes. Thisuly lhat all Muslims must fulfill tn every one of the Musiim countries to achieve the triumphant political revolution of Islam]

Khomeini's views on the superpowers are derived from his division of the world into the faithful and the unbelievers and from his belief in the need io purify Islam and transform the world into dar al-lslam. The

two superpowers arc seen by Khomeini as forming an antagonistic front against Islam. The liberalof ihe West and the Communism of the Easi are "human ideologies" ihal contradict the divineof I

Khomeini has argued thai because of the superpowers' immense power in the world. Iheiris everywhere. "One cannotountry today whose motto is 'neither East nor West': (all countries] rely officially or unofficially either on the Eastern bloc or on the Westernll the countries in all ihe regions of ihe world are under iheir domina-tion."|

Based on Islamic tenets, Khomeini probablybeen more al odds wilh Ihe USSR,endorses atheism, than with theNevertheless, It is the United Stateshas held in special contempt. Heasserted that the United Slates isenemy" and the "Great

We believe Khomeini's visceral hatred of Ihe United Stales was formed by his perception of both the US-Iranian relationship under the Shah and the greater threat that thend Ihc Uniied Slates as itslo Islam. Khomeini believes and has often stated that, under the Shah. Iran bad become the handmaiden of the United Stales, giving op its resources, its values, and its laterals io satisfy ibe "world-devouring" United States and iu stepchild io tbc region, Israel. The USSR's involvement in Irany contrast, wu never so loial as that of the Uniied States. The USSR also was considered less threatening because it had fewer regional clients andess attractive ideology thai made it less able lo achieve lis "evil intent" in the world

The Practice of Iranian foreign Policy International Pariah

When the clerics consolidated iheir control1 after nearly three years of struggle, the Khomeini regime was viewed by much of ihc world as a

pragmatic foreign policyJ

that Iran's key leaders are pragmalHK ana nave lell compelled to reduce Iran's severe diplomatic isolation, even at the expense of revolutionary goals, because of:

Economic necessity. Iran's faltering economy has become even more dependent on foreign oil sales and imports of basic goods than it was under the

SC ftrfHai

Shah. Tehran has been forced to try to end its international isolation to obtain consumer goods and military materiel and to export its oil in the current soft world oil market.

The war with Iraq. Iran's isolation has hurt its war effort in several ways. With the exception of Libya and Syria, Tehran could muster almost nosupport even though it was the victim ofAt best, Iran was offered studied neutrality.

Moreover. Iranian isolation greatly complicatedfor reliable sources of arms and sentbuyers scurrying io Ihe black market.military fortunes during the past twoespecially since the Iraqis began attackingin the springave causedloiplomatic offensivethe appearance of

Iran: Foreign Policy Posllioos of Key Factions

and moderation, however, arc notWe believe the conservatives oppose terrorism in principle, for example, whereas the pragmatists'to il is only tactical, and they are quite ready io resort to it if they believe it will advance their goals. As the pragmalists have exerted more control over the government, the use of terrorism and subversion appears to have been more carefully directed al specific objectives and has become more lethal.on US installations in Lebanon and elsewhere in the region are cases in point. Pragmalists, recognising Iran's need for allies in its war againsi Iraq, have led Iran inio closer relations with Syriahared effon to expel US forces from ihe region^

Current Foreign Policy Objectives The shiftore pragmatic foreign policyrend,ompleted process. Even though the trend toward pragmatism is apparent, countervailingcontinue, and no issues appear to have been finally resolved, At this point, the pragmatists appear to operate as the key swing group, supportingon some issues, radicals on ethers. Their support usually provides ihc winning margin!


^QB Secret

East Normaxim is central lo Iran's revolutionary foreign policy, but it has been reinterpreted by the pragmatiiu in one of iheir most important victories. The new interpretation hasIran to seek expanded foreign relations throughout ihe world and the economic and military goods essential for the political survival of the regime and the continuation of the war against Iraq. Q

A review of ihe immediate postrevolutionary phase indicates that "Neither East nor West" originally was intended io avoid the dependency and resultinglhat existed under the Shah by maintaining only minimal relations with foreign governments Wilh ihe appointment of Ali Akbar Velayali as Foreign Minister inowever, the prag-malistauiet campaign to change Iheof "Neither East norelayati and oiheri lists argued that the key element of ihe maxim was Iran's ability toalance between East and Westvoid reliance on either bloc while pursuing relations with both lo its own advantage.

efforts, as reflected in foreign trade statistics, have been successful.1 Iran's foreign trade was estimatedillion, while3 trade was estimatedillion.I

It was nol until ihe fallowever, that Velayati'i approach clearly emerged dominantnot ycluring the prcriou. summer, Velayati went through grueling reconfirma-lion hearings for ibe Iranian Cabinet by ihe newly elected Consultative Assemblye was sharply questioned, according to the Iranian press, on the wisdomolicy thai so heavily stressed expanding diplomatic and economic ties lo both the West and the East. Velayati responded by declaring thai "the destiny of ihe world is dciermined on the diplomatic scene. If we arc not present, it will be determined without us. If wc are there, we willhare proportional to our capability andelayali also charged (hat those who argued that

Khomeini hadolicy of isolation forgot lhat this was ai Ihe siarl of the revolution. "The directave received from the Imam areopposed to this |iscJationt"| )

Even though Velayati was reconfirmed, we believe lhat the considerable opposition he encountered led the pragmiitists to take to the offensive. Theyupon Khomeini in4 ioajor foreign policy address endorsing the Velayati approach. In bis speech. Khomeini abandoned much of his pre revolutionary rhetoric on foreign relations. He turned on the radical opponents of Velayali who had remained loyal to Khomeini's earliereven accusing them of being agents of the United States.

Thr superpowers and America fin particular/ supposed lhat Iran desired through listo secure an independence and freedom, which wouldovel thing and contrary to the ways of all government and would thus be isolated. If isolated, it could not exist But ihey saw thai this was nol tht ease, and Iran's relations with other countries increased. Sow they are asking why we should deal withThey are unjust, and we should have relation! with nations. This Is afresh and very

dangerousWe should act as it was

done in early Islam when theent ambassadors io all parts af the world topropere should havewith all governments with Ihe exceptionew Ithe Uniied Stales. South Africa, andSony advice to you ts to strengthen your relations wherever and in whateveryous long as our relations wilh the Almighty God art steadfast, no one can hurl


The Pertiam Gulf Hegemony in (he Persian Gulf hasraditional Iranian aim. We believe that all three foreign policy factions in Ihe regime share the ultimate goal of extending Tehran's power into the Persian Gulf but disagree over tacticsj

Tofi^cCrct ^eiefttteitmi

The Radical Perspective

The debate over Iranian foreign policy continues despite Ayatollah Khomeinis strong endorsement of Foreign Ministerolicy af expandingrelations.everal weeks after Khomeini's endorsement, ihe newspaperslami devoted Us lead ediloHalestatement of ihe Islamic radicals' viewpoint. The newspaper Is the party organ of the Islamic Republichome of Iran's activistone of the mosl influential newspapers in Iranf^

In lhc planning for ihe foreign policy of Ihewc musihare for thethe people of lhc world wilh the Islamicfrightens the salanic powers from

the Islamic revolution is its influence on the people of the world (and) not having good relations wilh

does not mean thai lhc

government of the Islamic Republic of Iran ought not io aitcmpl lo consolidate its relations with the governments with which it can have relations on the basis of Islamic principles and criteria of the Islamic revolution. It means that the priority ought to be attached toslam is the religion of nations, and relations with the government in permitted caseseans_fnr opening the way for

The Islamic and popular liberation movements ought to be given much more atlention by the Islamic Republicl


radicals continue to advocate publicly and privately "active export of ihe

Islamic conservatives also wish to sec Iran's influence in ihe Gulf grow, according to iheir own writings and speeches. None disagree with Iran's extensiveefforts aimed at Gulf Shias, and manytheologians in Qom, Iran's theological center. teach religious subjects io Gulf ShiasJ-^

Pakistan and Tarkey>lsi ibe aftermath of theeven personal linlcswtofncials from thesesutes were considered cause for suspicion by the revolutionary government.

We doubt thai Iran's apparent moderation will sue-any more than did its threats, especially so long is military options appear limited. If Iran'scontinues to deteriorate, the pragmatists probably will agairKConsidcr using terrorism and subversion against thcSulf states lo stop their aid to Iraq and force an end tothc war.

Both pragmaiisu and conservatives arc seeking close economic and political tics with Pakistan and Turkey because of Iran's international isolation and itsconcerns. By3 Iran was taking the lead in pushing for the establishmentripartite Eco-nomic Cooperation Org

'lhesc slatesspcc! primarily because ot tneir links to tbe United States and because both had been close to ihe haled Shah. Iranian radicals still try lo rouse the Muslimof both counlries against iheir regimes, and some meddling continues.

d ended a

Miuuar asocial ion, me Organization forand Development, shortly after the

ni7ationj The Iranians ha

and ease iuhey particularly hope to win African support against the Iraqis in international forums. The conservatives support these aims but do not appear particularly interested in Africa, while Ihe radicals see it as fertile ground for exporting tbe


statistics reveal lhat close0 percentimports come from Turkey and PakistanIran's trade is conductedarter basis, whichlo Tehran because of JU foreign

nranand Turkey recently

have3 billion barter agreement foryearalf, doubling3 level

Africa. According to public lUtcmcnu. the pragma-liiU view Africaey Third World battleground in their efforts lo enhance Iran's iniernaiional influence

Syria. So long as Ihe war with Iraq conlinues. Syria willrucial foreign ally. Damascus has aided Iran by:

Closing the Iraqi oil pipeline that transits Syria.

Servingonduit for military supplies.



Providing imporlani polilical support andthe war from becoming characterized as an Arab-Persian conflict

* Servingiddleman for Iran.

We believe that fundamental differences between Iran and Syria will strain relations over time.oppose close Iranian ties to any of Moscow's allies, and radicals oppose Syria's secular and Arab nationalist loeology. Even for tbe pragmalists, Iran and Syria have radically divergent goals for both Iraq and Lebanon. Damascus wants secular regimesto it in both, while Iranian pragmatists warn to establish Islamic regimes subservient to Iran.f-

Libya. Despite ihc pragmatists' recognition thatLibya has praised the use of terrorism

war with Iraq raises the importance of gainingthe United Slates in Lebanon, wc have no

in the Arab world, relations wilh 1that Iran and Libya have ever conducted a

other Arab state willing to supportterrorist operation. There have been times in

rocky. Libya has backed Iran more out oftbe two have been involved in subversive activi-

in the sameforeven here there is no evidence of coordination.!-


Korea We believe ihat Iranian-North Korean relations arc based more on economic realities than on any sense of common struggle againsthared antipathy toward the United States probably helped nurture the relationship, eachnational interestar more important role. When the war with Iraq began, Iranian pragma-list* rccognlred lhat Iran desperatelyecure supplier of arms and was willing lo buy them from any source- including Israel. North Korea wanted cheap oil."

do not believe that Iran's arms relationship with North Koreaoint of factipnal disagreemcni in Tehran. Nor has there been any reporting to suggest that anyone In Tehran is seeking to upgrade the relationship! I

Nicaragua and Cuba. We believe that Iran iscreate the impression of improved relationsand Cuba as part of its effort to endisolation. Prime Minister Musavicountries earlier this yearour thatTurkey. Spain, aod

Iranian radicals have given Ihe Sandinistas strong rhetorical support since tbey took poweressing iheir common anti-US attitudes, but tiei remainedelatively low levelnce pragmatists began to feel the need to lessen Iran's iiolation. however, some increase in relations begun to occur, f

Tke Superpowers. We believe all factions wish to avoid Iranian dependence on cither superpower. All oppose Communism as antithciical to Islam. Islamic radicals urc mosi vehemently opposed io the United


and Islamic conservatives appear mosl anti-Soviei. The pragmaiists arc wilting to considerrelations with Moscow but also wish io avoid close relations.

Uniied Slates. Opposition to the United States is more strongly stated, more universally parroled. and more emotively symbolic than any other aspect of Iranian foreign policy. Even those conservatives who favor lowering the level of hostility toward the United Sutes recognize that saying so publicly is slillrisky.) ]

Islamic radicals in the Khomeini regime view ihe US presence in the Middle East as the major impediment to successful export of the revolution, according lo their own words and writings.

Iheir speeches and writings indicates that they are committed Muslims who derive Iheir socialfrom iheir understanding ofMany of them have publicly condemned the Soviei invasion of Afghanistan and supported the Islamic struggle there against the Soviets. We believe ihey would alicmpl io export the Islamic revolution io the USSR's Muslim population if given the

Developed and Communisl Countries. The pragmatism' rcinlerprclation of "Neither East nor West" has allowed Tehran to pursue expandedwilh these statesay to secure the economic and mililary goods essential for regime stability and continuation of the war with Iraq. Despite the limita-lions imposed by Iran on its relations with the two superpowers, relations with allies of each areflourishing, Iran's largesi trading partners arc Japan and West Germany, and aboul two-thirds of its Irode is with OECD countries. Senior Iranianincluding Rafsanjani and Velayali, have soughtonvince Western visitors of theirand have even refrained from strong criticism of the United Slates on some occasions, according lo these visitors!

radicals who favor such measures as land reform and ihe nationalization of industry have been labeled Communists by their opponents. Analysis of




H ra

re Oat *1 -

fin., (ham* en you. the (oul fiend, From your evilhe blood of our youngstershe ferocious flame* of your fetidune Kist set the entire world. Theafety and security. Upset have been by your fraudulent trickt. Every center ot the world, far and rugh. Bears (he cruel tint of your cantankerous crimet. Vour hoarded riches, superfluous at ihey are. Upon the pain* of (he world deprived have been built. Thr dagger* of your haired deep.rave breast apart haveot Id-devouring pilferer of lowruculent, savage ghoul youethal, vrarnous-nsturedool-hearted, cunning foe you are. Replete with treachery, pure perfidy. Deplete of compassion and love you are. Of devilry and dread your bongainly void of the elixir of good you are Through the entire history of man.

Taken from on oJHeial Iranian journal^

Relations with East European countries are also on the rise Since Iraq began attacking tankers in the Persian Gulf In the springoreign Minister Velayali has traveled to Romania and Hungary,eputy foreign minister has discussed trade in East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Tbe Minister of Heavy Industries visited several East European countries in

Terrorism and Subversion. Although the radicals continue to exercise some freedom of action to initiate terrorism and subversion, pragmatisis have sometimes joined conservatives -who vigorously oppose these tactics- to curb radical excesses. We do not believe, however, that the pragmatists will gain total control over the activities of tbe radicals for the foreseeable futureJ

Iran's foreign terrorism has been directed primarily against threeexiles opposed to the Khomeini regime. Gulf Arab Stales supporting Iraq, and the US and French presence in the Middle East. Iranian-backed terrorismeavily anti-Western focus because Islamic radicals view the West


as (he key threat to Mam and believe Wesiern support for Tehran's enemiesajor obstacle to the successful export of Ihe revolution. French and US installations in the region have been the majortargets. Pragmaiisti have been willing to go along with radical attacks against French installationsFrance is host to numerous Iranian exiles and because it support* Iraq. The pragmatists may abo believe that terrorist attacks on the French will pot pressure on Paris to improve its relations with Iran. Lebanon, Kuwait, and Bahrain have been tbc sites of major Iranian terrorist acts in the Middle East Nearly all Iranian attempts against Baghdad have been suppressed because of the ruthlcssness of the Iraqi security services and because of Baghdad's threats to execute relatives of prominent Iraqi Shias exiled in Irani


Iranian foreign policy continues to be influenced by the struggle for power in anticipation of Khomeinis death andocus of that struggle. Although wc believe the pragmatic trend is on the ascendancy, key pragmatists. including Majles Speaker Rafsanjani and President Khamenei, are rivals for power. Thus,

Nevertheless, we believe that certain elements of Iranian foreign policy are likely to remain in effect for the foreseeable future. Iranian relations with the United States will be hostile long after Khomeini dies. Official Iranian media reveal that Khomeini haspage sealed will that almost certainly condemns the United States and explicitly rules out relations until Washington "becomeshat legacy will be difficult to overturn, wen if constrva-tives could wrest full control of the governmenlj

US interests in the Persian Gulf and elsewhere in the Middle East are likely to continue to push Iran and the United States apart. Iran's goal of hegemony in the Gulf runs counter to US support for moderate Arab regimes. Many in Tehran, including bothand pragmatists, view US aid to those regimes as directed against Iran. US support for Israel will also ensurccoutinuing Iranian hostility toward Washing-


We believe Islamic radicals will encourage further terrorist actions against the United States as part of their strategy to retain influence in foreign affairs. We also believe that pragmatists would go alongactions if (heyrowing threat from tbe United States. Pragmatists have openly threatened to use terrorism against the United States, in part to deter US retaliation for previous lerrorisi |

The need to sell oil, import consumer goods, and generate economic development, however, is likely to impel Iran to foster relatively good economic relations with most OECD nations. Eastern Europe, andTurkey and Pakistan. Both the pragmatists

and conservatives favorourse. Ultimately. Iran's dealings with these stales could lead to reduced hostility toward the United States, but thai probably is far in the future. None of the several US allies who are currently well positioned inWest Germany. Pakistan, andwilling to jeopardize their good relations to press Tehranthis issue.' jj]

Over the near term, wc believe that Iran is muchlo consider improving relation* with the


Any improvement, however, is likely lo be tactical. The USSR's military support for Iraq, Ihe Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, its ties to the Tudeh party, and the near universal Iranian suspicion of Moscow's intentions limit prospects for substantially better tics. Tbe Soviets apparently recognize Iran's limitations as well but may be willing to supply some mililary equipment to Iranay to keep open the prospect for better relations.| |

None of the foreign policy factions will want to be seen as dominated by either superpower. "Neither East nor West" is, in ourenerally popular slogan In Iran, and regardless of which faction becomes dominant. Tehran is likely lo adhere to its own brand of nonalignmcnt.|


Original document.

Comment about this article or add new information about this topic: