Created: 4/25/1985

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Soviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the






Information available as of5 -ai ottii ui ihc preparation of ihii Estimate, which -ii avorovcd bv lheign Intelligence Board on that dale-



The following inteBigcnce organizations porticipatcd in the preparation ef the estimate:

Ihe Centre! MIAUI-II Agency, .he Dcfeme in.cfl.gence Agoney. tho Notionolgency, ond lhe intelligence organiralJo* of the Deportment! of State ond Energy.

Alio Participating:

The Auhtont Chiof of stall for Intelligence, Department of the Army The Director of Naval Intelligence. Deportment of Ihe Navy Ihe Aiiiitont Chief of SiaH. Intelligence. Department of the Air force Ihe Director af Intelligence, Meadowarine Corp.




A Offensive Fore


Bombers and Cruise

efensive Force

Ballistic Missile


Influencing Soviet Strategic

Political and Military



Strategic Offensive

Strategic Defensive

Implications of Strategic Force

P. Operations of Soviel Stralegic Forces in a

Preparations and Training of Nuclear Forces forfor Operation of Soviel Stralegic Forces in o

Impact of Future Systems on Soviet

G. Trends in Soviel Capabilities To Perform Strategic

Destroying Enemy Nuclear Delivery

Attacks on US Space

Neutralizing Enemy Command. Control, andand Other Support

Capabilities for Comprehensive Strategic

Survivability of Soviet Strategic Offensive

Protecting the USSR With Stralegic

< ^including

ANNEX A: Key Intelligence


9 9tV4


This8 summarizes (he lalest developments and projects fulure trends in Soviet weapons and supporting systems for strategicnuclear conflict. The Estimate contains projections of the size and composition of Soviet strategic forcesariety of circumstances, including the presence or absence of arms control constraints.

We focus on the USSR's strategy, plans, operations, and capabilities for strategic nuclear conflict as we believe Soviet leaders perceive them. Wc have emphasized Soviet views on the origin and natureS-Soviet nuclear conflict and how the Soviets would plan to operate and employ their forces during thr various phases ofar.

In evaluating their capabilities to accomplish strategic missions, the Soviets differ from us in terms of the operational factors they consider, the analytic techniques they use. and their criteria for success, in this Estimate wc have assessed trends in Soviet capabilities in terms familiar to US policymakers and analysts, although these assessments do not necessarily correspond to those the Soviets would make. We generally do not know how the Soviets specifically would evaluate theirand we have limited information pertaining to how they measure their ability to accomplish slralegic missions.

This Estimate is in three volumes in addition to separately issued Key Judgments:

I contains:

Summary of Soviet programs and capabilities believed to be of greatest interest to policymakers and defense planners.

Key Intelligence Gaps

Biblioguphy (Annex II).

II contains:

Key recent developments

Discussion of the Soviets" strategic doctrine and objectives, including their views on the probable origin and natureS-Soviet nuclear conflict

Descriptions of Soviet programs for the development and deployment of atnlagle offensive and defensive forces and supporting systems.

Projections of future Soviet strategic forces.

Description of Soviet command, control, and communications capabilities and discussion of the peacetime posture of Soviel strategic forces.

Discussion of Soviel concepts and plans for the operations of stralegic forces during the several phaseslobal conflict.

in the USSR's capabilities to carry out some missions of stralegic forces in nuclear conflict.

Volume III contains tables with detailed force projections and weapon characteristics.


Bv the, nearly all of lhe SovieU' currently deployed intercontinental nuclear attackand sea-based ballistic missiles and heavybe replaced by new andsystems. New mobtk- intercontjnerital ballistic missile* ICBM,ajlety of cruise missiles are about to enter the force The nurraber of deployed strategic force warheads will increaseewovei the neat five years, with the potential for greater expansion ine are concerned about Ihe Soviets' longslandlng commilment todefense, including an extensive program to protect their leadership, their potential to deploy widespread defenses against ballistic missiles, and their extensive efforts in directed-energy weapons (ethnologies,high-energy lasers Their vigorous effort in stralegic force research, development, and Cepio> men! ts not new. bul Is the result of an unswerving commitment for the past two decades to build up andheir strategic force ranamlities. (t)

he maioi changes in Ihe force will include:

- Significantly belter survivability Iromin the submarine-launched ballistic missile

(SLBM)quieter submarines and longer rangedeployment ofICBMs in both rail- and road-mobile modes. Deployment of mobile ICBMs will Improve the Soviet' capabilities lo use reserve aaaWtw (or refire' The largest element of their force capa butty, however, will continue lo be ICBM* in potentwlly vulnerable silos (See

An improved firalstrike capability againsttarget* Ihmugh conllnued deployment ol liallistic missile system* with increasingly belter accuracy, partlculatly through furtherto the heavy ICBM force

More deployed warheads in the ballistic misslk-force. as new systems carrying larger numbers <rf multiple irKicTjendeMJv targetable reentry vefii He* (MIRVs) replace older rytfeau

A substantially itKreased number of deliverable warhead* for the bomber loreeesult of the deployment of new bombers with long-tange. land-allack cruise limbic*

*o. an elrcrruno


Sn.icl Intercomincnlal Altack Forces-Warhead Mix

- Tlie introduction of Und-atUck sea- and ground-launched cruise missiles.

improvements to ihr capability tocommand, control, and commumcaiiom connectivity to all force*

-Enhanced operational flcxibilllv and loicc Mivta inability.

air defense capability agQtmt low-altitude targets

The Soviet* would be theo

Eapand their forces well beyond armsitnj forces, with increases in intercontinental attack forces fromeployed warheads at pieseni to0arheads

idespread ground-based anlihallistic misulo (ABM) system for terminal dcfmiu- of key

military and industrial targets.

A. Offensive Force Developments

he Soviets will replace most of the weapons in their it niece offensive forces with new or modern-ized weapons by theany of theseare now bring deployed or are in Bight-testing, and some are in prcilight developmenl iterc believe wc have identiBcd most of them, but in many caws wc do nolood knowledge of their chaiaclcriJtics.

Ballistic Missiles

4 ICBMi. The flight teat programs for the newt andCBMs are nearly completed, and the Soviets have made major strides in preparing for the deployment of these two ICBMi Themiles and improvement! or foltow-ons to them are expected to replace and aasume the missions of all the existing Soviel ICBM} rxcepl theeavy ICBM:

TheIRVed missile thai carrieseentry vehicles (BVS> It is similar In site to Peacekeeperlthough tlie warheads are smaller and the accuracy is not ai goodfor deploying theppear to be under way at the twoomplexes. W> eipect mIo deployment of this syitem will betin in6 and deployment on rail-mobile launchers7

Thes smaller, similar In size to Minute-man, and is equippedingle BV. Theill mil..Ik be deployed al aof newly constructed bases and convertedases. Two new bases for the mobileave been essentially completed, andormerases at two complexes in the ceotial USSR have been deactivated forlo theystem. The Soviets have started to retire ctdW silo-based ssngle-RV SS-lls in preparation loreployment Wethe mobileo be operational bye do not eipect il to be deployed in silos.

We also liavc evidence ol other developmenl programs for ICBMs thai could be deployed in thend.

information and analysis increase ourin our rudemcnl last year that the SovieU are developing and willewvV ICBM to replace tlieCBM. We expect this system will have improved accuracy and improved range or throw weight capabdity.

probably will begin flight-testing in67 and begin replacing the current SS-ISs in

A follow-on or an improvement to ther possibly both, will probably be tested for deployment in theo. An improvedould have somewhat beller accuracy but retain lite tame boosler, resulting in no major increase In throwollow-on. which wouldew boostei, could have increased throw weight.

A follow-on lo the road-mobilehat mayhree-RV payload option, as weltinrfe-RV option, could be available forbv0

5 SLBMi. An extensive ntoderniration program now urader way will result in subttantial impeovernesui lo ihe MIBVed SLUM force by lhe

MIRVedLUM became operational3 on the Typhoon nuclear-poweredmissile submaiine (SSBN) Tliree Typhoon SSBN. have been launclied soaieat least tliree. probably lour, addi-lional Typhoons aie under canst ruction.


The Soviets, bcean Blrfit-tcsMng the MIRVedLBMV-class SSBN* Il

ignificant -

ly improve its accuracy. although probably not enough to make il hard-target capable. Theill begin deployment in5 or6v SSBNs (see figurend will probably also be backfilled inloI1-class SSBNs lhat are now equipped with the

LBM. TheV svas launched in5 and oneV is under conston.

ollow-on to the MIRVedLBM. with improved propulsion, guidance, and payloadis expected to begin flight-testing in about5 and be ready for deployment by8odi Bed Typhoon SSBN. An accurate one-RV variant of this system may be deployed in limited numbers in the.

Soviet Strategic Offensive Weapon Systems in Development


In IllghHaUnt

MUal oVplot-nenl

tn tfbvt


retd mobile S

In pre-filtthl-lnl dealopmtnt



ICBM. in silos and riu-asofailc :


In fitghl-tcMng

(nlilcl deptoymnt

D-iv ssbn

In pn-fllght-tnl dtetlopmenl

fim /tight leu


follow-on SS

and cruise mlssilci

In fllcht-ttlUng

indial devlovment

bomber :



ropresoolcIX?,! m;

i I

In prr-fllght-ial dmtopment

nUelk upiiutlo. laJlowon- lifceJv

likely .


fee Gueral.


The Soviets are piobablyollow-on to the MIRVedLBM that potentially will have increased throw weight. We estimate that this system will be substantially different Irom thend consequenlly benotlass SSBNs, bul ratherew clan of SSBN thai we project to enter the force In thehere is an alternative viewac system will lie merely an improvement lo thend be deployedV andll SSBNs. andew SLBM will be tested and deployedew cUt* of SSBN tn the

Tne holdo of thuhe IX-rcto, of Na.ul Jnceffifienm.ol ihe Not?

fi IHBMs.4 the Soviet* embarked on an unprecedented program Tor constructing newarting more new basca than in any previous year. (See figurehev also beganollow-on to thonitial analysisthat, compared with thehe new missile ha* improved accuracy and increased throw weight capabdity. Like thet has thie*e caport it to br deployed beginnine in6 or

Bombers and Cruise Missiles

4 the Soviets deployed their-Uuiiehcd cruise missile (ALCM)-their first long range, land-attack cruiseothers will lol-low Ovei tlx-few years. By thehe


Construction Starts5 84

willhoroughly modernized Ions-ranee bomber loree:

Theas an estimated rangeiet at low altitude andspeeds, and probablyuidance update system lhat could iiive il an accuracyeters.

Thes being deployed on lhe new Bear H. enabling the Soviets to deploy Ihe ALCM at least foui years earlier lhan il thev had waited for the Blackjack to be ready. Wc have identifiedeatircraft produced ihrough the endnd they currently are prcdncinger


Soviets continue fit ght test tag theiret sonic Blackjack intercontinental bomber Blackjack, similar in appearance to tbeB bomber (ice figureill begin8 oryear later than welast year It probably will carry ALCMs and born Iii

- We expect theill deployea-bunchedtile (SLCMJ. thehat can be launchedtandard-sire Soviet torpedo tube. It could be deployed on sevetal classes ol atlack submarines; likely candidates areH and the newlass nuclear-powered altack submarinese eipect initial deployment onII because the new classes will be available only in small numbers lor tlie ileal several years.

Aruise missilehelmilai in cluractcnftics to thes probably going to be deployed inS

nd is

4 the Sonets began Bight-testingbmahne theong-range, land-attack SLCM.

tubs! an (tally laiger than the

fired from unique launch lubes We expect Ihe initial deployment of this system to occur6 onlass nuclear-powered guided-missilelasshas been used for at-sca testing. We estimate deploymentew class of SSGN dedicated to cariyingill occur inlthough we have not yet identified construction ofubmarine There may alsoLCM version of tho

Soviet* continue toew tanker aircraft based on the Candid transport airframe. This tanker willultipurpose role supporting tactical, defensive, and naval forces as well as the strategic bomber force. We expect it to5

B. Defensive Force Developments

Soviets are continuing vigorousand deployment programs forpassive strategic defenses. Over thexpect them toumber of new typesand retire many older ones, resulting inimprovement in their strategic(Sec paragraphsoor discussionweapons; paragraphsarfare developments.)

Ballistic Missile Defense

sec under way significant developmentsSoviet ballistic missile defenses:

Soviets are upgrading and expanding lhe Moscow ABM system, vrithin the limits of the ABM Treaty. When completed byhe improved system willilo-based interceptors We project deployment off tbe long-range modified Galosh for interceptsthe atmosphere, andf the high-accelcra-tion(ntercepts within the atmosphere. Some silos for the modified Galosh will probably be operationalomes/ piles probably will be completedowever, the Soviets

will have no capability to useJwifh the Moscow system until the engagement radar at Ptsshkino is operational (in. oi unless they employ Flat Twin as an Interimradar.

net ion and testing continue on the new large phased-array radar network, including the Krasnoyarsk radar. iSeehree of the sir new radars will expand the axiniuthal

coverage of the ballistic missile detection and tracking system. By the end of the decade, when the network is expected to be fully operational, tlse Soviets willuch improved capability for ballistic missile early warning, attackand accurate target tracking. These radars will be technically capable of providing bailie management supportidespread ABMbut there are uncertainties and "differences of view about whether the Soviels would rely on these radars toidespread ABM deploy men I.

The Soviets are continuing developmentgive them lhe potential for widespreadbeyond the upgraded defensesduring the period of this listimate.system that included Flat Twinradars, Pawn Shop guidance radars,launchers, andbe deployed relativelybe deployed in months rather than years.


Theystem, to be deployed in the Soviet ground forces, can engageaircraft, cruise missiles, and tacticalmissiles. We are uncertain about its potential capabilities against strategic missiles. On the basisumber of assumptions^,


s conclude that it could have ept some types of USballistic missile RVs TliSie Is the possibility, therefore, lhat the Soviets could deploy somen an ABM role, either while Staying wilhin ABM Treaty launcher limits or loa widespread ABM deployment. We judge, however, thai the needs of the Soviet ground forces for this weaponactical role arc such that, for at least the next several years, tt would generally be unavailable lor strategic defense- Its technical capabilities bring to the forefiont the problem that improving technology Is blurting the distinction between all defense and ABM systems. As newer, more complex systems arc developed, the problem of distinguishingair defense and ABM systems will be further enmitlirated

Ait Defense

he Soviets ate developing and deploying new air defense systems designed to improve their early


Tap 6atr*rS

and detection, tracking, command and con-tfol, and Intercept capabilitict against aircraft and cruise missilci Their efforts are aimed at overcoming problemi In detecting and destroying targetsow radar croas section, using eWttuntc counter mea sores, employing air defense saiuialion tactics, or flvingow altitude:

SovieU are continuing to deploy thetrategic surface-to-air missile (SAM) system, whichubstantially bettci capability agalnsl low-altitude targets than that ol older systems. Other Soviet strategic SAMs have little or no capability against crime misules flyingeters or leas. Slatyites were operational and anotherere under consliuction at the endver half ol lhe sites are in the Moscow aiea. The deployment nilr has been slower than we originally forecast, bul there is recent evidence indicating the rate will Increase Deploymentelf-propelledobilewill probategin5

The Sovieti are continuing to improve theol their tactical SAMi.0 air defense reorganization facililalsi integratedbetween units of strategic and lactical SAMs. Although the tactical SAMs have shorter ranges, many of the systems are more effective against low-altitude targets than are strategic SAMs

The SovieU arc currently developing more than IS diflcrcnl types of air defense early warning ami ground-con trolled intercept fGCI) radars, as well as improving existing ones. The Soviets are seeking to improvelect Ion. resolution, and low-altitudencrease resistance to jamming, and develop the capability to operate in more diverse frequency bands They are also developing Jammers that could lore* low-altitude aircraft to fly higher.

Deployment of the Foxhound A, the first Soviet aircraft with lookdown/shootdown and multiple tracking and engagement capabilities, ubutlow rate

4 the SovieU began deploy nig the Fulcrum A. which has an improved lookdown radar and currim Iho newtr-to-aii missile (AAM) Theas designed for ulr-lo-atrmissions and for defense agalnsl bombers; It

aLw could be used against cruise missiles.of the Flanker, which has capabilities similar to those of the Fulcrum A. will probably begin in

The Mainstay airborne warning and control(AWAGS) aircraft will become operational5 It will substantially Improve Soviet capabilities for ail combat and conttoJ. as well as fill in gaps in ground-based radar coverage'and improve low-altitude detection capability.

C. Factors Influencing Soviet Stralegic Forces Politico! and Military Factors

Moscow's concept ol its relationship with lhe Unitedundamentally adversarial. Thisbased on Ideological antagonism and geopolitical rivalry, influences Soviel behavior and also shapes Soviet perceptions of US policies toward Moscow. Its most dramatic manifestation is growing Soviet military power that forms the cutting edge of the USSR's persistent efforts to extend iu global presence and influence at the experuc of the United State* and the West Soviet leaders view strategic arms policy in the contextersistent, long-term struggle between two world systems of socialism and capitalism, in whichMoscow Inis destinedlo triumph

The Soviets apparently believe lhal, in the present US-Sovict slralcgic relationship, each sidestralegic nuclear capabilities that couldthe other after absorbing an attack-Soviet leaders liavc stated that nuclear war with the United States wouldatastrophe that must be avoided if possible and that they do not regardonflict as inevitable. Nevertheless, thev regard nuclear warontinuing possibility. They seek superior capabilities to fight anduclear war with the United Stales, and have been working to improve their chances of prevailing inenet in their strategic thinking holds lhat the belter prepared the USSR it to fight in various contingencies, the more likely it Is that potential enemies will be detnird Irom Initiating attacks on the Soviet Union and Its allies and will be hesitant to countei Soviel political and militaiy

nuclear lorces underpin anforeign policy in peacetime by projectingof mililary strength SoviH leaders appreciate



i- political utility nl world perceptions of mililaiy vowel and have lone stiessed the contribution of strategic forces to the USSR's luperpower statu They recognize that military power is Iheir principal foreign policy asset and that continued high levels of defenseoth in acquisition of forces and in researchdevelopment programs, arc necessary to sustain and expand Moscow's global role. They view their current strategic position as supporting the conductoreign policy whose primary goal is the exparssion of Soviet power and influence abroad. Soviet leaders today perceive, however, that US actionsool have the potential lo undercut their slrategic and political expectations by shifting the central strategic and regional power equations against Soviet Interests, and they believe (be United States is likely to continue the policies and programs ol the past several years through ihe rest of Ihe dexssde.

he Soviet approach lo nuclear strategy lias been inherently incompatible with Western notions thatharp distinction between "deterrence" and "war-fighting" requirements. The Soviels have rejected mutual vulnerability as the basis for the US Soviet strategic relauoruliiii Moscow has consequently resisted constraints on its ckpierytnent of counterforce weapons and Usof various defensive systems designed to limit damage to the Soviet Union

IS We believe lhe Soviets are determined loanya result of the US stralegic modernization effortsose of their other potentialthe military gains lhe USSR has irude over the past decade. They recognize that new US strategic svsterns being deployed or under develop-niriil will increase llie threat to the survivability oi their silo-bascd ICBMomplicate theirwarfare (ASW) efforts, and present iheir air defense forces with increasingly comioblemv lly their actions and propaganda. Ihe Soviets haveIhey are very concerned about the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) and its focw on advanced lechnology. In theii view, II could force them to redirect their offensive ballistic missile development programs to reduce vulnerabilities or couldostly, at<en-cridcd high-technology competition for which ihey probably aie concerned that lhe United Slates can outpace iheir own ongoing efforts They aie probably also ewecrned that SDI wait leadustained US effort in malegicaira in which lhe Sovietsirtual monopoly.

NATO deployments of the Pershing II missile and the CLCM present the Soviets wilh new problems and unceitainties, including threats to the survivability oi some important strategic assets in tbe western USSR. Procramed changes to French, British, and Chinese nucieai forces also must be considered by the Soviets in establishing requirements for their own peripheral attack lorces, and in evaluating the survivebfllty ol their intercontinental slralegic assetseriod of theater nuclear conflict

oviet leaders view arms control policy as an important factor in advancing then strategy of achieving slrategic advantage They have been willing to riegotlate lustruiiiti on force improveinnnts and deployments wlien it serves their interests Moscow has long believed that arms control must first and foremost protect throf Soviet military forces relative to their opponents Tbe Sovtfb abo seek lo hnsit US force rnorlcrniialion through both tbe arms control process and anyn the future, tbb couldigher priority than it has been in past negotiations, particularly if llie Soviets believed lhe United States was actually going lotrategic delenslve system based on tlie Strategic Defense Initiative

he revival of the arm* control process will he used by them to pursue important near-term political goals, with or withoutalient feature of Soviet arms control policy will be its emphasis on trying to limit US ballistic missile defense and space warfare capabilities Tlie Soviets will try to use arms contiul discussionseans ol delaying orthe US SDI program, but we do not believe theyotter major concessions to halt (he program as long as it remains in the lesearch stage and is strongly susceptible lo unilateral US restraint Moscow will not agree lo steps that would significantly detract from the key elements of Soviel nuclear strategy: counterforce strikes against enemy nuclear forces and damage limitation Thus, deep reductions in the Soviet ICBM force, especially heavy ICBMs remain unlikely The Soviets will not accept an agreement that would prevent them fiomignificant level of foicr* modernization. They will look to arms control to help slow US IcchnoloKicalin ateai where Ihey believe themselves to beong-term technologicalIryinit to avoid slowing their own broad-based research and dcvelotsmcrrf efforts

IB The Soviets will face important decisions in the neat lew yean as they proceed withst log lur ballistic missiles scheduled 'or deployment beginning

taw Swul

(hend. SpedScally. Ihey will have to decide whether to test new ICBMs loay as to conform, or appear close to conforming, with limitations on characteristics and improvements from the unratified SALT II Treaty. They appear to have technical options for some of their new systems that will allow them to go either

I They also may beIRVed payload optionollow-on to theould makenew type" of ICBM and would almost certainly drive the USSR over the limit on MIRVed ICBM Uunchers The SovieU could test such missiles with less than what we estimate to be their maximum potential throw wclchiV capability

Economic Factors

vidence from flight-testing, productionand deployment sites indicates the SovieU will make increased resource commitments over the next decade to llieir already formidable strategic lorces research, development, and deployment progiamv There hasignificant expansion in research and production facilities:

0 the Sovietsiogram to expand facilities involved with lhe final assembly ol stiategic offensive missiles; since then, floorspacc at major missile plants has increased someate of growth unmatched since thehe added emphasis Is on cruise missile* and solid-propellanl ICBMs that will enter the force in the

Construction of additional production floors pace foi heavy bombers has resumediatus of nearly throe decade*.

Design bureaus and research Institutes are being expanded, providing additional Incilitlos lorami development of weapons that would reach the Soviet forces innd beyond.

hese eitorU will place increased demand] on the troubled Soviet economy; we estimate that,on Ihe pace and extent of the effort. tJjatectc forces (both offensive and defensive) will require annual increases in spending rang in itercent for lhe next five years (seeime when overall growth in the Soviet economy is

expected to average onlyear. This rate of growth, although substantial, would not be greater than (lime incurred during the previousmodernization cllorls of. During those periods, however, the growth rate of the economy was substantially higher. Since Ihe, growth rales have slowed in nearly every sector of the Soviet economy, as transportation snarls,supplies of raw materials, and decliningroductivity have all contributedteady decline in industrial growth

serious economic problems sinceSoviel mililary procurement hashigh annual levels; in particular, the Sovietsto deploy large quantities of newand substantially improve both iheirand defensive capabilities. Since tbehaveIRVed ICBM force, andil:IRVed SLBM force onclasses of SSBNs; andobile

in Ihe past. Soviet decisions on majorprograms and force modernization willbe driven primarily by calculations ofbeneuts and the dvnamum of weaponsWe do not believe that economiclead the SovieU lo abandon major stralegicprograms or forsake force modernization goals.thethey felt itwould substantially increase militarythe levels we have projected, even though awould have painful cortsequences forgrowth over tlie long term and for theof nontnilitary Industry and the consumerlhe shorter lerm.esult of the starkhowever, decision) involving the rateforce modernization probably will beby economic factors more now than in thesome deployment programs could beWc Judge, however, thai stralegic lorcesto command Ihe highest resourcetherefore would be affected less bylhan any oilier element of Ihc Soviet(Sec inset for arms controlur specifics on economicof protected forces.)

D. Future Strategic Forces

sing their extensive military research,and production base, the SnvicU continue to develop, improve, and deploy offensive and defensive

Consider olnd Airm Control

Economic coniidetalloni ilinoil certainly have notetermining factor in Soviot arms control policy, and areo become so,

Significant coil savings would nol accrue lo theeven if Moscow concluded egueirgisU In therms reduction tails (START) or those onrise nuclear forces (INF) that cooPdceahly reduced their strategic nuclear force* The USSR's strategic ofieiuive forces (In. eluding both inlcimritinertil aod intecmcdiale-ranfe systems) at preterit reoroent only aboutercent of their total militaryith anotherercent for strategic defense, hugely in air delete*.

their economic probleim are severe, we see no strut that the Soviets feel cornprJird to forgo luiponant stiategiC piogranu or that they will male substantia) concessions in arms control nrro-riatlons in order to refce re ermonor

force decisions and arms control decisions are likely to icoiinue lo be dii>ea by ntcuUtxjao of political-strategic benefit) and the dynamism of weapons tcchnotocY

Nevertheless, the Soviet* probably believe that arms agreements can provide some relief in the economic

Setting quantitative and qualitative Ixiunds on procurement.

Increaiing the calculsMLty of future militaryand channeling competition into predictable (and thus ImMIrd) areas

olitical environment that would contributelowing of tbe overall US defense effort, particularly in areas wing advancedthereby casing militaiy tpcndlnit demands on the USSR-Soviet inlureit in slowing the pace of militarywith the United States through arm. coatrol ivetonatwra it bkely to increaie with the slowdown In economic growl li Tlie Soviets will be particularly semi-live lo the proapeel of further ilia ittheof their economy and addiliomi coropctinc resource demands Hemmingraiprctive open ended, htfh-teccnoiogy armi competition with the United Stales lhat could result liom the Strategic Defense Initiative

weaponsvcrv 1ypi, Bndar planning and tbe command, control, and enmtrm-

nicaliont capabilities of their strategic forces. Our quantitative projection*Soviet strategic forces In tbe twit three lo live years arc based largely on evidence of ongoing programs. During thisbecause of the Soviets' military planning andis unlikely lhat they wouldalter planned deployments. Over the longer term, however, they have an expanded number of options In deciding on the size. mix. and characteristics of their strategic nuclear forces and supporting systems. Our quantitative projections for five lo ID yeats from now are based on evidence regarding those options, as well as our perceptions of Soviet prioritics.

undamental to Ihe options the Soviels have for the composition of their future forces is their Urge military research and development (RAD) base and their expanding production capability. Their vigorous and systematic research efforts, aided by technology acquired Irom the West, have resulted in lheof increasingly sophisticated weapons andsystems The overall quality of the Soviets' future weapon systems will dependarge degree on their ability lo develop and eiploit newincluding those acquired Irom the West.

Strategic Offensive Forces

ur projections ol Soviel slialesjic offensive forces over the nextears should not be considered precise forecasts Rather, they represent broad trends basedrge body of evidence on Soviet weapon development programs and data on Soviet testing, production, and deployment practices. The five force* we ptesent illustrate possible Soviet force postures under different assumptions. All Jtsiume thai, at leasthe Soviets do not take detectable actions inconsistenl wilh tlie teims of the unratifiednterim Agreement and key provisions of the unratified SALT II Treaty After thai tbe projected forces diverge, reflecting an expanded number of options the Soviets have in deciding the size. mix. and characteristics of their nuclear forces and supporting systems and in tailoring thulr forces to specific arms control environments (See paragraphs

ctlain trends are clear

The Soviets will continue their steady rtsodern-izalion of stiategic offensive forces, replacing most of llie weapom in iheir arsenal with new or modified systems bv theal least the neat several years lhe number of deployed warlirads will grow, as new misuses or aircraft with larger numbers of wai beads replace ones carrying fewer warheads.


will remain the key element of the Soviets' intercontinental strike force* The trend ts toward solid-propel laiii missiles and moreper missile. Thendill be replaced bv thend tlsewith four BVs) andwithass ICBMs. each withVs. High survivabilityortion of Ihe force will be achieved by lhe deployment ofownd rail-mobilesee figureeployrnent ol Bstsbile ICBMs will abo increase Soviet capabilillci to reload and reliie land-based strategic ballistic missiles'

Tbe Soviets' hard-target potential however, will continue to reside primarlly in their sdo-based. heavy ICBMs. That hard-target capability would be improved with the deployment ol anollow-on system in tbe, probably with improved accuracy and increased throw sveight; and furthci improvements by tlie. We expect no siguificanl reduction in lhe number of heavy ICBM. The Soviet hard-larget capability could abo be suppiVnientcd by hard-target-capable verssom of theiass ICBM in thenview Isolds that thes and will coatinuc to be an effective hard-target system.'

The effectiveness of the mobile irvlerniediste-range ballistic missile (IRBM) force will improve with lhe deployment of theollow-on. which wc protect will have increased lethality over the currentc expect thai Ihe total number of deployed mobile IRBM Uunchers will growaunchersTnafler number than we prelected last year, because we did not (hen anticipate the deactivation of someases for conversion toCBM bases. Bv thell of these launchers will be equipped with theollow on

Modernization of the soo-based ballistic missile force will involve com paction of the building piogram foiV SSBN, probableof theissile into IMII SSBNs, deployment of additional Typhoon SSBNs.of anollow-on. and probably lhe iot rod act tooew SSBNew

for en ofirrnefinr view, tee.

Thel ihu cicuf aie the fhwfor. Defeme fNeSfSSgfaOJ

V lA* AnUltM CkU/neiMlW el

iV Al fewer.iheMWwi Sea^e, '

missile in the.esult, the Soviets will have replaced all of their deployed MIRVed SLBMs. (see figurehese changes will resultubstanlial increase in SLBM RVs. improved operational capabilities, and enhancedReplacement of lhebsilee on the Dill SSBNs with the longer rangeould enable lhe Soviels to protect Ihesewilh (he Soviet Navy closet lo the Soviet shores or to operate under ice, therebywhat we believe the Sovietsator operational deficiency resulting from the limilcd range ol the current missiles The Soviets will also probably retain most of their older single-ItV SLBMs on.I SSBNs into al least the.

The heavy bomber lorce is undergoing the first ma)or modernization since theilh lhe deployment ofong-range ALCMs on new Bear H's and. probably8D. on Blackjack aircraft. We protect thewill deploy someoombers andlackjacks These changes will transform the heavy bomber forceollec-Ihxi of largely obsolescent aircraft carrying few warheadsodern force consisting primarily ofnd Blackjack aircraft, with aIncrease in warheads (see

We expect the Soviets to deploy additional types of long-range, land-attack cruisedifferent types of SLCMs and at least one typo ol Cl .CM The deployment of those cruise missiles, along with ALCMs, willew strategic strike capability for the Soviets. They willultnUfeclional low-CTOSS-teclicm. low- and high-altitude capability that will pose increasing problems for the air defense capabilities of the United States and its allies in Furopc and Asia.

Some older Soviet weapon systems are in the process ol being rellred. In4 the Soviets deactivatedS-llt. destroyingf the silns, and apparently deactivatedisonme Bisons may be conversed lo tankers) These recent retirements apparently arc relalcd to iheir force modernizationdeployments of mobileCBMs and ihe clepioyment4 of theheyoviet decision lo modernleast in the neatleplacing older forces rather than adding to tlurir forces The Soviets have also continued tolass SSBNs as new SSBNs enter the force

I f

stimatciof thenumberof warheads on various Soviet ballistic missiles arc becoming more um

arc differing views, we judge thai Soviets have deployed, and will continue to deploy, some missiles with more warheads than the maximum numbertotal of RVs actuallyplus those simulated. P


Theunder an arms control agreement that counted deployed warhead* by using the maximum Dumber Bight-tested on each missik ivpc

f our set of force protections Is bated on the assumption that, while no forrms control agreements ate concluded, rieitotiations cuotioue, and the Sorbets choose not to expand their forces beyond the quantitative limits set bynd SALT IIcurrent levels of strategic nucleai delivery vehiclesIRVed missiles. SSBNs. andlthough the strategic forces are lubtlantially improved bv replacement of olderwith newer ones,ace tratonabrv consistent with that observed over the lastears. We cannotudgment as to the likelihood that, in the absenceormal offensive arms control agreement, the Soviets would develop forces along the lines of Force I. as compared with expanding their forces along the lines ofrbe cirrunv stances that would affect these options include the likehhood of continuing arms control negotiations, the overall state of the US-Soviel relationship, and the extent to which the Soviets seek to ensure, through the augmentation of their strategic forces, that they could penetrate prospective US defense* This force assumes, with no formal agreement reached, some expansion beyond these limits In the, in particular a* the Soviets stop adherence to limits on Ihe number ol MIRVed missile systems There is an alternative view that it is unlikely the Soviets would maintain their force growth within these arms control constraints for such an extended period ol time witlioul agreements in effect,*

' TV heldtti of i'iUoreiw. Dtltnte InitBigmrt Affeniv. and iht OOmorof Naail Inullitfi'i. Drvatttnenl of tkt Nova.

how our estimates ol the direction, scope, and pace of expansion that Soviet forces couldhe alnence of any arms control constraintsteady upgrade of Use strategic attack forces. Projectedrates for new systems are consistent with available evidence on ongoing and new program* and with leeenl trend* in deployment rates and force composition Many ol thr features are similar lo.thosc ofigher level of effort thann the areas of production, deployment, and. in some cases, technological achieve-rncnt The differences between this lorce andeflect our uncertainties about the technological choke* and improvements lhat the Soviets mighl make, their potential deployment levels for some newnd their own evaluation of their potential ofloi *ive force requirements.saai-i'ium effort, and is not the upper bound for cither technological or production potential, but woulda substantially greater commitment of resources than Force 2.

Forceoviet START and INF. Tills force is based on our understanding of the Soviet proposal* at the strategic arms reduction talk* (START) and at the negotiations on intermediate-range nuclear forces (INF) as they eatsted at the time the SovieU broke off those nettotiations ine assume theroposal, would have allowed the deployment of the ballistic missiles Ihey are now tesling, and this force shows their deployment

ForceS START end INF.rotection as such. Rather, it is an illustration ol the effect* on Soviet forces uf3 US START and INF negotiating proposals We note that it Is highly unllkolv lhe Soviets would agree to restructure Iheir forces along the lines of these proposals. We judge that the Soviets would not reduce Iheir heavy ICBM force by moreoken number, given Ihe importance they attach to this force, and it is unlikely they would destroy recentlytem* or those now in lhe ptlielinc

nterconfincnfaf Attack Forces. Figurellustrates the trends in the number of deployed Soviet ICBMs and SLBMs that result from our various lorce protections We do not expect significant growth in the numbers ol these Uunchersas the Urges! Kiowth. aboutercent, dueargci number of mobile ICBM lautichei* ami letentiim of more silo-bused missiles.3 Soviet START proposal.

Figure 10

Deployed Soviet ICBMs; andS4




llsese Unai uie described, wldi dilleringIn the

in Forceeduces these launchers Irom the current total bv aboulercent, while the effect of3 US START proposal, reflected in Forceould be to reduce them by aboutercent.

he projected aggregate throw weight of the missile force is shown tn figurehe throw weight increases in due to the increased number of missiles and the improved technological performance wc eipect iu the various Soviet missile development programs.3 Soviel STARTa% represented by Forceould resultmall decrease in throw weight. The effect of Ihe US START proposal, as represented by Forceould be to reduce the throw weight by about half, because of the decreased number of missiles and the constraints on the number of medium and heavy ICBMs

igurehows the projected numbers of RVs on deployed ICBMs and SLBMs

.how brge increases in the number ST missile RVj. Thesegreater inthan the increase Infrom the dcploymeni of larger numbers of MIRVed ICBMs and SLUMs and from the increased numbers of RVs on some of these missiles. The Soviet START proposal, as

'otals IkUIb both online andffline -eapoeo are those on launchers or pblfonai that are tieiisg convert-mlrhaufed For ICBMi llvsually small, but lor SLRMi the nvmber can be ilgni&canl TvpieaBv. someercent oJ the SLBM force is ofl Uc* ind hence unavailable Seeee Hninisi ol raitir* and offline -capons.

-Jop Sim

Figure 11

Throw Weight of Deployed

Soricl ICBMs and54

MIIIMni of Ujpim


SALT II umcnal

miuirru until)



Forceould result in an increase ol aboul one-fourth over lhe current force.3 US START proposal would reduce Ihe SovietsRVs. but the number of RVs potentially deployed would be greater (See figureor discussion and illustration of the problem of differences between lhe accountable and deployed numbers and for alternative views.)

lso shown in figurere Ihe projectedof ballistic missile RVs- almost all oncapable of destroying hard targets and of HVs on mobile platforms The number of hard-target RVs for Forces I.4 would be substantially greater than the current force ofuch nvk

number of RVs on mobileand mobileexpected to increase substantially, but Soviet silo-based missiles will continue to carry the majority of ballistic missile warheads.

he Soviet heavy bomber force is nol expected to change much in overall size, new bombers such as Ihe Blackjack will enter the force as older bombers such as Ihe Bison are phased out As shown inowever, there willubstantialse number of weapons carried by the heavy bomber force due lo the deployment of new Blackjack andircraft

he projected growth in the number ofwarheads on Soviet intercontinental attack



- m

forces (ICBMs. SLBMi, and heavy bomben) thaiunder the various scenarios of our forceis shown inhe number of deployed watheads i* growingesult of tbe deployment of new systems carrying more warheads than those they replace. Thus, with the exception of theoice based on the US START proposal that requires deep cuts in ballistic missile RVs, all of tbe force protectionsubstantial growth in the number of warheads beyond tho current level of:

H the SovieU maintain about the current level of deployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and heavy bombers and remain within the qiiantitalivc sublimits of SALT II, we estimate the number ol deployed warheads00

3 Soviet STAHT proposal would also result in an expansion inlthough

ewei0 than under SALT II limits.

While, in the absence of arms control constraints, the SovieU would not necessarily expand their intercontinental attack forces beyond0 warheads they could deploy by merely modernizing their cunent forces, they clearly have lhe capability to do to We estimate the Sovietsnibcantlytheir forces to00 warheads by the.

rime Misfires. The Soviets began ALCM deployments4 and are protected to begin deploying long-iangc land-attack cruise missiles on submarines5 and on ground Uunchers in Ute IMSlthough our estimate* are highly uncertain, wc ptnjecl lhat. in for res I.ndruise

Figure 14

Deployed Warheads on Soviel Heavy5

deployments would reach levels ofmostly ALCMs) by the. (See)

nd CLCMs. Figurehows ourfor the total number of Soviet bnd-based INF missiles and warheads deployed in the Sovietin lhe European area as well as the Far East. Trie number of deployedaunchers is projected to increaseevel. similar to the numlier ofndaunchers currently deployed Wc expectLCMs would be deployed. We proicct sufficient reserve missiles available for retire fromnd CLCM launchers to amount to aboul one additional missile for each launcher. The number of warheads, those on deployed missiles as well as those on missiles available for rcfiro, isto increase significantly over today's svarhead totals

by the. An alternative view[_

fiom CLCMSec paragraphor an alternative view onefirc)

eserve ICBMt. We have evidence that tho Soviets intend lo reload some silo-based ICBMfor lefire operations. Wc expect the deployment of mobile ICBMs will lead to improved capabilities for ICBM reload. (Seciscussion o( mobile ICBMs. irrcluru'rig an alteinalive view.)to an alternative viewf"


' The hotdo of ihUhe OOeeiar, Bateau of Intelligent* and Ruaonn. Department of Stale.


Top ^arffll

Figure 16

Deployedng-Rangc Land-Attack Cruise54

taken as evidence lhatefirc figures In Soviel war plans. However, the Soviets probably would. In this view, attempt loew Uunchersontingency basis, if any reserve missiles not required to maintain the online force were available.4

e know that missiles are produced lor use in crew-lraming launches and as maintenance spares, and some ol these reserve missiles could be available for refirc. Soviel missile production capacity appears large enough to handle more than deployment, testing, training, and spare rco,uircmenti,r

whether the

produced additional missiles specifically

have for retire.

cannot estimate

Thef Ihii clew ll lhe DtrttlOt. Bureau of Inl'Vt^enct

ind Raeareh. Dtva'lmtnt of Stale.

res inns soft-

assess lhal

theRBM ha* missiles spcdfically tor refirc. and lhal it would be consistent for lhe Soviets to have such missiles for the ICBM forced^


eserve IHBMr. Evidence indicates the Soviets plan lo use reserve missiles for reflre fromaunchers.


relire today probably amounts toercent of the number ofeployed. Q

3 _

n alternative vlew-l

"jholds thai the Soviets do not plan lo engage In large-scaleeBie. However, theprobably would, in this view, attempt toew launchersontingency basis, if any reserve missiles not required to maintain the online force were available


Strategic Defensive Forces

The Soviets will significantly improve theof Iheir active and passive strategic defenses over the nextears,umber of new types of

' The hotdci olie ihe Dlteetat. Delenie InleOleence-Ageaet. and ihe Owectot. National Seeuruii Ageni.v

" The holder nj ihit clew is lhe Diteeiot. Bateau ol Intelligence and Bet/arch. Vevatimenl al Stale.

weapons are introduced and manyol the older systems retired.

Ballistic Missile Dejrme. The Soviels are in the process of upgrading and expanding theefenses at Moscow within tlie limits of the ABM Treaty, and are actively engaged in ABM research and development programs We have described, in volume II. throe ABM deployment options that represent different paths the Soviets could follow, beyond "the hmits of the ABM Treaty. The available evidence indicates the Soviets are steadily improving their ability to exercise options lot deployment of wide-spread ballistic missile defense! in. Wehat the Soviets could undertake rapidly pacedeployments to strengthen their delenses at Moscow and cover key targets In the western USSR, and lo extend protection lo key laigets east ol lhe Urals Significant ABM forces could be deployed by lher, as shown inssuming the Soviets have already begun making some of the necessary preparations.

n evaluating the technical performance of the ABM systems they could deployidespread defense, the Soviets probably would not have high confidence in how well these systems would performarge-scale, isndegiaded US missile attack, especially In thev improved US forces However, the Soviets would probably view theirmissiie defenses as having considerable value in reducing the impactegraded US retaliatory altack if the USSR succeeded in carryingell-coordinated, effective Initial strike Also, widespread Soviet defenses, even If US evaluations indicated they could be overcome by an slfuckirtgs- force, would complicate US attack planning and create majorabout the potvnllat effectivenessS strike. An alternative view tl that the Soviets,idespread deployment, would deploy sufficient numbers of ABM systems to enhance their confidence in the survival of high-value targets, even in the eventull-scale US attack."

ur views on the likelihood that the Soviets would abrogate the ABM Tteat* have not changed for several years On balance, we estimate thereairly low. but nevertheless significant, chance (abouloercent) that the Soviets will abrogate the Treaty and deploy ABM* in cicetu of its limits in. We continue to judge that lhe mililary advantages of tltc defenses ihey could deploy would be outweighed

" The ha/de, al thliiheir/.eje lautttteMt Aeeney

Figure 18

Potential Soviet ABM Deployment: Nationwide Defense of Key Target Areas'




IVM M M 4J W 44

'AssumiS Sonetsin<aiim>Otpbvmtiil IiucIki dtplejmfnu beyond ADM Treat) luniu eP.iloa nM KpraMMitem the Ekdihtnd ol tb; dcEbimtnli ificwn.

Fee* A

Piud byvalr praduihM ini el lisKhsif

iivi llrfe rsdir tmorudtM.II

Paced bi nlc ol ounnnoid(Cllon lid Uuncbtlu BiHinclin.

fam C

P'<ol anli br nulimrbVM refiuceiion

vittually no reason to abandon the bcnelits of existing treaties unless conditions changeIn this view, however, thereigher probability of the Soviets' abrogation andlo Gil the serious gap in their defenses in*

the other of these two views, the conditions that led to Soviet acceptance of the ABMUS technical and manufacturing potential to outstrip thepertain through; the potential costs ofparticularly in Western Europe, willurther restraining factor; moreover, the holder of this view believes it unlikely that Ihe USSR, could deploy in this decade ABM defenses that would significantly alter the strategic balance."

third alternative view holds that II is nol possible to quantify tlie probability of Soviet abrogalion. butoercent may understate the chances. According lo this view. Sovielrequirements for damage-limilinghave alwaysotivation to deploy ABMs both at Moscow and elsewhere and,esult of advances by the USSB in ABMIU coiinlerforce advantage over the United Stales, and US plans lo deploy survivablc and hard-targct-capable ballistic missiles, the Soviets may no longer deem it necessary to restrain themselves from further ABM deployment."

uller discussion of this issue, seehapter IV.J


the disadvantages olove, especially that nf energizing the United Stales and perhaps its Alliesore rapid, sustained growth of military capabilities. Theje are tliree alternative views on the possibility the Soviets would unilaterally abrogate the ABM Treaty;

According to two alternative views, there is lesspercent chance that the Soviets would abrogate on their own initiative during. In one of these two views, the Soviets have so effectively combined force improvement with arms conlrot undernd II that they have

idespread Soviet ABM deployment bv iherould give the USSR an important initial advantage Over the United States in Ihis area. We have major uncertainties about howoviet ABM system would function, and Ihe degree of proteclioii lhal future ABM deployments would afford the USSR The Soviets could perceive such deployments as giving Ihe

" The hotitei of ihuU Ihc Awtihinf Chief of Slag foi Intelligence. Itepeilmrnt of lhe Ami,.

" The ho'dei of ihiiit thef Imelhgenve and Reuanh. Opa.tnw.ii o/ Star*

" The holder of ihuhe Ihrecloi. Oefenie Ini'lliienee


lop Siwral

major near-term adi milage over the United Staiei. but would be lllcclv Io considerertainly thai such an action would solidify US and Allien1 support (or SDL as wollenstve forcedesigned lo counter Soviet terminal defenses

J9 Sowel Forces for Air Defense. Our two(or Soviet air defenseAreflect our uncertainties about the choices the Soviets might make in force eompositioii and in production and deployment rates fcr newer systems (acehe Soviets are proceed ing with lhe deployment of systems with low-aJliludc air defense capabilities, including thendAMs. Ihe Foxhound. Fulcrum, and Flanker aireralt. and tlie Mainstay AWACS aircraft.S lhe Soviets will beginore mobile version of they tlie, most of their strategic air defenses will consist of these newer systems Deployment of small numbers of ground based high-energy Users for air defense is projected to begin in thee sec the possibilily of additional develop menls in all defense by the, including deploymentew long-range interceptor, and Improvedapabilities against smallrodai cross-section vehicles such as cruise missiles. There is an alternative view thai it is unlikely tbe Soviets could deploy, by theew long-langc interceptor with the characteristics assumed inlitnatc "

An lis ubmarine Warfare. The Soviets have been laced with the threat from US SSBNi and SSNs for almostears The need to counter Western SSBNi and protect their own SSBNs from Western ASW assets has motivated the Soviets' vigorous puisutt ofJ in acoustic and lion acoustic ASW. They hatetrong active sonar technology and deariety of modern systems that support point dofenso, area denial, and SSBN protection bul do nol provide open-ocean surveillance capabilily. They still Uck effective means to locate US SSBNs at sea. They lackong-range lubmarine detection capabilityufficient number of short-range systems to search potential US SSBN patrol areas effectively.

The ASW program was ropoitedly accorded lhe number-one priority in the Soviel scientificIn the. Tho Soviets will continue to pursue vigorously all ASW technologies as potential solution* to lhe problems of countering US SSBNi and deferrdnnc their own SSBNi against US attack subma-

The holder of Iftu -Men uDirectorr..

Cenlntl Itiuthte*'* Aeeney.

tines. Wc are concerned about lhe energetic Soviet effort toapabilily lo remotely senseled effects from alrcrafl or spacecraft. Although wc continue to improve our understanding of lhe nature of (he Soviels' overall effort^

/here remain important uncertainties about the full extent and direction ol their program.

oviet nonaccusllc ASW detection systems that could be deployed within the nextears are unlikely to pose any significant threat lo US SSBNs on patrol, but couldpplicable to protection of Soviet SSBNs in bastion areas;

An operational space-based remote sensing system could not be available in lea thanears from the start ol engineering clevcSrajmeoL (ThisIs imposed by Soviet design practices, as dcrrwTHWatcd by nurnerou* developmentTlie wide range of continuing cspecimen-lalion, however, suggests that Ihe Soviets have nol yetensor for engineering development.

In view of operaliona! considerations, lhein ci plotting the basic phenomena, and the maw advances required in high-speedand in sensor and sigiial-processing lech-nologiev we do not believeealistic poiuhilily that tlse Soviets will be able to deploy inystem lhat could reliably monitor US SSBNs operating in the open ocean


-peicent) probability lhal lhe SovieU could deploy in ihcn ASW remote detection syslem lhat would operate wilh some effectiveness il enemy SSNs approached ASW barriers near Soviet SSBN bastions

ntisatellite Programs. Current Soviel systems with potential anlisaiellite (ASAT) capabilities include; '*

A nonnuclcar orbllal interceptor thai has been operational since Ihe.

Galosh ABM inlcreerrtors lhat may have an ASAT mission

lhat some Galosh ABM interceptors deployed around Moscow had an ASAT mission in thende doubl that the SovieU currently plan lo use any Calosh launchers at Moscow in an ASAT


Two ground-based high-energy lasersest range with potenlial ASAT capabilities,

The technological capability, using activewarfareo attempt to interfere wilh enemy space systems.]

'Sun naiaaupl" Lmiiailoo.

The nonnuclcar orbital interceptor, the nuclear Galosh ABM interoeplor, and two ground-based high-energy lasers have the potential to destroy oi interfere with some satelliles in near-Earth orbit. Electronic warfare currently represents the only potenlial threat toin higher orbits.

f cipalulihc ar>J


CBMs and space booslcrs have lhe theoretical capability to be used against low-altilude satellites, but wc doultt Ihe SovieU would use them Inole. Various modifications to space boosters or ICBMs would be required toapability against high-altitude satellites^.

Twelhe likelihood of such developmelTu is low. Although there is no evidencerogram toew non-nuclear direct-ascent interceptor for**use against low-alt iludc targets, with improvements lo overcome the deficiencies of existing ASAT systems, we believe the SovieU may pursue this approach. If ihey do. an operalional system could be available by the

trected-Enewu and Hvoeroelocitv Kinetic-Enerev Weapons. Directed-energy andweapons potentially could be developed for several weaponsair defense, baltlefield use. and. In lite longer term, ballistic missile defenseluee types of dircctcd-energy leehncJogics-highericrgy laser, particle beam, and radiofrc-quency- liavc potential strategic wiapon applications. Research into these applications is, io most cases, at an early stage, however, and major uncertainties remain over the feasibility and practicality of such weapons. Because of the limited available evidence, Ihere arc large uncertainties about the swe and scope of the Soviets' research efforU in key technologies required for direcled-energy weapons, as well as about the status and goals of their weapon developmentMoreover, dirccted-energy lechnologiesroad range of both weapon and nonweapon applica-lions (for example, laser radars and space object identification

"jJvVe judge, however, that the SovieU have the expertise, manpower, resources, and commitment lo pursue Ihe development of those directcd-cncrgy weapon and military support systems that prove feasible. We also expect them to deploy some of these types of systems, even if lhe systems' capabilities were limited under some conditions, this would be consistent wilh Ihe SovieU' philosophy and past practices

he strongest evidence of Soviet efforts in directed-energy weapons is in the area of high-energy lasers. The Sovietsrogram to develop high-onergy laser weapon! Theyoundbase and there is subslanlial evidenceargeffort:

Aboutcademic and industrial organisations, including several ccntial design bureaus, and at

lewiWn test facilities are directly involved in the high-energy laser error! Wc estimate from open literature that Inhe number of Soviet scientists and engineers Involved in laser research, development, orof which would be applicable to higli-energv laserthan doubled lo0 individuals Since the, live Soviets have mote than quadrupled lhe floonpaco al high-energy laser weapon research, development,and evaluation facilities The amount of Ooorspace dedicatedaser work is now roughly equivalent to thatajor Soviet missile designaser weapon program of thiswould cost roughly II billion per year if carried out in the United States

are two facilities al lhe Satyshagan lest range lhat we assess lo have high-energy lasers wilh llie potential lo functionASAT weapons Our assessment, based on available Sovietis that one ol the facilities could have lhe capability to damage or degrade an unprotected


ite overhead, in clear weather,ange of jTarl other test ly isaser weapon facility for either ASAT or BMD applications

are concerneduge Soviet program to develop ground-based laser weapons fordefense against reentry vehicles P

^Wr expect the Soviets lo test the franc-lily ofystem during, probably using one of the high-energy laser fadhlies at Siryshagan IIystem proves feasible and practical, we cipectrototype giound-baied weapon probably would be tested In the. An initial operationalprobably would nol be achieved until aftei lhe yearlhe Soviets ehoae lothe System withoutrototype If they chose this risky course ofew inch lystcms could be operational bv Ihe

- The Sovsess appear to be developing twolaser weapons with potential strategic air defense and naval

point defense

stimate that, with high priority and progtam wfecesses. deployment of such weapons could occur wllhln the nextears

develop an alr-

Tho Soviets are continuing borne Inset. ^

lesling and development to continue for several years Muaiom forystem are difficult Io determine, bul could include low-altitude ASAT. protectf high-value aircraft (such as AWACS aircraftX and cruise missile defense Deploymentew units developed from Ibis program is possible by tlie.

Soviel researchroject to develop high-cnefgv laser weapons for use in space, which would offer advantages over ground- and air-based deployment Such systems would be unaffected by cloud cover or other atmospfieric condition* We expect the initial applicationpace-based jyiiem would be for ASAT. but other applications could include BMD.and ground target attack mission* At an ASATpace-based laser ASAT system would have significant advantages over theSoviet orbital ASAT. In Out il would have mullisliol capabilities and. depending on orbit, more frequent coverage of targets. More-over, it wouldreater capacity toa target'such as maneuvering and decoy employment. Wethere-percent) probability some* hat Lower trun estimated lasta prototype high-energy, space-based User ASAI weapon ml be tested in low orbit In ihe, such an event is less bkely in lheven if laiing were successful,ystem could piobably not be operational before lhe. For attacking satellites in higher oibils. Ihe Soviets couldpace-based laser system wilh lhe heavy-lift launch vehicle currcnlly under development If the Sovieti sue cessfullyighenergy User ASAT weapon in low orbit in thee estimate thereode-ate probability lhat they Wrllser weapon in gm.nchrorious orbit by theeow probability lo operational deployment before the0



note that Hie psychological impact of the first testpace-based laser weapon wouldits actual mililary significance

An alternative view holds that, given thelorrototype high-energy, space-based laser ASATadvances in laser technology, laser pointing, and targeta substantia! heavy-lift launch capability; and extensive testing of laser components intesting hasow probability of occurring in theery low probability In Ihe. This view further holds that, because of the even more demanding requirements, thereery low probability the Soviels will testystem in geosynchronous orbit before ihcinally, Ihe holder of this view nolcs thatumber of years Ihe Intelligence Community has projected that the Soviets could test space-based lasers much sooner Ihan subsequent developments indicated."

Topace-based laser with BMDlhe Soviets would liavc to achievethnological advances in largo-aperture mirrors, muitimegawatt power generation, short-wavelength lasers, and pointing and tracking subsystems. Moreover, system integration wouldomplex undertaking and bottlewouldoimldable technical and operational challenge. In view of the teehnologi-cal requirements, we estimate lhe Soviets could notrototype spaee-based laser BMD system until at least the, or ansystem until after theven ii deployed,ystem would probably have limited capability against current US ballistic missiles unless deployedarge scale.

he Soviets arc also conducling research undei military sponsorship for lhe purpose of acQulrlng the ability lo develop particle beam weapons

undamental issue of feasibility for ground -based charged PB Ws Since thelie Soviets haveesearch effort to explore the technical feasibility of neutral PBWs in space and have developed some technically advancedbut we judge thev have not assembled atest system Technical requirements forystem are soensuring precise pointing and tracbing-lhat. although we believe the Soviets will eventually attempt topace-based PBW. wc estimate thereow probability they willrototype before theven if the Soviets pursue development ofeapon, we estimate ihey could nol beginrototype space-based device for interfering with the eleclronics of satellites before Ihe.evice for more demanding missions, such asdamage or physical destruction of sateDites or harder targeis like missile boosters and RVs, could not take place until later.


^radiolrequcncy (RF) weapons lo destroy the electronicsarget.rogram exists. It is probably small compared with lhe Soviet laser weapon effort TV Soviets are strong in the appropriate technologies, however, and we judge that thev are capable ofrototype RF weapon system. By Ihe, wc estimate there-ercent) probability that the Soviets willround-based RF ASAT weapon potentially capable of damaging satellites. We estimate it ispace-based RF weapon for damagingwill be tested before the

1 the Soviets beganaigc facility that mayirected-encrgy-weapon on topountain near Dushanbe in the southernmost area of lhe USSR (see.


^liypcrveloclly kinetic-energy

en lechnology. we judge that the Soviets are at leastoears away from lestine any long-range, ground-based PBW protolypc foi terminal ballistic missilepace-based neutral I'BW would not be subject to the atmospheric propagalion eHccts thai

The holder nf Ihuecioe. Bureau ol

and Hetearch. Deea'tment ol Stale.

urrently Ihey appear to be concentraliiig their research efforts on technologies applicable to short-range, ground-based systems. They probably now have the technology torototype short-range, ground-based or space-based systemseveral yearsecision to dohort-range, mound-based system could have potential applications for air defense and possibly for defense against tactical ballistic missiles; in space,ystem would proba-

- 'ot.


be limited to rlose-fii self-defense against antisatel-tite attacks- Wc estimate tbeieety low probabili-ty that the Soviet* willrototype long-range kinetic-energy woapon wilhin the neatears.

E. Economic Implications, of Strategic Force Projections

e estimate that total investment andexpenditures for our projected offensive andforces (assuming no widespread ABMwill resultrowth In total Soviet strategic expenditures ofearSee futurehe minimum growth rate wc can anticipateesult of ongoingand flight test5-percent annualSoviet modernization along the lines projected in strategic offensive (intercontinental and intermediate-range)see section on strategic offensive foices beginning atnd the lowei level of stralegic air defenseas projected inseerOwthercent reflects modernization along tho lines of offensive Forcend tho level of air defense modernization of Force 11

c estimate lhat. to deploy and operate the projected offensive and defensive forces over the nextean, it would cost the Soviets someoercent more than was expended In theyear period (seeAs noted inhese previous expenditures were at an already high level and have resulted in major improvements in Soviet strategicumulative expenditures on strategic offensive forces would increase by between

ndercent over comparable cost*5nd. for strategic defensive forces,

betweenndercent Tlie main elements

driving these estimated expondlluirs upward during

the nextean are all under way:

offensive lorces, deployment of mobile ICBMs. which are mote costly lo operate and maini than silo-based ICBMs; cruise missiles; Blackjack bombeis, andreplacement of near-

ly all MlflVed ICllMs, SI.BMs. and HIllMi.

defensive Inrces. tho widespread deployment of three new types of advanced aircrafl and the newAM

"Our estimate* include Obcralina and Investment ixaU. but

eidude lhe cost of leseaidi. drvrkipoicnl. tcsllat. ind ecjhiMion

They ibo rielude bulks*ASW. defense, and leadenlilu

iofi arc ettmiiSWjblt'

trategic offensive and defensive forcesfor aboul one-6fth of total defenseabout one-tenthrowth rateercent a

Figure 21

Estimated Cumulative Soviet Expenditures forgrams"

Foe-Year Period


bone I Force3




fan A FonrD




Ixrtcwit A


Our eiiimales include operating and invnimrni eusis. but

. luck Ihe lOll el research, develop men I. ttstincviluauon.

Ticv alio delude outlays foi ASW. ulvli defense, ind Ictdcnhip jroTrciiun. wliich ire considerable ITine figures.On noi include ihe cosi of tiimr^ic cum mind and eonliolroductInch -outa add sonveillion rublesoieieeytsdu'inc. its:eriod.


year in strategic force spending, combined wilh the projected growth rate for nonstratcgic programs ofercent, would leadrowth in total defense spending ofercent per yearoint* greater than the projected growthercent lor the gross national product. Increasing the share of the CNP devoted to defense will confront the Soviets with the difficult choice of reducing the growth in investment,ritical to modernizing the industrial base, or curtailing growth inwhich is an important factot In lhe Soviet drive lo improve labor productivity.

e estimate thai the deployment of ABM defenses far beyondaiinchcf Treuly limit5hen added to Ihe cost of other projected strategic programs, would result in yearly spending growth for strategic forces ofompared with lheercent annual increase without such an(See) Growth in stialegic spending aloear, reflecting the higher levels of projected strategic force growtharge-scale ABM deployment, would match or exceed the high rates of thend would resultate of growth in total defense ipending in excess of the historical raleear In addition, this would occureriod when the Soviet economy is expected to continue lo perform more poorly than it did in.

uch major now initiatives wouldhe Soviets might feel compelled to alter some of their ether nonUralegic militaiyefforts or lo stretch out tho ABM deployments somewhat. Rapid deployment of an extensiveABM system would be problematic, paitlcularly if the Soviets were also faced with the prospect of having to deal with tubstantlil progress and potential deployments in the US SDI program. We judge, however, that strategic forces will continue tuthe highest resource prlorilies and therefore would be affected less by economic problecu than any othei element of lhe Soviet military

hen! is an alternative view lhat Sovietto pay the price required for rapid deployment of an extensive nationwide ABM system will depend or the mililaiy and political context The holder of this view believes historical evidence of the Soviets' ability to make large sacrifices indicale* lhat Ihey would make (he necessary resource com mi Invents tolaptd deployments if deemed necessary "

Thr holder olt ihe AaHrtanl Oar/ ol iff toreportment el lhe Army.

Figure 22

The Effecl on Kxpcndi lures of Soriet Deployment Beyond ABM Treaty'

iiiu virtu


Iiraly Beyond


- Our riiiniald include oocalind. anil luwilnrnl into. bo(

rnlbSr th* caw oT leiearth, davetopmeai, leuae*.mSuitioc. Vter aho vulvaefa. aSw. ovu aefaox. andhcI> areThetcmorrentf.atdu ol onifiK cceaaaand we conUol gaj| imilcaiOurlion, which would add some IS billion niblci lo cumuliliie Shvibi eotueriod. *AHM Opiunctirn; UeilooO0

F. Operations of Soviet Strategic Forcesonflict

Prepaiolions and Training of Nuclear


Soviet military planning is guided bywartime objectives: to decisively defeat enemy conventional and nuclear forces, occupy enemyhe theater, and defend the homeland against enemy attack. To meet these objectives, the Soviets train their forceslobal nuclear conflict. This (raining has diversified in scope and becomecomplex in the operational factors with which it deals. In their military writings, the Soviet* note that wars usually do not proceed according to prior cxpec-lauons and planning. They almost certainly anticipate wide variations in circumstances and events. They recognize that numerous complicalions and degrada-tiom. combined with the effects of enemy action would affect planned operations, including the actual transitions to various levels of conflict but particularly in the wholly unprecedented environment of nuclear warfare.

opposite NATO

establishing three

and one opposite South Asia.

- Made changes in some of the operational modes ol tlieir strategic forces, such as lhe creation of SSBN bastions and the mobilityheirorce.



-eorganisationc Mrnd Air Forces.

-Steadily increased the complexity of their

uncertain lie* of warfare cannot be eliminated Ihrough such praclice. but the Sov.eis believe that their ability to continue to operate effectively in adverse conflict situalions would be enhancedesult of the experience gainedQ

he Soviets perceive modern warfarereat number of antagonists in various combinations and circumstances Awar could be foughlingle or multillieatcr setting, could lie conductedelf-contained aiea or in concert wilh global operations, and could involve varying degrees of combat intensity overlengths of tint, Soviet perceplions of lhe growine complexity of warfare have led lo grcaler efforts to plan forces and operalioasackdrop of increasingly varied conlingencie* and In achievrrealism in combat training.

uring the lastears the Sonets haveboth incremental and majoi changes affecting the operation, control, and sfiueiure of their strategic nuclear forces. The principal aim ha, been lo enhance Iheir operational llexibililv and forcebilily while maintaining oyCt:.II political and militaiyof (hew forces in combat. In doing so. thev have improved their capabilily lo execute directly from Moscow an Integrated strategic .strike. Tn achieve this aim. the Soviets have:

-ermanent theater high command In the Far East lc5 and are now

Gradually increased Ihe stress placed on their personnel In combat training.^

- Consislenlly worked to increase lhe survivability and redundancy of their command, control, and communications system and thus to increase their assurance of retaining control during the complex circumstances ofcxtended operationsuclear


hese changes, together with lhe introduction of new command and conirol systems, create amilitary establishment more in step wilh the likely wartime structure of the Soviet military. Soviel employment strategies also are being modi6cd lo increase lhe options available Io political leaders for uqos and controlling their intercontinental forces. Soviet military planners have sought to develop force responses applicable to various stages of theater or global conflict. TheseOTVV, ^ability for Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) weapons, r



(or Operation ol Soviel Strategic Forcesonflict

c haveompostle scenario, sum-in i; bclow^

e believe Ihis cornposile picture essentially captures the views ol tbe Soviet rnihfarv on the operation of their strategic forces and ooajor US-Soviet confrontation lhatthrough intercontinental warfare.

hef events in an actual conflict would be likely to vary considerably fioin that presented here. Our presentation, therefore, should notoviet prescription for nuclear conflict The Soviels could seek political solutions at any stage, oi could vary their military actions in response to unforseen ciicurrWances. The SovieU evidently intend to prepare the military establishment to meet the

II-iViIo liu-ieaw the

options available to the political leadership at any point inonflict, and thus to increase then chances of controlling events and securing favorable conflict outcomes (For un alternative viow,

riaii Period. The Soviets see little likeJihood thai lhe United Slates wouldurprise altackoimal peacetime posture, we judge it unlikely thai the,SovieU would mount such an attack^

indicate thai they eipect to have sufficient warningS attack to carry out the deployment and dispersal ol their forces (In their military writings, Itowever. live SovieU continue to wain of the possibilityudden attack by NATOeriod of crisis, an initialivc given crcdtliility in the Soviet view by tho high combat readiness of the West) They evidently believe that.eneral war occurred, it most likely would result Irom the expansionajor theaterolllical crisis period lhat could last several weeks or longer During thb crisis period Ihe Soviets


Heighten theii surveillance of enemy activity, including launching additional satellites, todetailed informationide range of US strategic lorce capabilities and readiness.

Shifteacetime-artime posture, while avoiding implement int readiness measures lhal they thought were unduly provocative.

Seek to oonluse Western intelligence and deny it information oo the status of Soviet forces and preparations, as the crisis intensified The SovieU would Increase the use of concealment,and disinformation for militaiy. diplomatic, and propaganda purposes in attempting to achieve their objectives.

7fi Conventional Phase. The Soviets perceive the conventional phaseATO-Warsaw Pact confliel as lastingew days to as long as several weeks. During this phase the Soviets would be attempting to protect theit own nuclear lorces, while weakeningieater-based and sea-based nuclear forces svllh attacks by conventional weapons:

Ihe outset of hostilities, the SovieU would try toheaterwidc air offensive in which ths>usaiids of Pact alrcralt. employing conventional weapons, would attack NATO with the objective of achieving air superiority and destroying NATO's nuclear assets, command and control fact lilies, and olher high-value military theater and sea-based targets.

if not all oi the mobileorce would be denloyed to lhe held by this lime We believe Soviel ground lorces. particularly air defenses, would provide protection against conventional or special forces attacks,

available Soviet SSBNs would be ordered to deploy from bases, primarily to positions near lhe USSB where they could be protected by Soviet genera) purpose naval forces or be under the Arctic icepack. In addition to protecting their own SSBNs, some Soviet navak,forces would attempt lo destroy enemy sea-based nuclear strike forces, principalis SSBNs and aircraft

estimate that thereigh likelihood that, during tint conventional phase, the Soviets would attempt to id erf ere with selected US space systems lhat provide important wartime support. using both destructive and nondestructive means. The decision to launch orbilal ASAT Interceptors against such systems during the early partonventional phase ofonSict would be aliccted by Soviet unceitainlics with regard lo US responses, including the likelihood of attacks on Soviet space launchiitea

he Soviets believe esemenU of their stralegic lorces would suffer lasses miring conventional confliel They expect thev would lose many of their SSBNs in

their forward patrol area* and in transit, and some In the prolecled havens; some SRF assets


imaged or

jjj NavaTbaies and command, control, and communications facilities in the USSR could he damaged, and losses of stratecic bomben. heavily engaged in conventional operations, probably would he considerable

nitial Nuclear Pluue. We believe the Soviets envisage that it svould he to their advantage toapid convent social campaign to accomplish their theater objectives in NATO. In this campaign tliey vrould employ nonnuclcar means, Including someof strategic aviation to attempt to dcstiuy NATO nuclear forces and associated command,and communicatsom facilities, with Soviet theater and strategic nuclear forces standing ready to

he Soviets are unlikely to initiate nuclear useheater conCitl unless they perceived that NATO was about to use nuclear weapons, because tbey would ptobablv see it as being to then advantage instead to keep the conflict at tlie conventional level. Moreover, the Soviets, in our Judgment, are unlikely to initiate nuclear conflictimited scale, with small-scale use connrsed to the imrnediatc combat mne. because thev would see the use of nudear weapons oo any scale as substantially increasing the risks of escalation tonuclear svai We believe, however, that theof Soviet initiation of nuclear strikes would increase if Soviet conventional forces were faceda major defeatATO counterofleuuve into Eastern Europe

he transition

from conventional to nuclear war in Europe aswhile Soviet forces attempt to preempt whatto be an imminent NATO massedlaunching their own initialuccessful preemp-

tive strike could provide one sideecisive advantage, and they therefore sties* the importanceimely Pacta preemptive one or oneleast nearly simultaneous with the bunch ol NATO's massed strike

HI. The available evidence implies thai, concurrent wilh the initial masard strike by nuclear forces in the thealcr, an initial strategic strike would takepresumably including intercontinental forces Soviet dextrine up to theenerally held that use of nuclear weapons on any .scale constituted the initiation ol nuclear war. with escalation to large-scale

or "massed" nuclear strikes inevitable. Soviet writings thus declared that any NATO use of auacsear weapons would be metassive response, drawing on the USSR's full arsenal of Strategic weapons. Some Soviet classified writincs, hi fact, stressed that, if it became apparent NATO was about to use nuclear weapons, the Pact should preemptassed strike even if it were not apparent that the NATO strike woo Idaige

Later Soviet doctrinalasserts that the circumstances under which nuclear weapons Gist would be employed cannot be predicted with certainty, and that preparations must be made to cover contirigencies Several Soviet classified military articles have discussed the need toider array ol nuclear options, including capabilities for using only those nuclear weapons deployed withlorces Nevertheless, nearly all Soviet open and classified writings in the past decade have resected ihe feasibility of limiting escalation once nuclear weapons have been used.

Jl he Soviels continue to emphasize the use of large seaie strikes to accomplish their strategic objeotive* Since the early

ew cases,use of nucleaito the battebeld. Development of thuis described in their doctrine as"seleclivc" uselhat lhe Sovietsthere may be situations where at leastof nuclear weapons could be confined tohow-

ever, that the Soviels remain highly skeptical ot the chances lot controlling escalation

f they perceived that NATO intended to use nuclearimited scale that would not resultajor defeat for the Pact, it is possible the Soviets might decide againstarge scale preemptive strike. We should note, however, that we do not krwsv how the Soviets would be able to

determine and be convinced thai an Imminent NATO

strike would be limited, rather than large-scale Thus.

warningATO nuclear strike might wefl prompt

a large-scale Soviet preemptive strike

hile the Soviets' overriding goal is combat success, not control of escalation, we cannot predict how ihey would react when actually faced with the prospectlobal nudearotivation for restraint wouldesire on their part lo avoid

Tup fafMti

escalation to theater wide or even global nuclear war TSeir decision would be baaed on several factors,csiie to avoid damage lo the USSH. and Iheir assessment of the likelihood they could still achieve their objectives.

I nuclear weapons were livedhealer conflict, with attacks confined to lhe theater area, the Soviets would have strong incentive* to try to keep the nucteai conflict from spreading to involve the Soviet and US homelands Thus, tbe Soviets mightragmatic approach and attempt to:

Aceornplbh their theater objective* withoutout interceptitscntal strikes

Create conditions that deter the United Slates from attacking the Soviet homeland.

Prevent the United States from providing further support to the thcatci campaign.

We cannot judge the likelihood that the Soviets would

actually attempttiategy. Theyimited nuclear phase, confined tois possible, and they have experimented with various selective use option*

uggest, however, thai the Soviets are highly skeptical thattrategy would succeed, and Ihal. rm>rc>.cr. itould pose addinooa! danger Io the USSR The Soviets would probably see an Initial localized use of nuclear weapons ai still leaving an opportunity to avoid large-scale nuclear war.once large-scale use of nuclear weapons in the theater occurred, imminent Soviet escalation tonuclear war tvnuld be likely.

s the likelihood of large-scale nuclear conflict Increased. Soviet leader* would face the difficult decision of whether to seize the Initiative and slrike. as would be consistent with iheir general militaryor to be more cautious In Ihe hope of averting large-scale nuclear strikes on lhe Soviet homeland Theie are no easv prescriptions for what the Soviets would actually doarticular set ofdespite the apparent doctrinal Imperative to mount large-scale preemptive nuclear attacks:

bciicvo they wouldoordinated theater and interconltnental strike in responseealer nuclear strike against tlie

western USSR

they acquired convincing evidenceS inter cool inenial Strike wasey would trv to preempt While we are unable lo fudge

what information would he sufficientlyto cause Soviel leaders toarge-scale preemptive attack, we beheve ihey would be more likely to act on lheof amtiaguou* indications and Inconclusive evidence of US strike intentionsattlefield nucleai conflict were under way thanrisis or acimflici

By taking tlie Initiative, ihey would eipecr lo reduce live capability of US strike forces and lo disrupt to some eilent the coordinationS response Evidtnce indicate* Ihal they would not eipect to be able toS nuclear retaliatory strike. They also piobably consider il likely thai Ihe United Slates would attempt to bunch its foice* on tactical warning

For reasons such a* lack of convincing evidence Irom ihcii stiategic warning lystems or fear of unnecessarily or mistakenly initiating intetconti-iwnlnl nuclear war. the Soviets might notreemptive strike.TW capability wouldarger and more coordinated counterattack lhan retaliation, while reducing the risk of escalation based on ireuffictcn! or faulty information

believe the Soviets recognise the posaitMiilv ihat Ihey might fail to gel reliable tacticalof an enemy Inteiconfinenlat nuclear slrike. They prepare for the possibility that they would be unable to act quickly enough to successfullyarge number of missiles on tactical warning, and could retaliate only after absorbing an atlack. Fot example, their tactical warning sensors might have been damaged or destroyed in the prior phases of conflict They wouldm i* to maintain control and launch laigc-sole mikes with surviving force*.

We believe the Soviets place con*iderableon assessing their strategic offensiveunder conditions in which the United Slates launched the initial major strike These would include scenarios in which they were able to launch varying portions of iheir force* on tactical warning, as well a* the most stressfulwhich they failed to launchct leal warning and had to absorb aUS countetforce attack. The Sovietsbeheve waifaie rarely goes a* planned and that being prepared fornd unplanned occurrences is of paramount importance. For Ihe Soviets these scenarios would be the most critical


an evaluation ol their force requirements and capabaulies

oviet offensive objectives in carrying out large-scale nuclearof which sidethe strikes- would be to riesitralixe US and Allied military operations and capabilities Instrikes lhe Soviets would seek to destroy US-based nuclear forces and to disrupt and destroy lheml laatructure and control systems for these forces as well as the National (Command Authority. They would attempt lo Isolate the United Slates from the theater campaign bv attacking its power protect tor capabilities. They probably would also attempt to reduce US militaiy power In the long leim byother nonnuclear forces, US military-Industrial capacity, and gtryernmen'al control facilities, ahhough the client of the atlack on these targets in the initial strikes could vary, depending on lhe circumstances Limiting the initial strikes only to command, control, and communications targets, or onlyort nm of US strategic forces such as ICBM silos, is highly unlikely."

n large-scale massed llieater nuclear strikes, which they would be likely to coordinate wilhnuclear strikes, the Soviets probably would employ hundreds of tactical nuclear weapons as wellarge share of those strategic forces thai have missions against theater targets Adjustments inallocations would have to be made for weapons destroyed in Ihe conventional phase. Slrategic systems would be used lo support front operations and to strike taigets beyond the area ol fiont nuclcai targeting leiponstblllty. The Soviet Navy would continue strikes, using both nuclear and conventional weapons, against Western naval strike forces Soviet strategic aviation would conduct nuclear and conventional strikes against high-value militaiy targets

oviel Urge-scale strikes probably would be dcliveied against US and Allied military targetsas well asomprehensive set ofand industrial-economic facilities We beheve thai the Soviets would conduct continuing altacks in an attempt to destioy, degrade, ami disrupt lhe US capability to employ nuclear forces, lhe reconstitution capabilities of US nuclear forces and iheir command and control, and the US capability to provide support to the theater from which the nuclear conflict arose:

The Soviets havecsibtlilv in then employment of ICBMs foi intercontinental at-

" For fun herrhcS

ramcu, ice viilurne II.

tack. In our judgment, ihey wolild not launch Iheir ICBMsingle massive strike./j


is less clear how lhe Soviets intend tp use their SSBNs during intercontinental nuclear contact Most SLBMs probably would be targeted against toft military and industrial targets, elements of lhe command and control communicationsand administrative centers; they do not now have llie combination of accuracy and yield lo destroy hardened military targets Some SSBNs probably would participate In initial siiikes againsl the conlinental United States^

Jll is likely lhat many SLBMsC

would be withheld for subsequent strikes or as aitegreserve force.

bombri operations wouldbe launched in coordination wilh llie SltF and SSBN it likes. Bombers probably wouldairborne shortly before or at the time of Ihe initial launch of missiles, either for survival or to participate In the atlack, or both- We estimate that Soviet heavy bombers would be used in strikes and foOowup reconnahssnce missionside variety of military and industrial targets following (by severalarge-scale ballistic mtuilc attack

uring the initial nuclear phaseonflict. Soviet air defense in deplh would impose successive baniers to enemy penetration The Soviets proltably would have relocated some surface-to-air missiles to thwart defense suppression and avoidance tactics They evidently plan to use nuclear-armed SAMs against penetrator* al higher altitudes and might aboem al lower akitudei in defense of key targets They plan for llie rapid restoration of damaged SAM sites, airlields. and command, control, and communi-calions facilities

avil defense plans, initiated eailier, would be fully Implemented Most of the Soviet leaders at bolh lhe national and regional levels would be in protective facilities horn which lhe* would direct emergency rescue and recovery operationsew davi lor preparolions, esienlial worker* cithci would be in

> lineal

at iheir place of work or. if uff duly, would be dispersed to rones outside the cities.

92 IJiler Phases of a Nuclear CoeiflicL The

Soviets plan fee combat operations that couldbeyond the initial nuclear phase Theyprefet to accomplish their objectivesreeogiiirc thai the later pluses could beIhe dllficully and compleiity offollowing large-scale nuclear strikeslittle evidence of the details of Sovietnuclear conflict in the period lollowincstrikes The Soviets believecontinue In this period, with the focus onmilitary operations, including the use ofThe

seems lo be lhat the strategic nuclear forces ol both sides are largely expended or neutralized, and their thcatci lorces would have sustainedprobably evenHowever, thewould attempt, to the extent possible, loand reinforce their foices and continue to pursue their mililary and politicaI objectives

Is evidence thai the Soviets have planstheir ICBM force io the bter phases offor protracted intercontinental operations.the Soviets wouldinitial ICBM force for protractedinitial large-scale strikes, tho Sovietsfollow-nn strikes In an effort to inhibitforce nmployment and reconstitutlotikey obiectlvc for the Soviets in the later plusesnuclear con Diet would be to prevent thefrom reconstituting its command andand nuclear forces.


We judge lhat tbe Soviets would attempt to reload and retire some ICllMs and to restore the combat effectiveness ol as much of their 1CDM force as possible aflrr nuclear strikes, although we believe the Soviets do nol make achievement of their primary missions contingent on carrying out major ICBM force reconslitution Theofmall reserve of ICBMs lhat could be employed after major nudear strikes could prove significant in corouraSton with otherforces in bnal military operations. Into end the war. or in the postwar world. According to an alternative view, Q


cannot be taken as evidence that ICBM retire figures in Soviel war plans."

^Overall, we judge live Soviets couldihe combat eHoctlvrness ol many of the surviving withheld weapons and would be able lo reconstitute strategic forces at least to some extent with surviving reserve weapons andalthough damage to the logistic system and requirements for decontamination would stretch out the time required (or reconslitution Taking into account Ihe problems the Soviets are likely to faceostal lark environment and the apparently limited extent of preparations they have undertaken to cope with these difficulties, we estimate they probably would be able to

and retire from ICBM siloseriod of weeks or monthsmall portion of the reserve ICBMs Ihey maintain in peacetime. There is an alternative view that tbe main teal overstates lhe difficulties tlie Soviets would have in rccotisltlullng their current silo-based ICBM force in nuclear conflict, given the eitensivc preparations this view holds ihey have made, and that consequently they would be able toarge portion of their resetve ICBMs."

SSBNs probably would be withheld, under naval force protection,eserve lorce role. Limited evidence suggests that the Sovietsintend io reload some of their SSBNs that have participated in the initial niadear strikes for iollov>-on operations. We judge lhat theiris limited, however, and that any icioad nrseration could includeew SSBNs Any SLBM reload operation wouldumber o: operational difficulties According to an alteraa-live view, it is likely that the Soviet SI-BM rdoad capability is even less than the limited one assumed above and, therelore. It is unlikely that reload figures In Soviet war plans evenmall way."

Evidence suggests the Soviets expect most of their stralegic bombers would not survive the earlier pluses of nuclear confliel. Theof any remaining bombers could increase

" Tlit holder of lAuhe Diiector. Bureau of ImtOifnet andonmenl of Stale

" Tht holderihe DUettor. Defense Inltlllstnte


" lhe holder of Ihuhe Director. Bureau of Ini'tUgem* and Heitareh. Derailment of Stale.

significantly If nucleai operations lasted beyond several days and space-based reconnaissancewere no longer operational bombers would (hen be eapcclcd to conduct reconnaissance and strike operations against key surviving targets.

Soviet air defense units plan to restore airfields for defensive operations. Fighters and SAM units would operate from alternate sites if necessary Civil defense units would continue rescue and recovery operations and asd with the distribution of reserve supplies lo lhe civilian population The Soviets evidently expect that some economic restoration would be possible.

he evidence that we havef_

the later .luges ofgeneral nucleaiwith uw conductuccessful injlitarywithreccenJituting after hcavyTosse*<iccupying much of continentalr

^insight into how the Soviets would seek touclear war on theirneutralizing the ability of US inteieontinenul and theater forces to interfere with Soviet capabilities to pievailonflict in Furasia. We have no specific evidence on whether the Soviets would attempt to endar by negotiation, or on initiatives tbey might undertake if Ihey perceived thev could not achieve thulr military objectives,

Inspect of future Systems on Soviet Operations

he structure, nnd operalions ol Soviet strategic forces will br markedly ditf cient bv, as new weapons and military support systems arc deployed and future systems become operational The strategic cnvironmenl will lie substantially different from the one In which current Soviet strategic forces operate,ariety of new US sliategic offensive forces and command and control capabilities In the European theater, they will face new land-mobile nuclearwith lunger ranges, and an increased numbeitrike systems. Chinese forces will also be improved

eai-real-Iime imagery and data-relay satellite system in thes likely to improve the Soviet intelligence and warning system.

making it more limetv and inure capable of monitor.

ingrisis period, as well as able to provide current

targeting updates if requited

ho expansion and intcgialion o) mobile and bunkered command and control systems havethe scope and capability of the Soviet military command and control network to maintain centralized control during the various phases of war. Future operational developments are likely to focus onsurvivability of command and control systems as well as improving communications flexibility so as to attempt to ensure continuity of operational control of stralegic and theater forces through all phases of conflict P

Problematic ioi mobile missiles as lot silo-based ICBMs. L

Expansion of the offensive forces weapons inventory to include mobile ICBMs. cruise missiles, and new bombers will require that the Soviets make major changes in their offensive operations plans as well as in readiness and command and control procedures

The Soviets will continue to rely primarily on silo-based ICBMs for use in initial strikes, while withholding many of their SLBMs andmost of their dispersed mobile ICBMs for subsequent strikes during later phases of nuclear conflict. Thcv will use concealment measures extensively to inhibit timely detection of mobile ICBMs in the field.

The deployment of mobile ICBMs will also lead to improved capabilities for ICBM ICBMs would have many of the logistic and operational problems associated with silo refire. they would have major advantages over silo-based systems for rcconstllutton and refire. Mobility would improve ICBMthereby increasing Use Soviets' capability toarger fraction of their ICBM force. L

obileentral support base could avoid the damage and contamination that might be present for reload of fixed-point silos. Ina mobile syslcm would be less vulnerable to enemy follow-on strikes. Thesgoing to be deployed and operatedanner similar to that for thee expect il toimilar reload capability. Because we have nol yet identified the basing mode for lhe rail-mobilee cannot anticipate how reload operations would be carried out for this system

An allernativc view holds that, while mobile ICBMs offer theoretical advantages for reload, operational considerations suggest lhatfor additional deliverable warheads can be satisfied with greater assurance by deploying additional missiles on launchers. The holder of this view notes that unwieldy and vulnerable logistics, as well ai damage and contamination from US nuclear strikes, could make refire as

Jthii view hold? lhat the Soviets do not plan to lely on reload and refire ofo meet their strategic objectives, and do not intend to engage in large-scaleefire. Thus, in this view, ihere is no basis for atltibutiaee Soviets an intention to reloadi

The Soviets almost certainly will apply their experience wilh lhe mobilen establiihing command and conlrol readiness procedures for ihese units Wc estimate^

^mobile command and controlof airborne command posts and field-mobile command, control, and communications van

units at all echelons.



strategy of operating most of their SSBNs with long-range SLBMs in Arctic bastions and under the polar ice improves the Soviets' ability lo withhold some submarinestrategicUnder-ice operations are likely to increase as Typhoon and IMVs enter the force. Aof design features make the Typhoonwell suited for under-ice operalions and indicate that il was probably built especially for such wartime operations. The replacement ofIls bv the much longer rangeould permil Dills lo operate from deep within lhe baslions or under ice. rather than at the forward edge of (he baslions We believe lhe Soviets currentlyIIs vulnerable lo US ASW attack while on palrol.

SLCMs will iidd diversity and flexibility to Soviet strategic strike capabilities Although the primary

TVtr /loAaVr ihu atui aDirector. Hwtau ol /nrdfiwncc nd Retra-ch. OeMlmtnt ol Siatr.

application of Ihcprobably

be for nuclearal nil theater targets. It would abo probably be uaed (ot striae* against targets in the continental United Slates We aspect the Soviets to begin deployments of ll SSNs off the US roasts5 Some ol the dedicatedSCN* also wii! probably be deployed near the US roasts In the. We have no evidence roncein-iui: the intended employment of these new Sl.CMs. but Soviet pbnneis could not lie wire of using themreemptive strike agairu! the United States without losing the advantage of surprise and giving warning of the altack The long flight time of lhe subsonicakes it particularly unlikely lhat the Soviets would launch it against US targetsreemptive strike before ballistic missile launches SLCMs are especially suitable, however, for follow-on strikes againsl industrial concentrations,and control sites, and other military

The employment of bombers in intercontinental strikes would lie likely to follow large-scaleby land- and sea-based Soviet ballistic missile systems Deployment of-mLCM has given theong-range standoff strike capability.ircraft are able to launchtom Canadian alripaceor from point* several hundredoff either US coast and still strike most target aieas in the continental United Stales. We raped the bomber force toreater role in inlrrcontinenlal strike operations as the ncsv AI -CM-carrying aircraft enter Ihe force.

he introduction of new air defense systems designed to improve Soviet early warning andtracking, command and control, and intercept capabilities against low-altitude bomber* and cruise missiles will require male* operational changes;

Soviet* appeal most concerned, in the north-em and northsvestern approaches to their coun-

try, about low-altitude bombers and cruisethreats lhat traditionally have been countered br national ait defense forces The Sonets will probably rely heavilyixture ol Foxhounds and Flankers for ovrrwater opera-twns. and on Flankers, FuIt-rums, and Flogger* lor operations over bnd-

Sonets anticipate thatwould be tuoir complex opposite their western military

districts than in the noilhern and northwestern approaches. We estimate, therefore, that in those military dnliids ihey would rely heavilyixt uie of Flogger and more maneuver able Flankei and Fulcrum aircraft that are well suited for thealer operations.

The Soviet* will probably continue to emphasize integration of Iheir air defense capabilities through lhe developmenl of mote comixntible dala transmission systems and newnetworks. In the areas where newdata systems are deployed, fighters with enhanced lookdown/shootdown capabilities will be more effectively vectored lo engage low-alli tude targets. The Soviets probably will intestate the capabilities of Mainstay AWACS aircraft and interceptors, such ai the Foxhound The Mainstay couldsed In forward air defense opera lions as an early warning system or to direct groups of interceptors toward the vicinity of incoming targets- With the Mainstay the Soviet* will attempt to extend their air defense /one oulward several hundred kilomrlers and attempt to engage cruise mux lies in flight and cruise missile earners approaching the Soviet border in order to mike targets far inland They probably will concentrate Iheir available Mamslay aircrafl in lhe most critical approaches from which thev perceive attacks by low-altitude penetrating bombers and cruise missiles would be likely lo come.

intioduction of the new Candid tanker lorces could improve Soviet air defenseby providing greater on-iflation time for the Mainstay AWACS and interceptor aiicraft This could enable Ihe Soviets to extend their air defease coverage farther from their borders in an effort lo engage US cruise-miuile-cairying air ciafl before they could bunch their Al-CMsanker* air protected by thehli number seems insufficient, however, to fully support the needs for both strategic air defense and strategic bomber mixtions, and we an- unceitaln how tho Soviets will allocalcbetween these missions.

G. Trends in Soviet Cooobil.iiei To Perform Strategic Missions

uring the nextears the primary wartime milsaons of Soviet strategic oflennve and defensive lorce* will continue lo be lo

enemy nuclear delivery means.

iflflr) SfM

Neutralise enemy command, control, andwarning capabilities, and othersystems.

Destroy Other military and nonmilitaiy targets.

Assure the survivability of sufficient offensive forces and command and control capabilities to perform the missions CTvbioned bv Soviet strategy.

Defend the Soviet homeland against attacks by ballistic missiles, bombers, and cruise missiles.

the Soviet leadership, economy, andthrough civil defense.

Destroying Enemy Nuclear Delivery Means

inulemanhe Soviets have enough hard-targel-capable ICBM BVs today to attack all US missile silos and launch control centers and will have lareer numbers of hard-targel-capable BVs in the future (as shown inllhough the Soviets' haul-target capabilities will increase substantially, >vc believe that ihev will still be concerned that atortion of the US ICBM force would be launched while under attack

igureepicts our estimates of theof the Soviets' current and projected MIRVed ICBMs to inflict severe damageinutcmanell-executed strike. As illustrated in the figure, uncertainties in our estimates of lhe accuracy, reliability, and yield of Soviet ICBMs, whencombined, produce substantial uncertainties in the piobabilityinutcman silo would be destroyed.

current Soviel capabilities for attacking US

"^The projected uncertainties in our estimatesi lure weapon system characteristics have less significance for damage expectancy as the Soviets further improve accuracy. The Irend of growing coun-tersilo capability for Soviet ICBMs is apparent.

ICS. Rccent_analvsis of the accuracies^ thend theo reassess cuir Minulrman silml

previouslyhal thend the SS- I'l had similar hard-target capabilities Ahhougfa there arc differing views, we now aaaes* theo beless accurate than we previously estimated, aod that the Soviets currently relyon theot Ihe countersllo mission:

According to one view, which agrees with this conclusion, two SSarheads allocated silo would resultest estimate damage cipoctancy. as shown inf aboutercent, with the uncertainties as shown The holder of this view assesses that, because thei accuracy Is much worse than Ihal ol theimilar attack witharheads would resultamage expectancy of less lhanercent."

The holdersecond view disagree with "the conclusion lhat the Soviets rely exclusively on theo atlack Minutcman silos. In this view, thendave very similar yield and accuracy, and both missilesapability to effectively attack US silos The holders of this viewwo-on-one alloc'inutcman silo by either Ihei thes resulting in damage expectancies of aboulilh lhe uncertainties at shown."

he projected accuracy improvements for lheollow-on* willubstantial increase in the countersllo potenlial ol llie future Soviet heavy ICBM force. Although there it some doaeicement on the amount of lhat improvement, as noted ine lodge lhat heavy ICBMs will continue lo be the primary and rnoal effective weapons against USsilos during the nextears.

he capability ofCBMs against Min-jlcn.'n silos iv iimiideiably lesi than wc assessed in last year's Estimate^

3Thc Soviels

seem to have emphasized ruggeslncss. mobility,characteristics in the guidancethan

"^Jias led us to judge thai Ihes unlikely lo be used against US silos. Wc are uncertain as to the types of improve merits lliat will take place in the program fortasj ICBMs over lhe neatears Figureliows lhe improvements that could cccuT in hard-target capability. An improvedn theouldroaH increase in capabilily, but.eployed in the, the hard-target capability could improve to the point lhat theollow-on wouldamage expectancy comparable to lhat of lhe currentode estimate, lhat an improved follow-on

'*thbttenhihe Dtf/utu Dt'tetot/oi Inttlltirttcf. Ctniiai (nieUirmc Ax/oicy.

" Iht ItotAen oliliu iVmotelhe Dirtxtv. Or/tnte InuKgeme rtg.-iiiv. and ihr Auutant duel ol Staff, fautkeincf. Oepaninent ol the Alt Forco



to theioiccled lot initial deployment in theouldignificant hard-target

trategic Aircraft The Soviets would attack bomber bases as part of their initial strike. Those aircraft not on aleit and unable to become airborneailer of minutes would be highly vulnerable. The Soviets would anticipate, however, that many bombers would survivetrike. For alert aircraft the critical issue is their ability to take off and escape safely in the few minutes before enemy missiles arrive. Our analysis of the problems the Soviets would face In structuring and carrying out such an atlack leads us to iudgeP

3<hat 'I -*

vict attack would be able todertroy most of the US alert strategic aircrafl. We judge the Soviets will not be able toeliable capability during the nextears to employ strategic offensivefor efficient largetine and destruction of US aircrafl in flight.

SBNi. The Soviets do not now haw an effective capabilily against US SSBNs operating in open-ocean areas Although lhe ASW capabilities of Soviet submarines will improve over lhe next decade, their overall ASW effectiveness against US SSBNs on patrol is unlikely lo improve because:


obilee fudge thai current and projected Soviet strategic offensive forces would be more than adequate in numbers and capabilities to attack nuclear forces in Europe and Asia in hardened and soft fixed facilities. Mobile missilesreaterINF systems and. inS mobile ICBM. The Soviels belscvc--tlie critical factor in attacking disi*ersed mobile missiles is lhe availability of adequate reconnaissance infoima-tion. To counter mobile missiles the Soviels plan Io make extensive use of all available reconnaissance means--includinE signals intelligenceINTXand satellite imagery, and humanlocale and track Die mobile systems, and aof conventional and nuclear weapons Io destroy them. Soviel special-purpose forces (Spelsnaz) have specifically been tasked to perform behmd-the-lines reconnaissance in Europe to locate enemy nuclear-capable missile systems for the purpose of initial strike taigeling. Thev arc also latked syith canyiiig out sabotage and commando operations against NATO nuclear lorccs

HI* Whether the Soviels could successfully locate mobile missile units in Europe and then large! and destroy litem would depend heavily on the conflict circumslances ol lhe convenlionalextent lo which missile units could remain bidden or move frequently and the effect of NATO air defenses on Soviet airthe ability of Soviet forces to react quickly lo changes in those ciraimsUnees The Soviets probably would employ land-based strategic ballistic missiles lo slrike most localed.'NATO mobile rnLuile targets and would use slrategic bombers against others, although Pershing units deployed within Soviel front targeling areas might be attacked by Soviet tactical systems

eployment of small, mobile ICBMs based in lhe continental United Slates woulderious problem for Soviet targctcrs. Cunent and projected reconnaissance platforms capable of monitoringin the United Slates probably could not provide target location data quickly enough or with sufficient precision to offer high confidence of destruction of individual mobile launchers afler they have deployed to the field. While Soviet planners might clmow Io barrage mobile ICBM deployment areas, as wo judge Ihey would do againsl Pcrshings. because of competing targeting requirements they would (ace icrioutin allocating the large number of weapons ni-cd-


cdobile ICBM force, oven if (heirattack foreei had eipanded ino twice the current force.

Attacks on US Space System)

e estimate it is likely that the Soviets would attempt to destroy or interfere with US satellites during an Intense conventional conflict The Soviets would presumablyecision to conduct ASAT operations against US space systemsariety of factors, including their perception of the military value of the various US systems, US ASAT capabilities, their perception of the capabilities of their antisatellite systems, and ultimately their view of the potential net military advantagci If tbe Soviet* decided to use ASAT weapons. In conventional war they probably would rely on tbeu nonnuclear orbital interceptor, electronic warfare, and ground havd Users to attempt to negate US space systems. Although il is possible lhat nuclear-armed Galosh ABM interceptors would be used in an intense conventional conflict, because of Ihe risk of escalation they probably would not be used until nuclear conflict appeared Imminent or in the initial stage* of nuclear war. The control and launch facilities (or the Soviets' orbital Interceptor, the control and aboveground launch facilities for the Galosh ABM interceptors at Saryshagan, and lhe two ground based high-energy lasers at Saryshagan are not hardened against nucleai attack, suggesting the Soviets would have lo use these weapons prior to and at live onset of their Initial nuclear strikes We ludge lhat the Soviets do not currently have the capability to reconstitute any of these antisatellite capabilities alter absorbing nuclear strikes.

urrent Soviet antisatellite capabilities are limited and fall short of meeting the apparent Soviel requirement to be able to deny enemy use ol space in

time of war:

Tbe nonnuclear oibital interceptor is capable of destroying some satellites in near-Earth oibit. and becauseonnuclear it would be used at lower levels of conflictuclear ASAT weapon!

The nuclear-armed Calash ABM interceptor used as an ASAT weapon would offset several deficiencies of the orbital interceptor. Thewould Ik: less susceptible lo countcrmcasurcs

because its direct-ascent flight profile allows it to attack targets within several minutes from launch; tlierelore, it could be used against high-priority lowallilude satellites that the oibital interceptor wa* unable lo successfully engage An alter native view heeds that an ASAT role for the Galosh is unlikely"

There are operalionsl limitations thai couldSoviet planners' views of Ihe military utility of the lest laseis at Saryshagan Because such lasers could be used only on relatively cloud-free days, and when target satellite* arc nearlythere couldonsiderable delaytheecision Is made toarticular satellite and the first opportunity tobearry out lhe attack

Ncoiroliiing Enomy Comrnand, Control, and Comirvorvieofiom, and Other Support Systems

IIS Throughout the nextears Ihe Soviels will have weapons of sufficient numbers and capabilities to give lhem high confidence in theii ability to destroy most fixed, land-based nucieat support facilities in the United States, Europe, and elsewhere, such as depots, nuclear storage sites, maintenance bases, airfields, and ports While attacks against these support facilities would degrade the endurance and reconstitotion of US and Allied nuclear forces, their destruction would nol necessarily affect Initial strategic force operation-,

lift The Soviet* have the capabdily to destroy or interfere with major elements of the US tactical warning and attack assessment system shortly belme o:arge-Kale nuclear strike. Although the Soviets probably could substantially degrade US tacti-cal warninge do not believe they would be confident that *uch inlwfcrence alone would prevent the launch of significant numbers of US weapons

he eSectivvneisoviet attack on lhe US command, control, and communications system, which would be intended lo delay or prevent issuance, receipt, and verification of US launch orders, would depend in part on the US alert posture We cannot assess ihe efiect* of such an attack The SovtetV military doctrine, their emphasis on radioclecl tonic combat

s well as their preoccupation

-bsUrnW Mew an Ike Pw.w. aWra* .

V*owni* Atf-r.

with the survivability of own command, control, and communications systems, lead us to ludec that they would devote substantial efforts tor

Diwonrseetirig and drstroying the US Nat tonal Command Authority, operating alternates, and critical intermediate nuclear force control points in the United Slates and Europe, through direct nuclear strikes by multiple meant

Delaying oi prrvcnling transmission ol launch orders by disrupting Ihc various communications pathsacks, jamming, andinterference, including allacks on some US space systems, andell-coordinated attack on many control points andlacilities

They might also attempt to disable electronicsunhardened to the effects of electromagnetic pulse (EMP) by detonationmall number of nuclear weapons at high altitude over Ihe continental

United States al the starttrategic ruadear attack. Moreover, the Soviets ptobably would seek to present leconstitution ol residual command, control, andcapabilities through continuing attacks

hereumber of faelor* that suggest the Soviets would not be confident of their chances of severely degrading critical US command and control of nuclear forces

We believe the Soviets would lack confidence in their ability tn carry out effective minimum warning strikes on US command, control, and communications facilities.

oviet nuclear strike, most dements of US strategic command and control wouldbe on alert, and mobile assets would probably be dispersed and thereby less vulnerable to


Wc estimate tho Soviels will not develop lhe capability over the period of this Estimate lo use ballistic missiles to destroy US airborne command posts and other supporting aircraft in flight

Improvements to US command, control, and communicationsas greaterand redundancy-would complicate Soviet attack plans

We believe the Soviets have major uncertainties regarding the effects of EMP on the wade variety of electronic equipment associated with UScontrol, and communications

The Soviets may believe they have not identified all Ihe important hard or mobile command, control, and communirati<aris frarililles for US nuclear forces

CopobJities for Coenpienensrvo Snotegk Attacks

e lodgeoviet nudear attackstrategic nudear capabilities would takepartarger comprehensive strategicstrategic missions are planned in the contestoperations within designated theaters

military operations

he nuiiibet and priority of targels associated with various theaters worldwide would vaiydepending on the circumstances, lhe threats they pose lo the Soviel homeland, their importance to enemy military operations, and their postwar military value. The Soviets would be especially concerned about destroying those installations that could support US power protection, thus preventing the United Stales from reinforcing Its mililary operations

ur analysis of potenlial targets in the North American Theater of Military Operations suggests the Soviets might identifyargets associated with US nuclear forces, their support, and theirand control, andther hard military, government, and economic installations, about one-half of which support US or NATO norinuclearforces thathreat or potential threat to Soviel operations in Eurasia and at sea. Induding potential military tiamrxirlation ladlilies. Theincludes installations critical for supporting US civilian Federal Covtinment opeiarlom andfacilities related Iu tlie production and supply of military capabilities In addition, the SovieUplan to attack some of the eneigy production plant network that supports the North American military and civilian economy. Many of these installations arc dusteied geographically, and only aboutercent are hardened

n initial Soviet strike against such aset of largeu in North America probably would currently include about half the Soviets'warheads, leaving their remaining warheads, plus any weapon systems that could be reloaded, to fulfill other strategic irquiternents (These numbers assume that the SovieU fully generale their strategic forcesucleai strike and do not reflect potential force degradation from losses duringconflict or endurance limitations.)


Over like nexl decade. Ihe Sovieli will iniro-duce mote modern and accurate missile systems that wc project will reduce the number of warhead*to strike current North American targets to achieve Soviet damage goals. This could be offset to some extent by the addition ol newexample, more redundant strategic command, control, and communications facilities or, inobile US ICBMby US defensive efforts such as deployment of an ABM systemardening program for military installalions In the absence of such new targeting requirements, however, lite Soviets in theould have, in addition to the warheads needed for an initial compiehensivc strike against North America, an increase in the number of online warheads available to fulfill olher strategic requirements:

0 online warheads, if Soviet forces generally remain withinnd SALT II numerical constraints0

00 online warheads, ifforces are expanded beyond arms control limitations beginning6nd 3t

nline warheads, if Soviet forces arc constrained by the Soviet START proposal

In addition, the Soviets would have some reserve weapons that potentially would be available for refirc. (See paragraphor an alternative view.)

reliminary analysis ol potential targets in European theaters of military operations suggests the Soviets currently would taiget up to several thousand fixed military, government, and economic installations in addition to those targets associated with NATO nuclear forces The most trnportanl of these arenstallations related to NATO nonnu-clear military capabilities.omprehensiveattack against NATO, the Soviels might also target several hundred civilian government facilities lopolitical control and up to several ihousand military-economic facilities that produce or storeend-products, energy, and petroleum. The extent ofoviet attack would depend on tlie course the conventional war had taken. Some fixed targets within the area of front responsibility would be altacked bv tactical nuclear weapons. The Soviets probably would also use strategic weapons to attack delected mobile targets beyond the area of fioni responsibility.

etaliatory attack the situation is modi more complex The command and control over forces

would be degraded, with great unknowns for the Soviels in the degree of control remaining initially, and in the ability to reestablish control, where it had been lost, and to maintain control over time. Thus, numbers of surviving weapons and tlie capability to employ themoordinated lashion arc both

the vulnerability of Soviet ICBMduring the period of this Estimate, ifUS missiles arc deployed, the Soviets willwith more difficult problems in assuringretaliatory capabilities in the evenl theyfirst. Their efforts to expand tlie capabilitiescommand and conlrol network, improveand survivability of their SLBM force,two new mobile ICBMs reflect their concernproblem.

Survivability of Soviet Stralegic Offensive Forces

Wc expect that silo-based ICBMsto be the largest clement ol Sovietforces Ihrough at least the nextearsjj

iid SS-I9 silos have nearly the same JtroduraiTardisrss as that for lhendilos are considerably softer.)^

Our analysis indicates that Soviet silos for the latest ICBMs. and their associated launch control facilities, wouldigh probability of, surviving an attack bv current US ICBMs and


igureulnerability; US

ICBMs andevelopment wouldonsiderably dealer threat, due mainly tu accuracy improvements. US bombers and land-attack cruise missiles could cause similar high damage to Soviet silos, depending on the extent to which thev could penetrate Soviel air defenses. (The figure should noi be taken lo represent the potenlial effectivenessorcewidc altack by US sveaponson Soviet ICBM silos, however, because noi all technical and operational uncertainties thai ivould be associates! with such an altack were considered.)

c expect the Soviets may further modify their latest silos and launch control centers and further


the missile systems, on Ihc basis of experience ihey have gained in teats thai simuUte nudear weapon eflecli. attemptingain Ulghl Increases in liardncs* We have seen no evidence lhe Soviets will sigmiicantly harden ICBM lilo structuies in Ihe (iiluref"


e rudge thai Soviet planners are unlikely to see much advantage in super ha rdening missile silos lo withstand extremely high overpressures. ThisIs based on the Soviet belief lhat surface bursts maximize destruction of buried sliuctures such as ICBM systems and the evidence we have on Soviet percrpltons of how nucleai weapons would affect such strudures. Thev apparently perceive nudear effects from surface bursts other than blast overpressure would become the dominant destruction meclianism. Soviet and Warsaw Pact nuclear weapons effects writings imply that cuter ing. ground motion, neutron radiation, and EMP effects aH wouldritical role tn assessing the oveiall vulnerability of Soviet ICBMs. Classilied Soviet writings through Ihetate that surface or subsurface bursts maximize the destruction of buried structures, the writingsdiscount ground shuck from airburstsiijof damage mechanism lint should be used against buried structures. It is likely that they assume the United States would target each Soviet ICBM silo with at least one weapon set for groundburst.

e expert that Soviet road-mobileCBMs would have many basic operational features in common with theRBM- housed inbuildings al support basesortion ol the force In ihe held at all times. Once dispersed into Held sites, the launchers would become more suivivable because Ihey would be difficult to locale The areas to which these missiles could be deployed are quite large-C

J Unless

their locations *ei* determined, ihe field-deployed missiles would brulnerable onlyarrage missile altack designed to saturate likelyor operating areas.

omber* and SSBNs. The survivability of Soviet stralegic bombers and SSBNs is largelyon Soviet preparationsrisis or theater war. and upon receiving warnings of possible enemy attacks:

fudge that Soviet strategic forces probably would suffer attrition during conventionalbut the overall capability of ihcse forces would noi be seriously degraded.

SovieU believe they will lose SSBNs during coriventtonal conflict, particularly those wilh shorter tange SLBMs lhat must be forwardto attack US targets Soviel SSBNs that disperse to sea would not be vulnerable to an enemy nudear attack, although they would be subject to attrition from enemy ASW attacks SSBNs with long-range SLBMs can remain In range of largeU in the United Slates whilein waters close lo the USSR, exploiting ice cover and shallow ocean areas, avoiding Western sound ttirvHllance system (SOSUS) arrays, and under lhe protectionignificant portion of their genital purpose naval forcesbly would increase the number of Soviet SSBNs that woulderiod ol conventional conflict, bo able lo participate In un initial Soviel nuclear llrifce. and be available for use in protracted nuclear war.

We cannot evaluate (he survivability and opera-bility of thetialegic bomber lorcetlie nuclear phasesonflict Important factors include the extent of bomber losses during Ihe preceding phases of cotifEict, capabilities to disperse and maintain aircraft at untargeled locations, and capabilities to reconstitute the bomber force Soviet strategic bombers on alert at dispersal bases, or in flight during an enemy attack, however, would have an increasedof survival

Protecting ihe USSR With Strategic Defense

lthough we provide an assessment of strategic defense elemenls individually, we have not assessed the degree ot overall peoirctioo, now or in the future, lhat would be afforded by the combination of active

and passive defrnscv

allistic Missile Defense. The currentABM system ofaunchers providesimited,veris capable ofRVs only before ihrv reenter the aimospliere These defenses probably couldmall atlack

not accompanied bv penetration aids such as chaff and decoys. Attempting toarger number of attaching RVs, however, would rapidly exhaust the available interceptors. When completed, the ongoing upgrade ol Ihe defenses al Moscow will provide the Sovielsuch more reliable, two-layerto defend critical targets al Moscow against an attack by some tens of current types of US RVs and against increasinglyirdarge-scale attack, theDM interceptors would quickly be exhausted, but they mighl be effective in preferenlially defending selected targets in the Moscow area, such as national command and control facilities.

he upgrade to the defenses at Moscow, and lhe completion of the six new large phased-arraywould provide the Sovietsoundation Iot expanding their defenses Withlhe Soviets could make hardened targets around Moscow, especially command bunkers, less vulnerableubstantial US force ol attacking RVs, although the leakage likely to result from such an attack would cause severe damage to most of lhe abovessound, unhardened facilities and to some ol the hardened facilities a* well. Tlie effectiveness ofefensehinese attack could be considerable.

If lhe Soviets were lo deploy an ABM defense involving as manyaunchers, as in the expansion options addressed inhe potential effect on the US strategic missile force would beS preemptive strike in tbe face ofeavy defense would be degraded, perhapsignificantS retaliatory strike could be degraded even more, because the lower number and rale ol RV arrivals in most areas probably would result in lower leakage rates for the defense.

The actual effectiveness ofefense would depend, not only on the performance of lhe deplored ABM systems, but also on the vulnerabilities of key elemenls of the network and lhe potential of an attacking lorce to exploit them Wc have notassessed, and arc uncertain about, the potential abilityidespread ABM system to reduce overall damage and to protect key military functions. It would probably be more effective against SLBMs than against ICBMs. if adequate coverage of SLBMwere provided bv battle managementradars. US countcniioatures such as decoys, chaff,

maneuvering RV* could reduce lis



In any case, widespread Soviet deployment of an ABM system, even if US evaluations indicated it could be overcome by an attacking force, would complicate US attack planning and create major uncertainties for US planners about the potential effectivenessS strike, ll isto judge the capabilities of the new advancedurface-to-air missile system. However, if our assumptions about certain features of this system are correct, lis potenlial contribution to ballistic missile defenses will be of growing concern as il is deployed in increasing numbers In addition, according to one view, the potential ABM capabilities of thendystems could further complicate US attack planning."

trategic Air Defense. Our conclusions aboul the overall effectiveness of lhe Soviel air defense system are based on our assessments of Soviet potential lo perform the essential air defensewarning, detection and tracking, control of intercepts, and target destruction. They are noi based onsimulations ol live air battle to calculate the attrition lhe Soviels could inflict on an attacking force- We conclude that the present Soviet air defense syslem, undegradedarge-scale ballistic missile attack or effective electronic countermeasuresrobably would perform well against current aircraft ataboveeters, although it docs not have the capability to conduct intercepts muchthe Soviet borders Irom bases within the USSR. We have not assessed the extent lo which Itswould be degraded by defense suppression, such as ballistic missile strikes likely to precedeand cruise missile penetration The current Soviet air defense system would be relatively ineffectiveow-altitude altack. ll could, however,igher probability of intercepting low-altitude aircraft In areas where radar coverage is dense and thereigh concentration of low-altitude-capable ground-bused terminal defenses, unless the attacker used standoff missiles or effective countermeasures and tactics.

- Ihr hiAdrr ol ihuhe Director, Ds/aiue tnlitl<rt<iee


rom llien, th* Soviet air defense system will be qualitatively different from lhe current system. The Soviets will have deployed in lameariety of new systems that possess the technical capabilities lo defend against current types ol bombers and cruise missiles al low altitude. We cannot assess with confidence (he overall capabilities of these defenses^


making up the wartime rnanageroent stiucture wouldarge-scale US nuclear strike. Although the Soviets could not pievent massive damage lo their economy from such an attack, timely Implementation of shcitciinr. dispeisal, and relocation plans would provide effective protectionarge percentage of the essential work force from the initial effectsarge-scale nuclear strike Soviet population casualties would vary gieally. depending on the ealenl lo which civil defense measures had been implemented

rotection of the Leadership andand Control Continuitv. The Sovietsarge program lo provide protection for iheir


ny judgment about tlie overall effectiveness of the future Soviet air defense system against an attack by bom ben and cruisehus su Inert to considerable uncertainly, l'enetraliou of improvedair defenses by currently deployed bombers will be more difficult Theseowever, would be considerably less effective against US cruise missllrs. Our Judgment is that,ombined attack of penetrating bombers, short-range attack missiles (SUAnd cruise missiles. Soviet air defenses during Ihe neatear* probably would not be capable of inflicting sufficient losses lo prevent large-scaleto lhe USSIt We judge, however, that Ihe Soviets will be able to provide an increasingly capable air defense for many key leadeisliip. control, and military and industrial installations essential to wartime

here is an alternative view ihal this Estimate substantially undcistatcs the capability of lhe Soviel air defense svslcin to defend key target areas against low-ahitude penetrators. The holder of this viewthat tlie effectiveness in such areas would be significantly higherombined of penetrating bombers.nd cruise missiles than the Estimate uiggesis"

ivil Ot-ft ate. Wc estimate lhat. with as littleew houis'arge perge of Soviet civiliangovcrsunent. and

- Th* hotdrt ofhrut of. OeiMrinwiar ot ihe Armii.

J pcssiDiy


we estimate there

a* many


leaden at the national and regional leveb; many of these are for leaders at lower levels, llie republics and oblasls The deep underground facilities at Sharapovo and Chekhov, near Moscow, for lheAuthority wouldifficult targeting problem. Evidence acquired in the several year* indicates these tiles are harder, deeper, and much less ^Ineralde than had been estimated in the.


The Soviet* may believe thot such deepwould assure the lurvtaabilily of the lopkey objective of theiic have not yet assessed llie implications oferception by Soviet leaders. Nonetheless, their eorasdence lo the effectivenett of their overall wartime managemeni striscture Is almost certainlyby the belief thai civilian ai well as military leadership facilities would be high on lhe list of US targetinguclear conflict

he Soviets have taken additional measures that wc believe would contiibute significantly to the continued functioning of the wartime management system, includii'g providing redundant and hardened communications for the leadership and makingfor poststuie restoration of communicationsThese meaiures would improve the su.-vmlnlit* andf the systems thai aie critical lo continuity of command and control.


e believe lhe Soviet command and control system for nuclear forces, even il directly attacked, could ensure transmission of launch instiuctions;retaliatory strikes could be delayed and not fully coordinated. Althoufih US allacks could destroy many known liaod command ronlrol. and communications lacihhes. many elements of tbe political leadership and mililary commands probably would survive, and redundancy in Soviet strategic common leal ions would prevent loss of anya nisei from disabling tbe overall system

t seems likely that the Soviets could maintain overall continuity of command and control, although it would probably br degraded The Soviets could experience difficulty in maintaining theand effectiveness of strategic command, control, and communications for weeks of continuingparticularly if subjected to US strikes. They would be relying onposts The cumulative impact of residualeffects could endanger command [snsonncl and degrade communication*.stem. It is unclear,how effectively lhe Sovieti could retarget and employ surviving or reconstituted weapceu. Wethe Soviets might eipect to lose most satellite reconnaissance capability and would thus rely peimar-ily on long range strike aiiciaft. signal Interceptand agents

Although some Soviet reconnaissance colassets would probablyomprehensive nuclear attack, many of tlie installations and lacilities lhat control these assets or receive and evaluate their information svould probably be destroyed, including satellite ground stations, rnnioi communicationsintelligence cooidinatlon centers, and airfields servicing reconnaissance aircraft. The eipoctedof the Soviet reconnaissance system in the post-Strike environment would probably limit missileat least through, lo compensating for known bunch fadures Strikes against new targets ot targets previously struck probably would be rnos! effectively carried out by aircraft

The Soviets perceive the Pershing HIrange, and short flight lime (and, possibly in, those ofl.BMsf as providing the capability to threaten key elements of their command, control, communications, and warninghreat thev do not now face to the same degree from loss accurate SLUMs In making pessimistic threat assessments, the Soviets probably assume that sonic key targets in llic Moscow area aie lluratcned by the

Pershing II, because they apparently assume it* range can easily lie increasedilometers.leum live view holds that sufficient information Is available to tlie Soviets on lhe range capability of the Pershing II. llierefoto, II is unlikely the Soviets would plan for the range to be any greaterershing II weapons have the capability lo destroy hardened Soviel facihites; because of the short But lit lime of lhe Perusing II. ihr Soviets probably would not have lime io bunch on tactical warningershing II altack. However, the overall degradation lhat could occur lo the .Soviet mmmand. control, and communicaHorn network, lhe early warning network, and strategic missile installation*esultershingltack alone would not significantly degiade the Soviets' capability toarge-scale retaliatory strike The Soviets may lielieve. in their pessimistic lineal assessments that their capabilities for IX)TWS ICBM attack could be affected. The holder of an alternative view believes the degradation to thecommand, ronlrol. communications, andsystems thai svould resultersrwrm II attack would not significantly degrade the Soviets' capability to execute an LOTW."

Concluding Observations

e do not know how thr Soviets would assess Iheir piospocli for prevailinglobal nuclearirable foices on both sides would suivive Urge scale nuclear strike*

Soviet oflensive forces will not be able lo reliably target and destroy pair oiling US SSBNs, alert aircraft, aircraft in Eight, or dispersed bnd-mohitc missiles, partkubrly tins* beyond the range of tactical reconrsaissance systems We believe that,risis or conflict, the Soviets would credit iindegraded US warning andss.steins with the ability lo launch ICBMs on lartiral warning

Dispersed Soviet mobile missiles, many SSBNs pal lolling in waters near lhe USSIt.rge part of lhe silo-based ICBM force would current -ly survive US nuclear altack We asarts the Sovlafj ran bunch ICBMs on tactical warning, assuming their warning and command andsystems were undegraded

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the Soviets ate well aware of llieir inability to prevent massive damage to the USSR with their Strategic defenses even wilh the improvements taking place in these forces. They abo recognize ihul US strategic defenses cannot prevent massive damage

e believe that the

their capabilities for global conflict probably will be critically dependent on command and controlneed for continuity in their own corn-mind and control capabilities, and their prospects for disrupting and destroying lhe ability of the United Statei and its Allies to command and to operate their forces The Soviets continue lo make eilensive efforts Io improve all aspects of their command, control and communications capabilities. We believe Ihey would launch continuing attacks on US and Allied slrategic command. conlioL ando prevent or impair the coordination of retaliatory strikes, thereby easing lhe burden on Soviet strategic defenses and impairing US and Allied abilities lo marshal military and civilian resources lo reconstitute forces Planned US and NATO improvements in command, control, and communications will probably Increase lhe So-

viets* unoeitaIitltcs about their capabilities to disrupt enemy force operalions


ISO The evidence shows clearly that Soviet leaders are attempting to prepaie (heir mililaiy forces for the possibility that they will actually have louclear war and are training to be able to maintain control over increasingly complex conflict situations They have seriously addressed many of the problems of conducting military operationsuclear war, thereby improving their ability to deal with the many coriiingencies ofonflict, and raising theof outcomes favorable to the USSR Anview notes Ihal it should, al the same time, beat the Soviels have not resolved many of Ihe critical problems bearing on Ihe conduct ofwar. such as the nature of the initiation of conflict, escalation within the theater, and protracted nuclear operations. According to ihis view, while they will try to do the best ihey can. the Sennets recognize that nuclearo destrractive. and ill coo lie so unccilain, that ihey could not expect an outcome thai was "favorable" In any meaningful sense."

" The Aofrfrr of thil Kite it thrd Keixareh. Oe-ur'meni of Stall.




5omprehensive luivcr of Soviet strategic foreei and capabililies Judgments have been drawn from other National Intelligenceand from Interagencynr rue Assess mcnls and Memorandums that contain more in-depth discussionsr-ciue subicct areas. These include:

. Wet Ballistic MMb Defense.2 Describes Soviet eapafadilir* lor ballistic rrussile defense.

. The Soviet Space Ftogram.3 Describes current Soviet space capabilities,

identifies elements of the space pioitraui in development, and estimates how these will affect future Soviet capabilities.ur-rcnlly in draft)

. Chinese Capabilities for Nuclear Conflict3 Describes China's(or strategic and tactical nuclear conflict at present and durine the nextears (An update iscuiieatly being prepared)

I1A.ossible Soviet Responses lo flic US Strategic Defense intiiahuf.3 Examines general principles and constraints in the areas of politics, militaryand research and development practices lhat will Influence the Soviets' responseS ballKtic missile defense (An update is outrently being prepared)

NIE. Prospects for Soviet Military Technology and Research and IMceloornrnt.3 Identifies leehrrologie* that ate Lev to future Soviet military capalaklm and assesses lhe likely impact of those technologies on

. Soviet militaiy syitems ofThis tali-male is currently being updaled )

X. Soirtei WartimeThe Hob of Civil Defense tn Leadership Continuity,3 Assesses the Soviet civil ilciensc infrastructure ami measures for

leadership protection and relocation as anpadroader national command and control svstcm

NIhreat lo US Hood-Mobile Cl Systems in COS US.aamines the potential threat duringeriod to road-mobile command, control, communications, and intelligence systems operating in theUnited Slates

Nlhe Soviet Approach to Nude-or Winter.4 Examines Soviet research on Nuclear Winter lo determine what the Soviet leaders think ol the hypothesis, Ihe extent lo which they are exploiting lhe subiect for propaganda purposes, and lhe most likely implications from Moscow's perspective.

oviet Nooat Strategy and Pro grams Through.the current role of lhe Navy in Soviet military strategy naval RAD and construction programs, key issue* facing Soviet planners, and the likely course of development lor the Navy over the remainder of this cenlurv

X. Soviet ptreot to Ground-Mol/ile Strategic Systems In the Continental United Slates.xaminesSoviet capabilities innd beyond to detect and destroy ground-mobile ICBMs and command, control, and communications systems in the continental United State* during various phases of war.

occt Suhmarin* Warfare Trends.5 Sets forth thethe Soviets have made tn submarineand rscrioamance ovri lhe past decade and eiamines all asi>ecti ol lubrnarinc warfare,weapomy. support, readiness, and laities.


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