Created: 7/1/1985

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible


WewniVigibodi InvcTvod (WNINTEl)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION Uncwlhofiiadubf-et to Oip;<il Sontflom


.Joe -ixiv-

NCCONTtACT- Met IIimwbWi tt> fteewaeo

Conwhoprktorf Wortnoiion

rarian ol tfiioriMatton


cmertcn Ho*AoflWied lor

oreign Oo-ernwMrrl Worwwtion


south africa's changing policy agenda: implications for us-socth african relations

key judgments


WaRMNC: Thel'auuinbouue of iKuiriolri "boie mb/ceizt :he




Th* following ii/tetiigmotarVof Iho fjftfwfei

Cemfaf krrtJIfjant*theki'tdtfltiy* AflBnrf.

Afytfiey, Old argon roriofii of Iht DtJpCBIWMft ol and

tr* T'taury.

Alio Pctlkipai'^gi

Th*iief ef rol the Army

OfrecfOr ol Neve*r. DaporTmerrt of the Nov

f olof rhe A> fore*

TJW Oveefor ef WeScwKe. Kaodova ie>i,orpi

Use Ovpartwenr of Cawci

key judgments

Chanted perjpectivrs and policies inre likely toIS-South African bilateral relations. We believe thiswdL continue for the "est several months as Washington aIo

each otheT* statements and actions. Tlicrenabfrhfccliltood, however, (hatew months renewed cooperation on mi rrs of shared interest wilt resume. Nevertheless, given South Africa's volatile domestic and regional problems, any present judgment must be tenia, live, and we do not ruleharper detertoralion that could lastonger period.

While the freedom of action of the Botha governmentundertake internal actions that would ease the strain in bilateral relations isits prrx>ccupatlun with restoringursue certain actions lha! would have this effect. The most fundamental of (he* would be to make substantial progress in resolving ihe issue at the root of domestic disorder in South Africa: the trtcltisioii ot blacks from national political life. One lev development would be winning ihe JttTeemeiil of Zulu Chief Milliliter Bulhcluzi and other major black leader] lo participale in the government'i reform process. Approval of Buthclezi's plan for multiracial administration of Natal Province would help, but Buthelezi and others have also made clear that the government musttatement of intent, recognize South African citizenship for allnd relrasc the irnprisorwrd African National Congress (ANQ leader Nelson Mandela. New South African Government actions and reform] Ihat would essentially meet thiie conditions would diminish opposition to the government andositive stimulus to bilateral relations.

Pretoria's perception] of us statements arid actions are ako important lo restoratun of cooperative .elalions. The Bothaappreciates thai Washington condemns apartheid and desires sociopolitical1 change In South Africa, but it is sensitive to US actions that derive from thai condemnation, such as possible new economicSuccessful effort] to block or diminish such prorjosed new sanctions would alleviate South African concern. Continued efforts by :he United Stales to persuade the surrounding stales that lhc presence of ANC guerrillas fosters insecurity, andggrcssivi? behavior, in Pretoria, would speak to Pretoria'] perception that Washington docs not understand its legitimale concerns. Renewed efforts to assist the

Mozambitiu: Government ar.ii encourage additional r'uropran support woiiid respond to frequent complaints bv South Africa that the West has not helped it to strengthen (he Nkomati Accordey element hi regional staoility. Similarly in Angola, any aclron by (he United Slates that would improve the pro*pects for Cuban troop withdrawal nr .in accommodation b> tween the ruling Popular Movement for theof Angob (Mf'LA) and Ihe insurgent Nalional Unionlhc Total Independence of Angola (UNITAJ would also be seen a* under wort tni US appreciation of broad securityin soulnem Africa.

In4 period, the South African Government fiursiird policies thai acknowledged the United St- rs as an important inlerfitn-lor In regional events. Examples include the Nkomali and Lusaka agreements with Mozambique and Angolaretoria aisu appeared lo payeed ti US suggestions, criticisms, and quiel pressures to speed domestic political and social reforms. Th,-willingness to undertake new initiatives was bases! in part on lb reading of ihe attiludes of the new US administration,niuad utility nf US diplomacy inrsis'rnt regional problems, increasing concern over Soviet Bloc threats, and the belief thatgovernments in Washington as well as London couldnique opportunity to blunt South Africa's growingl. mal isolation.-

Itevised arid changed South African pt-rceplioos olsivntv and domestic pressures have led Pretoria to policy II y, it has become preoccupied *ilh live need to reassert order over iis black population and reassure its while electorate in the face nf black protests, riots, strikes, and general diuiucno".

Regionally, the South African Government has lowered ilsas lo the usefulness of collaboration with IS regional dipio'iatic efforts, and it has moved lo reassert its interests ibrough unilateral actions,eturn to overtly coercive actions such as tin-5 raids inlo Botswana and Angola. Pretoria sees lhc Namibia/Angnlj negotiations as at an impasses disappointed that the L'isakj Agreement and Ihe subsequent South African withdrawal from Angola were not followed by any agreement by iheo patroi thengolan border to control incursions the South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO?.

Foremost among Pretoria's rcsponsn are increased and heavyhand-ed efforts lo curb protest and intimidate dissenters, to strike a! lhc ANC, both internally and regionally, and to continue efforts to win over leaders of black opinion in order lo persuade them In begin cnniMJia-tions wilh the Boiha government and participate in the government-ordered political process. Relations with neighboring stainsl as

international retailors* have been subordinated lo these domesticHeightened white resentment of Western criticism jfnJ threat, ofave? reduced the Botha government'* receptivity to US and Western demarche* and attempted interventions to change specific South African domejlfc actions. While it still desirrj constructive relatloru with Wajhingion, Pretoria's eipecntioni inf using ihe United Stales to break out of isolation or lo advance its regional sccuhly interests have been diminished and may be further reduced if WashinK-;on should increaser even invoke unctions.

During the neatonlhs. several volatile factors could work tu further strain US-Sooth African bilateral relations. These include:

The South African Government's deter in (nation lo reaain con-liole increasingly mililant black population, leading lo use of repressive tactic* that'" turn would provoke newn ihe West and demand* on Washington to lake punitive actions.

A continuing South African recession lhat hits hardest at live black population by raising unemr,Iovment and cutting governservices

Heightened concern in South Africa for its sovereignty, which could mTjie^gieateror inlerdic'.ion of official ande US efforts lo fundromote activities inside lb* co-intry. US pros/Jam* thatssistance to education, hu.nan rights groups, andrade unions could Ju0er.

Continuing ANCandSWAPO1 nf sabotage and tcrrnr-ism lhat will genente demand* amc. _government'* mottconsliluencies lo strike back at home and in th.-region.

At If- lime time, however, other factors will work to limit the bilateral fallout and slafa.Jiw relations. These include;

The Bolha govern men t'j continuing recognition that It must avoid lolal isolatlc.'i from theiew shared bv the increasingly influential business community. Concern aboutcholoccal effect of Western sanctions ind increased isolation on white citizens also will temper South African reactions.

The Bolha government's continuingion ofreform and pursuit of dLik*ue with bLck opinionncluding even discreet contacts withesident Tamr-o. This will work to P'^toria's favor even if talks do rot bear iramedia'- fruit.

L's and Western dependence on South African minerals j* well as Southeed fur Westernik-Ii willsen in the I- months.

Tho concern s! ami by Pretoria ami Washington about Soviet iiloc activities in Africa ami their iiimmnn goals of urcuniscrib-ing and rolling buck Soviet advances.

The increased diplomatic interaction and conperatise escliaiives *tth some African states, particularly the Frontline Stairs, which Southiplomatic efforts have brought are gains that the .egime will bo reluctant lo forsake. The,ariety of opportunities fo. South Africi to exercise infWme and seek to aci'ieve its .'i-gional and domestic gnulsehind-1tie-scenes exchanges with black African leader*.

ebtions stabilize a'ter some months or continue to deteriorate, lhc currmt altenualion of US-Sii 'h African rrbtium contains important implications for ihe United States. Over the nest several months:

Pretoria win become increasinglyreceptive to I'S advise, (etnies!s.nd efforts to consult.

There will be increasing domestic pressure onnent to retaliate against L'S criticism awl pmsiblebut Pretoria willn defuse such pressuresby rhetoric. The harassment or interdict inn nfrograms such as scholarship, human rights, or ir.uL- union financial aid programs cannot be ruled out.

The. momentum for voluntaryn South Africa is likely lo accelerate.:


Continuing heavyhanded repression by South Africa of dnrrtii-tic dissent and attacks on ANC facilities nut side its burdenCreole Hew pressures on Washington to "punish" South Africa.inimum, new L'N Security Council resolutions propr^iru Chapter VIJ mandatory sanctions may be expected.

Any new restrictions on L'S nuclrar technology transfer to South Africa could derail discussions concerning further increase of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) survriJIancu andouth African nuclear production

South Africa's Changing Policy Agenda: Implications for US-South African Relations


WARNING: The maWtaJ in this docurMot is sensitive. Duinbutwn of tha Esamatc is tuxtiy tiicitcd to ticse officials who teouiie amis to the subject matter for the ccffooiaacc of ujdi duties.


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in in< orrrnrmon nl

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he material in inia document ii Scnsiiivt. Distribution si thistricfiy limitedtliciali 'afco require acifss to iJw su&.icc; mailer for ihef their duties.


this estimatessued by the director of central intelligence.

the national foreign intelligence board concurs.

Theintail^tmacrtiopaled in fA* prtoorslicn at the Eiiimalt;

Tha Cartwcl tnirJlcant*iht Cg'tnta Inuligatwarha Noitoooionaq.amiKoot olStoia ond

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ThaiCW" rcr IrrtAywo


TXa Au-nonl CW ol Srrjff.Orpcvimci al it* Air fart*

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key judgments

changed, perspectives and policies in pretoria are i'keiyrit, in bilateral relations. wehis-^continue for :he next several months as WjsjjMtcnreact tc

eachstatements and actions. thereeasonable^nvelihood. however, thatew months renewed cooperation in mailers of shared interest will resume. nevertheless, giver jouth africa's volatile domesiic and regional problems, any present judgment must beand we rjo not ruleharper deterioration that could las'onger period.

while the freedom of action of trie botha government tv undertake internal actions that would ease the strain in bilateral relations isits preoccupation with restoring domesi-ccould pursue certain actions that would have this effect. the mostf these would be to make substantial progress in revolving the issue at the root of domestic disorder in south afiica: the" on* key tievebpmeni would bp winning the agreement oi' zulu chici minister eutheie;'. and other major black lenders lo participaie ir: ihe government's reform process. approval of rjuthelezi's plan for multiracial administration of natal province wo.ild help, but bulheiezi and others hjvt?ade clear that the government musttatement of intent, recognize south african citizenship for ail blacks, and releaseapnsoned african national congress (anq leader nelson mande'j.h african government actions and reforms that would essentiathe;-cor.chiions would diminish opposition to the government andositive stimulus to bilateral relations.

pretoria's perceptions of us statements ande aim important to restoration of cooperative relations. the bolhaappreciates that washington condemns apartheid and dev.rcs sociopolitical change in south africa, but it is sensitive to us actions lhat derive from tha! cendemration, such as possible new economicsuccessful efforts to block' cr diminish such proposed new sanctions would alleviate south african concern. continued efforts b> the united St3lcs to persuade thesurro-mding slates that the prefers or anc guerrillasnsecurity, and cor.seo.uen; assresske behavior,toria would speakretoria's perception that washington does not understand itsmale concerns. renewed effortstti* I

Mo2ambie-ue Government and encourace additional European support woutc cipond to frequent complaints by South Africa that the West ha* not helped it to strengthen :he Nkomatiey element til regional stability. Similarly in Angola, any action by the United Stales that would ifporuve thefor Cuban troop withdrawal or jo accommodation between the ruling Popular Movement for theof AngolaA) and lhc insurgent National Vnion for the Tolul Independence of Angola (UN1TA) would also be ;een as underscoiini: US appreciation of broad security concerns in southern Africa.

In thepet,cd. the South African Government pursued policies tha: acknowledged the United States a* an impc/tan: infer loeu-tor in regionailcs include the Nkomati and Lusaka agreements with Mozambique and Angola in ID-VS. Prctoru aisu appeared to pay greater heei to US suggestions, criticisms, and quiet pressures to <ceed domestic political and social reforms. Thewi'!:ngness lo undertake new initiatives wuv basei! in part on its reading of ihe attitudes of the new US administration, the recomi./tii utility of US diplomacy in resolving persistent regional problems, increasing concern iver Soviet Blc: threats, and the belief that cnuses-vativc governments inonell si London couldnique opporluuily to blunt South Africa's growing internalio::jt isolation.

Revised and charted South African pe":eption< nfridomestically, i: has become preoccupied with the need to reassert order over its black copublionreassure its white electorate in ihe face of black protests, riots, strikes, anc' general rJiisitjc.'ice.

Regionally, the South Africanowered itsaSto the iwctulnva ofegional diplomaticd ii has moved lo reassert ils interests through iuiiljlc-ol actions,eturnoercive actions such as theidi inio Botswana and Angel; Pretorialite Namibia, Ana-da negotiations as at an impasse ant! is disappointed that tht- Lusakahe 'ubsecjuen! So' African withdraw a! iVu Angola were nol followed by agreement b) the MPLA to palm liie N'ainibian-Angolan border Inncursions by the South-West Africa People's Oraani73tion .SW.APOJ.

mong Pretoria* responses are increased and heavy haeffortsurb protest and intimidate dissenters, to strike ald rcg'ena'.ly. and lo continue efforts to winof bbek opinion in order to persuade them to Iwgiiiwith the Botha government andi i. i

inienurional retalwnj have teen .ubordinatedhese domesticHeightened white resentment of Western cpttcism and thrcau of sanctions have reduced the 3otiu government's recectivitvS and Western demarches and attempted intervention! to charge ipecifec South Africanims. While rf stil! desires constructs relations with Washington,xpectations it. 'crmsng the United Sta:es to break ou. ofo advance its regionalnterests have been diminished and may be further reduced if Wjvhing-ton should increase iu criticism or even invoke sanctions

Dunne the cetiitonlhs. several volatile factors could work tc further strain US-South African bilateral relations. These

The South Africane*ermiiu*ion to it-gunover the increaai.ieJv mtiitant bbek popuation. leading to use of repressive (setts that in turn vouM provoke new outcries in :he West and demands en Washingtontake punitive actions.

A continuing South African recession that hits hardest at the blacky railing unemployment and

Heightened concern in South Africa for its sovereignty, wh-ch could cause greater scrutiny or interdiction of official and private US efforts tond promote activities insidery US programs that provide assurance to education, human rights groups, and nonwhite trade unions could luffcr.

Continuing ANC and SWAPO programs of sabotage andthat will generate demands among the government's most important constituencies to strike hack at home and In the region.

At the same time, however, other factors will work to limit (he bilateral fallout and stabilize relations. These include

The Botharnmert's continuing recognition that it musttotal isolation ftom theiew sh-red by the increasingly influential business community Concern about the psychological effect of Wciern sanctions and mcr-ased iWation on white citizens also will lemper South African reactions.

The Botha government's continuing implementation ofreform and pursuit of dialogue with black opinion leaders, includingdiscreet conlacls with ANC Piesidcnl Tamboill work to Pretoria's favor even if talks do nol bear immediate fruit.


I --

us 3nddependence on south african minerals as well ai southeed for western markets, which will not lessen in the nu.Ttonths.

the concern shared bv pretoria and washington about soc activities in africa andommon goals ofng and rciling back soviet advances.

the increased diplomatic interaction ands with some african states, particularly the frontline states, which south africa's diplomatic efforts haie brought and are gains that the regime will be reluctant to forsake. theyariety of opportunities for south africa to exercise influence and seekchieve its regional and domestic seals through behind-:he-scenes exchanges with black african leaders

whether relations stabilize after some months or continue 'o deteriorate, the current attenuation of us-south african relations contains important implications for the united states over the next several months'

pretoria will become increasingly nonreceptive to l's advice, requests, pressures, and efforts to consult.

there will be increasing domestic presturc on the botha government to retaliate against ls criticism iifld possiblebut pretoria will attemptefuse such pressures pri* marily by rhetoric. the harassment or interdiction of official l's programs such as scholarship, human rights, or trade union financial aid programs cannot be ruled out.

momentum for voluntaryby usafrica is likely to,

ntinuing heavy-handed repression bv south africai attacks on anc facilities outside its borders wt!!

new pressureinimum.chapter vi! manda

'punish" southesolutions proposing

to south -the: increase: of

any new restrictions onmi clearolo africa could derail discussions concerning internationa atomic energy agcnci f south african nuclear produciion.


Recen. South African Government actionsUS-South African relations and altered ihe Patternelatburta previlenl during theperiod. In our judgment, these stresses and change* have been caused by changes I* South Africa iand pnotllle* and have driven corresponding changes In is policies

ecent National letei'ieencethe Southn to eirfcat iti poteniuJ aa the rJeeolroc. regional eeonorntc aad military power ttO. at the tame time, reshape ru de-ivestie aocart* tad SOW* In recentr*ca hai followedvariety of policies in pursuing these soaii. 'heeavy use of coercion rnioruih. combined with the rjegsnninga ol systemic domestic reform Out use the

ertod. South Africa pursuedL'S regional dlnlumttie enacts and at lentof ittenllveness to L'S has beenof the use ol coercion, both regionallya continuation ofa

deemcAajts on Use utility of CS regional dipaorr-acr.

Bases for locreciecl Cooejerct-on

J Shonrv after sanareiaei eclceStateMisasterl P W

Botha emphaaucd th* iTtportsnee for South rVfrkl of brealcine out of itsaetatius iron tfcn Wei: Senior South African ortkials lepestedlvapparentlyPretona mmtotal arulauaht" by ihe trowing strength ofloc force* In the region and ihai. unless rrbiicns withest were Improved. South Africa ultimately would have to face theRotha 1uo sketchedegveaut policyonstelli'ion of states" thai -acid be economically interdependent jrd loaned bv mutual owiaiMremon pacr*


'ats twaaoai rM

a. The fcVilhaim perenved the nerd to make changes to accommodate rising blackihai dearly ran the risk ol liiriher dividing and polariiing ihe white electorate andthe traditions! bases ol support lor the ruling .National Ptitv WkSc oot retreating from white control ofotha lectured hia -hue constituents thaisi 'adapt or die* arderves of reforms that tr-Haded giiniiag iioaeu ooikical rights to Colored and Indue esifionue* and the rrtaotionaboUton ol provocative rzetA social laws hi il HI on to cn-tcst iarge ficmenis of ihe ncei-hne pcpvLtaor.

i South Africa's "rtehborio suDOort to the ism* Botha plancensreilaiion ol itales" and foimed theSouihrrnegional organisation eacluding

South Africa lhat wai jt$it*t4 ks *limmatolates' I'ccnomie dependence Sooth Africa,

0rom South Airiest perspective, the new IS odminittralion. as well aa the Conservative Thatcher aovrrriment in the United Kingdom -ai weno South Africa's comer-aiive ami ComnvoeKit. anti-Smict attitudes Pretoria saw thisr-oue opportunity to esubksh clowrelatioivs with Wpsteva eo>erroroci. etrao* Intel the gro-ing laolaimn. sod ai the sane time he-.ter reaMi Soviet mc-oactirr.rtt!

T Ptetnrui'i regional agenda dasHceg. coercive measures. Militaryrs.dt. and .ioi ver, clandestine support.tof this"Inch iinlin-

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ooperation With tbe Untied Stem

o.umber of reason* Soiilh Ainuactics in3apitsiUe on cast coercion jna t'S diplomat* erTcrts to achieve in resio-naihive remained cont.-anl through -out. Thii ihif: was wn likely based on the follow tng consider si.or&

Belief tnjt the United Slaws couldeishbortntt Kates mio publicjnsii-tent with core South African 'nteicsis it acost and more eifeeiivrfv than arewioai arirtlv coercive policies.

Beliefhe need for regional tranquillity white undertaking contentiousclueajor cuRslitutionii rlurw.

Concern about ihe com of the eertttnued admin-Imaion of Namibia, and ihe tackriKiible iliertrjlive policy 'here.

Concern about "'here ther. MotamO'ouc waseading South Atr-.Ca in terms oi in open-ended commit-mem oi resoureejanei end-tame 'is.on.

Satisfaction eir'.ier diplomatic etforii.hieh appeared in synchrony "ith US regional riiVris.producinnerms oi ccomhiic and security jncerwa ridings withand Zimbabwe

Hope thai increased regicr-al ccotx-taiion couid drawW( to ihc United States, and ihe We9t. breakine. Cut. io a: lias! someot (he pro-low pattern a!igation from the West.

during this wiiod. the Bolhaalio benanmplement lu^slanlKeitouldenericul side effectlespomiveS calls for societalno South African Government his evercollide criticism of lUsscSliOiu io;al least some effort wa> made :oexpressions of L'S concern aaand Civil rishu cases

hcnginrj Soith African Pcrcsprlcns

African rsolicie; and5 io ihe drtrimenl of US-Southin particular, Preloiia appears lo viewin southern Africa ai less relet am to lisCon It or. id withblack unrest,African .eacVrihip has focused ,tsspecially ihe Heed to refbireiLpprrst iiiiiem. .ind reassure theffrtimiin Huewhitejrrci'.i.ivd tr' aret*cj id Die United

bfjtei andt (he leuilinute ^iliiitjltheOPri"Jiniimi* arid Jemcnsi rat ions ivm-Western outcries ot priKeit. Tlx' Sdot'i African mililars jivi !ujwed ^iracki into ncinhixnni: iianr;mihe aedvttlcs of the African Xjiionji ttoivenrud ihe Suuth-Wfit Africa HniDlcstSWAPOt

il. Si'ith Ifrican Covermneiit

apl ub!f . mi ii-l

fjeivmenitmjiioiw in inekinuhe Botha admimil'itiniv lees, the Nami-hia/AiMftia ncmnhtt.rn as ai anwiili sjm-Americans iinaHe loilrr the Popularl-rucir.niiili.inroposal MtiifaC'o'v looHow-hii tti'^Wt conirol jurrement 'u louuturivrc jiid 'i-pljce th*Lusaka

I J.>rrvomiiwcoritv officii* ihaioviet Blot> neither so mavme nor so imminent asjelieveii; senior Southhai the Sovirii ire on the defcnilie in much of Airlca.

I'. Tlvere aisorcvi>ihiu inhai US domesticailiinston lo alterM'nr nyoiHuc sifKtu>tu -iuiiiiIvj. This la-tief wet latllrfed tile Uu MM lis hiirecioirhi ari'i-apanhcid camixiiS'ic United Stales and Wasri.toi-lot'i tlronii fitbiitof Pretorui irilli* odsnnter iocreatinK lilatk unrest, itn

-:i . tin- Hi

introduced in CmwessaMf hy iVsihm^ioi.'t rcsoonw^ i> cont:nuedhamivd Siinilin jtt rvtlicendililary and paramilitary forms into AuxoL md BotswniB.

Changing African Policy Amende

t-l. In recent morUhj ilit Smith African ooliev resmnw to ilwse chaivsed dKuinsunecs awl iH-rct:-tions has beeome increasingly discernible.cornoo'ierti I'lirrneitti 'ifii>lie tic-.', the mil andmn-ytic

concernsignificant shift (torn those in the coned1 loh* drivingenewed o'ewrcuoaiion with internal developments, particularly ihe continuing obex unrest and outrightotha's wormh* major <overnment effort to eive black residents local seif-govwroirieni. which beganashe face of biack boycotts and intimidation ind the murder ol blackown councils are no longerlack violence, pj.iic-jlar'v in the Eastern Cape region but prevalent in alher areas is well, has resulted in the murder and intinidation ic" those blacks perceived as collaborators with tnecivil servants, and businessmen. Tli* Sf'h African Covernmcni continues to ascnt*-many ot its troubles to the machinations of external U'egai organizations such as theIn any case, the government sees itself as having no choice butespond to the triggering of the deep-seated white fearlosing control of the black population. The govern-merit's response thus far has included.

Suppression of domestic black dissent bv ir.timi-daiion. including arrests, detentions, and mall of those perceived bv the fovernmeiit to be leaders of ihe dissent.

A oreocciicatton with tne Aan over preoccupation, given its limited resources anddetermined eiforli lo suppress it both domestically and rcg'-onailv. Relationsivjt boring slates increasingly are driven by real oc support such states !cnd to South African dissident orgjupporters of military and paramilitaryagainsl the ANC. SWAPO. and the Pal' African Congiestpreviously baLnctd bv. if not subordinateOscovernment who argueore balanced approach shouldegionalappear to be owe stain ir. the as-end sidencc of this can be seea in ihe lane raid on ANC Jaclhiici in Botswana and ihe5 brie: incursion into southern Angola b> arrr.rd forces in hot pursuit ofSWAPO guerrillas.

New government efforts and reforms des.gncd to luce V'.ic'f* into participating in local andgovernment. As there efforts ;cnr,Tue to be re.ectcd by blacks as in;ccoi. ite.minent may pay mOiC attention to the tribal homeland biack leaders and those lewmhip "leaders" who areeu responsive to South Africanressures.

testifies* with and negative reaction to international criticism as the South Africanretreats into the "bager" mentality {referring to the- cucie nf Boer pioneerefensive formation against nativespsrur results in intemperate government staiemrnts an*efusal to acknowledge even the most evsreviioiishis wiJ inhibit at leastime the goverr* ineni's ability and willingness to coo&erate or even discuss certain issues withited Slates and the Wggl.

Reloiions-Ocmcejing Vorioblej

e believe there are several factor) at pby in South and between South Africa anil the Unitedairk to iurther strain bilateral relations and drive South Africa into an even more isolated, "laager" mentality reminiscent of its interna-iionjl siancein.

Washington and other Western capitalsnew economic sanctions !sce annes) against and measuresncrease the isolation ol the South African Government, that govrrnment and ihe white electorate will reacr am! respondinimum by vorbJ outbursts against theeovetnments. In addition. Pretoria isecrease the depth of diplomaticwirh th* "offenders"s ouiie likely that La and oiher Western missions in Pretoria will PC "sent to Coventry"ime in terms of senior official contacts. This will comeime when pressures from th* aggrieved States and in the United Nations are demanding thatnited Stalirs and other Western stales curb Sooth Africa's regional aggressiveness

Wesiern public criticism nf specific policies and actsons nf the South Africanwiil make it even more dimcul: lo amend

i .:

heirai seen by the "hue constituency jj giving insterna'i public ces-ure. The Operativeublic. spvcA that South African leaders haveonic responsiveness lo discreet, nonpublic external pressures.

: i

r blacksrrcits. de-ler.lions. and trial* of black poetical figures wel! known in theand new cress-border-il' ncalaic the rhetoric on ailaking ife more difficult tomiddle" Ground.

The continuing Soulh Aincan economicionihe ce*irc ior budieiarv austerity topercent inCation rate -ill limit ihe vjfowih ofservices to biici reside:.'!ime whenducation ind housinc are increaiinit. Slackalready aboutlready alienated blacks iust entche Wo market.

Continuing and probably increased ANC. PAC. ands< aadwit-fessed bv thejure ISS5 Trantieiadd to the O'ewuretrike out.

Relations-Stabilizing Fc.'ori

im ncrc thai: factors will worktabilise telattons:

3clba sovernmenr remains concerned aDout the impact oiialici from the We*i. This concernart cn ihe ttychologica! needs or the while eleclorite. and in part on ther its percr-piion thai theon not appreciate South Africa's

mjli importanceastion ofEuropeantion fan "utpiist ror

Wesiern. Christian. Democratic, and anti-Corn-mcnis.i. The'wihe potential for new Western in veil me nl to improve mediocre economic prospects as well as the need lor Western markets for Souili African products. While the need for general Western imports is i'cm acute, Pretoria Mil! depends on ihe West for advanced technologies

The Increajin; willingness, ofouth African businessAfrikaners wilh aceeu lo governmentpressure the Bothani to coniinuc political-ill wort ro blunt difeiencese Wen and inula Africa.

The Bolha government continues toctcrminaiion to pursue political, refo-ms drapitr domestic opposition and the lack of favorable intemailonal recncnilion. The pace and rjiure ot refs'ms in the few

- .

eurihemiorc. reforms that ultimately couldpowerh biacks al local and resi^nai levelset gamer at feast private if ino*iedsmcnt and cnco'.ragcrr.en! Irom some Western observers.

U5 and Wcsi Eorocean dependence on Sooth Africa's rnirtera's *ill limit to some eilent the abdilv and willingness at :he West to imposeanctions against ii lusl as South Africa is constrained bv lis dependencep-irinouth Africa, for ewnvple. accountsercent ofommunist production of.metals, aboutercvMercent ol chromium, and J3 percent of minuarse. Il ii the worldthird-largest produc-er of urinium and the largest producer of gold. South Africa oroides the United Slates with one-half or more of lb supplies of chromiumlatinum and roughly one-fourth of its industrial diamonds,anadium,. and Quoripur. We do no: see this dependence lessen-;du in tile ncit I- monihs.ockpihfii< jfid new technologic* attenuate itroail ifecree.

The client of Wot European investment in and sales lo South Af-lca also willnified Western approach West Eisrcwan investmenl and loans total JIG billion, and annual trade ii valued at St! bill.cnCO ontijh iobs. for euro pre. are estimated to be directly related to ct ports to South Africa. LS inieiiment ar-i! loans in South Africa7 billion, annul trade is valued at

i inciuues lina hack

Therenndainen about Soviet Bloc activity in an interest in cireunucrliVuv (Soviet Bloc

The Son ih Africanrusts itis .inlilciv to abandon all rtmona! diolonuce cifoiii or to completely deny the Unitedeaianal role Itniha reeognires. forthai the dio-omaiic efforts of the past few yearsrought his govcrnmeni someand /ecotinilitin.

The inercnsed diplomatic irtci.niion and copcr-ative e'changcssome Africanthe frontlineSouih Africa's diplomatic efforts havet are ti.iins ihe icsjime will he reluctant io forsake Tiie>arirty of opporlunilic* lor South Africa lo

eTereiS* influenceo *elu*v* US IRDOIUl

and domestic goats throughetcbustci with black Aincaui lenders,

Elsewhere, ttaiemer-is beahi moVaie that mi "enertudoptraNamibia is not rese-ai-iueiic-Soeth Alnej is HWr lo reeainue ie pariicipait3 efforts ieaeaibtitaa ;Sc fiaraerworfc of United Nations Security Council ResoluUeo JOS. while coatineiBgtploie whalee as Ihe unlikely Optionactionoalmen icvem-ment outside the smbil of that Resolution

Alternative Scenarios

he Interplay of variables tendin| lo disrupt VS-Souih African reiailons and those thit wotk to promote more Msble lies lUejeiUplumbiccuring ihe neitonth*ene decline followed by resiabdiiation af leUtionsore precipitate decline as South Africa rcireati into theverall. we believe the Bnt icenarto more likely and en.Wteriorallan c) relations for some months followed byHabliiuiioo that -ill Xrmilooc*raiioe eo marten or uWrd interest ia our -uJgmeol. rtt.ttuea wul aat dnrnann to the tevefe Prunestated that the United Staleseatci threat to South Afnta than iniemai-xul But ihn period el eetrrtOcauon could iutmuch of the rteil IS reontlv. tod thereeal ocatsoditv that the ioterplai ef facton.he action- reactionexnbrd below, could deepen and eiiend it Uiend our Euimatr

Seitobit ration

etabiirulion icenirio similar to two earlier perioeli of ureas In US-South African relations. Following0 Sharpevllle massacre and the enactment of diaconian leeuntv laws, ihe Uniied States Imposed unilateral sanetwtis (binning arms saiei nival visiti and EiporMmpoit Bank financing of eiporti to South Africa! Similarly, following theowelo riob and subsequent lecunty cricWdo-n. the Uniied Nations7 Impoted mandator/ iane-lions or. arms sales and the United States Imposed new LTJate.-al bans on aalei of all goodt and lervKet io the Seuth African military and colice. Th* USabo endorsed the Sullivan Code of fair emeMoy-meai practices for US bwliieues in South Afnta. In boch eases ire] period ef ewataalirifiel rrbttcRt -as fctta-ed by quietly


lesmced dialogue and .oo pern ion The Habdiution fitters"oth utuat.ons in ibe lhawing of bilateral retanont Factors thai proenote this tccruno would inc.udc

Continued public pottunng against US cnitciim aad lanelieea bv South Kirea'i 'eaden to ip-peise dorsestic coeistitoencei butvtar*elaxation. Dipiceaatic contacts, (or eumple.euid quietly continue while public corMScU and asil back

Severe limitation of Soulhiiary and paramilitary stlatai into neigribor-mg retrioru. South Africa maypnvale aasur-ances thai itsmiliiary goal) are limited and have been achievedases of egregiouivJily viiibie terrorism.would look for (he government to rely on public and pnvale pin-sine to energiie neighbonng states to tale mess-jies againstPAC. and SWaPO activities.

An effor to draw tbe United States buckore active diplomatic dialogue, perhaps. shared concern tboutniereiii in ibe region.

enewed, high-levelof US dpioowi* pcrsenriel in Couthrtca. perhaps esiablahmg ehanneli uUivg Cabutel memoers ceeuadetedliberal t* African, standards.

Decnne ia black township nolenee er ugro lhat reene biaek leaders were movingaecep-lance of government refonni To cite eedy tM poittbility. Zulu leeeleracceptance eJ some form off Natal Provtnce would encourage the government to keep nyine. The Kmicbndesline dialogue by emisurmhe Botha governmentANC Piifldeni Tambo in Lusaka.i.l. cs,i. siccratton by Bothaossible release from prison of ANC ieader Nelvon Msndcla. ihould iheyome prcupeet ot Weiirrn reeoneil' ialion. also could change percepllom oi ihn regime's commilment to iignlUcanl domestic lefoirn.

. Nn- US actieni in the tegion that Pretoria would interpret as supportive ol Soulh African lon-ctrm fLiampfes of wch actons that wouldositive impactireng effort to deflect or dimuush puniliye economic meaa-urt* eontmoed eeforts toto tolerate ihe preserxe of ANC or SWaPO raerri'Us. renewal rBorti to aiaue "Ik

Mozambtoue Government; or action* in regardngela thai wontd be perceived In Pretoria a* improving prospects for Cuban troop withdrawal or UNTTA-MPLA aOTrnmc-datiori

Serious OereHorct-on

nder this scenarioee an act ton-reaction tecuenceouldharp andcr:oration in bilateral reialiona. Wideipimd oijin-vesrmenr. tor example, couii toif Pretoria to reim-pose restrictions on the financial outflows of foreign ccmpanies in South Afnca. Such restrictions could prompt further Western economic sanctions. Another sequence could Stem from South African Government eSorU to restore order and restrain black dissent. Further "massacres" such as occurred at Uitenhage last March by security forces or the detaining of Nobel Peace Prize winner Bishop Desmondnot implausible scenario even Tutu's outspokenness and politicalmost certiinjy would generatein the Welt for tougher action. Likewise, suable or frequent South African cross-border raids most certain^ would further alienate moderateleaders and give nse to immense pressures on the United Stales lo react forcefully. Factors that weikl pre mete (his scenario include.

An intenslBeation of South Africa's preoecnipa-tion with lettering domestic order and regionally attacking ANC PAC and SWaPO. Thise done at the eipenae of internal reforms and regional dialogue The South Africanhistorical Inability to distinguish between legitimate dissent and subversion would bebv increasing arrests, detentions, and trials CI nonvehite opinion leaders. Government use oi police and military forces, ill trained in nonlethal riot control, lo suppress demonsL'slions and riots could cause considerable civilian casualties.

A decision by South Africa to react to threats of sanctions or new sanctions by threatening or carrying out retaliate -ind Paul rig on the effects of sanctions to netghbonng states. For example. South Africa ccufd restrict repatriation of capital of foreign companies and could expel non-South African blacks from &bs in South Africa.

Heightened concern in South Africa for itswhich would cause greater scrutiny cr interd letter, of official and private US efforts lo fund ifC promote activities iruice the country. US measures such as disbursing greatly increased funds fcr education and human riahts. andptognnu that provide assistance tohuman rights groups, and nor.white trade unions could sutler.

clandestine and semi clandestinein the Untied Siaies designed to promote South Africa's point at view. Such icioris could run from paid triesouth Africa v. the covert funding of individuals and groups acting as unregistered lobbies andimilar program wasouth Africa3 and served as the basis of lhc "Muldergatc" scandal.

c the United Stetes

othdecline followed Pvapid deterioration insignificant implications for the United States. While we believe US interests and Average will suffer most should the second scenario unfold, weistancing between Pretoria and Washington for the next several months during which;

Pretoria will become increasingly nonrccepiive to US advice, requests, and pressures and, at minimum,engage in more vociferous anti-American public rhetoric as well asecrease in visible official contacts and consul*

There will bo increased pressure from hostile domestic audiences for the South Africanto react to US cnticism with concretePretoria will attempt to defuse these pressures by rhetoric rather than substance. However, official and private US programsnonwhite Southassistance to black students, trade unions, and civil and human rightsbe put on hold by the South Atricaa Government.

Therivate US com partiesei! off ttvir investment* and branches in South Africa could pick up [team in the face of growing domestic US pressure and SouthS companies,illion andork farceo tiO.OCO. collectively haveositive force for reforms including fairand homing practices, and also have played an important role I" pirating down apartheid in terms of housing, lob training. jisJ education of black employees and families Their departure wouldignificant force for

nonvsolent change is Southell aarij] L'S leverage an the South African Government

New uncTioni or restrictions on transfer of nu< clear technology to South Africa could undo recent discussions designee! to bring the seani-comroercial' scale Vj/iodaba Cranium Enrich* meat Plant under tr-emarvcrjl Mesne Energy Agency |IAEA) safeguards. They could alsothe peogrcsscducing Souths incentive to rvaccoed with developingew capabilities in Use nuclear fuel cycle naeh aa iperx furs reeenceaetng New restnetrorudiscourage future South African IAEA cooceraliao and co-aid provide an incentive for South Africa to proceed unilaterally with

developing new nuclear capabilities that would have serious advene effect) on proliferation.'The United States -ill come under 'releasing international pressure to unilaterally and coilec-tiveiv "punish'" Southretoria steps up efforts to suppress domestic dissent bv arrests, detention inals. and security forcestonng" measures in blackalr if rt earnes out more military and paramilitary cross-border Incursions. The United States, for eiaanole. would ilrnost certainly be forced to deal with new Security Council resolutionsChapter VII mandatory sanctions against South Africa.


impcct ciconomie Sanctions

ha* Ion* faced economicntended irifis>roee its internal rxol -otic.ri :ncj -net its control of Namibia In IMi- !the UNAssemblyensive economic Arab members of OPEC imposed an ml embargo against South Africa thai remains oftcallvarce,andatory inns embargo trttAunon was paaard by the I'M General Assemblyn each case South Africa responded -ilh programs of eiicom.ention. imoort .ubwilutton. and strategic stockpiling If has avowed heavy borrowing ovrrseas thai rmihl provide leverage to foreign miles of lis policies and has been willing lo damr down on economic powiS ifo conserve foreign eichange by slowing imports.

esult, the South African economy isore pared to -rather even widespread andeconomic sanctions (or teveial yeats.eicepooes. uocfcpasrs andprobably are adequate to provide basicat wet! as miBv oithat whites liave enioved. South Africaod reserve* iosia years wuhmeasures and an espansionapenmee and eipertise inembargoes probably would allow ilstockpiles of oil and ether key imports

Widespread bars on new loans or investment would have little impact during trie currentestbus on ihe lone haul they would undermine Fictonai efforts to diversifyvw-ab *nd grains and ihus sajw economic growth. Blacks would mier mealert*fti real econoenie growth rate is needed even to hmd blackat itiercent raren loans or investments imposed by only onetwo of South Af rvea's trading partners- would have along-term impact.

Forcing Western companiesl eiutingSouth ' would rot add subsuatiallvan on new Investment Timofalenest certainlr would hurt currentmore than ihe South African economy,retain iL- prodiactne facilities. At mostsell-off of foreign investment! probablyd.irupt normal Snancial nanurtK'nacountry as Southto

putrhasc ioreign interrsts at bargain prices

cjioef ot sales of Southrugerrandloruledaciunted foeWrugerrand sales orercent olccording to press

lo-er slightly the world price of gold ard South Afrvcao foreign earnings io the eitentemand for other gold voms did not immediately replace demand fo* Kruger-ands. Over time.ins minted in other countries probably wouldthe tCrugefraavi sales, and thus cancel even thn minor dampening effect on the world gold price.

Original document.

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