Created: 2/1/1986

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Rejuvenating the Soviet Party Apparatus




Rejuvenating the Soviet Party Apparatus

Rcjuicnating Ihc Soiicl Party Apparatus

KayGorbachev it countingevolution in leader thinnot

accomplish his priority objectives, aecrletaling ecu-

nomic growth andrayed social fabric. In the classical Soviet manner, he has assigned to the piny apparatus the latk of seeing to it thai his program is successfully implemented

To ihis end Gorbachev hattee ringing purge of the apparatus He has nsoved quickly to bring the central part* appara'ui under hisaa ally. Yegor Lgtctitv, at second-in-corn mand of the Secretarial, adding three of hit oaa Cheaccs assecretaries, purging political rival Grigoriy Romance from ki risks sad aaaairag ninebaadl of key Central Ccmmittee drpartmeati

He also hasoodejuvenating the regiccal leadership, sacking three republic first secretaries andhird of ihe provincial leadership -the most drastic overhaul of the leailcrship since Khrushchev's lime.

Gorbachevs purge is designed toadisTtelau. with the political loyalties, technical competence, and leadership skills necessary to implement his program. He hat installed new procedures fot selecting and promoting parly offic-.ils. moreover, that aie evirlcnily designed lo ensure that future pany leaders meet these requirement!:

He is reducing the average ige of parti traders in an effort toetter nil of experience ard new hiatal...

ross-posting regional leaders to bsock the orvekspencnt of "localist" sentiments and to ensure thai tascs- reaaain wedded to central potttxer,

He hasractice used by beak Stain aad Kfciusbehev. replacing many local leaders wish officials "ho Iumunt sn the central pany apparatus as "respecters "

Tke evidence is loo sparse to assess ibe tenspeiarnenl and policy inclination of the new parly leaders, butinimum they will not be beholden to the entrenched bureaucracies and traditional pioccduiei tbey have been uiiigned lo oversee. Ai least for now. ihey will be unable to use these institutions as entrenched power bases tn challenge ihe Moscow leadership. They sre likelye more open to innoviinr solutions to problems and

srti bviuvi


1 4 8 I

more eBihuiiaitic implementert of new policies. Gorbachev huear ibai ihe* -ill be held more HrKlly accountable for iheir performance ibin ibeir predecessor i

Bui even Ihese new leaden will be bard pcciied lo achieve Ihe Inrnaround in solvinc lhe country'i political and reonornic problerm thai GorbKhcv II hoping for;

They face lhe tame formidable problemi obstacles as theirand, barrint more radical reforms thin we have seen lo dale, they will have to work within the same IstSlhulWnal constraints.

While it has been relatively easy for Gorbachev io remove ineffective veterans, meal of whom were at retiiemeni age. the real test of hit revdsiion will be his vnlltnrjnesi and ability to sack ba own appointees tSould Ihey launder

Ahhongh he oil teewekd over the greatesthe pany agenratas Once Ktrmbchev. raw* reenaias to be done before Gorbachev win have taracd itdoMc loot I

He needs to beef up lhe Secretariat, namenew secretary to oversee rmnctrJc trailers, and appoint allies to lake ewer important pceifonco that are still in the hands of Breihnevera heJeovert He will abo want to name additional senior secretaries with full Politburo itains to dilute Ligachev's political sirengih

The recent reelection* of Ukrainian pany chief Vladimir Sheherbiiskiy and Kazakh party chid Dinmakharned Kurvtycv signal lo Soviet officials Ibai there arc limits to Gorbachev's powerush hit purge of lhe regional apparatus,

Tbt pany congress will provxle an important lest of the residual sirength of resistance to Genrnehev's personnel and policy agenda within lhe psrty appaiaius. There t" indications that Gorbachev may beew boost id his effoils to rejuvenate the parly leadership:

- He Is likely to sera the removal of tsvort veteran panypossibly Borisand Mikhail Zimyanln and ihtir lepiaee-racnt by Kalashev. at AleksandrtKcessfal Utt tnatvase more igaintir Kuaayo weaaVlartaEadartj braze* aad rtaakts move

I 4 8 2

According lo tome reports. Gorbachev plans toirect assault on tbe corruption and militia ol the Brcthncv years, giving lhe Generallub to further discredithas Sbchcrbitskiy andwith Brezhnev's retime.

He may try to change the draft party statule to insert provisions limiting the tenure in office ef partythat he reportedly pushed for bul failed to achieve in the initial draft. These provisions would provideeans to Instilutionaliic turnover and entire ihe continued vitality of tbe apparatus.

Gorbachev now appears likely to achievepercent turnover of lhe Central Committee al the upcominggreatest change in lis composioon sinced Congress1

inimum Gorbachev needs io advance some of his attics into the leadership at the Congress in order toolitical setback. An endorsement of provision* limiting party officials' tenure, while not BS essential to Gorbachev, wouldtrong signal io tbe bureaucracy that tbe pace of change wilt net flag in the months ahead. Gorbachev can probably postpone efforts to remove Kunayev rat Shclterbiiskiy.uccessful move against either would indicate Gorbachev'! resolve to act now acainst the Ian vestiges of the old guard.


14 8 3

Rej mini ling the Sot-id Party Apparatus

Leonid Breihw- soiled ihe pcttiori oreereiiry Irorn Nilils Khrushchev inbe ruily apparatus lamed respite from ihe job insecurity that Khrushchev bid puntoefully manipulated in order lo ensure that ii remained responsive to his directives.

Under Brcilutcv (he criteria Ic* mcaiuruig pany leaders' perform*became laa and srmit eame toiac* rale in ihe seleetion and promoiion of panv leaders. Few officii liremoved from tbeir positions because vf ineons|esenee Fertile soil was created fee the iio-iti of aapotiitri and abuse of petition for personal gain hi ihe lime Drcehncv finally departed tht scene. UM eflectixnes' of :he ina'KDS in implement inn centralreoneen-ic policies hid been Dadly digradea

Corteeha* Reiati With tftx Pasl

Mlhiil Gwbachev.ocnii>sor Yunr Aadraeov. hasaarp break wiih Bruaaev'i partuaanl peajOses. He aai caiehrv sutlerlha Boea as* issrae-er aaaoaaj panvfrorn iv Seero the local leadership

Gorbachev's attempt to step op the picahime is detuned lo accomplish simultaneously las pnlilieal and puller objectives. Promotion of officii Ii who will be biaotaWn to Gorbachev and removal ol hli oppo-neali arc tha meal direct way la ocmuudlic voari. Sat Gcebaebcv ilso secant driven by tie needadre of vigorous, iswontivc. aad ireajncatly raui mofficiib wbau accae cauas ca us carry out ha saeeraas for rejuvenating tha Sawsei intern He kas isid thai iVaa wa up is tie cMlket*haussa "in ous af thend tbescopr of pnioniwl rhingei M forced throat* to dauarly's

In Stctttariati Crucial Hole

Uaiirry of iht CPSU Secretarial Aai am attnt Slabt'l lime the key lo Sarinren, in

and lueeeiifiilty running polici.

Gorhethrr, comrol orer thli apparotui gttri* UUSf *fi rollragut, on ikt Pelllhura

Tht jnnna ffOti ikt Cratr af Setreiery ftei aeOUkol+ ikt roams' (tar Ir rinrctti mtr ikt it lemon aad placement af per-soassnl im all lay pan, aad love-nm ere nam

Tirana* ike Seeretartm ihc Central Secretory catered, itt miaaiitelea tf ikt Petliaara'it* la gotataq tod keeping the poller mating iaiiltnre

Uurtey af the Sacrtrartoi alto give, ike General Secretary ihepouer hi rrtnet iht txeruiaa of yohey by go*t'nmt'tal and other laiMur.oai

through lha Ctnirol Commtlittl

Ccheikev 'rcoimiei the Importance of ihehit ktu'i- ji' aptratiom lithe Sraieme Sarlel union fair July that he had declined the Prtitdency tneedeeanttnlraithi, the "central potty or eon,."

Secretariat, ihe Central Committee departments, and the retrieval parly leadership shows ihat be means batincst

Canutes la the Secretariat

<>cctechev was faced wiih the immediate lash last March of bringiag the CPSU Secretarial under his control (see insctl Two of his close political associates.

8 4

^Jl'irTnilr il -*

Ligachcv and NiVohy Rythkov. held hey positions on the Secretariat thai he inherited from Kwntantin Cheincnko. overieetniental-meats .ed ihe eeeeiomy. Dal Gorbachev wu foiccd lo deal wiia live hold own (rom Ihe Brerhnev era it-ttenable foi heavy sodality, light industry and con-timer gooda. fords* affairs and (he media, and one ttfemally dangerous exwpetitor- Politburo member Grigoriy Romaaov. whew reapcmibfliliea unladed snncrvifon of the miliury. lhe KOB. and lhe defense laduaUte*

Since kit election. CorMehev haiood wet in reshaping- the body (lee lable IL While (our Breihnev hoWoven remain, be hat

- Installed Yegor Ugachev in the keyiy" slot, "here he not only tupervitet hit own ipeeialpoucyandbut abo ovteteet the wort of the other members of Ihe Secretarial.

Purged Romanov, replacing him with Lev Zaykov. the former Tinteningrad. ZaykeVt itceni activities indicate that hit portfolio may bt cipaodlng Into older area* of heavy ladutiry.

Placed two other collcagaet in importantveesighl passions: former Sveedkrvik parly cWel Boriicontemporary of Prtanier Ryihkov. -ho grsaunted from the same engineeringmade lecretary in charge of the cob-tlrectionormer RSFSR Agriculture Minister and Gorbachev coworker Viator Nilonov -at made agriculture secretary.

Removed Xonutniin Ruwkov. veteran secretary ia Chirac of relations wilh ruling Comm.nist par

IU rVOMiamkl.

Yuriy Andropovtrong ttart at rejuvenating the leaderibip of the IJ Central Comraiiteechaired with over teeing the implement lie* of

Fust. YeTtun front Ryihlov's trurbeial batefrequently. Llgaehev protege Alektandi Mcl'nikc" from Tomsk -ere brought in io Mad the Ccnstmlion Depanment,aieelor to which (ierbxctiev hit paidenlar tneetkin.

itanemarm (Mrlcrnr Mauot no pi"V'1'- - tt'i" <PranWU ill

I 4 8 7


Central Committee ItcvuitmoiU

He hts alto replaced acveril elderly chiefs of dtpmriitcii" iwerseoing other specific ecooctiK lectors

On Ihc foreign policy side. Gorbachev niiolkd anprotege. Aleksandread of the key Propaganda Department, sendinc ike incunsbeni off to be ambassador to Hungaryho

pretsoush keadtd ihc important World fkowrruQ and huerroiional Relations Institute.hill reputation (or being tough mi rated en East-Weil relations, but also is0 be earn hit. like Gorbachev, of being itcxbk in his anprrarh lo foreign pcficy where il suils Soviei interests.

4 8 8

Th> RegionaHeaders

The Generalbilily lo rule lhe country effectively rem oa lhe competence ind loyally of ibe arpfoxirnauty 1TO regional leaden who scire aa pany chiefs ia (he rcpiiblies aad major provinces. Aaof central poaey. ibey tan aci at enthusiastic enforcer* or it eJIeetlvt roadblocks to tht taecuiioet ol rt* leaders will ia the rrarkms. Aecouniing for iworc ttaaercent of the Centralhey reprettct an ieflporiani constituency whose loyally and support arc ettcnilil for impterncntlni policy and tttniaimne political coatral

Beeihoev wu veryhat group duringof his tenure, stoasng theurnover among iheatraction ot (hat which had prevailed durine (he turbulent Khiutbchev times when the average ftorn in office -as only three years. Andropovoed iian in rewtahting the regional leaekeihW before he died inMintn threeetorustia. Utbeiiuin. and Attebaijaa-aridf the IU leaders in ihe provincea (the country's mayar territorial dintiom beta, the republic Seven, Chemenkn, however, mark-edlr slowed lhe pace of change among regional lead-<iv replacing only I)am

Gorbachev came to power stressing tke need to ret "he ermomy rnovtng tgitn. Regional Waders were lenme-dindy put on notice ihti heavy demands wc-ald be pet On them, ind thai changes in their ranks were in ike offing if ihey did not stand up to the test.htv of strength. Genbseavw has made good on his threat lo foice icokMraai leaders oat of ihtir pee* ions

. four more of the I* republic first tteieiaries have been replaced. Eduard Shevsrdnadte departed bis pail as head of tbe Georgian Republic's psn> Klinitation io eeeonvjinister. Tbtn republics have been singled out by Gorbachev for especially baiih treatment, with first ircrelarics being unceremoeUOuily wired from iter positions ia Kirgiriya. Tadthiknlsn. and TarkineniiUn (tee wWe 11

More thanf lheprovlncitl panyeenSome of ihese. like Leningrad leader Ziylov were advanced lu higher pasts Tbe

Table i

Changes of leadership to the ReneoOa



Pjtta-ir- la






majority of them. Breeltne- aoWevtrs of reliromeni age woo had been ia their ptaiiiont for yon were pentioned off

Cc-rbaehrV* Stratiiv

Gorbachev is countingevolution la leadershipsystemicaccomplish hisobjectives of acctleritiflf economic gro-th andrayed social fabric la the dsisietl Soviei manner, he has assigned so the party apparatus ihe task of ensuring that his prccrtm is lueetisfully implemented. RetWrul party leader, installed under Gorbachev have made eksr that lhe apparaias they supervise will be esptettd lo crack tbe wbipthe government bureaucracy aad heM eeonomie officialstaciii* performance surdardsftee insetl

Goebaehe- appears to be rdyitg on (fundamental change in proeedares tbe seloeiing tnd pie-noting pnny leaders to ensure thai kit oca cadre will have ihe political eemmitmrot. technical corupcience. aad


Republic Leaden aw Ikt Party*

At republic-levelJanuary aad

February, new leaden ins/oiled unite Gorbachev have called foe pari, eetaniiaiiots toight rein on the economic bureaucracy:

- few Turkmen Republic petty leader Saptrmurad Myaior criiicircd the reptHie'i Centre) Commitleethai,cenotmC decision! were actually executed and demanded an "end to inch incomprieei preclkti."

Utrrleflril secretary Abiamet MesaUyerthat the republic; part, ortanlmikm tot "carried away" by lenfkyhundred! ol ateUiom o- economic matter!htnfaiHnt lo make are they were fulfilled. He tolled upon Ihe Central Committee. Ill bureaus, end ict'eiertcs to exercise "day-'O-dey' leadership of economic development.

Tadthlk first secretory Kakhar Mekhkamovcrtii-cittdtht republic'! etricidiare lecretory end Irvtr-al other pony leaden by namr for failure to ensure thai dctUioni adopted by the leadership wereIn their mpceiive lecton

management skills necessary lo carry out hit pro-(ran He it using ike process to eemolidatt be political pc-er. butmpnasirlm; selection(hat appear calculated in (ht firsi instance ro build aa apparatus with iht leadership lUlht ntccsui, io gei ibe ic* done la many cases, ht has passed up ihe cpportumty lo advaier. eattdidaim -ith clear personal ileaimself. Se-eril pany officii haveo ihe equivalent offive-year plan lor cadre rtac-sl ihat -aa apparently aptxoved by tht March iMi Central Committee plenum Ihat circled Gorbachev at Central See/ei-i,

authoritative pany journal Kommunlu list March by the new head of tbe Central Committee department that ovrjjces personnel apprnntrntats, GeortiyAs described by Rniumewrary. tht principles include

Reducinf the average ige of party leaders la aa effort to actsevea belter mil of taperkactd aunac-ers and no- blood.

Ensuring thai pany officials possess suffioeMcorrtpetence by having thorntint ia

- Devete^nt eroeedares tohtol -localiat- settimewi and to ensure that rearkmal party kadori retains -edded to tbe teals and policies of Ut center.

Personnel actions since he toe* over in Mirth make clear Rnrunvjotay uai (peaking for the General Secretary. Gorbachev bis been transferrin: leaders laierally more often than promoling Ultra from -ilhin their own local party ottaniiatioru.rac-lice used by boih Stalin and Kheuihebev. Gorbachev has also in miay eases been replacing local leaders with officials "ho have firsttint in iht central

flirty apparatus, where iheyn

the Orginiutional Pin, Work Oteonmeni before being sent back to their home dairies. Alumni of this school foe reiioaal tarty leaders have been annul to bead almostercent of (be local first secrtiiry posts vacased since Coebiehe. came inioonrce

Aeecrdmethis "eorp of in-

ipeeiori"o* IM officials Wiih their selection personilly approved bykcy arc beougrn in Iron provincial pany oraamuiioni for lii months of imlruclibsi in Soviet don-erne aad foreign policyhoroush eaposure so Ihe work of ike Central Cc-owsiuee. They are closely Kiuliniatd by Ligaehe- and bis aides, and those who pass the tenoolofeaecfutly selected talent lor ad-ince-taent to key prejvuieiil leadership posts lajaehev reponedty seftcts these candidates for promoiion. while Gcebachtv tigos of on iht choices

ccneril principles Sse ipptsisrUlow ii choosing shepany leadership and the laiiomlc bchisvl Ihtm acre spelled out asouIk

9 o


- Similarly, the cause of miking Soviet propagandaideology rnori interesting, pUusibir. andapparent Gorbachevaot likely to be advanced under the rntelage of the tglng present iekofcsy and eeootcacdi secreury. Mikhail Zintyanin.

Ahkoughrdiiical illyof Gorbacnev's. las control of personnel ippoimme stt greet him Ihe potent ill ta taildirkpendeii power base, witchrllvavtlcly ale so tfttllenge Ms mentor. Ccrtuequeatly. Gorbachev will probably nor. ads al lean oo* more member to ihe ranks of "tenioe tecrrtarin" at order to dilute Ugacbev's authority.

i thaiike

a hit way out. and lhat theyrUced by iwo of the candidates in lint for promotion in ihe Secretariat:

' The International Department's first deputyTagttdin. -ho hat been Peeiomarev'i"right ruadamberofto be in Nne for imminentviully Shiposanikov recentlyu deputy" in tbe denarimeat. aclB'mrecursor lo

& glide'specialist ia European issues. Zagltdin -ouldogical sacccswr to Ponomaitv. bul some accounts tuggeti he might go eUewhere.

Propaganda Department Chiefa eleoe adviser toson hit way upWtgett-

ed ilui he wauld be tbe oneeplacenow say he it in line lo take

charge of the ideology portfolio, probably replacing Zimyanin in the |

Kumiaatin Kaiushev. head of is. Bloc Relaiioas Oepanment and Central Convmiiice secretary be-foee runaing afoul of Brerhne" in it rumored

N be in but lo taunt au old pOfalHMi in Runko 1

Zagladtn hat alioa

rouble caoltdaie Ice lae posit Ma

Were Route- to bt rtoUctd by ha

Fun depotr. Ovtg Rath oatealdaear signal lhaipltai to leap ba tat) Ear* pea* aHietlghl Ira it

Oeargiy Ataaaa. aaa Okaibe aeaa of Ibt World Social* Systemo box been lumiHid Ic bt Bi lane lor poaiiiors on ibc See rei. bat brnt arecar lo be tag thou at Ihii point.

Onlral Committee Department! Despite progress made by Gorbachev and Andropov, before himrefurbishing Ihe departments, ilmotl batfof ihem remain in Ibe handt of elderly Bicthnev-eit hoMoven. Moreover, tbe Economics Oepartaieni is once againanomabmi siiuation In light of Gorbachev's concern for improving party manage roeni of the economy

here are fire hcadt cf Central Committee depart menu who, by virtue of tee. ijog tenure in office, and their association vita the old gutrd. are likely candidates for reprtcemew

1 Nikolaiho hai headed iheItatne Organs Department since IMS-At.thc dceaf imtnfi work ii both important and tern hioversees the military and thefill wantan at iti head toon

' (van Yastrobc, head of the Heavy Industry and Power Engineering Department Althoughffiee. he isnd wai selected by CacrnentQ

Vatiliy Srainxyear-old head of lhe Ctlture Depjnmeit who hai held the position since IMS.

KirJIyear-old rraatpoil and Com-rnunicairjns Depiilmeal chief who has been on iht yjb lur tnuir lhanean

kervoocnko.year-old head cf the Cadres Abroad Department, which oversetsstiguKu oforeign countries.

Regional Parly Orgi natation* Even utlh Gorbachevs unprecedented sticcess in tumiag over lhe leadortaip of the repu M* pany organitations, alnaeeticahncv-era provisos) fustof the total of IJS up fot recleeSoa have brca ittuinod to office In lhe recent party eketioni. The reelection of Ukrainian and Kuita-ilaa party chiefs Vbdamir Sbcherbilskly and Dir.-milbamtdBrtibnevtccdaa tlrong tatnal through Ihe bureaucracy that Gorbachev is still eocoiHeiiag resistance In the Polls-boro and ihe republics

Win VAior Gnshln'i retaaecment as Moscow panynd reeew icarovil from Ihe Politburo. Sheher-bittkiy aad Kuaayc art ibe mosl conspicuous re-mtining Bicihncv holdovers among the regionalThere is little doubt Ihti Gorbachev wottd Be to unseal Shcherbiuklj. who seems to be out of step with

Gorbachevs foreign policyand to be raining

Gcebaebev't cadre policy byost of Breihnev-ert appointees in important oblast first secretary pasts. Apparently became of Sbcherbniiiy's protection, only five of the republic'! IS prOvincbt parly first tecreiariet Save been replaced. Recoil

on tone cf these leaders arcf GorbichtVi displeasure wiih tht ilo" pice of turnover la ihe republic

Ihe utk of remount Saehertaiifciy ana Kurarci will not beasy out J*

3 'he reelection of Sbclterbii Kuanytv makesones removal from ibe Polii- -buro unlikely. Bul Ibe cripreccdented persontl atlacfc



Kanayti following his reelection lo bead Ibe Ka aaklaian pony lueresu hitossibility.

Oirtlosk and impiiniiens

The chingts Gorbachev hu made in ihcctnirnl and recieeal leadership probably will be relleeiedihe Vth Pany Congress inmajor re shaftling of ihe Central Commilttt. now comtcetd mainly of thenifs of top party end government .poet likely in rentierf of ihe lly-member body wiih new appointees beholdenbira or bit associates far Iheiihighest rateai any congress1 This will mate ibe bodymere eompUtnt tcrvani of the new leadership, more tuecoeelte of iu te.ll end less likely lo offer resistance toils

roup, Goibaeaev'i new parly leaden in not only yountei bul.iny leniences, abo beller equipped lo do Iheiinlike ihti. predecessor!,eseaped the disruption of World War II and had the opporluiiiiy lo finis* hit bar educations before buaotang party careers. Although the evidence is as yet too ipane to assets their uorxnraem ind policy roetlaiiicert, Il is likely Hint ihey will be leu compro-rnised by assoeiitioa with pan policies and practices, mote open io innovative solmieas to tbe country's problems, aod more eoerteiic implemeniers of aew policies introduced to solve them In Moscow, lor oaaiptc, new firstindidatc member of tbebrintsfail-Class technical education in the soJunon of iheblemt. Hii pcedtressor. Grishio, only asanaged io atiailroad technical school bcTcc btint Ihrusi ipio party jobs.

Despite iheir evideni ikiEs. the new leaders will be hard prtned in carry can ike leadership revolution Gorboclev Isopes for:

- Tbey foce the same formidable social and economic problems as those -no preceded itscm in office.

- They wia save few new nuruucemcnl tools at ibtJi disposal, tarringt redoes ion of piotc radical reforms than wc have scon so date, and will have to work wilkin the same inswutioturl rasnstrainu as iheir predecessors

If failure leans, many of Item will be templed to obfuscate He facts and win seek to prelect, rather than punish iheirorbachev will keep close watch aa his new appointees. The Politburo, accordingpublished accooouecent sneering, promised to keep eonsunt nirervrace ofpar ly boil YcTltinfforts to trainee Ihe capital to social and teoaomle health. Ii ksi been retaiivdy eaiy foe Got bache. to remove issefftetlve veterans, mosl of whom wort at reu'reaneat ate. bul tht real Kit of has rovotulion -ill be hit and abilityack Iipminseet should they reader.

Gorbachevto find measures to Ustituilcauliie the higher rates of turnover of party leaden required to make Sure his renewed apparatus does net lose its edge. He -in have soifficult Ultncing act, eitabusbing enough job insecurity io keep pany leader, from laptirsg into ihr tiirly of the Ortilmtv yean, without gencniine tht fear. eesmb-ng. and alienation in the raru thai Utimatd. causedown ippoiniecs lo lura againsi him

Asteuing CorbaeheA Momentum at the Centres*

The ?Tih Piny Congress will be an important test of how fast Gorbachev will be able to push ahead -ith his ambition plies Cor rejuvenating the parly tea dec ship. His evident failure lo achieve all Ihat se horxd Tor during ibt tcgioas) parly clcttioas leading up lo the national congress makes ii all the more important that be be able to demonstrate continued momentum Judgingariety ofGorbachev ussy plan several initiatives ioew boosi io his efforts to renew ihe pany leiduiWpis political pasiiioa


leaden hla Changes

Gcrftaclievreponrdly initndi to cute teveralcharges in lha Politburo ia] Secreiariai. ai though ihc flection of Shcbcrbiukiy ind Knoiyc-II piny cliefi in their republics make* ibeir sfnrttcdl-tielikeJy. Gorbachev could move lo fui-iher ouifb* them tn tbe Politb-ro. He hu alrtsd, advanced Grisbinsoscow. Boris Yel'Uin, tocandidale mtrnbtnhip on ihr Pofctboro. and VsemMdew first dcpalyfrom Gorbachev. Suvrocef ta ifa-kk, may alto be rnoved up. Geubeehev undoubtedly also -sots to movemprove hit position in ihc Secretarial by prcvnotirit like-minded officiabl Zsgtadin

There are iadieoirons thai Gorbaebev plans toew drive against Ihe old gvard al IU eonjiess byttack on tht corruption,and mlsukes of the Brethne. years. Ato rerudinie the deceaatdeadertyle and discredit ibose-saeh Kcdiyev-associatedhb retimep steam in the Soviei media. Repcriaofan uifi-Breihne. tnmpnnn in ihe works ban bee- lent credibility by events at recent rcpahlic levelin Centra! Asia, where former leaden from Ihe Breihncv era have been subjected to humiliating peisonal Blacks during the proceedings (see insets.

Limiting Ttntsre in Office Gorbachev reportedly fought for. but failed to achieve, provisions in the draft of Ihe new party statute thai wouldeduce limits on Ihc tenure in office of tetysimilarhoseundo Kh-uslictav hui rescinded by ttreihnev He may (rr again to puth through such changes il (he congress; proposals lo include such limits have beta prominently featured in the officially sanctioned "debite" rf th* draft slaiule Ihal aai been cond-esed in Iht Sonel press

KcorgiMilag the Apparatus

Goibacne- may alio use tbe congress to streamline (he oigaaijalion of Iht parly's centralgiving him aprclcat for reshaffling iiakir

Oi'leiim af Deeded RegaHic Firu Stertleeies

Dtt-oud ftrn leceeiariei io ruranmiiren. Kirthiya. and Todihikutea ho ve been roundly tiiikited by iheir (ircreiKfi foe corruption ant nfamanogiwai.

Hew Turkmen party chief Nlyaic eieerioted hii predecessor Mukhomedaoiar Coporev. who hod been in officei. for foiicrlni ntpotUm. lyrOphonty. irrvilily. end trrcsponsibltlly among bll poriy lobordinom.

Ousted Kirtiifim leceiery TurCahia Uiuoallyc way accused by Art reptacemerj. Abtamalof -fneoaretint icrviliiy endmr* gromoilnt tenderers'eoatelSIp poililo"!

Inomintpatyckirf Uakikamar criikiied toih the former first lecserary. Rakhmor Nebiyc. end ihe record lecitleey. Yuriy Brio: tor

icdtrallnt irreioOnribiliiy tuner* their ivborelnelti in iht yarly apparatus, and trtnfae onrlookint

violations of ihe low by republic officials

officials in the process.otbewith bis drive to tighten up rmntgernen! snd would complement the coiuolidtiioa oflttrlci and agencies bt Us already begun-t

J pointossible reduction of ihe riumberCommitteetag-

gest that (he Letters Otpartmtal created byhas already betegivenby tie failure of the recent rc^Mcannounce new leadership fen tellers departmentslevelthai departmtaii

overseeing culture, eeeusigiDda. and foreign policy are also eaoddites for mergers ei realignments of rtipon-sibihliet.

A failure by (he congress io raiifi at least tease of ibtse initi sluts woold limosi eeriainly be perceivod in Ike Soviei tmitsvcrtvy ussignificant setback for


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