S6 The Cost of Projected Soviet Strategic Forces
The magnitude and scope of Soviet development programs for strategic weapon systems would enable the USSR, over the next five years, to begin to replace nearly all the elements of its strategic offensive forces with new systems and significantly improve Its strategic defenses as well. If these programs proceed as currently projected by the Intelligence Community inhey would require average annual growth in outlays for strategic programsercent9 and raise the total annual amount expended on the strategic mission to the highest absolute level we have seen In two decades. (I
Spending increases at these rates would be less than the increases In strategic outlays observed during thend,arked departure from the high but relatively flat spending pattern of the pastears. Moreover, the Intelligence Community is also projecting expenditures for nonstrateglc programs to grow during this period. The Warsaw pact theater forces projected by the Intelligence Cornmunity in5 would cause Soviet expenditures for the general purpose mission to growverageear through the end of the decade. Assuming no major change for RDTAE, combined expenditures for the projected strategic and general purpose forces would increase the growth rate of total defense spending to as muchate that has not been sustained by the Soviets Over the pastears, total defense spending has been growing atear, *
A returnercent annual growth in defense spending would be more burdensome for the Soviets to undertake than in the past. NP growth has averagedercent comparedercent during the earlier periods of high growth in defense spending. Unless the rate of growth in the economy returns to levels comparable to the late sixties and early
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ercent rate of growth in defense spending would Increase the already large defense share of the GNP. (Intelligence Coaoainity estimates of the present share range fromoercent). | |
Perhaps more important Is the fact that increasing the share of the GNP, and especially the share of machinery output devoted to defense, would run counter to General Secretary Gorbachev's efforts to boost economic growth by Increasing the allocation of machinery output to modernizing industry. Although strategic offensive and defensive weapons account for only about one-fifth of total defense spending, theyarger share of the high-quality and advanced-technology resources needed for modernizing industry.
technologyxpected to increase.
Each projected strategic program is, by itself, probably within Soviet industrial capabilities, but the defense industries nay find it difficult to achieve the rate of technological success at both the design and nanufacturlng stages that will be necessary to meet the aggregate projected deployment targets. In the past, the Soviets raininlzed the chances for industrial problems through conservative weapons designs that permitted labor intensive manufacturing procedures. Hew technologies were introduced only when the old ones could noteapon's arinimuai operational requirements. Duringhe Soviets initiated the developmentrowing number of systems that Incorporated Soviet state-of-the-art technology. This design approach has created new technological and managerial demands on the defense Industries that have Increased the time required for engineering development and system Integration and have created problems in translating laboratory ana pilot plant experience into full-scale production. These problems coula become oore acute through tire remainder ofs the number of strategic and nonstrategic weapons in productionstate-of-the-art
Strategic weapons systemsigh priority in the Soviet military calculus, and Moscow has alreadyubstantial resource commitment to marry weapons the HIE projects to reach IOC over the next five toears. To moderate the impact of their defense modernization prograets on economic and Industrial requirements, the Soviets could alter the rate of modernization by delaying, stretching out, or curtailing selected weapon procurement programs and retaining older systems longer. The high absolute level of Soviet expenditures on strategic programs which has been maintained for the past 10
years would allow for substantial modernization of both offensive and i
defensive forces with little or no increase in the annual rate of growth.
This aenorandum provides trie background and oetailed analysis that underlie the Military-economic juagments contained in National Intelligenceoviet Capabilities for Strategic Nuclear Conflict Through the.
The costs are computed in constantubles) to measure the burden of various defense activities on the econooy and to reflect real changes in defense expenditures. The resultant figures are not intenoeo to--and probably dotne some values that Soviet leauers consider in discussing their defense effort. Moscow presumably wouldore recent price base and might Include other categories of spending (for exaraple. Investment in defense industries! when consicering ihe cost of defense activities, believe, however, that our figures are useful for snowing changing trends intern of spending as welln tne relative levels of spending for the projected forces. We are In the process of cnanging tne price base for our estimates of both GUP and defense spending0 to
These estimates of Soviet expenditures on strategic programs include investment and operating costs but do not include the costs of research, development, testing, and evaluation (RDTAE) activities. The data available onutlays and trie methodology for calculating tnem do not permit the aggregate to be broken down by individual programs or specific missions. Nevertheless, we believe that strategic programs accountizeable portion of Soviet military research and development efforts because they are. in general, the oost technologically sophisticated weapons in the Soviet 1nventory.
Trie Projections and Their Costs
Five Soviet strategic offensive forces and two strategic defense forces are projected in, eachifferent set o* assumptions. These assumptions are enumerated in Table 1.
To assess the impact of these forces on Soviet defense spenaing and the burden they imply for the Soviet economy, we have estimated their costs.ere excluded from the analysis because they are baseo on Ibtii Soviet and US START/INF negotiating positions which have been overtaken Dy developments arising out of the recent summit and the ongoing Geneva negotiations. Force 1the SALT-constra1nednearly equivalent ton terms of total costs ana growth (seeo this paper will focus on two combinations of offensive ana defensive forces. These forces will be referrea to as the moderate force ana the high force. I
he moderate force is based on the NIE'sor offensive systems,or strategic air defense forces,reaty-limited ABM forceaunchers.
The high force is based on the hlE'sor offensive systems.or strategic air defense forcesorceaunchers. Differences from the moderate force reflect the Intelligence Concunity's uncertainty over the Soviets' own evaluation of their future
strategic requirements. (
These expenditure estimates are calculated on the basis of the forces projected in, Soviet Capabilities for Strategic nuclear
rop SECRET ,
teady upgrade of strategic attack forces, but assumes the Soviets remain within the key quantitative limits ofnd SALT II--current levels of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, MIRVed missile launchers, SSBHs, and
ontinuation of -hat the Conrnainity sees as the current Soviet efforts to upgrade their strategic forces, but with no effort to remain withinr SALT II, At this rate it is anticipated that the USSR would exceed the quantitative limits on offensive weapons set bynd SALT II
reater level of effort thannd 2. Itoviet decision to improve their strategic capabilities Dy deploying new systemsarger numbers.
epresent modernization of Soviet strategic attacx forcas and assumes that tr.ey are constrained by3 Soviet arm US jTART anu INF proposals respectively.
Air defenseteady Improvement inouno-oasec defensive SAMs, lasers, ana radars and airborne aefensesnterceptors and AHACs aircraft).
efenseore rapid deployment schedule fur newer systems.
Each projection assumes that ABh defenses will remain within2 ABM treaty limitaunchers. For Illustrative purposes, the NIE aisoBM force projections that exceed treaty limits.
rOP Sat RET
escribes these two forces In terns of the assumptions made about the major programs associated with each.
Me estimate that total investment and operating expenditures for the projected forces would result in average growth in total strateyic expendituresear9umulative cost for theillion rubles. This wouldharp upswing in expenditures for the strategic mission, which have shown little or no growth since the.
The projected Improvements of Intercontinental attack capabilities with Introduction of two new or modernized ICBMs, tne Blackjack heavy bomoer, and the continued construction of Typhoon- and Delta-class SSBUs would account for most of the spending growth (see Spending on peripheral attack ana strategic defense would rise more slowly as several ongoing modernization programs neared completion. (See the appendixore detailed description of the costs associated with the two forces). |
The moderate and high forces assume that modernization and expansion of theUSSfc's antiballistic missile (ABM) force will remain within thelauncher limit established by2 ABM Treaty. ecision by the Soviets to rapidly expand their ABM defenses above the limit, once the Moscow system Is completedouldostly endeavor. It could0 billion rubles to total strategic outlaysnd increase annual spending growth for the strategic missionoercent. The lower eno of tne range postulates that the Soviets begin construction ofaunchers in the western USSR to defend key military, political, and economic targets. The higher end projects constructionationwide Ab* defenseeployment goal ofaunchers.
Projected Strategicoderate Force
Introduction ofolid-propellant ICBMingle sv on road-mobile launchers. Introduction ofolid-propellant ICBM withIRVS,eplacement forndn rail-mobile launchers. Replacement of existingCBMs with follow-on system having greater accuracy and throw weight.
CompletionV program at three boats, each carryingLbMs. Sackfltting ofissilesI1 SSBNs.
Oelivery of four additional Typhoon-class boatsotaleployednd one final boat still under construction. Production of theLBM and the introduction ofw-on. w1 th greater accuracy and throw weight.
Production ofong-range cruise missile for deployment on newly producednd Blackjack aircraft.
Productionew tankerbased on theransport. Production of Blackjack heavy bomber.
Completion of SS-20
programaunchers. Introductionore accurate and eliable follow-on to thentroduction of theround launched cruise missile.
Hore rapid production ofollow-on androduction of components forollow-on. Introduction ofollow-on with three KIRVS ana improvec accuracy.
A faster construction schedule for Typhoon jStstis, with six boats deployed ano three more under constructionore rapid production of theno its follow-on.
Kore rapid proauction of the Blackjack. Sear H, and
Completion ofeployment programaunchers. More rapid production of both theollow-on and.
of two new long-range sea-launched cruise missilesheno the ICKS, including SOn dedicated submarines, woulo be deployed
Continued production of about ISear for the strategic air force.
A gradual replacement of old Fencer aircraft with an Improved version, with the inventory projected to Increase toircraft
Continued deployment of theoxhound and the introduction of two new aircraft, thelanker andulcrum,f the new aircraft deployed
Introductionew laser weapon for air defense
Deployment ofainstay AWACS
Faster rate of cruise missile production, witheployed
*radual increase in Backfire production for the strategic air force to aboutear
" Soviets would forego theof Fencer programew aircraft that will not be ready for series production tillV.
Increase in the deployment
of tlienoout the aeployment of fewer of the larger one aore expensive
Construction ofewites Introduction of new laserith abouteployed
* Deployment ofainstay ABACS
Projected Cumulative Costs of Selected Major offensive Weapon
Bombers and cruise missiles
a The range in costs reflect differences between the moderate and high force projections.
^Includes costs associated with all modifications and follow-on systems.
c Differences between the moderate ana hiyh force projections are negligible.
1 Includes costs for systems not listed in Table.
top JECSLl (
The Projections in historical Context
The rates of growth in expenditures for these illustrative moderate and high forces, while substantial, woulo not be unprecedented -hen compared -itn past upswings in Soviet expenditures for the strategic mission. They would, however,arked departure from the relatively flat spending pattern of the pastears and would result in absolute spending levels for the strategic mission higher than we have seen inears,
Me estimate that64 the Soviets spentbillion rubles on strategic programs--about one-fifth of all theirin that period. Spending on tne strategic mission -asdivided between offensive ana defensive progress, with eachaboutercent of cumulative strategic outlays. The reuainlngwas allocated to strategic command ana control activities anaof nuclear materials and devices.
Ashows, spending on strategic programs has fluctuated considerablyising and falling in response to investment programs. During this period, two modernization efforts produced upswings in strategicpush to modernize the offensive forces60 that enabled the Soviets to overtake the mi tec States in the number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles,wo-year spurt34 because of the initiationeries of concurrent modernization programs.utlays for the strategic mission have remained fairly constant, but at an absolute level high enough to have enabled the USSi to triple Its number of deliverable weapons.
The Hajor Upswings
6rogram expenditures for all Soviet strategic forces increased on average byear. This was nearly twice the
growth rate of total defense expenditures (Including MTIZ) and0 the strategic mission's snare of total outlays had Increasea to more thanpercent.
Spenaing for the 1ntcrconti iwntal attack fission, the major driver of this upswing, grew at an average rate of aboutear. This intense resource conrnii hsent enabled the Soviets to overtake the United Stateshe number of strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, although they still had fewer deployed nuclear warheads for strategic operations. 6he Soviets:
0ew ICBX silos for thendhird-generation systems and procuredCBhs.
o Constructedlass SSbNs (each of which carriesLBt-s) ana procuredLBHs-
Spending on strategic defense rose in they roughly theannual rate as the total strategic mission. These funds enaoledto deploy an ABN defense around Koscow consistingaunchers ana supporting radars. The Soviets also expandedtheir air defenses, addingndAM sites bybeginning series production of two new air defenseTogger andoxoat. The number of deployedhowever, as oloer models were replacedasis of less thanone.
Soviet spending on programs for peripheral strategic attack declined0 and thenodest upturn The Soviets
spent most of this moneyorceaunchers for the medium rangend intermediate rangeallistic missiles andedium bombers for strategic strikes along the periphery of the Soviet union. Procurement of most of these weapons had been completed prior osts for this mission began to increase gradually because of the production of the Backfire bomber.
3trategic force outlays again spurtea upward as the Soviets undertook major improvements in their intercontinental attack forces. During this two-year period the Soviets:
Completed construction ofSBNs.
Started to replace theirCBrts witn two new, nore
capable verslons-" Started series production of componentsew generation of
The high but relatively level pattern in strategic expenditures4 roughly coincidedlowing in both total Soviet military procurement and overall Soviet defense spending. The slower growth in investment and operating costs involved all four major categories of strategic and conventionalships, aircraft, and land arms Each of the majorgeneral purpose,lower rate of growthut the strategic mission was the only one thatecline in its resource allocations ifigure
o not know -hat caused the plateau, but the magnitude ana duration of the shift in procurement growth rates, as well as its pervasiveness among all the forces, suggest strongly that it was notemporary response to unanticipated economic, technical, or manufacturing problems. Because of rapid growth in defense spending duringeriod and the broad-based modernization that resulted, the Soviets may have decided to develop their forces more selectively during thend, ecision could have been Influenced by the fact that the economy tn theaseriod of generally slower growth. Another consideration may have been that the technical requirements of future military systems necessitated upgrading ooth the research and development and the Manufacturing oasesoncurrent slowdown in weapons procurement.
Soviet industry faced increasing difficulty duringn producing the weapons needed to compete with the improvea capabilities of Western weapons then under development or entering service. In the, for example, expansion of Soviet strategic defense interceptor and SAM forces with the weapons systecs then available would have hadarginal impact on tnetr ability to counter Western bombers and cruise missiles attacking at low altitudes. The Soviets may have Judged that continued procurement of large numbers of simpler weapons could not adequately deal with the evolving threat and opted Instead to reduce procurement In the near tern while positioning themselves through industrial modernization to be oore competitive In the lony term. |
whatever tne causes for the leveling of procurement expenditures, the high absolute level of the USSR's spending still permitted the Soviets to introduce an impressive array of highly capable weapons in large quantities. In the strategic forces,55 the Soviets tripled their
deployed reentry vehicles (RVs) and bomber weapons for strategic operations-frontarheads to They also continued theircampaign to improve strategic air defenses byarge and sophisticated defensive network with good capability against aircraft penetrating at medium and high altitudes. Specific modernization programs included:
o Replacementlder 1CSM launchers with launchers for three new systems: thenahe new missiles are more accurate, carry MIRVs, ano are deployed in more survivable silos.
o Continued "front end" irrprovements--improved *v
packages and guidance ana control units--to thendissiles.
o Deployment oflass SSBHs, which carry the intercontinental-rangendubmarine-launched ballistic missiles,yphoon class SSBNs which carry theissile.
o Deployment ofntermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IR8M) launchersackfire bombers with the strategic air forces.
o Continued replacement of older air aefense
interceptors with theoxbat3 Flogger and the introduction of theoxhound
o Continued deployment ofndAMs and the introduction of then
Economic Implications of the Projections
oviet GNP has increased at an average annual rateercent, comparedercent duringeriod. Growth in almost every sector of the economy has turned downward (see figureine when problems with the design and manufacture of technologically advanced weapon systems have been identified in the defense industries. The forces projected in the National Intelligence Estimate therefore have serious implications for the burden of defense on the soviet economy. Any sustained increase in spending for strategic programs will put upward pressure on total defense spending growth. The extent of that pressure will depend on growth in Soviet spending on their nonstrateglc programs:
a If spending on nonstrategic programs Increases at an average annual rate ofercent--the same rate as total defense spendingut somewhat less than that observed for nonstrategicprojected growth in strategic spending would cause the annual growth rate in total defense spending to increase toercent.
The force levels projected by the Intelligence
Corcrnunity for Warsaw Pact theater forcesational Intelligenceowever, imply growthonstrategic programsercent. This growth, together with the projected growth in strategic programs, would result in an Increase In the
growth rate of total defense spending to as much as 4
percent per year.
The Soviets could accomodate an acceleration in defense spending growth If they were to achieve the rather ambitious economic growth objectives outlined inh Five Year Plan--annual average GMP growthercent. Most Western observers, however, expect the economy to grow more slowly. Moreover, because General Secretary Gorbachev nas made modernization the centerpiece of his domestic policy, an annual rate of growth in uefenseercent would affect other economic objectives more adversely than in the past. The two previous upswings In spending on strategic programs coincided with periods of steaay growth In thegrowth in thein theercent In the. In contrast, if the GNP continues to grow by the average rate ofercent rate of growth in total defense spending could resultercentage point increase in the already large defense share of GNP ofoercent (measured in constant ruble prices anaS definition of outlays for defense).3
The consequencesoviet decision to accelerate the growth of total defense expenditures In theould be even greater than the defense-to-GNP ratio implies because defense competes for many of the same resources that are critical to Gorbachev's plans for promoting economic growthejuvination of the industrial base. Strategic weaponsigh priority
This juagnent is based onrenas ana Developments in Warsaw Pact Theatereptember TSoBT!
DIA believes that when measured in current ruble prices, the defenseGNPercent.
for the Soviets ana are less lilcely to be affected by economic factors. Nevertheless strategic programsarge share of such high quality resources. For example, the finer tolerances and consistency of replication necessary for the series production of pulse-Ooppler raaars and onboard computers for the new Interceptor aircraft require precision machinery, such as computerized timing and control devices and wafer-handling equipment. Computerized machinery ana the accompanying software necessary for tn* mass production of advanced microelectronic components are already in snort supply in the Soviet economy. harp Increase In Invesonent on strategic weapons would also entail the use of critical materials, sucn as high-strength steels and titanium alloys, that coulo otherwise be used in the production of turbine components ana cutting tools for modernizing tne country's industrial jasc.
Potential Technological and Manufacturing Problems
Each projected strategic program Is, by itself, probably within Soviet industrial capabilities, but the defense industries may find it difficult to achieve the rate of technological success at both the design and manufacturing stages that will be necessary to meet the aggregate deployment targetsither scenario.
During, the availability of technology was not aon either the development or production ot Soviet weapons. Soviet approach was to upgrade weapon capabilities throughintroduction of new technology. Host systems containedfrom their predecessdrs. This practice entailed the use ofdf earlier weapons, limiting the systemingle mission,high reliability through common subsystems, redundancy, ano ease New technologies were introduced only when proven and when
old technologies could no longer meet minimum operational requirements. This approach was successful because it allowed Soviet industry to produce these systems in large numbers with minimal risk. _
Ourlnghe Soviets began to alter their oevelopraent practices,umber of Innovative weapon designs that Incorporated Soviet state-of-the-art technology. This new approach has Increased the time required for system integration, testing, and production assimilation, as also generated new manufacturing requirements, including:
Computerl*ed equipment and the accompanying software tc manufacture complex parts and achieve the higher tolerances necessary for new weapons.
Computerized testing equipment for microelectronic components and subassemblies.
silicon, gallium arsenide, andmicroelectronics production.
" Composite materials like graphite fiber structures that permit the construction of components that have low weight but strength equal to or better than those components manufactured with traditional materials.
skilled labor to operate more sophisticated proauction processes at the component, subassembly, and final assembly stages.4
As Soviet production technology becomes more sophisticated and trie roleand semiskilled workers declines, there willeed forprograms for computer programers, designers. Inspectors, and
" More and different support industries for individual programs as system integration becomes more complex.5
There is evidence that since thehe Soviets have encountered difficulties in both the development and productionumoer of major strategic weapon systems. Some of the more expensive programs experiencing delays in development include:
we believe that the Soviets had. planned to
start full-scale productionedium size solpropellant ICBM in the. Because of difficulties inolid-propellant rocket motor of this size, such an KBM--thenot be ready for series production TheLBH. This missile, deployed on Typhoon-class SSBNs, did not reach initial operating capability (IOC)ecause of problems with its solid-propellant motor. Thisear after the first Typhoon had completed sea trials and when trie
weapon system should have been fully operational. Large phased-array radar. Planned as an integral part of the Soviet ballistic missile early warning system, these six radars have experienced several serious technical problems, which have delayed completion. The Pechora raaar has been damaged by fire three times in testing, most recently Authorized for construction3 c
radar probably will not achieve
0 SA-lQ missile system.
lead us to believe that development proolems--especially In the propulsion, guidance, and autopilotthe missile's deployment by two to three years.
nterceptor. Flight tests begansystem has not yet been deployed becausewith both the missile and
There areumber of weapon programs that have entered series production but are proceedingace slower than we have observeo for stmtliar systems in the past. Moreover, we have good evidence that wnile the
themselves had initially planned to deploy them at relatively slow rates, some of these programs have fallen behind these deployment schedules. For example.
Soviet plans to reequip its
fighter regiments with its three newestoxhound,ulcrum, and5 fallen behind scheduleear or more. These delays can be traced at least partly to production problems stemming from increased manufacturing complexity. The airframes are more complex structures using non-metallic composite materials, their avionics systems are based on new technologies, and they represent the Soviets' first use of turbofan engines on fighters.
It is uncertain to what extent such problems will persist through the remainder of the decade as the number of new weapon systems incorporating Soviet state-of-the-art technology increase. On the one hand, tne Soviets have made some Impressive advances in upgrading their manufacturing base. In the aircraft industry they have modernized most facilities, particularly those manufacturing such advanced aircraft as the Flanker, Fulcrum, and Foxhound fighters and their missile armament; the Blackjack bomber; and the Condor transport. The average level of manufacturing technology in the missile, space system, shipbuilding and tank industries has improved substantially as well. The high rate of expansion in assemblyin the USSft is usually accompanied by the installation of new manufacturingsuggests that increasingly advanced equipment is being employed In many production lines in these industries.
Such impressive advances may not have kept pace with the demanas of new weapon systems, however, and some industrial disruptions almost certainly will persist into. There is, forontinuing potential for production resource competition between strategic and nonstrategic programs
that draw on similar, if not the same, production resources at the component and subassembly levels. Future production decisions might require the Soviets to make some hard choices when assigning priorities to individual programs ano missions. Moreover, because of the specialization and newness of the technologies the Soviets have concentrated them in production processes that support defense programs, with little or no counterpart production in the civilian economy. Even when comparable components, sucn as general purpose electronics, are produced in the civilian sector, the quality of output is often too low for use in military equipment. The Soviets nay consequently find it increasingly more difficult to rely on civilian resources to compensate for shortfalls In the production of components ana subassenolies for aavanced weapons.
Finally, while the projections in the estimate take into consideration technological ana manufacturing problems we have been able to identify, they generally make no allowance for new problems that may arise. If the Soviets experienced problemsajor new program, such as the Blackjack heavy bomber, and initial deployment is delayedear or more, procurement costs would drop accordingly, although such delays would almost certainly add to the ROTiE costs of the programs.
Strategic systemsigh priority in the Soviet military calculus, and Moscow has alreadyubstantial resource commlbnent to many of the weapons projected to reach IOC over the next five toears. The rate ofmay be increasingly affected however, by technical and economic considerations. To moderate the impact of economic and Industrial constraints the Soviets could make several adjustments that would alter tlie rate of
strategic force modernization. They could:
Extend the service life of some older systems by
refurbishing missiles or reducing the operating times
for SSBHS ana aircraft.elay scheduled force modernization ana stretch out
selecteo weapon procurement programs.urtail early some weapon procurement programs, either
retaining older systems longer or accepting some
reduction in overall force size as the quality of the
force improves.educe some costly training activities and make
greater use of training simulations.
Such adjustments would not require the Soviets to forego eitner the modernization of their forces or the achievement of their military objectives. As has been the case for the pastears, the high current level of Soviet expenditures on strategic program would allowubstantial modernization of both Soviet offensive and defensive strategic forces even with little or no increase in the annual rate of
An arms control agreement that Imposed limitations on US force modernization could allow the Soviets to slow the rate of their own force modernization while ensuring tnat the strategic balance did not snift in favor of the United States. The USSR probably attaches little economic importance to arms control in the near term. An agreement tnat imposea deep reductions on both sides, however could eventually result In significant cost savings for the Soviets. These savings probably would be realized only in the long term
because nearly all of the projected programs are in process and several will be ready to begin series proouction within the coming year.
The Soviets would also find an arms controlseful mechanism for managing ana planning their modernization efforts over the longer term because it wouldeasure of stability and predictability on US strategic plans for the nineties. The uncertainties of the nature ana extent of possible changes in US strategy and force posture compound the complexities of Soviet decisionmakers as they consider their economic strategy to the Major new US strategic initiatives in an unconstrained environment could add billions of rubles to what will be an already high Soviet defense bill. The Soviets are particularly sensitive to the prospect of an open-endea high-technology arms competition that could result from the US Strategic Defense Initiative (SOU. It is too early to assess accurately the cost to the Soviets of responding to SDI. We estimate, however,ationwide terminal ballistic missile defensemissile launchers and supporting radars--would cost the Soviets someillion rubles and increase cumulative strategic expenditures over the nextears by aoout one-fifth.
TOP SE< HT
Under each of the tworesource allocations for all major
strategic force components Host of the Impetus for overall growtn
in spending, however, wouldefforts to modernizeattack forces.
Under the moderate force, Soviet spending9 for intercontinental attack would be about two-thirds greater than the levelrowing at between io andear This wouloramatic reversal compared with the lastears, when spending for intercontinental attack forces declined steadily byear. (Spenoing on total strategic offense also declined during this period byercent, even though outlays for peripheral strategic attack were increasing). The acceleration in spenoing is based on our expectation tnat several Soviet programs, now in either development or testing, will begin series production9 Under the high force, Soviet expenditures for the intercontinental attack mission could grow by as much asear. The Increase reflects the added Investment the Soviets would make to enhance both the survivability and the destructive potential of their intercontinental attack forces.
Modernization of the ICBM force would be the major cause of the rapid increase in costs projected for Intercontinental attack programs. Investment would dominate as the Soviets began series production of two new solid-fueled
Projected Intercontinental Attack
ofolid-propellant ICBMingle RV on road-mobile launchers.
Introduction ofollo-propellant ICBM withIRVS,eplacement for thendn rail-mobile launchers.
Replacement of existingCBMs with follow-on having greater accuracy and throw weight.
More rapid production ofollow-on androduction of components forollow-on. Introduction ofollow-on with threeana improved accuracy.
V program at three boats, each carryingLBMs. Backfitting ofissilesII SSBNs.
Delivery of four additional Typhoon-class boatsotaleployednd one final boat still under construction. Production of theLBM and the introduction of follow-on with greater accuracy and throw weight.
A faster construction schedule for Typhoon SSBNs, with six boats deployed and three more unuer constructionore rapid production of thend its follow-on.
ofong-range cruise missile for deployment on newly producednd Blackjack aircraft. Productionew tanker aircraft based onransport. Production of Blackjack heavy bomber.
More rapid production of tne Blackjack, Bear H, and
missiles (thendhich are either Dcino flight tested orearly stages of series production,ollow-on to
eviaence indicates is In development. The cost to operate the force would also Increase somewhat as they deployed the new solid-fueled missiles on mobile launchers, making them more costly to man and maintain tnan cotnparaole silo-based missiles. Under the moderate force, spending on ICBMs would wore than doublerowing at aboutear. Under theorce, the Soviets *ould increase the deployment of each of the three new missiles andore accurate version of the They woulo also begin series production of componentsollow-on to theollow-on to the Under this force, expenditures would nearly triple by
Under the moderate force, spending growth would be uneven, declininglast ofv-class SSBfts is completed Costs wouldto increase as the Soviets started productionollow-on to theSLBh (currently deployed on Typhoons) ano began construction ofew class of SSONrojected completion date Soviet expenditures on SSBKs would increase byercent under the high force the Soviets wouldasterfor both the Typhoon ano the new class of SSBnhe production of the SLBMs they will be deployed with. investment would resultteady growth in outlaysoa year.
Sombers. The Soviets are reemphasizing the intercontinental attack role of their strategic bombers; this force is undergoing Its first major oodernlzation since the. The reewphasis begann the
deployment of theong-range cruise missile onircraft and is expected to continue with the deployment of the Blackjack heavy bomber in8 Under the moderate force, Soviet spending on the heavy bomber force would double9 and account for one-quarter of all outlays for intercontinental attack, compared withercent prior to the start ofroduction in the, unoer the high force, production of both the BUckJack andombers would be accelerated and spending would nearly triple. The bomber forces would account for nearly one-third of Soviet outlays for intercontinental attack programs
Under tne moderate force, spending for the peripheral attack mission would increase byear9 bsolute terms, projected spending9 would be aboutercent greater than Spending on land-based systems would increase as tne Sovietsollow-on to theRBM and began deploying long-range ground-launched cruise missiles (GlCMs) by56 The Soviets are also expected to begin deploying sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCHs) on suocarlnesncreasing the sea-based share of peripheral attack outlays fromercent4 to aboutercent In contrast, spending on peripheral attack bombers would stay about the same, as the transfer of Fencer aircraft to strategic aviation is completed and Backfire production continues at the current rate of aboutear.
Under the high force, spending for peripheral attack programs would grow steadily througnear. The added cdsts would result primarily from the deployment of an aad'tforalaunchers for theaster rate of production of the The Soviets would also
Projected Peripheral Attack
Introductionore accurate and reliable follow-on to thentroduction of theround launched cruise missile.
Completion ofeployment programaunchers. More rapfa proauction of both theollow-on ana.
Sea-Based Missile Force
of two new long-range sea-launched cruise missiles, thend theLCMs, includingn dedicated submarines, would de deployed
Faster rate of cruise missile production, witheployed
production of aboutear for the strategic air force. Gradual replacement of old Fencer aircraft with an Improved version, with the inventory projected to increase toircraft
A gradual increase in 3ackfire production for the strategic air force to aboutearoviets woula forego the expansion of Fencer program In anticipationew aircraft will not be ready for series production till
produce more long-range SLCMs, wltn these programs accounting for one-quarter of the outlays for peripheral attack Spending on peripheral bombers would remain at about4 level, although the Soviets would gradually increase Backfire production for the strategic air forces to abouteartrategic Defense
Under tne moderate force, Soviet spending on strategic defense programs would grow byear9 Tin's would break the trend of the pastears when spending grew by less than oneear. The Soviets would make major improvements In their ability to engage current bombers at low altitudes and,esser extent, cruise missiles They would deploy two new aircraft, theulcrum and thelanker, and continue to produce theoxhound for their air defense forces. Under this force, the Soviets would continue to construct newites at the current pace, witheployed They would also improve their warning and surveillance capabilities, primarily with the deployment of the0 Mainstay early warning and control aircraft. Finally, the Soviets would continue to upgrade their ballistic missile defense around Moscow withinauncher limit established In2 ABM Treaty. This limited modernization would be largely completed
Under the highore rapid deployment of new Items ana aof some older SAMs andewite construction, witheployed sitesresult in average annual growth in spendingercent, the Soviets wouldround-based high-energy laserair defense
Projected Strategic Defense
deployment of theFoxhound ano the introduction of two new aircraft, thelanker andulcrum,f the new aircraft deployed
Increase In the deployment of the9 but deployment of fewer of the larger and wore expensive
Introductionew laser weapon for air defense
Construction ofewitesntroduction of new laserith abouteployea
Warning and Control
Deployment ofainstay AwACSOriginal document.