TRENDS AND DEVELOPMENTS IN WARSAW PACT THEATER FORCES, 1985-2000 (NIE 11-14-85/

Created: 9/1/1985

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Trends and Developments in Warsaw Pact Theater

National [ntdligencc Estimate

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this estimate is issued by the director of central intelligence.

the national foreign intelligence board concurs, except as noted in the text.

The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:

The Centre* Inltlb'genee Agency, the Defame lirfe*flence Afjeney. the Notiotvol Security Agency, and the inleKgence cxgceiiiolions of tha Deportnvenli of Stol* one) Energy.

Also Participating:

lha AHistont Chief of Slerff for InteJ&Qetvco, Deportment of the Army Ihe Director of Novol inteflirjenea, Deportment of iho Nervy The Atuttonl CWaf of Slofl, Intc&geoce, Deportment of the Air Force Tha Director ofHecKlquarters, Merino Corpj

d

trends and developments in warsaw pact theater

Informalion available ai ol5n the preparation of thii Estimate, which -at ipotovnl by the National Foreign Intelligence Board

contents

Page

SCOPE

KEY

7

Resource

Defense

Manpower

Other

Technological

Evidential Basis of

Purpose Forces Perspective: What Are the

Soviets Up

Firepower and Maneuver in Soviet Conventional Strategy

New Emphasis on Troop

III Warsaw Pact Doctrine and

Theater Warfare

Nuclear

The Forces: Status and

Command

Organization of the

Ground

Air

Air Defense

Naval Forces

Reconnaissance and Electronic

IV. Soviet Ground

Air Defense

Short-Range Ballistic

Force

Manning and

Air and Naval

Air

Weapons and

Support

Force

Naval

Strategic

Theater

Warsaw Pact General Purpose

Command

Ground

Air

Naval

Soviet

ANNEX A: Defense Spending: Implications of the

ANNEX C: Warsaw Pact Manpower 79

ANNEX D: Projections 83

SCOPE NOTE

5 is intended Iu forecast the major trends in Soviet and non-Soviet Warsaw Pact general purpose forces through thet answers the question: Where are the Warsaw Pact general purpose forces going and why? Our quantitative projections for thenumbers of aircraft, ships, weapons, and ground divisions) are summarized in tables at the end of this Estimate in annex D.

No attempt has been made totraditional" multivolume NIEomprehensive compendium of data on all aspects of the general purpose forces. Rather, this NIE should be considered as partamily of documents that addresses Warsaw Pact general purpose forces in statistical, operational, and future developmental terms p

Related documents areoviet Forces andin the Southern Theater of Military Operations, published inoviet Capabilities for MultUheater War, published inoviet Naval Strategy and Programs Through, published in[

Readers of this Estimate are asked to complete the appended questionnaire concerning the format. The next Estimate in this series will take account, whenever possible, of readership rcsponsc.1

i

oconc-i-

GtentT

KEY JUDGMENTS

The Soviets are determined to maintain the war-winningof their general purpose offensive forces through the remainder of this century. They plan to do so despite NATO's programed high-technology antiarmor and anrJair improvements. They are prepared to make whatever adjustments are necessary in their equipment, their combined-arms organizations, their operational concepts, and their command structures and procedures to counter any potential opponent. We expect improvements throughout their general purpose forces despite manpower shortages and fiscal constraints. Q

The force projections in5 are based on Intelligence Community assessments and new intelligence data bases andthat highlight the long-range planning and methodical force development strategies typical of Warsaw Pact military institutions, Both the size and tremendous economic investment in the current forces constrain Soviet options for radical change throughout the force and give us high confidence in our projectionsidtermnd long-termrojections arebased on what we see as logical follow-ons to development efforts now under way and on critical assumptions about economicpolitical priorities, and prospects for new technologies. We have less confidence in our extended projections, although our historical data bases suggest that radical change is uncharacteristic of the Soviet force development process.^

These projections indicate that, despite increasing cost andtbe Soviets plan to acquire new weapons in virtually every category of general purpose forces. Higher costs and lower economic growth rates, however, may bring about procurement rates slower than those in. Nonetheless, important qualitative and quantitative changes will occur

Soviets willew generation of interceptors with advanced lookdown/shootdown avionicsajor

catchup" for the. Soviets in fielding advanced avionicsin the West.

Soviets, and perhaps some of their allies, will field at least one new tank design, as well as new self-propelled artillery and surface-to-airSoviet weapons that are already among the world's best.

The Warsaw Pact weapon inventory by the0 will grow00 major artillery0 armored personnel carriers (APCsJ and infantry fighting vehicles,elicopters.

Priority for modernization will continue to be opposite NATO.

All Pact general purpose forces have been affected by new command structures designed to overcome NATO defenses bylarge-scale joint-service, combined-arms offensive operations at the theater level. Tlie Soviets have apparently established at least three theaters of military operations (TMOs) high commands opposite NATO directed by senior ground force officers. These peacetime TMO commands:

Permit centralized control and integrated planning ofover large areas using joint forces subordinateingle commander operatingingle plan or concept of operations.

Permit the planning and availability of forces and supplies to conduct successive, multiple-front operations able to strike throughout the depth of the enemy's rear area, supportive of the nonstop high-tempo offensive favored by the Soviets.|

The Warsaw Pact will continue to make important operational and organizational changes to concentrate conventional ground and air firepower and to improve battlefield maneuver. In the Ground Forces:

Divisions are being reorganized to emphasize combined-arms operations against NATO antiarmor defenses. Infantry and artillery have been added to complement the tank by clearing defenses in advance of armor. We anticipate continuedimprovement

The Soviets are probably considering the precombatto East Germany of forces in the western USSR to add more weight to the initial attack against improved NATO defenses. An unprecedented logistic buildup in East Germany will allow the forces to deploy rapidly to Europeby their supply train.

Tbe Soviets will continue to refine operationalas use of the operational maneuver group and air assaultto bypass NATO defensive strongpoints and increase rates of advance.

In (lie Air Forces the Soviets;

Recognize that NATO's qualitatively superior air forces present the greatest threat to the success of their TMO offensive andounter have modified their concepts for winning airby developing an air offensive operation designed to create temporary local superiority over NATO in key sectors of advance.

Have designed an air defense variant in case NATO seizes the initiative in an air war. The air defense variant integrates air assets and ground-based air defense and artilleryoncerted effort to defeat NATO aircraft and destroy forward bases and air defense sites,

Have reorganized and converted many interceptor units to ground attack elements and given ground commanders rotary and fixed winy aircraft for direct support.Q

Naval general purpose forces continue to have the major missions of protecting the missile-launching submarine force and defending the USSR against NATO strategic strike forces. In addition, wc expect naval general purpose forces gradually to increase training and assets lo support amphibious operations on coastal Banks. Strategic Navalforces are continually being modernized and will cooperate wilh the Air Forces in the struggle for theater air supremacy. These forces might also participate in land bombing. Finally, as new submarine-launched cruise missiles become available to the naval general purpose forces they will be integrated into theater nuclear strike plans. Q

New weapons, new organizations, and new combined-armsskills have led the Soviets to question traditional training practices. New unit training programs have been identified in the Ground Forces, and pilot training is improving in the Air Forces. The latter shows more realism and offers the opportunity to display more initiative, but we do not predict that these improvements willWestern standards of training. Q

Despite programed improvements designed to provide Pact forces wilh greater lethality and combat potential, most Pact forces face growing manpower shortages. This results in expanded structures not fullyowering of peacetime unit readiness, and greater reliance on reservists. In the near terterm this situation will be unavoidable. Thus it appears that the Soviets are trading readiness for combat potential, making it less likely that they can quickly go to war without extensive unit preparation.

The Warsaw Pad clearly remains prepared touclear war. and planned improvements in theater nuclear weapons are designed to keep the Pact at least at parity with NATO in the years ahead. Nonetheless, the significant improvements we project in Pactforces, operational concepts, and theater command structures are designed toar-winning conventional capability. The Soviets apparently hope that the application of conventional firepower and high-speed maneuver would Quickly overwhelm NATO's forward defenses and cripple its nuclear delivery capabilities at the outset. NATO would then be compelled to use nuclear weapons deep in its own territory. The forces and employment concepts projected in this Estimate apparently underlie new Soviet writings suggesting that the Pact might be able to achieve victory over NATOeriod ofconventional conflict ofonth. However, the Soviets are not confident that they could destroy all NATO theater nuclear forces during the nonnuclear phase of war, and they expect that NATO would use nuclear weapons to prevent defeat in Europe. Therefore, the Soviets realistically plan for the possibility of nuclear war in Europe.^

Although the East Europeans retain peacetime control of their forces, force development is probably heavily influenced by Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact committees or through direct bilateralwith the Soviets about projected force goals. In wartime. East European forces would be subordinate to Soviet-commanded TMOs.

Despite Soviet pressure on them to follow Soviet forcemodels, none of the East European forces have kept pace with Soviet force improvements. This disparity will probably worsen in the years ahead, especially in the Air Forces, where the East Europeans are unlikely to procure enough of the most advanced Soviet models. This gap creates potential weaknesses that can be exploited because the East Europeans will have difficulty in adopting the latest Sovietor operational concepts. The Soviets are apparently trying to compensate for this discrepancy by pressuring their allies to modernize in critical areas such as air defense and by sponsoring East European co-production consortiums for Soviet-designed equipment. Nonetheless, barring sustained economic recovery in Eastern Europe and greater willingness to spend for defense activities, the East Europeans will fall further behind the Soviets during the projection period. The Soviets may increasingly be forced to augment or replace first-echelon East European forces with their own forces drawn from the western USSR.

DISCUSSION

THE PROJECTIONS

Overview

I. Thii Estimate forecasts trends in Soviet and Warsaw Pact general purpose forces through (he0 Itumber of fo structure, command ar nidation, weapon procurement, and operational art The labies inrovide quantitative projections of the number* and types of units and weapons we eipeet to be Belded in the Warsaw Pad general purpose forces during the nextears. Regional and aggregate projcctioeis arc provided. This first chapter of the Estimate discusses tho principal resource coei-vtraints affecting force development j |

IIerspectiveere the general purpose forceshole arc going and what objectives tbe Sovieis hope to accomplish with their ongoing conventional and nuclear force buildups Chapter III deab wMh Warsaw Pact doctrine and forces. Subsequent chapters discuss the rationale for the changes we forecast in each of the general purposeforces (chapterlt forcesnd naval forces (chapter V) We abo Include an extended discussion of non-Soviei Warsaw Pact (NSWP) force trends (chapter VI> Chapters II and IV-VI also address importantas those la operational art and in command and controldo not lend themselves to quantitative presents

Background

of the secrecy of tbe Soviet and East European systems, we have little direct evidence about Soviet or non Soviet Warsaw Pact plans for the future size, composition, organization, or readiness of general purpose forces- We do, however, have Insight Into the lore* development process, into its historical pace, and into weapons development programs, arms production capabilities, and operational goals Historical analysis, made possible with new intelligence data bases, in particular provides usrtlnr understanding of how Warsaw Pact forces have developed over time, how Pact planners have responded to new challenges, and how long it takes fully to Implement major force programs) |

In malting our protections wc have tried to assume the perspective of Soviet planners whoystematic, long-range approach to force programing This approach would require the Soviet General Stag to integrate tbe planning, supervision, and execution of force development activities within the contortong range plan We believe tbe General Staff worts with Hale pUnning elements, weapons designers,facilities, service elements, and others lo de-lermine and assign priority to military requirements foe the utilization of state resources The plan then apparently receive* high-level political |

Tlie Soviets apparently use their dominance within the Warsaw Pact to push modernization goals on their allies According to open press reports,high-level Warsaw Pact meetings are used to assign defense ipeoding priorities to Pact countries Judging from uneven rates of modernization within the Pact, and East European public statements, the Soviets have not been completely succeasf ul in obtaining rapid rates of military otodesmization in Eastern Europe.e less, the Soviet force development model Is used throughout the Pact.| |

Resource Constraints

In malting our protections we have coruidcred Important resource constraints that we believe am influencing Soviet force planners as they prepare future force programs. We cannot determine the specific effect of these constraints on individualor exactly how these constraints are perceived by Pact planners themselves. Nonetheless, we can describe these constraints in tbe aggregate andthe ways In which they could bound reasonable possibilities for future force change.[ ]

Tho two maior resource constraints that both Soviei and non-Soviet force planners face come In ihe areas of defenseby tho slowing of Communist countries' economicmanpower supplies caused by demographicTo some eitent these problems are common throughout all or most Pact countries, although their severity varies considerably from country to country

Defense Spending

ur most recent estimate of Soviet defense spcndinst show* lhat tolal defense-related activities grew at an average annual raleercent during (heut al onlyercent in the. Recent evidencelightabout 3defense spending growth in. We believe that Soviet defense spending will continue to grow in real terms. We believe, moreover, tbat in the neiiears the Soviet economy will be able to provide general purpose force planners wilh the means necessary to maintain al least the growth rates experienced thus lar inhis rate of growth will be less than inhrough the, but we anticipate it will be sustained without dramatic peaks and valleys in spending levels (see annex AX

9 Soviet military rnoctirerneot-the purchaseweaponfor about one-halftotal Soviet militaryovietremains at about its current share ofproduct (CNP) and weapons costs continuewe Judge that the projected lutes of growthwill result in rates of weaponslower lhan inurthb peobabtlily into account We doubt thatEuropeans will increase iheir weaponSoviet pressure. |

In any even! we believe spending commitments have already Ixwm made to continue and complete Ihe force changes we have already Identified and which are discussed in detail in chapters IVowever, we judge that more modest economic performance may affect some force programs, but probably not until tne neat decade. We have tried to factor this Judgment into our rxcaecttoru I

All agree thai, even if in ihc yean ahead there is selective or broad-based slowing ol tbo rale of force development relative to, economic causes will not leadurndown in overall general purpose force capabilities Furthermore, priority will go to improvement of forces opposite NATO, wheremodernization is expected lo continue during the prcecctioro period.omeabout the effect that any economic slowdown will have on miliury programs and about which programs may be affected. These disagreements basically affect the rate al which loodernization will occur, with economic difficulties possibly slowing the rate of modernization by several years in some portions of the force. Our alternate projections reflect some of these

e tudge tbat anyin the force development process would be reflected primaiily in weapons programs.lowdown would beIn:

Lengthened research and development times and the fielding of fewer weapons.

A slowdown of weapons actjuisilioa in general, although we do foresee increased acquisition ratesew high-priority weapon systems, such as self-propelled artillery and such high-performance aircraft as thend

Increased use of product improvementin the Ground Forces, such as the current program lo52 tanks in order lo lengthen the service life of older equipment

A slowdown in the rate of growth in the sire ofound Forces.

Extension of the life cycles of newer equipment

Manpower Problems

IS We fudgeightening supply of draft-eligible manpower already hasubstantial resource constraint, particularly in ihe Soviet Ground Forces Our analysts indicates the Soviet manning problem will persist for the remainder ol this decade, but that the supplies of draft-eligible Soviet males will rebound toward the end of the century. Throughout the prolectwnj period, however, the Soviets willhift in the ethnic mix of the draft-eligible population as non-Slavic growth outstrips Slavic growth (seehee* changes may create soma) training problems for non-Slavic conscripts, particularly in the Ground Force* which receive the bulk of poorly prepared drafters, because many have poor Russian-language skills. Furthermore, the Soviets have probably begun to open up sensitiveositions and the officer corps to larger minority participation than in the post.

e believe the Soviets may have alreadyto tightening manpower supplies in they imposing manpower restraints on their armed forces and by enlisting women With Ihe simultaneous expansion of divisional structure, this has meant that Ihe peacetime manning authorizationercent of authorized wartime strength in the typical Soviet unit has declined during the past several years. Thb resultsreater dependence on reservists for wartimerend lhat will become significant

e

in ihc yeais ahead,lowering of peacetime readiness ol manv units. In fact, even ihe Soviets' most ready divisions in Eastern Europe have been affected bv the manpower freeze. Typkal manning levels in both motorized rifle divisions (MRDs) and tank(TDs) have dropped from aboutercent of wartime authorized strength in theo betweenndercent. During theperiod the Soviet* may choose lo compensate for this trend by adopting more effective reservist training.j

everal of ihe East European countries are abo facing conscript shortages, although the timing and severity of these shortages vary comiderably. By the, however, most of the Warsaw Pactwill face shortages of some type We cannot exclude Ihe possibility that this common problem wouldegotiated reduction of standingthrough the mutual and balanced force reduction (MIIFIt) forum into Pad polilical leaders. We note, however, lluit all the regimes facing shortages arc already taking steps to deal with them and apparently are not Mtssssfcssjorce reduction agreement with the West will occur. We also judge that anyot likely lo be large enough to resolve the conscript shortage in any of the East European countries]

Other Factors

Our protections can also be affected inways by significant technological or political development! For example, we believe thai Soviet threat calculations have the most potential forignificant change in future force oVveaoprneot Our analysis ot Soviet writings and exercises suggests ihal the Soviets see an Increasing threat, particularly from the Uniied States. NATO, and China,

The Soviet political-economic system has given priority to military requirements. To judge from tbe USSR's sustained heavy investment in military forces and weapons research and developmentoviet leaders recognize thai miliiaryhe principal basis of their influence and status in international relations Traditionally, thb leadership has beento sacrifice civilian needs for military

e believe there is small chance that there will be any major shift in the am'tudes of the Soviet leadership toward ihe armed forces during the period of this Estimate. Wo are less sure of theeriod, but we assume the traditional Soviet process of devctoping potential leaders will continue to resultmall group convinced of ihe needtrong military establlsliment. This conclusion is important io oureadership that wanted loadical shift In the Soviet economyguns to butter" emphasis or that wanted to markedly reorder resource allocation priorities within the armed forces (such as Nik Ma Khrushchev did in) would substantially affect the development of the Soviet armed forces and the result could be general purpose forces much different from those we have projected. At present, however, there is no evidence lhat this type of policyeing or will be considered!

Technological Breakthrough

e considered the possibility of aIhal would have an impact onpurpose force weapon systems and dosuch an event before the end of thisOur ability to protectot good during ihe outyears ofperiod. While weew seriessystems now beginning to enter thegenerally have modest improvcmenli inmobility, and survivability. The Soviet Airhowever,ew gcneraiitm ofinterceptors, with advanced lookmultiple target tracking capabilities, aimprovement over older aircraft Thoughb new and stgmficant for Soviet forces,notreakthrough as much aslo technology available in the Westleads us lo conclude that any weaponslo enter full-scale deployment by the turn ofaxe now or toon will be in al least theof

he conservative nature of the Soviet weapons development process almost precludes any dramatic change in land-arms characteristicsone period of discussion and troop testing precedingdeveloprnenl It takes the Soviets many years toeapon system from the concept stage to the full-scale deployment stage. Our evidence oneapon enters die conceptot adequate, but we have seenefinitions of iieededthai were not fielded forears Ouris slightly better for the time required to movesystem fmino the full-scale deployment Stage. Our initial indication of the eabteftceew weapon system usually occurs during thb period

Evidential Basis of Profetftom

he protections inepictent ourof ihe likely outcome of the general purpose force development process. The confidence we have in our

projections varies considerably, depending on how far Into the future we peer and on theorthe individual protect tonome dbafreement within the Intelligenceon ipeciue projections, but most of these occur in the out yean of our protection period when hard evidence must largely be replaced by educated mioses anil assumptions concerning economic and political performance Bather than obscure these differences in compromise projections, we have offered alternate projection* In general, though, we believe all would agree on the following general characterizaltoni of the reliability of our projectionsunction of both lime and available evidence

Wear-Termhe inertia imposed by the large size of the current force, iu past developmental patterns, and limits on current production of weapons tend to dictate near-term (up to five years in the future, within the current five-year plan) force devcJccjrnent Events now occurring in the force provide the evidential basil for thb projection period In the near terra there is little prospect for dramaticossiblehe initial fielding of the9 andircraft, which should enter the forces in modest numbers in the neii five years and become standard In. These aircraft are major improvements In capabilities over predecessors, and the forces affectrd In ihe neat fivethose oppositesuch modernization will undergo substantial improvement Bv and largr, however, ihe Soviet general purpose forces are simply too huge and substantial changes too expensive for the force to be able to respond quicklyadical shift in force development

Midtermeapons now under de vrltqimenl. anticipated changes in rates ofand our assessment of tbe likelyof current developmentalterms of force structure, equipmentprograms, organizational goals, andand tacticalprovide Ihcframework for our midtermtoean in the future. Thb period also coincides wilh our ability to make reasonable protections about economic performance and technological developments.

J-ong-Term Projections. Our assumption, about the Soviet force planners' response to theirof economic, deritogiapfuc. tvchrtulugi-cat. and other influences oc the process of force development provide the conceptual framework for long-termtoears or more in tne future.reater opportunity for change in the long term because there it more time for weapons program impiovements, tech noWical developments, and Ihe impact ofdecisions and other Influences to occur. Furthermore, even the accumulation of small changes implemented widely over an extended period of time can have large elfects on force capabilities. Because of the great uncertainties in nuking long-term projections. Ihe leader should be aware lhatreater variation In our protections and that we have less confidence in their accuracy. We have made no seriousto cost protections during, nor can we predict Ihe effect of ma Vat technological changes past5 _

II. GENERAL PURPOSE FORCES PERSPECTIVE: WHAT ARE THE SOVIETS UP TO?

n the. Premier Khrushchev's great emphasis on strategic weaponry resulted In deep cuts Inconventional forces. Since then, however, the Soviets haveetter balance between their strategic forces and their conventional general purpose forces Consequently, the general purpose forces-paced bv theustained recovery during the pastears Q

ince the, moreover, theof virtual parity inmote recently inforces has apparently led both skies lo reexamine ibeir conventional war-fighting capabilities. Tbe Soviets probably expect NATO to use nuclear weapons to prevent defeat in Europe. The Soviets, therefore, most plan realistically for Ihe possi-hihtyuclear war in Europe Although they probably prefer that operation lo be nonnuclear. they are prepared lo conduct nuclear operations. TVprobably are considering (he possibilityore prolonged conflict. It is unclear whether thisoviet assessmenl thaiote likely to be detet led from nuclear first use noworeappreciation of NATO's growing conventional capabilities, and they continue lo devote considerable resources lo theater nuclear war. Thev may consider it possible, however, tbat in an eitertded conventionalif substantial NATO territory wereoutcome favorable to Moacow could be negotiated before tbc nuclear threshold was

crossed According lo an alternativeoviei planning option* lot operations against NATO in Europe musl consider actions lo prevent ihe move-merit of forces from the continental United States to the European theater. Such planning could include flratespc selective strikes agairot the following targets in the United State* general purpose fortes, raearn of power protection (ports,nd command, con troL communications, and intelligence facilities,'^

ho Soviets believe that the Wert presents them, above all, wilh enormous economic andthreats that have direct mililary application. They believe strongly that the West's economic strength is the basis for its vast potential militarypotential being partially realized by. in Soviet eves, the recent US defense spending increases. US spendingunmatched by all NATOled. according to Sovietto troublesome improvements In NATO'santiarmor defenses-Superior economic potential also means that the West would have an advantagerotracted war and helps explain Soviet insistence on quicklyNATO. | |

he Soviets are equallyWestern technology and technrsiogical potential Recently deployedaa the nuclear-capable Pershing II and ground-launched cruise muaile (til-CM) with sophisticated guidance packages resulting in high accuracies at extended ranges- present immediate threats lo ihe SovietTlte Soviets are now openly writing about, and presumably planning to counteract Westernprecision guidance and electronic miniaturizationare still in theflag* or only beginning to be headed in quantity.^

y Western standards the Soviet military is excessively centralized and committed to unusually long-range planning Implemented by methodical force development The General Staff oversees forcesupervises program implementation, and, In wartime, would actually command combat for era. Highly influenced by its World War II experience, itautious view of the potential threats to the USSR, and tries to guard against them by building massive strategic and general purpose forces. Q

' TV fteiaV* a/> iht AiBitoiU (Sir) of StmtDepartf Ihe Ar*oa> I I

'Wey. wA addirawd Gjluarnm ir. a NATO

Wanaweuuiewitbrr ol the Warun Fact. Cuba'i militarv potential itn6 St.fMifiMi|titnKftp

Soviet military development, reactingto perceivedhe near future and to the Inertia created by large forces, has been evolutionary and exhibits remarkable doctrinal continuity.the Sovietsreat extent have already planned for and heavily invested In the generalforces thev believe will prevail on the battlefield of. The broad outline* -and someof their future general purpose forces are already visible in new weaponmerging operationalew unit organizations, and trainingdiscussed in this Estimate [

The Generalominated by Ground Forces officers who believe that, shortlobal nuclear war, the enemy can be decisively defeated on the ground by overwhelming loint-service combat actions1 Cround Forces developmenu, accordingly, deeply affect the ovetal) development of all theater forces intended for land campaigns.round Forces officer would he given overallof forces drawn from al) services within land theaters of military operations (see figureith accompanying text inset) Q

believe that the bulk of the generalwe project will be influenced by theviewonventional war-winningsucceed- This view, coupled with anof programed NATO force changes, hasmajor tmprovementi in conventionalmaneuver concepts, and overall trooplarge joint-service forces. The pursuit of theseground air-nival firepower,and reliable theater-level troopspur further change through therovoke complementary changes in thesuch as logistic and training improvements. Q

Firepower ond Maneuver in Soviet Conventional Stratagy

Soviet writings In the past few yearslengthened periods of intensiveThe Soviets apparently view aandoater-level conventionalas potentially nearly as decisive as onethe early use of tactical nuclear weaponsdescribe the effects of some conventionalas approaching those of low-yield nuclearHr/wcvcr, because of the effects that blast, heat.

ihn littimti-imi iht twin "Kilta-iervtae" (in Savlrl cwunoe. "ctmbiordu WnUmtrcombat action involvtnf acrl-llv it Iwo or more ei-mul pur now forors-ground, air,r ivmhai million j

Soviei Response lo Emerging Convontionol Weapons Technologic!

DtfchfrntnU- The threat of Improving NATO technology to tbe Soviet con vent tonal forces surveyed in this Estimate has been recotniied by Soviei Marshal Ogarkov

lat rapid development of sctcncr and lech nnlagy in recoil yean create)pttcuraliiiucs for the eaarifceibe very nearf previouUv unknown typos of weapons bated on new phyiiralt woulderious mistake not to take account of this light now. Q

Rocent clsantet of NATO doctrine alreadyransitionew generation ol high-techookw weaponry designed to stop Soviet oflenslven InIMS. NATO approved the Follow On Forces(FOFA1 concern to prepare (or new. deei>atrtkc, prectnon -guided ossinkioro thai may be fcelcled kater the decade TSeae weapons art rhiiigiind lo mike Wamw Pact airfields, follow-on foreei, and eorrunarsd facilities deep in the rear before thev could affect the forward battle. Some conventional weapon* cannuclear weapons in destructlvoncas f

Chief among new developments apparently most wcensuose to the Soviets are:

Advancediantci aowiatlaaeito as aaaiuk breakerw.th rrrcciston-guided subrnunitiora These missiles can rutke with first accuraci' to ranges of upilometers. The most scajihisuCatcd niuoltlons will repoitedli discriminate between atmor and'and against advancing follow-on forces, (bey could destroy the timing and high- tempo momentum so crucial to the SUCCaaS of Soviet

Advanced riuHcrefirered to vinous ranges by air, artillery, or ns issues, theae system* drop multiple Dorrsbiets over extended target areas and are designed for use against maased armored or iriher formations. Such weapons could also be used to crater runways, depriving the Pact of operating forward aidsses.

explosive technology munitions These combine new explosive and warhead tectinologiev Their include fuel ur expaonvrt. scatterable msnn, Km and-forger antitank rntiaikn. reanotrly piloted vrenctes able to deliver sell forging and-armor fragment bombs over tank for ma tuna, and "smart" artiHery shells able to achieve single-she*

- again* tanks and other targets.^

Sot'iet fleaellona. In general, ihe Soviet* arc reacting to live new high-technology consent lotul weapons uiins language umltat to that they used ino describe nuclear weapons The Soviets are movinginimise the vulnerability of their conventional forces toew weapons through

The flrkling of more weapons with betterperformance and the apparent planning ofovement of more units opposite NATO to give more weight to the initial attackATO. This represents the traditional Soviet belief in the decisiveness of offensiveoven against Improving defense*

The use ofechnology expedients to exploit suppoaed vubierabilltiea In NATO high technology systems, such as the addition ofarmor to Soviet tanks

The aaa of decereion irirmaqoes.

Preparation of hardened Seld defensive poaitiorn and alter rule runways.

Drvelopmenl of concept* using existing weapon* lo target and destroy NATO deep-attack system*

pacta. The Soviets, though aware of these emerging threats to their conventional forces, show no stasia of atiendoning then faith In the uBensIre or in armor as the spearhead ol orTerrnve action Rather, the Soviets ar* at work making the tactical, tocoootogical. organiutsoaaL and numerical adjustment* that thev believe will permit ibeir forces to maintain the monserv-tum of the attack and tbe credibility of then oflensive doctrine |

radiation would have on enemy equipment,or structures In any type of target area, nuclear weapon) remain the most powerful weapons on the battlefield The Soviets, however, continue lonot only the uitsuiposscd destructive-new ofweapons bul abo their decisiveness in determining the outcomear. They apparently have two principal components to their eonventscrsalestruction of enemy forces wilh icarsl sr^vice conventional firepowerenetrating enemy defenses.

nless NATO initiates theater-nuclear war, the Soviets plan to exploit the range and destructive power of modern conventional weapons and munitions. Thev have always believed in the shock effect of massed rocket and artillery fire to shatter defenses and open paths for their maneuver units Tbe importance to them of such 6re has been magnified, however, by NATO's modern aniiarmot and antiair delenses.commanders al all levels are now receiving additional artillery, air defense weapons, and tactical missiles with greater range, better mobility, and spe-csal-offecls warhrudx Tliesc weapons can accompany

13

maneuver forces to suppress antitank defenses or can lay down preplanned area barrages at extended ranges to protect armor aod infantry assaults Q

Tbc growth of Soviet ground firepower has been matched bv increasing air Brc support for land operations. Increasing numbers of theater bombers opposite NATO and China can strike deep into roar areas at the same time forward defenses are assaulted on the ground. New fighters and air defense missiles will contest the NATO air threat. The Soviets plan to use short-range ballistic missiles (SHBMs) tothe air operation. Finally, helicopters and fixed-wing assets abo have been provided to groundas pail of the program to reorganize the Soviet Air Forccsj

If the Soviets arc to successfully integrate join! source combined arms forces they must overcome important ditriculties. They must, for example:

Identify and procure the proper mix andof conventional weapons in combined-arms units and formations

Develop and automate integrated joint-service staff planning and control procedures to ensure responsive, coordinated ground, air, and naval fire strikes.

Develop reliable reconnaissance, targetand fire-control systems for rapidand destruction of key targets such as NATO nuclear-capable units.

Train officers and conscript crews in increasingly complex combined-arms tactics and new

The Soviet conventional strategy would seek to overrun rapidly any nuclear-capable enemy before It could organize its defenses, make the decision to use nuclear weapons, or authorize, complete, and execute its nuclear fire plans. Against NATO, maneuvercould include- quickly punching through forward defenses, rapidly penetrating rear areas, and quickly destroying most nuclear delivery and command and control means. From the Soviet view-point,trategy would immensely complicate NATO'sof fast-moving Warsaw Pact forces, would force NATO to make the decision whether to use nuclear weapons deep In its own territory, and might cripple NATO's nuclear means early on.|

The Soviets face improving NATO antitank and antiair defenses that could slow their tempo ofThey are introducing operational concepts and tactics and weaponry to breach or bypass theseto avoid congested, easily defended urban areas, and to pursue NATO defenders relentlessly until their defeat. This work will spur continued develop ment of their doctrine and iheir forces In the years ahead as they attempt to refine their combined-arms capal><lUies.| |

the ground, the Soviets are working onand tactics intended to introducearmored forces into NATO's rear areas,airmobile units behind enemy lines, andthe tempo of attack byunits. In the air, their operationsand support ground attacks andNATO's growing ground attack air threat.probably view NATO's air forces as thethreat to the success of their conventionalin the theater of military operationsconcepts for winning air supremacysector air operations if the Sovietsalrpower to conduct TMO-wide attacksdefense operations if NATO seized the initiativeair war. On coastal Banks, naval forcesamphibious attacks to outflank enemyand would protect Pact ground forcesnaval task groups. All of thesearc intended to keep ihc Pactrapidly, f |

New Emphasis on Troop Control

TMO increasingly is the focus forand control of Soviet military operations.Soviet commander, in chargeMOof forces, coordinates the activities ofthai could include moref aircraft, and supporting navalforces would operatearge areaobjectives could involve seizing targets.or more within enemy territory.P

he TMO level of command rose tobecause of the need to coordinate the operations of several fronts with forces operating deep within enemy territory and to use available air forcesthroughout the theater. Modern electronic advances, according to the Soviets, provide thebasis for central control of large, joint-service forces operating over vast areas. The Soviet challenge foro exploit available technology by developing reliable integrated joint-service staffresponsive automated reconnaissance andand control systems, and skilled combined-arms senior officers able to provide continuous overall direction to theater forces. Thb will require the TMO

commander and hb staff loingle integrated plan ol action for allo keep constantly in touch with the battlefield, and to shift and concentrate his forces to exploit success in any sector of Ihe theater.

During the period of thb Estimate, the Soviets will improve their communication* and computer equipment, refine their staff and command proce-durci. and work toward perfecting the high cornrnand ol* forces concept. The Soviets recognize, however, that thererave danger on the modem, quickly (hanging Isattlefidd of creating excessively rigid and oentrallxed control procedures at all echelons. Junior commanders are also aware that higltei controlconstantly monitor theii progtess and candirectly in tactical situations. Thb rigidity-typical of the entire Soviet mllllaty and originating in the prerogatives and control mechanisms available to the Genera!with the autonomy needed bv commanders on the baltWficld to react quickly to unanticipated conditions. New Soviet trainingemphasize the need for junior-level fsexibihty. But neitherapparently ihehow Ihey can fevolve the dilemma in the coming years posed by iheir traditions of centralization and modem needs for tactical Bexibility. Q

The Soviets apparently have In place with most East Europeanystem that effectively places (Ik- NSWP lorces under Sovicl control from the outset of notfllitieJ- Non-Soviet officers would be subordinate to Soviet* on major wartime command staffs above front level Peacetime training, readiness, and equip men! procurement programs are monitored by Soviet-dominated Warsaw Pact staffs Furthermore, from the Soviet viewpcant. the East Europeans can generally be relied on to play roles that ihey have been assigned and have trained for, at least early in any NATO-Pact conflict. | |

Soviet fiat, however, cannot close the wideriing gap between modern Soviet lorces in Eastern Europe and Ihose of Soviet allies. Thb disparity in combatost pronounced In Eastern Europe's southern tier and in Poland ll will probably lead to operaltonal adiustrrkents in Soviet plans against NATO In the years ahead | |

The Soviets have made significantin their theater nuclearnd wemore to come. As they reach theater nuclear parity wilhall classes of weapons from nuclear artillery to tacticalmay believe NATO would be less likely to pull the nuclear trigger, thereby justifying even more emphasis

Soviets view cliemical munitions,nuclear weapons, as weapons of masshave distinct military utility. The SovieU arethat the use of such weapons could forceretaliate with nuclear weapons. Nevertheless,on and development of new agentsihe Soviets may decide to rcemphasizcoffensive opera (ions in Ihe future) |

the tseatears we anticipate changesway the Soviets organize, equip train, control,to employ their general purpose forces.will, of course, be affected by theresource* and by the political priorities Put onNonetheless, general purpose force* willthrough the0 Somewill be caused bv bureaucratic momentuminfighting lhat we do not entirely understand,of ibe changes detailed in the (able* in annexdescribed in tbe following chapters will beto the enserging Soviet beliefnd maneuver just might force aeven so powerful an adversary as NATOlo massive nuclear warfare.| |

ARSAW PACT DOCTRINE AND FORCES Theater Warfare Doctrine

military strategy Is designed toof the homeland After their bitterWorld War II. the Soviets never again intenda defensive war on an enemy's termsbelieve offense tt the best defense, and planthe strategic initiative against any adversaryIhe fighlitqt to enemy territory fiomTbe Soviets and iheir allies havegeneral purpose forces ideally suited forwarfaie. In peacetime, the best of these force*on the borders of tbe Soviet homeland orEurope, where thev hope to stopwell short of Soviet territory and take theinto enemy territory. Q

be Warsawrepared to fight at anychemical, nuclear, or anyThe Pact continues to hope lhat. if war should come to Europe, it wouldhort conventional one during which an enemy would be quickly crushed by the scale and violenceact offensive The Soviets believe in clearetil forceat Ihe point ofihey and their allies have wotked Incessantly lo build Ine massive convenllonal forces tbat they believe create such superiority.^

enet associated with iotce superiority is mutually supportive action by all mllitaiy serviceair, and naval. Properlyjoint-service combat actions can simultaneously threaten an enemy such as NATO throosthout the depth of iu defenses, providing no respite from the relentless oBensives planned by tbe Fact Inception and surprise will be used to magnify the effect of toint-force actions, confusing and demorauzing the enemy The Soviets know that thererade-off between achieving force superiority and tactical surprise, but hope to exploit modern mobile weapons and complex control systems to achieve both. We expect, however, that if forced to choose between the two, they would select force superiority with its more predictable advantages. Q

be Soviets intend to destroy their enemy on tbe ground, and base their plans on offensivetactics Their large tank and mechanized infantry forces permit them to rapidly concentrate force against soft spots in tlie enemy's defense and In outflank and bypass strongpoints Once through tliese ilefenses, tliese forces have the mobility, range, and shock power to destroy enemy reserves and overrun and seize targets deep In the rear area. Air and naval forces would support these armored thrusts, defeat enemy air threats to maneuvering ground units, and attack key targets and enemy nuclear units in advance of the ground forces,

Soviets would, of course, seek lorisk of escalation associateduropeankeeping it conventional. They would preferintense conventional conflict, but considerbe preparedore protracted war.major leaps!ic buildup has improvedability to fight an intensiveartoays. Their large pool of reservists,and military production capacitiesthe Soviets tho capability to sustainlor extended periods Q

Nuclear Weapons

Soviets also realize, however, that theof their conventional arms coulduclear response. Such isrolonged COTverrtionalcould lead either side lo use nuclear weaponsthe deadlock. The Soviets believe theirforces are trained and equipped touclear environment. Evidence shows that,Warsaw Pact learner! uf NATO intentions loweapons Fact leaders would hope to preempt NATO in their use Although preemption continues torominent feature of Soviet theater nuclear force doctrine, its application since theas been confined to those situations that indicated thai NATO wasuclear strike. There are some signs that tbe Soviets may not necessarily respond to NATO's use of nuclear weaponsimited scaleassive attack In general, however, tlie rvl-dence indicates that NATO's use of nucieai weapon* will evoke some type of Soviet nuclear response. The level of response cannot be predicted.! 1

According to one intelligence communityhe Soviets will respond to any NATO use of nuclear weaponsrge-scale theater level nuclear strike. According to the holder of this view, anv attempt lo assess bow the Soviets might react-niaUtcale NATO nuclear strike must be based on thethat the Soviets know theoing lo be of small scale and are wnGdenl it will not leopardire Ihe success of their offensive. Because of tliesethe issue of how the Soviets might reacturely speculative one of questionable practical value- Constdet.rw the Soviets" lack of ccoficlenc* that nuclear escalation can be cent rolled, and their belief in ibe decisiveness of nuclear weapons, this view holds lhat it would be imprudent to expect lessarge-scale Soviet nuclear response to any use of nuclear weapons by NATO.[ |

The Soviets arc pessimisticaior nuclear exchange in Europe would be confined to ihe theater. Such an exchange could quickly engulf the Soviet Union in an intercontinental nuclear war. We have no evidence that the Soviets have yet altered their beliefheater nucieai war could be prevented from escalatingtrategic conflict ^

ATO's deployment of more advanced theater nuclear forces such as the Pershing II is seen by the Soviets as complicating the chances for controlling escalation The Soviets ihink lhat the Pershing II. with lis high accuracy and short flight time, threatens key targets in the USSR, including national command authorities, from tbe very outset of hostihties They also believe that the new NATO missiles will present new tmcertalnties for them in assessing the via* and objectivesuclear attack from Wesiern Europe and therefore in knowing tbe level at which Ihey should respond.^

Tht holder of ihUht Aiitstant Chuf of Slag for

tnltihgtna.ol tit |

Thetatu* ortd RecioWit Command Structure

hu Sovicl* may be establish inic limit commands in some theatcis of miliiary operation! such as the Western and Southwestern TMOs, opposite NATO.

he blah commands of forces are an extension of Ihe General Slaff operating between ihe combat forces and the Supreme High Command TheHigh Command is not active in peacetime but would be headrd in wartime by (he party Ceneral Secretary. Use of tbe high commands to control combat force* would free the Ceneral Sufi inexecutive agent of the Supreme Highconcentrate on the overall directionultithratei war!

S6 Opposite NATO any new high commands would include Last European forces, at least in war-lime. How the Soviei controlled peacetime highwill relate to the armed forces of the East Ewopeans is not yet clear lo us and probably wouldJelieaie matter that is Still evolving. The Warsaw Pact has one command structure in peacetime and another forit is only the wartime struclure lhat Include* "unified" Warsaw Pact high commands for the TMOs. The Easiexceptartime structure that subordinates their force* directly lo tbe Soviet Surxeme High Command | ]

n tbe past, high commands for the Western and Southwestern TMOs may have been activated to practice their wartime control of both Soviet and East European forces. Establishment of these comtnandsermanent tsasis would appear to be an evolutionary step in Ihefforts to improve their own command structure. The East Europeans, however, almost certainly will resist any arrangement for the permanent activation of the planned wartime high commands that inducted day-to-day control of ibeir forces The Soviets could compromise by limiting the new commands' peacetime Warsaw Pact role to such functions as planning for wartime operations, (raining, and weapon nnxlemization programs, and byto exercise* their operational control of East European forces. We do not yet have sufficientlo determine the nature and eitent of Soviet authority withinMO structure What* their rrUtioetship with East European forces, the high commands probably will control Soviet forces in ihe TMOs in peacetime. L

he high commands ptobubly will have thewilh the General Staff in Mosplanning and coordinating nuclear strikes throughout the theaters As the Soviets becomethat ihe new high commands are operating smoothly, the commands probablycertain circumstances--be green wartime controlot* nuclear forces allocated lo deliver strikes in their theaters The Soviets regard the TMO high commands as ctlcmlons of the Ceneral Staff and probably have contingency plans under which they are to continue nuclearpossibly In order initialstrikes in ihe theaters- if Moscow-level control should be

saving the high commands operating on abasis in peacetime would ease the transitionSoviet and Warsaw Pact command structures toposture and does remove one potentialof preparations for war. Our ability to warn ofmiliiary move, however, depends primarilyof the many step* required tocombatof which are combattheir logistic support.the activation of tbe permanent TMO highr>di does not. by itself, reduce our conbdettce tnability to provide warning of

Orrjarsi ration of the Forces

a land TMO. the largestront is similarATOand its associated air force* in size, leveland function There ts noront. It usually would be composedlo five tank and combined-arms armies,three lo five tank or motorized rifleTactical and strategic SAM systems andunits would provide air defense forAdditionally, air forces with as many astactical aircraft would be employedand defensive operations. Naval unitssupport to conduct amphibious operationsprctect the flank of coastal fronts The typicalhaveen.ihe front opposite NATO's centralocn.| ]

Ground Forces

Gt. Front forces are drawn from allinfantry, artillery, trussale, air. and certain air defense forces. The front could have one or more airborne

Sp^iot^ftiipose (Spettnoi) Forces

Main letcflasxttce Directorate (CRU) ol thr General Sufi maintains special-rjwrpose (SDftsnar) forces organized In tuigadr* in moil miliiaryof forces, and fleets. Time uniis. operationally subordinate lo fronts and Beefs Iu wartime, range In nre. iraJo TOO personnel, but units in forward areas are larger The brigade subordinalr lo thr (Jioup of Soviet Forres in Cetmanr (CSFGX foi etain-ple. hasen, and oilier brigades, opposite China and in ihc western USSR are of sunlllar size-]

The total Speorau force may be0 tUoatg Breause Spetsnai un.liuLataMial percentage of conscripts, ihe potential reserve loroe could have as many0 men, but we have little duett Infoima tion on the Sir* or planned organlratlon of these reserves.

la addUrm to the brigadentrnburg subordsnair to the CSFG. Spebnar brigades In ihe western military dlitrlcts and smaller units in the other groups of forces would be available for initial operations against NATO. The brigades would be subdividedmanlo operate behind enemy line* in wartime, each bngade coasdsiina ofroirps When similar noii Soviet Warsaw Pact sriecial-psirpuae forces arepelsrui groupt could be employed in Ibe Western TMO against NATO's Central Region In the course of the campaign. |

In wartime. Sprttnar forces could operate as special purpose reeonnartiance groups behind NATOrimarily lashed with locating, and in someattacking, mobile nuclear misuses, mobileposts, and other priority lancet* They might abo monitor NATO's nuclear airbair* and storage sites In cade* to detect theo itUtiale Use use ol nuclear weapons The Spetsnai aroupi aie lightlyantitank guided mimics,surface to air missilesnd autornatlc weapbut the Soviets evidently believe that Spebnaz can be effective against some inadequately dHer-ied. vul-ae^ceeuiaatsj |

The Soviet* might attempt lonal) number of Spetsnat groups Into Western Europo some day* before the beginning of hostilities, but the vast majority of Stsrtanai force* probably would not cross the border before tW aotbreal ofcearveotBrol war The Soviets rrtognlir tbat even limited prc-arnd sabotaiM by Spetsnai units could Jeopardiw the pros pecls of achieving surprise) |

The Soviet* could infiltrate Spetsnat groups by light fiied wing aircraft (AN-faX iselicoptert, aad trucks im mediately ixiwediog ot concurrent with ihe large all operation The Soviet* would rely on thr confusion of war. and the opening of penetration corridors durinu tbe all operation, to allow the insertion ofubstantial number of Sights would be required lo lift Spebnar teams WeoofideolH Sedge whetherroops can be deployed like this, but we have saVniihed no alrcrafl-or trained pito conduct ihc demanding mission of crossing the forwardthe ballle area (I'KRA) at ihc nutsel of confliel

Soetsnat units may receive better cotnenptv may be rnore rigorously trained, and may have moreand talented officers and NCOs than regular motorized rule divisions In Afghanistan, Spetsnai troop* have been equipped with conventional equip mem. varii a*nd apparesstly may be used as ebte tenantry rather than as sabotage umti j

supporting it Meet would have an air assaultpetsnai (see inset) brigade attached. Combatnd combat service dement* of the front would provide transport, maintenance, engineering, supply, and medical supportesigned to give the front commander all the organic assets he needs to plan and conduct all-arms conventionalfsrestnkes in support of his maneuver units. Q

he Warsaw Part ground forces are bv far (lie largest of ihe three general purpose forces. ThePact countries collectivelyroundprincipal maneuver unit of theand hundreds of specialized nondivUtonal combat support and service support units (see lableespite efforts al standardization, divisional compositioncoroiderably from country to couniry. particularly in term* of organization and weapons holdings} ]

arsaw Pact ground units are categorized by the Soviets a* either "ready" or "not ready" for operations. Ready unib have higher nunning. are better named, and usually are better equipped than not-ready units [see tablebey are generally concentrated cfsrxsiic cither NATO or China.the majority of all Pad mills are coiuidcred by the Soviets as not ready {See figure 2jQ

veadv units are cspected to be inuTsedtMely ready to mount at leas* emrBgencv defensive ccera-tions at any lime. They would, however,mall

Table 1

Warsaw Pact Cround5

Figure 2

Rcadincvs of Soviet and Ncm-Sovict (ground Forces

Active MRDi

Ailive TDs

aaaw

J> MB ft

He*l. TO-

Nil reid, TDi

Iimldirtiiom

Nroi.pf unified army corps Army coir-mandi Army conn

SI

191

IS

ts

15

11

III

a

Si

0

8J

i

tabic

amount offrom twoomplete pieparaticsns for intensive offensiveNot-ready units are consider rd bv Pact planners to be incapable of offensive oprratsoru without longer periods ofmobilization and post nsobilirationcould extendonth or more, depending on the unit's peacetime status and the nature of their expected missions Not-ready units could be commllled to operations before completing all preparations, but Pact planners would have to settle for reduced levels of coinbal proficiency. All of tbe not-ready divisions would have to move from the USSR before they could be used.Q

he two-tiered readiness system effectivelytwo Warsaw Pactell-trained and wefl-equipped force ready for immediate commrtment,uch larger reserve force not irnrrtediately ready to fight but representing massive combatin the event of rwolonged hostilities While ready divisions generally have first claim to defenseproximityaSOi threat and planned role in combat also affect resource allocation For example, although Soviet not-ready units In the western USSR oimositc NATO are not as well manned or trained as ready divisions opposite China, ihey do have more modern equipment. Ccnorallv, non-Soviet forces in the northern tier of Europe, which face NATO's strongest forces, are belter equipped lhan those in the southern ticrQ

* irtam remu*, -rflotit ruhus ulutei di-

I-tt ibotiaanc4 mm**

continued)

Characteristics of Soviet Ground Force Maneuver Divisions'

l<ufn*ioiamn4tw {compfetelv (ildir)

ffiom predominate.

nmiriti to nuinlain eouipmeol

Mml units in thii category aie motorlrrd liScdrvWons major

No unit training, tome individual trjininE

and armored persiwnel carrier; older oqulpnwnl

, formal ion dmiiuro)

Mentation-base divisions

NO i

piedesicnaled Irom eolocilod ranted diviHom.

HahH equipi oimbilder.

No peacetime tinning

are among lhc leim. rtioM frequently used by emigres in detciibing renvrnatofta units.

Emigres have further IdentifiedBwns at pofuWriroumnova (ball cadre) and pvlunnmtHava (hall deployed)

Onen thii group ta identified by an emigre as pok.-kadiirownnov* (half cadre).

Nora: The agreed NATO caicgceiaation nxrm for all Warsaw Pad divisions iias follows:

Uve

Categories Percent of Manning

Nor reads-

(At) (AS)

B

C

|CI) (CI)

II

andndpO up toup top5 up lop to 5

table ii

21

taniiMaik-

Figure 3

Age of Soviet Ground Forces Kooipmeni'

l

tgjjMM anna UlawItwor

thoughft technology, arc still com hai capable. These weapons are not necessarily inferior to their standard NATO counterparts, which oltcn alto represent older technology Many of the older Pad weapons are rugged, reliable designs lhat have been proved by the thousands deployed to tbe held and still found in large numbers with tbe forces. In addition, the large pool of these weapons provides the Pact with mass and numerical superiority for offensive opera tions and with significant reserves to survive the high attrition rates characteristic of modern combat.)

Air Forces

he Warsaw Pact air forces consist0 Died-wing aircraft and anaircraft (eadudlrag Soviet Naval Avialkoni These include EsJtters. fighter-bombers, light bombers, me

hlriuOrd from tha lutm* are al Sen aaval aWi aad hear,ombctv 2tf> bthunHTM aircraft tubordlnMe lo ihean armies All value* Ide have been rounded lo thr nearest five

ITtt labia

ilium bombers, and varioin specialized fixed-win* support aircraft, as well as combat and transport Hicoptersted wing aircraft andvehcopteri are Soviet The basic air unit throujrhout the Pact ts the air regiment, which can haveoircraft, depending on the type. There areersonnel in the Soviet Air Forces andn non-Soviet air forces. Q

he Soviet Air Forum are not as large or aging as the Cround Forces (see labiand cortsctjucntlv even forces opposite China and tn the interior do not lag far behind standards set opposite NATO.7 Hooter anditter fwhter-bombers, as

Fisrure 4

Comparison ol Aj-es of Weapons Inventories of Ready Versus Noi Ready Soviei Ground Forces'

lyTtas'

1M4t'

. :

H

r -.

Ai in-ptnoniel

t.

i-'l-

Ik

ruuinmcoi began lull inirodwtion into Inrce

as theloater fighter, have greater range, btggcr payloads, and belter avionics than the older models thev have replaced Newly deployed deep-theater-strikethemm andackfiregive the theater commanders ihe capability for all-weather low-altitude attacks throughout Western Furope"

he Soviets remganiwd their air lorces in Ihe. The essential features of this reorganization

Included:

The transfer of some Air fMensc (PVO Strany) aviation forces lo air forces of the military district (MD) in thealong ihc periphery of the USSR.

The disestablishment of front aviation air armici and Integration of front and the newly created army aviation into Ihe joint forces of MIX fronts, and ground armies.

The creation of total air/air defense command procedures to provide unified area air defense coverage

The establishmentorce referred lo as Strategic Aviation This force consists of allformerly assigned to the disestablished long Uange Aviation and aircraft drawn front front air armies | |

he air force reorganization was apparently intended to create forcethe means

figure S

Age of Equipmrn(roup of Soviei Forces Germany

iMSMai

ss*T1 '* mm Bif^n

Tahiet

Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Air Forces: Tactical (lornbat5

FiRftlfi-intficeptea

v..

Fbaaa*

rew *SB

rmm

rnaatad

Floaaer

Fiogloal

on ml name

iwitir

n Fnhtw.:

rtaar

IS Fottwi

it

w{

of controllingare well suiled to joint operations and comples thcatcrwidc air

on-Soviet Warsaw Pact air forces are much less modern orin the northern tier of EasternSoviet resOonal forces. The East European air forces collectively havemall percentage of the modernvariants of thendare the mainstay of Soviet forces opposite NATO (seehe East Europeans are slowly acquiring such aircraft asind attack helicopters androgfoot ground attack aircraft. Because of their aging inventories, the Last European air forcesisproportionately lower percentage of potential combat effectiveness opposite NATO than their numbers might imply-

with their ground forces, Warsaw Padapparently cannot afford lo keep their entireat peak readiness Combatthose opposite NATO andmanned with trained pilots. However, thehave difficulty fully manning rearmaintenance positions. In some units, theyon civilian technicians. Enlisted supportare available are not generally wellthat is beconiirsg more serious as themore modern and more com pies aircrafthandling and command and controlwould be neededajor offensiveagainst NATO are not complete andup to Iwo weeks to accomplish. Pact defensivein the forward area could, however, respondalt attack immediately.Q

Air Detente Forces

air defense assets in theare drawn from the Soviet Air Defenseinclude strategic and tactical surface-to-air reis-

stiles (SAMs) and air surveillance, units. For wartime air defense of theater forces, the theater commander, who alsoommander for air defense, would draw from units of Ihe Air Defense Forces of the MD/COF within his area of operations'

eneration strategic SAM systems aredeplo>rd to improve Warsaw Pact air defenses Thrnd its mobile version. Ihe SA-lOb, have better low-altitude capabilities than earlier types. In addition, thes being deployed to provide long-range engagement capability for non-Soviet Warsaw Pact strategic SAM units in East Germany,Hungary, and Bulgaria. Theas also deployed4 with air defense forces in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany

SAM systems currently beingdefend ground forces induce

The long-rangehich is probably aneplacement and can abo use the Giant ABM

The medium-range SA-II.

Thehich is replacing ilw SA-fl for defense of regimental formations j

No vol Forces

Estunale Is cotscerrted primarily withthat wouldole in land thea'erIn Europe, most Warsaw pactnaval forces are assigned to protect andareas of the submarine strategicforce or to attack NATO's nuclear-capablej

t hiummarizes the general purpose naval force order of battle.!

aval forces most likely lo support land TMO campaigns0 Soviet navaltroop* located in the Northern. Baltic, and Black Seaolish sea landing division. and several small East Cerman, Bulgarian, and Romanian uniu trained in amphibious assault tactics In addition, naval fighters and bombers and amphibious-lift ships would be dedicated to such support

he Soviei approach to naval leadiness differs markedly from that of Western navies. Generally speaking, the Soviet readiness philosophy stresses readiness lo deploy for lumbal on relatively short notice rather than routine deployment of large forces. Toinimum force generation capability in times of crisis, the Soviet Navy emphasizesand in-port/in-area training rather thanat-sea narrations To the Soviet mind, it apparently is more important lo be ready lo go to sea than to be at sea Under this system, operational eiprriersce and some degree of crew probesency are sacrificed to achieve high material availability. The Sovietscould have more than half of their submarines and major surface combatants available for combatew days and someercent within three weeks We estimate that, given several days' warning, Soviet Naval Aviation would have moreercent of its aircraft available, although this percentage could be sustained forhorte preparation for combat of naval form* supporting land TMOs would be adjusted to meet the opeiattonal requirement* of land TMO forces. | |

Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare

ll Warsaw Pact general purpose forces stress the need for effective recoiuiaistaisce awl electronic warfare capabilities. On the modem, fas'-changing battlefield, the Soviets realize reconmlsiance tavital for identifying and targetingey obicctive of Soviet conventional

he Soviets haveide variety of reconnaissance and electronic warfare means,human osxnts. special purpose reconnaissance units, signals intercept and lamming units, and aerial reconnaissance systems. We believe commanders are required to consider and integrate electronic warfare capabililie* into iheir overall fire and maneuver plans Despite the Soviets* investment in reconnaissance and electronic capabilities, however, wc believe further improvements must tie marl" in tlie size offorcci, sensor technology, and informationand dissemination lo meet ihe challenge of I

Figure 6

Major Soviet Naval Forces"

SEA FLEET

Major Surface Combatants Submarines

Kiev-Class Aircraft Missile 1

Missile 2

Attack 25

NORTHERN FLEET Major Surface Combatants Submarines

Missile, ai

Cruise Missileorpodo Attack 02

14

52

Kiev-Class Aitctafi

Carriers Cruisers Destroyers Frigates

Infcumahon as of Ido not include

mm in rcsove Among tho other units In iSe So^el Navy aiaalrol combatants,mphibious-warfarendnde-way lepfeoohmoM snips.

Btae*oot tiuu<ei iiclude tho unila cA Iho Casp-an Saa Flotilla fatal xitanliy consistsivision In the Pacific Ocean Reel and on* twgsoV in each ol th*floats

i!'T'l I

ver weapon. Efforts to maintain its battlefieldwill lanselv determine pound forceduring the projection |

lse Soviets know that their Groundespecially their tankface seriouson the battlefield of the near future. I

[reflect the most concern about;

Planned NATO antitank missiles and guided munitions, which continue to threaten theprimacy of the tank

New and programed air threats to Soviet ground opera tsoru.

Deployment of the Pershing II and the ground-launched cruise missile, which can strike targets in the USSR from the European theater.

The US faintly of deep-strike, precision guided weapons designed to target Pact follow-on forces while they are deep in Eastern Europe and before they can exploit forward area1 tough these systems will not be widely deployed for five toean, ihe Soviets are already developing ways to counteract lliem.

Increaving urbanization, particularly on the north German plain, with its allendanl obstacles to armored force operations.|

mproving NATO defenses and the operational environment create two major problem* fo* IheThev mustay lo maintain high rates of advance throughout Ibe theater by going through, over, or around defensive obstacle! At the same time, they mustav to protect tbeir lank forcesroper mii of combined-arms firepower, and tactics thai enable them to drive rapidly into an enemy's rear area]

Oporolions

he Soviets arc now ex peri men ling wilh new operational and tactical concepts suited lo high-tempo, armor-heavy pound offensives. Their most significant operational adjustment, affecting all general rsurpose forces.hift of land battle management and control from the front lo the theater level with centralized command entrustedroundficci. lite TMO commandei and his staffingle concept of operations, synchronize the combal actions of all ground, air, and naval forces within the theater, and then monitor fluid battle conditions, concentrating force* and adjusting tactics as Deeded to achieve victory.

TMO commarsden opposite NATO face corn-plea command and control problems Tbe numbers and types of weapon* available lo thrmIrom tanks to deep-StrikeI hem (othreaten enemy targets from tbe East-West German border to the English Uhannrl By properly organizing their forces and supplies, ihey can conduct nonstop multifrontal operations, preventing NATO fromand possibly from pulling nuclear strike plans into effect.

The SovieU hive developed tht concept of the integrated fire desliuelion of Ihe enemy for more effective use ol firepower with maneuver forces. Use of different fireartillery, missiles armed wilh conventional warheads, andmust becoordinated. At the division level, for example, the commander must blend helicopters, artillery, and tank fire to influence the Immediate battle, while at the TMO level deep air and missile strikes ranging over hundreds of kilometers must complement cannon and rocket bombardment in support of initial ground assaults

he Soviets appear lo be experimenting with control solutions lo cctnplci. all-arms, jot rg-service operations They are apparently searching for the proper ml* andbe drawn from the various general purposeintegratedstaffs at all echelon* The pre ruga lives, roles, and command links between staff and command personnel will slowly be worked out in the years ahead- We lack precise details on these staff

he Soviets also appear lo be experimentingignificant adjustment in Ihe use of their forces in Ihc western USSRampaign against NATO. Thev are probably considering ihe deployment of some of these forces to the first echelon in Eastern Europe before the onset of hostilities In Ihc past they were to become available only after as much as one week of hostilities. These ad/ustmcnU mayajor rethinking of operational plans for the West-em TMO and may reflect important changes in Soviet thinking about Ihe NATO threat and Ihe correlation of forces. The Soviet* may believe, for example, thai NATO de-frogs are. or wdl soon be. so Improved that they must provide mote combat force and firepower to breach them The SovieU may also feel that early movement of second -echelon for re* could complicate the largeting of these lorces by NATO'* deep-strike

weapons. Finally, (be Soviets apparently realize ihal. as the remainder ot* ibe Warsaw Fact Lags further behind them, their East European allies are becoming less capable of accomplishing first-echelon mission* and must be auspnertted or replaced by Soviet force*

roles for Soviet second-echelonhowever, tcquire "not-ready" divisions inUSSH to make major improvements tnstatus. In the past several years,2 tanksartillery -and adopted newnot generally found withHowever, unless the Soviets change tbetraining levels of thesenot currentlyunits will needmobilization and training before theyfor demanding first-echelon irrationalany case, early forward rnovement of thesecertainly will provide increased warning| |

Tactics

On the tactical level the Soviet* are seeking ways lo assure high rates of advance by maneuver units and to make conventional integrated fire support responsive and effective- The most siguilicant advance in their operationalhe operationalgroup (OMG1 TV OMCank-heavy, all-arms mechanized formation, designed for highly rnornle, semi-independent actions behind enemyhe OMC is to maintain ihe tempo of the offensive and createn<lit ions for the success of the main attack. It does so bv eapkslin* gaps in NATO'* forward defenses early on and by shifting the focus of the battle- to an enemy's roar. Once through Ihe defense, OMC* conduct deep attack* against assigned targets such as nuclear delivery units or targets of opportunity, but try lo avoid decisive engagements with large enemy concentrations Bv introducing large, highly roaneuveiable forces in an enemy's rear, the Soviets hope lo draw off reserves from forward oefenses. prevent the establishment of coherentdefensive lines, and seize key terrainMGs are thus intended lo keep constant pressure throughout the enemy'* depth, to maneuver and al-lack him from unexpected directions, to force him Inlond uharnately lo collapse his defense!

The Soviets know' thai they are not yet able lo fully exploit the OMC coisccpt. They will work indecade to correct obviousa* how lo provide reliable fire support, commuriicaliim*.

and air defenseorces operating deep behind enemy lines. Some ol their better equipped allies are testing, and may adopt, the OMC concept.

he emphasb on high ma neu ver ability has led the Soviets lo develop air assault tacticsay lo leapfrog defenses and add depth to Ihe Uctical battle-ficld0 ihey have formed al leastronl-and army-level air assault brigades and battalions capable of parachute assault and he!iborne airmobile assault Division level units are abo being trained in alrmolnle tactics

irborne and air assault operations ofwould have important roles In Soviet effortsNATO's defense. Target- would rncrodedeptowd forces, airfields, river-crossingin the later stage* of ihe offensive, target*Ihe TMO In these operatiom, the .Pactecisive effect on the ouUorne of acreating favorable conditionsapidthe main femes. Combined-armsto divbion are now expected to train inair-ground coordination rsi^eded toand supply alrrrsobile uniu operating Inof mam-force

e expect the Soviets lo further refine their concepts and develop iheir forces for airmobilethroughout ibe projection period. Air assault battalions will be added to selected armies,opposite NATO, and additional helicopter* will become available lo aimy and division commanders. Exercise* will emphasize the procedures needed to coordinate air/ground assets and the better integration of joint -service staffs required lo plan and manage air assault "]

Orgoni lotion

he Soviets are reorganizing their Cround Force* unib to protect and complement the tank. They are restructuring iheir combatthe vail bulk of iheii tanks areprovide maneuver unit commandersalanced, lethal array of mobile weapons needed lo conductoperations against NATO anOarmor forces. | |

n Ihe current divisional reorganization, which began in earnestbe typical tank regimenl hasully tracked mntorired rifle battalion, ratherompany, tripling its infantry asset* Tbe lank regiment is also tripling its organic aitllleiv assets byattalion of armored self-propelledable lo keep pace with tankn addition,

tha artillery regiments of both tank and motorized rifle di> ivtorn (MRDi! aretheir battery rnr by one-third and converting to self-propelled models, and helicopter dctachrnenti are being upgraded to squadrons by the addition of attack helicopter*only one motorized rifle regiment (MKR1 In most motoriicd riBe divisions is equipped with tracked Infantry fighting vehicleswhich (he Soviets callthe other two have wheeled armored personnel carriers (APCs) Five MRDs,have recently been reorganized with Iwool BMPs (IFVs) each in the CSFC. Il ihis presages more widespread fielding of the BMPs in place ofCs it would be expensive and increase maintenance requirements, but would give Soviet MRUs increased firepower and protection, as well as cross-country mobility more comparable lo that of tank divisions (secnd SlQ

he recent organizational changes willdivisional and reantnenta! commanders totrue combined-arms commanders. Theylo master planning and control proceduresto integrate their fire assets with maneuver.writings now stress the new combined-armsof tactical commanders- Nonetheless,must still make maior adjustments tolower-level commanders to master theirorganisations. Division andfor example, do not appear tostaffs, communications, orto coordinate air-ground tactics and tothe weapons now at their

We believe that the current organisational (tend* in divuloru opposite NATO will require at least the retulnder of the decade to complete Theywill not be completely implemented throughout Ihe force, however, during tbe projection period. Our historical analysis of organizational changes shows thai many years are required to complete changes of the scope now under way. Often before one set of changes is finished, another has begun. In, therefore, we anticipate yet another series of organizational changes, as new weapons are introduced and steps are laken to implement further development In military

The Soviets have also beenew. large maneuver organization the new-type army corps This new corpsesernhiance lo the large US and West German divisions and wouldartime autboriaed Urength of0 men As currently

the corps has two rnechanized brigades and

two tank brigades, plus other combat, mm tut luppnrt. and combat service support elements tsee bgurehe organization may be expanded during theperiodive-brigade structure Each tank and rnechanized brigade has four combined-aimseach with five companies We eapect more to be formed There are none with non-Soviet Pact forces, nor do we expect any| |

he new-type army corps should lie capableariety of combat missions It Is fully mechanized, capable of performing offensive operation, behind enemy lines. Its balanced inventory of tank, artillery, infantry, and air defense weapons is well suited lo the inderjendenl missions often temporarily cut off from support by main forces It appears, however, lo lack reconnansance and logistic support necessary toextended independent operations, all hough these may be attached to the corps as needed.

Tbe Soviets appear to be testing new concepts for grouping fire support weapons, target acquisition systems, and automated command systems to counter US high-technology weapons derived from the "assault breaker'*mploying precislon-gulded,deep-strike systems

These concepts are further ciprcsilons of the Soviets' belief In integrated fire destruction of the enemy. Their weapon systems arc short-range ballistic missileiannon and multiplet is too early to forecast the outcome of these experiments, and the Soviets may modify or abandon them. They will probably encounterin providing timely target acquisition andfire Nevertheless, these concepts embody the Soviet commitment to integrated, long-range,firepower as otse of the key ingredient* in Iheir nonnuclear operational srt.Q

n iheir quest to improve conventionalthe Soviets have also expanded nondiviUonal cannon and SRBM units. Artillery battery sizes arc incrcasine by one-third, and many units oppmite NATO are converting to self-propelled models The sizes of army- and front-level SRBM units are also increasing by one-third in areas opposite NATO. Collectively, these increases will provide large forces Ihai can be quickly concentrated to provide massed Are to cover assaults throughout the front's zone of operations and which are mobile enough tofad-moving maneuver units(

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Figure 8

Principal Charter* Resulting From Ihe Reorganization and Modeniirationeady Tank Division'

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Thr Sovteti air developing and reohablv ieslit* the conrepleeonnaissance Utile tvslrm (RSS)econnaiiwncc die ivrtemhev do not appear to have standard orgaoizalions bill are Icmptirarily lai-bred Ink groups lornre-nipooil rotssiuni Tbeic ocumialtona can include artillery and multiple rocle, launchers <MPLa)-as surface muailrs -a. in BSSt-iotcaraied bv ani edrill Till be drawn primarily from army and Irani unlti Li.it; aie nol colocaled but linked by- the automatedlyilcmjj

These onunlutioni are quite likely meant to counter new NATO hiirVtechookity battlefield intern* The Sovieti' concern for tbe leeurity of their toUow-oa for coi

tbe threat peace) br US and NATO leasg-raea* capable of delivering preciUoo Rinlrd munitions or wbmunitiom on matted com tatoviet opeo-touree wnling* haveigh level of concern for Ihe threat posed by theae tyilrrm The Soviets would Israel high-technology weapons that could engage follow-on forces. Additional Israeli would include NATO theater level nuclear deliveryiueh as Pershing II and ground-launched cruise mis-siles-thathreat ro follow-on

The cornpoUtion of Soviet reconnaissance mileit evolving over time. Al first thev puueawd short-range ballistic mbsdesannon, and MRL assets; more recently, only SRBM* have been included RPSi have apparently always been limited lo cannons andhe Soviet* will probably further eiperimeutthe complexes' com postnd oieaniralion In the yean ahead Q

Utile ii known about the emplo.niern ofasset* in support of the RSSa It athey wiB have an organic iccunnaissanceor receive eairting reenmamanre assetstheater reconnaissance unit* The rolehas yet to be fully identified. They coulda ircnnrumunne role and may function as

PSSs wiD probably appear only at front and army levels It appears that theormed only at division level The RFS probably Is composed ol tube artillery and rocket Launchers drawn from orgaruc or attached division aaarti. and may be confined to operationsi.ir.oos area ol rrarinrrMbility The Soviet, may continue to capenmenl with the organization, mlaUont, and subordination eJ both nrganidations, and such testing may continue forlime in the future.

he Warsaw Pact ground forces are fielding new weapons of virtually every type ranging from tanks to air defense guns. (Seeorces in the Western TMO historically have been the first to modernize. We expect no change to this pattera|_

eapon designs in the ground forces must be compatible with operational requirements formaneuver warfare,e power, reuability, and survivability. Soviet weapon designs are generally standard throughout the Pact, but ibe drive towardften frustrated by the fielding simultaneously ofenerations of Sovietwithin the same force. This complicate* logistic, training, and operational planning As Soviet weapons become more cipemive and complex, ihe rate of equipment modernization and integration into Pact forces may slow somewhat.^

10ft Soviet weapons development and acquisitionsiscerriibte pattern (sececause of the programmatic nature of the Sovietprocess. Although there are often problems in the development of weapons and difficultie* inproduction grab andresult in delays inforce planners are able to develop long-range force goals knowing roughly when and in what numbers new weapon systems will be available. | ]

Armor

he tank will remain lite primary maneuver weapon In the Soviet combined arms inventory for the remainder of this century. Although the Soviets are aware of its viilncr abilities there ts no evidence that they will dcemphasize its importance. To do so would destroy iheir offensive ground doctrine and tactics Instead, they arc expanding tin* research,and production facilities that have beenwilh lank programs Moreover, they have madeeavy investment in tank forces that replace-ment would require an enormous expenditure!

he Soviets now are supplying three new modeb to their tank unitsB.2

Figure II

Soviet Ground Force* *ietditig of Newhronology

Trace,

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truing Unci anwx> ai

aad corny Oar anal.so or Ihr prate* o' -tapons dcwlopmtcl ind kM DM UO suaei.xh fsJ-xM.y ito yen JODS

andhich combine* features from both42 *eries buttill uurt of the same second post World War II generation ofndO have the capability to hie long-range antitank guided missilesO Mi) through their main gum (seeon-Soviet forces have only received2 in small number*

eihe Soviets willew tank design or designs by iheo meet the challenge thev perceive from NATO's programed antiarmor forces. Future Soviet tank* could simply use evolutionaryn the form of new and better atmor, electronic protectivend more powerfulcounter thethreat This would require the Soviets to coorinue to improve technically advanced armors0 and simultaneously to develop new engines to drive some what heavier vehicle* Because tbe Soviets have an extensive basic and applied research establishment that is not significantly dejicndent on Westernthey probably can achieve these goals.j

entative evidence suggests, however, that the Soviets may be workingadical new lank design (see. We have seen what appears toankeduced-volume turreturret leu model mounting its main gunedestal or some similarhe Soviets decided to putehicle into serial production, this couldolution to the classic design dilemma of providing superior armor protection while keeping vehicle weight low and UttlefieU mobility high.esign probably would not call for the developmentadically new lype of armor, nor would itore powerful engine.f^

The Soviets could opt towodesign strategy. Such an approach would allow litem to undertake the higher risk developmentr reduced-volume-turret design while alsoore traditional turrcfed tankackup The Pact will also strive to compensate forts current lank generation and will probably modernije thousands of52 tanks that will remain In Ihe inventory ihrough the yearseemprovements lo newer tanks will include belter fire control systems, supplemental armor, and improved stabilization systems; older lank* could receive more powerful engines, new guns and perhaps imprmedletn*.| ]

Soviet emphasis on maneuverability and aim bused arms requires infantry troops to keep pace with lank units Pact force*ide variety of armored

Figure 12

Latest Soviet Tanks

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carriers and Ittfunliy fighliriG vehicles to provide the infantry with necessary mobility and protection The trackednd the wheeledn now entering Soviet and Pact forces and will become new standards We eipect follow-om lo both models Insee

Arliltry

n addition to its nuclear capability,artillery fire with modern improvedmunitions and ealcrsded range offersdestructive power. The SovieU areself-propelledat- thus providing artillery units with highand survivability (see figure

he current Ground Forces reorganiratioa Isequirement for more artillery thanproduction rates can sustain. We crpcelrales for modern self-propelled artillery to be increased because such models are critical to high-tempo offensive plans. Nonetheless, in many cases much older, towed cquipnserat will be used lo reach e'pardrd organizations, and this situation will prevail with Soviet forces In the USSR until well into. Priority for the acquisition of newartillery pieces will go to unilv opposite NATOndicates the large array of divisional and rtorsdivisional artillery and rocket launchers Ihe Soviets probably will field in Ihe coming years.!

Soviets believe new high technosVjgyfirepower can approach the levels ofof low-yield nuclear weapons Theynew artillery munitions with impressiveand lethality' These munitions couldterminally guided artillery slsells. rocket-cluster warheads,etplosives. antitank and antipersonnelbom Wets, and rocket assisted extended-rangeshell* For cooverrtkeral fire the Soviets stillarea saturation bombardment rather thancontrolled by forwardncrease*number of artillery weapons and the newavailable to tactical commander* couldfireslrlkes even more destructive, butfire planning and coordination, andmovement of expanded artillery andneeded lo support infantry and tank forces.|

Air Defense Weapons

widely deployed current generationair defense weapons have good mobility and

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Soviet Light ArmoredMeld Artillery

leer el

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Tear at Penod eJ

i Tionp

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effective air defense coverage However, these* systerns have limited multitarget engagementWeollow-on generation ol army- and &vis*oo-level surface-to-air missiles and sir defense guns lhat will have improved sow-level capabilities. multiple target capability, and improved range. As with other systems, priority for deployment will go to units opposite NATO where the threat is most severe.

Short-Rarsoe Ballistic Missiles

s Ihe Soviets have developed their conven-tMrral war-lighting strategy, the role assigned to their tactical missiles has grown considerably Once used almost exclusively for nuclear delivery, older, short-range and relatively inaccurate FROG rockets and Scud missiles are being replaced by improved versions or by new follow-on missiles able to deliver Improved conventional warheads (seeccurately at extended ranges According to onehe Soviets are belding an Improved

version of tbethat has better0m) and betier accuracy than theany older FROCs and Scuds remain in the force arid will

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continue lo do so through. Opposite NATO, however, Ihe SovieU will replace older lockeU and missiles wilhndissiles bv Ihe.

may be used more infire planning at all leveb from divisionMissions could include destruction of airin conjunction with air operations, andagainst command and control units andsupport of ground offensives. As morebecome available, additional targets suchairbascs may be largeted by missilesconventional munitions. With theirand ranges, new Soviet SRBMs couldmore formidable nuclear deliverycombined with increases in nucleargive the Soviets near parity wilh NATOdelivery means. |

Force Structure

Soviets will continue toarge standing army to supply tberatios they believe are necessary todefenses- Because of persistent manpowerwe foresee no acceleration in the growth ofForces. If current trends continue, we expect:

A gradual increase in the Large active divisional force. Since Ihehe Soviets have added an average of three low-strength divisions to their active force yearly. Most of this growth has resulted from the activation of "secondwe call mobilizationwhich arc unmanned equipment scls-

The upgrade of existing armyof two or three divisions and limited supportfull army status by the addition of low-strength divisions and specialized combat support and service support units to these corps. Most of this growth will occur in the southern and eastern portions of the USSR.

The use of the new-type army corps organization as the basis for implementing the OMC concept at front level.

estimate that by the0 theForces will have grownivisionsnew-type army corps. We expect virtually allgrowth to occur in the "not-ready" portion ofthus increasing Soviet reliance on reservists(see. According to oneobilization-base divisions will be activatedendo others will be formed, andGround Forces will peak0and nine new army corps. Thisfewer weapons7 because itadditional mobilization bases It notes, however, that

' The holder of lhahe Director, De/enie fniefngem* Agency.^

.

the Sovietsufficiently large reserve pool to man this force structure in the eventeneral war.|

The Soviets apparently continue totheir "second-generation" mobilization-baseThis reconstltution forms the basis for the further growth of divisional forces past the projection period. This would be consistent with an obsessive Soviet requirement for ever larger forccs|

Theachieved virtual parity with NATO In ground force theater nuclearprobably will continue to augment their tacticaland nuclear-capable artillery forces We expect that most of the growth in this sector of the Soviet Ground Forces has or will come ortporite NATO's centra] region. In the past year the Soviets have established three missile brigades in Eastern Europe equipped with theod 2in response to NATO's deployment of the Pershing

The Soviets may reconstitute theScaleboard units at their home garrisonsUSSR, which wouldet increase of atsuch unitshe Soviets maytheir front- and army-level missile forcesWestern TMO by establishing additional Scudunits. In addition, we expect the Soviets to

41

man

establish additional nucieai -capablei wei arid lety brigade* opposite NATO, continuing Iwo decade* ol lorce growth in ihi* arca.| ]

logistics

iganiraiional etpanston. new operational concepts stressing continuous frontal operations, and new weapons with greater range and firepower have created unprecedented requirement (or gelieial pur pose logistic support. The Soviets have respondedustained, unprecedented logistic buildup of ground and air supplies in Central Europe opposite NATO during the past decade (see. Their logistic buildup has outpaced requirements imposed bv force modernization and expansion, and they apparently hive in place logistic* toorce twice the sire of their Soviet forces in Eastern Europe. This has been accomplished at the same timeuildup of their supplies in the Far East Mihtary District to keep pace with the growth of their convenlional forces opposite China These improvements will allow the Sovieti to replenish successive front operations without pause and, opposite NATO, would permit the rapid early rclnfoicernenl of forces moving from the western USSR unencumbered by logistic trains, | |

arsaw Pact forces are also icsttucturing Iheir combat support unit* to consolidate transport and logistic elements into coherent, efficient units called maleriel support brigades (fronl and army level) or battalions (divisionhese units permitmanagement of materiel supply handling and delivery fui-tions and. in line with other trends lo emphasize battlefield raobilily. should facilitate rapid, responsive rcsupply to quickly advancing combal

ecently the Soviets have also made aeffort to improve their nuclear logistic posture opposite NATO These moves increase ihe readiness nf these forces and reduce warning time0 in East Germany the Soviets have.

Constructed loading docks at nuclear warhead llles.

Dismantled all fixed liquid-fuel storage stirs at Scud missile installations and constructedgarages probably for trucks already loaded with missile fuel.

Constructed bunkered vehicle sheds at all seven nuclear Scud brigade* in the CSFG and at or near IS ofivisional surface-to-surface missile battalions

Tha CW SlockpJe ond OrWy SyHwvn

We hai* limitedaa. io bate our Minutes of Soviet cfaenaka!rc-iuctioo caoacili We aaoaator IS plantt In the Sonet Uaasa ihai are capable of producing lone agents. Of iheic. three are particularly configured lo produce chemical warfare agents, one of the three it active for ioui lo eightear Current production is lufftcieni to lepleniihrain production personnel, and provide tetle believe that the Soviett, even wilhoul activating all their plants, are capable of producing mom lhan enough chemical watfaie agrtiti tti fulfill iheir wartime requirements I

To dale, wc have identified

Chll ichemi.-il R'poli - 1

tr,.ir

chemical warfare agent* and CAR equipment and materiab InteCSeocc Community estimates on ihe use of the Soviet faaft aorage agent stockpile are0 metric coo* fCIA) aaa) atetric

tana (DlA and Army)

toik chemical raiicars and trucks are hrid in'reserve in and around these depots lo permit ihe rapid tramfei of bulk agenl to forward locations Little intelligence cmit or age of chemical munitions is available. Filled chemical weapons are stored at mine depoti in the Soviet Union and possibly at tome in the lorwatd area

The Soviets continue to produce andariety of chemical agents and munitions, give high priority to research and development of new oragents, and have developedrheadi or munitions for virtually all type* of Warsaw Pact ihort range baNcoic mimics, ground attack aircraft, and artillery. The Sonets can engage target* tlsreaajhoul ihe full operations! depth oftlehekl Moreover, tha improvements aa the acctaracv and reliability cf current and furore Soviet weapon rytfemi further improve their capability to deliver all tipes of munrtiom. includinc I

These changes sliould shorten Ihe time required for Soviet missile units in Eastern Europe to move horn their garrisons in the eventATO attack Q

here is lillle conclusive evidence aboul the number* of weapons of massorby Warsaw Pact lorces.

I LilimiW vary Itofft SHUuclear warheads stored in Eastern Europe The Soviet Union also maintains chemical weaponshough only limited numbers are believed to be in Eastern Europe (see inset)

Figure 18

Soviet looistk Buildup Opponie NATO

logistic preparations in East Germany aic much greater than we had earlier estimated. We now iUdee that the USSR has substantially eipanded Its miliiary logistic structure in Central Europe since theo supportoays of combat. The Soviets appear io have enough combat supplies in East Germany to support more than twice their current force there in the initial phaseampaign against NATO. The Soviets, however, still would need to move in troopsut rear service unils in East Germany.

During the past decade in East Germany, tbe Soviets have:

Built seven front-level fuel depots and eipanded ihehey now have fuel storage facilitiesapacity loetric tons.

Constructed seven front-level ammunition depotsai*tVd ihe oilier nine We believe their depots couldetric torn.

Doubled the eouipment available to form mobile eQulpment-repair units.

Increased their mobile held hospitals fromo

Modernized motor transport units with new trucks built with Western tochriologv and catseserve of as manylder trucks

The tcsgistsc buildup lagged tonsJoVrably behind ihe reorgaiuiauon and buildup of combat forces andsystems, creatingime the impression thai the Soviets did not plan toubstantial logistic capability in peocrtime. We now believe, however, that the logistic buildup has far outstripped the pace of combat force Increases, and that il reflects the Soviets' long-range planning Io gradually implement ibeir force improvement programs.!

AdiMnloger lo the Soviets, Wc ludgc that the Soviets intend much of this logistic buildup as forwardslocks for forces in iheir western milUaiy districts. This systematic Investment In service Support reduces Ihe Soviets' need to encumber iheir lines of communication before hostilities wilh bulky, vulnerable supplies This would facilitate the rapid movement to Ihc forward area of combat units from the USSR iMersdcd to participate in ihe initial campaignar against NATO.Q

The Soviets now have the flexibility toby forces of ihe Western Theater ofeven if supply lines were cut or somedestroyed earlyonflict. In addition,could use stocks already in Eastern Europeunits of the second slrategi* echelon thaifrom the western USSR to reinforce orsuccesses by Ihc Warsaw

RerrtdMiingWarning rrdicfltorswilh the movement forward of supplies from the USSRonflict would be reduced, but not eliminated. To meet wartime rrQuireroents the Soviet service support structure in East Germany would have to be fleshed out. This would require the transfer of additionals well as manpower, from lite USSR for those unrirritrenath service support units already in place. The manning requirements for this augmentation are estimated by ihe Central [melligence Agency to be digbilvnd by Use Defense Intelligence Agency atThese figures take account of front and army service support requirements, of re-QUiremenu for the Croup of Soviei Forces In Germany (CSFCX and of tbe provision by East Germanyortion of front servicen addition. CIA estimates aboutroops (DIAould be required to bring Soviet combat divisions io East Germany up to full wartime autlioiiztllon.i |

These troops could be moved auiekly to ihe forward arearisis. There could be some Initial confusion, however, as units thai had never trained al full strength were filled out and as supplies were moved from depots Io combat units Moreover, stocks not rapidly removed from facilities at the outbreak of IsostUrise* would be vulnerable to aItack.Q

Since most of the new facilities are concentrated south of Berlin, tbev are not positioned tu support Warsaw Pact forces thai would operate in northern East Germany. Those forces might still require rcsupply from Poland or the USSR-I-

t-cat;

Figure 19

USSR: Conscript Demand and Draft-Ago'

0 0 75 80 85 vO O

' Drill ace Ithroughonxripl demand? and liter assumes Ilia) uital military tain power remains constant.

fcWiai.iil-

aat

Manning and Rrjodiness

o some extent becauseorganirational and equipment modernization trends that will signihcanfly increase (he combat potential of the Warsaw Pact, thectually becoming less ready to go to war quickly. Moscow appears to be trading force readiness for combat potential At the heart of this apparent paradox has been tightened supplies ofrend that has clashed with the unit expansions the Soviets are trying to achieve. While the trend is beginning In improve, Soviet manpower shortages will peisist through thend have already led to substantial undcrmanning in even the must ready Soviet combat units. (See figurend[ 1

Because of manpower problems, the Soviets apparently imposed manning restrictions on their units byas current organizational expansions were beginning in earnest. Even Soviet combatin Eastern Europe were not exempt, andin those units dropped from aboutercent of authorized wartime strength lo betweenndercent. Percentage manning reductions apparently occurred in Soviet nondivisional support units and probably in some units in the Soviet Union as well. These shortages have been complicated by anlarge percentage of non-Slavs among available conscriptsof litiguistic and culturalnot as quickly trained, especially on complex equipment, as arc Slavic conscripts (see

Accordingivision categorization system based on Soviet readiness concepts (seen chapterhe Sovieis do not have any "full-strength ready" (NATO category Al) tank and motorized rifle divisions opposite NATO- Such divisions wouldno mobilization and would be ready forrjperatiota withinoours alter an alert Instead, even opposite NATO's Central Region. Ihe Soviets would need to mobilize0 reservists to man their ready combat divisions alone. At least

iicnfci-

]

eservists would In* needed to man nondivisional units (set* figure ISAhe most ready Soviet divisions in basinn Europe now (all into the second readiness category uted by the Soviets (NATOnd. although still considcted immediately availablembat. would probably need live to seven days to achieve lull strength and combat readiness Furthermore, reservuls (or some ol these divisions probably would be rrsocdized in the western USSR and would then have to be moved into Eastern Europe to Join their parent units.these adverse readiness trends make it increasingly less likely that the Soviets would plan loudden attack without warning against NATO because o( short (alb in the preparations needed to conductisky operation. Growing requiretneots lo aug-(orward-area Soviet lorces with reservists also should provide NATO with early flrategic warning ol Increased combat icadiness in Eastern Europe.^

Troining

he demands imposed by organizational cx-pansion, by increasingly sophistitaled weapons.and by Ihe new emphasis on compter combined-arms tactic* have caused Warsaw Pact authorities to question traditional training and manning practices. AllPact general purpose force* idv on conscripts, who are available (ot relatively short periods ranging fromonths loonths. Ground force Iraimiig has been criticired by the Soviets fori

Inadequate development of individual and crew weapon skill*

Ineffective training for night combat

Poor preparation of rumor commanders, who ate increasingly called upon to master combined-arms tactics.

Lack ol initiative and overieliance on"school solutions thai are increasingly irrelevant

Poor maintenancealling that ismore serious as new, more complex weapons

he Soviets and Fast Germans have developed novel training piugrums to correct these deficiencies. The programs requite combat units lo be manned by soldier* who are conscripted and discharged together after serving in the same unit for at leastonths lu the past, because ofnsonth or two year Ground Forces conscription cycle, all units discharged about one-quarter of Iheir enlisted personnel and replaced them with untiained recruits every six months. Units were consequently restricted to an elementary,six-month training cycle needed lo train and absorb nrweocners semiannually [ |

nder ibe new sysiem. however, units are isolated liom Ihc disruptive semiannual induction of new rcorullt and. after formation, progress fromto more complex tactical training without receiving any rsewcorner* During their nisi si*ll unit members master individual andcrew skill* In the wc-ceeding periods ihey conduct increasing amounts of combined-arms unit training and exercises No time Is spoil! repealing basictraining as in the past, over the course of itsnit can spend ihree roore months in tbe field than under the old repetitive training program We do not yet know all of the details about how the Soviets and Last Germans stagger the* maturity levels of Iheir units. However, we believe tbat. within infantry Utuhons. two companies are on the same cycle while the third is formed in the neat cycle Thus, when two of the three companies peak, the battalion is at its peak efficiency However, when both ol these companies are then disbanded, the third company is in its final training period and provides the battalionhole with residual combat capability Within tank regiments, each battalion is apparentlyifferentthere is always one ballalion newly form-ing while another is in its peak (raining ]

he new program apparently has beenby alloviet divisions in East Germany, and we estimate lhat it will be used by alloviet divtssom tn Eastern Europe Wc cannot yet tell how extensively ihe program has spread within the Soviet Union, but il is likely lo spread to all Soviet ready divisions within the nextear* Apparently only the East Germans, among non Soviet Warsaw Pact tones, use ihc

c estimate lhat, if ihe Soviet* andsuccessfully exploit their new program,teach iheir better units and commanders tosomewhat greater variety of combined-armswas possible using their traditionalschedule, in addition, ihey shouldbelter able lo use llielt weapons. ThisSoviet and East German combat unitson the battlefield and should helpthe combat potential offered by tbeand hy rrrodetninlion with moreof the convcntioiial ground force* ol

a-

V. SOVIET AIR AND NAVAL FORCES Air Forces

The Soviets believe that NATO sir power would pose ihe nearest potential threatarsaw Pact TMO oflerrriveonventional war. Their tensor military leaders plan to remedy this situation by making the establishment of theater air supremacy (or Pad forces and the destruction of NATO's Ihrater nuclear lorces lop priorities early in any Pact-NATO hostilities They have modified theii concepti for winning air supremacy and reorganized their air and air defense forces in the past several yeais and aie fielding new-generation aircraft. In line with their insistence on integrated joint-service Diepower, unt fted under TMO direction, they have assigned ground forces such as artillery and missile units and airmobile und air assault troops important complementary roles in the defeat of NATO air and air defense forces Q

Since the, as the Soviets haveexamined their prospects for conventionalin the air, they have altered iheir previously optimistic views of the NATO-Pact air balance They generally rate NATO aircraft as superior to their own Further more, they consider that French aircraft must be counted as part of the NATO total Despite their numerical advantage, the Soviets beheve there is rough parity in combat capability between NATO and Pact air lorces ratherlear-cut Pad dominance as they had thought in the ]

Orooniiotionol

he Sovietsaiorof Iheir Air Forces91 (see chapter II) as partarger set of changes emphasiz ing theater-level planning and control of Joint-service strategic operations. The reorganization was designed lo make more efficient use of available theater air assets, and to coordinate them with the combat actions of other services in the theater. Results of thehave includcd-

The continued growth in the number of fighter -bomber regiments opposite NATO and China and along the southern periphery of the USSR0 four new ground attack regiments have been created andormer fighteralong with four former training regi ments. have beenroundhesenits provide additionalfirepower to seek and destroy mobile enemy nuclear means early inkey objective of Soviet conventionals well as means to suppress NATO air defenses. We expect additional regiments to be formed

A douUing0 of the numbers ol strategic aviation bomber regiments opposite NATO through the formation of additional SUight bomber regiments We protect continued theater bomber force modernization with Fencer and Backfire aircraft.

Upgrading of divisional hdicopter detachments lo full squadrons consisting of attack and tram-port helicopters. We anticipate thn trend will extend to all ready divisions opposite NATO. We also expect that, as newer, more maneuverable altack hclicoplen become available, thesize will increase from six lot possiblyttack helicopters to provide the divisionwith greater aerial firepower This trend supplements divisional growth of rocket and artillery conventional firepower andighly mancuverable fire-support platform to supplement divisional combined arms lactic*.

As pan of tbe general incorporation of army aviation, select armies received direct control of combat helicopter resrausent* to peovide army commanders with organic, responsive aerial fire support. We expect this trend to continueNATO and China. The growth and overall improvement of army aviation help* cvmpeniale maneuver unit commanders for the loss of fixed-wing ground attack aircraft support during the conduct of operations I I

Oporotions

espite their perception of less favorable air force trends, tbe Soviets apparently still consider that their first priority would be the attainment of air supremacy in the TMO. Their old plansheatcr-wtde air offensive depended on catching NATOon the ground in TMO-wtde surprise attacks. Tbe Soviets doubted they could achieve the necessary surprise Since increasing numbers of NATO aircraft are being protected in hardened shelters, some Soviet experts felt that they lacked enough aerial firepower to destroy sutbcient numbers of NATO aircraft on the ground even if thev achieved surprise Q

1 tbe Soviets hadew variant of Ihe offensive air operation that wuuld rnoieattempt to achieve temporary force advantage* by

concentrating individual massed ali raids inlhan bv attacking across ibe toll width olThis variant would permit the Pact lowound and air offensive In Ihe theater withparilv in the overall theater air balance.concentration of air forces lo achievelocal force superiority was madebv the eipansion of the strategic aviationIt was aho facilitated by the formation ofhigh commands

y tliehe Soviets receiveduccessful offensive air operation for air supremacy wouldubstantially greater share of their war effort in the Western TMO than they hadestimated Despite the massive modernization of their Air Forces during, the Sovietsthat sir to eight massed air raids would have to be cooductederiod of three to five days to achieve airthan the three massed raids in onc-and-a- half days that thev had planned for dining the. Air Forces ground attackwas increased for each massed air raid of (lie air operation in the Western TMO by giving top priority during theo modernizing the Ihreater bomber forces opposite NATO and by increasing the fraction of front aviation dedicated lo the ground attack role. Moreover, the Ground Forces artillery and missile forces were given an increased role in the suppression of NATO air defense forces in the atr operation Wc believe that in the future the SHBM forces armed with improved conventional munitions will supplement aircraft in the airbase attack role once the projected terminal guidance systems arc widely deployed'[ ]

he heart of the air operationeries of daylight air attacks designed to destroy on theortion of NATO's air forces sufficient to establish stiategK air supremacy and lo reduce substantially NATO's nuclear strike potential Against NATO, the Pact could be eipected to cornmit dements of two to four strategic air armies, ihree to five front air forces, and assets of Halite Fleelr more aircraft The achievement of tactical surprise to catch many NATO aircraft on the ground would still be important Fighter bombers, rocket, artillery, and tactical missile forces would befor establuhing corridors through NATO's air defenses, for attacking mobile nuclear-capable nnlls and command, control, and communications facilities

NIEAacr MfTVeat u> MA TO AirfcaseiCem'rat Lmtopc Q

encers and medium bombers would berespormbie for attacking NATO airfields. Top rjrweity would go lo sinking NATO alrbate* housing fighicr-bomber wings with nuclear strike roles Though Ihe battle for air supremacy would lie conlin uous, the first several days are the most critlcal.[ |

he Soviets prefer lo take the initiatlucair operation of their own timing and in sectorsown choice. Yet they fear that their aircould be disruplcdreemptivecountcrair campaign Consequently,established an entirely newair defensecomplementair operation The Soviets bebeve lhat theoperation is the mosl appropriate form offor the Warsaw Pact If NATO seizesin the air war. [

| Its purpose wouM be lo blunt Ihe NATO air offensive and destroy enough NATO aircraft loubstantial Pact advantage in the atr balance, thereby allowing ihe Pad to seize the initiative with an offensive air operation of its

The air defense-MO air-ground-naval combal operation. It prnliably wouldried wing aircraft under TMO control drawn from Soviet and tVSWP air forces and naval aviation covering all air and sea approaches to the iheater. This comple* defensive operation would doubtless be carefully coordinated with ground-based surface-to-air missile defenses and Cround Forces artillery and missile fire designed to suppress NATO air defenses within system range. [ |

The Soviets probably will encounter numerous command and control problems in attempting lo efficiently manage complex air defense operations They have made maior changes1 to solve potential problems, and we anticipate more By far the most important change has been the transfer of air and air defense force opeiational planning and control authority from the Soviet Air Forces Main Staff and

the muKttude of retpooal airand< to the Air Forces and Air iMcrue Forces deputy ONCs of Ihe TMO High com mind For the first tiine this integrates sir and laV defenseat the TMO-level commands^

n the future the Soviet* will work to ease their command and control problems by Increasing both ihe eapacily and capability of iheir air communications and by ihc Urge-scale use ofalasystems coupled to onboard computers andChanges we eipect include

Airborne use of communications satellites, which will increase the range, capacity, and flexibihtv of air communications relative to present ground-basedem*.

Expansion of the number and types of aircraft with communications satellite capabilities.

over almost limitless range

The use of direct broadcast satellites Io enable aircraft to pass data lo individual ground units

he Soviets recognize and are attempting lo remedy serious problems threatening Ibe success of iheir air supremacy campaign These involve the following:

Aircraft losses substantially higher lhancould prevent the Pact from decisivelythe air supremacy battle of attrition and force early cancellation of the offensive airTo avoid such losar* the Soviet* must suppress NATO's improving airJiferatioo of hardened aircraftat NATO air bases would force ihe Soviet* to concentrate on closing runways, and rxossibly destroying support facilities This would require more air raidsonger period of time and hence greater exposure lo NATO air defenses.

The Pact's deep-attack capabilities arc limited by its current fighters as well as by pilot training. This restricts it* ability to protect attack forces.

The Pact currently lacks the capability to con-dtact large offensive operation* at night or in adverse weather.

Pact air forcesimited capabilityfind NATO's concealed motile surface-to-surface mnailesyet we believe the Pact proba-bly will plan to divert many more aircraft from atlacking airbelds lo hunting for SSMs because ol Ihe introduction of Pershing lis and GI.CMs.

Airspace management and stafl coordination among the many force components andparticipiling in large, complex ihealer air operations is very difficult.

Acquisition of low-altitude targetsaror problem However, ihe depiovmerit of look-down/shoe*downirborne warning and control system (AVVACS) aircraft, and improved SAMs are expected lo reduce these problem* by

Weapons and Munitions

he Soviet* continue to 6eW aircraft with improved range, avionics, pay loads, andaircraft belter adapted to conduct Iheaterwideand defensive operations They have also Belded tbeir fin! AWACSodified Mainstay, which, when available in sufficient numbers, should erihance airborne ihealer battle management of air defense operation* Furthermore, they are lusta new generation of fighter* which will have the escort range, avionics, Bight characteristics, elec-tionic warfare systems, and munitions required for independent all to air operations throughout theThe Soviets are also working on new fighters, attack helicopters, and higher capacity airrimarily for cost reasons, the non-Soviet Pacthaveew of tbc most modern Soviet aircraft and have generally been content to purchase new aircraft tr-preseritingaahjj |agf>

1

ni.-cvloTs The Soviet Air Force* have virtually ceased acquiring variants ofndhese aircraftonrideroblein onboard avionics,range, andtheir predccesvori (seeut they are no match for NATO's newest aircraft. More than two-lhirds of the Soviet lighter force consists of these aircraft, which, with improved radar and better missiles, have all-aspect attack capa-bilitse* against aircraft flying at similar altitudes However, Ihey have limited capabilites against targets Bving below them

Maiintgtn Maximum Year Operational Pajtoad Speed Operational Radlui

Mail mum Operational Pay laid Radio*

Maximum Year

Operational

MIG-27

Floager

mAMi/pmxnAAank

g bombsanki

loci

2.KO km/hr

Fiagraot*'

m- k|

drn

ion*

Foibai E'

km

AAMink

Im'hr

lanker

m<toc

lomtrit.) im/ht

kxo*

j bomb*nki

In/^r

2k

m Fulcrum' with

4 AAMi/ auo* and

2 Iaaa*

WOO lorn (en.) km/hr

Rami nrfWicombal arafik, al aboM isjuo miun

TWUithisieatc

w To* it*inu(M4 Io Ojtwk* the iDeeduT

MundX

50

a'1*f_

The imminent widespread fsesViing ofit defense otwill, how ever, greatly improve Soviet capabilities. The Sill.oxhound is theest interceptor, ll became opeiationaluj live atr regiments now aie at least partially equipped wilh il. It is capable ol (racking and engaging low-altituderuise missiles, and other targets flying below it. However, production and fielding have been slower for ihis irchnically complex system than for earlier intercep-

Theew twin-engine fighter-interceptor will, over the nextean,the backbone of tactical aviation, succeeding thet is etilering service this year,arger twin-engine fighter-Interceptor, thelanker, may be assigned to strategic aviation and territorial air defense units by the endhe aircraft have better potential for executing air defense opera Hons and for conducting sweeps over NATO territory in support of bombers and some capabilities for oflensive roles Priority for deployment should be with unit* opposite NATO The Soviets probably hope that the fielding of these weapons, coupled with theirnumerical superiority, will tilt the air balance clearly in their favor again by the_

FiKhter-Bombtri. In an effort to beef up conventional firepower, the modernization of ground attack air regiments has had high priority during the past decade The MICnd there the standard Soviet ground at tack aircraft, and together they compose more thanercent of Soviet front-level ground attack forces. The Sovieis are also fielding iherogfoot ground attack aircraft, which will operate in direct support of ground forces, Non-Soviet units are not nearly as modern, being primarily equipped-agend SU-7s| |

The ground attack aircraft represent signifi cant gains in range and payload and provide the Soviets with the capability to conduct deep attacks as well as direct support lo ground forces Thendave only limited night or poor-weather capability. According lo one view, the introductionong-range navigation system in the forward area wouldiable attack capability under nighttime and poor weather conditions| ]

" Tie kobltnof IhMot lie Dimler. Or/ease

Ajewcy aaaf lAr ara*a> UMeAcraor oUtert of At extfsunj

Ih, hold*.

Helicopters. Army aviation is now largely responsible for direct support lo ground force units The majority of that support is provided bvhe mainstay* of tlie force being theip general purpose support lielicopter.4 Hind multiple-role attack helicopter, and the aging Midi Hook transport helicopter. Thealo heovy-llfl helicopter is expected to icplace the Hook, thereby improving army aviation's lift capability (seen an effort to provide ground commanders with more survivable and effective aerial fire support, the Soviets are aho devetoping two new attack helicopters ihe Havoc and the Hokum Thev are expected lo supplement, rather lhan lo replace the Hind. The initial fielding of the Havoc could beginroduction could continue through the early years of the next cenlurv. We are unsure ol the Hokum's basic mission or deployment date. According to onehe Hokum will be primarily employed in an air-to-air roleecondary mission of ground attack

We expect the Soviets to field. Later in thisew laser-guided antitank missile wilh their late-rnodel Hinds and iheir new attack helicopters The misflle can be expected Iu have greater range than iheTOM currently deployed with newer Hinds. In addition, il should have better accuracy and provide greater operational flexibility because lhc Soviets wdl be able to use II with ground-based laser target designators, giving Iheirfire and forget" capaljusry.|

Theaterhe Soviet* are attempting lo meet the need for more deep-tiieater-attackfirepower bv giving high priority to the modernization of bomber regiments opposite NATO and China with all-weatherencers andackfires. Although some Fencers are assignedthe tactical air forces, two thirds of the aircraft belong to three of the five air armies of the Supreme High Command Of the five, three are opposite NATO, one has inrennediate-range TVadger.2 Blinder, andackfire bombers, the others haveencers and some foghlerhe fourth air army for theaterTU-IGs,ndhe fifth is primarily for strategic operationsomposed of HeavyOne intermediate rangeBackfire C. which has improved supersonic performance at highcurrently In production, wilh approii rnatelyew aircraft fielded per year Wc expect

aaree at At Aaahaaar fW off iktfott I |

Si

Optrtlional

im'hr

Hip t

IS Km wilh UJO-kf vripon load

TOM, rocketr, bombr, Gallia* gun

nVtal

Hil.i

km wtih

OO-tc

cattoid

aai/ai

(dtitlopmenial)

CIA. IMA:

WO km

(USAF; 2TJ lo)g

payload

AAM oi ASM or ATOM, reeked, bombi. caaooo or Gulling gun

km/nr

M1

opiwnUl)

km/nr

(USAF: ITSrockcu,

cannon

Galling tun

avant.

the newest Soviet bomber aircraft to receive better onboard self-protection electronic waiiare systems, better navigation systems, and sensors lor adverse weatherwill significantly enhance their penetration capabilities, j

IM. Sew Aircraft, We expect that inwill field improved variants of thehey could also be workingndut we know nothingcharacteristics of such aircraft. Thefield attack and transport versions of theiraircraft innd thereby improvespeed, lethality, and survivability of theseproviding air assault support.

Air Munitions.onnuclear environment, the Soviets recognize the critical importance ofconventional munitions to inflict massivesome cases approaching that of low-yield nuclear weapons. They are working on better air- and missile-delivered munitions as one bey to the success of their air operation anday to counteract NATO's defensive airfield improvements. Theide variety of air-delivered gravity bombs. Theseunway-penetration bomb consistingarachute retardation assembly, booster rocket, and concrete penetrationg scmiac-live laser-guided bomb for use against htgh-priorily point targets; and several fuel-alr-exniosive bombs effective against soft targets in fhe opcn.p |

The Soviets apparently see major potential, however, in the development of aircraft-delivered tactical air-to-surfacc missiles (TASMs) and SRBM-delivered improved conventional munitions that could be used against NATO alrbases. air defense targets. uikIontrol, sntj cofnciuniX4tJoiu fddlitfcs*1 the Soviets have produced and deployed eight TASMs employing antiradiation homingemiactivc laseream rider, command, and, recently, electro-optical guidance systems (seeurrently, significant numbers of the newer TASMs are deployed orjr-osite NATO. The current Soviet TASMs will probably be usedaseline for the evolutionary development of future TASM systems possibly employing fiber optics, solid-slate electronics, and more advanced electro-optical guidance systems as well as improved propulsion. Betsveen now ande eapect lighter weight missile structures to be developed.igher warhead mass. Future TASM warhead design features will probably include shaped charges, self-forging fragments, reactivesmart mines, smart sul'munitions, and rocket -boosted kinetic-eiTerey

The Soviets are also striving to develop new TASMs Ihal provide greater launch ranges, lower launch altitudes, launch and leave, televisionimproved accuracy against fixed and mobile targets, the ability to attack higher frequency radar and communications systems, all-weather operation, and operationsountermeasure* euviionmeni. The Soviets continue to emphasire TASMmunition (ARM) developments directed toward attacldng surface-based air defense weapons andAs ARM* become smaller, lighter, and more economical, ihey will probably be considered for use against emitters such as tioposcatler communications systems, other communications systems, battlefield surveillance radars, countermortar/counterbattery radars, jammers, navigational transmitters, andairborne emitters as well (for example, early warriing radar and data

The Soviet SRBM threat will growin the next decade as ihe improvedm range I

ecomes available. Improvements to thewill give the Soviets an option to employ it Inattack against some critical airbases andof air defense sites in penetrationSuch attacks could significantly improveof success of the initial massed airconventional munitions (ICM) could beconcrete or armor piercing,could be adapted to rocket delivery andeffective against soft area

Soviets will also probably tn' tonew types of warheads including:

Aitridt'-dtrniaf-mirie fCM. Although there is no direct evidence to support development and deployment on SRBMs. the existence of this type of munitions cannot be ruled out. The possibilitymall antipersonnel mine also exists, butine would have tittle utility against aircraft or materiel.

Runwav-penetralor ICM- Possibilities forarhead couldmall runway penetra-lor weighing aroundoilograms-ilogramarge runway penctrator would mean only three pene-trators could be deployed on an SRBM.[ ]

"CEP (olreiilai error rOThahleJ-an Inductor ot the ddiierv accuracyeaponrir*rieii as Use radiuslide-hica SO perceot ol theussiiri Bred are exireci-

Support Systems

he Soviels continue to press development of support systems, the most importantew AYVACS with associated command and control data systems link An AW ACS force would be vilal to managing and controlling air defenseaod would significantly increase targetand tracking capabilities against low-flying threats. Series production of the Mainstay AWACS began this year, and seven have been identified so far. One Mainstay has been stationed at an operational base sincehe Mainstay data link system probably could be used to control MICnlerceptors. as well aseventually. when those aircraft become operational. The Mainstay radar should be able to detect cruise; missiles farther from the coast thanround-based radar (limited to aboutm in its line ofn theater operations, the Mainstay could provide an overall view of the air situation and would direct fighters in both defensive and offensive operations.

We eipect ihat some aircraft will acquire an aerial refueling capability during the protectionft may be some time, however,ignificant tanker force would be available. Aerial refueling would increase Ihe combat radius and loiter time for theater air forces. | |

The delivery ofandid )et-powered transports is wnlinulng slowly, increasing theof Soviet Military Transport Aviation (VTA) Io move military forces over long distances. This gain in airlift capability has been offset, however, as the airborne forces themselves have beenwith more armored equipment to bene-lime movement and airlandingomplete Soviet airborne division with supplies for three days of combat, for example, would require the enlire lift

capacity of the VTA Ord anil wouldeek lo prepare. |

The Soviets have enlarged theacility, and the deliveries, of new aircraft are expected to increase Irom the current four to almost sis per month. This increase in production will enable them to maintain the pace of modernization of the transport force as modified versions of the Candid are produced for other

esting of the new heavy transport, the Condor, is continuing;econd prototype has been built. The Condor is comparable in sirx to theA but is estimated toarger payload If no major problems occur In the flight test program, the Condor could be operational7

Force Srruetura

he ground attack ctcmenl of the SovieiWarsaw Pact ait force hasut the numbers of tacticalbeen relatively stable. Following the recentreorganization, however, the Soviets havesomeighter or interceptor regimentsair defense roleround attack role; theyactivated lour former traininground attack mission; iheythe number ofencer-equippedopposite NATO and assigned five ofregiments to bases In the forwardCctmany. Poland, and Hungary; lastly theya few new units to the force, includingwilh therogloot groundAfghanistan and in the IsclonissJan,Odessa, and Transcaucasus Militaryaircraft has also recently been acquired byair force.

e believe the number of aircraft inand fighter-bomber regiments for almostof new generation aircraft will bebul that the three-squadron regimentalwill remain. The type of aircraft and numberwill bv determined bv the Soviet estimateeffectiveness of the new

e ruder the most potential for dramatic air force structural growth during the protection period would come from an acceleration of the trend to bolster direct air support for ground operations The Soviets" newest direct air-supporl aircraft, iheiogfoot.ission similarhai of theO and. with Us low bombing speed, high stability, and greater ordnance accuracy, could be an important asset in Waling and destroying enemy defensive strongpoints beyond the range ol Soviet artillery. We project at leastoviet regiment* will be formed in the next decade Army aviation attack helicopterincreased byercent opposite NATO in the past fouralso grow as additional attack and transport regiments are formed

TrraWraj

ince the, the Soviets havemaior training changes designed lo equip aircrews with the combined force skills they will need to actually participate in offensive or defensive airTraining sorties have shifted perceplibly from general proficiency flying to air combat, bombing, ladical air-to-surfaco missile firing, electronicand navigation. The share of total sorties directly related to combat missions rose Irom about one-fourth in theo roughly one-half in the |

he Soviets have abo instituted new tactical training programs lo address qualitative deficiencies Fighter pilots nowormal training program in air combat maneuvering in addition to theprogram of ground-controlItd-intercept (CO) training Pilots are now required to show moreduring intercepts in response to target maneuvers and to electronic counter measuresCIstill accounts for mostighter pilot's combat training sorties, however, and still is the dominant type of training. |

he Soviets aie also workingmproveamong fighter, ,trike, and support aircraft during offensive opcraltoria. This training includes drills to tategrate rotary- and fixed-wing aircraft operating wilh ground forces and deep- interdiction drills that simulate maior multiregiment strikes against critical targets such as NATO airfields. These eoordi-rtated operations make increasing use of radjceiec-trooicorm of warfare the Soviets fed has great

hese improvements in tacticalhift in tlie Soviets' perception of tbe difficulty of defeat inn NATO's air forces. Theof air comhal maneuvering into fighterand the encouragement of pilot initiative in the end phases of GCIs indicate that the Soviets are taking; steps to offset the limits of iheir radar and coromuni-caliuns coverage over NATO lerritory. Cround attack

Whining has been changed Io improve capabilities to hod and dVstiov mobile targets {lor example, nuclear missile launcheis so important lo the Soviet conven-|localootdlnalo liiepower in support ol ground operations, and attack aufields wilh liarderied aircraft shelters- Finally, the increase in training with electronic countermeasuie* (FCM) shows lhat the Sovi-ets expect it to be essential in operations against modern air defense* Q

any air force conscripts fill low-skill posl-twrrs; scene attend mdiUry technical schools where short, six-month naming courses provide only limited technical training In the case of those who may have to deal with complicated equipment, such as radar operators or aircraft mechanics, this is not enough time to produce adequate competence Evidence indicates thai conscript specialist courses are general andand thai practical work consists largely of familiarization training on obsolete equipment. The conscript who has received technical training usually finds lhat maintenance and operation of sec-rusticated equipment are performed by either an ofheetarrant officer. The conscript acts as an assistant. | |

ccording to one view.'* the force size and complexities of modern aircraft would not allow tbe Soviets to relegate conscripts lo rust assisting officers and warrant officers in alrcralt maintenance and in performing general cleanup duties The holdeisof this view believe thai it is more likely that the Soviets are taking positive step* to increase the technical skill levels of conscripts although they have not yetarge pool of technically prchcienl person

nothers the following As avionics equipment becomes irxreasingly complex the Soviets apparently intend to ensure that il is equipped with built-in test circuits and line leplaccablethat can be tested easily and replaced by relatively unskilled conscripts. The components would be replacedeserve pool of similar components and defective units would be shippedear depot for repair. This concept does not require the Soviets toigh level of technical skill In theirnor would it require them to greatly expand current technical training The success ol this ap-proach would depend on ibe Soviets' ability to build

" The hiddenMil etru> are lAe trnerlor. Ramie el InttlHand Feataxh. Otva-trntml al Uatt and iht unlet mtellt-teaet egven ofanj temeei

" fV kddf ol Ikm woeiheiMtttt* fo-meElrmr uiprnent with adequate reliability and iheir wilimg-neat to maintain sufficient stockpiles of rer^aceroent units I

till another view" is as follows The most notable features of Soviet inainleriance manpower are the changes in composition and capability thai have occurred in the past decade. Soviet aircraltpersonnel are no longer dividedarge, lechnically capable, but specialty-limited, officer con-tirigentarge, technically untrained conscript contingent Today, while theof officers remains large bv Western standards, the conscript pool is both large and technically proficient. The principal sources of the improvement in conscrlpl capabilities are the civilian educational systems, particularly thetechnical training/trade schools) These scltooU nowonscript pool whose theoretical and practical proficiency reduces,inimum, the postinduction familiarization training required ofAir Forces fSAF) technical schools One re (sect ion of this significant development is the shift from Officer-led fiightllne maintenance teams lo teams led by warrant officers or noncommissioned officersn addition, it appears that conscripts and NCOs trained In SAF technical schools car* perform dnerse teeimital numtenante'repair lasks

ISO The problem of inadequate training and inel-fective utillzalion of enlisted personnel is also acute in the NCO corps The curriculum for air force NCOs appears to focus on leadership training rather lhan on technical subsectsesult. NCOs do not generally gain necessary technical experience NCO deficiencies reportedly frequently lead to fiustrations amongofficers who must increase their workloads,duties thai ordinarily belong to ihe NCOs. Wc have no evidence on bow the Soviets plan to remedy (during our pirncetion period) their deficiencies in enlisted air force training.

e iudge that the Soviets probably still have several fundamentalin their flight training programs:

/ W. e. Dr/aws*

Fighter pilol training in air combat maneuvering is limitedew Isxslc maneuvers and still averages only ooe to two sorties per pilot per month

Cround attack and rermiiaissance aircrewsto receive almost no training in air-to-air

" The htmtet of ran ar* tt tha

I

St

defensive tactics needed lo survive against NATO fighters in contested airspace. Thevmake little effort lo limit Iheir exposure to ground-hosed air defenses in the target areas instead ihey use chaff, flares, self-protection standoff, and escort jammers.

Low-altitude trainingeters) is rare. Fighter pilots do not practice intercepts against targets at the low altitudes at which attacking NATO aircraft expect Io 6y, and ground attack aircrews do not use terrain-masking techniques lo evade NATO's ground-based air defenses.

Sions of combat are only now becoming more realistic, hulIhe tactics of likely adversaries arc not practiced. I

Novo!orces

upport for land ihealer warfare is amission for the Soviet Navy overall during the iniua! pliaseATO war. Within ihe Soviets' wartime strategy, the primary initial tasks of tbe Navy are strategic These tasks are and will remain

To deploy and provide protection for nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) in preparation for ami participation in inlerconti-rtcntal and (heater nuclear strikes

To defend the USStt and lis allies from strikes by enemy ballistic missile submarines, aircraft carri as.ships and submarines aimed with long-range nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) (sec

Accomplishment of these tasks would entail attempts to control all or portions of ihe Kara. Barents, and northern Norwegian and Greenland Seas, the Seas of Japan and Okhotsk, and Ihe northwestern Facific Basin, and lo conduct soa denial operations beyond those areas toilometers from Soviet territory. During the period of this Estimate, we believe that the Soviets will attempt Io extend their sea denial aream from Soviet territory,in an attempt to defend the homeland from Western platforms carrying land-attack nuclear-aimed cruise missiles We believe that virtually all of tbe Northern and Facific Ocean Fleets' available major surface combatants (seead combat

eeaplcar diKirauon. are NIKorxei .Venal

Sittterv Proftna* ihr IBsMr.8 j ircraft and some three-quarters of their available attack submarines would be initially committed Io Operations in these walers. |

Theater Forces "

Support for Ground Forces operations in Ihe European land theaters of military operationsrimary initial wartime task (including countering naval support to enemy operations in peripheral areas such as Norway) of the Soviet Navy's Baltic and Black Sea Fleets,econdary task of the Northern Fleet Naval forces supporting land operations would, under Ihe commandround Forces TMO commander, seek to gain conlrol of ihe Baltic and Black Seas, neutralize enemy naval forces (including aircraftand SLCM-armed ships in (he North Sea and the easicrn McditcrrancanX conduct amphibioussecure maritime sea lines of communicationonduct seaborne logistic operations, and prepare for sea-based theater nuclear strikes againsl NATO.Q

In NATO's northern region, the Soviets could expect enemy amphibious landings in northernin support of Norwegian resistance to any Soviet advances. The Soviets may also anticipate enemy airstrikes or landings on Ihe Kola Peninsula Sovicl Northern Fleet forces would probably resist such moves as being strategic as well as theater threats in their sea control area. The Northern Fleet could abo provide assistance along the Finnmark coast Io Ground Forces operations. Some Northern Fleet units could also participate in theater nuclear strikes.

In the Baltic Sea. operations would beby the combined Warsaw Fact Baltic fleets, and would be directed al controlling the Baltic through Ihe use of surface units, submarines,ariety of aircraft, including naval fighter-bombers. Warsaw Pad naval forces would attempt Io gain air superiority over the Baltic, and the action would be quickly followed by operatioiB to secure sea control. This would lead to amphibious operations against the Baltic straits and northern German mainland, and heavy seaborne logistic support for Ground Forces operations on the Northern and Central Fionls. In addition, the presence of enemy aircraft carriers or SLCM-armed units in the North Sea may require coordinated strikes by Baltic Fleet air units flying over NATO territory. The Soviets' ability to prosecute such attacks from Baltic Fleet bases would depend on

nmptee rlncusslnnmpfoymenr of Worwu- Fact Form Aeomrt NATO.3

4aa6BB

overall Soviet success in neutralizing NATO airThe six Baltic Fleet CM .bit SSBs (non-nuclear- powered ballistic missile submarines) would be reserve! (or participation in theater nuclear strikes.

The combined Warsaw Pact Black Sea Beel* would focus their operations on Raining control of the Black Sen and supporting sea denial operations io the eastern Mediterranean Sea. especially against enemy aircraft carriers, SSBNs, and SLCM-armed units These operations might require preboatilitiesof the Soviet Navy'sajor effort by naval aircraft to strike enemy units in the Mediterranean through Western air defenses. Operations In direct support of the Ground Forces would include maintaining seaborne logistic Slot's, and conduct ins amphibious landings seith naval infantry supported by surface and air bombardment and special operations in advance of the Ground Forces offensive toward the Turkish straits j

We foresee no significant operational changes in Soviet naval support for Land TMOs, We anticipate, however, the slow continuation of severaland weapons trends that should provide land theater commanders with more capable naval forces for combined-arms operations Chief among these are:

integration of the newly developedong-range land-attack nuclear SLCM intonuclear strike plans.

Continuingconjunction with Airdevelop more effectiveair defenses, especially against aircraft armed with air-bunched cruise missiles (ALCMs) or improved air-to-surf ace missiles (ASMs).to NATO air forces continue to leopardlze the Soviets* ara'liiy to secure airand hence to gain sea control, in the Baltic and North Seas.

Increasing Soviet concentration on antisubmarine and antisurface operations in confined waters of the Baltic and Norwegian Seas, due to theNATO nations' acquisition of coastaland antishipping units, particularly small dicsct submarines designed for operations in the Baltic and fast missile-armed patrol boatsfor operations in the Norwegian fiords and Da rush islands

Increaslns: efforts to remedy equipment and training deficiencies for rapid mine clearing in the approaches to amphibious landing areas.

modernization and eipansion ofand Black Sea Fleet naval infantry fortes Werowth in these forces fromt present to0

gradual replacement ol older naval Badgers withombeis.Soviet Naval Aviation greater potential for in-theater maritime strikes.

increasing availability of sea-baseda few larger aircraft carrierslthough these ship*some support to Ground Forceswe eipect thatATO-Pact warwould use them primarily to enhanceover areas of the sea they wishedThe first of tbe new carriers (seecould be operationalut thereabout lis propulsion system andto handle conventional takeoff(CTOL) aircraft.

The Soviet Navy alone has only enoughlift capability to transport about one-half lo three-fourths of ib naval infantry force and its equip men! in one lift. Tbe remainder, and all resupplt material, could be carried in mobilized merchanthulk esjsrrialv advanced roll-on/roU-orl (Ro/Ro) vessels Amphibious lift capabilities will he modestly increased wilh the resumption of Bopucha class landing ship construction by Poland in Ihc yean altead

Because the Soviets generally believe it Is more important to be ready to go to sea on shoil notice than lo be at sea. the operational experience and training proficiency of naval crews suffer somewhat Although we have vet to see dramatic charutcs in general purpose naval training. Soviet writings havethe need to improve training programs lo shorten ihe lime required to attain crew proficiency with sophisticated systems. Hence, we expect mere mental modernization of (raining We do not, however, expect the Soviets to abandon their belief thai trainingIncurred by maintaining vessels in port aie more than offset by ibe higher material readiness rates achieved. Q

oviet naval infantry forces are Improving their amphibious assault tactics, emphasizing tech nrques to gain the initiative al the beachhead and build Up forces ashore Au-cusbaon vehicles and con ventronal landing craft have been used moreMoreover, specially trained motorized rifle units have participated in the initial assault, ralhe* than acting solely as second -echelon lorces |

vi. non-soviet warsaw pact general purpose forces

lthoughhe dominant member of the Warsaw Pact, the USSR has assigned non-Soviet forces important offensive missions opposite NATO. Soviet operational concepts and organizational modelsIhe general direction of non-Soviel Warsaw Pact force development. To ensure the basic compatibility of Pact forces, we believe that the USSR, or Soviet-dominated Pact committees, set standards for Pact training and weapons procurement, define the strength and structure of NSWP forces, and guide development of transportation and communications networks within member states The USSR has also attempted to manipulate tlte military and defense industrial planning institutions of the allianceIn an effort to achieve arms production economies and sijrsciali'ation. Q

espite the Soviets' interest in ensuring that their allies adopt Soviet operational and tactical concepts, procure modern equipment, andSoviet organizational models. Eastern Europe's reluctance to spend on defenses and its poorperformance haveidening gaptbe military capabilities of Soviet general purpose forces and those of the NSWP allies That gap will almost certainly grow during the projection period. The Soviets will probably devise stopgap measures and make some changes in the operational missions of their allies in order to compensate for these disparities.!

61

tecuhi

Figure 26

OrgardTJiion of Ihe Warsaw Pad In Wartime

Sup'CmtCommandntral Secretary ol ibcCrSU)

Soviet Genrrel Stall

MinuirtNil ion i! DKcmc

Crechoilovak. Ministry of National

German Ministry or Naiioni! Dcfcnst

Hit I

High Command of Western Tlicucr of Miliury Ocrutioet

Fronl(f)

HiflM Co-nmuifl of

Southwestern Theater ol Military Operation*

Ministry of Defense

Ministry ol National Detente

_

Ministry ol National Deftnie

Structure

The Warsaw Pact is currently. authorityeacetime statute ratified in the. Marshal Kulikov, the Commander in Chief, directs and supervises peacetime Warsaw Pad Uaining exercises and monitors the readiness of non-Soviet units that belong to ihe Pad's Combined Armed Forces (CAF) Q

We judge that the Soviet Supieme Higbwould assume absolute control of CAF units well In advance ol* hostilities,eriod of heightened internailonal tensions (seeast European forces, including fleets and air defense units, would operate under the direct control of theSoviet TMO commanders- The conditions and procedures for deciding lo move lo the wartime structure are probably vague, however, and there apparently is no parallel to the explicit procedures by which NATO members would release their forces to SACEUR's contiol. Mosl likely, the Soviets would consult their allieseriod of rising tension,onsensus for the shiftaitlme

mand structure and their willing panicipation and support In anv case, with the Soviet* to their backs, with powerful Soviet lorces in Eastern Ip. and with the unifying factorerceived NATO threat to their iecunty. the East European regimes would most likely cooperate with and be judged reliable by the Soviets lean through tlw early periodany Pact-NATO conOict T

he wartime command and control structure probably is designed for actual war fighting and is not intended to expand the Soviets* control of the Pact during peacetime. The organization establishedtlie Soviets' determination to centralize control of all theater-level assets and commands, including their own With the wartime structure probably now defined to their liking, the Soviets may be establishing lira, rtime TMO high commands, The East Europeans would be suspicious ofevelopment, fearing errcroachrnent on their own control of national forces We doubt they would surrender any meaningful control of their forces in peacetime to the Soviets We eipect Ihe East Europeans would object to anof Soviet authority.*" |

Ground Forces

The NSWP countries assumed offensiveIn the Pact's military plans only in thend. NSWP countries arc to supply aboul one-half of the first-echelon forces in the Western TMO although generally on the less critical Banks of the main Soviet oflensive against the Central NATO region Tliese missionsuildup in NSWP ground and air forces through tbe. The forces were initially equipped with older Sovietprovided oo cocicessiooary terms. By tbe, NSWp ground forces in the northern iter lagged forward-deployed Soviet units by five toears or more in many categoric* while southern-tier nations were equipped wilh even fewer modem weapon. Q

The current Soviet emphasis on improving conventional forces threat ens to lease the NSWP forces further behind, with important operational implications. Even wilh their declining capabilities, ihcte force* can be assigned mission* supporting lite Soviet offensive strategy. They can attack In secondary sectors and fix or pin down NATO forces and prevent them from deploying to more threatened sectors They can abo serve as mopup and occupation forces.the lag of NSWP combat capability does represent an exploitable vulnerability The Soviet* apparently realize this could create soft spots in the Pact theater offensive, inviting NATOand eapnsing Soviet

he NSWP countries have only slowlysince theseaeal disturbing from the Soviet viewpoint. thty are falling behind in precisely those categories of equipment most critical to the Soviet conventional strategy, which ts based on integrated conventional firepower andmaneuver tactics [

example

Some countries, notably Poland, stillajority of World War II-vinlage lowed. and none are approaching Soviet standards for acquiring and integiating modernartillery into their maneuver divisions.

The East Europeans will not acquire the laietil Sovietthe fiweseeable future and are receiving2 tank very gradually Few have even modest number* of5nd several still have World4 tanks in active units Most,are equipped witheTie* tanks All of these tanks are vulnerable to at least some currently fielded NATO antitank means

Most still rely on older towed antlaircrall gum that would be hard pressed to provide mobile air defense for maneuver unilsigh-tempo offensive.

Almostercenl of NSWP "motorized rifle regiments, primarily in the southern-tier armies, arc still equipped with trucks rather than APCs and IFVs

Most NSWP divisions have few or no attack helicopters assignedern

NSWP countries apparently are tryingthe organizational modes* typical ofin Eastern Europe in theprobably consideied bv thes theacceptableoab needed toall-arms maneuver units capable ofSoviet style combined-arms tactics prescribedNATO anliarmor defenses. Theofeorganization would include:

Expansion of the MRR's artillery unitattery of six gunsattalion ofuns.

Formation of artillery battalions of IS guns in tank regiments (TRsJ Currently the NSWP THs have no artillery.

Expansion of tactical mimle unit* and itondivi-nonal artillerysenerallyrowth of at least one third ut haltahon-sxxe hcJdingsl I

Hfturc 27

Mod^rnination of Non-Soviet Warsaw Pac<Forces

Iir DrtVav

Air Drf

clipped SAMmKil

FjiU

Gcntiany Ff'jn^.r^

Bolgarii*

Pmiijiii.

0 M>

4

1

l

Troop ta

TI Quipped -ith APO ofth

rlilkr>*

ZLZ2 Ke^toicsti *vUrfU( cutilkryKr^tnra^in tattltor

CEtefctAwV

Bulgaria 4

KaiUi'iiih."

not include hand held SAM.ihcoland* airborne ind amphitoou; laadmi: tfiviMas ire ooi

included

1 Bulgaria'* five fan* brJjde* arc no4 included

Reflect* equivalent number of APC^oipp^ubjana and rtomtn* drMribuic imall numbers or APCs in ill MRR* richer than coocefliroie iheraew units,

Pact goals areuip til regrnicnla'- Ian* ata* rmXoriredattalion or IS suns.

'ank bnxidei, "bieh arcrire not Included

M1

]

of ihc NSWP countries will meet all of these- objcctis'oi bv the endndihe possible exceptions of Fast Germany andunlikely to meet ihem evena%tiiiii constiainls and production problems will limit compliance, and in most countries only modes* changes will occur For example,esult of tank production problems in Poland and Czechoslovjku. none ol the NSWP countries is likely Io organiseingle tank or motorized rifle division within the next few years according lo the current Sovicl model.

Sluggish equipment and organizational clianges probably have, from the Soviet perspective, distressing operational consequences Some of themost promising operational innovationsare beyond the ability of most of ihe NSWP iour.tries io impternent For example, we have seen no changes in unit organization and little training in NSWP countries to suggest that ihey are preparing to implement the OMG twneept [

The SovieU havr. attempted to quicken the pace of modernization by granting Soviet production licenses for miliiary equipment lo their East Europeanumber of East European countries now coproduce Soviet-cUrsigned self-propelled artillery2 tanks as well as other, leas complicated systems Despite tbe obvious appeal of such an approach In modernization, reproduction efforts can be crippled by parts sliortages or production delays in any one country. Nonetheless, ilw effort, which provides ihe East Europeans wilh an economic slake inshould slowly provide them wilh an increasing source of modern artillery, tanks, and other armored vchtcles-l |

be Soviets have also pressed their allies to improve their capabilities in key selected areas. For example in keeping with emphases on their newly conceived air defense operations, the Soviets have heavily sold Ihe needoint air/groundintegrated air defense net over Eastern Europe. Most of the NSWP countries arc at least acquiring some self-propelled SAMs to replace lowed antiaircraft guns, and wc expect SAM acquisition will be an East European priority through the. Moreover. East Germany, Chechoslovakia. Hungary, andhave built or are building sites forigh-altitude SAMs, and Poland may do so When coenpiet ed. Ibis CA-crrlapping; network of sites will threaten NATO AW ACS and other hiiih-a'titudeistancem from Pact territory over Western Europe from ibe Baltic to the Black Sea. |_

ome of ihe best equipped East EuropeanFast Germany andimproving their nuclrai delivery capabilities They have begun to acquire nuclear-capable artillery and theactical misule These changes underline Pact determination to improve capabilities louclear war. evenajor effort is made lo improve conventional arms As in the past, control of nuclear warheads ihal would Ise used by NSWP forces will remain with the Soviets. Q

c foresee no major force structure changes in NSWP ground forces. Older equipment in somewill be stored as ihe basis for the mobilization uf combat or combat support units in wartime. However, few new units will be formed, in brge part because the East Europeansanpower base andto support substantul force

Air Forces

Theole of the NSWP air forces ha. been air defense.3f their aircraft were air defenseighters constitute neaily two-thirds of the total NSWP fixed-wing combat force By contrast, onlyercent of ihe Soviet aircraftNATO3 were fighters'

Wilh the new emphasis on increasingfirepower, the NSWP air forces are beginning to follow the Soviet lead of converting more aircraftround attack mission.3ircraft were in NSWP ground attackincrease ofercent since thehis trend shouldand more emphasis will abo be placed onground attackhelicopters andixed wingdirect support of NSWP ground units.]

nalysis of trends in the sUength andof Warsaw Pact air forces opposite NATOrowing disparity between ihe overall Soviet and East European air forces In leimx of combat potential Only in ground attack capability have the NSWP air forces shown substantial improvement In recenl yearsue mainly to an increase in aircraft numbers rather than to the deployment of more modernalthough ibe slow introduction of thend SUitter.rogfoot. andoaxers by ibe East Europeans are important qualiutive improve-

s4 onlyercent of ihe aircraft In ihe NSWP forces were models introduced sincelthough some East Europeans have spent large-

arnounts on aticrafl acquiulmrahein the capabilities of East Euiopean air forces relative to those ol Soviet lorces is likely to grow because ol the tendency in NSWPfor economicbuy rrkodernizcd versions of aircraft thatecade or more old rather than the most advanced aircraft in the Soviet inventory.|

Novo. Forces

ith their limited forces, the Pohsh. East German. Bulgarian, and Romanian navies are assigned less critical roles in the combined fleets that inwould be formed In the Baltic and Black Sea Fleer areas Their forces are structured to assist the dominant Soviet fieets in providing defense against NATO amphibious assaults and rwoleetion of Warsaw Pact sea lines of communication from submarine and surface attacks The NSWP navies abo wouldamphibious forces for landings on the Jutland Peninsula and tho Tuiklsh Slraits and carry out mine clearing operations to support the movement ofPact naval forces into the North Sea and the Mediterranean We believe lhat the Soviets would maintain overall direction of NSWP naval operations In warlimeombined headquarters in each fleet but (he infrcquency of loinl cierciscs might hinder the smooth integration of tbe forces. |

he aging inventory of submarines, ships,aircraft in the NSWP countries points toof their secondary position inar with NATO Frigates and patrolwith rorpedoes and short-range cruisecontinue to be ihe backbone of NSWP surfacewarfare forces. The NSWP naviesonly fisc diesel submarines in the BalticSeas Despite prompting by the Soviets,countries with naval forces do notor able to sigmficantly increase theirin order to acquire modern navalthat would seriously threaten

Prc-specti

ioapects for material improvement in NSWP forces that would satisfy Soviet requirements hingeroad, sustained economic recovery in EasternNone of the East European regimes approaches ther so percent of national income devoted to defense by the Soviei* because mostigher standard of living and devote more resources lo nondc-fense activities than do the Soviets. None is estimated to spend aboveercent on defense Inmanpower shortages may prevent tbe Eastfimn adopting expanded Soviet unitthat woudl require more conscripts- Economic, and lo some estent manpower, problems are Lkely lo keep Ihe Eat Europeans from closing the gap with Soviet forces during mosl of the protection period Q

, in an effort to giveNSWP modernon programs and to reducedisparity in Soviet-NSWP forceSoviets did push for greater integration ofdefense industries dcvoled to generalforce production. |

effort lias had several consequences

NSWP defense Industry has increased itson simpler support systems, small arms, munitions, and weapon components. The Soviets base apparently continued to decline the license of more advancedhis eased the design and pioduclion demands on NSWP indusiry and lessened the opportunity for leakage of sensitive Soviet technology NSWP componentio torn, has benefited Irom the iolow of Western technology. NSWP concentration on support sysletm also reduced Soviet dependence on militarily vulnerable NSWP plants for critical weapons and enabled Pact rear services to draw on local sources for parts

Specialization in components probably liasto wider participation in production and procurement programs for major weapons like2 tank. Thb should resoh in economies because of Urge production volumes. However, it alto renders programs more vulnerable lo dlsrup (ion because production problems in any one country can slow or hah production in ethers Furthermore, cumbersome procedures within both Ihe Pact and the Council for MutualAssistance (CEMA) have apparentlyarms trade within the Pact

the growing Soviet controldefense industry has been to theor disadvantage of NSWP countries isclear Militarily, standardization in Sovietpiobably has increased NSWP militaryand probably has increased Soviet abilityoperations. Economically. Pacthave benoBled from the efficiencieswith specialization and the opportunities tocurrency through arms export* to the Third

NSWP Defense Colli

the Soviet Union devote* lw..rn I'I and It percent oi ill total Mimal incnrn* lo defense, iui-Soviett countries upvalU devote oakyercent ThM widen defenseand io the imtilKal prxeity accordednncipal reason why NSWP lories are ta far behind Soviet general purpcae force dcvrlopmcnls. [

Dollar cost assessments of Warsaw Padindicate lhat NSWP defense cnils havea luilc more thanof ihe lota) Pactall defense actlvitiev Dollar cost assessmentslhat. since the, averageriln in NSWP defecaeror rnaearstent (see

CIA and DIA bothinkage between slower economic growth arid slower growth in defrnse outlays.

Annual Growth Rates of

Defense Costs'

Estimate.

Estimate

"ul 'be dnggith growth In NSWP defense Spending during the past decade haslanned responw to slower overall economic growth. Thisis consistent withJ Furoceanindicating lite cancellation or deferral ol scene weapon prmtuetnenl programs because U |

We anticipate vers modest lonein Fastern Europe Becausr of the closeeconomic growth and rales of delmseIt is unlikely that force moderniiation canthere In the absence of broad economicWith costs for new weapons rising moredelrnse expenditures, we eipect the Fastwill buy new weapon systems ai even ilowerIn theorce inventories will "turnalowly. and older equipment wilL renuinfor an eitersded perrod In the IStsOs andihe Eastee ciample, rsmoletedusttion5 tanks for Ibeir us active divisionsa decade bus. in ihe past four sears.lo equip even one divisionT-7&

While some economics can be made in fuelcutis to boost procurement budgets,have adverse training and readinessare self-defeating if carried too far. Thehave probably sought Soviet nihudicimodernization rates or. failing that tactic,spread purchases of new equiprnetilovicl made ccr Icesger periodi thani would preferihe

taut European' will gradually rasoOertnae andimprove llieil general purpose forcci in ibr fuming yean Korirthek'u. because of high wtsapon costs and limited procurement budgets, their forces0 will be Ira* capably equipped relative to the best Soviei unit* than Iheyecade earlier. | ]

Technical dcrxTKience on ihc Soviets may impair develoocoent of NSWP industries, however, and NSWP arms industries willlnerable lo Soviet Influence over the term* of trade, as the Soviets charge heavily for licensing and ciport iiithl>

e believe the integration of Warsaw Pact defense industries will continue. NSWP speciauzatkori in subsystem and component production and reliance on Soviet designs will probably intensify In. In open-source literature, CEMA industrial planners extoleriod of coprodtaction anderiod ol perfecting the mutual advantage. This trend will increase' the intetdepcrwlcrsre of all Pactnd it may iiicreasingly involvewhich strove for greater industrial independence in. We doubt, however, that armsin Eastern Europe will be of sufficient quantity in the ptxriecticcn period to close the growing gapSoviet and non-Soviet forces We do. however, expect slow overallperhaps impressive progress in selecttbc East Europeansto meet Soviet modernization goal* and orsjani-ttornis. |

Soviet Options

s Soviet force Improvements outstrip those of their allies, il will be increasingly difficult to maintain common training standards and lo uniformly increase

67

p *

operational capabilities in terms of Drcpowcr, inobd-MV. and tuivivabihlv in all Pad forces In particular, the East1 have treatdoptingof the moat proroisirar Soviet combined arms tad in such ai the OMG or in developing the integralirr Miptk-tt forces viewed by the Sovid* aa the key In defeating NATO's anliarmor and antiair drfruu-tihe future

e Soviets appear to haveew altertia lives to compensate for slipping NSWP combat pnterr tial, and none are attractive They could, for example, pay much more of the East European defense bill However, tlie Soviets arc notinancial position to provide generous subsidies to their allies, especially since they are in the middle of their own ambitious and costly force improvement program. The Soviets might, however, offer some of thdr older, but still-combat-capable equipment now being displaced bv thdr beatasA 8s, and modemhe East Europeans on concesrncn ary terms East Germany and Bulgaria have. In fad. received. Such measures will resultenuine improvement of non Soviet capabilities, but will not close the gap in force disparities. In someforgap bdwecn Sovid and NSWP forces certainly will widen because of the large differences in capability between the newest Soviet aircraft and the older equipment the East Europeans might buy. Q

he Soviets could give the East Europeans an even larger stake in the production of sophisticated weapons This wouldolicy decision by ihe Soviets lo share some of their more sensitive designs and technical manufacturing processes, sorndhlng they have been unwilling to do in the past.Moscow would have to invest heavily inEast European industrial plants that are not now capable of producing advanced technology weapons Should lhc Soviets make such athe East Europeans real economic incentive tocould probably nd begin to series produce advanced weapons until 1

Soviets almost certainly are aware ofprice they may pay if their allies areto perform their assigned misasomforces because of force disparities Theequipped NSWP forcesultinationalwould be:

i-ess capable of executing breakthroughor exploiting attacks deep in enemy rear areas.

Less capable of proteding the front's Ranks.

More vulnerable to NATO airstrikes and counterattacks

AI the very least these forces might slow theof the attack achieved by superior Sovid forcesus threaten the very basis of Sovid wartbe swift, violent, unrelenting conventional orrensive

The Soviets could partially overcome these operational problems by relieving (lie East European forces of responsibility for portions of Iheir wartime missions The Soviets arc probably experimenting with that option.

iecemeal basis, tho Soviets probably will continue to compensate for the most glaring East Eurooean military deficiencies For instance. Moscow has substantially increased its logistic base in East Germany, lessening its dependence on the railroad transportation network thai transits Poland from the USSR The Soviets might also plan and trainarger, earlier commitment of USSR-based forces to wartime operalions lo assist their allies. Such changes would provide short-term solutions to Moscow'sbut over the long term the disparity bdwecn Sovid and East European capabilities is likely to continue widening-!

ANNEX A

Defense Spending: Implications of the Projections

This annex examines the resource implications of Soviet general purpose forces as projected by this Estimate. It analyzes past and future trends offor general purpose forces against the backdrop of prelected Soviet economic growth. It explores what effect economic growth may have on future levels of general purpose forces, and whether Moscow's future defense spending strategy will be tempered by Hs assessment of the health of the Soviet economy. |

Estimates of the ruble costs of Soviet military activities are intended as an indicator of the levelend of resources devoted to defense. These estimates allow us lo examine the effect of economic factors on the defense effort and. conversely, lo analyze tbe impact of the drain the mililary imposes on the economy. We are also able lo analyze trends in subaggregates of theinstance, tlie general purpose forces mission. By comparing spending trends for maior classes of general purpose weapon systems, the tuWe cost estimate helps us lo gauge the relative priorities assigned by the Soviets to various military programs. To capture real growth of defensethe ruble estimate is expressed in0 prices. Our estimate for general purpose weapon programs does not Include research, development, testing, and evaluation {RDT&E) costs because we are unable to measureosts for specific missions

Although this NIE seeks to protect forces through theur insight into the growth of Soviet forces and the health of the Soviet economy ineriod it too uncertain to make definitive judgments about the military burden imposed on the economy. This section, therefore, concentrates on mili-tary-economic resource allocation issues only up

Results of Ihe Ruble Eitimote Historical Patterns

Our most recent estimate of Soviet expenditures for general purpose forces shows lhat total outlays forercent of total defense3ercent per year6andof weapons for the Croundthe highest rale of growth, atercent per year.almost all components of general purpose forces grew slower, wilh ratesercent per year. Only Military Transport Aviation (VTA) showedfaster growthhanQ

General purpose weaponshall of totalthe same general growth pattern Duringeriod. It roseercent per year, mainlyesult of an expansion of the air, naval, and ground forcesowever, growth of general purpose weapons procurement virtually ceased The exception was again VTA, where annual procurement continued lo grow byercent I

future Growth Outlook

The Intelligence Community does not currently publish future cost estimates for either total defense spending or mission subaggregates of that total Wc can. however, assess cost implications of future general purpose forces as implied by this NIE.|

The force levcb in this NIE imply total Soviet expenditures for the general purpose mission willercent per year through the end of the decade. Soviet costs for general purpose aircraft willercent per year. Procurement of general purpose weapons will growercent per year for the rest of,ercentage point higher thanate. Procurement of naval equipment and aircraft, including those for the VTA, would growercentage points higlser thanuture procurement growth of land arms, however, is likely to beercentage poinls below the growth rate, but well above the Increases oferiod. Q

Economic Performance

In the decade since the, the Soviet economy has grown at the slowest rateie

post-World War II era. Economic growth eventually fellercent for three1 Trait cVdtae was rspecaalii noticeable in industrial growth. The average annual growth uf industrial output durinfieriod was about hall of lire average annual growth)ui the economy has been doing somewhat better recently Cross nalional productby3 and growth has been maintained in most sectorslthough CNP will rise byercent5 Isecauseoor harvest. Q

The upturn of Soviet economic growth reflects improvement In Iwo major factors thai contributed to the preceding slowdown. First, growth of industries producing key basic materials rose sharply after falling for several years ami transportation rebounded from its2 performance Second, overallstabilizederiod of marked decline. We beliese thai unmeasured increases in hours worked and relief of bottlenecks affected productivityImprovements in morale, efficiency, andalso may have helped.]^

On Ihe basis ol the improvement noted in Soviet economic performancee believe that average annual CNP growth forill probably be about 2sr percent Our analysis suggests that tbe average annual rate of increase over thr decade is not likely loercent.undamental improvement In productivity appears to offer the potential for moving longer term growthercent Such improvement seems unlikely, raarticularly in view of the increasing cost of introducing new plant and equipment into more remote areas of the couniry. The dilemma would be much moie acute if Soviet leaders attempted lo accelerate growth In defense spending. | |

Ecorsc>mic Inspirations of Future Moderniiaticn

Production ofincluding those forpurpose forces, draws lieavily on thoseseclors that are most important forThese industries include machinery,and chemicals We know that there is aof interdependence among theseesuunple. the machine-building and

rnctalwotking (MBMW) sector produces many invest merit goods and is also rMponn'blc for llse production of such military hardware as general purpose weapons It is also clear that much of the military demand

consists of indUect purchases from non-MBMW sec-ton of the economy, for example, il requiresinputs lhat come from other lectors, such as metallurgy. Such industrial integration makes it clear that an expansion ol general purpose forces would compete for resources wilh civilian prated* as well as wilh other defense programs. We examine twowhere general purpose forces alone are modernizedecond where therealanced modernization of Soviet forces | |

Genera! Purpose Forces Modisrni ration Alone

In thb scenario wc examine the effect of increased procurement of general purpose forces weapons while holding the procurcenent growth of the other weapons categories at the current slow rale An expansion of only ibe general purpose forces would have little effect on the growth of Ihe Soviet economy In terms ol Ihe ratio of defense spending to total CNP This is because general purpose weapons procurement makes up less than ooe-bflb of total Soviet defenseand onlysercent of Soviet CNP. Raising procurement of general purpose weapons at rates implied by this NIE would increase the defense burden by lessercentage point0 | |

Looking purely at shares of total defenseand shares of CNP allocated lo general purpose forces may urydercinphasize ibe Importanceeallocation of resources in favor of this mission, however Aside from drawing from those Industrial sectors most Important for economic growth as described above, most general purpose weapons programs have close counterparts in the civilian sector. For example, higher tankC production could decrease the number of trucks and railroad can available lo the civilian sector. Such shortageslearly negative effect on isconomkr growth because they cause transportation bottlenecks, decline inspot shortages of industrial inputs, and other economic disniptiora

Bolonced Modarnizotion of Soviet Forces

We believe It Is more likely that general purpose forces, will nothe only forces experiencing growth in the future. If Ihc Soviets increase general purpose weapons spending, then they will abo probably decide lo increase spending lor strategic programs This wnuld result in growth rales for Iota) defense spending resembling those nferiodo 5

A policy decision lo pursue an intensified defense, buildup would be cosily in terms of economic performance II economic growth were slow,would consume all of Ihe anticipated growth in such key sectors as metallurgy Incenario, tbe way lo Increase sunplies ol mrlallurgical products lo the civilian sectors would be to boost imports. Such actions would cut into hard currency holdings, which otherwise could be used to finance Imporls of grain and technologically advancednlabor requirements would growesult ofpam ion of general purpose forces and strategic programsime when net increments to the labor force would grow only slightly through tbe remainder of the decade The only way to meet these increased requirements would be lo accelerate labor productivity growth, divert labor resources from other sectors of ihe economy, or increase hours worked or labor participation rates, or to undertake someof these three. The accompanying lestrtctions

a attmaitnr Me ot tka Dimeter. Defamee ImtitittnetM aorta that amdtftmttawataaea- wUh mama* eca-cwav rwU mtaml eaaanV fatot Sotttie male diffnlt iJimra.ot* bos btilevt thai the nlue'ton theat eittrmelaUhet/or) at pottravtd ahme Thec*oi*ej ontfit uifl> than iadtcaledll Nit.

nn consumption growth would hamper worker moral" and suppress potential productivity gains Economic growth alates would offsel somewhat the negulive unpacl ol (he rate of defense growth on lhc economy and allow some increase of supplies lo the civilian portions of the economy, and the share of metallurgv lor procurement would grow only dnrhllt2 |

CorxluStOn

Despite the economic corisequcnccs of hlgliei spending oithet overall or only for the UP mission. Iheto step up defense procurement must be Intense for tlie Kremlin given Ihe state of Soviet-US relations and the recent increases in US spending on military hardware If the Soviets choose to increase tbe growth of toul defenseilemma involving conflictinginvestment, andlikely to confront ihe leadership for the rest of the decade We must keep in mind, however, thai, even if defense spending growthat rales below those implied by this NIE during the rest of this decade and economic growth remains in theercent range, the Soviets could continue major weapons deployment programs and proceed wilh Iheir force modernization. |

71

r saw Poet Manpower Issues

nd through thehe USSR and most of the non-Soviet Warsaw Pact (NSWP) countries will be laced wilh manpowerdueecline in the pool ol draft-ace youths. While these problems are manageable, they willadjustments in diaft policies The countries will be forced to adopt measures to economize in the use of both military and civilian manpower Conscription terms could beigher percentage of draft-age youths could be conscripted, and unit manning levels could be reduced These steps could lead to some reductions in unii leadirsess and in overall force readiness. We beheve the Pact countries, particularly the USSR, most likely will optodest increase in the percentyear-olds drafted andeductioo of the number of "unskilled" positions filled during peacetime. Greater difficulties will abo beIn attracting volunteers for officer and specialist slots, and shortages are prwible Greater reliance will be placed on reservists and perhaps on enlistingThese steps will allow them lo maintain their forces close to current levels duringater in, an increase in the number of potential draftees should alleviate manpower problems in most of the countries. Given tbe vast pool of reservists, all of the Pact countries would be able to mobilize enough manpower lo fill out all ibeir forces in wartime. The reservists, however, would lequire refresher training to regain military skills Ihe amount of training would depend on tbe skiDs required

Soviet Union

The Soviet Union has beenecline in ihe numberyear-olds since the. This is due primarily to demographic distortions created during the war years The number of males reaching draft age6 will beercent of the postwar peaknd there will be no quick recovery in manpower levels The number of males reaching draft age svill not return to0 levd through tbe0

IJ. TV

While declining birthrates lesulled inoviH rcituiiements for servicemen have continued lo arow Even if the Soviets draftedercentycar-old males and kept units manned ol levels common Inhortage of new soldiers would exist0n thendhe Soviets copedore severe problem of thb kind by reducing the number of troops on active duty. When Ihe number of txttvntialincreased, manning levels in active-forces rosej

We have observed some Soviet responses lo these shortages Student deferments al most academichave been eliminated Workers at militaryand research facilities also used lo receive deferments from conscription. In4 thebegan to drafl some workers atercent of these enterprises. Q

The pressure on manpower also lias been observed in the forces themselves We believe thai inhe Soviets maintained Iheir divisions in the groups of forces in Eastern Europe at close to full strength. In thend, the Soviets expanded these divisions, requiring more personnel, but did not increase the number of soldiers actually assigned to themesult of ihis Increase in authorizedwith no real increase in numbers assigned, the percentage of overall manning has droppedndercent of authorized wartime strength.[

In addition lo problems with total numbers, the Soviets alsohange in the ethnic composition of their forces In tbebe non-Slavic shaic of the draft age population began to grownow stands alercent and will reach at leastercent by the end of tbt. decade. This shift toward non-Slavic groups haa intensified the militarylonsjJandirit concerns about rion-SiavK soldiers Open-press article* cite three rthnsc-reUled problems Russian language deficiencies, lower educational achievement, and antipathy between nationalities

ti.ll MrID unlila> lowered tuQ

Zl

3 Central Committee plenum directed thatarticularly premilitaryussi an-language instruction, that poliiicalof conscripts give more prominence to ethnic issues, and tliat mote non-Slavic candidates befor officer schools None of these movesundamental reform, however, and none is likely lo achieve quick

Since upgrading education and language skills among non-Slavs willhrw process, the military will have to rely on its ability to assign conscripts to positions that match their abilities We do not know the details of Soviet assigrvmeot practices, but it is clear that units with minimal security or skill requirements have highly disnroportionate numbers of ethnic miriorilios We estimate that aboulerccnl of the conscripts assigned to norKombat forces (construction, railroad, and internal security) are non-Slavs, twice the non-Slavic share of the draft-age poiiolatlon0esult, the combat force has disproportionately few non-Slavs. We estimate that, because ofdernocrsplnc pressure, the share of non-Slavs in the combat force has risenercent0 toercent today0 this share could reachercent. [

Our estimates imply that in Ihehe combat force could be relatively selective, taking aboutercent of non-Slavic conscripts, presumably the better educatedercent Ihe rest apparently did construct ion work or prison guard duty0 the cornbal force had aboutercent of the non-Slavic conscripts, and if overall manpower levels re-mam constant this figure will reachercent0 The growing proportion of non-Slavs in the draft pool will fotcc the Soviets to accept more subslandard Slavic soldiers and more non-Slavtc inductees Into the combat forces. This willreater burden on the military training estshhshrnent and the Soviets will be forced lo rely more heavily on reservists lo fill out units in wartime. Q

Despite conscript shortages, the Soviets would have no problem in filling out their wartime force with reservists The Sovietsarge reservepool, ronsistirig of aboutillion men below the agepproiirnatelyillion have been oo active duty within tbe past five years. In the event of general mobilization, anillion reservists would be needed to expand the force structureeacetime level ofillion to an estimated strength ofillion men

Although the sire of the Soviet reserve pool is impressive, the quality of the reservist* generally is not There are no reserve units as such, but ralhei an aggregationen, rmxil of whom baseour of mandatory active duty The reserve trainingthese men is of uneven quality and frequency Most Sovietn fact, are unlikely to be called up more lhan once for training. An exception to this is the relatively small group whose prior military service or rrsohilixalion assignments require the technical or military skills necessary' to operate or maintainequipment such as radars, missiles, artillery, antiaircraft guns, and engineering equipment Areason for the lack of systematic reserve trainingthe disruptive effect on ihe civilian economy if Iraining were more extensive,

hlorvSwiel Warsaw Poet

Most NSWP countries will not encounter the same kind of demographic pressures that face the Sovlets. Their mililary forces are not as large as the Soviets' in li.oport.on to the popuUiloo In the past, the NSWP rountrics have been able lo man (heir forces by conscripting aboutercent ofyearold males. During theost willeduction in the pool of available youths With the exception of East Germany, we believe the NSWP countries will be able to deal with the problem byightly higher percentageyeai-oldsQ

The East Germans historically have drafted alioutercent of draft-age males Their mental and physical standards have been high Starting4 and continuing through the end of the century. Ihe Fust Germans will be forced either toigher percentageyear-olds or to reduce manning levels In the active force. We believe the East Cermam will maintain unit strengihs. they will deal with the shortage of available drafl-age male* In part bv draft-ing students and defense workers who normally would have been granted deferments and those who would previously have been below standards. ( |

We expect that the NSWP countries will rely heavily on reservists not only to fill out forces in wartime, but aho to come on active duty during peacetime as well Because of their role and training. NSWP reservists may lie belter prepared than Soviei reservists, and the unil* thai depend on them may be more effective after rriobilixation lhan comparable

Sovietarge percentage of the NSWPparticularly those opposite NATO's Centralare manned at high strength in peacetime and require relatively few reservists to mobilize. As the manpower available for conscription declines in, however, the role of reservists in these countries may increase.|

Although the NSWP countries will face demographic restrictions during the nest two decades, the problem should noi affect their capability to man iheir peace-lime or wartime forces. The countries have more than enough reservists. If they were to mobilize. II million reservists would be required. Two million reservists have served on active duty In the pasl five years Q

HI

rojections Tables

Ground Forcesotal Warsaw Pactb

MPDt

TDi

11

borne and other doitiom

10

active diviioia

Mnhijinlim hm- itLrtt-m.

l i

l B

1A

C**MT uttnxilD

Ready MRLH

V.

77

77

70

u

s-r

71

45

27

7?

TDi

MRD>

Nalrrailt Tth

r

dlvltion.

3M

281

211

71

282

71

128

71

290

army corpi

comiruiHU

coin

ill the "Ground Form SiBtunary" uHe* there not always additive. "Total active divKtoru" exclude "mobiliiatioo-bajr dl.Uioni" Hoaoer. "mobilieatwn-Uaieare included in "tolal (UvhionT and. as appropriate, with -not-ready MRDV" or "not-ready

WA proteuiiitln* rr^litatioriW diviiiona will be activated by tbt cm)hat no other) will be formed, and lhat tne Soviet Ground Force* "ill peakctive dii-iuons and nine independent army conn

Thii

S3

Ground Force* Summary: Southwestern TMO

I

Mftlh

TO*

divisions

active divisions

base diviiioco

MBDi

TDs

MRDi

TDs

divisions

"

army coir*

comraifiiis

corps

Soviet Cround Forces in llir Odessa and Kiev MDs and in Kunamv Alio includes Itungditui. Bulgarian, and Romanian na-IkiiuI forces

Ground Forces Summary: Northwestern TMO

Ground Force* Summary; Far East TMO-

Ground Forces Summary: Southern TMO-

-

Ground Weapons Summary; Total

aT

r

ODD

Ifi5O0

artiln( cW

"ti

l-v.

SAMi"

o

900

1

0

o

il i

j

i lSSMi

*Mi'

SD

WO

)

0

I wo

(Includm* roondlna ruin) foi all6

-

Cround Weaponi Summary: Force* Opposite- NATO -Wcttern. Southwell em. andTMO*

Unkt

wvn

Ia flfafl

1 *i

Iflilinr o*

0

* ,mM>

CO

SCO)

l>

i IliaV

900

i run

a

T&M. ATt JMi'

8S0

.sou

OO

(InHudina loundin* ruledall aroundml.Vm Wlow

Th*

i

k

loflo-e Tbu table

I"iI Weapons Summary; Southwestern TMO

Median ttnki

u

Soviet

l

* mo

a11

ftk Mm

r j .

irlillery' Mi

moo

MM sow

O

)

0

.

i im

i

500

100

: joo

ATCMi*

SO

aW rain) for

400

vu

500

700

710

3 '

Ground Weapons Summary: Northwestern TMO*

Ground Weapons Summary: Southern TMO*

labie ti

tilje

Ground Weapons Summary; Far Eastern TMO*

i -

Ground Weapons Summary: Strategic Reserve b

Medium lauki

artillery out

0

im

(including rounding rulra) lo loOow6

all Ground

table it

labia ii

7

Soviet Tactical Air Force: Western TMO

*.

Flwjon

1 FlihbnJ JflflJU MIGeFmbat AfE Mir.ji.'f:

(A

fiWr

0 62

u 65

0

0

0 11

ifl i

0 0

0 0

0

Ik 0

rt

FUnta

MJC H

4

14

40

31

lit

Tfi 06

64

6

ltJ-

1)

1

0

0

rt

0

,'l

0

A

0

A

0

*

0

luir/1

Ground JlUck

uW*d

Fkfitrr

tf riuiji nrn/i

1 ad 1

i't

lV_at

*

90

] Cm-.

it"

90

1 M

abc

ritvn

0 0

1

310

0

440

HO

t>

0

0

0

L>

c>

31

0

109

iim Hftti ii .

iarr 0

mic as r'wUi rt/n

SUIT

0

41

8

Al

96

8

10

4S

8

6

*

6

it Fcrmir BMI (PA A)

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

16

h

16

miciilmm.rita Unkft^Rpr 0

0

0

24

24

U

CO

60

uvtaAir Fm Uhln f'Jlo-or toub ihi-rwrng currmli*iiUm ordtr4 llW DwntU

Soviet Tactical Air Force: Southwestern TMO

AIrerill

t>B

Floaoo

Fule.um

Flanker

Foxhound

attaek

Fioefool

AK

(PAA)*

Fobbed H

Brewer D

.

Filter HA

Fencer

ee

lor dl Switr Tuctkal Air Force tibia followor lotah shovrinr. curreM tactical aviation order otl the DUcuioan

Tba ublc

c'ZRal

9

Soviet Tactical Air Force: Northwestern TMO

A Hot all

OB

A

Fulcrum

Frxhound

ilttek

Fahbed

Filler

A/C

AK

FbnUF-GAK

>

Fitter It/K

FutcrunvP Ree

ec

oviet Tactical Air Force tabidor tout showing current IMicil aviation order of buttle, u*f ihe Ditcuvna

Thti tMe fi*

0

Soviei Tacltcal Air Form Southern TMO

Airmti

OA

U

Ucon

t5 Fo*bat VE

m

n

261

6

no

tt

0

15

0

45

0 36

AMTFUafar MICotfiwiad

m

f 41

0

it

In

0 0

64

lb

n

0

120

t

NO 14

Fiddler B

_0

Mtuk

OA'

A/0

AKAK

1id

6

0

0

0

r.

TI

46

120

Ml

0

0

iC

0

?6

16

0

Jt

Ji-

31

2

0

0

0

16

FiifcniiivP-rto SUtec

i_|

i.i

tiA

i

Atl

for all Soviet Titticil Air Foim ulilei fnJJo* ubfeFor loUk arming cufwtf lAdiciil MlW oruVr of?i the

I

Sovfri Tactical Air Force? Far KaMcru TMO

O*

p|

^

MlOllC/WN MICotbalMKM3iikrumlanteroihound FJMl [ASF)*

ii<cafi*

Ground attack

o

|

0iio

a

48

0

0

0

0 64

32

0

0

it

0

314

120

6

0

frl

M

S 1

o

0 0

M

o

130

Ihfl

6 II 36

09 60

0

0

0

0

280

166

64

0

60

il Fbfcbod

Ftt^M

0

6

40

fO 60

2 0

ISO

140

110

1*0

200

0

fTAK

BPPA A) 4

FMVICST)"

MICnhhrdIfwr P

0

0

32

0 0

0

o 0

0

0 0

90

0

0 0

0

0

u 0

0 0

0

0

H

0 0

0 0

^

0 0

Ucnctr

t: 0

7

32

27

32

27

61

17

31

tr

16

1

1

*tr Pulcruiv. P- II**-

W

14

lor nil StiviHir Fore* tabb* follow2 For loubnikvIaiMn order of Utrlr. aa*f Ibe Dtfcttauo*

WW

2

Soviet Tactical Air Force; Strategic Reserve

OB

Fulcrum

(CAP)'

itUck

AK

=1'

Fencer

oc

lot ill Sovicl Tactical Air Force tablet ate below. For total* limine, current tactical aviation order o( bottle, leel Ibe Dix-ioiion

'II* table a

Notei lotD22

Department of Dcferueoireij ihalI long ranee InterceptorRI)replace theoabat and MICoeheend aircraft TW aircraft ptifaitJYohaunK ciuaaa/niproocac dadai rapababtv.owM lave a

lupn ivuiwrapaUr al nnlMnoi dime al aeaWWfc ipwdi

'hat theit tuivrnrtt t- Earner(ASF) until trnlace tla MICkejaer ami5 Flatoti lllo have an all atpm airborne intercept (Al)ouldown/inool-down capabdily again* amaH. ha* altitude lararliapability

im'* (ram lhort

preiecta laaU rianlrraat tattler fCAf) -illukrean analieapacted to leave an uarrlucW ranaean. lo be capable ol aerial refuelinc. and lo I. al ipeedt up loetounaimncr venlcm ot. and -III -ill be fiel.led

DOD prutecti that the BP-II neiu>heral-air-allaeh (PA A) aire rait will replace theencer. It bt eipreled tamajer ranee and amiwahat laror* payload than ihe Fencer It willhave an

accurate teaiaa lyatran IVah mrniuinam (B-

lec)and taeetreaac -ariateIbe

< DOD proareB that thaV poand-iuppor! bitinhe SUraffool ll licipected loanaH,narhl capable attackot ckne airGaorea (oa recunnaltance and eleeJronatare aareed won"

3

Non-Soviet Warsaw Pact Tactical Air Forces

0 3 l>

Soviet Strategic Aviation! Tolul

5

Soviet Strategic Aviation: Opposite NATO

two

D-26

Soviet Militarv Transport Aviation (VTA)*

Aircraft

Cock

Candid

medium ir Jiuoort *

t VTA ei drawn (torn olhet (on

ten Aeroflut

irjiuport aircraft aocts These atrcralt.

have not Wo pioietted. and theirwould be highly

6 DO It Dteaeeliom are in porenthess

' DODew medium tmretwri lo repticc someubs and In complement other auelt

e

labia7

opters: Total

Table Ml

Soviei Helicopters: Southwestern TMO

Artec. Ml* Hut

M

Si

its i.

to

o

HaraJ milolvm

9 9

20

0

29

40

6B

,.i IjIi

liii

vet|*

Ml ft Honk

64

42

m

ale

taM.

M

14Haad

1 Irdi nan

1 L

ulot

0

100

220

piarpow<

Ml Ml,,.

4(6

530

350

439

Hoot HHIHib

111

151

151

(ill icaci

28

-

MM

Hip

ook

alo

lablr u

D-32

Soviet Helicopters: Far Eastern TMO

5

Baltic Fleet: Amphibious Ships and Craft

D-36

Baltic Sea Fleet Air Force

l.u.

7

Baltic Sea Fleet Air Force

5

Fitter 3S

rrplaccmcM (possibly 0

)

Floeeer;

DIA doc not prokd individual led total* for the;Flgurei In parenlheao Indicate DIA reotectntii All other figures ate agreed upon bv the Intelligence Community

Ttm table

8

Northern Fleet: Amphibious Ships and Craft

D-39

Noilhcin Heel Air Force

ia* is* ami)'

TU-BM 0

foVi )) 36

don twit protect individual Bret lolalt ic* ihe0

In parent hoc* indicate DIA projection! AH other iigurn are airred upon by Ihe Intelligence Community.

Thiiaaaal i

arc tattled upon bv the Inteiltecnce Community.

able

0

Norlhern Fleet Air Force

replacement tpoEtbl. the Flogger)

Forger A

Fore" Mod

V/STOL

fabler

DIA does not praect individual Beet totab Ice theigures In parent boa Indicate DIA oroketiom All other beum ace agreed upon by ihe Intelligence Community

Tlii! table u

n. i

D-||

Black Sea Fleet: Amphibiou* Ship* and Craft

lack Sea Fleet Air F

Table TU3

Black Sea Fleet Aie Force

in

a-,,

isgai rhaFhw)

0

.IH-BtrA

FortrrMod

V/jTOL

Cahtcr

DlA dor* nM piojert individual fleet lotah foi tbtlaw" in pattwhrwa indicate DlA pioieetiom Allit aiirtd upon by the Inlcllisence Community

Pacific Ocean Reel: Amphibious Ships and Craft

D-15

Pacific Ocean Fleet Ait Force

tible i>

6

Pacific Ocean Fleet Air Force

0 <

Filler

0

replacement (pwjtblr tl* newel)

75

Foreor Mod

V/STOL

f

36

CTOL

(0) IS

Original document.

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