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Proposed Action: Expand USprOgraw
lapact on South Africa: Would beef up existing programs and Increase us ties to affected individuals but, in our view, would be unlikely to win nany points for the United States among blacks in general. Growing anti-Aaerican sentinent among South African blacks reflects the perception that the United States supports Pretoria's "neo-apartheid" policies that change the inage but not the reality of racial oppression. Increased us assistance to blacks under the current system reinforces the radical view that the us governnent is tacitly aiding SAG efforts to cocpt blacks. apid infusion of US aid targeted at blacks could overwhelm the already extended managerial
'y or .ftj Mack business and conmur.LtyPretoria's recent crackdown on antigovernment activity also raises problems for possible us ventures since many community groups are affiliated with the United Denocratic Front, whose local level leaders havepecific target for detentions. Finally, the SAG's toleration of specific prcgrans targetted at blacks already has been strained; increasing them will be viewed as more "foreign meddling" in internal affairs and could well be rejected by Pretoria, especially if these measures are announced in conjunction with an econonic sanctions package. |
Impact on Region: Hone, unless aid programs of neighboring eo-r. tries are reJjced tc accomodate increased funding for South Africa.
Impact on the United States and Its Allies: In addition to normal budget problems, increased US or Allied assistance targetted at blacks under the current system always risks the perception, both domestically and internationally, that efforts to help blacks, without ending apartheid, amounts to little more than helping blacks adjust to continued white rule. |
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Proposed Action:dbuilGn,agcd in antiapartheid unrest, part icy Ute areas of housing, education, health, and business development
Impact on South Africa. Unrest-related destruction ln the townships stems largely from attacks by radicals which probably would continue despite US efforts to rebuild schools and other governnent buildings. Rapid urban growth is straining the already inadequate health, housing, and educational facilites and probably can be alleviated only by longterm development programs, themselves possible only if unrest subsides, which is unlikely. US assistance in such areas as nousing' undoubtedly would be seen by many blacks as American collaboration with Pretoria to make apartheid more acceptable. Pretoria, increasingly about "outsides unlikely to permit any crashai* '. progran forobviously undercuts the potential impact on South African blacks. |
lopact on Region: Probably some resentment from neighboring states where living conditions often fall short of those for urban blacks in South Africa, pjjj
Imapct on the USllies: Would require dranatio increases in funding to achieve even marginal results in theoordinated effort by the US and Its Allies, however, would likely allow greater funding and possibly defuse opposition from past critics of US projects. |
Proposed Action: Marshall- type ?lan fer ScjtliTi Hfrica
Incact on South Africa: Strong demonstrations of Western support for neighboring black-ruled states would have significant psychological tnpacts on Pretoria, which also counts on its neighbors' dependency on South Africa to stave orf sanctions, in the short tero, however, significant progress toward reducing dependence on South Africa is unlikely. Moreover, any improvement in neighboring econoaies prooabiy would raise their deoand for South African inports. We estimate that South Africa earns2 billion fron all of Its regional economic ties,
Impact on Region: Depends on nature and extent of assistance. Major infrastruotural projects, such as upgrades of rail lines or port facilities, could take years to have any significant inpact and could be derailed by
toiia turmoil. The Southerncrdination Coni'wi wiice--loriaed0 by nine southern and eastern African nations with the goal of reducing economic dependence on Southreceived donor contributions or commitments exceeding t' billion, but is further than ever fron achieving Its goals, in our view. Poor economic policy choices, drought, and low world prices for the region's major commodity experts have coabined to boost economic dependence on South Afrlca^Western donors, and policy advice froa organizations such as the IMF.
Inpac'. on US and Allies: An effective Marshall-type plan wouldassive multi-year effort. For example, in the extreme caseouth African blockade against its neighbors, balance of payments assistance to compensate for the loss of all exports currently funneled through South African ports would totai nearlylllion per year.
Original document.
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