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The New CPSU Program: Charting the Soviet Future


Wandas Notice

Sources or Met beds InvolvedJTEL)

Soowttf Irderrasdan

Disclcaure Subject lo Criminal Sanctions

mleiofKOe copr of thii Ooeai-

vsllsbie frco OCR/ooei fromr AIM rtqucsl lo' JPASIMCl Recnlar receipt o! Dl reports ess be ensnare1 ihroulb CPAS/IMC.


ii UnUiulHeC.

The JNew CPSU Program: Charting the Soviet Future


The New CPSUn11iiij; the Sorlel Future

Keynear CPSU program and statute, released ia draft ia5 aad

in final forrn ath Cooxress inrovide unique

into the Gorbachev regime's vision of the future and its strategy

for getting there. While offering few specifics, the program nonetheless establishes general bourrfarics for future policies: it effectively opens up new options to Gorbachev. Although often couched in vague terms, it is tbe party leadership! most comprehensive statement of iu long-termin key areas of domestic and foreign policy. Tbe suiute sets out tbe rules for tbe pony's organization and operation that will define the levers of power available to tJorbachev.

Compared with1 document It replaces, the new programore sober view of Soviet prospects for the future, both at borne and abroad- It discards1 program's predictions that the present gerieratidn wouM see the Soviet Union surpass tbe capitalist world's standard of living and witness major successes in the global advaitce of Communism.

The program makes clear that new policies are needed to get the country rnoving again, bul it does notpecific plan of action. Instead, it opens the dooride range of options by removing some iderslc-gical barriers to reform and by callinghorough reassessment of the policies inherited from the Brezhnev era. Tbe program's general language on both domestic and foreign policy appears to have been crafted to give the regime flexibility as it hammers out more specifk policies in the yean abend

Tbe program presents an imagearty leadership that seesthe coantry's economic base as an important factor in improving foreign policy prospects. It gives higher priority to domestic issues than didrogram, and It suggesU that Soviet influenee abroad is directly dependent upon the country'* economic strength and ill ability to serve as an attractive model for developing countries. At lhe same time, ihe program provides no evidenceet real from current foreign commit-menu. It prcsenU the achievement of strategic parity with the United StatesutOfk accomplishment on which there can be no compromise. It suggests that the Gorbachev regime sees negotiations with the United States as useful in consolidating this strategic position.

sov it-ioai:im

Comperhlea of Key Paints In1 and


Siatti ihat Communism Is the party's 'immediate"goal.e achieved

Predicts that ihe USSR will surpass ihe United Slates In key economic Indicators

Dtseusstt foreign policy before domestic policy.

Deeaastic Policy

Colls for elimination af tht private lector In agriculture.

Calls for tltmtnattag tht rolt of commodity-money rtla-tionsfrom the

Limits tenure of all party officials (dropped afteraf Khrushchev).

Promises every family "comfortable" apartment

Coflt for the -vrilhertng away of the state.'

Refers generally to the parly', leadership of the mililary.

foreign Policy

Says ihe capitalist world is undergoing serious crisis and isrevolution.

Views tht West as monolithic.

Calls for East European countries to have "uniform" political and economic syitems.

Stresses Importance af the Soviet experience.

Stress the 'Internaltonatlit duty" to aid development In the Third World.

.ammmtnl luuei ore net unlnlirt

States that Commaniim l, the party'sgoal, to be achieved in ihe dlitani future.

Makes no specific economic comparisons with the Untied


Dlscusttt domestic policy before foreign policy.

Sjfiction*conliuaed role for private iirvcollure

Call* for Ruridoc "fuller" use cfmoney rait*pening Ibe door lo expanatoo of tbe market.

No Lrrttt on tenure ia office of party offkiati.

Promlteivery family an apartment0 Cab* for "itrcagrtlteruat ihe ware."

Specifically points out the party's leading role tnstrategic and defense policy.

Rceoenire* that the capitalist world ii mil "wrong "

Views the Wtst as three competing cenitrs of capliallim Ike United Stales. Western Europe, and Japan

Allow* limited divertiir ia internal development of Bloc count ha*.

SUctsca the irnportancc of the eiperieoee of all toclallil esyoaxsitt.

Sucuc* the need for development of Third World countries wiih limited financial lupport from the USSR.


The program bear* Gorbachev's unmbtaLable imprint, particularly oo economic policy, but it abo contains indications lhainorung into conservativen on ccriain issues la maay parts of the program, different poinu of view appear to have been intentiorizlly papered over with ambiinous Isnguage. The coniinved influence of cortservntive elements In the party it evident in ihe failure of ibend statute to reflectviews on several controversial issues, such as limiting tbe tenure in office of party officials and expaoding public participation in dedsidtirnak-Ing. There arc signs that "second" secretary Yegor Ligachev supported the conservaiivo position on some of these issues.

1 decision toew program toh Congress forced Gorbachev to present the draft before he could fully desxiop his own blueguinl for the future oresolution of some controversial issues. Because be was confrontedrgdy finished document when be assumed power, hb redrafting efforts appear to have been focused on softening language thai coo Id constrain hb freedom of action. The program's broad formulations allow fksjbilily in interrelation and are therefore likely to sour intense debate over (he future direction of Soviet policy. not end it

The opening created by the draft program was pushed further by Gorbachev ath Congress. Although far-reaching proposals for revision, which were raisedublic debate of the draft, were not reflected in the final version, marginal changes seemed to make the program more to Gorbachev's liking. Gorbachev and hu allies used their Congress speeches to widen the scope of discussion of possible reforms andegin lo layew specifics. Many cf (be controversial issues theraises will be resolved only in the years ahead as the new leadership thrashes out iu respoose to the dorricstk and international challenges that were left unanswered by the Brezhnev regime

Coti lea to


Key Jucjfmcou


A Sober Document

Ueense foe Change




Political Sysiem


Foreign Policy



lioeal Communiim

Third World




The tie* CPSU Profiram: Charting the Sovief Future

rafl waa wearing

rxuiplcttoa aad would be released shortly

Once Gorbachev became party leader, however, lhe program's release was delayed:

A wclMnfeavnedreported

that Gorbachev msndalcd changes in the finished draft of lhe program.

The draft anally pebtobed on5 made evident lhat aaajor last-mm. tc changes were made to reflect ihe eol-Jes oallined by Gorbachev at the April Central Cornmittee pleaam and lhe June conference on science and tecbrvcaogy.

Jstated in November that he law several iBlllli of ihe program before It wai released.

Gorbachev clearly won some key peiata during lhe redrafting process, bat there rs evidence that be had to ounaeeeeniseseme issues TV party's new (aiding document alien rxc-ndeiim outline of luiLre direction This is reflected ia:

. Numerous internal inconsistencies (see sections on the political system and foreign policy) that snggesl passages were inserted to please specific interest groups

A clear Hand on some conirovcfilalhile sidestepping others thai continue io be hotly debated

Prevalence of Gorbachev's views on many issues, bat iaconsrttcncy with pmiimm he has peMiciy taken aa cabers

DiaVatties ia the drafting process that Gorbachev tad "second" "cretary Ligache* have publiclyto

^TlioTidr nilT-


Sine* Ike founding of tkt partyS. Us program km been tkt moil fundamental itatemeci of Ut pollcits Tke program ttrrtt keek propaganda ami poller function. As tkt leadertklp! vision af tke future. Il It Intended lo mobilize the tank and file and nonparty member. In support of the party! tools. Al ikt some time. Il lays down boundaries governingolicy decisions

First Prat ran.ef tke Crew.

by7 October



ocialist society.

Result: when Stalin declared thee

the Soviet Union had nocked the stage of socialism


Objectives. Greater per capita production than tke United Statesreation cj foundations0 with abundance af material and cultural wealth for all. Workweek ofoours

partment forby

New Edition af Third6

Objectives: Prepare the way for eventualto the abundance if Communiim.

Apart mem for 'practically every" famUybyiVOO.

Double national Incomeore than double labor productMly

While he rnar not hive obtained ill be wanted. Gorbachev farther advanced ha agenda ath Cc-greer.

Clungts ia the final vcrsiea of tbe program gave him additional leeway io ihe economic sphere,

Building upon tbe openings created by tbe program, he aad bis aapporteri messed for more specific measures La their Congress srareehes.

The eOnprsccnt laraower ia the Central Coram, neeody to work withore fararabte loehaitge.

A Sober Dacuascnl

Viewed la the light of the decuraerrt it rerrtaors. tbe new programceering picture of Sonet reality. lUiriiibchev's IMI program mads wildlyprojectionsife of abundance for tbe present feneration of Soviet cilitem aad the rapid eipaniioo af Comaenfluence throughout the world. Reflecthe economic downturn of the Brezhnev era and ilower ihanespeciod progress on the international scene, the new program considerably scales backI goab aad makes il clear that even these will be achieved onlyhange in current rabieses. While continuing to rsroosise aparadise, it provides no timetable tadthat major mbtakes made by past leaders have retarded domestic development and reduced Soviet influence abroad. The protram illustratesintent to rectify these errors, batvident

that the regime remains uncertain how to accomplish

this goal.

A Mcease for Osaage

Although the program provides no clear blueprint for the future, itider range of options to the leadership by removing some Important ideological constraints to fundamental policy changes (ace| It crieonragca innovation by characterizing "tbe creativeof Marioni Uaiorsrn as the party's "most importantsing language


Viktor Aforuuyev Nlkolay Boybako' Par Ftdoseye*

Borit Gostev

Richard KosoiopOr

Georziy Markov

Oleg RakkmCAin

Stepan Shaloyev Boris Slukalln

Aleksandr Vlasov Vodlm Zagladln

of Vttrca.

Head of Gosplan

Vice President of the

Academy af Sciences

First Deputy Chief of CPSU

Economics Department

Editor of Kommunir.


Head of ihe USSR Union of Writers

hirst Deputy Chief af CPSU Bloc Rtlailems Departmem Sovitl trade unions head Head of the CPSU Propaganda Department

First Secretary of

Pint Deputy Chief af the CPSU International

io that mod by OorlAcbe* al an hrujortani4 conference cm ideology, il calU for "tbe rh-alry of ideal and avenue* of science, and fruitful debate* and dttcaririoM "

The moat fuodamental ideological change in ihe pcogramrovliion deferring Communism to (he distant future. While1 program described the achievement of Com menime of materialfor all, aa anask that stould be accomplishedhe new programnly lbs "ultimate goal" of party policy.

This shifl has important practical implications. Marxist-Leninist doctrine calls forder Communism of private ownership of production,mtTerences among the population, and the market. By deferring the. liming of the achievement of Communism, tbe new leadership's ability to explore inch unorthodox eeonrjmic options, which are actively promoted by some Soviet eeoncrmrts, is enhanced.

Tbe new program further prepares tberoundor innovation by adding language that will make it easier (or the lendetahip to discard ineffective policies Il atates thai economic and societal problems, orint be carefully studied and -promptly" resolved It ehnencteriie* measure*emove iwch coetradtctions ai aandfoeee in ccinem.

Sueb languageartial victory forolish crisisharp debate In the party, during wfajcb advocates of change warned of tbe danger of similar unrest ia the Soviet Union unless the leadership addressed popular con-cerni and implemented domestic reforms. Specialists at tbe leading Soviet institute on Fastern Europe took ibc lead in advancing this new in the Soviet prcai Their eeoonenis. led by the recently ontted chief editor of Kommuniit, Richard Kosolspov. argued that

Soviet society is loo advancedolish-type crisis and lhat fundamental policy changes are not needed.

The program alsoew willingnesspasi policies by its indirect, butof Stalin. Khrushchev, and Brezhnev.naming tbem. it criticizes the "personality"sabjcctiviim and voluntarism"and failure to address growinglthough such criticism ofin line with remarks made by Aivdroptwit is stillttciItvcttiya during lhe debate over rha draftthat this passage be


Dorneiti a

The Gorbachev program make* clear Ibal revitalizing ihe domestic economy it the regime's top priority:

order of ihe foreign andlic policy tec-lion* is reversed from thaidomestic policy now first.

- Tbe domestic policy sectrorii have undergone more fundamental revisionthose on foreign policy.'

Tbe foreign polity section open* wiih ihethat the main goal of the USSR in the international sphere is lo "ensure favorablefoi oomeslic development.

The revival of ihe Leninist formula that socialism wille world not through forceorce ofidea ihal fell inlo

C .

m1 ihr chimiaf -ix"mldc leu

impeitooatolicy disuse underan apparentthat the Soviet Union will not be anmodel a* long a* capitalist countriescttci job providing for their diizenV well-being.

Economic Policy

Gorbachev was successful in getting hisheart of tbe newsections of1 program have beenrewritten and his itofficialsthai this

part of the program received the mosl attention in the drafting process.

The only specific economic measures spelled out in ihe program were previously set out by Gorbachev in his speeches:

Decentralizing economic maftagemeni by increasing

the financial autonomy ofeorganizing the ministries to shift their rotes

loward kmg-icrm Strategic planning and reducing

iheir stiffi.



Pmbllc Diseustiou of Program aad Stmtmie

Im tke momhs between ike release of ike draft program mmd tiaiute mmd ihtir adoption mlk CPSUrood publU discussion of ikeir eomtnis look place ml pony meetings and Im ike Sovietimilar procedureused lo discuss1 program and osker major Serriri documerjs. sack as7 Consiliuilon mad recent Are-rear plans. The leadership uses nch discussions lo exam-Urn various poller opHons. lo gauge public opinion, and to allow ihe population lo let off arenas.ew of lha thousands of Ideas aired during ihe public discussion were Incorporated Imo ihe fined versions of ike program and statute adopted al ihe congress.

The public discussionmlaut Insight Into lha concerns of the Soviet population as well as policy options mow under debase. PropoeaU with broadtr policy significance art discussed Im ikt approprlaie lections of thU paper. Other Ideas aired In the discussion include the following:

A Soviet general's letter im the army paper Kras-naya Zvwda called for ihe addition of language to iht program that would pUdge io supply tht armed

Say* (hat "practkally every" family willouse or aparthistep back from1 progrsm. which predicted that every family wouldcomfortsbk" essartsacat0

The program also unveiled the ocoriornk goals that were set out in greater detail la the draft five-year plan aad guideline* it ibe0 approved at the Congress. These tit remedy ansfeilicass goals (see inset, pageere set at Gorbachev's personalstaledpeech in3 that the growth rate of national income should be boostedercent to a

minimumerceni (ihe pro*.rem tea ilercect)hose, ccoaomic foala arc forrausbticd in more general terms lhaa ia1 program, and ipcclDc targets for acciora of (he economy have been drugged. It it surprising thai the* arc iaclwacd in Ibr program at all ia new of lhe embarrassancnt caaaed bynfulfilled goals aad Ihe criticism Soviet officials have direoied at hai program (or letting specific targets. Their ind as Km aneana that the program mar again require revisit* at the cad of tfak century ,

The economic sections of the program provide few details oa futarc policy thai go beyond the agenda already set forth in public by Gorbachev. saggesting that loci-term Strategy is sliD being worked oat and may yet be under dispute The asost significant development may be several doctrinal changes that will make it more difficult for roriservaUvca to exploit tbe programarrier to cccnorrac reform

Tkty* tkt Market. The program Opens tbe door io expanding Ibc role of the market should ihe leadership decide to move In that direction Indeed, Gorbachevs5 apeech in leningrad suggests that beolicy ef allowing greater private Initiative ia the service sector. The program calb for the economy to make -fuller" use cf -commodity money reUiiona" andreater rote for supply aad demand and economic levers.ecember <muntttoviei economist described tbb aa ihe most important passage on domestic policy in the program.

Tbe role ol market forces ia the Soviet economy is highly controversial, and any tsgnttacant srsowemeat to rely onroblematic. The widely divergent views tsrouaed by Soviet offlciaii on the proper role of Iha market indicate thai no policy has yet been worked out. Kosolapuv, for example,arrow approach, arguing lhat thenatural part" cf tha Soviet economy and that ibe cxparnion of commcdiiy money relation! should not be viewedpanacea" for all drsordexs In the economy

The formula lion in the program oa comrocdKy-rnciriey relations hews dcaely to Gorbachev's language at the

4 ideology conference, where he called for making -better- use cf commodity-moneyand increasing reliance on economic levers such as "price, production costs, profit- and credit.-remarks were controversial, and other speakers si the conference arguedore restrictivecf the role of crymmodity-moncy relations in theVxJ

At the Concrca* there waa additional supportfor allowing market forces toarger

role In ihe economy:

One of lhe few changes made between tbe draft and lhe final version cf the program broadened the scope cf the discussion of commcdiiy-itxoncy iclalioni along the lines suggested in the public diacussion by reform economlil P. G. Ho rich While the draflprogram said lhat conwnodrty-mooey relations shouldarger role in exchange aapects of the economy, the final vers ion said they shouldarger rok in cachaage. production, and dUtributlon.

- First Deputy Premier Vsevolodorbachev protege,ong taboo by directly calling for an expanded role for the-market within the bounds of the socialbl economy, assuringthatothing to be afraid of.


The term "romatodity-moneyaguebeen used by the Soviets to denote tha uselevers such as prices, credit, profits,profiubilrtj lo better imrseenem centrallome Soviet officials have staled intbe fcrrmilaiicn inforeshadows an expansion of th*Is not clear lhat they mean decentraliredand resource alloc*lion bated on supplycon; ide rations

using the woidorbachev(or raeasure* that could, if liberallyallow market forces toarger role in the economy, eritidlingo view "any change" in the economic mechanism as departingcaahsm.'

Despite bis rhetorical till toward tbe reformist view. Gorbachev has not challenged the legitimacy efcontrol over price letting and resourceHis focui on general themes, rather than specific measures that could galvanize opposition, may reflect aa intent to encourage public debate on controversial issues until he has consolidated his political strength and has the necessary support lo implement more far-reaching measures. Since thj December confe-ence. commodity-money relations have been (be subject of continuing debate in the Soviet press.

The Prieale Sector. The program appears totrong guarantee that private agriculture will continue to play an important role ia tbe Soviet economy. Changes in tbe program also undermine somemade by the conservatives againsf the private sector. The new program:

Drops language (hai called, in1 program, for the eventual elimination of private agriculture.

Adds an implicit endorsement of private agriculture by crediting individual private plots withfood resources.

ew, explicit guarantee of the continuing

- role for kolkhoz markets, where individuals can sell privately produced foodstuffs at prices determined by supply and demand.

tbe door open to private enterprise byonly that the "basic means" of product ion must be sociallyqualification not in1 program.

Sarid official V_

ven tbe advocates of the private sector, did not interpret these changes to mean there would be an expansion of private enterprise. They suggested,(hat consumer services and other smallmight be operated by cooperatives or small brigades in order to stimulate individual initiative, without expanding private ownership. Evidence of movement in that direction includes:

An5 Imniya article that described an experiment in Estonia, inroup cf workers repairs borne television sets, working with space and equipment rentedtate enterprise, and then keepsf the profits. The party programtrong endorsement to Utts type of economiccalling it an "effective means" of developing tbe economy.

Gorbachevs suggestion at the. Congress thatcould be made in the service sector by making greater use of cooperative contracts between groups of individuals, including families, and

Sod at Policy

The programelatively low-key. pragmatic course on social policy, lis avoidance cf key issues suggests that the Gorbachev regime has not yet worked out its policies. Despite tentative signshawing of cultural policy, this section of the program is lifted practically verbatim from1 program, retaining tbe conservative Kress on the need for partly/tent (nrtymindedness).

At the same time, the program shows greaterto the persistence of societal groups' differing interests than was evident in1 program, and it is less optimistic about Soviet progressomogeneous society:

While continuing to urge assimilation,ore flexible on nationality issues and shows greater toleration of cultural differences. It avoids calling for tbe "merging" of nationsontroversial term that came back into use under Andropov) and defers the "complete unity" of Soviet nations to tbehistorical future."

Exhibiting anew semitlviiy to workers' attitudes,esult ofolish crisis, it callsore active role for trade unions in protecting workers' rights than1 program, whichtbe unions' role in boosting production.


tbemc ihal bai been publicly railed bylaces greater mpha*is on the role of than did1 program, by calling for (he parly to "more actively iieanlnate women for leaderthlpt the Congress. Gorbaebev act an example by adding Alexandra Buyukova io (he Secretarial, ma king her the fint woman in the leadership lince the Khrushchev era.

Renccting the Sovieioocem tn recent years (hat the family be atrengtbetvodillar of loeial aubility. the program places greater emphasis on tbe importance of the nudes' family than did (hestressed (he communal up-bringing of children. Tbe final version ofew passage (hat nates children should be responsible for the welfare of their parents daring old age

IV PoK deal System

IV program provides evidence of persistingwithin the regime over the desirability ofup the system to broader partidrsation by Soviet dtirens. Gorbachevs public remarks at the December ideology conference suggest that be favored stronger language (ban was conl* tried in (he drafts of the program and statute. Small changes in (he final version of the program go in tbe direction favored by Gorbachev.

Reform-minded Soviet academics argue thatpopular Input into decisionmaking is necessarypublic apathy and to make economiceffective. In *meeting with


stressed the link bela-een improving reonomkand expanding public partidpaiaon. Some of the specific measures he and other* have advocated includes giving srorker* expanded rights in runninguch as electing managers; givingenterprise* broad autonomy in decisionmaking; allowing local atto decide Issues by referendum; allowing greater freedom In public discussions;information on sensitive issues more available; and making the party and slate election processes more


ovember Kommunlst ankle.thai telT government, can be acbieveel only through the stste. thus rejecting ii strongerthan was used in the program the idea that Ihe state wiU give tip power to organs of self-government.

Gorbachev might havetrongerol espanding public participation in the program:

At the4 Ideology conference, he criticized unnamed officials for arguing thatmeasure! expanding public participation should be put oh* until the distant future.

At the October plenum, where the draft wasbe called for expanding politicalin stronger terms than the program did.

Since he became party leader, top government officials have begun to be exposed to public scrutiny on live television programs where tbey answerphoned la by dtitens.

Changes in the final version of the program reflect ideas advocated by Gorbachev in calling for workers toarger rote in management:

A passage stating that workers' organizations should have increased rights in managing all aspects of production was added.

A passage stating tbat workers should elect lower level managers was abo added. This controversial formuUtion was specifically endorsed by theKosolapov stated that this change had been previously considered by tbe drafting commission but apparently rejected. ,

Revitalizing iht Party. Changes ia the partyat the Congress along with tbeto be aimed at restoring thetbe party leadership (seeovietMedvedev.

claims thai the changes in the Statute are of greater political consequence than those in the program. The major changes include:

The CPSU Statute

The statute It ihe pour's eerie document thai oal-lines Hz organizational structure and operatingSince the first statute was adoptedJ. It has been revisedimes. The rules previously In force were adopted with the party programut they were amended atd Congress6 andh Congressecision to revise the statute In conjunction with the program was taken at an4 Politburo meeting,ommission was appointed to oversee the process.

Party members' immunity before the law isa aew provision holds them responsible for criminal charges before the party and the judicial system. According to Medvedev, party members formerly could not face criminal charges unless they were first expelled from ihe party.

The central party leadership apparently has greater leeway in overseeing the work of party andorganizations.

Stronger bnguage was added that calls for public reporting on internal party business and encourages more open discussion al party meetings

Gorbachev may have run into resistance in an erTort lo include more radical measures in the statute to facilitate the replacementlective leaders and prevent the formation of local party fiefdoens that occurred under Brezhnev. Medvedev maintains that Gorbachev Initially sought provisions to limit the tenure of party officials, but that he backed olf because of tbe strength of the opposition. The statute containsague reference to the need for "systematic renewal" of cadres. Tough provisions in1 statute limiting terms of office of all party officials, including the Politburo, were stronglyby the party rank and file and rescinded atd Conflicts, following Khrushchev's ouster ,

Parly members are given expanded rights ofUnder the new precisions, tbey would be able to critidzc any party organization, even those to which they do not belong.


An urnoccesjful effort was mounted la have Mich provision* added lo Ibr statute Be for. it wu adopted ath Congress. Propeaablrtcily liarii leniire la oeReermneatly featarcd infacially uactioaed -octane- of ibe draft scalane. Threeiaraea of iha lea dire party journalaaatH carried learn aa part af the debate:

migrated Inrutice the teaare of party txtfi-elala to two or threemu

One aaLd that lhe eeeaaloa ofd Congress on this subject needs to be reeonaiderrd.

Aaother called for placiai are limits on party ceocials. i

The diacuaaioa of tbe statute alao revealed pressure for changes in party vexing procedure)sild have nude it easier for the rank aad ale to head leaden to account:

A tetterajor Soviet daily claimed thai secretham becaose party members must cross namesist in public view to vote against aii iteesult, 'far from everyone" who would like toegative votehb letter called for new procedures to make voting: moremi* requiring that ballets be markedeech.

A letter ia ItrwmirntiT went further. It suggested lhat multiple cs-dadstea ma for party posts and lhat manors be decided by secret ballot

On Ihe eve of the Coagreat, the public discussion of thebegan to loach oa highly sensitive baues. The icuiaioo culminated ia iba publicationoundup cf letters ta theebruary Freda. They made the foUowmg points:


Below tha level of the Centralslow-rnoving. Inert. Dabby" stratum ofnrnthv.sis.stic about "radical change" and only cipecti .

All arecial stores and privileges enjoyed by the party elite aaould be diaatnaied

A -tborough purge" cf tbe party apparatus b


Il soon became evident that these issue* divide the party leadershipighly unusual move, which

claim was at the initiative ef Uga-chev. /VaWaebuttal to one cf these letters nary two daysesponse usually ultes weeks These baaat agnia ra rfaced ai the party Cccigrrsa

reported [

j to nave arsprovtd publicatioa ofrxrvda article, Gorbachev, in hb opening speech, ocTered assurarsces lhat there was no needpurge."

orbacbev protege roeafiaallj criudzed one of tbe letters ia /Vwvata. and Ugnehev criticised the ncwrnaper it more gevmrel terms.

contrail. Moscow party boas Boris Yeltsinto endorse tbe Prrrda article by ealling for an end to special privileges for the elite and de aoundng "lhe Inert layer of tirneservers" in the party.

dditional evidence thatrying to restrain pressures for far-reaching reforms of the party. He suraported elimination of ihe requirement thai omoialt be elected by secret ballet in the smallest party oecaniratwm kn hat November /Comma/UK article aad suggested that thb should abo be dorse in larger party crgaaisaiaous. These patjagaaj in the siaiutc were aot ehaaged ia the anal vcrssbn.

Dafeaae PaOcy

While both the IWI and6 programs stress tba party's leadership cf tbe military, the new program placet additional emphasis on lhe party's role in formulating military doctrine and strategicassage has been added thatpoints lo this leading rok.

Thb shift may be intended io define crviuanareas where military questions have takenpoliticalmember captained Ibeout lhat advances in weaponry over theyean have made military doctrine less tmilitary maneuvers and opertise and more onepolicy tnd raMilics.




b ibe tome tentative evidence thai civilrcarccr rote ia shaping ulional security doctrine:

Crnliaa spccislbas hare bee*ererate ta irucnbuag Sonet strategic policy tot foreign aadiences.

Geroache* plant lo0 advis* him on national teciiriiy

Change* in cloctrloal formabtion* in the new program also fuggest thai the emphasis on party direciroo of defense ptfey reflects ibesen-sHiviiybe foreign policy implications of military doctrine. Portions of the program essentially empha-sbee positions that were Aral anicntaled by Brezhnevandmark speech at Tab in6 program:

Present* the achlcrcnicot of "strategic parity" with the United Suteshbtcric" accomplishment thai most be preserved

I* less bouik than1 erogrsm. stating that there snQ be -neither victors nor vinqaished"uclear war.1 program bluntly stated that,orld war. insporislism would be "buried "

Reaffirms the idea, introduced into Soviet military doctrine by Khrushchev, that nuclear war is not inevitable.

The international tfTsirs sections of ihe program, like the dorneaiic portions. *how ihe effects of an attemptaUr.ce divergenthe program open* with an indictment of "imperiatbm" and anLcninbt interpretation of international developmeois that should please party eoeiservs lives Latern contrast, spell out current pcasraea in practical terms that are devoid of harsh rhetoric

hole, tbe foreign policy sections of the program are considerably leas detailed than thoses in dorneaiiche CcrbsetVev regime appears lo be keeping iu cation* open

Easa-Wrsl Relet***

The program reflects ihe growiag rote of arms control and trade in the Soviet view of the Fast-We*tWhile it crnphaiire* the importance ofwith the Unitedt appears to be more optimistic atout ibe prospects for improving tier to Western Europe. Specifically, the btiguage in the new programsupportive of Gorbachev'i efforts tothe West in direct diplomacy, and it bean little trace of the confrontational rhetoric thatwas proposing only three years ago. (In his speech to theJ party plenum,ample,*aid that the program should contain language reflecting the "unprecedented sharpening of tbe struggle between the two world systems."


6 program's scaled-down c> recta'. for the interna ticeiaI scene further indicaic the Oorbachev

regime'sn its domestic agenda. The program

b more cautious about the advance of Commuoism.

aod more respectful of the strength of the capitalist world, thaa1 document At the same lime. Ibe

program contains ao hint thai the Soviei Unioa will pull back from its latrrnilional com mil menu.peech to the Tuilmeo Republicirst Deputy Chief of the CPSU Inlcrnattonal Department Zagladin directly linked domestic economic strength to Moscow'i success in managing relations with ihe Uaited States- lie claimed that one of the reasons for the failure of detente in theas thaiconomic difficulties created an impression of Soviet weakness in (lie West

In contrast, the program avoid* harsh rhetoric and focuses instead on resolving ipecine bilateral issues:

iven bigh priority. Compared with the generalcontained in most of the program. Soviet ncgotbtiag positions are spelled


eipsrrtwn of Fan West tradeAt ihe same time, th* program reflects the impact of US embargoes and internal ions! economicover the last decade, by calling for steps to make the Sonet economy independent from tbe West in "strategically Important" ateni and immune from the effects of crises.


The program endorse* ihe espanded efforts Moscow has been devoting to using pobUc opinion ind political nsovecneot* in Ihe West asmeans of influencing Wcsiem foverninents. Ilew recognition Ihal "mass densocraiic movements" are an important "progressive" force in capitalist countries.'

United States Infor "normal, stable relations" and pointing out that "differences of social systems areeason for tenseros, pects for relations with Western Europe, however, arc Stated in more positive terms, calling for "peaceful rood-neighborly relations."


relatively sober attitude toward competition with tbe West is evtuently basedew appreciation of the strength of the capitalist system. The program discards1 assertion that theearing collapse and concludes (hat capitalism it still "strong and1 program contained aexegesis of the decline of capitalism, describing ilrotting and dying" system "ripe" forand er lling tbb the "age of tbe downfall of imrerialisra" Tbe new program drops much of ihb language and merely says that the crisis of capitalism isnd that itystem that bdoomed."

This change in attitude appears to be controversial. Vadim Zagladin, First Deputy Chief of the CPSU Interna liens! Department, complainedhat "some Marxist tejentists" incorrectly argue that the crisis of capitalism hasore acuteotnmuaiit editorial, publbhed after the draft program was released, described the crisb of capitalism in more dire terms than did the program.

Soviet Bloc

The program, like the Congress itself, sends no clear signal regarding Gorbachev's intentions towardEurope. While (he program accepts tome diversity in domestic policies, i( ensphasues (he need for Blocn foreign policy Blatters. The program'sapproach to internal matters could ease (he way for Soviei experimentation with economic reforms ihit have been tried out in Eastern Europe.'

The new program gives Bloc countries greater leeway in tbeir internal policies than did the Khrushchev program. In his3 speech on the program. Andropov said that, since1 program, the Soviet leadership has recognized that the Internal development of socialbt countries would not be asrm" as once thoughtore "diverse andhe new program places less emphasb on the relevance of tbe Soviet model for other socialist countries and reiterates the legitimacy of various paths to socialbm, which are adapted to tbe "specific conditions of each country."

program leaves no doubt that Soviei diplomacy will increasingly feature differentiated policies toward the Western powers. It underscores tbe multipolarity of tbe West byew formulation, cited by Gorbachev in his report to Ihe Congress, thai refers to three main competing centers of capitalism: tbe United States, Western Europe, and Japan. It also predicts that new centers of economic and political rivalry "ill develop in Ihe Pacific and in Latin America

Tbe importance of the United States to Soviet foreignevertheless underscored inihe program. Although it does not recite policy toward any other country specifically, ii discusses relation! wiih ihe

The program places greater emphasis on Blocin foreign policy matters. While it stresses the need for coordinated policies in the international arena, il stops short of endorsing the view of bard-liners.rule out any incfcrieeideni actions, by:

Calling for "increasingly effective coilaboralion" on foreign policy mailersfurther deepening" of Bloc economic cooperation.

Slating thai coordination in ihe international arena must take account of both ihe "situation andof each Bloc member and ihe "common interests" of the communitya whole.

_ _


the potiilon takenardline article, (hat appeared in the5 Fravda and waa reportedly written by Rakhrnania, Fint Ocpaity Chief of the CPSU Bkc Rets una* Department The article stated that tanall countries cannot pity aa inekpenekwi rate in East-West rraaiicaa. bat the program proposes that (arte and atnall iiateaol their potential or geographic (oration'ote to play la solving ecait problems and curbing (he arm* race.

Dunng (he drafting of tbe program, controversy occurred within the Soviet catabli>hrncB( over the acceptable limita of diversity in thead fordgpolicies of the Soviet Bloc eov ntnes

rruWs article left practically nofor diversity ia internal policy. It lashed oat strongly at unspecified economic reforms lhat would weaker. centra lired control or eipand the private lector. In uncompromtilng teems, tt attacked East European tlpiratkwil for greater independence In foreignby crilidzing "nationalist tendencies" and Ihe potiirao advanced by Hungary aad East Germanytslea- can art as mediators between East and Watt.

- After thb blast, however, ether artietes by wcll-placed Soviet officialsore Reaible tine on diversity within Ihe Bloc.

Inell-placed East Europeanclaimed that Gorbachev's dissatisfaction with tbe programs treatment of Bloc relation was delaying (he publication cf tbe program.

Roy Medveriav claims lhat Gorbachev aad Ugachev did not sec cyaye over this section of the program

The controversy over diversity within ibe Bloc appar-ently li stilt going oj. Tbe drafl program1 line that stated that socialist countries roustuniform state structure" marked by "social -economic and politicaloned-down version of that line waa Inserted ia the final program, aad il called for Bloc countries tosingle type" of economic, political, aad social system. Thb was balancedew passage callingwdl-lnteniioned romparison of viewpoints" within the Bloc


The program givesheoretical framework for dealing with ruling Communist parties (forChina or Yugoslavia) lhai are not part of tbe Soviet Bloc, which the previous program bested.1 program tooknarrow view of the world scmairst system, which implidlly required rcraagnrtien cf Moscow'i sararctnacy. sad left no rueun for ruling parties to take aa ijtdcpcssdcnt path, la contrast, tbe new program dbtlngabhes between the smallercommunity" (Soviet Bloc countries belonging to CEMA and the Warsaw Pact]and the broader "io-daust system" (all Communist countries)

The new program alsoess dectrtaaire tnd more prsgmxtic approach toward ramruhng Cnmmu-nist parties. It nates that the party ia each country should "autonomously" determine iu own strategic course and addi that "differences" over ipcciftc issues should not stand In tbe way of cooperation. Thb tolerant stance was rdnforced in the final version cf the program, whichassage critidring divergent views in the World Communist Movement that was contained in tbe draft prog ram

The new programar less optima tic view cf the prospects for the "International Workersnoting the "complex' problems lhat It faces, rather ihtn lhe "favorable" situation described In1 progrtm. In what may bean effort toommon denominator lo unite disparate pa nice, tbe program eschews calling for support cf specific Soviet policies,eoeocee* common general goals, such as preventing world war aad abolishing "vestiges of colonialism1

Tbe Third WoeW

The newar less ssngairw aboutprnapects for Soviet ideceases in the Third World. While underscoring Moscow's commitment to conaoUdating it* position in tbe Third World, it accords the Third World less attention than dad1 program. In contrast, the Khrushchev program, written when decolonization was widespread, eiuded confidence that the anilcolonial posture ef the newly irtdependeni nates would bolster the USSR in its global competition with Washington

The new pregram abo suggests ihe leaderships new sensiilviiy to the Ismiis en* Sovietbetiing "soesalblhe Third World While tipreaaac -profound sympathy- far Third World rialhecn* that ihey will lam to create ihe material aad lechaical bateocSsInt society -mainly (broach their ownoaoow. ihe program states, will give aid "to the extent of itsn contrail. In hb discussion of the procram at1 coogrcss. Khrushchev rnterpreied ibe program's ttslenseat of theBleraalionslw daty" to tneaa that the Soviet Uoioo would actively aaabt in the development of ovajor ocooomie projects in the Third World.

The program's stince on (he Third Worldeio"lintneia hy Sovietand specialiili of ine pace of teetal change la the Third World and ihe effect rveneat of Soviet aaaiaiancc ia winning reliable alba. In the. Soviet academics began to write that Ibe trend toward tocialitm in ibe Third World wax slowing. Tbey now argue thai Third World countries are unlikely to follow the aocislbt path unless (he Soviet Union canore attractive model Tbe language used in ibe Third World soclkeihift ia official taaakiag that Andropov first outlined in hb speech on the program to theJ plenum, when he said that the Soviet Union would five economic assbiancc to developing countries to the "extent" of its ability.

The discussion surrounding ihe program suggests thai ihe draft papers ewer two different philosophical ipc*cache* within the party lo scaring the problems facing tha Soviet Union Without challenging the bask auumptioes oa which Ihe Cornrnuabtased, Gorbachev appears to be willing toroad range of political and eeorkomlc options to Strengthen ibe Soviet state. He seems io be meciing resistance from powerful ocatiervstive lend* la ibe party, who oppose majer inaovatioos oa Ideological grounds, tpparemly bocaaie they fear that reforms couldelicate baUnce that allows the regime lo maim, tn control.pokesmen, such asargue that any significant relaxation of central control runs the risk of unleashing an uncontrollable process that couldtheim of the system. They point lo the recent crab ia Poland and past upheavab tn Czechoslovak is and Hungary to make their case

Given ihe cautious nature of Ibe Soviei political kstdcrihap for ibe pastears, healthy sleptis likely to remain among the party rank aad file about the need for any far-rcachiag changes. Most party ofltciaU who are gaining positions of influence spent their formative years In an environment that rewarded conservelbm and caution, not bold innovation. As Gcrbachev's housee leaning progresses,ecoming evident thai (be conservatives' political base extends well beyond the dimiaishing circle of Brcrhnev holdover.;

I truncations

Althoughmprint on the rsrogrsanb clear, the political compromises andquestions evident in these documents suggestregime has not yet resolved someissues. Gorbachev's cmpbatb so far has beenthe existing system week better. Theto other indications, however, that themay be open lo more substantialthe long term, should its ambitious goalsIndeed, well-placed Soviei eeooomiia havethat far-reaching economic reforms

are being drawn up for cossible introduction within two or three years

Many of their leading spokesmen arc not members

of the old guard but men of the same generation as Gorbaebev. Kosolapov. forear

younger thaa Gorbachev,ra.dc suffer whoecent series of articles stsaachlyihe conservativeven younger.

1 heir continued political vitality was evident inFebruary reelection of Ukrainian partyShcherbrrskiy and Ksrakh partyKunayevheconservative in the Politburo; Kunayevold Brethnev crony. In recent months,is have said that Gorbachev wanted

to remove both leaders




r n

Despite ihe continued influence of entrenchedaehev's dcmonst/stedtiling net* lo marcuildi and |C1 hh programuggest that tbe prospect* (or bead initiatives thosdd mot be eadcrcstiesaicd:

Key change* la ihe program appear to undermine conservative arguments (gainst reform, and tbey put the party scniardy oa lecord ai seeking new sedation* to chronic problem*.

.* ran.

Tenia lire sigat base appeared that "lecrod"Ligacbe> may be drawing on thesewithin ihe party to bottler hbolitical ally ofpublic debates over the program and statutespeeeb at .he Congress suggest thst he took aposition on several Issues. Roy Medvedevwell-placedhave both

claimed, moreover, that trgachevoreposition during the internal [arty discussions Oa severalgacher'i view appears to have prevailed. Such postariag in inner party circles could be aa effective lUategy for building aa independent political base and could set the stage for major battles ia the years ahead

Most major policy shifts io Russian and Soviet hntory have not reflected tbe prevailing views of the political elite; insiead, change has been initiatedtrong and determined leader. Gorbachev seems to be tbe kind of leader wbo could lake such inftiative. if he concludes that be canood case for more radical measures and that he can overcome resist* nee

Original document.

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