Created: 10/18/1985

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AJIDUM TO: Area Control Support Croup



SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Aras

ave aentloned several tlr.eshink the Soviets Hilt offernew wrinkles on their ares control proposals before the Moveeiber seating, Also, acre prcpasrancla aoves are likely. It seeas to ae that there nrc several key events that aay provide opportunities for such initiatives. These include:

The mpt Bilateral beginningctober;



Th* Warsaw Pact Suae It beginning 20

Shmrdradxe's trip to the UVCA forh Anniversary Celebrationsctober;

Gorbachev's address to UNESCO on 2ft October (uhlnh Jl4will be earlier In the day than the President's

UMGa speech;

oveeber Dutch CLCH deployaenttJo^

final plenarles of the fctST talks, which end on toveaber; and

Anniversary of the Russian RevolutionHoveaber. (C)

2. The attached Is ay personal speculation about the types of things the Sovleta sight do. All of tha Items listed have either soae precedent or soee basis in intelligence reporting. Hore detailed (and eore sophisticated) work on this ts underway, and I'll pass It on to you as It becoaes available. (C)

3- If there's anythingan do Tor you



Possible Soviet Arms Control Initiatives


draTt treaties reflecting their recent initiatives.

offensive force reduction proposals In areas of USpermitting additional new types of weapons, waving to Halt (rather than ban) LPCMs, lower sublimits on ballistic Missile RVs, proposing specific subllnit on heavy ICSHs, differentiation of types of "charges" (perhapseightingntroduction of INF aircraft Halts that delude US dual-capable FBS, eipllclt acceptance of some US LAINF elsslles (along the lines of "Walk in ther proposals for reductions Insystems outside of Europe.

"fleilblllty" on Defense and Space Issues by: eipllcltlyillingness to accept scete SOI research (even eitendlng to some subcomponentroposing discussion to supplement the ARM treaty with new agreements covering "space-strlkoreaty modification to allow eipanded terminal defenses, or modifying their ASAT ban to permit one type of ASAT for each side.

--Be more forthcoming in discussing verification.

procedural changesore Joint plenaries) or private discussions by heads of delegations.

more explicitly at possible walk-out or military responses If progress Is not made. One known KCH officer on the Soviet delegation has begun to do this. Offer of separate IMP talks could theoreticallyalkout in START/Defense and Space groups but noti. SLCM systems nearlng operational status could be portrayed as "response measures".

In ihe 3CC:

--Show greater "responsiveness" to US eoapllanco concernsabling formally the proposal made

informally to the MST delegation to halt construction on the Krasnoyarsk radar In exchangeS halt on facilities the Soviets allege raise compliance concerns. Indicating greater willingness to addrosa telemetry encryption (perhaps evenissileanithoutsserting that US concerns about theave been taken cjirc of, or providing more Information about their bomber fcrce In response to US questions about SMDVs.

new charges of US noncompliance, such as: asserting formally that the SOI program violatesf the ABM Treaty, charging that Mldgotmanrohibited "new typo", alleging that the shlp-borne radar used as part of US NTHobile AUM radar, or complaining that the Patriot air defense system violates the prohibition against giving such systems ABM capabilities.

a "business-like- attitude on

supplementary Issues like submarine dismantling procedures.

ther negotiations:

explicit Indications of willingness to reach agreements in such areas as chemical weapons, non-use of force, and radiological weapons.

toward accepting the US ofrer touclear test, but falling short of full agreement. (One possibility would be toata exchange or expert working group.)

at greater willingness to accept verification measures that go beyond NTM.

old proposals for reduction of military budgets, nuclear and chemlcal-weapons-free-zones, limitations on naval deployments and limits onpatrol tones.

In public speeches:

proposals or Informal probes made In Geneva and elsewhere. The recent suggestions on IMF and Krasnoyarsk are good candidates.


existing proposals to suit theBFR, non-use of force and chemlcal-wcapon-frcc zones are candidates for treatment at the Warsaw Pact Suanit. This would also be an appropriate forum for revelationew INF Initiative. Reduction or military budgets could be proposed In the UNESCO speech.

--Announcement of new unilateral moves, such as force reductions or reaoval of forces from "combatEiaaples are detailed below.)

n private dlplonacy:

to leak new proposals to selected foreign leaders, as has already been done with The UK and the Netherlands. Other possible recipients include the leaders of Industrialized countries who will meet with the President before the Gorbachev meeting, as well as key non-aligned leaders who might be lobbied by Shevardnadze at the UHGA.

at dire consequences,reakdown of the NST talks, if the November meeting is not "positive". ossible variant would be to hintreakdown of talks on bilateral Issues, but Indicate willingness to continue discussing issues of broader concern, such as INF.

communications to Dutch Prime Hlnlster Lubbers urging postponement ofovember GLCH decision. Propose "Independent" verification ofumbers.

to theormat for documenting the November meeting; propose substantive arms control Ulksigher level than the NST delegations.

n military farces:

quipment or missiles to substantiate clala that missiles have been taken off alert. Further underscore claim by opening launcher garages, dismantling garages, launchers or missiles.

dismantlefrom alert status

other INF forces, suchIRBHs,

SLBHs, SCUD 0missiles (which

are being replacedr older


Intersedlate-range bombers.

dismantle older ICBH launchersa raUi In excess of that required to compensata for clalaed deployeent of. Continue, or accelerate, dismantling of alder neavy boebers.

withdraw allltary units from Eastern Europe.

najor Military exercises, Including probes by nuclear delivery aircraft and live launches of strategic and IMF alsstles.

operationally theLCH andCLCH; deploy additionalsubmarines near Europe or North America.

--Conduct an ASAT test, ostensibly in reaction to US actions;emonstrationaser system.

Original document.

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