Created: 5/1/1985

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Year* After 'l^'faV

Keyyears after Tito'* death inhe Yugoslav political system is

with serious and deepeniiiB problems but nonetheless ii proving

Sresilient than many of in detractors had predicied. The rieeeniral-

iicd. COilccltve leadcrsbwp has managed to provide iiabilily by responding loeorapettBf groups while denyingeady target against which to mobilize opposition

The system has benefited, moreover, from fairly wide support for the young nation's nrvfral and irsekrytisdejice. from the strong commitment of the military to preserving unity and Order, andraditional public concern over foreignfrom the Soviet Union. On the whole, most of Yugoslavia's small constituent republics, afraid from historical experience of going ii alone in theec no alternative to the current feccrarion.'j^

Still, strains over national policy seem inevitableystem thai has .inuallytalemate among the rival ethnic groups andontinued conflict among overlapping interest group* will almost certainly hamper serious reform effort* for some time to

Theillion Yugoslavs are sharply divided Over what is wrong with (heir system and how to fix il. Dsicusiions take place on miny planes and with few commonhe country is split politically betweenand aniiccntrglisis. ideologically between hardliners and moderates, and economically between advocates of market force* and ofmethods. The factions do not line up along conventional Communist patter iu and ars influenced by ethnic and regional economic congemiaJB

The leadership system will probably prove loo creakyake dramatic changes any lisne seson. Bui.harp economic and polKscal deienorsuo" or inier-eiuion by thewe do not predict a: lhe presentbelieve it wilt be flexible enough lo make minor / adjustment* thai will allowalling economic recovery and somewhat nvore political efficacy. We expect Belgrade will keep collectiveing but may creagihen central authority and ai least partially impiemeni more rational economic practices

with incremental changes, however, we expect llllle letup in either ihe

bickering; among rival group* or criticism of the leider-thip'i performance, including that rrora Use military. And we see no caiy resototion to the potentially disruptive ethnic and political conflict hi Serbia's Kosovoi major problem that would challenge any

Wt art all In ike lome tkolr. mS no eonduriorr,ont linrlngt/.

LCY Preildtum mtmber

Poit-Tiio tlavia hai lirUtt the moil pessimistic predictions about in fat* bvi rt rone'heJeu facte" -ith serious and mc-iaiinghe economic boon and iiUlatcd eipeetaiiems of the Tito yean arc ewer.he watchword, cimolcaiddebtighest per capita in Haitrrti Europe. Int five yean the average Yugoslav hai iiruceled0rop In real income, with wage (aim outpaced by inWitlon no* ruining at an annual rate of IS percent. One worler in ii* itnd many ire only marginally0%%

Long*landing ethnicremain serious, ihar-pened by the economic pinch ind vat: and growing development gap* among thehe future too It particularly troubled inutonomous province of Keaowo, tccaa of AKsanaenear after Tim* death. The haderiaip is stymied' dealing with Albanian nitiembtm. wh^ch in turn I*ackUih among the Serb* and ihutcrcittng ripple*ugotlavia'i multlniiion. al map

Yntotlinal leader* are in general agreement that the sytsem theyrean Tito it aoti at they booed Butiugree ihirpry ewer how to Qi it. Meanwhile, the publicnerei*>ngly gloomy over leadership inaction and nainfal. protracted aui-icily meaiut

role in the Nonaligned Meweoient. which Tito CC-four.ded. Il continues to defy Moscow by asserting the independence of all Communal panics and stressing that Yugoslovnot the Redwere the main author* of the modern Yugoslav ttate. While Yugoslavia also refuses to align itself with the West, i: It increasingly reliant on the IMF. and lit youthrowing wot-ard culturalM

Tiio. Legacy

The leadership system, dcngacd so exaare thai no one ethnic group woe Id dominaie ibeample* power-sharing amngcment pui into farce by Tito before hit death. The lop federal bodies, with the cicrpiion of the premiership, ire composed offrom each of Ihei* republics and two autonomouset fo-mata Tbe party and state hcadt are more like efnirmea of the, fioird than iciual leaders. *ad their positions route annually among represeniaiwe* of the regions

Tito'* "nianl wasnsure itibiiity and continuity after his death. He realisedno individual or group would be aeeepeaWe to theany corspei>ag political feces The syswm byUrge

-hi.. led. | trc

the tentiont caused by eacctsivety concentratedsuch is before World Wir II when Scrbii Clomi-mted ihe country. Buieen done at the cipensc of erTetti'C deeitionmaklng and policy

Some ol* the reasons the system i* so.

Limited federal power: The range of isiucs over which federal bodies can mike decisions It limited.

foreignof the fewn which the leader)hip it relativelycontinues it* policy of independence that began following Tito'* break with Sialintoderating

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The Elide Factor

The compley Yutottov political system was dtii/vta ia maammmtlam ike fwi'jilethnic

groups, many of <kem mutmaB, MHfsnW.of thereSlavic, they tomprtse ihm ma/orRoman Catholic, andapeak

Several lengucgei. Serbo-Croanan bring ihe ntoitThe northern half of the eoomry It tmorr

and central European, having hernby the Autiro-Hungarian Empire while thr poorer south evolved under Turkish dom. iff

Theup. the Serbs, conitiioiesercent of the populetioo and Is located In several of the t onstituent republics. The Serbs are the object of suspicion by the economicallywhom theyin fratricidal Struggle daring World Warand lhe even moreeveloped andStoveneiertuted into Ihii eeon-itmapulation of Muslim Slo'i mostly in Botnte-Ht'ttgevinamatt groirp of Monttne-grlm IHnd the Macedoniansertenil who Inhabit the louihernmoit republic. The larrrttheercent).high birthrate and difft'tnt cultural traditions hove touted ttralns among neighboring gr .

Sn'irllifvt Aiiinmr" ueoila.il

many areas fall under lhe competence of tht regwns othich sursue divergent, ofliaaccord isa(ed. policies

- Consensus decisionmaking: IK* widespread us* of consensus (unar.ineouij decisionmaking in federal bodies allow* each region lo block action on anyaht region* fed liee lo exercise

Waak enforcement mecharusaM' Few enforcement mechanismi caiit to ensure i'ii federal andbureaucracies will carry oat decision* "IftBJk

A Feudahstic Parly

A re.1ettion of Yugoslavia's strength* andiu Cootai.na.UagaeDespite iit Ma rim

the LCY it organiicd along almost feudal Itncs and opeiatet accordingetwork of personal ties much lhe same- political orgnnintions in pre-Commvmit days. Its officials move in and out of nonparty orgaaitat rons. forming local chtes thaitbe cooatry'i real power centers. TW LCY differs from Soviet Oloc Communist parties in several key wan Mon of these features were pieteni during Tito's lime but have grown more pronounced during the pastyear*

regional power: The regional panoarge voice in centra! (tarty decisionmakingigh degree of autonomy. Their leaders arelo their own local bate, and cHoris by lhe central parly apparent to replace item -rid be Offlcak al best.

Weak central authority: The Communist principle of democra(iefor majorityand ending the minority lo centralOnly ttoarsi rally in fore* and nose other bedylo cntare compliance. Unanimity is rare at the lop because it is rare among the regional parties.

- No itrocg leader. The top party body, lheisaiteats

are allocated to regional representatives accordinget formula Tbe lop leader rotates annually by region among the member*.

role ia (he system- The LCYkad.rg- but not commanding rot* ia tbe system. Tht LCY has no officials or bcdi'i that parallel the work of government organs, as do Scr-iei Bloc pariiet.

fntcrnul conflict: The pail; tolerates fas greater internal conflict than In bail Blocendency 'bit hai bccorapronounced to ihe ruling PicaicUaar. unateath-Indirect media controlV hat no official party daily, and the radM. television, and icc.cnal dailies nt not directly aider party or other central control. Many media hawincreasinglyte: Tito'i deitX actingorce Ihttpublict idcatibc* iiiueii edd-cssed.

Military role: The military,onpolitteil oreinijalion, hai more farmnl rcprcicntatlori (it the LCY--and more direct nftuence in ihe politicalthe Soviet Dine military it their panics Itesti in the LCY Central Ceatirrutioc.crctnt of that body, and the head of the military'i paity organization itlace on the LCY

United Central CororaaMl

Like tht party, tha central government hai Itntrthan mosteven many Weltfuro-peaa gO*eramemi. Ceat feral over bey economic kveri )ach it foreign eichaagc. balking, ua rata, trade, ie iitneni. andhared with reg onil authorities. The federal bulge! consists miinly of defcrue. military peniioni.and aid programs to the leu developed regions

Of the lop grecmmutal bodies the Federalrie "maeconomic policy ma Msg body slice Tito*death, acting aiih authority andautonomy more akinest European (tin Soviet Bloc cabinet. Several factors help accoaite FEC's influence:

The raemptiao of the premier*hip from the one-year rotation, allowing for ton inc-ship role not giVeaia* ever cbangiag head of

the party Presidiumate PresidVaOy.

Tht strong personality aid keen political ikillt of Premier Milka Planinc.iiarictf her four-year termespite hei lackluster record ai

Croatian party head ihrough much ofninc hat won widespread respect and rceogniilon in her latest pott. emer|ing is perhaps Ibe single most influential igurt in the post-Tito leadership

oACcniratiea of eroaamic tipe*ti on the FEC Staff, which gives Ii in edges-Mmic iiiuei over the Itsi well orginiied ind more divided LCY Pletidtun. snt! Slate,^0

r>ap-ic these* the FECs poweru lions Like tbe central pany apparatus theon the consent I'd cooncratioc. of thegad

is eicesslvtTy on the defeatIvt and thu liseak and inefficient federalby personnel policies--based on regionaldo not saffcicMtyacc^MtasaS the economy thaisecurity,defense,alTiirs.irong role has also madeconvenient target fc official*or fear that the FEC il oversteppingPlanine herself is troubled byit. StfJHHHaaf

The leading slate oriitiiatian. the collective nine-member Stale Presidency, hat broad poweri over defense, security, and foreign policy as well ai tho right io nominate the premier, propose action in the

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and itsue decreet in wartime IheUj - by of the coon-iVsand hei racedBread ranic of uiu'i

ecause ll sirwg pertooalititl hare leadedaneal oneaii. In rcuni -on'i te>erit ofore conaervKiiie Preiidency membersrilicifcd economic pol-cles idtnttfteC with Pre-nircr Planinc. rcSccting tn part.believe, ihcit concern oaer the FEC's llrong me Hfe

The bicameral Assembly hat grown contidenblyand iaaWncato'i limeadmg cheek en Ihe FEC and.than ihe ICY Centralonly every fewimponanl forumthe recusalcwi iheir differencesAssembly hat been

a vehicle lor tiienatfveniniihe role of ihe rcginrulceniertthe federal level and hai tomel<met cfiipUeed TEC bod.es in varting out interreg


coaacivairve Icaccri teem eeterramee" not io lei the Auembly grow too strong uace they fur it could further eclipse the party and uther in the beginningseitern-iiyle pari lamer tiry tytiem. The election of Ataembry cekgiiej.cr. itkaaoerai-ic than in moil Wiueraare cho-trn b> regional elites and not directly by the public.

Praimec for Change

Prcu.rc to evaluate critiea '< the poliiacal Systam sharpened after the YuprslJ"nto erir.ii and near insolvency following Tito's death. The prosperity of Tito't latrr years -due lir gcly toandeliance oa foreignpoiieiet that Ihe system Tito bequeathed to feu meets-sort made postible since il Itched either strict use of market criteria or strong, raiional central ptanninc. To gal out of lb* iritis aaeaae that Ihe economy wouldo improve its pertorminee. and this, in turn, would rCOjViri Changes in economic policy ind perhaps in theupersir-Hivrc.'apl


Hwr in*,Krr (vi. < fm

The Planinc government responded tocrisis bytbroeagh aa *eonomic wiBtliiauon program int called for curbiragorilieallrinveitmenit and introducing more market forces in investment, pricing, foralgn ciehar-ge rtlcs. andconomic decisions It alio implied greater leckrli control err sorx key (roormic Ictri. tweb ai monetary and credit aftocatroa. Intercti rales, aad fccciin eickangc utngc. Planinc's program was batedeport issued by ihe blue-ribbon Kraighrr Cnm-raittion. named for thei-dent who cha<rcdlf KnptcrocauC. the program would reduce the role of local bureaucrats In economic decmur making and thus deprive them of pditnal leverage.

The measuresoosthen the IMF got toagh aad iaittsed (bet*e enforced to Qualify Yugolavii for ttandbv loans. Dripitc the IMFmplementation of some measures Ms proceeded only Jowly and lulu IK. i> lucal olli-ciabuughiprivileges and thick' vorlcrv frurn in. inAiiiun and raane closings thai tietc mea*ure>ail dJB

Tbe governmeaitouk another, tenuiiocto

reevaluate theiyn. Ihe nrejeeib* ^aydanrugrewlve.Serbianvlnee Tito'swritten teieralon ikv need forAf Piwc'vhai beraefTeel of bureaucrav> aad rac dangerparochial intvrv.it Thebt'gimt- Mud.er 1upwiah reeomawndaiiont b-

April ofveil Mveo rcnani suggest Ibat Ihe body iv considering vuih ernngci iv making thelectoral vytiem mure dircei. cncouraglntof multiple candidates, reducing eunsensut dcei-

and sirenftFcn-ng Its* federal govern*

rncnt But dispuict on iFiese and otherc.revented the body from meeting its deadline |fl

The Party Debit* on Fedenliini

The party, hivins lost much of its influencenifying force since Titos death, tried to reassert


Itteir by author Ifationwide gimsicoit debate on the political system. The debate "in the result ol an LCY plenum onII* at which many dtlcgaic. demanded an end lo leadershipand(ion. The tcacCrsaip ofcily movedewth its own agendaIu restore greater federal autv aaej implicitl) mare Sertaanthe inf ihe discussions Tha merits of iheide, rhc Serbiana' confrontational (actio and lomcMrnes sleeping pronouncements led io one of lhe mom open and heated debates In the history of (he LCY or any ruling Communist pari)

The debate eamen iracunelutlvc (mills at aaonMarch |levcrul monthsThe plenum markedeibuckromote imtitutionjl change, and al teat',rleiiiry for defenders of regional rightspoliOs-al uilaiinjl statementregion jl differences that badofor the aeit

I.CbenOopiic this

Ihe debate -j- wispiieiani both

attsntwn un (he pony's rule .md inm.in>

Serbian I'ropotali

The Serbian progrjni cries ofparty plenum, and ktsdevship simcntcni- 1 oxnoall)

rvtv.ew.-din she system Tanad BtxfMtsfe

v.'s'ni'jlmj'imdx Joula-

(Un itegiunalhe Serbian poiarjmeiurn tusunicahit gruulcr iVfliral nuihti'iiy.e furty.alled Tor enfore-inr; th. principle of democratic Centralism, including iiouumging nurtvity Inotesi wonThe Serbian attack on cytswiuuaeak ai an LCY pi cumo October nhen prunaineat Serbia aOragetsla*pauJ-cl) eknuaekef broad ate at* nsaiority vcnlng a* lhe must "democratic'* method ofionng. Ccnt'ul governmentu'd Be urged to ret mux fureefully. and their tlilfi .be chosen more for competence than meeting ethnic quotas. In nne uf ihe mofc controversial movct. ihe Serbians nl.os.id that Hie Constitution should be amended unerc nesrcitat)eet current needs

Economice Serbianseptember regional plenum urged implementation of economic reform! already agreed open, but only partially implemented.llowgreater play to rraarkc: forces. Tne goal woald bend merVica autarkic praciscci and restore ibe "anily of Use Yugoslaval lhe aapense q/ Ibe regional oligarehsci.

Circaier Serbia: Indirectly related to (ha above concerns, the Serbiansovember republic plenum demanded dghter condor(heir (wo autonomous provinces.nd Vo|vooina. The province* each have substantial tor-Serband have usee? their ambigtous legal statusbstruct Serbia'sbote within Ihe republic and in the federal Of One Scn.ai idea. floated Ian


hreemembergai.on with on

s-otc to represent the republic and Ihe provinces in lhe LCYtate PresidencysfJJB

The Serbian proposals seem to have been motivated by anrowingspirit of Serbian ruiionalnffl. by an atlempinlit bosh Serbiaanil saC ideo'ocical modeiaka. andenu-<ae belief ia auai eases ibat these oscdSuras were m> the eoaatri's bets interests. Themg probaXr aba seemed light, at ihe party debatepco'luniii to aif-aicelB

Soft Suppoei

The Ss-(bljn leailcmhip quickly discoveredhe broad coalition of support i| hopedrogram never maierlaliacd. Instead, it found iiielf with only leniativc backing from two traditionaleaderships of Macedonia sad Montenegro. Tm> of (be coantiy'i least developed rcpabdVt. Matrdo^ii and Maatenegrolong supported voir ceacral-ired cconomac auihorily to gain mare access to northern-(tnt fated foeeign etehanit.aid. capital, and goods At the same lime, both appeared to be taken aback by the nationalistof ihe Serbian prog-am

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Macedonian support lor federalist meiiMirttabout lb* lime of thethat

fc-ctcd oaTtbe debate, but trui supportas theushed their ptogriai aggressively in tneimilar pa it cm xoi glace inAt the Jan* LCY Centraltte* plenum, tevcral Montenegrins sireddose to those of their Serbian countetparts. warning of pan* fragmentation and eicetsur defense of local interests. Montenegrin leaders. howr>ei. failed to join in the Strbiant' fall csmpauin. and notepublicani debate on Ji DecemBer did theyal'fWd support jf"g

Hard Optwttlfloa

The three remaining republic) and the twoprovinces, meanwhile, aired strong oppositionSerbian led federalization meaturci and putown views on bow to handle the crisis.thread in the opposition was that themutureshinly veiledor 1 to regainla* capc^sc

of other rrg.owt. Out cart of th* n bad other dixt*m. reflectingiiapping of interests that makes Yugoslav decisionmaking to complriflH

Stotenia. Slovenia opposed Ihe Serbian program not because or its mareniedinduitritius Slovenes Lave led the rnuntry in appiyUg marketbecause ihe centrapeooosah cotild alien- Belgraden ce-

morrn resource, to the poorernuWW

earlier (his yearajoritylovene party membeit want an even looser federation. Tholeadership wai fairly united itt -It.ieking the Serbian centram proposals. Some leaders6 October LCY plenum publicly allackrd Serbia's Dra-goslav Markovic forurtailment of conteniijsAoothcr Slovene itadcr. Stare OoUac. dec- Serbian ue iahen he visited Serbia's Voivedna province and urged the Serbians to stop trying to revamp the system and to simply work harder!



sap the republic Sloveniah kct-oriented n

C'to>tia. The leadership ol Crouiii opposedrolan, notecause Ibe centrals aspects could


i also bo reservMi



Icc'v. During lb"uspicious vi ot by lhe Serbiansheaiert


n leaneri

* of conittluiK'pal changes hinted no inn.id thesjj.cn of'" WHiCroeiwrtfori* no cobcrear alitiaatrvc kiMHb. rhe>ores ion of tony Mtaodoiy and discipline to prevent what tome of idem bel-cved vat "he LCY't evolution into many tcin-aiiiononioiis naili'

Btnaie. The leadership of Hunii HtMfH-iribehaeoi io then Mati-elv tight conned ft- tbeir republic The Bosanasibe Serbune for attemptingtbe gmt-Tilo order ind can dcniott on the Serbians* adherence to Communis! ideology.the Serbian iiarty't Nmember plenum. Dm man Mioncmar.iie warned against aitemitttabel at" proNcwant to trep lhe Cnntiitut-v. and linked attempt) iaicvampthe system with 'imiwuiv earnersunifter Bosnian tradelaier ia iVccrnbcr simi'd'h calked for "harsMi utikai ar-Cfiniiii' yih people who want lohe anlit-ral tssicm

A pi 'i i' and* fp/vncfinM Serbia's two autonomous prosKoacno and Vojvnd.na. onposed the Serbia" becauserns dealing nhuett threat ta rvoviiaculThe proposal* ici off tome af thr ibaipeii open polemics within Ihe ir until it >r. recent uiovo party plenumanuari. we leader tald thai thraused "anaiety tind ncrvoutnttl" and were "nol in line mill the corisIKu-nonalroiniiciitfficialrovincial plenum scxral day latei. ua.cH, cnllad taeb snortshange thet-carsttrnd and -i cptabje Temperatures remavsed aagk ai

recently ai April, when Serbian ard Vnnndnu dele

gutc* ariutd Ovr. Serb.an charge of provincial "uvl nnomiain

mmciciak h'.ve soughtun re'erred to federalere theyecure oulsirJe Suppo'iSerbia.

Oprnurik Versus Onkodok)

la rsnderr, -nr. the debates over eentia.isan and rte-vorat oiinca' twees locted horns over ihe appropriate degree of openublic II' the issue,oint ol conienlion in Yugcslav political lift, cutler) Iwo loose campa against

each other

AfOntacal and cwtiur-al -it essentialag the euuntrj deallonelily and elfecrively with its problems, this group ranged front liberal oriented writers and in-lellectuali io party moderates, such at SerbianNaiSartPasic. fanwing mruc democracythe party itscsf

onh-ni.ii group, believing the country hadeady stiayed ioofrom Margin principles and

1 lie the riiliiiral dcbalc. lhenlogicel iisueien et'vtic anditaacs Wbleaf rcgwanal seadt'ikit's contain both naode*-ates 1'lac Serbian and Slovenian ktdei-thirn have be- time ment closely identified villi more tolerant ideorufi'Ol policies, and those of CitsalUi. Bosnia and Vojvodina wiih hardline tendencies Their la Iter leaderships, set back on their heals by ihe Serins* otensne 'or autre eenriatin and economicotsgbt to throw Satbaa on the drlentive by deman-ting lightergreater partymlogical pericvj

Paliiieel C'esiti*"fMi

CArrirtitMiliM SOiiiCOna f frillOv-inf;

have Iieenlariy iroublewine

iA of tteftimnrneiling in Yugiiilarla ri'lttr-if thre-onented atltonret onion/ regionalltht-ngh In Soviet II I'M reunifies een'roh'Ht tend to be itleiilagieatn>(fir ore. hut niO'ii ure not The debate over

reforming the Syiien has rel'eeted ihest

riWft a



Economic MxbilifiicO'i: Piemiei f'laninc'i eeonann Mabil nationliOnn.lves have comeiowing attackrecent room hiwrciy itfdud Kciarail icaton. |^

economisl atiV Ceiilial Coinmn

lee plenum grotttec buckoan Central Committee

nine. Mm> ia id

vai.cil most vividlyllvruial olVtclErnde ini'lmiuli thai concluded in lie'srade in cSriy f'ebruary Aunfjucl) Yugoslav blendommuniSt-Sly'iCm.il gctj Western political I'ica'.ci. the Iriol idkctcd pressores by hardliners fur move ditcipline. by inlclleclvaK fur more freedom old by nrtkiilt ouis'Or Serbvii'nnirine the Scibian leader.hit) The weak evidencehe accused and rclniivcly lenieni sentence, meieri out nnne(scored leadership divisions nnd ineHecii'cnect.

Dispurr* nn Fcnnaiiiir Left illation

While Hie competing faction* deadlocked overn Hiti ly debate. Ilicy disputed

'- i. .'. Itn 'i; had miiutaiiaU fromdof theinert of foreignvoiced concern thai new moves lo centralize foreigneiehanBc hoklins. eoukl provide disincentive.their linm to oiporio generate an esporl-lcd recovery, premier I'lanm has announced trans'lionjl mensirrevto try tnac-conimodaie the needs of rhr variousmi ne long.term solutionlikely "ilound

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Original document.

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