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This Memorandum establishes an interagency data base on ihe yearly production of Soviet strategic and general purpose weapon systems and equipment for the. The weapon systems represented here are virtually all of the most significant items of equipment, measured in terms of both the cxlcnstveness of their deployment and the political and military implications they possess, andias toward inclusion of weapons still in production. There is overwhelming interagency agreement on both general and specific estimates. There are, however, systems for which the CentralAgency and the Defense Intelligence Agency differ in their estimates of production; I
The Soviet defense industries exhibit stability and momentum over long periods of lime that have resulted in levels of weapon production that are extraordinary by any standard. The Soviets during theroduced:
ntercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs! andubmarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).
DIA) intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs).
anned and unmanned military or joint-use spacecraft,pace launch vehicles.
0 (DIA)0 (CIA) cruise missiles.
rew-served surface-to-air missiles (SAMs)
hort-range ballistic missiles (SRI!Ms).
0 aircraft,0 fighters0 helicopters.
ew ships,ubmarines andajor surface combatants.
0 modern0 other modern armored vehicles,0 (CIA)0 (DIA) of the mostartillery and multiple rocket launcher systems.
0 stand-alone radars.
illion trucks for military use, includingeavy
During the past decade the Soviets began to emphasize iiiultimis-sion weapons that requited state-of-the-art technologies. Earlier design practices that favored using off-the-shelf, standardized parts andgave way to ones that required greater technical innovation. The share of these more advanced, complex weapons has increasedroportion of the total since the, suugestiiig that the Soviets want more such weapons and arc willing to pay the higher prices associated with them. The Soviets certainly want to minimize costs wherever possible, but we do notere is an overriding design
imperative Io hold costs down While Soviet designers seek to minimize weapon system costs, their fundamental concern is to meet military and national security requirements. Q
In general, Soviet weapon production rates arc two to five (or more) times greater than US rales.4he Soviets producedimes as many ICBMs and SLBMs as the United States and over seven limes as many nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarineshile the USSK producedRBMs andtrategic long- and intermediate-range bombers, the Uniied Statesershing II medium-range ballistic missiles and only six such bombers. In the lactical field the Soviets producedimes as many crew-served, land-based SAMs as the United Stales, in excess of twice the number of cruise missiles, two limes as many fighters, and over three times as many helicopters. They produced twice as many submarines other than SSBNs and overercent more major surface combatants. Theyimes as many tanks and over five times as many major artillery pieces.'| |
Our estimates in this Memorandum cover production ofsyslems (includinghip-conversion programs),three categories of trucks. (Seefigures
IA and DIA reached year-by-year agreed-upon estimates of production forycar period for almostercent of these,
Our collective confidence in these estimates ranges fromthat is, we are confident we are withinercent of the actual productionthe larger systems thai are fixed or take long periods to construct and are easily visible, lo lowcould be off byercent or more from the actualvery small, highly mobile radar systems. |
' The eBlmaled Sovirtmed fur these oomporisoro lun through in order to belh the L'S dun available at therafting. Ai such thev da net, tor example, include continued US prodocr.cn otumber. theI MBBM. tbeTndrrit SSDN. ce the Ml lankomponwn would den.le onlyirull deureexaifniiMn ihal included the5 because both US and Soviet production rates ihowedreawubl ihe searf^
these difficulties and delays lias been lower productionthat should have entered production sooner and begun deploy men! in this period will not reach their lull momentum until later in.
advanced weapons fielded during the period also have required greater resources and effort and. hence, have been more costly In tbe CIA view, though we have no concrete evidence, the burden of these higher costs in some cases may have conlribulcdoviet decision not to sustain production at historical rates.| |
The Sovieis have responded to these technical challenges by modernizing their defense manufacturing base. We haveariety of new materials and manufacturing processes beingiu the aircraft, missile, shipbuilding, ground arms, and electronics industriesumber ol programs have recenlly complcled. or soon will complete, iheir lest phases and will enter serial production. Hecent growth in defense industry floorspace indicates thai production capacity has been increased in anticipation of these and Oliver new military programs
Expansion has been observed at Pavlograd in anticipation ol production of tbeCBM as well asollow-onand at Zlatoust in anticipation of production of anLBM follow-on
Substantial expansion at facilities in Kuvbvshev and Moscow and activity at the Tyuratam test range indicate production of new classes of space launch vehicles will increase during the rest of the decade.
Maior expansion of Kazan" is intended lo support production of thelackjack bomber.
Considerable expansion at Nikolayev suggests that new classes of surface combatants will be produced later in the decade, the new large aircraft carrier, how under construction, will be completed later in the decadc.
Recent extension at Omsk suggests that lank production will increase in the future.
Thev- dramatic increases in production floorspace in the strategic missile, spacecraft, aircraft, shipbuilding, and tank industries alllhat tbe Soviets will continue to produce substantial numbers of weapons and other major military equipment oxer the rest of the decade and into |
Soviet Military41 DENIEDOriginal document.