US trade with Nicaragua.
Supporting the Nicaraguan democraticleaders, institutions, and objectives.
Insisting to the Nicaraguans that any resumption of serious bilateral talks with the US depends on their honoring Contadora and other commitments.
Making clear to the Cubans that any improvements in bilateral relations with them will only be pursued if they reduce their involvement in Nicaragua.
to improve the defensive capabilities of friendly states in the area, ^jj
3. The author proposes one specific action that seems sensible and overdue to me: bringing home our Ambassador and leaving the Embassy in
managua in the handsharge d'affaires. elieve her further recommendation thai we break relations altogetherad one. ove would make the us look petty, and would open the administration up to attacks from critics of both the right and left who would point out that we maintain full diplomatic relations with the soviets-sputh africans and other repressive governments around the world.
4. tne heritage foundation paperariety of further actions in areaselieve the us is already doing as much as is wise or feasible:
encourage central american leaders to offer more forthright support
for us policies. elieve the administration has enjoyed considerable success in this area and that asking more of the leaders of el salvador, honduras, costa rica or guatemala would risk undermining their position at home and making one or more of these
is that this idea is premature. virtually all oas members have indicated their distastes-led military solution to the nicaragua problem. elieve pushing this idea at this time would not only fail but would undermine other more positive and effective aspects of us policy.
elated matter, the paperoo-limited appreciation of the fact that the effectiveness of any us measures (and the ability to garner international support for our actions) turns on the success of the contras on the ground. just as the oas call for somoza to resign came at the end of junethe entire country was caught uphe civilwill contra military progress make any us program and series of diplomatic and political initiatives more workable.
marshal european support for trade sanctions. this notionisunderstanding of current european attitudes. the most we can hope for (and we are working on this)hat the europeans will refrain from increasing their assistance to compensate for the us embargo that virtually all oppose.
5. two of the items proposed by the author seem to roe to carry great Gangers. the first is the idea of the usicaraguanxile. witn the fdn controlling no territory and receiving only uncertain Dacking this action couldegal nightmareolitical embarrassment of the first order. elieve it wouldistake to provide cobra helicopter gunships to el salvador and honduras. congress would
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notlong with this. Moreover* this weapon system, if provided, would have the potential for misuse, especiallyl Salvador, that would undermine the Ouarte government's current positive momentum witn its own population, with the US Congress, ana in the region. The Hondurans for their part have higher priority needs than the helicopter gunshlp. The blow pipe surface-to-air missile woulducn more cost effective counter to the Nicaraguans'elicopters tnan would the Cobra.
6. Returning to thehink the real utility of the Heritage Foundation paper is that it effectively describes the Nicaragua problem and offers some concrete idea as to what might be done. Itorceful argument for the two aspects of US policy that are absolutely critical: ontinuing carefully calibrated and Increasing pressure of various kinds on tne Sandtnlsta regime, and ncreasing and publicizing our willingness to provide assistance to Nicaragua's neighbors and stand by them as they face the Nicaraguan threat. "jfHOriginal document.