PROSPECTS FOR SOUTH AFRICA: STABILITY, REFORM, AND VIOLENCE

Created: 8/1/1985

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Prospects for South Africa: Stability, Reform, and Violence

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PROSPECTS FOR SOUTH AFRICA-STABILITY, REFORM, AND VIOLENCE

KEY JUDGMENTS

B Inl of OiuU brmm publutmJ wtwiuly

THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS. Thm 'oJcwirtQ aifemgetKe o'gomtOtKWiht pftpcration ol tlx*

Ag-xxy. endVtrtll^cni* orgai-tioiion ofO-MJof-cttxit ol

A (so PartielpOir';:

Ihe Auittarrr Oitl ol Sta" for lA'alllganca. Daporol th* Army

Ihe Dirarror of Novel tottUgmrxt, Daporh-wit ol the Novy

Tha Aunroalo*ol the Air Fore*

Th* CirKlor ot . Moil* CcKfl

scope note

Tim Estimate assesses the prospects (or stability, reform, and violence in South Africa during the next year and tor the remainder of. Such an Estimate is called for in light of developments in South Africa during the last year that include:

The worst outbreak of black unrest in South Af-ica's modern

history

Hundreds of attacks by blacks against nonwtittesollalior-ate" with the government.

The declarationtate of emergency in not-torn areas.

Some socioeconomic reforms by the ruling white minority, and the beginning of political reforms designed to bring the blacks Into the government at the local, regional, and ultimately the national bveU.

Ciowing international pressure on South Africa lo abandon apartheid.

The paper addresses those factors that will be critical inthe future comae*of events in South Africa. These Include:

The level and nature of black unrest.

White resolve and the security resources of the state.

The government's reform strategy.

The rightwing threat to the ruling National Party.

The economic outlook.

Capabilities of black protest groups.

Efforts by the Soviets to exploit Pretoria's problems.

Westerndevelopments in South Africa.

The Estimate also examines the effectiveness of the government's program of racial reform and the prospects for evolutionary versus revolutionary change in South Africa during the neat five years. The pa* per does not address in detail Soviet intentions in southern Africa or South Africa's regional role, issues analyzed in recent Estimates.1

oui* Africa tad Iu Hrpuml falmtt Th-oaiX ikt lafM. November tSW. in! NIE

S. Sow Pallet* in SoviAemnarv IHS

KEY JUDGMENTS

The whit? minority government, relying primarily on the coercive actioru of its security forces, "ill be able lof order in the black townships during the next year. Wc belirce that oter the next fke years Pretoria's economic, political, and military resouri.es arc sufficient to overt the collapse of the untie regime.ough stretch of road lies ahead. We believe the black townships willtinderboxes during thee years, with antigovcrnment sentiment and socioeconomic preuures prompting more episodic but containable violence.

Ai ihe same lime, W4 must acknowledge Internal and ezien.al variables beyond the capacity of Pretoria to control that might fundamentally change the attitude' of blacks and set in nioiinn aof events lhat would have an impact impossible to forecast but that could seriously threaten the uhtte minorityew breed of black youths may emerge who are determined to continue aiid escalate their low-level war of the last year. Aniitrcvcrnmentmay be sustained by the belief that the goiernnwnt's reforms as well us growing international pressuresirect result of their protest efforts. Moreover, if unforeseen developmentsretoria's ability to suppress unrest or stabilize the eccioroy. white resolve could begin to crumble, especially if therehite perception that the West has abandoned Soulhhite regime lhat realized it no longer held the initiative might be forced toew and more equitable political deal with blacks or risk plunging Soutli Africaloody ci* il war.

The government's refoim program is likely to achieve no better than mixed results during the nnxl five years. The program is an evolutionary one intended to reduce tensions and lessen the chancesingle isolated incident triggering nalionwide disturbances on the scale of the Sharpeville unrest. the Sowelo riots. and the recent violence. The program may co-opt some blacks, but we believe the stigma attached toollaborator will make it difficult forto persuade influential blacks to participate in any limited power-sharing system.

Nevertheless, we believe President Botha will forge ahead with his own agenda oi reforms, including revision of laws restricting the movement of blacks, while continuing to study alternative political systems that retain white control and expand black rights Over the nest year, Botha is likely to announce steps leading to the establishment of a

/.OJflpfNCC Cf'T'ACT

confederal system linking ihe central government and th*ationalody foe blacks outside the homelands;ultiracial government fcr the KwaZulu-Nii'al Province region. Con-locus of his irnag* wiih ihe while elect orzte. however, he is unlikely tn implement major political changes until the unrest abates

Overall, ihe government probably will have to reli more on its security resources than on its reform initiative} to proiect its stability.in the short term Pretoria's massive internal security apparatus will continue to be able to contain most violence in the hl-iek townships, ihe msjjoriw of which arereat distance from v. hue areas. We estimate, for example,n ft South Africanis.CCO men andparhcipates at least part time in some aspect of internal security flrnd that Pretorij is likely to carry through with plansubstantial buildup of lis police rnapnower to avoid calling in the Army in future disturbances.

The fundamental causes of black unrest will still esist High black unemployment, poor living conditions in the townships, police escessej. widespread dissatisfaction with black schools,litical consciousness among black*esult of their exclusion from the mult-racialincludes Coloreds andwas established last year will continue tolimate conducive tn violent protest in black townships.

Black militancy, especiallyouths, is likely to increase and may represent morehreate government's interests thin the guerrilla campaign of the African National Congresshus far, the unrest has been'i'gelv by Slack youths who have little organization. Despite-"rga lions, the vast majoritynot under the direct control of. itigovernment groups, although the rhtoric of these groups nas helped raiseei of political consciousness in thenprecedented level of attacks on black "ccJUborsstoes" and their families by other blacks is likely loommon feature of black protests.

While Botha will face political criticism and chalkngr from those in the white community demanding both more and less change, his control of the white political structures and his overall support in (he while electorate arc likely to remain strong. Aware of the failures of grind apartheid policies to guarantee white security, Botha willhis "adapt or die" rhetoric in an effort lo strengthen the now majority of the white constituency that favors gradual reform. While the ruling National Party under Botha's direction has skillfullyroad coalition of whites wno support its reform program, general e'"Ctions, expected lolaceill

Botha must balance calb lor reform with an linagetroruj leader, impressuxed aad in total control, orapid unraveling ot his white coalition.

Deteriorating security conditions rsser time could create new opportunities (cr tlie right wing toupport among many Afrikaners who already view Botha's reforms as the first step on the slippery slope leading to black majority rtiie. The right wing will benefit if white disenchantment with theconomic policies continues to grow and if Botha institutes costly new pro-trams for blacks at the expense of white taxpayers. While the threathite backlash from the right cj'i-jt be discounted, we believe Botha has the political skill and support toerious challenge frorr. wtlftes frmrratcd over the scope and pace of reform

an

During tbe renainder of this decade.frica's average annua! rate of real economic growth probably will be no moreercent, and could be lower if the price of gold fallshe world economic recovery slows sharply If thii forecast holds tnic. South Africa's already grim black urvmpioirise. Economic sanctions and sustained violei.ee are likely to kweimited Immediate impact on South Africa's economy, but they hurt investor confidence, encourage more capital flight, slowake white resolve.

The outlook foi the most importantroups is mixed:

blac'c protest movement's main weakness will continue lo be its lack of unity. Ideological disputes, tribalide generation gap, urban-rural divisions, and government divide* and-rule tactics will remain potent factors limiting the abtli'y of these groups lo challenge ihe government.

rapidly growing black labor movement will becomepoliticized, and will test Pretoria by furtherwith antigovernment protests. Black union activity will continue lo be tempered by its vulnerability to government

militaryof the ANC. the most popular group among blacks, has been dealt several rnator setbacks in the region in tht last year and probably will notilitary ihrea" to the government. The group's bombing campaign is likely lo conlin-ue. however, and may result in more incidental white casualties than in the past

for the multiracial United Democratic Front are dim. as the government appears determined either to ban the group or to use stepped-up harassment tuvtlcs to keep it under control.

-The governrnen, mav fc^ ab,e

ulu group. Inka.ha. by inviting i, !osystem in

l.kelyse to suppress the almost inevitable outbreaks of

Prospects for South Africa: Stability, Reform, and Violence

Wo'ning Noiice Int-iligence Sources ot MeiheciNINTEL}

nvolvcd

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Unoulnoriiecj Dhc'auie Subject to CrimiiKtl "Wionj

DISSEMINATION COnI-CI

bltn-en Motictnoh

NOCCNTHACT- Nora Co-ir-at'ori or

Con'rocCI

Inlorir-o'ion

crim-mit Only

arti

ed by.Iniormotion Hot Beenfor

fc'iQInlormation

FOI-

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A RiitreKhc copy a' ihii docvmcni it ovoJobi* tramiedtaia'ort)e orcm ton olioPAS/IMC.

PROSPECTS FOR SOUTH AFRICA-STABILITY, REFORM, AND VIOLENCE

b. ii* Sumai

CONTENTS

SCOPE

KEY

Kev Developments Leading io Stale of Emergency

Botha Offers Limited Reform.

The Unrest and Its Causes

Trends in the

Critical Faclors Affecting Future Course of Events

Prospects for

Level and Nature of

. White

Norm rule Political

The Soviet Role and Strategy

Short Term (One

Long Term {Next Five

PrerequisitesovernmentWorst Case

Scenario

Implications for the toiled

ANNEX A: The Decline of Grand

ANNEX B; Background on Sowed) and

Shaipeville

ANNEX C; South African Security Capabilities...

ANNEX D: IixitcatofS of Evolutionary and Revolutionary Change

SCOPE NOTE

This Eslima'e assesses the prrar>trcts foreform, and violence in South Africa during;exl year and for ihe reiiiaiudri of. Such an Estimate is called for in litdi* nfin Souir. Africa during the Usl year ;ha. include:

wont outbreak of blackn South Africa' modern ht.iori.

of attacks by black* attaint) miiiwhitcs whr. "ctmmthat-ate" wil'i the government

The declarationate of emergency in rffll-mrn arr.is.

Some socicec'inomic reforms by the mliivat white niiirif:ly. and the beginning of political reforms 'irsifiiied to liriutt Ilia- blacks into the government at the local, regional, and uittmateli the nat tonal levels.

international pro.lire on South Africa lo jIkuhIiiii apartheid

The paper addresses those factors ilia'be critical in dettith* future course of events in South Africa. Tlit-je include:

The level and nature nf black unrest

White resolve and Ihe securityf the state

The government's reform strategy.

The rightuing threat In ihe ruling Njltotuil I'jrty

Tbe economic outlook.

Capabilities of black proteit groups

Efforts by the Soviets to exploit Pretoria's problems

Western readdevelopmentn South Africa.

The Estimate also examines lhc effectiicncss of ihe noveriiiiieiil's program of racial reform and the prospects lorversus revolutionary change in South Africa during the next five years. Tin* iw-pcr does not address in detail Soviet intentions In southern Africa or South Africa's regional role, issues analyzed in recent

' ME.1 Sail* 1 .Iu rVfumol Mm Tftf*.r*i mmi Ml

KEY JUDGMENTS

Therfinonty government. reWinc primanlv on theactions oi Hi jec-jrilv forces, will be able loerhhbnce ol order in the black townships during the next year. We believe that over Ihc next /ice years Pretoria's economic, political, and military resources are sufficient tu avert the collapse of the whit* regimeough stretch of road mm ahead. Ws believerk townships willtindcrboxes during ihe next five years, with anltgovernment lentiment and socioeconomic pressure* prompting more episodic but containable violence

At the same time, ire must acknouledge internal andbeyond the capacity of Pretoria to tuntrnl thatcrW ft' the attitudes of blacks and set in motionof events (Jptf aou'd have an impact impossible to forecastcould seriously threaten iV uhitenew

bleed of bbek youlhs may emerge who aie determined lo conlinur and escalate iheir low-level war of ihe last year. Anltpevi-rnment grimr* may be sustained by ihe bciivf (hat liie ttovvrnincnt's reform* as wellBrowing international pressuresirect result of iheir Tentevt efforts Moreover, if unforeseen developments limitilily lo suppress unrest or stabilize the economy, white resolve could begin lo crumble, especially if iherehite perception thai (he West has abandoned Southhite regime (hat realizedno lomccr held the initiative might be forcedew and more enuitaUe politH-al deal with blacks or risk plunging Soulh Africalnodv civil war

The government's reform program Is likely In achieve no belter than miied results during the nest five years. The program is jn evolutionary one intended to reduce tensions and lessen the chancesingle isobted incident triggering nationwide disturbances on Ihe wale of the Sharpeville unresthe Sowetond the recent violence. The program may co-opt some blacks, but wehe stiitma attachedake it difficult fitr Pn-loria to persuade influential blacks to participate in any limned pmvcf-shar ing system

NevertheleM. we believe President llotha will form' ahead with his own agenda of reforms, including revision of laws restricting (he movement of blacks, while continuing to study alternative political systems that retain white conlrol and expand black right' Over the next year, Botfu is likely to announce steps leading lo ihe establishment of a

ciyoKON

confederal system linking the central government jikI tin- homeland*uliorul advisory bod* lor oUk* outsiderm-tjiHK. jiH|multifacial eovcrnmervt for the KwaZuru-Naeal Prmirwcious of his .mage with the WMmf rinri.iralr. Un-f. h- r. imlikdytmplemeni numr political changes until the unrest fiNtrt

Overall, the government probably willto-rely nunc on its security resources than on its reform initiatives to protect if lability, es-pecially in Ihe short termassive- internal security apparatus will continue to be able to conljm rival violenceie bin*nsh.pv chr marnhtv of which arereat distance from white jr.i* Ar estimate, for example,th0 men andat least mrt time in some -isp.nl of inlernal security or defense, and that Pretoria is likely in curry through with plansubstantial buildup of its police mammier tn avoid calling tn the Army in future disturbances.

The fundamental causesJtk ami will vtill nbl llfcejimerit, cortin-tem,

widespreadrhtni.il pditical consciousness nn.onc blacksesult of tlvetrrom the

mulliraclal government-which Includesndwassl year will cnntiiuie toiilUille omiiucivx In violent protest in black inwmiilp*

Isbck militancy, espeiijlly among svwlliitscrw ami mav represent morehreat to theou-rest lion the guerrilla campaign of the African National Onirics* tAXQ Thus far the unrest has bee-ti perpetrated targets, b) bfacft youth* who hovr Intl.-organization. Despite govern merit alliiratious. the vast iiiujnril) are not

under the direct crnitr.il of the largeuniupv. alllitHitili

the rhetoric of these groups has lielpcd raise the level ofJ conscujusncss in thec unprecedented level of allaeta on Mackboralors'" and their limUics byUks is liU* loommon feature ofrotects.

Whileill face political criticism and cliallenge from those in the white communityoth mure and less change. Iitv control of the white political structures and his overall support in ihe while elecinrate are likely tn remain strong. Aware nl tin- failures nl grand apartheid policies to guarantee white woirih llotlu will oHiliii-ue his 'adapt or die" rhetoric in an effort lohe now maiorily ol the whitehai facias gradual reform. Wluk-the ruling National Party under Botha's direction lus skillfullyroad coalition of whites who support its reform prngijm. general elections, espeited to take place in KW'J. willajor tut

Bolha must balance caib for reform with an imasetrong leader, jnpreuuredn tOUl control, ornraveling ol his wfciu* coalition

Deferui rating secuniy conditions over lime could creafa- net. opportunities for the right Ming lo gain support among many Afrikaner; who already vieweforms as the first step on the slippery slope leading to black majority rule. The right wins will benefithile disenchantment with the government's economic policies contiMes In grow and if Botha institutes costly new programs for blacks at the expense of white taxpayers. While the threathite backlash fromht cannot be discounted, we believe Bolha has the political skill and support toerious challenge from whites frustrated over the scope and pace of reform.

During the remainder of this decade, Smith Africa's average annual rate of real economic growth prolubly will be no more thanercent, and could be lower if the price of gold falls nr the world economic recovery slows sharply II this forecast holds true. South Africa's already grim blackill rise. Eccncmic sanctions and sustained violence arc likely lo haveimited immediate impact on South Africa's econorny.f| hurt investor confidence, encourage more capital flight, slow growth, and shake white resolve.

The outlook for the most important black groups is mixed:

The black protest movement's main weakness will continue to be its lack of unity Ideological disputes, tribalide generation gap. urban-rural divisions, and government divide-and-rule tactics will remain potent factors limiting tbe ability of ihesc groups to challenge the government.

The rapidly growing black lulmr triovLinent will becomepoliticized, and will lest Pretoria by furtherwith aniigovcrnment protests flljck uninncontinue to be tempered by its vulnerability In grnvriimnil counter measures

The military wing oi thethe most popular gr-Mip among blacks, has been dealt several major setbacks in the region in the last year and probably willilitary ihreal to the government The group's bombing campaign is likely tohowever, and rray result inincidental whitethan in the past.

Prospects for tbe multiracial United Democratic Front are dim. as the government appears determined eiihcr to ban the group or to use stepped-up harassment tactics to keep it under tout rot.

The government may be able lo co-op* Chiefnfluential Zulu group. Inkatha. by Inviting it lo partlcfpattetieral system in Natal Prontice

Washington's relations with Pretoria are likely lo be problematic during the period of this Estimate Apartheid critics in the 1'ined States and around ihe world will continue to highlight the inferior political status of nonwhttes in South Africa and the repressive methods Pretoria is likely to use lo suppress the almost inevitable outbreaks of siulunw,

DISCUSSION

V rah*-Party eedrr fret-dent Phai rmbai.rdtrrni irane- (diii-reform* .IrDarlur* from wirnr vf

th* mid wntU olhcd Chief imooa ih* tlwetn hai hrralo SrHkt- ibeern "al iheowablrbe -hale minority NffcMI uratcev k)ie limited polilicil jnd econfiuc coniuuic.ni toric portion oi tb* buck majoritynll -hmre .nufturd lo itaer. bUk rorotment of ihr eo.ernmrni. foreed dur.rg oVeaJc! of hjnJ)rule, and to manaae the raoiiili einuine black pupula-turnc-al, and -thconflict

Uaei. j'irf ever icvrrrociemngcoupled with ihr continued rtcluwonfrom the nalxmai political lyitem. Iril Inof gnini breinmne incoenniardreavrd duong ihrhe drciaialOTale of emeiirncv In trlecied area-the black cntnmunitv andhe lati tearniilreffort, to mdrru

and III rrfnular aaernda OHWart political ruchri Tt* violence ha.among many obwr.rn o' ihe Smithirabil.lv awl nwMiy nf ihe -bne

regime, and aooul ihr prospect*eform

Key Development- lecding lo Stele ol Emergency

toiho OHer. IWM MM

1 Tbefciormi to date have not fundamentally alined the racial allocation of power In South Urica. bui ihey hiveomentum for further change. Weolha.ef hm'trd 'xial leform it orsgiinl l> krlp, Preiori* belterany problem, involving black. while mainialmntcontrol Pretoria* do-nettic policie. have alwayi rren driveno-crapfiK. alreaJv MiMmbrr.ntb,fl I.e populal-x. t. -ro-.r* .apvdly lirei -ell aware of the failurr nfouth African Hoedlalion

Ol*iei>wthM

t.n th* hOOWUfXIS -hi> lowering a

mare stable black urban -nrkmu class llut enjoys expanded pc-rttrai raghts aad jopre-ed living crand.-lions and ickoob in the townihtps. Botha Impel.view, that ihas iMban classoevevjo it.tbncalitoeieefending the syatem against tSeae bent on using tioleravrr rid.ol change* In addition he aha probablyhat tin efforti to co-opt urban blacks willSouth Africa's pariah uitn tn the inteenalaaeai -omm.in.ti Pretoria, mmin while, ts likely lo try lo preserve theharacter of raral blacks bv coratn-orvg subiklies and rrlnforcme traditional Inbal rule

i Yetso Th.new farnrses of Pir-

lumenl (Colored aid Indian!established last sear haie Waned with !ml* difficult and have offered no ml challenge to ihehit* government Onli about in percent of eligible Coioreds and Indians voted in elections last August lor new Colorrd ami Indian chambers in the segregated tncjnirral ParlianioiL The towen.lt of traditional apaihv in ihe Iwo communities leinforced bv abo.eoit campaign by aniigovernmeni group* protesting the exclusion of blacks from the system

6 Black faJilxxl rbgJua. Botha tho year Iwseral landmarkmost lec-ratlyhe political status ol bbcki He hasgoverninerrt poJiciei on thr homelands I" nukedependence" osMaoeial altnaigh stressing that rorV-arxl >nctrp*radeneesnB :h* governmentrrl-erence While he has nolefinitive offer, rlotba has kunted that resaoVnu of 'indepenueni" brack homelands could regain their South Africanhis mighth* way for bringing thr Maek homelands iiitoa Iirmied piwrr-than ret jrrangi" mrnt wilh the while minority (igime at the national level- Dot ha annooeed two gtoMbs ago that he enfl hold summit meetings with homeland leaders in No .ember to doeess ways of "improving governmente has refrained Irjm puhlicls iprculat ing on tbe tletaalsew system, but an unpuMnhed reportpeeial Cabinet comm.llr* last yearthat Pretoria faorm with theernment and the indeprn-denl homelands ai full members, and ihe otheras asaooate raemheri Lndere

' IUaiugmcrwwdSt ,

law Haw.wuUoj hmmt>i

at "* wnr illwir

aawMnnrlan.li nlmali wouldhomrlaiki miil.-iis hi muvh the Mill* wayaerw.ililimitedm

some nationalifwluw Simih vf ma

a BigKa has invited black leaden -ho"violent mi-llnls" of uro>npfuni iluinra- totalks withon eauUrshing asystem that abospa nut lha right! ofthe hometar-ts VImI black leadm.Israelk ga the liinimmruiare skeptical about the pr-Kprvn U* aare arartv aloa specific agrrida fiu tails, and aren thr1*

ncrnsiiwU line Ingwrrn noriwhilrs wiili tlrs to tiir Wrtrrnrrv-ivl gflaj

Th* Urresi eoo kg Ccartes

wild IUIij'. MvwgggfiarirMahiraenl FarU*mmt inVM.ets brnke out in Ihe hl.i'k towiitlups vnitli of Juhju. mbasrg Th* nrarest was soiacbrd offJip residenla slierdpneetl* in ri-ypoovi- liu III-uetcent rent incrnsw lakaaH ttl--increasr.inKwrnhimint of living Hun Ini.iL jreu in tlv cooniry. aoraeblacks werehemtlrw in cladi"the imlarr Thnr deathsvele ofprotasis In bUkaby leceiity lorrei thai id io nrarin tiiwruhlps The -iotsn Llrlolle-ing Large-scale arretsi ami activists Some IriO hlaiki dud dining tlie dgera months of unrrsl

" Molence broke out again in Januaryt was centered mainly in tbr eaUrin Cbgke rewimv -here school hoyeotts -rre rxgwring as lludeM groups proirsioJ tlie atresiavhe paean shmgrfll bL.(liloearby white area iC'ileiirugrt I" getiirwul for notindiacervt biasA township; at least HI blacks wen- killed. The ungrskMBaho fuel morr unrnl. parlKularli in Ihr caitern Cape lownihips. over tin- nest mnntlis In 'owetn. South Africa'sUk towrnUipenter of hlavk act.viwn.as rdal.ve calm urnl mid-inly. when nrgs erupted. Three days later, fif toru-apparently motivated by mrrnorieske drawn-out violence In Snw.-ro eightf em.rgcniy in lb.-airev of Tljnai Jaitte I'riivin.n

Event* Coring Uivnt II March

tor CaaaraJ aa*iu-rirnil colic* c'uti villi noma site*cillini for an

boycott

Tbirtv-oo* Unki kiQrd It painiare* toulli oljrB ii- didihi rent hike.

POatlfcM

ihouunJ iPidlrri and pubrc ewer Sebo-er.1two nearbyiiruvail Pioviote: tmndrnu af buck* mniN.

Na-eabet

H<-idred> ol thonundi ol buck woikrn obtervc !wo-uav general Hike In Tiiwvaaimeclacli kuM andnkr ariuuirn aiirueti

Rim* duiioal* In Trinivial tnwiuhici:icoi) conllDiHO in aiei loulh ol

February

men >ei mum Cape Fmim mnahict ha nardbr recc-aon

ebruary

Eiariiaaa burliured io meni raooa* oltarn

CniHCradi ikinmown rniorMi

Policefuitcral

IN on crowd ol black* aaicfMat tohiw. titLac al nilO June

blacka killad bvnoted lo eiptoc*black*soon peane a* eartmtashe bootnirapped erenadn loactum*.

11

Fear acti>aUm Cape Pnrtaanr:iM b% ci'iini'in acenU

Piack toniumer Sncai ol anite thnp. Immiwern Cape Province.

ETlal-

RmareeM black mono Mltd*

Slaienieni-ticy declared

hm

ftntnclon* placed on lunrrali 'orWuil

end Zuha. breakndia" bucknearVad

uu.i

C 'iMnir SimyttMW area anilCape Fmtnee

direct and indirect causesrompted inc ir.tr* Southlack to-mhipt aie linder-baeaa because of mibeeonccnic pieivuin and non-white lesentm-nt of apartheid.

ct en ccnl'tbutiac le ihe bub voiatilily of Ihe lowruhipt (ncludr the folhiwine/

The ecoocmicmade bv inban blarai over ibe laat decade baa taowrd coeiaoVrably iccenlunnc Sooih Af rlcs'i -outince. ahkh hai hit NacU In cittern Cape Tier, ate rtpeciaaty hard- NattcavaioV. tbe black 5 peiceni.

Th- political corueiouapni in* urban blacks ha* been ruted by the vlttarau* ciktickVR oi the lovernrnerit* political propouli by *nt.eo*em ment (roupi.

Black orbaa aienieh ceavcrntrition of bored, anetnploved youthi whoeniOy

iparkinai cmf ronution* with the pokce Half of southule" 'beof I'i Hinrtehold* in nhich Irw fatbc and nMrih-ei lyidi hold tob* ate crnimoo. andn-ntt admit ihey tannct coniiol their childrea

nmere nf mow urbanndiilnpreatl diwaUiljc-linn in the black cm'inuBilv over Ik1 fnir um-iSv of the rchunik wbicb unce ibarave been center* of oiaanitatior disgruntled black youth.

he

The normal compieenent of pftlace in the toaai|iiate toU'nip*

(ntrablack rlvnlrfes andeinmentore pri>llnted cwillon of other ion while* on lead'ei.p. abetr tpmuo*nity, a* ha-hippcnnl inrea

Trend*e Violence

onlicks nanduring ihc?ew militancy lhat'0 fadeccrsiBleieiy. and representsa threat lo the government'! interests thincampaign oi the African NationalThe moil dramatic evidence ol growinghai been the unprecedrnied level otblack. Colored, and Indian coila bora ton andD-jn.ig the soil year, mcbs havelacknd police and havehome* o( over 5'"hctebe the moil effet j'-*ieit tactic ever ingaining worldwide media attention andplans

One te*uil otttack* hai been the eollapie oflack town council it item. The lyttem of directly elccred local black official* supervised bv regional while "development boards" was envisaged a* partial compensation lo urban black* tor theirn from ihe new multiracial Parliament. During the period from4 'o. at least HO biack councilor* re-.ie-.ed under pressure, andnflack council* set up1 are now defunct. Even before the violence erupted, maftv black councilor* had been accused bv township residents ofand corruption,on biaefct were deeply unhappv with the service* provided by ihehe councils, which -cie eiptctrd to be virtually se'f-yifficlenl. lack adequate fundi to maintain theand have accumulated huge budget delicti*.

lack violence also ha* broken out ini tear among tcveral important .lonwhilr polit.-ruincluding the multiracial United Democratic FronthcAranunOrsamnlion (AZAPOI. and Chic! Butheicn'i powerful Zulu organic lion. Inkatha. These orsyrnja-liiiiii arc cofiipetirrii lot influence in the black comv. ard Iheii .uppoitei* have liata been at odd* for ideological and politicalmmerin"recently have boiled over into violent attack* arid

eta larsoi i

he violence among biack group* ha* not posed any rna(or ihreat to the liability ol the -jot eminent, which boaor dec-dri to tow division! in and among black protest* well a* in the larger black community- At timet. Pretoria bat even helped one black activist faction at the eiperae of another

IftACT/OKOu

Fur'WJ ihiiilcd aZ.VPO"inther nrifile in S'uut'i .Africa to Jrtliilrrporl for croups such ai the WCie IDF. From Pretoria* Perspectivenegativeof the intetgronp violence tliii ye.ir ba* been th<-widespread be'ief amnnit many omsiisi'' -ell ai buck* familiarietimeiii'l divide-and-rule lactic* that Pretorias hekttnl't

I Vll'Il I'lll

ihv area of the

I'i. Second;easure* em-

he unrevi hai* variin "jnii. Antirim saitadsol

country

nt raw- recruili with little experience nr training who have used liie ant mum'mil rather than bin Mux nr riihber bulli-tt The rwdhe :iiape Provinei' have al lime* appi-an-ii tuout ofuol and havearget nf InternationalThere haveiirnennis inciileiui uuriUumwih-ii pulice coofKiniiilhm ilumailt ally at Iin March IVAiJfieial iri.imry nfncident roeaied that ihe pulKe lein toiiiiercept the criwuf i'l'te nut in aiieerrc nf daiiiier tne goiernmi-'ii bail vLni'.ed earlier Inhereii.il piJWe li.ni- vmg li.nlrljimm wiih thelnleiKi- li.iif hiviilMi tniniimini

IT. Other security meuiurei etti^Jnieii il'iriiii: the tinesi tnciiitie the fnllowini;.

Stale oflrclared in AH ruauiili-rial dittnCL* on JO July lhathr poller

jmi

ami jllow'S for indefinite deleiiii'iiK Curfi-wvef.'tvi in several of the riiii-inrri(uie been placnii' ir,

Iei-ri'.iii^lralimit inaSI tear

Army hathe piJice bt.'oailbinckt. helping lo val nil towntliiiii. ami particlpatine in >noliwi lame <iiiiim--Iii-

hnuieTin-h-r-

on occurred onimIiitMI

Ai-jv ooooi and poivcemea tisoved intolacksouth elat had been calm for several day* following earlier riots, soldiers lined the itreets as police searched0 homes and arrested more than MO blacks

Maes arrestseen wed against crowds ol rioters arid to suppress ant (government groups in general In particular, ihe government haseaacv leaders ol the CDF whacfa Pretoriaehind much ol the unreal in concrri with Ihe ANC. Overall,0 nonwhites have hero arrested cr detained since lastmeet of whom have subseooeotlt been released

tconoour Impart o/ lA* VToiefiee. Slackand the threat of trade sanctionseakened foreign Investor confidence in South Alrsta's economic prospects and triggered capital flight, which hasto an cat!lowillion in private capital dunng the last QuarterJ. and the tint quarter3 (see figurehe capital drain more thanreet* current account (uipba0 million Pretoria has saad il will respond by maintaining fairly ihjht credit policies to rebuild foreign reserves and reduce inflation, now tunning atercenttheestrictive policies, theloss of foreign financial credit, continuing high inflation, and the curtailmerat ol economic actwty by civil unrest and hovectts. real CDP will most likely decline this year. Although blacks bear the brunt of recession, slow growth and light credit will reduce somewhat Ibe purchasing sower of middV-elaas -hues.

Critical Factors A'fecting Future Course of Events

19 South Africa's stabililv and political future will hr.gr on thr interaction ol the foskowirtg critical factors. Their relative order of importance is open to debate nod, in any event, is likely toeveral limes dunng theof this Estimate. (Upending on the ebb rod r. of demesne and internal iooa Ion - ^ia. Factors esamircd include thefor reform, the level and nature of black unrest, while resolve, and the neowSale poilt>cal dynamic Soviet influence among ute South African groups and Moscow's activities against Pretoriaem thainocgh at this time they are cot as erttica) ai other factors.

Cr.

to protect ll from being dominated bvn la iecoioei oa mtioaul anee* twit as defense and foreign affairs. In ewencp. whiirt areimited pent* arini- lem ihal retain* bmb white control and io*ne Inium of iw'nil iind at racuilt irparjie tcrtoolt and residential aresi.

IV pmuling raailLiner per.ion* o( the urban black romiaunitt aanger al ibc government. Tint mood may soften somewhat in lite nnt inr lean, but mamll remain niile- In addition, economic condition* in South tfnca dunrw llie remainder of this deeode will not be conduciverading urban black townshipi ana vboobarge-scale bull or oliteitirti high unrmplot meni iinongn monitoring the reaction n: blacki to inrbe penod ofi mate.ihum differentiate between the rheiotic of black leaden and ihe ailitudrithe maionttlacks.mdiarat Mack leader* are enlt eoa-cerned with the pnd game and their chiefinchne-man. one-vote ttnetn thai would enable blacks io dominated ccnoittenily bt the gotrrnmeni These leaden haveuringule of rejecting allinferl nennui*. including nonpnt-li al ones, at inadenuate what it more crucial is ihr reaction of the bulk of the black populace, etpectal'i ai Pretoria* oabniii it onlyarge numbers engage in violent pinlctts

be es^errnenJi wralegi ma* haveu in tlic period beyond ibe tcope oi tha Kuimair but only if the living condition of urban black* improven the mce*im Tbe lOvemmrnr it tiling lo pcftuasie ihc reitive urban Mack popular to be tailificd with anot thedice cf the poltiical pie inorone menu in lownshipt and tchran*oosening nf tome ol ihe tlriclurpt of sparikvld

he black reaction to lociai andherefore. may be a* cigical lo Pretoria'* plant a* ihe predictable ditcontent amoncheir inferior political Mann. The power of sociocci>-

.-'i'ic ir.entivev r. black - can he

Kid eiample. prmr loowrtii

remained relaii.elv cairn for eight yean deipile in irs-.ta: 'nenter oi bbeka can be ait'ihuied in Urge pan io ihe fumlt the government pouredollowing the riotsT to imprate tchuob and liningl ibould he noted, howevei. lha: unrest reoccuried in Sowi-in In July ISW.

COntimie Cuml'oinlt la Rr/'irm.li-vwontara-vi* nulbeeaVivmlriter retahiiKfrom ibenabilityl currpnuml ibe there! lo- - by the effort* al nun* hue nmipi toMor greater fWiiicai /igliis Ituuthlikely economic prrimmnvv inleveerlv cnmllatn antn imp'tne the* living nxidit-ms end-ki r uvfrriiiargerauil defkg and :- tnllalion will !mm real ! inhibit gntrrnateig tCendir*bile*

IY DuringnjimiVllhaverage anrnaal

ll hi- ti> mini-t. ami umlilJ the pri.i- nf tnUIn-ai>niiH re-coverydwuK ne .WWern tagHliani tor appurd Tb- iwimiii iHc.i'iil. iintiv rn grow ai an annual rate ufvi In-iOO.OOO new jniiwrven eath vr-jiMi leailaikI*slrtgate n1t-naimul

rvOoomir grrmlh lali- williIMti* ullh tile di'injild fu' ill'" tuln Toilu ll-ii

ibe gdverrvmenilikehhe Jniggkrig oar*eien. and eiav haveUrali-vv -I

concent rating on the impr'.veini'ni nfnv> ntbta*ciivenning aniliallt nrj tar traditinn-alxtern'lOv-nce

:i, While Suetmel for Be/oem. It^hag aof whilotummil hi*e In* pn-*ee.icl hu pi.wiam in MSgkthai -il-t

mint iinlerrte il or sutler tlip gain*amiwhstethey mustii nrin limpa UmL itnlolamproeram patwil lis liingest test In daleol white viHer* approved of tor newOmtiiolioiita'intul MMHattVaai inIVi) Mnriiivrr.nnjinl In ix-rn-ulrhe new (jnnvtuuliihi were

piiv'< im muli prncctfing the eirlaiem olnn the new syttem The not veneralto take place in IW.lie aeolaerm (or ib>-refnerala ibe intccna. ftuttu amnlan imj.i' nf iM-inu iiii|>ri tviirui .mil in mlal innlrnl mi-r

l/JtmXONlBAC

NCVOTZCO rv

tot'tai Haformi

January

Ucraararvuaa on kronlot Itact eeen-osunit-*.

Potha uyi viban blackse granled palm-rights t(Jieit pombic

Fttnur*

Plans canceled .'c* reloratiniowrohiai near Cape Town.

BiKti toillcwrd tiaater Iieedoon ol aaneineni

urbanij. rujh i

Crouioaib0ather lhan desnoved. tome iriidenu allowednula

March

"thti lo become eligible that l

PI)ra ahardonrd lo move live bid lowruhina (ran "white area" of Natal Province lo biack hoiRtlard.

April

Black)vnr for freehold right).

ftevuioni to be made in of black*.

Government cimudrring eatendin. South African citi-irrunip to include black* officially regarded a* foreign ciliKiu of" independent" hcnwCir.di

ar-vrxnt^J May

Racial Mb restriction* in vines lo Ik abandnonl iiril vear

Baa on eiwklnnal raaatsrale jr-oorU

Plant (tMiconnJ lo movetuntiihinilometersunvebral.

entral buiineu diHoeu in 'white" *rruele alarly aa

Jane

Ban on marriagesl iruiioni betweenand--ires overturned,0 eian Kidravn-jied jrnie- ibew bw

More ciawrs ol tialn nntbrse opened lo all race*eptember.

Ang.il

oeneunJi tn fie aivm choice ol South African or hantcund cliapnihins.

Botha hinu at regiaru! power-sharing lrMe-n. pt'txipila puna for eat KwarvUFnynaeial adouniilratnn rale in NatalFirst RotJotul Service Council! Iu be set upill cunt of local authorities of ail races in metropolitan aeeat aad willfnr puMic vmrn dnarortlncrraw twwrlea tomo-daapl

direction and rate of change, or risk seeing his coalition of white support vanish quickly.

17 vVhates latrwever. already hard hit by mi. recent taa hikes, and credit testrictiorvs. are likely to be unwilling to foot like bill for costly racial reforms in the near term. Pretoria, therefore, will try to sustain she moerver.lum of reform by impaemergaog changes that do not cost very much but are designed loymbolic value to nonwhitcs. such as Botha'son IS August canftnning Southnrerabip to blacls in the "nomraderjendeor" borne-land) Pjtfca -jpilaltied on white fears following the Soweto riois" lo launch his reform program; he may be able to use white nervousness over Ihe recent spate of unrest to move faster-especiallyolitical issues--than otherwise would have beenPretoria also can be ct pre ted to try to convince whites tha: they will have lo tighten their belts more, and evenower standardag. if they are to avcad becominghaotic domeuic situation of1 lent black unrest. However, the most likely trend is thai Pretoria will spend substantially

larget funds on blacks only during the goodhe economic cycle rather lhanun erm>on of white support.

he long-term future of the reform program and Hi appeal among whites will hingearge degree on the popularity and pnlitical talents n* Botha's successor.m rapectcd lo tenia in active in politics oiler ihe tint general clccilons. whirls must lake place bvlthough Bothaead of the National Parly aad eatremely powerful, be cannot fvoose his iiiecctsot:aodidaie mustottyeading cuiidttiate to replaceat this time, in our rudgmcnt.Minuter of Education and Devrlopanerg Aid. who is strmgly supportive ifeform efforts but i> not asigure. Nonetheless, he nroUibly ii capable of keeping most of the National Parly intact and moving forward with refnesn. as would Own Heumv Minuter of Constii -- DevteaagSaaBtM andnother leading contender.

The reform {Mot-.ni may fairerore conservative Nations!. De Klerk. National Parlv head inic Wadershinaiwn;lisl in power mar0 impend inoWlfiiiviv manynow being considered* effort lo reitore Afrikaner unity. Evenorecandidate 'ins ihe tosspot, he Clay beie paiem reform until be is confident be vontrnh theBPort ihai Botha now *cn>vs<

The Mthttcin? Threat. Boihas policies hue createdpooi (unities for the right wing to train Support among many Afrikaners who view hii reform, as ihe firS step on (he slippery slope leading to black nuiorily rale. We believe that the rialil wing willhreat during ihe period of thn Estimate. 'Kit that the National Party moil likely will win the nett general election)omfortable margin, although probably not aa convincingly ai in the last elections

he National Parly is still eipcticncing traumaemit of its ihift away from orthodox aoaitbeid. The ronlroversy overeforrn has splitpolitical, cultural, and religious Institutions, and haa revitalized the while rightIn receni years. Whife the Nationalosing some ol lisAfrikanerural areas, it Is picking up new support from English-speaking whites in urbannabling it to retain it* tremendous popularity overall and il* hold on the government. tScen tbe pail Iwohe two rlghtwlngCons-;ivalive Parly and the Heniigte Nastonah-approximately AO percent of 'he popular vole in IS byelcctinn* held In districts cnmpiueil mainlyAfrikaner*.

he National Party cnntinuei to hold an edge in support in il* traditional stronghold of Transvaalbut the region* north of Pretoria mas turn increasingly to tbc right wing panics Rnlha himwK believes the rlghtwing parties would win as many asdditional *eat* in ihe white chamber of Parliament If national elections were held today, although this would not threaten the huge ntaroniv now rnioscd by the National Parly He also must protect against conservative Nationalists in Parliament twitching overight*ing party The Conservative Partsormed in2 byormer Nationalists who opposed Botha'* plans for bringing noivwhifes,Magovernment.

Figure J

Suutb African National Party Slreneth

tUirtai Diunmiimv of Seii> In pj'liamralarv L'hamlH*

Jlll

ClIWjTiX Putt MM

Vm.imi ejni i

tmliai a'arvvv

Pari' Sappnrl

Over Pavi TVite Vein

ni Ml

ii

.1*

i

he rightabo nuy be ableapitahi* rpchticilly onntisiicmeeonoeruc i'j.-ra ihei economicecent nationwidehile* indicates ihat ihe government'scvi-cent hike 'n the cent of gJtohrs* in Januaryre the biggest uncle came of aiuotolactor among .hoseho Jexnbe lhemaH*ea a* tiyrreaaanejy disench ihe government Southarmers, meanwhile, ire unhappy wilh agricultural riricei set bv Pretoria, high interest rates, and inflation.

It As the government rnoin forward wilh its reform program and the pn-lanisiion of the white community intcrnlliet. militant white conrrrvntites may become mote active in using ritralegal rrtMBI to undercut the reform process Last >ear. there acrencidents of low-level rtimidatory aitaeks or vandalism iga.ns: white liberalsiaortrr Vt'eer-itandirVueging (Afrikaner Armed Resistance) imi the H'rr Scorn manhite Commando) ate lightning Afrikaner eitremiu gioupsombinedof less0 that mat breomr more prom,-neru again after leveral sears ol relative dormancyovernment crackdown in ihe eatly I'rtOv

IA Most English-speaking whiles favoriil racial change in South Africa than th* government tus outlined The Pragresaive Federal Party (PFPI, the official opposition party and th* nam reprrsenialitc ol the white Engluhipeaking communilv. willto press the tilling National Party lo institute reforms The PFP is an important political courier weight io the ceamervatives. and might form an rln 'oral pact or coal* with reformuu in the N'a'emal Party if the hreat dramaiically Incrrawi Engliih-speaking while buiincumen also are likely to heighten their efforts to cominee Pretoria topanhrwi. especially the aspectshath Africa's rconomy and ndustry

level ond Natura of Unrest

econd critical factor that will helpfuture course ol events in South Africa inohesand nature ol elcanesTi; unreal Periods nf.ihe nonwhile communities hat* longouth African life and ate likely to recur inof this Estimate, regard less of the directionel reform, because of growirgThe impact of future 'incest on tbereformslabiliiy will

Ct/OKON

d*prndare* part on the drgrrr So whavh theiaiarwvwo oro-lamed -nd includes or nduiles attack, irfi whiles In addition in tlie violence, am.lhcr common featureilo'ntstic unrest in South Africa is luinvinlrnt reiiv tatvc* in th* form of grikr* andbiscuits foe political pu-pmn

Socioeconomic Prestures.i<aviliiiiiiv paesiutes thai playarge part in creatingc fori are unlikeiy io alaate inaeit five yean, and prolublantrauai as.-blackunes Tlie largebeks who willfrom rural tn urlianln-coming years will create an esrn bigger train mi iU-already rpoc i

ttalrities.i may be rWBrrtg*-tivr. presentlyuck homingnits in "white"heheS nullum bucks wliu ire ripn-tiil In punillion blanksrbanU ifuuir* at lent anillion

esult of the restrictive

policies pursued In lhc gmerninenl. Iiljvk iiiinii.ynn theb-

MM'iLii ti*

short-term rob creation in the l sear.

black edin'almn crisis is likely lo vmrvaiiranks ofbiark ehddirn todai nrve*

mi thenhighn.it make no (Hifyn. nln- rimiHim-nl in li-tb'iK'jl K'lmb arid imitrrsitio*apitaiie for whitentlii limesn fur btackTVestimates that achieving raeial tunty in schiioling lav icw. assuuiing liiflallun. mm iiii re an annual addiliunaleat inn uuilav "ilallaun (lg percent ol tlu- tigjl cur nut bntgrtl

t

likely In continue In eywriencv iiiiim- seiiim*henronfiimled with oiulireaks ipuntjiH-imt iinn-ii vminraaigrts ol vmlence.that th* eetrnt vpale olai lieenyei-iisrev-THildnnn-oul perimhof (iraVemhai ibis Herd may lOiiinui' in lhc (mure. fHevJ

Since the National Party came to powerW ind bcran forrruilv *oa.-aiiheid. il hat had to content, with aiitatovernmeni prc-tcsts bv organiird bhckn general, the efforts of black protesl group* have had little apparent impact on thedomestic porky Pretoria hat med it*security apparatus effectively lo infiltrate .indullv counter the oriranired black resistance It hat faced over the yeart without making mamr coiicct-lioni tScehe police are proficient al rooting out activist* and jailine ringleaders The secun-Iv Uws. including detention without trial, allow ihe police ureal freedomarrying out their duties. Olhet key laws ban on.door meetingsermit and any actions, sich at an illegal strike nr boscott. that disrupt rorrial business and rennomic activities

aO The tc.-urilv forcesuch mote difficult time luppreuing outbreak* nf spntiiaiteou* unrest, which are often charactorlied by riotoui crowd* of youths, rock throwing, andajor se:uri> tv leseorae involving the Army iio* proved ni the past to be effective in ending these outbreaks, butesponse incur* costs In terms ot theelation* with the black and inletnaiionalThe* outbreaks signote unsettling effect on white* than ha* been apparent. cample, in their response to tbc bombing campaign ol the INC. Isolated terrorist attacks and organized ptuleil* lerm to make whites angry, whereas wideipread Spontine-ous unrett make* them nervous

pisodic Venut Sustained. The duration nf the violence also is critical. The dynamic* of black unrest in South Africa are svtch thai widespreadif it can be confined to the town,mote threatening to euvemmciitthe longer iteriout Hack unrest sets in morion etherasoreigncan weaken the government's pOtilion and are difficult for Pretoriaounter without ending the violence.

Ibe government ha* survived episodic unrett. cycle* of which have lastedear Many observers believes inevitable, however, that wide-ipread unrest will break out tit South Alricaersist without the lull* that in theave afioided the government lime to review its options, enhance it* security resources, and reassure whiles. The current unrest already has tailed almost at long a* iheStneeto disturbances, and there have been more incidents spread out more evenly over the period.

flondom Mtaekt onhe directviiiiles (mmnrest alsodalof llsef theDuring theonly twocitasol ibe township unrest: these deilli* nvt'irrcilvieinilt ol blackin white

areai. The deaths received morehe invai" media and probably affected white jiti.'t^lr. inward the unrest more than some other ma>u- uivkieiit*g larce numl*ilatks killed

ash of -jnttftin attacks bv blaeki attains! -hi;eanuiii/eil campaign of terror bvroup* like ihe ANC and Pan-AfrtcjniHiand >vo>iltl great's incrrau- the proum- iui Pretoria lo lake tougher action than il has over tlx- ii.ni tear, a* well a*anic ainung ruarrv white* UV believe such an nuilneak itn the period of tins Eitimair. alilinimi. im-jItiavk atiitisde* in fhi* regard it extremely .iilfii-iil lltjck attack* on white* have noim" because the white and normtJe:icij| areas ere widel, separated and the Security forces jcriirrally have prevented not* (mm tpillinu mtu white aie.iv Ami* ii ii nineiitime-itv iu tin- black niniltwurili have tint yet beennto militant anllnhile fervor. However. onCe the psvchulumt'ul barrier ivmignt (enureattacks mi while* cimidrend that hardens attriiide* in lint it 'iu- wl.ite and nonwhite comrnuriities.

onciofenf Iter ft fa nee. ililitn-.iili iiiuiiv.iiiii t'riki'* ami Uivcntt* andli' passive ri-si-tlatiiv anil cml donbcilienvc camnadrii' have beer: uud frntiietit't in South Africa in the lavl liiii-i-utave not been tiA'cesvfiil in jeliieving tin-"hiectives of ilieiraniiviMnv 'it tniv ma-alto have rarefy mirrored thou- ntsueutiv) m'li tin-peaceful prolesii of Caiidl.i. tiles ix'lcn Ii.ivi-ailed liy intimidation im-atiirev miari nf non whites setmn aslo-ci-rs ofi pa ign.

-Ifibelieve lhatn ruiUjmi tactics willand -vid ri-vuli in umreon lite ttale than in ibe'I lie itrnviii-.v* Sin-nglh of the hlack lalior ni'ivrnieni. ihe incieaviin:owerki and llie liieivof lactic*ev ill nf lei->nnv tciiiiedn tiii'iiunv miSljkes. it i* doubtful, hnv.ev.-r. that ihe Kovrtnint'tit

NQHmXACT/(

be forced to yield to radicaleu.lt ol raoertieernt rrvslauce camraa-gn* durirag thel trm EMinuir. althougn it ma. make tome economic sod social concession*

tl.uck ffo-.pt hate called foe mmrge-ical* work boyeotti In ihehreerotest government pebty Me* rj ihrie efforts -err orsanlted and dre-ppott becausepi mil have beenW tUM. theu-or po.ii.cal oUrcttvev Tne -ort bu>coll can be -double-edged sword us South Africa, primarilyemplovrn usuaili car. bear! .ebb* blacka -I" are eater lo replace pariicipanttnieral ytnkeban black -hoic-roa boycotty hrtiobiooor ol the many vmemtMed black. Iter, theeine relocated in an Impoveridieii homeland

ven unko lhat hate been -eil ^rgamaeusupported Uve had little impact onpobcyai ge-*ral gnkr min. organised by ihethe two black labor frderaltona.seful Tbenn* ol the moat

successful ever in South Africa in remit ol the number el black workers oho raarWtraatcd-an estimated TO percent of if* blackforce in Transvaal Province The participation rate, -ere highest among iinmn member, art reudenti ol (be to- rnbipa hit ha.icSt by the previoui months of rioting Many blacks, however, -ereenrtactwae. -ho stated hoove tobe>ni iniuted bv bmcotteti or because they -err unable to find trarisoo.latum Some bo* companies hailed lervjc* lo sererilun alter cro-ds ol bUks uoned buici and iheir passenger, on the linl morning of the strike

J9 Many oherven hailed thenmow of ilrent.il- bvpartici-

pants,ecled il lo be ihef mansho-ever. Ignored the long lilt ofeconomy demitdi that had been corrgpoVd byotganiier. Moreoter. at lean it black, diedbetween pobce and bencotter. and inbos-costers on leflow teiadenti trying to commuteaboulabor leaden and activists whoto organire the mikeeHed. andlarge synthetic fuel company (SaSOLJpercent ol it)he bo.ro" Ah hough meet of the worker)loter rehired and many of the activiit)released,

epealr ma nee. mainly breauve the uniontin- economic- andol piggw-alaruwdCwua-rrianother lactic iisedutt ai -ellihe current unrest Blatk isinwmer huyi-omned shorafimimr mi lonl tales, .ml the bosom i* twum eviendrd toand weUern (ape -remthat Iheilling In letraiherwtanii.lh after

ill! fit nil to not am numll Ireanw bUkWft.6a>

hread uiually coal three. much nr mnrrack dvip ilunhile onr

White Retol-e

uerhain Irn- nurd iaffrcling lln* iminr of eveiilswtulewhile,remrly tutmrulistic mmito retain control The. Iitmiy Mice thatrule inevitably -ould rBSeal In thefvoewl andnv Jewel ami ciaWaland thai Smith Aftn rllie ronl.rwnt thai are plagued In tubal-rver* ecomnHac

III founded attempt. a< uvialnni They are law amf order fanalici who have araotauJrd tfrnrag nrnnin lo restore older in ihe black Irmmhin, Tlie present rrnee-arncy rrteatiires employed by the Male are In no way asecurityandnrite. hihiUI appnne lite imrmtltiim ol lurdirr martial thr iirvrst

H Tlx- while ixioiilate. kemilga. islUli

Tlieillionib tutof thepufciliim. are thtinwbm nonuf-iithacarw urban JaMin liiiiim-y. anil tin- profi-mnrii olien with mternatmnal etjgeaccaeafalnercent ii Afri'.aners femain on tlie land While still coiiscrvati.e. the urban VfnkuneM are moreW- let'em rvuie. Few Afrikaners are likely Ui leave the tnunliy in Una- inniihrriee.great.

ofillion Er-ih.liam mere progrrtteve on racial itwamittle influeiKL- in thefrikaner

They llto prnoabtv are iess optimis-He about the mi-ability toid on domestic violence and more likely thanto leave South Africa <Jtiri;ig maiorof unrest. Emigrationuch eisiet fornglish-speaking South African nartonals who hold Biitish passpcts

The Portuguese community in South Africa, which now numbers approximately WOmany of whom have Portuguesein the main teceot immiftants with only tenuous lies to South Africa

Si impact olhe htack unrest and subsequent emerzency measures have added toprenure for economic sanctions, bit likelv measures probably will have little short-termImpact. The French ban on new investment Hops ifieri of limittng trade. London. Bonn, and Bern.ey European trading partners, hatereiected the sanctions approach. Without iheir support, most observers believe that sanctions will not seriously hurt the South African economy Moreover, the country probably could weatheraior cutoff in foreign economic lies for several years. Reduced profits for South African businesses and reduclion in the Quality of life forsanctions couldshake whilehowever.

espite the limited direct imcue: of sanctions, pressure for disinvestment reinforces investor concerns about Southconomic prospects Recentof ciedit linesnd West European banks hasanic in South Africanmarkets and led to the temporary suspension of mestic trading in currency and stock* Pretoria C'piCMed concern that inereitrd reliance on ir term debt is one of South Africa's few source

/OBCOrJ

to chouse between putting its reform program on the shelf while enhancing its security capabilities ami rutrdrwU Mispressing Mark nrapetrtmri or Irvine, to accornrrMxiate Wrslern demands for tagkagaj

rwortwh.te Po-rkca Oymeae.*-

in The Slack Legderahioourththat willautt impact ml

evens is the nonnhilr pj.Hrsi mmrnirnl iti SouthKey element, eumined include thv absencea dominant black spokesman ami 'he rimaclet thatons precluded Ihe hoe iinilrd. nrgariijeil cmtesi activity thai we ieWleie tavU lieinapid collapse of the "hue minority regime This section also assesses the prmpectie ml the leading .ion white groups

n response to tS* continuing unrest arniprenrovcrimen! blacks, mans whiles ami blacksAfrica agree that Pretoria rmai frwleader Nelson Vbrdrlarthorder toacial end war ami reach athat satisfiesuibato set Meadeiaif

capitnl MoteOi eiemenar gnsvtRi

violence.Ittrly knowing that Mand>-ia winrfd refuse lo accept on prim-ieicmcntaliliwend reh-asp nf Mandela might hebitka Most whites view his offer as irasnnable.would see iian of weakness il Iknlia suddenly

r.rhtionaliv. ice another

Sti-i

crisis,] reinforceesire to accumulate foreign exchange reserves and reduce debt before promoting economic recovery.

lie potentiald psycho logical impact of Strang punitive measures bv (hearc more difficult In assess. Rrrcmly. Smith Africa has hinird ai some reforms thai appear lo be intendedead off any further deterioration in relations with ihe West However, if countries like the united Stales and the United Kingdom eventually join the growing ranks of nations applying greater pressure. rVeioriii would have leailetroup trial rtnpr*nits Hi' iinnwhito protest movement "dto an dfcitnc fore- fur uhange willto in-twin tremendous obstacles. Even though apartheid alienates all nonwhiies. llioi'- arc deep splits among the Colored, iml.j'i. and hi ark communities. Thr three have slu.'rii snini-pcncnces under apjiihenlll.-

iri.ri ti- nl

o

C'nlorrils and Indians. Mi- blacks, are fmnin'il tu livellv granst cum Urn "Hies,: it her standard nf living ami holier

ihere Itomelandfor Colored* and (radians, arid thev are not nibiect to avii inihil cootrd reainctiont. and their group* have been brought into ihe government "rule bUcki tie itill on the ouinde.

Pretoria ignore* Colored and Indian infractions of certain apatthetd lawtnW litem mtaeh more *irtns*otly agamstorduring the pastears,ack* were arrested (or not carrying an official klenlitv document tornpaaed to no Indians and otter two CoWdi.

ThemajonU ef Colored* ineik Afrikaans ai their (int hnguagr. and in many -at*r culturally to wbiiea than to blaeks-

Indians gerteralhutoet* clantome unkingapathetic toward politlet. Many tndijni and their butineurt have beeneececaflv coring the mott recent rampege* by Zulus near Durban, reflecting deep-seated black resentment Indian* also have not feegottet* thatof themdled by Zulu, during now3 in Natal Province.

he Colored and Indian cnn-muittt-r* are caught between the nilintj while minority and an angry black maiorUy tbat vometime* viewi them at opfwrturr* target* of science Colored and Indian touth arliviiu will continue to create problems lor the government by organizing tchool protest* and bv pamcipeling in other rJernoroiration* ortjawaed bt national groups like the tDF. Most Coioredi andr-wever. probably are silent tupLortrrs ol gradual political change lhat define*be black community andlack-dominated (overnmeni tmerging in the foreseeable future

CO There are Wrong dinwvethin the black community lhat are likely to prevent the black protesl movement fromhe regimeog the period of ihn Estimate. Some of theile* to greater black unity invoke ll* faSlvtinf ht

Tnbef. There are nine maiw blackroitpi in South Africa iba. can be differentiatedgnoiie. euheial anu htuor-ral >tne* T'* mm-ernmenl ha* deiignatedercent ol South Afrlcsin territory fortCa^slha'ly bated black hcenekaitdtai oliBMi blacks reside. The hometandt are Mattered throughout South Africa, which help* reinforce the cultural and Hftguittlc difference* among Wack tnfaelorrcner. ir. the larger bbek townships. Pretoria ha* set up neig.iborboodinbal beau Some tribalncludinghe Zeau*mdJionl and Xbnws vSlong been timlile Inwaid one another

el Tl"-re are pronounced difference* among urban and rural South African tracks, npmall. in theirofteneu and aclivnm.esult ol ihe relatively inferior educ-atumui npportunuiei In ruial area* Moreoer. mow bUkt -ho reude in rurai areas of ibe homeland* engage in tubais-tettte agriculture snd are out of touch wiih weir luue* that concern urhae Macks,ctivity, urban retldency nsthts. and petitestriction.he CkUegillion Stack*rt-an area*ack* who reside in rural area* haveecur.lv threat to the white govertimenl

fdeofogtrel One of ihervtseveit* the black protest mntenwiH InvJiet the rulehe punuil ul racial reformed by tbe tDF and the ANC. encourage white participation in anlia-panhewi Still ntm, aUhough theof .hese group* are nosdy biacit Membett of "blackroiipt suchPO on the other hand.agamtl pr.mJ.tiort* tn tornhe ttrugglr for "btock"Calmed and Indian! political it*his

The generation gap uinura's black township*blacks generally are more alienated,and Lnspalienl thanmiIheir pareni* are pt-hticalli unawareweal for accepting ihr ind>gnilie* ofw.lhnui offeringnceattitude* of eitner aeneraii'm could haveimpact on the domestic tcette.

<i| Onrfook for Key Grotto: Cmemmcni ogegv termeuturei prnltalily will coiillnue in preventxen Nefavnaf Omi-ett from rfutsf-emingamoeg Southblacks intoale active tupoori in theecessary cordlllon. weheo hecoese amiUarv threat lonmcW The ANC* drtxn-lence on etternal lu.st^ ba> iKcomo inereaMnidy

ibe group, which has1 guerrillas, mow whom ire in camp* in Artgobvlev regional tin leg v. highlighted by crcoi-bceoet ami. rorot raic* hat prompted nervous black gain in the rcgaon increasingly to cut jmscnbe the artiv itm wf the ANC Detpiie ,ti oVenceainghe rmtm we bebeve tbe grouo wilt be abie t< num a

camoaign ot ipoiacbc but sometim ocular

bombings in South Africa.

herelrong pnaihilily during me ported of this Estimate thai thea splinter croupampaign ef harsher attacks in South Africa.ranhand-fuV rttr^nben areover [be lackgres, mace bytfrtjef*adstarv wing and are preu.ni therrt-.papceeve an .nirnsified campaign thai ire lodesmg white Civilians Pretoriat reaxtion to such awould probably include additionaloperations against the ANC pretence in the region. The ANC already it aware of Its tremendousto an all-out eountenerrohit effort by Pretoria, which we believeaimhe uoup't relueiance lo aitack wh.te civilians.

eroductive dulogwe between the fO.eriimetsf and ihekLety to lake place in the foreseeable future The group recenilv decided at its firtt mamr conference9 not to enter into talkt with Pretoria The contentui among top govern-meni officials alto probably precludes the poMibiliii.

hennui Ctmrresi. the ANCl small-er rival, nayenewed campaign nf gurrrilbin South Africa dunrg the pertod mt thn Estimate The group, wh*ch hasnerr.U. batedrtnd Lesotho hat been Ciar.-ing touerhRa campaepi fur ve.nai yvars. but hai been wiackrd by internal divitwnsack of adequate eiternal funding, and are heavil, penetrated by South African security service* Some new tnurcer of aid in the region may be forthcoming that allow the group to initiate atlacki within the nesl year orAC military campaign wobiMy wttuld include torrte attacks on whiletnot represent aikrea! unless the merabre-slup of the group eipendt greatly, torneihmg whichunlikely in the foreseeable fitrere.

The bUek Ubor morcmenl Increinnglv mat become the main fulcrum for biack political leverage. Since Pretoria decided9 to give black unioru official recognition and allow their participation in cofleetive bargaining, ihe WC of the Uack labor

movement hat mushroomed. Total trade utimnrepresenting alt races, ttood atmillion4 ol which abmil TtHl.lUIblack trade -nnnrtfi-ai kraUbelong r0 newer groeps formed neer 1VT)ap ibeersim, raUk UU*Oespue ike rapwj growth ofeicent of the bbrk

agriculture, dornrtllc- SfTVhar, and lite public texinrnioniied.

no they tears of Incutinc almost rultitttrrteeonnnm itiuet. theaboractive cAi.alt for

araptV. Iwo Urge biack labor amon* andlack labor federalMM repeevenfan* aMeJ mi moreblack workers, helpedthe generalrant>aal Province latlbet. Some black labor groupt alto activel,he rvnnwhile electionoinnaign lail tvar Labor unions representing titer JIM.UM wirfken itio't mi (hem bbek. aller three trarvolialliiiit plait Inederationnvembrr Tl* orgamra-

tion -ill hitk the pemrrfid Nalnal .J

wgh. (he t'DTastM'rvf

the mineworkert. nhn rreenrly drmandnll to the slate of emergency, stromd* suggest,w federation will Krk political gains for blocks

riT Tiie wdluttutett of the black labor movementHi weight brh-iid politicalrrr degree bv nv

h-dify dettewuen. forevgn fueghng.ff bytf the gmurn ttPSSJ h

illegal' adivitin inch it etneral strikes he pnlitwal -ndv Some of ihe moyl Undently aii|iivivernin<-ril unions already have suffertd from various govern merit harassment lechnlquet. IihIimIiiik llm delenllnn of tup nfftciaii Despite rhete hararth. we Mirvr the noverii. ment will be forced lo contendoteand politically demanding Mack labor mnvemmling ihe penod of ihn En male

hiefaolkm. has tome Ieiernlw-rv and mayinvrrav ingly imporiam to iheorm rifnttt. as Duthele" is one of ihc few black power broken in South Africa Inkaiha is detected by many other black groiira beeaute of itt culm ill emphasispositmn as Chief4ulu ImeiH-lai-l

.

ocal minority ol .turn urban Zulus jtio .JOprwe him. tSufheieiiidely popular arrnni thr Zulus -bob* *amu Serfage? and >oiatiJe tjiuir has made thrm feared fr. mhergrown Hit moderate stance haihim aiDuirui prsisr from mnv whiles who cenerallt air grateful foi the Influence, he has amonc the Zulu* Lale last tear he gained media utemouth Africa lor cocdemning tbe irriool boycotts, theownship* and tbe geoetal Unke bv bdjt* workers He paablietv hai chasmed militant group* Hie .he sNC lot underestimating the tetuiitt resource* 'I ihe Hate

ecision bv Uufheleil eithef IC parlicipaleew political svsiem tet up bv the government or iOM in an active campaign to raaiimiae preuurr on Pretoria would be an eitrrmeb' imperta.vt dt*taee> ment. iceordiogolored mirdtter. Preudmt Botha announcedabinet meeting in May iWtH that the government is romideung planscileral system in Natal Ptovlnee that Includes ceding ihe important port ofay to ihe black homeland ofTbe "vatai provincial councileneral proposal in3atuloey body linking Na'al and kwaZuhi administrations on malteri of commonommlsiioti initiated by Buirwlciilmilar power-tharing lyslem in Nalal2 that was to he controlled icuntlvhite provincial adroininrtfc*

TO. Pretoria may decide loow -er-thaiing system in Natal, whrte many progressive English'> pea king whites leilde. However, manv black leaden probably wouldegional power-lharing scheme incorporating the tribally batedespecially if Buthrlcii ion along wilh il Even Bo* hear.upport farbo. ai oarwnarjj depend on ihe level ol aulortcats it offers him Pretoria alio undoubtedly would face iiiff opposition lo ih*rom while larmert In notthern Natal, if it wet* to be controlled by KwaZulu

Tl The United DrmorreiK foanr has emerged aa ihe roost active and important roe-rule, aalheoveen-ment political group inside Smith Africa II waslaunchedo unite groups oproedhe new Conut loo thai ri eludes the black maionty. Today, the L'DF is an umbrella organisation lhatembership ofroups representing moreillion laJi.idaak sbovtercent o( them black-ough the L'DF does not have a

co"utilut:<m. affiliate memhel (roups mutt lupporl a

declaiallon opposing apartheid.

rRACC-OICCN

Ti The L'OF'* powpnti ate wertain unpa> thratil, amiaU, Tbe newbderatngi in lie turned in VoienuVr .nil includeunions atliliateil mthil may remit in iihiii'K-blai'k ulnr actum like Ihe twu-dav general slriLr laatowever.katrimr tar art ot* guternrivrM huratsanent tactm. theeet-ings Ireqeerglteen Itanrwd ami mam IDF leaders hive hrenhe Usi yell In addi-liun. ihe ongoing treasonbK aetisin Durban is drtuinrd tn jlluw thr iinnriuiKiit toountain nfmmh of iithe guvfimrtt nut i* to NStifv oW< lawing Ihe group

Tl Thenetai Maik groupi thai could aiiain national prominence and he co-opted lo suppnttthe gotcrnnienl's reform program One tiich group it lite Zkin OiHifMln Cliunh 'ZCCI. the largest Southack wpafalrtl ihureh wgh ao|edbuntl dnmnnsnd refuses in address political mors, alihuugh it hasarmp wilh PrHmia 'or over two derides About IS million ul its follow enSlh annitrftary ceii-rnouy in April ItrHS in Tramiaal P'mince where ibr keynoteeace imLiI Trw lit'. has played an no porta iM nie in tearbartg its mouly mill and poorly educatedh 'iulhoritiei and i-

The Sovier Role oed Strategy

Tl The Suviet Lnaon's efforts tn utidrrmirar the -hale grnernavrntS-eghovtrf Imks with .'jK'k antiapanra-lil gmum to datee createdr'jil.-mt lor Pretoriaiiei angle is impiiilaiit. Iionever. Iiigi-ls lie-cause Mutcow provides cnlicvil ftpprrl tn thr ANC. which Ii pupular among Snutli Afrkan bbeksaain gnlanl in. wgb neighhxuig Mack. Ua'es where the gnmti ' emence

TS identified ihe ANC a* the leading

oppntilion orajjuifjui.-ti In Sniilh Alrlca. ant) lias soughtuild ils infliient'e wills ihe ANCBftety of waitr Smwls fily on the lacl iliat memberi of thr booth Alrtran Ciraimanisian enhr party heavily cepemleM neifunding andmam key prnti ir. the ANC.that iA Secretary neneral andilitaryIn addition, the Soviet (line tiippbes virtually all

of the anc'i mililarv supplies and naming.Sonets champion lhc> cameumbrinational foturnt for rb part, the ANC makesof ill clow relations with (he Communis!cla.mi toaiionai jt orgaevolutionary struggleprewmabli seesconnection as its raost effective meansree inees aa the tons-termcontrol gihe Sown willtheir intermittent contacts wnh ibe PaC future us that

oreaniaaiion

The Soviets have no formal relations withand ihui lack the tame of cuctatnaitc.and front organization assets inside Souththat they are able to eiploit elsewhere. In ihehowever, ihe Soviei press has commenledon the actlom of the CDF and the blackand Soviet academict have noied llieirnature This reflects Soviet miereil in trineptomoten of revolutionary change and. possibly,elementi of turh organizations toconnect mm ,mide South AfricaiheSoviet com menn have tempeied ihuacknowledging that, for the moment at lean,foeeei are divided and vulnerable to

TT VIonow rebei heanlycui propagandatoitj maerroi in southern Africa, with th* tybarctlves of denwroiraiiaig Soviet loudaritv with blaelhe L'mted Stale,acker of apartheid, and derailing "evern miLiti.es The Soviets oilen "play bock" black African .nlicism of Southhe Soviet preia. ind are ft-quenlly able to piste Soviet-original-ed material on supposed LS-South AlrKaiicolluiion in African preii organs, aa well aaariety of tuch material in the Soviet media. At teait twice over ibe pail year, for eiample. ihe Soviet media ran ilnrie* aceuilmj the United State) and Souh Alttca of devrl-oping an "ethnical weapon" that only worked on Urn-am and "other rion while racial croup*."

A Soviet 'toot otuniiaiions loch at the World Peace Council and the Afro-Align People! Solidarity Onamution frecnienily use South African issue* ai meani of attracting Western and Third Worldfor their sctmtiet. and the anti-Sooth Africa theme -ii prominentlr leaiured ai the Moscow Youth Fevi.larn. the Kferr.nc generally suoporl* ante South Africa revohotioni at die Called Nataom.it hai net take" the initiative onsanction!.

preferring inhe .'cad of black African slatei and avoid ruling 'Sooth Africa as an East-Weil rata* The Soviets will undoubtedlyocal role in caitigating Pretoria at the utxomingCenetal

tuembfv

CMocaV

Sheet Term (On* Yen.,

79 W* rapaVir il nthe

white government wiilrmg the .veil HWi lecurg) rrwourtes mi the rtate and the firmf mostll prrv-tit the developmentrvg MaeaWtJ dunng the nest I* months

Hi The government, rrlung primarily on inpowers. pn.bo.hly wille some semblanceIn many luniuhip* inutill continuen mai> arreui"hereersistsweakenginum II violencen othertherumple, theCapegovernmeni mav be lorcediiendmilln- murevniieiKT mahead at blatki rVesl JCatrot the Haleaealrrn"iohevictims, and evpanl tfant Tb.s mat probmg the Wale nf

ol As il.mnaed earlier, howevrr.

differs in some iripetls from earlier outhrrakt. ami vuirenimeauirei may prove inadnmale Inhr neit year Sporadic-fnr esample. hasm vonie inwmhip*i the Halemergency ai black youthslebani acti uichhrmvmg roekj at police pain.li ami allacking cm In bora tortiolencvelieve Pretoria vnuilil nioil In eveniiiilir-meaiurt's Tlie attiom taken bv ihe gmernnwnt tn dale in no waianrnumpnnw bv thr slate If the sanation detenorate. uuhily. Pretoria could drcnle to Jet bee martial bet,Mal preiim me-torn areas, enoduciIvinne-hi-hroiseie-rchel andranJriaie arrnli mif ban several proteHho eoaiU draw upon the east reeenei of the pobee and Army, which at haiirt had to do lo enforce the current njte of enartgreti

Theolitical reform elheterm are likely lo hime largely on the nature ol unrett and on the level of international preuure. Wehai "hen Pttkanenl tMH inotha will forge ahead with largely nonpol.ikalrevisioneitrtctiraj the movement ofwhile coniunattc to tludt aher-native political syilems that retain white control and eioaftd black rights. During the nest yen. Bothaikely id initounc* Bept leading to the ertabcnhmentonfederal ivstem linking the erntrai soveinment andnebational advisory body for blacks oouMe theernmen: for the KwaZutu-Ndtal Province region. CMItfM mi hn irnace wgb the white eteettatale. bow*ver.o implement maw1 get until the unrcti abates

Long TermTere Ytori)

e believe that over the long term ihe chanceownoirai coibroe lemaim anufcrli.ieates lomewhat becauw existing trends mat become untamed or magn.liei (Seet in the short term, the Mite's teeority resource! and white resolve arc critical; however,ive-year period, the interplay of such factors as ihr economy, black unrest, reform,eelite, and .nier-national acttont attains! South Africa are more difficult lo

W. The government's reform program it likeit to achieve no better than mited resulli during the nett live tears

believe the itigma attached loolbb-oratof is uahkeli to fade soon,h -illery difficult fee Prelorla to find Influential blacks other than homeland leaders to lalk with or persuade into partsnpatiag kl am bmiied power-than ng tvsiem Nonetheless. Pretoria mat move toew ttstem thai eipands black polillcal right* without -iningan-dale from blacks, much in the same -ay it established ihe new muitiraeul Parliamentfustandate from the Coloted and Indian communities.

_ Theta part from ihe effetli of tanctioni and dimtiuibed investorwill be unable lo support any corawebensive gcrvernmeat program* to imelw tate rendition* in the urbanhich probably will add to the number* inclined to

.rOtCON

protest for greater polaxalPretoria,may be able lo improve condition*in ihe more troubledmi would be able to do more if ibe tsrtce of gold climbs.

Pretoria'* piecemeal eradication of oeilylegal barrier* separating tbe races in puce places and socialmoti hkelv will lead to greater racial mixing in offices, uloovnd even in tutne icrWa and resideniial areas- While it will offend tome white* and increase conservative oppmiiion. ihe net effect -tl be to increase ihe number af while* who view racial change* at inevitable and irreversible.

e believe itcertain thai, during the nett fiveretoriaeneisce *fciitinnal Mack uoretlesult of both growing toe^oeconcmic pretguees and cominjingirvaneei During ihu period, ihe unretl probably will lie cyclical, a* in tbe poll, teane cycle* aaay bai longer and be ntorr violent than before, but the government -ill he able In restore orderime in beiween cycles as black* grow -ear* ol the violence and arebvtv overwhelming po-rr of the ttatr.

Heas likelv. however, but Ml poudwe. thai South Africa coukt begin to riper icnve mote suitained and intensified violence. Black youths may be under go.sycfsteagical iranuttoe.raull of their daily confrontation, with security forces Rather than fleeing the country lo ioin the ANC at ihousandv ol young blacki did during the Soweto rets,il.black tooth* matontiam kswJgvai -ar against the governnt.nl in the lownihipa. In addition, black protest group* nay be moreallting the tiipport of the tradilioruillt pimve black maiorits by pointing to the governmenl'l reform*ien that iletrewonuve and -rakeuing. awl bv cNnag growtng internaiional preuure a* evidence thai then anilaparlheid activtlie* are influencing world opinion aad anting rrtult*

equ-iitatovernmentWortl Cose Scenario

ST.overnment collapse to occur in llie nett fhre tears,up-fieaM number of bbcki would have lo engagerrvame campaign nf violence lhai rapidly eroded white resolve andvied the lewity force*ction lhat mults in hundred* of black* killed at once, orey blackspark

ampaign. Th* command ind control structure of the securut form ought break do-tvhe (ae* of nationwide outbreaks of noiance that ravaged both nonwhtte and white areas Wot* fetohe mightquicklynto random killers ol whites.

ampaign ol widespread violence evenm-mlitantccould acre*-erate form thai might lead to ia economic crowktsclution ot* white resoiir:

Th* laterratiortalik*l> to nghten :he terews on South Africa ut mportse to the repreiiite. blooxlv measure! Hf believe thewould use initially to tiv lo counler escalating violence. The initial ttveasuresia the bat year could snowballomplete ceonototcgo-.nclud.n* tb* oV aial of anding and port rights to South Afrteait planet andiheof South Africa from all international organiiaiiom

A severely deteriorating domestic situation might send investor confidence to an all-time Vow. prompt Western banks to recall loon, to South Afnta. and hastenathi

The black labor rtsovemefit aught very wrO asak* its prrsvnce felteries of protraeied general strikes that could bring industryalt

The security forces may wrtle off ihr mam black townships as "no go" areas and halt effort! to restore order there This wouldthe wis for gjercira groups So set up an infrastructure it those aeraa and dole out >ratons lo voung black firebraada.

Smelling blood, lb* Soviet tnnai prohabli would Hep up itt support lo the ANC <nd press hlaribceoertng Sooth Afrtca to do hke-rte Some of these sum ursdourgedlvallow the ANC greater freedom ol action if the South African security forces were tied up Stamping oui bnishfirei in the black townships

W. We lyrbevc thai even under (hitblacks would be unable to overthrow the what* emrrnmrrtt bt force in the rest five tears Even before theseowever, the goiernntrnl.th growing violence and has ing exhausted itsoptions, ptobahly would agreeote far-reaching political refnrmt and attempt to it.imi.air with black oppunrntsivil war.

thetnaDvrli bite nppnss-

lo reform deselom during ihemething wr hrlieie is possiblehe ruling National Pan, miehi abaikhm .It rvfi urn pn>-gram, purge itself ol refurmitls. tie tolil inlo opposing camps. If ihr Parly thiftt away fromreplacedoalition of rhghiwma parties lhat tinesuararecrdroled lrv*tl ol bt-ck unrestudt

Imelicoiicsrts for the United Storei

athtngion't relaiion* with Prrlnna ate BMy lo be proMinalJl durlna the period covered by ihu Estimate. Toe white regime's responses inr.eerrpeeiuve measures al lvune or erou-berdrren against HXC lar em in theguaranteed to preoecstos trai'tkridmiled vans and around the world

he Decline of Grand Apcrthetd

Inormer Prime Minister Hetidrik vVrwoeru' developed it* bbck homelands KhciTie thai una! recently irrved is Ibe pohlical ecerw-rsiooe of 'grandhich lefets to the fineepi of separate, self ruling black natioo staleset-woerd introduced the Promotion of Raulu Self-Cov-erttmenl Act, which set guidelines for ihe political evolution of the black homelandsule pendent lilies and was designed to strip blocks of their South African citiarnahip L'ndcr this plan illven those rending outside the hegnebnds. would become lanonals of new independent statesad art the atagte for ihe SeJ-Coeroeneru Act The Land Acts36 set audeercent of Sooth African land for tribally bated black homelands, separate administrative ttiuctures for blacks were set up inhe Bantu Authorities Act1ribal local authonlv system in tbe hotnebrids.

I The primary otrectivr of Vcracard'i pokes was to rarotect white control acaintt the threalaoadlt ;'v-on white pop-ifeisorv He presented hi hem--iands scheme ai the only alternative to an intcKtated South Africa ihai he feared evrntually would be dominated by blacks Verwoerd also viewed theadministrationsecessary outlet for rising bbck political aspiritions. as evidenced by thepromts inn add.tion, he hoped the plan would defuse iMrryutJorud eritlenrn. which had been mounting Unce the ee.emrrem began mot ingI to eradicate the limited political rights of non-wrutcs Under VVrwoerd'i pljn, ihe eotrmment has moved upillion blacks from while areas to ihe homelands since, frequently resarttng to force to gain compliance.

he ruling. National Party recently has admitted pubhdy that us granddoclnnes are badly flawed and in need of revision. The Parly's rethinking, in our view,esult of tbe dramatic failure of the homelands scheme to achieve the National Party's political ob-rcKtes. Rather than guaranteeing white control, ihe denial ol South Afitcan citizenship and basic political rightsblacks hai promoted unrest. Bbck political aspuaitum hate imi been laliifled by the hornebnd sdmirUWrtiI'nCnrei. which are filled largely with moderate bbcki ird tribal authon-tiesho are vcorned bv moal urban blacks lor weeiasvg withm thet stem In addition, -io slate other than South Alrxa hasthe 'our homelands that to date have evolved into "Indepen-dent" slates, and some humcbnils. including Kwa'Zuln, hate refused independence

4 The horreitads ahoremrmlcmi rent* m* burden and navean chance ol* becoming economically liable in thr coming decades Eten the government has admitted recently that the homelands etentiially will be able to accommodate onlyeicrttl of bbrks at the moil Even though Pretoria iprnt some5 billion bit year on drvrhnmig inil mairuaining the bomebnib

er capita in Ihe himrbndi only ntcieaird0ftmX makint them among ihe pooresl areas in the world

Pretoria'sSib creatoti program lor tlie homebnds has provided work forercent el the resident potential bbor force

Infantke horr elands is among the highest in Afnea

The homebnds onlyercent of South MrfcsiCDP,

rtcrnt of niral hnusrhnlili and IS percent of urban hniorhnldi located in tlie home-bods have incomes hrluw ike minimum tubut-lenee level

l.armngs of horrtrlarid rcinlenti who work out side of the homelands in white areas of South Africa make upercent nf liio tola! Income nf tbe homelands,

ANNEX 8

8aclcciroorid on Sowelo and Sharpeville Violence

SAerpecif'e. Ontice shotrowdint had gathered in ihe towruhip of Sharpevdl* la protest ihe 'pass laws' rrouitiog btacka to cam identity and nock document* aod twnctinc tbeo namement and repdeoeihue areas.tacka died, and looie ISO were intured The rsrotest had beenhehich alio played an activehe violent aftermath of the shooting. The PAC and other groupseneral iinke in Sharpeville that spread to moat iaduttnsl areaa of tbe country The*aaeffective .r. Cape Town,atted almost three weeks and paralyxed industryhe0 of thelacks in the area participated.

2 Some of the underlying caiuea of the Sharpeville unrest -ere wmuar to the pteient outbteak Three-four tha of Sharpevilc'i population ofOI -ere under the agend the fugh schccfa in the area could not aceommodi Ir all of them b'nempim mentkI and risinghird of the residents >ete defaulting on their rent payments. The area ofProvince in which Sharpeville is situated had been hit hard by therogram of fotcibiy resettling communities. The local police werefor vigorously enforcing the pass laws

3 The generrunent retrarmded io the Sharpeville incident byiatpof emergency inaior cttles ond towns. The calicr headed the security response, backed by the irgjlar Army andest-meets of reserve soldiers mobdieed after the shooting incidenti it theaad ANC were out la wed The stateerge ner wai eipaaded onpril lofagisterial districts {compared to the IA magisterial districts nowven though bv then much of the violence was abating Onugust, the state of emergency was lifted There were ILnriu madelightly more have been arrested so far duringnrest!

4 Black on-black .kJence occurred during tbe Shir rev.lie inrestmal scale, including the death ofpoliceman, the ransacking of numerous hornet of policemen, and ihe murderolored man who had driven two while journalistslack township near Ooe Town. Like the current unrest, the violence generally was contained within the black townships The notable wee pi ionrotest march0 blacksownship near Cape Town to the Parliament building in the center af the city that endediolent clash with police and the dispersal of the crowd.

he international community svu outragedSharpeville inctdenl and lis criticism ofsharply The unrest great It accelerated an outrnenl funds that was not reversedWhale* in South Mrtea generally were shaken"earner. The deeply held belief amongihcv arc Cud's chosen peopleprilullet fired al close4 crated white gunman miraculouslythe face of then Prime Ministerkilling him ce damaging has brim. Thea period of heightened repression as (heleipottdeddriting subversive

groups Into etile and intensifying its effort to relocate utban blacks in tbe homelands

6 Sautto. The disturbance* began in Soweloopulation5 million at tbe timel onhen0 black students gathered to protest the ir* reduction of Afrikaanseaching medium in two courses at local schools After several students died when police shotrowd, youths wentampage, drums inn government itlfkvt and vehicles ift Sowelo Within Iwo months, anlignv-ernment violence bad spreadlack enm-mjnti by the endhe number bad risenragaraared toommunities inveJved in dmurhancrs in thenrest) Duiban was the only mayor city lhat saw little or no violence, primarily because the local police used restraint in handling the student protests that did occur.

he protests onune followedonth*frustration in Soweto over the forcedsome eianuooms rather lhan (he uade

iional medium ofribal dudeerclassrooms in Soweto resulted from agoveinmcnl puih In the early IflTOi to educate more

WBhTUCl

even though ihr owmbrr of<bmo in Soweto rote from*lfi. The per capita eipendirure for while students4 was aboutimes higher than for blavk UiaoVnti The economy waseep recession and uncmplotmrni was high and rising, which angered the growing numben of black hagh schooloweto. hkc ctner black townsKipv for Ovet three tears hao been under the administrationew tisicm nf black local authorities that had resulted in the dctermraiion

of ihe townships and widespread cVstainfactina with oral tervicet.3 percent ol the hoi on in

Southblack townships had no bathrooms and

ercent had no bet running

8 Student groups were at the forefront nf mow nf ihe disturbances. Thev ocgamtrd several gene-il Strikes. iKkading one ihtt at iti aenath aehinrd about.ercent absrf.tccom in Jotunnesburg. and attacked Uacks who ignored thelack consumer bosf white stem during6 Chrtttrssas season aiso wasccrtiful In addition, atchools were damaged, moil of ihem bvhe hands of militant students who were advocating school ben colts St dents tSrstrsned hundreds of gns-ernmrnt-run taverns and eluded their parents who attended them

t least one black policeman was nv utile red in the unrest, and ihere were several instances in which suspected pullce informers were killed bv cnwiib. Cedents also attacked the faoaaes of several black policemen. The worst black -on- black violencew-ben Zulu migrant workers inin part by the at lacks on taverns, and tuspeited of being encouraged bv (bewith lm-a! residents; tomelacks died. Similarpitting migrant workers front the hnrnebndt against local blackowl in black townships near Caoriedwere iniured. and IVi ranges- were def rosed -JiKine two datsof rtigs.

heunrest deeplt friuliteii'd mailtliilea and worried Jnmgnhiles iatn no the Ileal das of ihe met wrfe heatm lo death, and several others died in the fnlliiwiiivt month. In Cape Town, black demunstrjt.ts nurwlsome white render*e-as vi'mio*ew unprecedented Lrie-tcale riots aim look place in ihe ienter of (ape Town as police ciaslnd wall twrgesli'w

Wei figures letlrcted the level id

while concern;5 therea net gain ofwhites in South Africa: two tears latera net loss of more than .tteails

tiream nl new arrivals who had fiVil lite ttiii-rrilla warthodetu Moreoverolf6eriod fur gun dralrnitfrica a> frnihtened whites niihni tu buy Itaitticum andu addit-n. the ruetlim nf le.estoe ivnfidrnirJiUsinmt ir-of foreignooth Africa.

II Ponce rrstanatrt In ihepn. kits wrrr seneralhanded Mutt clashes In-vnlvril the police using ti-aratonvgmw aeaietthr tkrath tnr| alter the first were, stood at tTri Inn PrrtnnaintirutsiitHMterumeiil uriuot.h tittleishe death Sal hadw tor nnu Over then iht of unn-sl. pnlicr arrested and convicted IJSrir>ronleil.|liun.lVfndU "for tsitcwtneuncvi ertdedrackdown on IV (Vtnovl itJTT in which ihr gnvrrnmeui lianned ihe leading student mourn and

alenut ail bl-ck. cnnscsnirtnrsa

rrarhrti the hrlalil olmljnlv during ibe ii ii rest

outri Al'ricon Security

South Africa's white minority haier* am* and growing internal sreurttv apoara-tua that enforce* and del rod* iptrthcvdrwimate thaiight South Africanit,en andici pa lei at lead part lime in loriie aspect of internal ieetiiitv or defense Com-noed louee. ptuoo. and defente eipenditurei account lor alaso*Uoe. or II percent of ihe badgrt

1 Police. The South Africanparamilitary or-aniaation with0 meraberv forma the backbone of the iwefaal security apparatus Thta national fore*et pooce and riot control compooenis aa well is traditional uniformed ind detective until It is backed upast amy ofi*rarior. lhat permits deteniion without trial aad wide powers ot search indjeiiure In addition, the government ein limit press coverage of the seeufly Woheir

1 Tbe SAP has recruited nonwhilei mice itsn. and they make up about half of thef the norr-Kites in ihe SAPere*nl in- black.ercent are Colored,ercent are Indian. The position of (sonwhites In the SAP hai improved in recent years, butd*rihip remains overwhelm-irtsdv mad* up of coroervttiv* Ainkanrrt

i The government hai Mated publicly lhat itexpand ibc Sire of the 5AP bv GO percent asavailable. The number of police Inper capitabout half that InGlvbecaaae ibe SAP

usually does notaior pie**nee In most black townships and devotes few retourcrt toor investigating crime in nonwhila communities, consequently, some blackouth Afrtca are among therime iieas ia the -orld

h* gn-ernment in' empowered black local aulhoriiln to establish and control new blacfc police unit* that wdl he separate from tbc SAP and respceu-bie for lawheInretoria announced thatlack local authorities initially would set up these unit*

the plan isn area* and to om ihe violeni "peace officers" May. On* black m

Accordingouth African offK designed to nurture andraasroot* leadership in black nba eitricaie the central fi unrest. The first contingentT finisher! training by SAP instnictoii in council al the center of th*an forceost ar.nu-Ui -hen fofly staffed a* two y

6 Army- Tbe South African Detente Forcea key role In milling the SAP inorder Mil.tarv uotf* lhareth ihr poUtr. prttvsd*

Targe-Kale policeoperations and manhunt* in rural areas, and assist th* SAP duiing tnaior internal disturbances Moreover, ihe Army's Commando Force, comprised of local home guard anils scattered throvodsout the country, help present attacks ongo.ernm*nt and industrialWho* nenpvd for tun rears' full-lime iluty. and are liablr lor part-time duly from ihe age ofivilian-staffed Gvil Defriu* unit*he direct ion of ihe MlMttr of Defrosr operate throughout South Afnea and arebv numpr-ou* white gun club* and neighborhood defense group*eicenl of whiles own firearm*!

Miliiary (SADF) Manpower

Total

Active duty Read* irsem Commando*

ther government security units IncludeO man Rail-av and Harboresponsible for protecting the countty'i nrpanindandan Proon Service. The black homelands alto have security fotcc* thai -or* closely with South African units.

8 toeaftg of NonwAi'fe Sreur.ii. Pmonnel. There hav* been no tt port* tbc* far of noo-Kites defecting from thr security force* Dlaek policemeneputation ol being tougher on black* than ar*

HOffMN

CW

v/NgatrWTiTOAcr/*

policemen, In addition, (bete have been torn* report, of biac*rem certain infaaJ groups being deployed in areas predominantly populated bv blacka from ether hostile tr.bai groups.ercent of tbc timelack, if thousands of black poocemcn began deserting, tbe government could replace them -rih personnel frocn tbepol.ee inmaU Ot the Army Historically, tfir--hrtecgune in southern Rhodesia etEeneoeed almost no dcfectiotu from iti Itrgriv black security forces deio-le their being targeted by intuiEcoii

1 Secun'u and Town Planning. Secvifity iiunt in town planning Meet buckne purposely separated by gtcai distances Itom -hit*and urban areas and jcceuibfe onlyew roada By Qfcagolice can quickly mlownshiprou tituation. the government could ihut off water and fcod uppl.es Security ctrauieratiora has* tboawr part la deter mining the internal design ol black township*governing 'he design of black townships have been intended to provide rtot poiice -ith Tan-mum maryeuveiabdily. General guidelines followed by

civil engineers and architects pkanmng black townahips

near Durbanalled for

Township roadi wide enoughouth African atmored personnel carriertuns

Houses buiil no closerpecified distance so as not to impede oolite -eaptni fur tnd to make il more difficultugitive to evade authorities

nt age po>nt5 for police len-ciei so gather and monitor wide area* of the lownship

A distance between theof thehip and mainin Ihe area that eseeed-ed the rangeigh-powered rifle, presumably to protectrt lice, int peri andani police ihots in ihe eventcnou* disturbance

Jktf

ANNEX 0

Indicators of Evciutior.ary end Revolutionary Chcsrvge

lollo-irm arc checklists of tvWuiionuY and revolutionary indicators lor devtSotaneoQ In South Africa. None of these indicatory should be interpreted in laobtion. but th* ilkelihood of either seeriaiio unfolding will increase if the pattern of events in the nett few yeiirs mi iron one set of indicators more clotelv than the other

EWgtioeaary Cheney

The new polities' structure* setto inesude bbeks function even though many bWki choose not to participate

Bbck-owned stores multiply dramatically io both white and black areas.

The ANC continues its bombing campaign, but is meracked by internal eaueniior.

The governniene receives Iracteased revenues that allow for greater erpenditurei oa services to blacksttSuui raising costsoe in gold prsces or sale of parastataii.

Pretoria enter* into fruitful tails with the CDF or ANC

The govrmment offers various options to theadministrations, includingonfederal intern

New- bbck police easts in the tewnatupe draatxaliv reduce tht bagh crime rate in the towmhipv prorect progoverncaent blacks, and prevent flareups from spreading

.Nonwhile itudent tSemonstraticea continue ipoiad.-cnl'y but Increiiingly are viewed bv lhc blackas dimiplive and counterproductive

Pretoria writes off rent arrears that hate accumubt-cd in vinous areas of the countryesult of boycotts.

The new llegaonal Service Coancib berncae cti-duiti for eiparided fonds to develop black lowrah.p*

The government rebiet its hounng iiandarrb. and private indusiry responds bv proud log low-costunits that are built on the prrypSvery of rusting townships.

The National Party wins electionsarginal number of seats to the Conservative Party but picking up seatsloundeting Progressive Federal Patty

naition occur* as Botha retires aed is urrerededeader whoeformand has good rebtionj with the rarmwhite* r. enter nmmr

Almoal all petty araarthesdlegal barriers separating the laces in public settings and socialeradicated, although residential ar-cat remain largely segregated.

The government creates new oppotlunilies and incentives for bbck upward rnobilifr. lubsliniiailv altering South Africa's racial cute system, in the

ReveArtionrary Ineaeotors

The ANC'ing establishes active cells in alt black towmhips and begins to systematicahip away at white resolve with tcrioriyt attacks andbombings.

The Ind-an and Colored chamberi in Parliamentalkoutesult ofesses in suppressing black unrest

Tbe erggioeny goesesult of cirri mi rig gold prices, capital flight and Ihe coflapaeof the rand.

Pictorial effortsecruit new bbck policemen are unsuccessful.

South Africa is bit by another devaalattn* cycle of drought that prompts rural blacks to pour into the already overcrowded urban areas.

A white backlash to reform seeds many National Part* member* of Pirturoervt to defect le the Corner -tattve Party

dela dies in prison, leading lo violent protein and work strike* nationwide

Jkff

A railitatr bbck cofjoousneu tfeologvopular among tsonwates and fneh growing anti-hue sentiaieni and attacks.

Inkalha move* into activethe government.

isassieutrd b* bbck or -hite eitremutt.uccession cruis develops that pnialvm the Government or leadsew retime thai abandon* ret'oern.

The police makeaHheaiteri effort lo nop rKhtwIcs militant (roups from carrying out attack* leairut white liberal* and progoveinrncnt obeli.

The bbck labor rn overrent eipands rapidl* and initiates an all-out campaign to ritnct polilieal con-cessions from the %overnrMnL

Nervous whiles in rural areas begin iliootinsi 'suipi-oous-lool.mt' black.

The Transvaal and Orange Free State provincial blanches of the Naii-nat Parly split nil lo form their own party and ilo- down reform.

Various hornebnd administration* come under its-tematic aitaek from militant bbek group* ami coibpte

Sbcks inrrras.nejv engage in industrial ubrrage and random attacks on government property

XUritst-Leniorst doctnnn become more ranpular among bbck itudcnti and activists who indoctrinate growing lumbers in the lowships government effort* lo stop lhc trend only increase the ideology's appeal

Original document.

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