THE FUTURE OF SOVIET SCIENCE (NIE 11-7-85)

Created: 11/1/1985

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

tril Inicilicenor

The Future of Soviet Science

NnlionulILstiRutte

OCT 9

Gvr 3^

HE FUTURE OF SOVIET SCIENCE

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THIS ESTIMATE IS ISSUED BY THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE.

THE NATIONAL FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE BOARD CONCURS.

The following infcUigonce organizalioni participated in. tho preparation of the Estimate:

The Centre! lofetgence Agency, the DefemeAgency, me Not cool Security Agency, and the krtettgencel lhe Department ol Stele.

Abo Participating:

The AiAlonl Chief ol Stall for Inietgonce. Deparhnent of the Army Thc Dueetor of Naval Inle&oonre, Deporimeol ol the Novy Tie- Anidont Chief of Staff, Intelligence. Department of the Air Force The Director ol lotefligenco, lleactjuarleri. Marine Corpt

CONTENTS

NOTE...

KEY

Research Environment.

Concentration

Rigid Hierarchy.

Political Factors

Military and Industrial Influence. Science to Technology Transition.

Policy

Resources

Instrumentation

Thc Soviet Scientist

Compared With Westernof Western Science

Participation in Military, Government, and Party

Soviet Scientific Research

General Considerations.

Relative Strengths and Weaknesses

Intelligence Caps

ANNEX: Formal Organizational Structure

0

85

15

IS6 10

7 IS

19

2:

23

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SCOPE NOTE

This Estimate addresses the sector of Soviet society at the very leading edge of future technologysciences. The sciences, under which we include fundamental and applied science, are concerned with the discovery and conceptual development of new laws of nature and thc preliminary steps taken to explore possibleof these discoveries.

Science, and in particular fundamental science as distinguished from applied science. Is so far removed from weapon systems, products, and processes that have an obvious effect on our relations with the USSR that it is difficult to convey with clarity the far-reaching and long-term effects it has on societies. However, science serves as the wellspring of new concepts and theories from which new technologies, and finally products'and processes, evolve. An understanding of Soviet science, consequently, can provide the first indications ofnew approaches to problems of defense and the economy. These early indicators can serve lo alert the Intelligence Community to areas where the Soviets are particularly strong and where surprises are likely to be in store. More generally, an overall sense of thc state of Sovietas well as how it couples to industry, canackground of reality against which to evaluate the viability of intended policies and programs initiated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

The intent is to develop,road sense, an understanding of the current health of Soviet science and to speculate on the implications of ils current and likely future course. This entails an understanding of the environment within which Soviet science is conducted, in additioneneral assessment of thc relative slrength of Soviet scientific research in various fields of science as compared with that in the United States. We have tried lo identify and discuss the implications of the striking differences between the Soviel and US research environments in such areas as organization and management, resources, science policy and education, and the nature of lhe Soviet scientist.

We have limited this study primarily to science sponsored by thc Soviet Academy of Sciences, and, furthermore, primarily to thc physical sciences; we have also collected data and impressions on applied science in industrial research institutes as well. We talieve, however, that the environmental factors identified are generally applicable in describing lhe conditions for all of Soviet science. In addition, we have explored somewhat the transition of science and lechnologv to industry.

. judgments were

cross-checked against several studies/reporis/surveys that wereoutside of the Intelligence Community. We found the themes to be largely consistent among these various sources.

We do not attempt to provide an in-depth analysis of Soviel scicnlific capability; rather we have focused on the research environ-tnent, policy, resources, and scientists that affect science in the Soviet Union.

This study is intended to break ground in developing an undcr-stand.ng of Soviet science, and to serveasis upon which further analysis mayore complete and detailed picture-

KEY JUDGMENTS

Soviet science mayradual evolution over tbc next two decades, which could resultore effective system for responding to thc technology needs of the country. Over the next decade, party policy initiatives from the new-generation leaders, which have been designed to focus Soviet scientific talent on economically and militarily relevant research, could resulteduction or leveling off of Soviet research in areas of fundamental science having little or no obvious applications. Beyond that time, an improved technology base could resultignificant reduction in the problems imposed by the Soviets' traditional lack of instrumentation and computing power. This, coupled with their large applied science effort, could allow llicm to overcome more easily future technical deficiencies in their military systems and civilian products, thus increasing their competitiveness.

The transfer of science to technology and application is difficult for thc Soviets because of:

An incentive system that does not strongly support technical innovation and implementation

Restricted communication.

A rigidly hierarchical burcacracy that docs not easily allow interministry scientific projects.

lt is likely that the new generation ol Soviet political and scientific leaders will institute substantive changes that affect bothdministrative bureaucracy and the research environment, which could improve thc science-to-technology transition problems and theinstrumentation infrastructure:

We expect that substantial impact resulting from any changes

will be slow and gradual, and that tbc current research problems

are likely to continue for the notears.

Beyond that time, however, if the new generation of leaders is successful in instituting changes, wc may expect to begin to see substantial impact on the Soviet technology base.

Many new leaders in lhe scientific community arc also of the new generation and havr made ihcir carecis in applied science. They may be eapected lo perpetuate any changes over at least two decade*

tew-

There will probablyurther shift of Soviet scientific research toward applied sciences in the future:

Should the Soviets be successful in improving their ability to move scienceechnology and application, the expected increasing focus on applied science, combined with theirability to come up with new scientific concepts, could lead to an increased likelihood that the United States may be surprised by an unanticipated applied scientific development The occurrence ofurprise in applied science couldhort time impact on militarily and economically important technologies.

shift will probably substantially affect the Soviet Academy of Sciences and resulteduction or leveling off ofscience, particularly experimental science,maller core of scientists can be expected to continue to produce world-class scientific results.

areas of fundamental science that have traditionally been closely coupled to applications, such as condensed matter physics and semiconductors, may in fact receive greater emphasis.

A greater reliance on the West for fundamental scientific research can be expected in the future.

Even after the technology base begins to respond substantially to the new policies, vigorous Soviet efforts lo acquire Western technology can be expected to continuc.

The best Soviet theorists have capabilily comparable to that of their Western counterparts in all fields of physical science.

Soviet theoretical research is largely comparable in scope and quality to that in the West:

The Soviets arc particularly noted for their strength inplasma physics, laser physics, mathematics, and astrophysics.

The Soviets* lack of large-scale scientific computers forphysics may limit their contribution in the future.

US scientists have attributed the Soviet absence in. for example, thc band theory of conduction to inadequate computer power.

watt

The best Soviet ejperinientatistt are itut as good mtellectually as their Western counterparts:

The Soviets have been lauded lor their contributions inscience and laser physics

They are. however, frequently limited by problems withavailability, and maintenance of instrumentation.

Nevertheless, the Soviets frequently surprise Western scientists with tlie quality of thc data they obtain with relatively crude equipment, and they ofteneeper physical insight.

In scope and quality, the Soviets' experimental research isnotar with their theoretical research. Thc Soviets have been conspicuously absent in some fields, in large part because of lhe lack of necessary techniques and equipment:

Such has been the case in surface physics, where the availability of ultrahigh vacuum techniques is essential.

Lack of sophistication in vacuum and cryogenic technology has limited Soviet contributions in low-temperature physics.

While ultrafast laser spectroscopy hasajor interest in thc United States, the Soviets have biien slower to achieve extremely short time resolutions.

Thc presence ofew very bright scientists can. and has. made thc difference between very significant Soviet contributionsield and the virtual absenceoviet contribution. Even where the Soviet contribution is significantly poorer than that of Western countries, as in biological sciences and molecular biology in particular, it is possible to find specific examples within the broad field, such as biophysical chemistry and protein conformation, (bat are regarded as world class by Western scientists.

Soviet scientists generally show an overall excellence ineducation, which exceeds ihat of their Western counterparts. This

has:

Contributed to excellence in theoretical physics.

Allowed them to circumvent inadequate computer capability to some extent, thereby allowing analytic solutions where Western scientists would be more likely toumerical solution.

Allowed adequate numerical results to be obtained onof comparably lesser capability in some cases.

Should stato-of-tlic-art computers become available lo lhe Soviets, the possibilityurge in their scienlific computation capability exists because of their excellence in mathematics-

This surge could be mitigated to some extent because of the need for special programing knowledge and experience.

Soviet scientists are often thc first to come upew scienlific concept, but generally the USSR lags the West in fully developing the idea. Such has been the case, for example, with the Tokamak for controlled thermonuclear fusion, and optical phase conjugation, which can be used in correcting atmospheric distortion of electromagnetic wave propagation.

Restricted freedom of communicationundamental flaw in the Sovicl scientific research environmcnl that results in:

Reduced synergism among scientists.

Duplication of effort despite central planning.

Slow diffusion of new ideas and technologies.

Errors resulting from inadequate peer review.

Thc best Soviet students have had depth, breadth, and quality of scientific education comparable to that of their US counterparts. They generally have greater mathematical expertise ihan their UShowever.

Because teaching and research are largely separated institutionally, the interchange of ideas between researchers, professors, and students is

reduced;

Soviet awareness of this situation has resulted in efforts to decrease the separation, but tbe problem persists.

Students often need substantial retraining toesearch instjtule.

-WeMfO-

DISCUSSION

Environment

he formal organiialrona! structure of Soviel scientific policy, administration, and research entities has been described al length in other studies. For the interested reader, tbe essential elements ofen briefly summarized In thc annex, to this Estimate. The fundamental perspective that should be carried Into Ihe following chapters is the critical role played by the leading members of thc Statefor Science and Technology fCKNT)e Soviet Academy of Sciences (ANseend the fold out, figuren formulating, coordinating, and executing Soviet science policy as defined by thc Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)

Concentration

n the Soviet Union, research activity is highly concentrated organizationally and geographically. The Academy dominates the republic academies both in terms of numbers of people and the overall quality of rcseaich (seeimilarly, the Moscow area dominates the other mata scientific centersNovosibirsk,olitburo member V. V. Crishin recently noted that over half lhe scientific personnel of tbc Academy are located in Moscow's research institutes and Uboratories and nearlyercent of all doctorates andercent of allof science arc in Moscow,

Rigid Hiororehy

any characteristics ol Ihe Soviet research envj. ronmenl thaitrong impact on how effectively and efficiently research Is conducted In llie Soviet Union can be tied to the rigidly hierarchical lines of authority. Of central importance Is the strong role of Ihe institute director. The director has vast authority in deoding what projecti will be undertaken, by whom, and what resources will be made available, as well as In authorizing travel to scientific meetings, especially (hose overseas The influence is so extreme lhal lhe director's own scientific or ideological views can dominate those ol all the researchers in lbc

' Units tf- .- nili IV AN

udnOnrtFpulilic academic*

Table 1

Manpower in the Academics of Science

In Acadcmi Systran*

are In Soviet Academy of Sciences

'

wwlen

academics reixraenl abouterceni of the eouniiv'i tcierfliiie etanpawo.

iewci

1 Including cccrrapoodiBc men ben.

institute This was the case, for example, wiih V. V. Belousov'j suppression of work on plate tectonics in geology, ihroughout an institute, thcroendency Inward ossification because of lhe pervasive inability to challengein some cases, on the technical validity ol an argument. The management structure in the institutes tends to be very shallow, with sometimesr more laboratory chiefs reporting to one director. The director spends most of his time in committee meetings with financial and administrative matters and has difficulty in providing effectivediiection for Ihe laboratory chiefsirector can easily remain in place for lifeIhe suppressing effect on lite younger,scientists is, in lhe words of one Sovietscientist, "like ice on the water"

Conversely, in the handstrong scientist/ administrator, such as Lev laindau was, an inslilulc can flourish greatly,radition ofFurthermore, Ihe director can shield researchers from the bureaucracy, allowing considerablein what protects may be undertaken once lire researcher gains the director's support Tins leadseneral licnd in which it is easier for Soviet scientrsti lo woct- off the beaten track and maintain funding over many years lhan il is for ihcir US counterparlt.

Tbe ttiung hierarchical lines, which run not only llirougb ihr incillules and the academy structure but

HI 1

Soriclutuig and Management Structure

1 i-cir, the Council of Mtnlitc'i

CKNT-Slile tamrnjiue for Sfkrxc

echnology OOSHAN-Stue PUnnins CommtlieeCooiai^tw for MMerial

jnd rcrtnicjJ Supply COSSIROV-Sutc Comminee for CwtitructM

t

COliTANOART-SUKfarcmr of Sc*ncci

Cwnmuniii PtMj of Hit Setiti Union

iv.

RepwWic Council

GOSSTANUART

AN SWR

IfHluiUiBl Miniitry

. ,

EE I

it is necessary lo devole Urge numbers of people and amounts of time to instrument design, construction, and maintenance Nevertheless,b-tO-Ub comnelitionovietS lab. thc Soviet lab can sometimes obtain results faster than can Ihe US lab through the sheer slice of the effort tliat can be marshallediven topic.

Potticd Factors

Tltc party bureaucracy plays an important role in staffing institutes with scientific personnel The hiring decision is noi made solely by thc director, but rather by the director, the secretary of the party organiialion, and tbc personnel departmentOften factors such as party membership, social activity, and nationalityore important role than scientific qualifications.

Party niembenhip becomes an increasinglyIssue to career advancement as tbe level of institute director is approached. The ability lo obtain approval for projects within an institute or funding for an institute from lhe Academy dependsrge ertent on the "old buddy" system- At the institute director level and higher, the Uck of partybecomes more and more conspicuous, andof higher authority are almost always filled with paity members

Military and Industrial Influence

hc Soviet military has three basic mechanisms for tapping lhe talent in the Academy. One formalhrough tbe Applied Problems Section directly under the Presidium of the Academy. Through this mechanism, problems of Interest to the military arc brought to the attention of the Presidium, which can then allocate resources from within the Academy's institutes lo work on theecond formal approach ts via research contracts negotiated directly with an institute Although we have no directof Ihe number of military contracts laken on by Ihe Academy, V. V. Crishin. Moscow parly chief and Polilbuiu member, recently noted that "every year0 contracts between scientific researchand design bureaus and enterpriieshc third, but more informal, way is through individual consulling agieements

cientific research done under militaiy contract is oroluMv attractive lo many researchers because it allows them access lo better funding and equipment, some of whxh they can use fo* iheir own fundamental research pi meets II is avoided by some, however.

also Ihioush iho varioui Industrial ministries, loodevere isolation of institutes and laboratoriea. This isolation hirvderi Soviet ability to carry on "biguch as the oo oil ruction of Urge, forefront high-energy particle accelerators. Manybureaus and research institutes do not want to loin Urge cooperative protects because it is not dear who will get tbe credit for the wort Thu has been part of the reason why Urge Soviet acceleratorprojects generally are completed after the Western research community has already explored tlie accelerator'i attainable energy range

6 Soviet attempts lo deal with tlic problem of organizational Isolation have included theor proposal of special intermlnblry organizations that can coordinate and direct Urge projects that cut across organiulional lines. These concepts include:

Scientific research institutes, simlUr to the Paton Electric Welding Institute, that cot across minis lerial lines and can conduct applied research, engineering, and technology desigiL

Interbranch Science-Product ion Associationsuen nw* obucdti-eniva) and similar SrVT centers that promote collaboration of scientific, cducollonal, andestablish men Is in ibe development and diffusion of key technologies.

project teams, developed to solve long-tettn, complexproblems or to design new equipmentechnology. If successful, they may be changed intooint decree issued bv the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers on3 explicitly calls for the creation of such ad hoc collectives, and tbc USSR Council of Ministers in4esolution regulating their formation and operation

he isolation also severely restricts Soviet ability to participate in tbe rapidly expanding mijftidiseiplin ary fields where, for eaamnle. biology and laser

spectroscopy come together In this case, Ibe organ)ia tional isolation is aggravatedestricted freedom of communication of scienlific research (sec inset on Freedom of Communication)

8 The sire of Soviet scienlific research institutes is one of Ihc firil and strongest impressions noted hy visiting scientists Many of the main research institulei are very Urge by US standards,o several thousand woikeis The productivity in Soviet institutes is low compared with lhat of the United States This

Freedom ol Commookottan

eueniut rLrmenl of (he We* noe search environment that ran greatly contribute to the quality "nd ulr of lkokicu of science is the capability to effect rapid and broad dissemination of ideal TliUwhich appears tone in the Soviel Union,undamental flaw in (he Soviet research environment Tlterc aie numeroui reports ol highly rettrietcd communicalKHi betweenven to (he point where actenttiuiven liuiituie may be unaware of relevant week coinR on in their own institute Many US scientists have noted their Soviet ccainieipacts ailing fear copies of Soviet papersifficult for lhe Sovietsbtain Access to scientific literature varies Irom institute lo institute, bui many examples of poor access have beeo cited Furthermore, access to pbotocopvirst machines is highly rcuricted. requiring (be authoriiaUonunci-visor for each use. The use of electronic mall systems has been very rare, and limited la access and coverage. In addition, (ravel bclween institutes forespecially intercityestricted.

1 im lac* of broad and easy eocnraunkatioo leadsumber of effects Because lheem (nation of new Ideas is slow, there is slow movement of thc scientific community into new fields and slow dillusion of new lechriolocv to different research groups, ll abo leads to an inefficient use of people because ofof effort. 1'iaductivttv it reduced because of (lie reduced synergism among scientists, both from an intellect nil lha nne perspective and fromsaint eiperi-mentation peripcciive

This difficult* Ii alleviated toeni by the liiaji concentration of tcteatlfic worieri in Moscow, where icsalli (end to be raropagited through teminan held at Ihr .minutes illher lhan throughartrcirs How ever, attendance al (hoc seminars lends to be restricted lo only personsew of (he leading institute!iven field.

Allru such as journal ait idea, ranast passeries of committees before being publuhed. Timpecial party censorerisor who screens lhe material for sensitive miliiary-relatedinformationesult, tcientiits heavily edit then own articles prior to submission lor publication

Tbe Soviet solution to these problems has been loent rallied management structure that linksnetworkrJormation orxaniratioruUvllr iii. Thai system, known at the "State Scienllf-ic aad Technical (ofarrasatico Svsteoi"t made gf]ierarchy of Ihoosasds of inflituhons involved Hi activities such as colleetme. Irarulaling, indriina. abstracting, and disseminatingources The CKNT(Stale Committee for ScMrsoe andu mspoosible for ibe sapcevMoa of the CSNTI. Indodinc its several sB-unioo (national) information agencies The mint Important national agency, thr All-Union Institute ol Scientific and Technical Informationandles mow of the tilcealure in (he natural tciences and technology- Other important ageneieaIbe AkUIaaea Center cf Seiorofic and Technical lisforruatlon (VNTTTS) and the Ali-UnWn Seienlific Research Institute of Interbranch InformationIX whtrh manages defense-related materials

il limits tho scientist's ability to travel and meet Westerners.

migres have Indicated that virtually all ie-search institutes, particularly in Ihe physical sciences, have some fraction of their budget, which varies from institute lo institute, allocated for military-related woik. Many tttstitutoslosed section (fora floor or building)evoted lo military supported work.

Seience-roTochnology Transition

M Inecerwration of new scientific ideasevelopment and pi oil uct/process phase is difficult in the Soviet system. Formal review and approval mini lake nlaci: through the laboratory, instil ulr. Academy, and state cornmiltec levels of management Imple-nimitation would then lie called forinistry

directive. Line managers, however, often ignore the directive for fear of not meeting short-term quotas as specified in thc current plan Furthcruiore,boundaries are strict and tend to separate thc functions of academy, branch mi nil try, and university research, compounding the difficulty of Integra Ting these efforts. Science-Induction Associations have been established In Iry to smooth this franc Hon These associations, however, have been In existence lorears and have not been successful. AcademyA P. Alcksandrov recently called for more lateral communication between industry and Academyinstitutes. To improve the Academy'sIn applying tho results of research into production, CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Corbachev, al lheCommittee Conference on SAT Piogreas inndorsed lhe new "technical center"developed by lhe Ukrainian Academy ol Sci-

ences. Thc technical centers consul of anesign bureau, an experimental works,ilot production plant. Thc director of Ihe institute carries out supervision of lhe center Six of these centers have been established in the Ukraine. The technical centers have also been endorsed by USSR Academy President Alcksandrov and leading economist Academician Abel Aganbcgyan. Independently, examples have also been tiled of large teams of engineers goingesearch institute for several months to pickew process or technique. Conversely, research laboratories have Iteen set up at plants; tbo Zi| factory in Moscowaboratory where teienlists from the Kurchstovand the Scientific Research Center for Industrial Lasers come to test the use of lasers in the auto industry. Recent changes have been rnade that allow production quotas in tho current plan to be reducederiod of time following tlie introductionew instrument or process to erscourage risk taking through implementation of technical innovations.

Pol

IS. Decrees from the leadership of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, and their implementation within lite government, state the intended direcllons for current and future Soviet scientific work. Pro-nouncemcnti fromh CPSU Congress indicate lhe high priority being attached lo scientific and technical progresseans for fulfilling theand social development of tbe country. During that eongiess it was stipulatedesearch In the future should be even more supportive of theand social needs in the Soviet society. With tbe general goal of increasing industrial efficiency and labor productivity, (he CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers issued onoint decree titled "On Measures on the Acceleration of Scientific and Technical Progress in the National Economy" thai calls for increasedon Soviet science to pjpport the raising of Sovicl standards of machine outputs, equipment, in-sUuments. and other products lo the highest world levels

he trend toward pushing science to support economic needs was already present in lhe lllh Five-Yearith the impremcnlalionlate integrated scientific and technicalolalate comprehensivecchntca! programs were established by Cosplan (Slate Phoning Com mil-lee)', CKNT, -ml (he Academy, and incoiporatcd as a

* sn ike ix>nevtUaa ol ike wgaaUatMui

Sovier SaT notMv formon. ad mirHui alien, ind rioeullon

Examples of Tapir* VUtt Conceived la Ibe USSR, bal Pushedla Ike West

Totamai for thermonuclear hrsidfL Inflmon theory in cosmology.

Optics:

phase cenjueatioa (having Implication! for correction of atmospheric distortion ofeleolro-nurneucpropagation)

- Inunction of fast laser light pulici with

back-tea Iter Inn (scattenng of light fiom sound waves).

G ether -Mukuse* met hods for Telocity ioverucoi in ie.smc4ogJ

Radio-fit queney qua dru pole aecekritor. Nonlinear laser techniques lor driving chemical reaction pathways.

1 held view among US socqusu is tail ihe Soviru are often Iht first to come upew ictcniific concept US experimentalists often findew measurement (hey have made has already been predictedovicl theorist. Ucvorid the initial concepIualiration.use Soviets begin to Lag They are generallylo wort out lhe detailsoeapkte new theory from ihe initial concept. Tbe Sovitu, for example, were Ihc first lo note property changer of materials on Ihe nanosecond time scale when illuminated by short light pulsei They attributed Ihe propeny changes tois later, the United Stales, working wllhresolution, showed the changesbe doeapid melting and recrystalli ration Mi an amorphous Halt There isame effort in this area in Die United Stales, in pari because of possible applications to semiconductor doptnc technology. Finally, the movement of newdeiclopmefits into application] has been particularlyWc believe thu is largely due to Ihe ttrong spiit bei-rrn iheoreiicUns and cxperimrntalliis and ihrsupply and maintenance of eiperimenial equipment

stent*

component part ofevelopment plan These programs allow scientific worker) lo focus iheir efforts on developing and rapidly Introducing Into practice more advanced equipment and production methe majority of the programs pursue Ihe development of (he machine-building base (seendost of these programs are underfor inclusion inh Five-Year

t is within this corneal lhal one can look al lhe Academy and ask what effect lliese programs will have* on its research The clear implication in tbe programs backed by the CPSU is that applied science will be heavily favored over fundamental science. Furthexrrioie. according lo Academy Vice President V. A. KoteTnikov. "There docs not need to bearee Increase fn Ihe number of those working in scientific Institutions as look place in previous Five-Yeariven tlie demand for applied research, greater pressure will be exerted on scientists in the instilutes of tbe Academy lo pursue applied research at the expense of fundamental science. Since lbs Academy now performs aboutercent of allscience, thisradual reduction or leveling off of the fundamental scientific research effort in the Soviet Union.

IB The Academy has In lhe past been able toubstantially Independent force in Soviet society largely through lhe great respect accordedand, in some eases, through tlie personal actions of its internationally rccogrured scientists.esult, the Academy has been able to protect its scientists pursuing fundamental science from parly demands for research Ihat can be directly tied to application The percentage of academicians who are party nvtinbers has been rising steadily since, however, when it wasercent. With the Academyelections on AOhe fraction of academicians who arc party members exceededercent. There is little doubt that tbe influence of the parly on Academy affairs will be likely to Increase, for It now has sufficient strength to exert substantial influence on future decisions made by the Academy membership

hese statementsrogressay to improve economic oulput arc not new ideas having been stressed throughout Soviet hislory. There has noi since Brezhnev, however,eader in power long enough andolid enough political base lo push Ihrougli io fruition the necessary chances. Wiih the accession ol the younger and dynamic <JorbaohCv, we expert these changes to move more rapidly from

reactors tor boih heating

Lead Agency

Lebcdcv Phyiki tnnltuic Sr-seoHf le Reaearch Center for

ai Lav-n

OkrtunUui Academy ofol ProblemsIScience

ImtlluUof Metallurgy

U*-ede> Phyiia Institute

UittUute of High Temperalum

orbachev himself stressed ike essential cole of SAT progress indrveiotwnent inspeech5 al lhe Kremlin Palace of ConctesseA celehralineh anniversary of Ihe Soviet people's victory in lhe Great Patriotic War:

"The parly corwiderj the main task ofis lo substantially accelerate lheprogress of Sovielhatlo primarily Is lite intensive andgrowth of the national economy, uthtchon the letetl achievementtt is the basis that will maketo ensure tlie lurther growth ofwell-being, lo strengthen thedefense potentials of the country andlo perfect developed socialism

The principal way lo achieve this goal Isand technical progress. The rate of our development and the course of economicwith capitalism will dependecisive extentow wc resolve the problem ofscientific and technical progress and on how efficiently and how timely we apply theof science and technology in lhe national economy."

hese ideas were reiteratedaonference held onS in the CPSU Central Committee.peech delivered at lhe conference. Gorbachev specifically noted lhe role ofhe acceleration of scientific and technological progress.he frontline of the -druggie lo accelerate lhe scientific and technologicalin Ihc national economy advances throughne can be proud of lhe pioneering achievements in space research, mathematics, mechanics, thermonuclear synthesis,ie same time, comrade, wo can and should obtain Incomparably greater achievements from science We shouldew look al the tasks of sciersee based on the roquircmcnli of our time, thc rc-Quiiements that science be turned decisively toward tlie needs of sociall Is from these positions ihat all bnks in ihc chain thai binds science, tcclirsclocy. and production ought lo be analyzed and strengthened

Wc believe |Isat Gorbachev gave only lipscrvice lo furrdarriental scaence in hfa comments and lhal lhe true ihruit of his program will be tSrarnands for relevant applied research

'urtliermorc, concrete indications ofchange occurred in Ihe Academy wiih tin-in3 of the Department oft inn. Computer Technology, and Automation lander Ye. P. Vchkhov who. like Gorbachev, itew fenerationhe first new Academylo be createdhere have abo been decrees introducing provisions allowing short-term falb In plan prodrjction wlien technical innovations areecent Joint resolution of lhe Central Couunittee of the CPSU and the USSR Council of Ministers calledhange in the wage structure for scientific workers and engineers,iheii salaries and adding bonuses for Innovation, Thb measure was abo intended to reduce lite time of development and introduction of new technology and equipment,

lthough wc do expect changes to occur more rapidly in attempting io solve some of the traditional problems of tlie centralized Soviet system in regaidrogress and Its impact on tbc Soviet economy, there will nevertheless be tremendous inertia toIn addition, the continued influence of some "oldionprogressives and the collectiveprocess will serve to make reallake place slowly and gradually.

he combined party pressure for appliedthe newly created department in theand the advent of younger men. who arc oriented more toward applied work, lo leading positions in the Academy should succeed in shifting the Academyuch more applied orientation This shift will probably be pcrpctualed by lhe entering young generation of leaders who might be expected loin power for several decades. This implies that, in addition lo lhe directed and Wended Impact of Academy contributions lo the economy, there wil! be adclcrioralion or leveling off of Sovietscience unless specific measures are taken lo bolster and protect thb aspect of Soviel science It should be noted, however, thai some areas ofscience that have tradit-ceulry been verycoupled lo applications (for example, solid state and serniconductoi physics) may in fact receive greater cmphasb

inancial resources for conducting research in tin: Academy imliUitcs aie available through several mechanisms the formal Academy budget, contract

CCflCT

Tabic 4

Breakdown of Fundamental Venus Applied Science Funding

Total Science BwW

ATOltcJ/Devriopmei-.l

fi'*.'lWn;

t-*s

ofcience go

ol Total Seteaec

<

Bunch

099

3.6

1.5

its

60

25

085

31

1 10

uncertainty ol there number, bpfcu

jimn.air liuecl Qu litlermitioa

S8&.

higher education institutions. The Academy share of expenditures for total fundamental research has de-created from an estimatedercent in thc early

oercent In.

be level of review for approval of funding for major scientific protects within the Academy isa function of the ruble amount of the project:

research, and consulting fees. We estimate lhat aboulercent of the research conducted by the higher

educational institutions is done under contract and

thai most of this is applied research.

Project Con (rooter)

of Review

director

million

level

1 milium

ol Minuter)

Tlic contract and consulting research, as well as problems presented to the Academy's AppliedSection, are generally for applied research with more obvious applications to the sponsoring industry or miliiary service. The Applied Problems Section is the key link between military objectives and the fundamental research conducted by the Academy of Sciences, coordinating and monitoring all military-telated programs within the Academy. Tbe main goal of this Section is to study all scientific research areas and to seek technology lhal could support miliiary inlercsls or be applied lo weapons systems. The amount of contract work done by the Academy has increased steadily sinceoviet sourcesthai0ocoove fromgrewercent6 percent of Ibe Academy budget. US scholars estimate lh.il today contractingercent of the total budget.

ecause Soviet official statistic* report annual expenditures only for total science, tbe distribution or spending by research and development stage (lhal is. fundamental, applied,ncertain Soviet scholars, using unknown ii.eihodolog.es toexpenditures lortages,disparate estimates of the distribution of BAD expenditures. These estimates, allhough seemingly consistent in their coverage of fundamental research at defined In this Estimate, appear to Incorporatedefinitions of activity in. Therefore, we can estimate expenditures only for fundamenlal science.

everal Soviet authors have estimated thatfor fundamental research rangeercent loercent of the total published science budget (see tabley applying these ratios to official Soviet statistics, we estimate5 eapendituies (or fundamental science probably totaledillionillion rubles. Il should be noled that official Soviet statistics on science spending:road range ofork, including work done ui lhe social sciences and not included in the traditional Western concept of It&D. Our knowledge of Soviet accounting systems leads us to believe lhat ibis total includes civilian and the maiority of miliiary funds mentalecent Sovicl published souice indicates lhat. of this total, aboulercent was spent by Academy of Sciences Institutes, and lhe remaining SO percent bv mrniKry scientific organizations and by

unding, however, is not lhe major difficulty In puttingew research plan, according to emigre scientists. The problem is gettingoptc and equipment required for tho protect enteredart of the plan.

Instrument ot ion

drives,rlorn bu. technrJagy.as new scientific principles areirrstrumentaripn and products, advances Idscience often depend on advances intedmology.

idespread lack ofparts, and maintenance personnel inUnion. Furthermore, thc overall quality ofIs often far below that ofEven where Western equipment isin Soviet bboratories, the equipment Is oftenbecause of thc absence of spare partsto repair the equipment.

esearch equipment is extremely hard toGenerally, it is necessary to develop and maintain tire equipment at the institute. This usesarge fraction of theime and personnel In some institutes, as many as half of the rxrsorusel are leehni-csam devoted to building and maintaining insliumen trtiots. This function is servedarge extent by private industry in the United States. In the USSR,o private sector pushing science through thc development of new iintiumcntatiori. Some institutes have alleviated the equipment/manpower shortage problem byarge in-house shop These inslilutcs have gained some measure of self-sufficiency by not only building their own equipment, but abo manufacturing equipment for outside use to generate funds {for example, small accelerators for medical purposes at the Instilute for Nuclear Physics in Novosi-busk)

atiigre scientists have Indicated thai thoof obtaining equipment and othetsources outside their own insltltute ere iothat ways of working around lhe systemwidely developed This "isnderground"

system introduces some flexibility into the otherwise rigid reaearch environrnenL

3ilackwrumcntation support not only rJowi the Soviet research effort, but. in someeaves Soviet experimentalists unable to partkipalc eflectivelv in forefront research Thev are unable to co.-tiiictc in many new ciperimenial areas (for exam-

pie. molecular biology) because they do not have as responsive an Infrastructure of equipment and services as is available in the United States. Marked increases In publications have been rioted from specific institutions when Ihey have been able to obtain new pieces of Western-built equipment-

ack of computim; power is endemic in the Soviet Union andeveren their research capability. Soviel computers typically are not very powerful (the we*khorse for Soviet computation, Ihes comparable to widely used US personal computers) and have severe reliability problems Technicians needed to maintain these computers are In short supply. The use of scientists' lime Is Ineff icienl because of the lack of adequate computing power that in some fields severely hinders their participation In forefronl research.

Thereeneral shortage of office space for scientists. Most theorists, even at somo of the best institutes, work in their apartments and come In to their institutes only once oreek. Consequent -ly. they have reduced opportunities for informalof ideas wiih the caipcrimenlalists and other theorists.

In some cases, even basic supplies have proved to be significantS mentis!lhal in hb role as chairman of an international coherence held in the Soviet Uraon. hc was respomi-ble for the distribution of lhe conference proceedings He was told that the sportsoring instilute did not have enough paper allocated to it in the Five-Yeai Plan to publish the proceedings.

Ihe Soviet Scientist

ciencerofession is highly respected in the Soviel Union Senior scientists generally receive higher salaries and better benefits than people In other professions. The theorrtical sdences stand above ex-penmentat srieiices in prestige, and physics inbaa been referred lo as the "queen of Soviet science" Recent changes in the wage structure now give equal pay to both experimentalists and iheonsli

Compared With Western Counterporli

For rrtost fields of theorrtical physics, senior Soviet scientists arear with their Western coontct parti in terms of depth and breadth of capaUI-II v. Senior Soviet expertlius in virtually all fields, althoughar intellectually el-

work because this destroys their opportunities for traveling abroad and restricts the already limited means they have forand publication.

he Academy is regularly drawn upon as part of the Soviets' SIT collection effort from tbe West, and, although the practice is distasteful to many Soviet scientists, these scientists respondollection requirements during trips to technical conferences abroad.

any senior Soviet scientists serve inovernment and party position) For example. C. I. Marchuk. who wai formerly an Academy viceand headed the Academy's Siberian Department, is currently director of the CKNT. His predecessor at the CKNT. V. A. Kiriliin. had alto been an Academy vice presidenl Yu. A. Ovchinnikov, whoice president of the Academy,andidate member of tho Central Committee of the CPSU; AcademyA. P. Aleiandrov.ull member.

trJucotion

he best Soviet students who have come lo thc United Stales have had depth, breadth, and quality of scientific education comparable to that of their USne difference that has beennoted by US scientists is that lhe preparation of new Soviet candidatesquivalent} in analytic mathematics is generally better than for their US counterparts.

oviet universities tend to have moro upper-level specialized laboratories (for example, in fluid mechanics, turbulence, and lasers) than USTheir large scientific man power pool enables them lo add these specialised lab* io thc curriculum even (hough adequate equipment il often lacking. In the United States, the equipment can generally be obtained, but there are not enough people to teach the labs.

ccess to computers in lhe universities, both large mainframes and personalery limited Accordingoviet magi riot article, there were Iwo computers in preunivenliy Soviet schoolshe Soviets began inlo introduce compulsory courses oo computer technology and programing into all primary,and vocational schools. Furthermore, they intend lo set up ipecial cliitiooensiddle schools, each with IS loersonal com put Civ duringive-Year Plan This, however, willegligible

Western counterparts, are generally unable toto the advancement of Ihcit field at the same level aa their theorist colleagues. Thb is because of the lack of adequate experimental instrumentation. Many of the secondary Soviet scientists and candidates arc given tasks of an unimaginative nature, for example, laboriously measuring the physical properties ofneve aibiirary combinations uf materials.

Imporlonce of Western Science

oviet scientists, both theorists andare keenly aware of US experimental work and value it highly, since the scope and depth of Soviet experimental work is not as great as that In Ihe United States. Some Soviet theorists have even expressed concern to US counter parts about tbe credibility of Soviet experimental work in some fieldsidely held view among US theorists and experimentalists).US scientists have noted that visiting Soviet experimentalists arc often able to hm International oollaboralive experiments and, even though ihey have never worked with some of the advancedtbcy Quickly become fully contributing members, litis probably reflects the dose scrutiny the Soviets give to Western literature, including instrumentation manuals Thc Academy ts known to have access lo unclassified Western scientific data bases via

oviet scientists very highly prize tbeto travel abroad to conferences, universities, andonly for the material learned and the feedback on their own work, but also for the peer recognition of their work. Soviet scseaitists feel that the West does not appreciate the value of Soviet scientific work. In meetings between US scientists and their Soviet counterparts, lhe visiting US scientists are left with the feeling of having been completely drained of Information

Participation in Military, Government, and Parly Activities

any senior Soviet scientists serve in advisory capacities lo lhe militaiy and have used their miliiary connection! in rising through tlie bureaucracy- The stall members of lhc scientific research imlilotes of the Ministry of Defense are responsible forcontact wiih personnel In lhe relevant industrial and academic institutes and design bureaus Further more, some military scientists study or participate in researeb within lite Academy institutes. Many Soviet scientists, however, completely shun

lo

effect on increasing Soviet computer literacy because it represents an aver age of less ilian one personal computertudents

eaching and lesearclt are fairly distinctlywith teaching taking place largely in theand fundamental research in thc Academy irulilutes Some institutes award candidate degrees for research within the Institute,mall amount of fundamental research takes placeew select universities (for example, Moscow State University? Because of this overall separation of teaching and research, active researchers generally have littlewith teaching and students, and vice vena.scientists teaching in the higher educational iristituu-ons lose touch with the excitement and vitality of forefront research, making it more difficult to convey these qualities to the students Attempts have been made lo get tlie researchers more involved in teaching, but the physical separation of university and institute facilities has strongly hindered Uib effort. The large number of candidates who receive theli degrees in the universilios require lubslanlial retraining to become productive in the institute research environ-

tudents have tlic freedom to apply to any institute or university. Although thev may choose the field thev want to pursue, each year the number of people for each field Is detciminod by the government and then competitive examinations determine the cutoff. The entrance examinations are crucial and are taken at thc institute lo which the siudcnt is applying. Failure lo be accepted within two years generally results in the student being called into military service The university entrance examinations for physics arc separated from lhe other subiects and given first because the field ix so prcallgtoul that the competition is very high Tins si agger ingaminations gives the students who fail an oppcttunity to try other fields

ecisions on the filling of faculty positions are strongly Influenced by outside effects ethnic origin, geneial ideological standing, and personal connections Faculty pout mm are routinely (illed by the universi-tv's own graduates, which contribute! lo lhe lack nf ciosi frrtlliration among universities.

he parlytrong role even in the granling of candidate degreesormal pari of lhe Coneiat criminations (even for the advancedandidate rnuil pan nnlection on political history nnd philosophy

Soviet Scientific Rcseorcb General Considerations

The scope and Quality of fundamental scienlific research in the Soviet Union hasarge extent been determined by the conditions of Ihe researchdiscussed in previous chapters. Most notable is the striking difference in scope and quality between theoretical and crr*rimenlal work In virtually all scientific fields.

The scope of Soviet research in theoreticaly aod large similar to that of the United States. Thes good as that in the United States in most fields and perhaps betterew fields that have been traditional Soviet strengths (forturbulence and laser physics).

scope of Soviet experimental sciencebeen limited by the availability ofcomputers, and major researcheffort has been further hindered by lack ofinfrastructure for servicing theand for developing new equipmentadvance the limits of knowledge. The qualitywork has suffered oorrcspondingly.interesting discoveries are generally madescientistsoneis available to them first. Westernare frequently surprised by the qualityscienlific results obtained with relativelyThe Soviets compensate by payingattention to (heretical details andeeper scientific understanding of theb common In the West. One Americanspent several months in the USSRresearch he saw as "modem science in antribute Io tbe skills and talentsexperimentalists. In addition, when hardis available, much of the laboratoryran be obtained from live West, althoughwith maintenance still remain.

ite Soviets have been conspicuously absent in some fields, in large pari because of the lack of necessary techniques and equipment. Such has been the case in surface physics, where Ihe availability of ultrahigh vacuum techniques is essential, and in low-temperature physics This inadequacy probablyin lhe establishmentrobably atnsistence, of ihc Center for Vacuum and Surface Science. US scientists have attributed lhe Soviclin tlie band theory of conduction and in iheorct-

arc currently inverting heavily in this field. Another example ofuni for mi tyield is in fluid dynamics, which we have assessed as beingin status to lhat in the Unitedurrent Soviet work in experimental plasma physics,in ibeir fusion energy program, ii noi keeping pace wllh Ihc West On the other hand, Sovietwork in shock physics is greatly respected. In contrast, some field areas, such as oceanography, have traditionally had massive resources allocated lo them, bul the overall results produced have not greatly impressed Western scientists. The presence ofew very bright scientists can. and has, made the difference between very significant Soviet conlribu-tioosield and the virtual absenceoviet contribution

e expect Soviet workumber officidi lo suffer in tlie fulurcesult of inferior large-scale scientific computing capability. Fields such as fluid dynamics, astrophysics, and some calculations in high energy and condensed-matter physics will become increasingly computer intensive in thc nexl fivemuch asercent of nslrophyiical work may be based on computer simulations in this time frame Fields such as astrophysics and high-energy physics will be likely to suffer further under party and government pressures for relevant applied research. On lhe otber hand, condensod-ttialterbecause of its dose connection to semiconductors and electronics, and molecular biology, because of possible genetic engineering applications in agriculture and Other areas, may receive considerably greater support This may be particularly true for molecular biology, givenctive role In this field aad considerable influence in the party and the Academy.

be interest, or value, of Soviet work to West-em scicntisti may not necessarily reside so much in lhe sophistication of the research as in the access to data unavailable through any other source, such as in geology. This has also been the case in oceanography,the huge fleet of Soviet oeeariographic research .esseIs hasast amount of data And in maleriab science, tbc Soviet brute-force approach to research has resultedealth of data on physical properlics of new materials with possible application to. for example, new lasers

ith these points in mind, we can rx-vertbeless ask where llic Soviets stand relative to the United Statesiven field of science In an overall sense Wc are relying laigely for this comparison on lhe

ical high-energy physics Monlc Carlo cause theory calculation* to inadequate computer power.

iven the frequent inadequacy of the available tools for doing forefront experimental research, tlie organizational difficulties in maintaining and building these tools, the societal bias that places (he theoristigher Intellectual plane than tbe experimenUlist, and thc differences in salary and benefits, it ts not surprising to find (he toughest competition forlo universities and institute research positions lo be for positions in theoretical physics

he excellence in mathematics dernoostrated by Soviet scientists has contributed lo cicesVnce In theoretical physics. The Soviets often producetheoretical solutions to problems In analytic form wlierc the United States typically would rely on numerical computer solutions. Examples exist in the field of hydrodynamics where lhe Soviets haveaccurate solutions on computers of significantly lower capability than US computers through insightful choices of boundary conditions and clevertechniques, or efficient programing Such was the case, for example,oviet calculation of the magnetic field-induced compression of afusion targel lhat tlie Soviets suggeslcd might have commercial power applications Thc Soviets have been essentially forced into lhe position of having to rely on clever theoretical approaches to computer calculations because of their lack of the most advanced computer systems On the other hand, il can also be suggested that if stale-of-tbe-art computers do become available tootential existsurge in theircapability lhat could go beyond tbe effects of iust the improved computer capabilityurge, however, might be mitigated or slowed by inadequate preparation to handle advanced programingused for supercomputers.

Relative Strengths and Weaknesses

eyond these overall trends, whichar-rcaching impact on many fields, it is difficult toeans of summarizing the relative status of science lo the Soviet Union as compared with that in the United Slates Even where lhe Soviet contribution ispoorer tliaa thai of Western countries, as in biological sciences and molecular biology in particular, specific examples within the broad field, such ax biophysical chemistry and protein conformation, can be found lhal arc regarded as world class by Western scientists Furthermore, wc note lhal, despite tlie poor overall performance in molecular biology, the Soviets

Future

e expect that the ccrktinuing Soviet drive for scientific and technological progress directed toward meeting specific economic and military needs willajor role in shaping the nature of their science over the nextoears. Tbe advent of Gorbachev as General Secretary of the CFSU reprcsenu the beginning of the transfer of power from the "old guard" to the younger political leaders. The initiatives forrogress that began to bein theill now begin to receive the rwliiicaJ support from the top leadership required to implement necessary changes in the Soviet system. These changes may be slow and gradual, as Gorbachevureaucracyubstantial "old guard" element. He has already, liowcvcr.urprising ability to accelerate political allies into top leadership positions.

everal changes have already taken place over the last several years These include: the creation of the Academy Department of Information. Computer Technology, and Automationhanges in the wage structure for scientists and engineers; newIncentives for technological innovation; allowance for adiustmeots in plan Quotas to allow for downtime during the introduction of new techrsologies; and the creation of cross-disciplinary/intertninistTY groups with the authority to coordinate large technicalWe expect such changes to continue to receive support from Gorbachev and his allies in the future, providing the necessary backbone for what had been hollow rhetoric in the past.

lie implication for science,hole, will be that the cmphaui gradually shifts further toward applied research, even within the premier onrahistorically dominating fundamental SovietAcademy Yoimgci men such as G. Mat-ehuk. Ye Vcllkhov. and Yu Ovchinnikov. who haverge extent climbed to the top because of iheir work In applied science, aie gaining positions of great responsibility in terms of science planning andwithin the GKNT and the Academy.eported to be in weekly contact withserving in essence as his science adviser. Fundamental scientists had dominated the Academy

ivy

phi-BCS

icieooc-

rAvncs

(bramio

[Oyin

peri mental

btote*.

physics

science

An arrow indicate* ibe estimated dliection of chanEC el the fnlure relative Halm where we lie rraaonabtySeot. Some lidda haw; not been dtrided inlo theory and experiment became el lad of dan

Wti were not tourJ lot* inroli-stronasri than the United

Slam in i ol thee fields

leadership0 until recently. These men can be expected to infliaeooe strongly thc nature of Soviet science for at least thc next decade, and tho results ol their influence will continue into the years beyond.

n the short term, the emphasis on applied research will further focus tbe attention of the high quality scientists in the Academy on the priority economic and military problems of lhe country. In terms of manpower, however, this willmall addition to lhe already enormous Soviet appliedeffort

n the long term, given (he smaller fraction oi scientists devoted to fundamental science, we expect toradual induct inn or leveling ofl In Academy

futidamental science having little Of no obviousand. consequently, in Ihe pool of new ideas generated by Soviet scientists. Tbe Sovietsel lhat, with easy access lo Western literature onscience, they caninimalresearch effort in order lo accelerate iheir drive for technology development We expect,n increasine Soviet reliance on Western science, as well as technology,ource of new Ideas. Thb will come at lhe price of reduced international prestige, and (here williraelag before the Soviets can pick up and exploit Western science.

of (ho extent lo which appliedencroaches on lhe Soviet fundaiiienlaleffort, basic research ia general willsuffer from two major handicaps that wcremain largely unremedied over the next decade.

first handicap is the bck of thefor conducting research, particularly inscience. This includes instrumentation,large-scale research facilities, and theparts needed to maintain them Althoughhave demorotratcd the ability lo doRood research with equipment consideredby Westernhe lack of afor producing and maintainingreliable instrumentation will slow theirand continue lo absorb the lime of large(lie personnel of their research inslitules. Inthe lack of sophisticated instrumentationsupport may completely exclude themparticipation in forefiont research. Thisequipment may be alleviated to some extentequipment can be purchased in the West,problem of the availability of parts andpersonnel will remain. Tbe structural andchanges thai the new, younger politicalexploring, even if successful, probably willloajor effect on thefor anotherears

lie second problem, thai of rcstiicledand travel among scientific researchers.articularly thorny issue for the Soviets. The strong penchant for secrecy and lhe sharp irxstrlutional boundaries that are at the heart of tbc communication problem are unlikely to loosen in the near future, and, if th-reurther shift toward applied science, are likely lo lighten even further The importance of the control of information in Soviet society is so high, and the threat from uncontrolled publication* so great, that

i rt-

on technology inferior lo thai of the West than on technological brcallhrour.hi

ver Ihe neat decade, we ire Soviet science overall Biransition to an even greater focus on applied science that can directly contribute lo economic growth and military strength. Despite ils problems. Soviet scienceormidable force in many fields and should be closely monitored, if for no other reasons than its vast site and potential and the high priority attached to scientific and technological progress by the Soviet leadership Nevertheless, we expect Soviet science to continue to be hampered by low productivity compared wiih that of the Westesult of lhe existing research environment It will be of crucial importance to lite United States and ill allies, however, to observe lo what extent the new generation of Soviet leaders is successful in modifying and changing thc Soviet scientific researchover the neatean, thereby releasing in enormous potential The consequences of suchpolitical and administrative initiatives will be felt for decades to come.

Intelligence Gaps

n addition lo the obvious need to explore other arras of science, such as chemistry and biology, as well as to further fill out the developing picture of lhe physical sciences addressed, the following specific topics should be considered for further analysis

A, The most significant Soviet scientific resultsiven period of lime lhal appear lo be ripe for exploratory development should be identified. Such identifications could serve to focus community attention on potential new technology developments

he importance of personalities, the behind ihe-scenei pol incline, and how these features of the

Slavic! system affect lhe direction and conduct of Soviel science need to be addressed

C The success with which Gorbachev is able to carry out economic and administrative reforms lhal have an impact on science and lhe industrial base lhal supports science sltould be monitored. Some indicated wiih which lo recognise significantshould be developed

D. The effects on science of lhe evolvingtrends In the Soviet Union need to be examined, for example, lhe expected Increase in lhe non Slavic population.

F. Better definitions of how much money and resources arc being and will be devoted lo various scientific fields should be developed This can help in recognizing bow much importance tbe Soviets place on any one area.

F The dilemmas faced by the Soviet leadership in maintaining competitiveness on tbe frontiers and applications of science.

C. The implications of lhe asascttod trends in Soviet science on Soviel society andd

vice versa.

H The extent to which Soviet secrecy andmay affect our perception of Soviet science.

I More detailed and broader studies ofadvantage in specific fields following from systematic eiploiUtion of Open literature.

I. How would reduced scientific contact affect

Soviet science'1

owemigration policy and discrimination aliened Soviel science?

L What arc the areas of the US technology lead that Soviet science could reduce if the Soviets increase llmr emphasu on applied science?

21

ANNEX

Organizational Strucluro

Basic seicrttif ic research in the Soviet Union, as wiih moat activities, is centrally pbnncd The orgaoi rat tons rcsiomible foi policy guidance, administration, and pet lot ma nee ol research are embodiedigid, hierarchical structure thatechanism whereby Communis) Party Central Committee policy initiatives can directly influence the direction, scope, and level of effort in all fields of research- (SeeaeeB.)

The USSH Council of Ministers serves as the lop administrative body of the government responsible for day-to-day operations of the economy, and theof an integialcd economic plan, whichbasic science It is abo responsible for reflecting brood policy initiatives, as set forth by the party, in its planning and ad mi initiative activities The Council of Ministers exercises its responsibility for planning and administrative dutieseries of statereporting lo the council, which are oriented toward specific functions (for example, finance,supply, and SAT)

The primary players who coordinate the overall scientific research plan for cortsaderation by theof Mir.istcis are the State Committee for Science and Technology (CK NT. an All-Union state committee under thc Council of Ministers, chaired by G. I. Milnd lhe Presidium of the Academy of Sciences of the USSH (ANleksandrov. president) Trie State Planning Committee of lhe Council of Ministers (Cosplan) and lhe Ministry of Finance participate with the GKNT and the AN SSStl in scltiru: the overall fundingor projects which require niaior resouice allocations, olher committees under tlie Council of Ministers, such as the State Committee for lamstiuctrnn Affairs (Cossttoy) and the State Committee foi Material and Technical Supply ICossnab) also participate

The GKNT ii charged with the coordinationnified state SIT policy. It prepares SAT forecasts,ut ofroblems to be solved during lhe next Five-Year Plan, develops proposab with the AN SSSR and Cosstroy for inclusion in the five-year SAT plain and longerrograms, and works wiih Cosplan and llac Academy in developing proposals for the introductionesults Into the economy. The GKNT has Utile direct rnanagenal control over the actual conduct of institute research.

The AN SSSftivotal role In the planning, management, and conduct of fundamental science in the Soviel Union In addition to thc overallunctions performed in collaboration with the CKNT noted above, thc AN SSSR maintains directcontrol over the hulk of thc fundamental research programs in the country. We estimate that about SO perceni of the research conducted in fundamental science in thc Soviet Union takes place In the scientific reseated institutes cf the Academy system, with the remainder taking place mostly in the universities and other imiitulct of higher learning (VUZy) under (he Ministry ol Higher and Specialized Secondaryand to some extent in the research institutes of tbe industrial ministries. In addition, the AN SSSR by charier is given responsibility for overseeing and coor dmating: all fundamental scientific reaearch in the country, although its direct managerial control only extends to Us own institutes Thus, the reaearch plans ofmi Ren iblk Academies of Sciences, for instance, muil be passed through the AN SSSR viai .nfjmrdinstior: Council (See figure 2)

Fach Academy instituteroposal for its owno thai forms the substance lor the delibcrstiretihe upper levels of the AN SSSRMinn, and iwraadtorn) and the CKNT in formu-UrtiuCi! rnscarch plan for the country

i

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