NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA REVIEW: THE LEVANT AND NORTH AFRICA IN 1986

Created: 12/6/1985

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Near East and South Asia Reviewer

Special Issue: The Levant and North Africa

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93

Warning Page

Neir Las! and Soulh Alia Re-ie-

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S(v. ijt Itiur Tkt Lfaxl ami Yorfft

atl: ShifKag AUiiocn. Odoriat Rlolrim

Protpeciioaleicence of Arab state* lo take tbe lead in addreuiflg the biucs that beiet the region appeared to recede during roottad. although tone regional icnuoa* may cue io the coming year, hidden agcndaicooiinue to inhibit an erTedl'e Aub approach to regional iuucm

Despite nwvei that had eneourigcd Arab moderate* to believe iba< PLO Chairman Arafaterioui about seekingrael. Paleitinian ted will activity incicated iignifkanily during tbrad Arafat'* mbcakulation of hit ability toraca policy left PLO preatige in rains.

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Syria: Exploring Option

>d demonstrated Utthdnc'Tnuatic*on front lhc nefwiK<ii probliffiibatMin. Arabtowufd necotiatiom *iih Israel, military preparedness, ind thcut cvcr-ihifiiagin ihc Araband thc magnitude oT ihc issues1 ma" ,Bai of hii goats "ill remain elgsive uauapv-

-* at am

Lrtanc* OH War Without fid IMA

Lebanon moved closer to political dissolution andduring the IOth year of5 atCWtinued to battle throughout most of thc countryMi

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overthrow of President Nimeiri has unleashed politicalrormse to keep Sudan in flu* over theyear, but it* senior

a irauiiKM to civilian rale l; net year, despite the lack of preparedness for elections on all tide*,

libya: Qadktfi Under Siece

Ai unprecedented combination of risingirKj foreign chalknges coaled to pot Qadhafl at baynd. if there is no chance fn current conditions, his chances of surviving another year are (title better than even, aaftj**

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mid-dccadc all radiations are that PresentonsoUditioc hb potHMn and coram,ut bit mart on ihc countiy. bui his cffom io promote private initiative and decenwaiir* ih* burcaucr acy ate link more than economic ami politicalmm*

Cfbeiaad Pofiticl I

ycai hat been one of unprecedented chilkoses for the governmeni of Pieaident Bourguiba and Prime Minister Miah ihai have reveakd the weaknesses of the regime and its inability to resolve socul and economic problems, and iruncaverinc -anticipation of Bourguiba't deathsharply Caul Ihe covernment's ability lo acs in the coming year duBbM

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onths in oftce, Mauritania's Preside* Taya appears weak and vaoTUllne in lacklxg his country's severe economic and political problems, and his abilityop- wllh these issues Is complicated by eateinil picuurcs to take ildes in Ihe Western Sahara dtipote. If be cannot thow progress in the next year, he may not survive. Naannanf-

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Articles

Middle East: it Shifting Alliances. Enduring Rivalries (

oakscence of Arab stale* to late Ihe lead in addressing the issues that bevel the teg km appealed to recede during mostne Arab leader* complaint early in tbe year thairc "loo many walties" going on in tbe region proved lo be prophetic inagap.

inds, con&kls of national iniercsi. and ibe intractabilily of the issues contnbutcd to the high degree of fluidity in the relation! among Middle Faiiern naieaS. Utile could be agtccd upon in ihe multilateral meetings called during the year, and Arab League ciToru to case tensionsregional rivals made link headway.{aafjsa.

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Develop menu during ibe past fewyrian-Jordanian rapprochement. Arafai'i Caito naiement. and movement toward an Arab summii meeting inthe possibility daring lhe coming year of an eating in some regional tensions Broad agreement it Uacly, however, only at tbc coal of blurting tbc hard issues Hiddea agendas wnln we to inhibit an effective Arab approachcaoluiMn or tbc Arab-Israeli conflict and will"tribute to lhe reappearance of enduringi*alric

Despite the emergence of numerous claimants, the long-term outlook tor effective regional leadership in Ihe Arab world it poor. Regional conflicts arc multiplying. No current or prospective head of state has thc political resources to put together an Arab consensu! oralority powerful enough to act or to maintain its ranks against defection when politically controversial decisions must be reached.

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Multilateral Diplomacy and lis Limitations Control,-hi Arab League meetings lasi spring and summer indicated ihe depth ofdivision* within the Arab world through mostJ. Thirteen Arabministers and Ave deputy miariteis met in Tunis io laic March for long andsessions oa tbc Iraa-lrao. war. the Jordan-PLO agreement, aad other issues sMKBtflflMawMot i'* deJcgateiecond ministerial meeting called in Tunis in Juneollow up meeting or ibe permanent representsttves in July produced sharp recriminations among ihc participants and publx complaints that the meetings had leftabs even nrorc drvkkd^VMao

Thecitraordinfiy summit meeting called by the Arab League in Casablancauguii served only to confirm (he client of Ihe splits within Arab ranks. Tbe League failed to endorse the Jordsn-PLO agreement. Thc summit meeting produced signs of open disagreement among the -ery parlies le> lhe accord, with PLO Chairman Arafat refusing lo accept King Hussein's poittsoaesolution of the Palestinian ruse weak) be achieved only through hard, but peaceful bargaining final language on ihe Irat-lraq war reflected ihc continuing refusal of several slates so support Irao. against Iran. ^usMBfjaaj among the diplomats, delegates, and futtcttoBarrcshe conference was one of futility.

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rTtyit b) member stale* to KirduK regionalnder the ag>|wcc^cafvc failed lo make hcadwat ihtuugh mem of ihe

lied

Arab Moscraies and Their Radical Oppoarnli Throughout muchS. Ibe Arab wojj dil Into moderate arid radical factionsT

PcTcloprocnis aflcr midyear indicated thai lhealignments amounted to consider*lea*suggested by the rhetoric that accompanied

The apparent poll rl rathin ihc Arab world durinc lhe pasiprevious such ckawiei -was short lived. In ihc pan twoanu -and Amman haveeeoneiiiatico

undertaken ia ibe cowtest of aa Arab_

Leajoe-Sponsored mediation effort-!

in while strains

among the -radicals persist, as ibe Suspension of Iranian oil shipmentsyria and Libyan expulsions of Syrian worker* contribute to new frictionsa**V

TbePros peels for tbe Coming Year

Tbe AraVlsridi'coalnkl and tbe rossst-Iiiy of peace rsecmuiions remain al the lop of the Arab amenta, but the pfospecis for an elTeetite regionul response to Opportunitieschieveartial resolution are dim. Am Arab summit meeting held6 probably would resultonsensus restating the positions taken at Fea in IM2 and favoringnternational conferenceeans to moveuccesaful Arab summit mectbsg. however, alnsost ceruialy would be followed by Use dispatchashington and .of an Arabi

f inter-Arab conflict*irics occupies in" sfcate of ihe lime and effort* of Arab League member states In additionhe Iran-trag war, the League "ill have to con lend with Algerian-Moroccan tensions over ihe Weaiern Sahara; heightened friction between Libya and mosieighbor* (Algeria. Tsnhia. Egypt- Sudan, and others arc involved in disputes withnd lhc conflict between Syria or in Lebanese surrogates and tbc Palestinians in Lebanon tunnnpu

Ihe longer term, Ihe prospects for the emci|cnce of effective regional leadership are poor. With few exceptions, political institutions ia the Arab world arc weak. Even apparently stable regime* arc highly vulnerable to domestic "co/iimuencics" (hai restrict policy change on what tbe Arabs call ihe "fateful" issues At th* regional level, the ideological dimeauon uf interstate conflict hasyear's polarization, for example, pitted Ba'lhlll Syria,bya. and fundamentalist Iran against the IUsli;miie monarchy of Jordan, Ba'ibm Into, and republicantbe source* of regional tension and rivalry have multiplied along with lhe

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ip*-

PLO: An Opporluniij Losi?

II

CSyria: ExpfetW Options n

On foreign policy issues. Assad huillingness to make tactical accommodations with bis adversaries, primarily lo win sbort-tcim political and economicut also to abed Sytsa's reject ion ist image. Despite Assad's apparent nCalbility. aimed at establishing Syria as (be pivotal regional power, be has not been able to initiate policies that would win bread Arab support.esult, leadership of the Arab world continues to elude Assad, and Syrian goals arc pursued largely through coercion and intimidation, sanaaf-

The Syrian economy continued Its dismal performance, so Peri og from mcosnpeteni managers, corrupt oAcaab. and ibe malaise and inefficiencyentrally planned system One bright spot this year was the naming of an economic refotaser at Minister of Economy and Foreign Trade. Despite thc implement at ion of some pragmatic reforms.economic distress will not be easily overcome in Ihe near term.

5 President Hafti al-Assad demons! rs ted fresh determination lo confront tbcof Lebanon. Arab moves toward negotiations with Israel, military preparedncii. and the economy. Auadasterful uctician picpared to ciplorc all options that would enable Stria to play tbe central role It covets la Inter-Arabespiteonsiderable political skiDs. ever-shiftint alliances In the Arab world aad tbc magnitude of tbe issues lacing Syria mean that most of his regional goals will remain clash

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I

Ci-.ii war wiihou, r)

moved closerln.cal dissolution and territorial partition duringh jeiir of civil waractional militia* continue to bailie throughout most o* thend initiate aimed ai poluical reconcilation have (alien victim to Ibe endemtc violence. Extremistsides use terrorism i0 discourage moderates fromommon ground. Despile increasing Syrian efforts to subitirc the country. Lebanonolitical and security minefield foe US intercsis.dnajaap-

Politkal disagreements fettered among leaders of each of Ihe four major Lebanese religiousDruze. Shia Muslim, and Sunni Muslim. EaCEISetctTnUiecl to maximize its parochialtetms of power and teetmiy-at ihc expense or Ihe Lebanese Government and Ihe national political system. Political loyalties in Lebanon revolve around family, village, and religious sect. Most Lebanese fed no allegiance to the central government, which has become praclwallj irrelevant.

The Lebanese Army units uodei governmentfew remainingorce no larger than either the major Shia or Druxe miliiias. These Army units control only pan of lhe Green Line, ihc area around Ihe Presidential Palace in East Beirut,mall pan of Ihe Alayh ridge southwest of ihe Palace. Much of the Lebanese Army it stationed in areas over which ihe Lebanese Governmeni has no control. The 1st Brigade is in ihe Bekaa Valley and is directed and supplied by Syria. The loyalties of most troops of Ihe Ind Brigade, stationed in Tripoli, appear divided between Syria and the focal anti-Syiian militias. The 6th Brigade in West Beirut is loyal only io Shia sectarian leaders.

Tbc Risingide

The increasingly milium Shia Muslim eommum'iy pressed its challenge to ihc Lebanese Government and thc Christianshiathe

fundamentalist Hizballah movement and the more modem* Anutto grow in power and influence in relation to the other majorroups. They arereater political and economic role more commensurate withnumbers.HlnMP

Division* sharpened Ibis year within Ihc Shia community as Iheee0U. reformers and lhe Hizballah fundimentalist revolutionaries clashed over tcmiory and Ihc right to speak for themal adherents generally seek to alter tbe existing political system to accommodate Shiahile lhc Hizballah radical* advocate the violent overthrow of Ihe presentand Ihc establishment of aa Iranian-siyle Islamic republic. Thc Israeli withdrawal from mosl of southern Lebanon last spring WnVed an intense Struggle between lhe (wo Shia militus uajaxaau*,

Amalarger organization, but the Hizballah network this year grew dramatically in Size, sophistication, and effectivenessolitical party

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illlia: lhe Hirballah published iuoliticalh February and theneries of public cemonitratioas in Shia areas of Lebanon thai allracicd large crowds. Hixballah fighters bare almost completely supplanted Amal mifctiarneo in the Bckaa Valley, operate virtually at will throughout West Beirut, and are expanding theirouibero Lebanonillage-by-village

Syria bat moved to stem tbe Hizballah fundamentalist tide by bolstering the Amal militia and preparing it to serve as the primary imiryjpi-ii ni* Syrian policy in Lebanon.

refuse to compromise on Muslim demands for pwitfcal and military reforms. Chrbtiam. who nowinority in Lebanon, fear that concessionshe Mfslims would erode the Christian power base and threaten the security of tbe Christian heartland north of Beirut. Hardliners in Ihc Lebanese Forces militia and lhe Phalange Party rebelled last spring against what they saw ns the capitulation of somePresidentMuslim and Syrian demands. Mavnaav

Despite their intransigence. Christian kadcts are slowly coming to grips with the need lo deal svtih Syria. Key political and militia officials, including the new Lebanese Forces chief Elie Hubayqa. began traveling regularly lo Damascus this yearegotiate with tbe Syrians. Hubavqa thenyrian-sponsored peace plan in November, although it fetl apart within weeks because erf opposition within the Christian and other confessional communities. ubayaa and other Christians hopehow of submissionyria will persuade the Syrians to guarantee Christian prerogatives inBsssfjafc

Suonb oa Ibe Defemirc

Most leaders of the Christian community, which

dominates the Lebanese Government and ihc Army.

Sunnio sought Syrian assistance in preserving tbetr traditional position in the poliikal system. The Sunnb. however, cannot compete wiih

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other confessional troop* because iheyo effective rnllitiau Traditional Sunni leader* also fell inctcasingly threatened by the growthundamentalist Sunni movement in Tripoli. Beirut, nod Stdon. This pro-Iranian radical movement is spearheaded by the Tawhid militia, which spent most5 battling Syrian-backed militia; in Tripoli.

TbensoUditlng Cain*

Drue leader Walid Juinbiatt. bead of thcSocialist Party (PSPi mdrtia. succeededcoaso&datiat Drute control over his community's

he* nil ad in Ihc Shad* anouauint south of Beirut The Israeli withdrawal from ibe Side* area lan (print gave Druxe militia menAo*nce to move agami thc few remaining Christian villages on Ihe per>phcr> of ihe emerging Dnire "canton" in ihe Shuf.hristian eiodus IBaakantL

Ircrodtm and Turf Battles

Lebanonattleground foi trigger-happy militias for whom lighting hasay of life.iolence erupted at various times of the year inll part* of ihe country. Lebanese Army uiiii* addilitiamen cichanged fire repeatedly on the Alayh ridge south of Beirut Southern Lebanon witnessed regular fighting between Amal and

Hizballah gunmen, between'Amil and Palestinians, and between ibe Israeli-backed Army of Sooth Lebanon and practically everyone clve. Stdoni: iIi experienced overmonth of heavy Hied fighting a* Muslim, Palestinian, and Christian mllillai snuggled for control of the city and Ui environs. Pro-Sytlan. inti-SytUn. and Palestinian raciioos reduced much of Ihe city of Tripoli io rubble during agestrnded battle that I* tied*

Beirutawless, heavily coatcalcd war rone mi which lutf battles erupt almost daily. Anifleij duels are common between Chri.tian Last andest Benut During the past year, clashes occurred between vMluatly every combination of CM Be rut miliiiai Clashes sometimes arose from disputes over whkh fiction controlledit reel, but as often a* not they resulted from personal vendetta* orat rmlitu cbeckruintt ihti

sparked widerhree-day battle between PSPand Amal militiamen in November occurred after Ibe Druze UkxI iu remove Lebanwe flags from Amal-held buildings-ininar that tlie US Embassy described-futile, even by Lebaneseirrfi

Terrorismact of life in Lebanon. Musi of the sectarian tactions vtcacd car bombs, assassinations, and kidnapingi as an acceptable form of warfareargets of major car bombings included ihe home of Shiai kadcr ladtallah in West Beirut. Druze and Christian miliiia center, on both sides Of Ihe capital, several Christian-owned lopermarkewonference of Chrnttanin

Beirut, mosquci and diuretics in Tripoli- und numerousd Attn} of South Lebanon facilities in ihc south

Lebanese terrorism conlinocssClrtniKspecially Westerner* Lsirembts kidnaped four more Americans, lour French, and three British citiicns5 Sunni fundament alms seised Tour Soviet diplomats io try ioia to end it* iiege of Tripoli in October. Shia mrliiant* hackedune, resulting in ihe death of one Americanwo-week hostage emit in Beirut, where Ihe absence of any central authority enabled thc teirorisis to operate with

Bleak Lcooomie Picture Lebanon's economy remains depressed wiih link chance of improvement in lhe coming year. Afierears ol civil wir, the economy is probably operating at about half of Its picwgi level. Much of Lebanon's cconomk infrastructure has been damaged or destroyed, many of its raced'skilled peopk have emigrated, and lhe country it divided into sectarian loncs of influence.dJaHBa ii

i4la the las! year, infiaiion has more than doubled to 'abouterccM. ihe Lebanese pound has dec*posted by over J5 percent, and government debt has grown by over one-third. On the plus side, the Central Bank

'"hii been able to rebuild iis foreign eichange reserves by refusing to fund tbc government's foreign exchange deficit, and agricultural production has siancd to recover from the disruptions caused by the Israeli invasion:

The government continues io finance much of the country's economic acimty through deficit spending ll pumps money into lhe economy by may of its binned payrollew public works projects even though government revenues cover lest lhanercent of expendituresesult, governmcni debi has grown from6 billion at Ibe cad* to aboutlion in September The deficit thi* year mayillion So far. ihe

government ha. had no reobktn fundingLebaitcx bank* hair few local(3)

The economic picture remains gloomy, bui people base sufficient food, and considcrabk moncs remain, in circulation The mil itcontinuej. funds, puasibts totaling as much0 million dunng some month- Illegal tiade with Syria increases com me raj! actisil)5onth and provides income Remittance* from Lebanese abroad still continue,0onth. Lastly, ihe ilkjgal and lucrative drug trade continues unencumbered bs^yrian or Lebanese meat interference gaasjpa

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Hie Lebanese economy cannoi recover until Ibe securityrought under control. This, however, wouldolitical accommodation between t'ie contcpding faeiions that is unlikely in the near iVure. In ihe meantime, ihc ccoeoms will fores ion al ill presently stagnani leveL and the goveromeni will have io continue so resort io borrowing, eventually genrriilng greater inflation and further worsening the situs lion.

Outlook aad lasplkaiicns for the United Stales

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We see no evidence thai ia* Lebanese factions are prepared to make peace FuncUmental pcailkal and economic problems have worsened during the pan year,ecade of civil war has generated often insurmouniabk personal ammoaliies beiwcen sectailan leaders Many younger Lebanese who have come of age during tbe tarrnoil of war have no concepthich all rcbgitjus groupstogether peacefully under one government. Despite the genuine war weariness thai pervades much of society, tbe ethnocentric civit wardHtmaliiy remains 'issnassy-

l-veft if the mainstream tclig>Mii communities could

asis for cooccration. Ihe increasingly inftoeotial Islamic fandamcnlaltttt and other exiremists would seek lo disrupt any poliiical

kCitkmen' Tbc fundjmcntativi movement is likely to continue lb flourish in thc anarchical environment of Lebanon. Desoiic ibeir relative's- small numbers in rdation io otber giouos. lhe fundamentalists are dciermincd and caoablc ofpoiler role In any Lebanese political reconciEia(ion.<aaauj|ha>

our judgment, Lebanon will remain Inartitioned country for the coming year. Tbc Christians and Druze will teatously protect their respective "cantons" in thc mountains north and south of Beirut. The Sbias will consolidate their areas of control in West Beirut, southern Lebanon, and thc Bckaa Valley. The Lebanese Government will remain largely powcrlesi. existing in name only. Violence between factions almost certainly will

Continuing violence and instability in Lebanon affect US interests because of the potential spillover into regional politics. Syria remains preoccupied withettlement in Lebanon, and its success or failure In dotrtc so affects its relationship with Iran. Israel, and (be Unitedother slates that Syrian leaders view as panidpants in Lebanese.

sdr-dcsiruetiue tendencies of the Lebanese civil war are likely to cripple US policy Initiatives aimed at reconciling lhe waning factions. US oftldats working in Beirut, moreover, will remain at high risk both from terrorism and from the random shelling that hasact of life in Beirut'

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Sudan: Facing an Uncertain Future

overthrow of President Nimeifi lias unleashed political loree* thateep Sudan In flu*the neat year. The tetue* oflkrrs who ousted Nimctn have provided weak, inei per* need leaderihiphe inter up government the* ere* tedher appeal willing to boeiot their promiseransition lo civilian rule byear. despite Ihe lack of preparedness lor election* on all side*

We believe there is an almost even chance that election* and Ibe transition to civilian rule win take6 There tt aa equally street* prospecteconstituted interim regime "ill head onower until Sudan is preparedold elections, damnsnrcslconomic grievancesosily defeat to southern rebels, the Army probably would prefer toivilian or another interim regime dernonstraic ill inability to run Sudan before mewing to take over. Younger general* and middle-grade cAcers. who mightoup, probably could prcridc stronger leadership to settle the southern insurgency and impose needed economic (cforms.

Khartoum's stability will continue to be severely strained by internaloth between and within it* civilian aad military esetoeais The south and ihc economy will provide lhe caber major challenges io Stability. Khartoum's acquiescence lo labor demands for wage increases and its reluctance to increase prices are likely to result in higher inflation and growing shortages that could spark unrest neat year. Meanwhile, Ihc failure of thc dialogue between ibe government and the southern rebel* ensure* the prospect of intensified insurgent attacks ihat will severely test thc Army's loyally.

The regime's stOfiallgned foreign policy, which has si tamed US-Sudanese relations, probably will continue under likely successor governments. Khartoum will maintain its Libyan connection and pursue improved ties to the USSR and Ethiopia as a

lactic to reduce support lo ihe insurgent* inhc decline in support lot IS pjsiitom in regional forum* is likely to con

continue to count on US military'and economic aid.

The Interim Regime's Scar rcara ,

Senior Sudaneseby civil

general strike over price hikes, and increased

insurgentPresident Ninscsii las!

April, afterears in power. The senior command's

tenure of power was motivated largely io preempt a

takeover by younger officers

Tbe former President's policies, spcdllcaily his Imposition of Islamic law and thc polilical division of the south into tnrec regions. heightened ethnic ditfcrcitces, cauung growth in lhe then Libyan- and Eiruiocon-baeicd southern rtOesino that shut down major cs! aad water oevesopmessi protects. Fur User more, already poor economic conditions were made worse by shortages of food and energyerious drought thai contributed lo

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Thc Transitional Military Council's promise io return ihc country to civilian rule6 underpins Its legitimacy andajor reason ihat the regime has survived despite weak, ineapcfienced leadership. In our new. Khartoum is bard pressed io respond effectively to the vswifbctisg demands from Islamic northerners aad non-Muslim souiberneiv from ihe military aad en,lunnd from international creditors and Sudanese domestic economic needs Deci.ionmiling i* further confused by the Military Council's coniinning struggle with lhe civilian Cabinet. Nevertheless, divi*ions among opponenit give thcurability it has failed to tarn on lis 'nussur-

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The ffcct political atmosphere in Khartoum and the regime'! nonaligned foreign policy allow oppononu io take advaaugc of Ihc existing political instability. Weakened coumerinldligenceby tbc abolition of lb* Slat* Securitymakes Khartoum more vulnerablenternal and eternal subversion. Radical groups such as the Communists. Ba'thisis. and Libyan-backed Sudanese Revolutionary Committees operate openly and receive foreign tupporVand some arc building (heir own miCtias.orking hard to penetrate Sudanese society, and an increased number of agents from radical Arab and Muslim states arc operating in

DometiUcene. Preparation for erections scheduled next springajor focus for the regime. The Military Councilonsensus on (he interim constitution and an election law onlyong and arduous debate with its civilian counterparts. More thanolitical parties have declared themselves since Ihe coup. The regime now must whittle down Ibeir number by pastingpoliticol panics law granting official recognition to run in elect

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andful of the panics have any following, and most of these have yet lo reestablish ihc cohesion and structure tosi under Ihe former regime. The political spectrum of Ihe parties ranges from the far left to the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood. Tbc Ansarlimnia Party, ihc largest Muslim party, probably couldajority if it succeeds inoslit ion with its historic rival, thc

Khaimiyyah's Democratic Unionist Party. If ihe . -Ansar and Khatnuyyah parties cannotoalition, elections may be postponed by the Military Coundl. particularly since tome members of lhe council hare begun in question the wisdom of holding elections next spring.

The regime's survival depends on the Army't royalty. Several coup attemptsutiny of southern KOups in Kbailoum failed to overthrow thc government,he military has become further politidred. however, and seems more than ever lo reflect lhe numerous divisions in Sudanese society. Reports of varying reliability indicate that there is extensive coup plotting at all levels of (he armed forces, including collusion between key commanders and younger generals on the Military Coundl. Many officers and enlisted men are critical of tbc Military Council's lack of leadership, its failure to control civilian opposition activities, and its inability io rests! (he pressures of lef list-dominated unions. They also nurse resent menu over slow promotions, poor pay. aad righting in the south -rafajpfc

Policy. Khartoum hasore nonaligned foreign policy since ihe coup, largely io avoid ihc perception of being under foreign influence andechanismndercut external support io th* insurgents. This policy gives both Libya and th* Soviet Union an opportunity to increase thdrhe expense of the United Stales and

SeeteT

Egypt Khartoum Ii likeljalue ilt rapprochement wiih Libya at long a> Tripoli itluim from direct military support to the lauirgcnii Libya. nvKerncr. bai won influence In Khartoum b> providing cconuo-.ic and military aid. Khjr.oum believes ihai ihc Soon Unionu (shorn to withdraw ill crucial support lo ihc rebels The regime will continue lo seek improved relations with the USSR and spate pans for old Soviet equipment

Sudan's relations wiih Cairo and Washington hive beenKhanoum't efforts toeutral foreign policy, especially the rapprochement with Libya Relation* with Cairo have improved in recentut US-Sudanese rclationi have further aourcd. The regime appears to Lack the political will awd abilityddress US dernxodiipcl Libyan and PLO lenoritu in Khanoum and to control ibe anti-US lone in the trial of ihe former Sudanese Vice President for his pan In the exfiltration of Ethiopian Jcw*>

Nevertheless. Khanoum continues to say it values relations with Washington and view* US aid as crucial. Sudan, however, supports the United States less frequently on regionalJisues. and military

Tht Eretomf. Economic cottdiiions remain chaotic despite an increase in aid since the coup. Stocks ofhelp fromconsumer goods have been replenished, but famine relief nimpeded by Inadequate transport and bureaucratic inertia. The war in ihe southinancial drain that absorbsay. In addition, (he insurgency continue* to ieopardiie Sudan'sconomic future by blocking the development of vital oil and waier resources.'tusunBT--

Sudan's financial status remains unsettled The IMF hat agreed to endorse conditionally Khartoum's limited economic reform package and not declare

Sudan ineli;ibtr farnd .1 rrcai* loialingQ millionivkti paid.ce to icpu>rc aot good Th* Lnued State *nd Saudi Arabia together have pkdsed IM million, bul olher donor* are noneocwmitiat Barring unexpectedly large piedget of aid. it* arrearage issuemosi likely remain uniesolvrd. an inipedimeni to larger aid disbutsali by international donors as wellonstant source of tension between the Sudanese enernmcni and Ihe IMC. aBjUjatv

Khanoum's politically expedient gr^iopue policies are likely toource of ma/or instability over the not year. Thcukk acquiescence to labor dcmandi for large wage increases and its reluctance to allow consumer price increase* are an almost certain prescription for higher inflation and growingoreover, the failureiehange tat* oremonstrate rcsiraini inc>cgaiivr signalhe business community, international and domestic alike, and conftrms the suspicion of many thai ihe interim government cannot, or wilt not, implement genu in

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The SvutS. Imurgent leaders placed the onus for initiating dialogue on Khanoum when they made their first serious overture last fall Theynd set condition* for talks, including dernandt for public commitmentational conference regarding ihc electionew interim government by pankipuait in ibeajor factor behind lhe rebel imiicirvc may be Khanoum's recent retonariee-nnd-stick policy. The dviliin Cabinet was encouraged toialogue, while the Military Council workedlate and press the rebels by seekingut off ibeir cstemal support andilitary solution.

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Resolution of the southern conflict will not be easy aad may not be possible in the neat year for any government in Khanoum. but. in ourilitary regime may prove more capable of flexibility than an

Such regimes, however, would coniinueook toStales for economic assurance. Tbewouldarge! of suspicion,

relations with Libya would'anujjtr" jti,

A takeover by younger gcnerali orttkkcrt would be more effective and would have the greatest popular tuppcwt if it took place in (he midsttrong military-dominated regime, forriple, might have greater leeway lo impose stricter security and unpopular ItBZaftiy mcaiura needed lo subfile the domestic political and ecvomx situation.onstitution probably would be pcAtpnned for tome time. Ending tbe insurgencyouldriority foregime, which would have more fk nihility and probably be less dogmatic tear, an elected civilian government Insurgent leaders probably would have more iruil in these officers, as opposed to some of ihe more senior officers In the current regime, especially if they had limned ties io

met President)

f levied i'< lian ij-ecnxfti Ai ihe heart ofpolitkal scitkmcni will be Kharioum's adoptionederal model of (overnment in which (he >mih -ill receive eoMiitaiiottal guarantees sgamsi lhc icwiiiion of Itlamk law and formal agreements on revenue sharing Mcan*hik. internal divisions among southerners are likely lo impede progress on agreementuccesiful dialogue between id. government and the rebeb fatliateria lite, (he Insurgents probably would receive Fihiopian baching to intenufv ibeir attacks in lhe south to wealed Khartoum's reaotv*.

urtooa farand laiptkioom

Poliikal instability in Sudan nukes Its futurebut tevcrit outcomes arc possible in lhe coming year:

Barriag ma wive civil unrealajor military defeat in lhe south, there isow even chance thai ibe current regime can muddle through lo elections in ihe springurnover to civilian rule. There It an equally ltrong prospecteconstituted interim regime will hold on to power untilrepared to hold ckctkmi

If preJonged civil unrestostly defeat in tbe south occurs before elections or after elections arc positioned, the protpeci increases thai younger generals or middle- grade officers willuccessful coup.

Leasoup by radical or eitrcmc kflill junior officers with Libyan backing, particularly if (be securitv -itnation deteriorate! and Ibe senior officers fail Io lake charge )PJJ|M

Extensive divisions among civilians in an elected governmeni or military-civilian tensionsew interim regime are likely to impair ibe government's ability to make thc necessary hard decisions on dortvitic probkrm In addition, there is likelye little agreement on Urge portions of lhe constUution, including lhc status of Islamic law If lalks between Khanoum and the rebels fail to mat trial ire, the insurgents probably would view any election thai look place as invalid, would find it difficult lo reachsetikmeni with an ineffective regime, and would

Libya:

Oachafi Under Siege

An unntecedenied combination of rising unrest aad foreign challenges coalesced io mil Qadhafi at bayour consecutive yean of economic decline prompted growing dissatisfaction with tbc regime among the public and key interest groups. Dissident activity both abroad aad ia Libya is oa the upswing, and tor the Best time in nro years serious unreal ia the Armed Forces was discovered Doubts about tbc regimes viability have emerged, even among senior officials, and they are beginning to position themselves lo succeed Qadhafi. Moreover. QsdturVs principal adversaries close to home, Egypt and Algeria, are cooperatingut Libya on thc defensive. Qadhafi has responded to these pressures by giving greater power to relatives and young radicals whose programs Include domestic repression and international terrorism. Qadhafi could reduce the threat so bis power by reversing or moderating his anpotailar policies, bui be shows no willingness to do so. In our view, political and economic trends in Libya continue to run against Qadhafi, and, If, as seems likely, there It no change In current conditions, hit chances of surviving another year arc little betici than

including theillion Great Manmade Riser water project. Qadhafi also has stewed payments companies operating In Li

' copeconomic decline

local population.

i. Sower ir

Faltering economic performanceedining standard of Irving continued to erode Qadhafi'a public Standingespite Libya't prciducingf crude oil above its OPEC Quota, wc estimate that total export earnings will remain at aboutillion this year. Severe austerity measures probably will5 importsT billion, which, la conjunction with worker remittances and other servieca, willurrent account deficit of aboutelter lhan iheillion deficit* Foreign exchange reserves hive dwindled from aboutillion1urrent levelillion.

Qadhafi probably has aggravated these economic grievance* by bit coaiinual exhortations to revolutionary activity which further utsdermioe the sense of security Libyans are seeking In their daily

Income has forced Tripoli to reassess in development goals. Qadhafi has imposed kogthy delays on the completion of several showcase projects.

Trunhlr

I oic.i'ii affairsi< Qauhal with mixed result* in im. He could point lo tome successes, tbe most impoitant being the rapid cspansioo of Libyanudanoup thatQidharYs oid nemeiit Jaafar NirrciH. Tripoli also restored relationi with another former enemy. Somalia, andureau (Embourl in Niger. Bul. on the wtkOtc. Qadhab has not enjoyed the umc level of lucorss (hit year that he did the previous year whengnedunion with Morocco, negotiated tbc Trench out nf Cbao at no cost. and mined Ihe Red Sea with impunity. taught

Qadhafi was frustiated most of the year in his attempts to translate his tuppon fa^occign retimes inio real influence.]

Qadhafi'* most serious foreign policyhowever, was the expulsion in August of0 Tunisian0 Egyptian workers from Libya. The move was in part an effort io stem the drain on

<6

foreign exchange caused byremittance* Qadbuli. in uur judgment, aho saw an opportunity tu dcstabilire the already uncertain domestic situation in Tunisia and to punish Egypt for its tics to the United States and Israel. Qadhafi probably did not anticipate the willingness of Algeria and other Arab govern' ments to come to Tunisia's aid. Most worrisome from QadbalYs point of view was significantly closer cooperation among Tunis, Algiers. Cairo, and Baghdad. ^kWW

Qadhafi Circles tbe Wagons For tbe most part, Qadhafiudicious political calculator who Is capable of patient waiting. He has often been able to respond flexibly to his political troubles, tactically changing course without losing sight of bis long-held revolutionary goals. But when be is feeling under siege oreightened sensitivity thai hisailing.sually pragmatic decision ma king can ratter. We judge thatow intrained period, and Qadhafi's Hawed decisionmaking could well compound his political problcmsS

In dcal:ng with bis rising domestic problems and increased foreign pressures. Qadhafi has chosen to repress dissent at home and resist pressure from bb neighbors rather than icvem or moderate hb unpopular policies. I

our view, this reduces the likelihood that the regime will address the fundamental problems that threaten It. I

Qadhafi bus incrtasimly surrounded himself ssilh people whom he believes he canfellow tribesmen, or young radicals committed to his

arrow tactical sense Qadhah may have improved bis security. Mrs personnel ctvanges pcooabl) have increased the ability of bb supporters toascent coup plotting or rimr aniiirguns imfiiy In our view, however, Qadhafi's increasing reliance on esirermsts indicates how deeply eroded bit support has become. In addition, as Qadha6 becomes more dependent on radicals for support, he risks losing the loy.ilty of the armed forces, tbe one iRSiituiica capa'uH of tenwing him.*sjBjng&

Another effect of QadhatVs siege mentality has been increased infighting among senior officials as they prepare themselves for the inevjiabj? succession sifogglej

QadhalVs popular base will continue to erode as long as he respond* to tbe challenges to hb regime by ctcoctirtg himselfiminishing circle of revolutionaries In Azzitiya Barracks. Qadhafi is almost entirely dependent on lhe continued loyally

and competence ofthe Revolutionary Com outlet* and ihc security terntesosition Ai present, these inititut ions anpcai capable nf protecting him. Nonet he leu. the political and economic ircndi in Ubya are running aiamil Qadhafi. and we aues* hn (hinets of wr-mic until Ibe end4 ai Mile belief ibaa.

A popular revolt againsi Qadhafi is unlikely, evenignificant increase in popular disconicm. Such disconieni. however, increases lb* risk of auassination. In addition, ibe MS! almost etna ml, will iilempt to eaploil this disconient. possiblr by launching another commando raidibyan installation. Qadhafi probably could survive such an attack, but, if NFSL operaiivea siruck wi;boui tuHenng subsuniial losses-oy no means awould aggravate his insecurity, diminish his prestige, and probably attract greater foreign and Internal support for the i

Crumbling in lhc military it likely to continue. The airetii and personnel change* made ihit year probably have disrupted coup plotting for al least the neat several months Nooetbelesa.expect to sec more evidence of antiregtnx atimty by dmatsncd officers over ihe neu year, andmove against Qadhafi by Ihe armed forces cannot be ruled oui. If the officer corpsoup attempt with diitideal attack, and/or foreign intervention, we believe lhc chance* for toppling. Qadhafi art better than even tuajptar

prucubly be trued at .tl-boadian duudcnii rather than an men tibyan attempt to wire Urgeof territory

Qudhafi might aiiempt to purchase uippori by reordering economic pnorilKv delating tome military purchases, and ehanneUng savings mo ihe comumer sector. He alio might siep up oil production An Increasen oil capons al cur rem price levels would boost revenue* by about SI bll.oaan.uall, Sweh an increase, ho-ewr. would be dilicull to sustain under cuirent market conditiom -iihout some priceonetheless, the likely improvemeni in revenues would ease mounting er Irving Use

failed.

revolution bad fa

fcjH.bly

Qadhafi is least likely lo reverse his unpopular policies nnd curb ihe power of the Revolutionary Commiliees lo ibore up support fv his regime.eversal

be an

:hai hit i

and. ia our new. Qadhsn wiTpsychologicallyaudi an admission. Moreover, even If he reined In Ihe Revolutionary Committees. Qadhafi might not be able to count on greater support among alienated military uAkcrs.ove might instead be interpretedign of weakness and encourage coup plotting.

o repress distent and ride out tbe worm Al the same lime, he amy try to recapture international attention and burnish his prestige

through sudden, bokd foreign policye almost certainly will continue current efforts to break up the cooperation against him between Algeria,

will coniinue hi* conn tatactics with tgyp< and may try to atnke indirectly at Egypt by expanding the Libyan presence in Sudan. Renewed Libyan aggression in Chad may be in lhe offing, allhough French tesolve to support N'Djamena would

a*

t3

4

t3

it

>

Algeria: Bendjcdid PoliiicsfjHold I

mid-decade all mdicatiom are iKai Prtssdcni Chadii Bcndlcdid. who assumed his posts consolIdating his position and continuingut his mark on the country. The focus of politics5 hascndicdid-initiatcd detune on thef the Nationalocument promulgated byresidcni Boomed ienrsehich sets fotth thc country's socialist ideology modeled on Soviet lines. Reconsideration of lhe Charter, which may be concluded by the end of December, appears to be part of lhe government's efforts toess dogmatic brand of socialism mainlyhift toward privatehe marketplace and decentralization of the governi-tinl bureaucracy.j

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Bendyedid't orientationesponsive chordopulation that is weary of economic austerity and inefficient public administration is ready foe comprehensive change. It i* unlikely, however, that tbe debate or its results wilt spark much optimism among tbe public. Reforms espoused by Iheheaded in the rightlink more than tinkering with the economic and political system. Dim economic prospects and dcrnographk pressures demand more concerted action by Algerian leaders,loecauKhunger rely on rising petrcteunv "'generated revenues lo fund rapiJ development ftaSSSSSy

NationalautlnaSlaeaihiiag "BradWid.sm"

la oaf view. Btrsdyodad's decision to revise the Naibrsal Charter stems fmm Ihc same political motivation ihai kd Boumcdicnnr io adopt the Charter: to forma lire his own version of thc country's ideology, llourrsedrenn* could mstiiutc Sovkt-slyic socialism in Algeria onlyyear bank with conservative opponents and oiher rivals, who were finally overcome in Iheendiedid's allempt lo revise Ihe Charter signals his success in pushing aside Houmedienne's leftist stalwarts and replacing them with military officers and icchnocrats who share his pragmatic political and economic orientalioc

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For ihc mosi part, lhe cuneni dcbulc and its results arc ptcotdalncd. Most obseiters believe the findings will ieffect government polk)

mmWkWHtt the debate has been closely supervised by ihe ruling National Liberation Pany ii:. legal party, as it progressed ftom the local to tbe national level. FLN commissions tasked with supervising ibe debate restricted discussions to threeinstiiuiions. economic development, and politicalskirling more conlrovenial issues such as Islam or the role of the military. Bendjcdid. at the initiation of the debate ai ihe Uifi FLN Central Committee meeting last spring.ational referendum on the revised National Charter. Tbe vote could lake place by thc end of ibe year following the FLN Congress int cr natively, Bendjcdid may have the revised Charier ratified by the FLN. because he specifiedeferendum would not be necessary if few changes were made.

Despite ihe formality of the debate, it symboliics the profound changes taking place in Algeria. The governmcni. in lhe face of public disgrunlkment with Soviei-styK socialism, is groping to institute reforms, largely along Western lines, to copeajor population surge, falling hydrocarbon revenues, and hyw agricultural productivity. Bendjcdid also hopes io mode mire military.educational, and governmental organisations. At ihe same time. Bendjcdid and his colleagues do not want to abandon ibe revolutionary heritage that has marked Algeria from independence.

The Ccceiomy: An Opening Toward Capitalism

Ai the heart of Bendjed-)'* espousalarger role for private enterprise is lhe apparent failure of centralized planning lo promote economic development and satisfy consumer demand. Although

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Algeiu iu>uunccx economycue tcgnm andior .jului tuUntMt mjijgemenlBend it0 id MiMI ine wumry no Ionicfinancial fgtMttrwtiuunuer onheavy industrial projects at ineoilier economic HPtWf. espcdalty agriculturetu cipoeii. ta* nuntstays ol inc economy,I'owih in terms ol value. Inecoming mote acpcnaenl uponid part eetauKurgeoningin population and almost no growthfool proouc-.ion Aljeru also

renegotiate gai comractt with ils hey West Euiopcan cuitomersyear. Downwaro picssurcon gas prices and lhe availability in Western Europe of Soviet gas from Ihc irant-European pipeline will make il difficult for Algiers lo maintain above-market

The govetrnnient nope* lo encourage piivate iniliaiive primarily in agriculture and In nonairategic light industries tM servxaurrent Dve-year development plan is gcareo towiro agriculture and lhe offer of free stale lands to farmers. Prrvaic-sector farms already accounl tor the bulk of the country's V cereal and meat proouction. Officials hope to

bnpkraent Wesicrn managemem teconiqnet in tbe slat* texsor aad allow entrepreneur* greater freedom of action.

(ft,

: benefits of these economic rdorms probably willbe long in coming, however, as long a* ibe government i- coearol* (he principal senircet of economicor eaample, there are no indications thai Bendjedid ,ee!uC* 'edundant manpower in stale-owned y- factories, despite the implementation of more ralional

fr"

management programs. The government also seems indined to retain control over the selection o( crop* and the marketing mccnamsm for allusinessmen will be prohibited from investing in heavy industry, in the all-important petroleumn iric manufacture cf censumer goods. |

Military: From Revolutionaryorps

ess visible manner, thc government is embarkingrogram to transform inio professional armedilitarycmbucd wiih the ethics of

guerrilla wirlarc. Algiers Has adopted tuochieve this goal: divcnihcaiioo of it* military equipment, and reorganization of the MiniMri of Defense and the officer corps*.

ear of signing lis last mayor arms contract with lhelgiers approached mi)or Western arms manufacturers Including the United States. Great Britain. France, and West Germany loidsariety of new military protects. Since then, the Bendjedid governmeni ha* asked WesurjB supplier* to coprodnee variout arm*menu in Algeria at another means of breaking the country'* dependence on Moscow. Weapon* diveriilkaiKn willime-coniurmng process, given lhe courury's resumednd continuing need foi dose ties to the Soviets to assure accesspar* parts '

Moreeorganizing the Armedir last year. President Bendjedid promoted tight colonels lo general officer rank, reinstated the office of chief of stafl. andew senior military adviser. The governmenteeondof senior officer promotion* in July, while creating new directorate* and rcorganinng eaitling ones. Still unclear is how ihe icorganlialion will affect lower level tactical units in terms of their training and fighting doctrine

The psychological implications of these decuions on the military hierarchy and public will be far reaching. Never before has th* military had generals. Moreover, there are no separate armies foro coenrr.and Finally, four of ih* si* new general* were given job* related to intelligence and internal military security. These chaises will allow for more efficient management at well at clotcr supervision of the newly redesignated Air Force. Navy, and air defense commands The creation of general officer* also provide greater headroom Lack of promotionongstanding complaint among junior officers Al the same lime, there is some skeptidsm. in Ihe military and among the public over

To* general officers, and some .tew l1 ai nothing more than high-naying job* tot

Bcndjcdid'l cronies-

Foreign Policy: Potting National Interests Abosc Idealism Parallel with thcttempts to adopt Western practices in economic and burcaocraiic management Is Its shift toward closer relations with Western nations. Artotheroncentration on regional politics and bsucs ihat touch directly on national interests, rather than on more visionary international bsucs such as the Algerian"new economic order" and Nanh South economic dialogue of previous years, liven though the majority of Algeria's diplomatic contactsprobably will continue toCommunist and Third World radical states, rets lions with Western states ate increasingly important to Algiers. Algeria reeds Westerni natural gas exports and wants access to Western capital, food, and militaryanBM*Sa.

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lgeria began to shift It* attention Irom Morocco, the country's traditional adversary, to Libyahreat to national seetjriiy. We believe thai Algerian leaden now view Libyaenace at least as dangerous as Morocco. The manifestations of this concern are Algeria's steady shift of military forces eastward, its budding economic and military cooperation wiih Tunisia, its willingness to patch up differences with Egypt, and its collaboration with both Tunis and Cairo on ways to undermine Libya's influence in Arab andoliiicijnraatSjgi

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Algeria's relations with Mcuocco have deteriorated since Rabat's "usvsoo" wish Libya inis year. Bendjcdid presented King Hassanlan that would allow the Western Sahara to be linked lo Morocco much like Ihc relationship between tbc United Kingdom at* lhe Commonwealthelations between Algiers and Rabat in thc patl yecr have been marked by lhe destructionoroccan reconnaissance aircraft by Polisario guerrillas with an Algerian-provided missik, Morocco's capture of Islamic dissidents based in Algeria, and another Moroccan-Algerian stalemate in ihe United Nations over measures lo end the conflict tr. lhe Western Sahara.

Otner elements oliplomatsluifciwcd paiierriscsiabiisncrj in recent yens. Algeria continue* to keep tne radical Arab "reieviionisi" stales hiength, while ptODing lor ways io oridgc the differences cesween raoicai and tneonate Arab stales. Algeria's aciisist diplomacy in Sub-Saharan Africa appears designed to Muni Moroccan diplomacy and Libyanut ions Relations "ills Fiance remain strained in laige pan Because ol wnai Algiers vkws io benclination io appease Uadhali and side with Morocco in tne region, rrsosssas

Llonsestic Crosscurrents

Bcndjcdid's efforts to cnange cuuisc have not rxen without cost. Programs to mooerniie the country through tne promotion of Western managerial tecnniqucsodest aegrec of local initiative on thc administrative level nave piooncee) some tensions within tne government. Anrxiugh inloimatton is sketcny.vidence mat ine modification of lhe National Charter is being resisted by leftist stalwarts in ihe FLN, who fear that liberalization will undermine lhe regime- Such op position does not proem an Immediate danger io Bendjcdid, given ttis brm control over thc government apparatus. Nevertheless, differences could become mure Intense and widespread if the government's liberalization of society encourages open dissent or ihc economy does

Some of these pressures may oe coming to tne surface in ihc guise of ethnic and religious ditsidence. Both therab ethnic group trial comprises about IS percent of the population, and Islamk fundamentalists have been increasingly active during thc rust year. Recently, for example, Berber activbu clashed with police InBerberilometers cast ofthe convictionopular Berber Singer for aniiregime activities associated with the alleged Berber-dominated "Algerian League'for-Humanidely pubtkiind raid by putative Islamic funda menu listsolice armory last summer was the botdcsi action to date by religious dissidents. Governmcni concern aboul the threat from this quarter was reflected in the pervasive security roadblocks around ihc capital during lhe laic summer

ss

and fullissivedragnet by tecum) forces thai neucdundamentalists. In October gendarmes used helicopters and armor to quash oneC roups based in Larbu. 40

kilometers south oftgfl

Prospects6

In our view, the Bendjedid government does noierious Ihreat either Irom ethnic or religiousdissidents or from other opposition groups. Berber activists arc better organized than the i; fundamentalists and probably more numerous. Their demands, however, are principally social, particularly Ihe protection of Ihe Berber language, rather than political The fundamentalists hope Ioopular revolution, but Ihey are fragmented.

While the Beodjedid government is not in immed;?f. danger, we believe il wiU face more open challenges as It attempts lo move ibe country away from (he revolutionary legacy of previous leaders Most Algerians did not witness Ihe revolution or experience, Ihe early years of nation building, and they are less inclined to make sacrifices for the sake of socialism and national development. Both ihe Berber and islamic activists seem less inhibited in confronting the governmeni. and both groups appear to have enough support lo sustain (heir activities. Tough securily measures alone will prove ineffective in quashing dissenl from these quarters, in our judgment. Al lhe same lime, Bendjedid probably will attempt lo find ways io co-opt or accommodate dissidenlselinquishing any of his prerogatives, gyaaai

Algeria's economic fortunes will oe tied to world oil and gas market* for lhe foreseeable future, despite Bendjedid'* efforts to restructure the economy. We do notignificant decline in (he demand or prices for Algeria'* hydrocarbon exports nextwhich probably will allow Algiers sufficient financial leeway to move ahead with essential developmentarked deterioration in the oil or ga* markets, however, would severely hinder government plans lo redress social needs and implement economic reforms. For example, the government loses Sj*0

millionn ctpcrtach Si dcclinc in oil prices at current production levelv. Moreover, every IM.tMO-lwffeis.pei-elaj dWpin'hyd.-ociirbon export* cost* thcI billion al proem price Ic^els-adMkVt*

In its foreign policy, lhc Bcndycdid government probably will unveil feu- surprises next yeur. Algiers will continue lis hardline stance to-ard Morocco and Libya and Ils balanced position between ihe radical and moderate groups of Arab states. Relationi with Western Europe *how promise, bul ihey win hinge io some extern on developments In Hade talks over gas ricing. Algerian relations with the USSR and ill allies probably will continue to mark lime because ofore important regional concerns and inieresi in expanding irade contacts wiih the West. The possible exceptions lo continuity are funhcr rapprochement with Egypt and possibly Libya, especially if Algiersoosening of theolitical union. Renewal of format lies lo Cairo, however, probably will cook only after otber Arab stales have done io.1ia*utfunr

Algiers will remain keenly interested in further trade and political openings toward Washington. Most key Algerian omcials appear commiiied io securing US technology and expertise io icvitslire (he country's industrial plants and military establishment. Common trad-interests aside, political relations probably will develop more slowly, given lhe divergence in political viewpoint* in both capital* on Middle Eastern issues. Algiers probably will wanl lo move carefully in developing bilateral lies on (be political level because of whai it views lo.b* Washington's continuing military and diplomatic support for Morocco, as well as Algeria's own interests in maintaining tics to radical Arab slates.

Tunisia: Foreign Crises/0

Political Immobilism[3)

year has beca one ol unprecedented chalkagcs for ihc moderate pro-Western government of President Habib Bourgoiba and Prime Miniiter Mohamcd Mrali.* expulsion of0 Tunisian workers beginning lati lammei. and Ihci cat of cailiury coarLcf. -ere followed by ihe surprisestrike on PLO facilities in Tunisia. More recently, ihc governmcni dashed with the principal taborUracil organization in ihe counirywages. These challenges revealed Ibeof the regime aad Hi inability to come to flips wiih festering social and economic problems. In ourolitical maneuvering in anticipation of Bourguiba's deaih will sharply limit the fwrnmcBt'i ability to aoewe quickly aad decvtr-cly ia the er-n'fg year.

A Stale Adrift

At yearcssd. Ihc traditional maiauayi oforeign policy arc badly eroded France andxtent ihc United States, the pnncipal alliea of Tunisia since independence, have been found wanting, according to Tunisian leaders. In their eyes, both countries have been icluciani to respond to urgent rcQuesu for military assistance to deter military threats from Libya. "ITse Israeli airsirikc, whkhonsensus that Ibe United State* was ai least negligent in not warning or protectingompounded these misgivings Although Tunis undoubtedly will wani to strengthen lis tiessihington and Paris, ii will do to with less confidence ihat its Western partners are committed lo helping Tunisia deal with foreign subversion or aggression.'

To compensate for French and US ditalorinest. loaisia has sought miliury aad political support from Iraqyp! lu major dipsssttsalac effort, however, has beca in courting Algeria. Tunisia has undertaken an unprecedentedpans ion of miliury and economic cooperaiion with ihat couetiy. Algerian kaders. for their pan. have been eager to acconsatcalau Tunas, given their cwti concerns about Libya and longstanding pretensions to regional leadership

This courtship, howeser. has nut been completely palaubk for Tunisians Go" tr nment kaders and much of ihe public share rmsgrvusgt about Algerian monies and intentions Most offktah probsbl< believe thai the Untied Slates and Trance would come io the couniry's support solely oui of concern for subilily ia North Africa and lo check the advance of Libya Algeria's motives, ho-cr- are percened differently As the most powerful country in lhe regioneighboradically different ideology. Algeria is suspected by Tunisians ol having politkal and even territorial designs on iheir couniry

Mt-lny In ibe Body Politic

Libya's expulsion of Tunisian workers and ils blatani atlcmpti to undermine the government through presi attacks and letter bombs have not been safickistty threatening to quest public discontent with the governmcni and curtail infighting between poliiical groups and individuals. Prime Minister Miati. who appears to have I* ken advantage ofeclining faculties to strengthen his own position, has.iempied lo exploit Libyan machinations io undermmells principal urgei is Habib Achour. leader of Ibe politically powerful.ember General Union of Tunisian Workers (UCTTl Achour during ihe nasi year called oa Muti to end ihe wage freer* and link wagea to iaRaiion. To back up hb demand. Adiou: threatened nationwide strikes to paralyze the government'

Thelien of tensetween Tunisia and Libya in tne October allowed Mull IOull seak attack oa Achour. Probably aware of Infighting between Achour and other UGTT eseculives whoofter line toward thc government. Miali initialed ao intense press campaign against Achour. accusing him of mismanagement. Me*', followed up with harsher action, using potke units aad ursion militants associated with the ruling Desioursan

SocUIUi Party (PSDl co (did tOTT offices.nion leaders were temporarily de turned, and Achour was placed under house arresc. UGTT 'members supporting Acbour staged several suites in response and. in some instances, clashed with police.

wo-week interlude. Mtali renewed Im offensive against tbc UGTT leadership The most ominous moveovernment proposal for an extraordinary UGTT congress lo removessociatev who coo trot Ike actionalten of lhe UGTT Any attempt to further weaken Achoor could unify ihe opposition and prompt more widespread violence. Opposition panics, which had been discreet in iheir support for the UGTT leadership, are Openly supporting Acbour dauaW

At this juncture. Mrali hasragile victory Over the UGTT. Progoreromcni workersncd control over most UGTT offices, and most oltrikes called by Achout supporters have failed because of thc threat of governmeni sanctions The reconstituted leadership of Ihc UGTT appear* sufficiently cowed to refrain from leading aniigovernmeni aaioers. Mrali also his been able lo avoid Ihc tenoui economic-re la led disturbance* that rocked Ihe country early tail year, when Tunisians rioted following ibe announcementeicenl rise In lhe price of bread'

In lit geographiche government UGTI clathlear distinction in regional support for each tide. Tbe first UGTT locals to openly criiklie Achouf't leadershipsummer were located in President Bourguiba's borne base in theown of Mont stir and in other citia of the Sahel UGTT branches in the senrtbern citic* of Gabes, Gafta, andesitted tbe takeover of union offices by themilitia. These affiliates also have been able to organiic successful strikes. Government control over southern Tunisiaas been weak, given lhe concentration of politicaln elan* from the north and ethnic lie* of southern Tunisian*ribes in Libya uuutu*a>

Al Ihe senior level* of Ihe government, longitanding infighting within the political elite ever Bourguiba's mantle appears to have abated because of lhc

impcruiiie (or unity We believe, however.political maneuvering "ill continue and th.Habifnvold on io power i> not atsurcdnpopular because of hi. iirong vorrort forbread price* thai prompted lanriot. Influeniiat rivals such as Minuter of Public V. oris Sasah. Foreign Mininer Caid EtscbsLor Bourguiba's tonand wife Watvilahreat as king us Bourguit^ Ji.ti.rali has adrwtlv uved the country's crises to sircagihcn hi* potition a* Bourguiba's designated weenie utsttttsst*

The mitiury. uaditlonally apoliiical. is increasingh-concerned about the government's abilityestore the country's economic health. Younger officers also are inclining toward Islam and nonalignmcni at an aliernaiive to lhe current tocialitt. Wettern-oii.nicd political and economic structures. Mrali has attempted to improve hit popular standing among Ibe military's lower ranks, but we doubt that he can rely ua miliary support in Ihe event of widespread antigovemment

I.curi<.mii Sboalt

Internal disorder and foreign policy problem* have distracted ih* government from the country'* economkt tbe heart of Tuniiiapoor financial outlook are dwindling petroleum resources, which will make iheei importer by the nest decade, and reduced pike* in ihe international market for phcnpoitcs,ey expert commodity. These thortoomingi arc compounded by high population growth, dismal performance in the agrkulturil sector,iop In fcmitiancci (rem workers in Western Europe and Libya. I

A recent aiudy of Ihe Tunisian economy by ihe World Bank outlined the more obvious manifestation! of the country'* financial decline. Theseear doabiing of the current account detVi' aad debt service rationdtetdy widening of ihc ballercent-per-year increase io the labor forceersistent JO percent unemployment rate, and foreign exchange reserves covering only two or three weeks of

ft

I

pror-ised remedies miotic polim alii risky initiatives in buih governmcni spending and allocution uf foreign esrchuuge'

(hedi-j-6 b>g

percent.

Reducing price controls >nd subsidies lihe laiicrercent per year).

Limitingincreasesercent per year in ihc Public secsot.

rogressive cut in the budget deficit from ihc currcm level of aboulercent of GDPercent1 ihruughenduures instead ofa* Increase apujuje;

Government leaden claim to recognize the need for aciion. Tunis'* willingness to let the value of the dinar depreciate against major Wcm European currencies during the past sistep in the righi direction. Thc commitmenl to m'.jor reductions in government spending,ikely lo be far

! Of the impact OB priors Ol

goods and on already ifortaMy high unemployment. The World Bank. .weTunis has Utile time left toinancial crisisoss of (seeded foreign credits. The Bank projects the crunch could come as soonsMhrt*

Forecast: Slantty Seas Ahead

Tunisia's (roubles almost certainly will persistven wiih Bourguiba on lhe scene Tunii cannot be assured ihat the UGTT will remainjpassive,eports tasaataaiaaSaaa^itiai thc

opose another year of wage freezes couldresh round of den*onsi rations and violence, especially if officials simultaneously reduce subsidies for bread or other basic commcd.iKi In any event, thc ruling PSD sriD remain lied to Bourguiba's socsalisi policies and increasingly conccnted wiih its own survival. This Inaction will only benefilpposition grout* for esampte. all indications are thai Islamic fundsnvenulists arcesurgence throughout Tunisian socieiy. especially among youths who perceive ihe current regime as out of louch with popular concerns taggaajv

Internal strains also will encourage unwanted foreign meddling Libyan leader Qadhafi almost certainly hoped ihat his unceremonious dumping of Tunisian

t-3

worker* would bmh utwcllk ihc tlwirc-ib*provide an opportunity in inii.-luccHe could it any lime decideepairTuniuan -orierv back aration by Tunntan dissidents, or launchagainst Tunisia.during lhe pan (ear cile arrests ofassociated wiihsad Ssria la ourassistance, although potentially helpfulpolitical or military aciion in TunisiaArab slates, could be used to influenceleaders(3)

Tunis probably will continue lo tiplorc furihe' military and ecc-tomic ccopcraiion wiih Algeria andib neighbors The governmcni. however, will stop sheet ofrabk Algerian military pretence unless it perceives an imminent ihrcat from Libya. The Tunisians could ouenipi io secure weapons from Italy or West Germany if France continues so'reocrasunaic ia supplying military aid Tunis may also capand contacts with the Soviet Union and discuss weapons purchases. If only io gain leverage to eairaci greater security assistance from France and ihe United States anssfjawwa

b(3)

Mzali's ability to appearecisive leader will be a

key to Tunisia's Internal stability in ihe near

eclining faculties will provide farther

opportunities for the Prime Minister to place hit mark

on thc bureaucracy and policies of lhe country.

Nevertheless. Mzaii cannot be assured of compklc

freedom of aciion until tsourguiba's death. He also

will have lo contend *nh powerful opponents within

ihc political elite, who almost certainly will intensify

their efforts lo discredit Mzali as Bourguiba't demise

becosnes imminent We believe thai Mxab will

tent.-sue lo take tough aciion against real oe imagined

opponents. There Is little evidence that he will ever

fulfill earlier promises to allow greater political

participation by opposition movements In our

judgment, he is asoee likely tormly io proieci

(hi icgime. even if harsh measures tarnish the

country'a lecordelalively moderate and tolerant

Arab stale in terms of* its domeatie

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Mauritania: Taya(3)

Under Fire "MMrr

Afteronth* in office. Mauritania's President Taya appears *eak and vicillatinc in tackling his country's severe economic and politicalouakchott's limited resource base has been further weakened by drought, corruption, and managerial ineptitude. The government depends on foreign largess for survival. Taya's ability to cope with these issues is complicated by external pressures to take sides on the Western Sahara dispute. He cites his predecessor's pro-Algerian nance as Instrumental in last December's coup. Taya knows be must avoid being sacked into Ibe fray because of the risks of reopening lhe ethnic split between Arab officers and blackdominate the military's enlisted ranks and have previously refused toagainst lhe Polisario.

During the next year, Taya will be under increased pressure loore active role in managing tbe economy. This willormidable task, as there are no prospectsramatic turnaround in iron ore and fish prices, Nouakchott's principal sources of revenue. Diversion from this usk by foreign policy concerns will only complicate Taya's already daunting probken In gelling Mauritania back on ks feel, (gasjat

A New Start

When Chief of Staff of lhe Aimed Forces Maaouiyi Ould Sid Ahmed Taya replaced Mobamed Khouna Ould Haidallaloodless coup last December, he pledged to end corruption and economic mismanagement and lo deal with the effects of lhe drought.peech. Taya catalogued his predecessor's faults but offered almost no evidence thai hit regime was coping with the country't problems.

Taya's government it composed primarily of Haidalla holdovers and new individuals with no demonstrated competence. Contrary to initial pledges lo improve governmeni efficiency. Taya has not abolished the state-run companies or curbed official corruption. Refuge* camps continue tohas

one of the highest rates of urbanization In theend the construction of villas in Nouakchott's new northwest residential quarter are prompting queries about corruption.tow by Westernincreasingufficiently high rate io catch lhe attention of thc governmcnt-conlrolkd media.

A Mendicant Nation

Mauritania's small economy is the primary source ol nationaler capita GDP0 ranks Mauritania among the poorest nations in the world, a

b(3)

situation Ihatharp disparit? in ibe dwinbwlwa of wealth Thecultural sectorbeta nprciatl* haid hu b> recu'ienii managerial ineptitude, and lack of investment. Ag rkuliurc emptoyi abouterceni of (he population bui produces lessercent of GDP.on. ibnown bs SO pcrocai from leveh in ihtndercent of domestk demand. GDPat avengedercent annually over ibe last five

ars. aboul bah* Ihe rate of population increaie.

arked declinei

Mauritania ii in coniiani need of roncctsional aulilancc lo keep ill economy afloai. Foreign aid accounted forercent of budgetary receipt* lau year. Meeeover, the government hat borrowed heavily to suppori development and, to an increasing client, food Imports. Chronic foreign payments problems and mounting debt service costs on ibe nation'sillion debt have brought the financial system to ils laces The governmcni narrowly avertedollapse last spring by putting large amounts ol scarce foreign cicbange laio several falling banks. The egitne successfullyaris Club debt rescheduling in April, but with only So* mill too remaining in foreign eachangcthree

months of importprobably Iagain fall behind oa debt obligations of IH rrUUson payable aeil year. UajBBa>

anifold ihroughoui ihc economy. The governmcni conlinues lo move ahead with plans to reopen its long-doropper mine wiih lhe help of wealthyey backer.

Mt. Tbe

project, however, has no assured market for Ihr ore and is plagued by high mining obis. Moreover, plans

proceed wiihh* bl Illation of Ihe country's only oil refinery is contrary la World Bank recommendations that the refinery remain closed because of high production costs, poor prospects for

supplies,eak domes lie demand for oil.

otential Wightcccnily signed aceoid with Moscow provides financing and shinsiploil Mauritania's ma tine resources Norte of the

Mauritania; Currear Account Balmee

mow tatinrr

j*t

Ml

Its

balaaM

ore

lc

R*

i<

c

tiaaafrn

JO

fan. however, will be processed in Mauritania, and the government hasimited capability io police Ihe catch. In our view, Moscow will reap the lion's share of ihc benefits from ihe accord.!

Foreign Policy Concerns

Coping with economic problems is complicated by foreign policy demands, particularly lhe Western Sahara bsue. Taya cited hit predecessor's pro-Algerian stanceritical icason for hi) overthrow. Taya has moved loore balanced posture toward both Algkrs and Rabat. Correspondingly, relations have cooled with the PoUsano Front, which lliidilla orttciaHy recogniied* Relations with Morocco had been warned since thc alkged Moroccan -backed coup attempt against Haidatla inI. Taya hoped thai byalanced position he would avoid reiri-olvement in the Western Sahara. Instead, growing prcssarc from both Morocco aad Algeria loide ihirateco io drndc lhe icgimc tmWtW

b(3j

62

tn' liiyjK>M hiv

governmeni i>u Continued Aijcun facwure

on behalf ol lhc PuirtjrM1 at lhc ucx itmc tl> from Morocco- Ratal hai threatened lo engage in hoi pursuit into Mautnania if Nouakchoil cannM control PoJisario acnvliy In lhe border area. In addition. Ihe Poliiarlo hai oiked for permissionstablish an embassy in Mauritania, transit rights for Pofisarro military gaits through Mauritania, the rightesettle ihe Peart* no in camps on Mauritania" ierirtory. and access lo provisions for miliary

We believe Mauritanian military leaden sutpect thai the thift in fighting touthward is pari of an attempt by Morocco sohe *ar to neutral territory,nability to control Polrsario activity could produce severe stiains in Taya's military cabinet, particularly if Morocco carries out its threat of hot pursuit Some officersonfrontation <vith either Morocco ot the Pc4jtario ecessary lo preserve Mauritania's territorial integrity, bul lhe majority of Mack soldiers view the dispute at an Arab rivalry and would resit! renewedirnilar spill led lo lhe military coup8 by Taya's predecessor. Moreover, in our view, Taya'i policy of neutrality might put Mauritania in the unenviable posit ion of having to face all

Tayn alto worries about Libyan matin nations inand remembers Qadhtfi's effortsprevious regimes ingoals

includeonsulate in Nouadhiboo. establiihmeoievolutionary commit tec. imtallationadio transmitter, and landing or overflight rights. In our view, Taya will not grant the Aril Ihiec objectives but may acquiesce on privileges for Libyan aircraft because thai would noi involve an increased Libyan presence in Mauritania and might result in tome aid for Nouakchott. Landing rights at Nouakchott wouldLibyan planet thc transit point needed to ship military equipment io Latin America.'

The Role of ihe Military

Tjyatl i. hi. continued pupularily in ihc military. Taya hj< been prompt in meeting tbc needs ofiun nTattVufaaajitssttJaaaV

salaries are paid on lime. Irving staadaiui art maintained, and modesi upgrading of equipment is under way Tint policy, however, puis undue stress on ihe budget and sharply reduces funds available to meet lhe need* of the country's burgeoning poor. Thc Presideniof Moorish descent--strongly favor, increasing the percentage of blacks in lhc junior oncerlack* makethe majority of ealoted personnel, andove could prmtde him wiih broader based *upport ihsn any other Moor leader since independence. Nevenhelen. in ourhis move could backfire by splitting the military along ethnic lines and prompting senior Arab officers tooup to maintain the status quo

Outlooi

la our view. Taya facesniurntouniaUe barrier* in arriving Mauritania* economic and foroign policy problems Shortfalls in food and employmentertainty for the near term. If the droughti* effect on agricultural production and rural migration will place increased strain on ihe government toie human needs The meatfactor* for ewercoming thesemassive infusion of monevuaranteed waterlargely beyond Nouakchott's control for the foreseeable future, and it wifl remain heavily dependent on outside help, .aawanr

The President's major foreign policy concern almost certainly will be the Western Sahara Mauritania will be under pressure from all sides in the war. particularly with lhe citensioe of Morocco's defensive bens shunting Iheetnto ihe tribordcr area. Taya almost certainly will try to foresiall entry of Moroccan iroups into Mauriianiangage the guerrillas Ale time, bis own

*

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