Special Analysis
Guerrillas Continue War ot Amnion
The insurgent* are trying to husband dwindling resources by concei.fralino on urban operations and tmell-unlt fecrics-Oo.ernmani and rebel cetueltlet alike bare decreased Hgniiicamif thlt rear aa tha government maintains inn Initiative. Deapite recently publicised ettorti toward more efficient coordination, unification efforts br the guerrlllea teem detUned to tell end, in any evil, are designed mere tor propaganda then tor operational gelnr.
Despite continual Army allacha In recent weeks aflalnat Inau-oenlin rurai areas, ihe re bed have avoided major bailies In pan by dispersing In ever-amaller unlta Combst ttesiha lor bolh in* covarnment and Insurgents are down aboutercent lor the Ural an months ot this year, as compared with tha same period last year. This underscores lhe lower kiieneliy ol rural activity by the rebels
When the guerrillas occasionally have mounted larger scale snacks, they nsvs had Utile aucceaa sgalnal even poorly equipped Ssivsdorsnecent assault bynsurgents on one small town, lor
example, resulted Inluerrllles killed but only lour National woundsaaal
Defensive Tactics
Indicate lhat Improved
the Army and me qutok-slrlks oepibuTIrea of lhe A* Force
mflkJI, me guerrllaa view
*r. *ndnd-run anaoki en small out pom manned by Civil Oefsr.se forces aa their most affective laotlos undsr current carrAjmstarsoee. Kebel riwilng of trails sndoads, lor
pt<Mvnrrv^wf-cn .utteredasualties fromwo recent
te the Insurgents am also trying to kinnd mlUiary personnel In San Salvador and jrovamrrsani supporters hi ouliytng areas. The insurgents hope such tonortsi acts will reduce pubflc confldenos kt the governmenl and par-aptightist bachlash. 8oms urban guerrilla IsadarB
continued
probablyi.ii tn public reaction ia nol auflKitint hmvxi tilassess -si ons and oombtr.ga in in* capital 'n tnau pe<*peciiveterrorism ha piegatenJ iccei advantagesnniaty. air power, ana bailie-trained soldiers
Al Iha samera increasing attacks on civilian economic targaia in - ( abotages power, communicationand iranaponatton systems cut rio'and oeauoyeoano producen eiiempMooi|i'*ci Iha armed forces and undermine lite weak economyfB BfB
Possibility el Unltlcallon
Facedorsening mililary alluatlon. the guerrillas are tryingombine the factlona Into one army They have had aome success in cooperating on tactics and logistics, but longstanding ideological andar anew, aa well aa competition amonp rebelare serious alumbiingbtocki to affective unrflcello.
One major laction. lor example, continues to holdosen Wanapedmftyori oaaplle objections from other groupa
^SfinTthemselves on tsroeltngol peasants, and execution ol captured
Wedm"
Outlook
A war o( alldtwn might reduce tha mora* ol lhe governmenl forces somewhat but k> unlikely to alow Ihe government'i military progress. Incrsssed use of mine detectors, better training In mine deactivation, and mora amajt-ynft operations win help lehrsdoren troops counter rebel mottil Ik
In the ortlea, the government'a Improved use ^Ssfl Wk evidenced by the captureozen terrortsts inonth-wti guerrvus ertons to expend urban warfare,'
Clw reoeniry orderedntorgntr iron, San Servicer to avoid further arrests
fl"nbutC1ly!ty eubstsntlelry to demorslU.governments efforts loIts suthorn
Original document.
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