Soviet Civil Defense: Objectives, Pace, and Effectiveness
Interagency Intelligence Memorandum Memorandum to Holders
Key Judgments ami Summary
Worning Notice Intelligence Sources or Methods Involved (WNINIEL)
NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION UrKwtlvorized Disclosure Subject to Crirmnd Sonctions
PROPIN-ORCON-
Nol Keleoioblc lo Foroign Notional* Nol Refeotoble to Contioetort or
Contr of"/Cwi^'mdInformationDuteminotion and Extraction of Information
ConVofcrf bynformation Hai Boon Avtfcorlied 'or RalcOM.
DISSEMINATION CONFROl ABBREVIATIONS NOFORN-NOCON TRACT-
oh
tu>
mkroncho copy of thii aocurnenl is avoilcbfr from QCR/DLB
printed copm from
receipt ol Dle, rtiierofiehe or printed form con olio be
arranged through CPAS/IMC.
Nl4
MEMORANDUM TO HOLDERS OF Nl
SOVIET CIVIL DEFENSE: OBJECTIVES, PACE, AND EFFECTIVENESS
KEY JUDGMENTS AND SUMMARY
Iff amnionbb*rat IS5 tued In Uwof iha Mcroamn-dam. which wjabllolkai oafull terf of tna Mtmonvr.rfnu pubKthrdwilh irsutit detnbuiion
PREFACE
7 Interagency Intelligence Memorandum on Soviet civil defense planning reniaim in many respects the major comprehensive study on theowever, important sections of that paper have been superseded by1 Memorandum to Holders3 UM, and analyses undertaken by (he intelligence agencies individually have shed light on additional aspects of the program.'^
This document incorporates Intelligence Community findingsand new data on sheltering, evacuation, and effectiveness-nol as comprehensive in scope as7 IIM. it addressesthai wc believe lo be central to an evaluation of theeffectiveness. We do not attempt to assess Sovieimedium- or long-term recoveryuclear attack because ofsurrounding the climatic and biological effects ofnuclear exchange. In addition, in-depth analyses wouldscenario dependent We have, however, identified thoselo us that wc believe would have an impact on llicfor continuing operations in the period shortly after a
Thb Memorandum to Holders was prepared under the auspicesNational Intelligence Officer for Strategic Programs. It wasibe Central Intelligence Agency with the participation ofIntelligence Agency. Contributions to various portions ofwere also made by elements of the VS Air Force, the NationalAgency.
Joint Data Systems Support Center, Defense Communicationsextensive computer support for thewhile statistical support for the evacuation and shelterprovided byand CIA's Analytic Support Croup.
This Memorandum was coordinated by the NIO/SP's Interagency Working Group on Civil Defense.|
> St* Seoul CiHl Defend,.Mikwu. Nll |
' St* tamammmdmnm lol Wafl Cud DttennTVonmwin. fmcr. end (JAuhthi.l1Seat* WaeOme
Monaatmenl TV Hole ef Cmrf OtlenntdertkiplilM SS-IOOOSIX
vn
<
KEY JUDGMENTS
Civiln integral part of the Soviets' strategic posture. The Soviets sec their program as providing them with an advantage over the United States, butrisis period their judgments about their freedom of action and recourse lo hostilities would be based on many military, political, and other factors beyondignificant civil defense asymmetry. They probably have many uncertainties about their capability to implement their civil defense plans, as well as about the impact of longer term nuclear effects. Nonetheless, continued investment in civil defenseyear period has resultedrogramthe Soviets'perceived as credible andontributing element of their strategic posture. According to anview, there is no indication that the Soviets believe their civil defense program makes anyarginal contribution to the USSR's overall strength relative lo that of the United Stales, or that it coulda satisfactory outcome in |
Although current civil defense capabilities are not uniformly comprehensive, the Soviets to dale haveevel of competence that permits them to focus selectively on weaknesses in theeriod of maintenance and stable growth appears lo have succeeded the intensive development of thehrough, and ihere have been no discernible changes of emphasis in the program over the past several years. Spending on the four elements of the program for which wc can estimate costs remains steady atillion rubles per year,5 billion if duplicated in the United States. (These figures should be viewed as minimum estimates only, inasmuch as many aspects of tbe program are not included)[ |
The Soviets have made considerable progress in almost all areas of civil defense over the lastears. In particular, ihey have made great strides in their efforts to implement plans for the protection of the leadership and essential workers during wartime. Recent analysis suggests ihal, in addition to an extensive command post network outside of urban arras, the Sovietsore extensive urban command post network than wc previously suspected. In Moscow, where Ihc need for leadership protection is the greatest, the Soviets over the lastears
hfr-cr end KoecrnVl
have constructed an enormous system uf urban deep underground complexes, inlcrccausccted by public and special subway lines and linked to Vnukovo airfield, as well as deep underground complexes outside the city at Cliekbov and Sharapovo. Deep underground facilities connected to public subways have also been identified in several other major cities- There are indications, moreover, that the Soviets' capacity for underground production may be greater than we have estimated in thethe extent of such efforts remains unclear. |
We have identified other areas, however, that the Sovietsperceive as needing improvement They experimentedajor reorganization of civil defense in thend. On the basis of statements made by Marshal Ogarkov, as Chief of the General Staff in the, we judge that the move was partly intended to address problems in coordinating military, economic, and civil defense mobilization requirements. We do not know the outcome of the-reorganization attempt.!
The ultimate effectiveness of the Soviet civil defense program is highly scenario dependent. Our analysis shows tbat, if in tbe course of an ongoing crisis or conflict, the Soviets mobilize- early enough lo implement fully their civil defense plans anditst strike against the United States, the program could greatly minimizc the casualties attributable to prompt nuclear effects among all segments of the population Immediate casualties could range from atillion with little or no civil defense to at leastillion with fulland evacuation. Although civil defense could protect some key economic assets, the Soviets almost certainly believe it cannot prevent major damage to their economy.
SUMMARY
by the perception lhatgligmean little without the capability for war survival, the Soviets have contended for overears with the problems of providing civil defense against weapons of modern warfare The scope of their effort exceeds that inferred by the interpretation of the term "civil defense" in tlse West. Soviet dvil defense Is intended to contribute to tbe maintenanceogistic base for operations by combat forces, lo limit human and material losses, and to attempt to ensure that the essential political and socioeconomic basis for Soviet society Is preserved Inpostattack petiod.
The Soviets' current civil defense posture is the product of an ongoing effort to balance three doctrinal require men ts with the complexity, cost, andinherent in preparing for nuclear war.current capabilities are not uniformlyThe Soviets have made considerable progress in almost afl aspects of the program over the pastears, however, andesult ihey view the program as credible and ai ono thai provides them with an advantage over Ihe United States. According to an alternative view,o indication that the Soviets believe their civil defense program makes anyarginal contnbution lo tbcoverall strength relative to lhat of the Unitedr that it couldatisfactory outcome inar'
These objectives have been consistent over time and appear to reflect actual Soviet policy (see
Organization and Moraiing
Subordinate to the Ministry of Defense (MOD)vil defensetatus within the military similar to thai of other nooforce blanches. The chief of USSR Ovil Defense, General of the Army A. T. Aitunln. isdeputy minister of defense. Tlie General Staff coordinates dvil defense activities with the rest of the armed forces, and closely follows"civil defense inorMkiation plans through the Organization and Mo bilixation Main Duectorate^ |
Civil defense is adrwiustered nationwide on abasis, with civil defense staffs piesent at all territorial administrative andlevcb. We estimate there areull-time dvil defense personnel. Operational control of civil defense rests with the military; in wartime, the territorial dvil defense chain ofwould be subordinate to the deputy comma ratter for dvil defense of each military district (MD> | |
The operating elements of the program consist ofilitary dvil defense units manned0 troops in0 in wartime) and an unknown number of dvilian dvil defense format tons thatinvolve overillion participants Thr quality of the civilian formations varies considerably, since much of the population apparently does not lake dviltraining seriously Tins cWldencv appears to concern the leadership,4 Altunin approved legulatuno tightening training staisdards for theformations, j |
Operational considerations have demonstratedover time for increasing integration ofInto ihe military. The latest manifestationtrend dates from thendsubordinating territorial dvil defense staffsmilitary commissariats. This structure waswith in at least several MIX We do notoutcome of ihu
Twomay have been factors in tlse proposed reorganization. Other
1
Objectives and Tasks of Soviet Civil Defense
P.otCCt iltr lodcnhip
Ta.l.
piotw
pochl'atlro
urban oommabj pral)
bwtunturili mwn-.t
Protect the enrMUl watt (ore*
Shelters at eamtial worbkci
plant
he imI popubtloa
(ocban and runt. blast aad Ultat) militaryof the umc periodal aligning the peacetime force structure"1th wailime operational plans. One effectdunges was to consolidate ibe MD commaover fences In hitimilarhave been expected if Ihe civil defensewere successful, and would have followedcsutj.shed by the MOD takeover of
lso possible that serious concerns over the Soviets' mobibzation capabilities prompted the move Marshal Ogarkov, while Chief of tbe General Staff, expressed concern In thever the nation's ability to coordinate all aspects ofmilitary, economic, and civil defense. In fact, emigre rcpoittn* Itotnresents strong evidence of problems in alloc*tine personnel and transportation assets between civil defense and the military.
plain
r
Costs
coMmiatty ot economic activity in wattimt
dvll detente ind tomumipc
ttiiiJ^jIl.jI'in plara
Protect .
frtwn ami ewrban coram* nd vrti
I'" '-imn lr*droh:ri
Sheltering, dispersal, and relocationn-ninl uotlcn
Ensue ruble supply ot raw nutetlak and
mlillty inpuU
buried utility lino
Strategic iwhb
Piuteot indt.yinlp.fTO of machinery and equapaaeni qlialwd implement ttfaui)
Hasty rardcnlM
IU:iIi4 il-.utdown
Prewnwn of tfcondiry dimu> Protect will re nauHnitms
Geographic dtwcnaJ (broiled implementation)
are unable lo estimate (he total cost of civil defense preparations in the USSR. We have assessed tbe annual cost of four elements of tbe proctam: pay and allowances for full-lime personnel, the operation of lhc military civil defense units, construction and maintenance of facilities for these units, and urban blast shelter construction The cost of these Clemen'smounted toillion rubles, theofercent of the estimated cost for Soviet strategic defensive forces, or leasercent of (he estimated total defense budget If duplicated in the United States, (hey would have cost about Si 'j billionith aboutercent representing manpower costs. (These estimates thould beverypt oil mat ions because of unccrtain-lies In both the Quantitative data on civil defense programs and pricee emphasize that these figure* represent the cost of only part ofand should lie viewed as minimum cslimules.
Enhance prospect, for poaittadt
recovery
ih; tii,|>
].rw!ut(lco
Relocation
Maintainivil defense unit,
Organise clvUlan civil dele Maintain medical reserves
Maintain food teaetvei
Crovidc training in rescue and tecovcty operations
Available evidence suggests that Ihe leadership takes the civil defense programespitc the preva lence of statements to Westernciah thai play down the extent and significance of the program, domestic literature continually emphasizes the importance of general preparedness and of training activityinvestment and activity in an eia of budget constraints abn tuppoit litis view. The average Soviet
jjgggg
however, apparently continuese apathetic toward the progiam. pa fine little attention lo civil defense lecture* and regarding eiercisn as more ol an opportunity (or socialirJnit llun for training. Although tliU reduces thef training and couldthe effectiveness of the civilian civil defense formations, we believe it has very httle Impact on the rest of the procram. Tin* majority of Soviet citizens probably would obey orders under most crisisMoreover, ihe general disinterest of Soviet citizenry in civil defense does notcl of purpose on the part of use leadership.
Level and Direction of Activity
It i* difficult lor us to measure the pace of the program Few areas arc quantifiable, and our current reporting is limited. Some areas such as shelterand military dvil defense unit activityarked increase io emphases in thend, but appear to have levekd off since the. We fudge that the enduring and cumulative nature of many aspects of the program has allowed the Soviets to increase their dvil defense capability whileteady pace of effort.
The Soviets haveevel of competence that permits them to focus selectively on weaknesses in theeriod of maintenance and stable growth appeals to have succeeded the intensivethai characterized tlse period from thehrough the. Although manyremain lo be resolved, we believe the Soviets have surpassed the minimum level ol achievement
necessary to impart confidence in the program's via-
With many of the basic requirements for dvil defense apparently fulfilled and cvidencincalnlenanoc lesel of effotl, the Soviet* probably viewime to address less tangible problem areas. We haveew new areas of cmptsaus over the past several years These include;
Mobilization capabilities.
Rural dvil defense formstiom
Allies' civil defense programs.
In general, we have been unable to discern any civil defense initiatives in response to the cictcrioration in US-Soviet relations0
Protection of the leadership
A primary objective of tlse Soviets" civil defense program is to protect and support the leadership from the time tbey begin the Iransitiooartime footing to the early postattack period We estimate that there arefficiab Ihe Soviets roost want to protect, including political and economic leaden at all levels and some dvil defense personnel. AD key leadership components probably are assigned both urban and eaurban command peats. Theof the component determine tbc number of its primary and alternate command posts, ibeir size, and the. degree of protection they offer against nuclear effects, as well as the communications equipment, transport, and other support rarrMded At the highest levds of the national Ieadri0.ii> and throuajsout tbe armed fotoes, mobile command posts and related communications facilities abo arelthough they are not usually available to subordinate territorial-administrative and ministerial organizations Thewar istaruuserrient structure rehes primarilyed command posts and probably will continue to do so; we doubt the Soviets could carry out their wartime management plans effectively using only mobileposts J
I urban command posts exist for mostentities. |
banal rapearca tag locused on
subway rclitcd facilities in Moscow. Leningrad, and Kiev. It is clear that the Soviets used subwayas cover for urban command post activity as early, ihls practice is continuing. Some of these command posts are physically connected to theIn addition to protecting the cadres remaining in the dties. tlie subway-related (adlities enhance the pros reds for covert and sccuic relocation!"
The Soviets would try lo relocate most oflo ex urban site* in wartime. Wctotal number of exurban facilities supportingwartime apparatus lo be. Ofwe assesss being vital toSovid war-fighting operations. These beiong toCommand Authorityationalmirustries directum war-supporting sectorseconomy, military districts, republics, and theimportant obtasts' j
hcadouarleii. main com mi rid pons, and (la-airicommanications (xililiei are rxrt included.
The vulnerability o( identified facilities varies. Some of the urban and ex urban relocation srtes are located deep underground andifficultproblem (or US planners. T
has ledetter understanding of^he nature and extent of some of these facilities. The maior underground complexes south of Moscow at Chekhov and Sharapovo (provided for the Soviet NCA. General Staff, and top-level government components)!
Our assessment of the scope of the deepprogram has also changed. In addition to the Chekhov and Sharapovo complexes and the AirForces facility at Chemoye, tbe Soviets have also constructed an enormous system of deep underground facilities beneath the Moscow urban area.
examined in detail for lliii report: sheltering,and medical support. Pioteclion of the urban population does not receive the priority accorded to protecting essential personnel, bul is nonetheless aa established object ivcj
We estimate the Soviets could shelterpercent of the urban populationigher in larger cities than in smallerestimates show citiet wilh more than 1couldercent, those with1 million peopleercent, and thoseercent Most of thewere at places of
Comparison of information on shelters constructed8 with those constructed before suggests that shelter capacity is exceeding population growth only slightly, and that the rate of progress will soon level off if current rates continue. We estimate ihe Soviets will be able to5 percent of their4 Shelter construction at residential sites has declined, with much of the slack taken byat Institutes. The newer shelters abo appear to be smaller. H
Subway systems probably provide additionalcapacity. Although we do not know tbewhich the public systems would be used forhave est)mated the potential shelter capacityoperating systems We estimate theunderground stations could shelter almostor moreercent ol ihe populationcities with operating subway systems. Iftunnels and stations were used,illion people, orof the population in those cities. Evenwere used, however, this lallcr figurea maximum lhatnlikely lo benot all sections of the subways would be
Tbe Soviets will have to rely on evacuation to protect lie bulk of ihe population As manyities might be evacuated in wartime, involving someillion people, orercent of the population of the cities. We believe the percentage of people to be evacuated would vary according to city size since relative urban shelter capacity increases with the size of the city.1
The complications associated with mass evacuation under the best of circumstances could be exacerbated by factors such as inadequate strategic warning,shortages, and adverse weather conditions-
' We define uttiiiiallwith populilramol Ei.fXK) ot
B
" I
Although these problems must lie obvious to tbe Soviets, vre do not believe tbe Soviet commitment to evacuitioniminishedesult | |
The available evidence indicates that the Soviets have taken extensive measures to provide medical support for the population io Ihe post attack period. Tbese measures ind ode:
Mobilization plans for medical personnel and facilities.
Special dvil defense training for all medical personnel
Provision for emergency medical supplies and (ransportation.
Preparation for sanitation and epidemic rnanage-in-ni teams to control disease.
Plans for medical evacuation of casualties from urban areas to relocated hospitals.
Const ruction of underground medical facilities
SheJtet for medical personnel P
cussed in dvil defense literature. They haveprogress in piriMririg to protectand economic managers, and have hadin developing pcotrotlve rncasuies for major industries defense, machine buildmetals, energy. transportation,and communications They also haveplans for defining the wartimedispersed, orall types ofrut >ilignificant number ofproliably attempt lo continue operationsfor as long as possible, either throughot dispersal
Of particular interest tohe growing body of evidence suggesting that ursdergrouod production fa-ci lilies mayreater tote in plans for continuing cCTriociuc activity than previously recognized
[in almost all
cases tne plants reported to have such fadlities are engaged in at least some war-rdated produdion.|
Soviets probably have significant uncertainties about the ability of the Civil Defense Medical Service to perform its wartime mission Compounding! tbe problems presented by the number of casualties that would insultitclear wai may be factors such gs*
Availability of appiopriate medical supplies and equipment, despite stockpiling
Availability of qualified medical personnel
Problems with sanitary-epidemiology operations deirsoctstrated during peacetime crises.
Nevertheless, the peacetime preparations in effect could enhance prostiedi for reducing casualties should war cccur.l I
Protection of the Economy
gUKesli lhat the emphasis Ihc Soviets have placed on each of these areas varies.
In pradice. Soviet efforts to protect the economy appear selective rather than comprehensive and focus on key elcmenls of the economic infrastructureto war support and recovery. Tlse Soviets have been unable to implement all of tlse measures db-
Trie array of measures discussed in Soviet literature for protecting the range of economic assets is shown in tableur review of the evidence,]
|we currently ire conducting futlheretermine the extent to which such undeigruund facilities figure in Soviet wartime plans. | ]
The Soviets have experrtneed difficulties inthe peacetime economy for the transitionartime footing, despite the citcnuve organizational mechanisms to facilitate Ihe process. The magnitude of the task confronting Ihedifficulties in peacetimethese problems will not be resolved easily. |
Picvious analyses have concluded that the Soviets would not attempt to implement preattack measures such as evacuation or relocation unless convincedigh tHobability of nuclear attack; they probably would wish to avoid economic disruption as well as ihe possibility ofS preemptive strike.the Soviets might try to carry out some measures incrementally to ease the strain of mass evacuation. Some aspects of evacuation abo could be carried out covertly, to buy additional time. (For example, children could be evacuated under the pre-tezt that they were being transported to summer camp) Successful implementation of these plans could provide some protccttou for key assets and would contribute to Soviet capabilities for protracted conflict and rjottaltack
'See Nlonwi Planning and/or Prrtnulrd Meteor Warp^rtiruar,
We have updated our finding] on the effectiveness of Soviet civil defense in reducing casualtiesarge-scale retaliatory US nuclear strike. Estimated casualties resulted from prompt blast and radiation effects and from fallout during someweeksthe attack. (We did not assess the impact on ultimate casualty levels of other factors, such asdamage, food shortages, or the spread ofur reassessment took into account new information on targeting strategy, population sl/r, shelter capacity, and evacuation planning We abo incorporated into our model new features thatore accurate assessment of the effectiveness of Soviet plans to protect the leadership, essential work force, and economic uisiallatioru, as well as anof the extent to whkh antiballiitic missiles (ABMs) would contribute to reducing population |
The key findings of our assessment of the effectsypothetical US letaiiatory attack on the USSR4 US forces on generated alert are the foHo-inj;
Protection of the Leaderthiv, Sufficientlo implement relocation plansrge percentage of themostly at lower territorialthe Soviet waitime managementwould be seriously disrupted, withor denial of manyfunctions associated with theDamage would also be pronounced atlevel, affecting militaryregional military high commands) as wellleadership of tlse Soviet
ability of the
tegdorship lo cany out its trans- and post-attack functions would vary. Although higherfacilities and communications would be seriously degraded, surviving or reconstituted NCA elements, primarily those in mobileposts, probably would still be able to launch follow-oo strategic nuclear strikes Tbey would be seriously hindered, however, in their ability to direct vital reconstitution,and recovery operations in the near term. The local-level leadership, which would not be subject lo severe attrition in tlse attack, could concentrate and control surviving assets ai tbe local level
lection ol the Eitenlial Work Force. With time to implement the shelter program, Ihc Soviets probably could protect one-quarter to one-third ol Ihe essential work forceof relocation and dispersal plans would result in the survival of overercent of this key group.
ol iht General Population. Soviet population casualises and fatalities would vary greatly depending on the estcnt to which civil defense measures were implemented, as shown inoviet casualties could range from atillion with little or no implementation to aboutillion with full implementation, including evacuation ofercent ofities An attack bv US forces on day-to-day alert could result in fewer casualties, rangingillion in ihe absence of any civil defensetoillion if there were full sheltering and evacuation
rn_
Protection of Economic Facilitiet. Using the same economic weighting scale employed in1 Memorandum lo Holders, we found (hai the hypothetical US attack on the USSHnearlyercent of the value of the
with roughly kali ol the Installations
(DEs)
i n
Soviet economicaTT
having
ercent We believe that relocation plans and underground production facilities would prove effective to the extent ihey could be used Using small hypothetical samples of relocating and underground installations, we foundf ihe relocating Installations woukl have DEs ofercent or more if thev did not relocate Onlyercent of our sampleinstallations sustained DEs of overercent
-Effect of ABM Protection. ABM protection is of extremely limited utilityupplement to dvil defense in protecting ihe population The current Moscow ABM lystein would reduce easu-allies in the Moscow MI> by3ationwide ABM system2 could save several million lives, but would not significantly affect the total casually levels because of the size of thr force targeted against ihe Soviet Union, the proximity of many urban targets to eacharget intcIuEcnce base and tbe modernization of US forces will offset many of the Soviets' gains in these areas as weM. I I
Trends ond Implications
year period of changing budget priorities and cooling East-West relations, (he Soviets haveonsislent level of effort In those aspects of civil defense reviewed for this document. This contribute* to our judgxnent that civil defenseelatively constant priority in Soviet planningiewedignificant part of plans for hotncland defense. The Soviets apparently recogniseargin of diminishing returns for each ruble invested in the program, and probably have chosen what they consider to bo an economically realistic level of effort thai still provides key peacetime and wartime benefits.
r i
We jt dge that the Soviets' civil defense program weighs significantly in their perception of the strategicoviet doctrine explicitly recognizes the program's contribution to both war-fighting and war-survival capabilities Soviet leaders, however, cannot be certain of the degree of protection civil defense would allord, al present or in ihe. Our analysis of tlseli civil defense plans and activities suggests (he Soviets are not likely lo be anv more conltdi'iil now than we assessed lliem to be1 lhat they can carry out the lull range of civil defense measures planned for tbe population ami theMoreover, although we have not detected any change in emphasis oo their civil defense program in the aftermath of Soviet scientific speculation about the likelihooduclear winter resultingaior nuclear exchange, it must compound the uncertainties about ptrniiects for post attack recovery.^
We do not expect loajor shift in the Soviets' emphasis on theIncreased ora dramatic change in one of the superpowers' strategic capabilities and doctrine. The Soviets probably willairly constant late of investment in civil defense to consolidate the gains abeady attairied, with attention to improving the efficiency and effecuveness of existing assets We expect the Soviets ta
Continue blast sheller construction al roughly current rates, with emphasis on shelters forpeisoniH'l
Improve maintenance of existing shelters
cJvil defense featuies inlo newconstruction
Construct additional bul relatively limitedof new command posts as new requirements are generated.
Continue to upgrade eiistinst command post facilities and equipment.
Maintain constant levels of military civil defense unit activity.
Take additional steps to integrate civil defense into tlie military. Including increasing coopeia-tioo with the militaryhedid not occur
Aim for improvements in rural civil defense capabilities
Try to redress the problems noted by Ogarkov in coordinating all aspects of mobilization planning.
The Soviets also will continue to pay attention to such programs at medical preparedness and economicbut we do not have enough understanding of the current direction of those programs to forecast future activity.
The reotgariization experiment and the mobilization problems noted by Ogarkov suggest that thestructure of civil defense will continue to be scrutinized closely by the General Staff tn the neat several years. If the reorganization did not take place, other measures probably will be implemented to compensate for those wellnesses that prompted the proposal Wo do not fully understand the politics and personalities of thel Defense Staff, but would expect additional changes when General Al-tunin eventually ii icplacod.
We cannot confidently forecast tbe factors that would determine the ultimate "victor"uclear conflict, or the social, economic, or military position of the super powersost at tack world Nevertheless, it is undeniable that those capabilities and assets Soviet civil defense is aimed at supporting and protecting
would be foremost among the factors determining the
political realitiesoslnuclear era,-
12
jtTr r
Original document.
Comment about this article, ask questions, or add new information about this topic: