ZU> Intelligence
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The Prospects for Change in Sino-Soviet Relations
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Aj*vtng jntvm*genc* drgaeiaatkths participated tn Iheprepa/aw ot this Estimate The Cott-eJ inte'npeoce AgencyDelenso I'lieii'jonci?h* National Security Agency The BureauInteibgonce and Reseetch. Department ol Slate he Office ollnlef-gence Sucioon. Department ol the Tr easiiW
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lime frame covered by been improving since the ncy and his subsc-nt impetus to theihe the Cambodian issue have ity in dealing with the
USSR:'
The Sine-Soviet relationship could even advance to the point whereino-SoMct border agreement, resumption of party-to-party tics, statement of principles on relations, and perhaps the beginning ofeduce force* along the border.
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Relations, however, are not likelyjlo progress lo ihe point where China moves lot truly cquldisiant'positlon in ihe Sino-Sovici-US triangular relationship or stops competing with the USSR ir. many regions of the world. Although we expect military contacts to develop, we do not believe the) will extend to major arms aatlcs. advanced technology transfer, or genuine military cooperation. Past disputes, lingering distrust, geopolitical ri airy, and conflicting national ambitions wilt continue to bound the reconciliation and promoteI ,
The pace and extent of improvement will depend in large part on whether
Both sideseformist course at home and coniinuc.to' more' peaceful international environment as essential to the pursuit of
domestic';
ii .proved Sino-SMel r'cla ion's will increase Chinese and Sovietc aliohsVith thej United States'ihd add toeacemaker, The'a.ready Wnirri-ipotcnlial for Smo-Sovict military wnftictwill recede fevctt firtberj fob willjincrcase pressure on the Urn
i the United
Slatesolicies inWmore cha llfcnging polutcal environment.
The Soviet-US aftd Sino-US dialogues remain essentially on track.Thereiis continued progress toward resolution of the Cambodian conflict.
The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan is interrupted.
The Chinese maintain their positive assessment of Gorbachev
In addition, the more rapid the "pace of improvement* in Sinn-Soviet relattwk the more pronounced will Ue.their impact on US freedom of maneuver in East Asia, For example, inatmosphere of triangular detente. Ujnn probe baV.will be under greater pressure to improve us relations with the Soviet Unioni Moreover, if the Image of the Soviet military threat in East: Asia is diminished. USma>' ecdpend tVim.cy.on dcfcnsc.jor permit US military access.
None^lesa, WimpiJvemenu'in Sino-Soviet relation* envisioned in this Estimate will nol, in ourundamentally threaicn US interest* in lhe next two to Ihrec years:.. i , j.
Expanding contacts will make it easier for the two sides to coordinateticw.where their interests ecocide, bul they will remainown very diffctent geopolitical agendas.
h We do not believe that any Chinese or Soviet forces withdrawn from the border regionesult of djminiihed miliary compctii ion will be redeployed to measurably augment the threat to NATO or to US allies in
! the Pacific-1'! 'j
I Although Moscow will try to takencreased Sino-Soviet j. ccorrOmic interaction to try to get more Western technology. China will !gainscopardiM iu own access to such technology.If Slhc-Soviei relations improve sufficiently to be perceived asng, Asian countries may secfgreaier, US support -
.This information
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Contents
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Key Judgment* Discussion
chinese and soviel goals incr ties
t
at
Progress loDaie -
Haori Likely To Affect Sino-Sovlet Relations in the Nest Two to Three ^ ]'[
Interna IRole of
CiunUe Internal
External Influences on Sino-SoviciS Factor
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Conned OyerU ; The] Impact of the Afghan jSettlerttent
N nhapan
Acion
Sno-Soviet Relations Over the Next Two to Three years :l; ij j
: Implrcatiortt for the,United SuicV.
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<d So*frta Dckpirt fleeter TV*
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The corning io power of reform-minded leodcrships ih both China and the USSR has already significantly changed each side's perception of Ihe other and. spurred subttanlul improvement of Sinb-Sovictrtla lions.believe theestined for furthereiult ofevents) Sovkt relations, the Soviel decision to withdraw from Afghaaiitan. ana the efforts the Sovieu are making toeitlemcjit oftho [Cambodian, problem.hinese attribute these changes lo General Secretary Gorbachev personally, want to reinforce hit neworeign policy; and seem on the vergeecision to expand and elevate political contacts with the USSR. We believe the ultimate 'outcome of these
ly acknowledged. We abo believe thii could occur well before the end of theto three-year lime
baa, tba objectives of its changed policies toward the USSR are to:Diminish the Soviet threat to Chinese security and free up more resources for economic development at home, mprove.everage in Washingtonime
of Increased US-Soviet cooperation. . >Buttress Gorbachev's internal position.
political concessions from tbe USSRSecure economic and scleniiflc and techno'ogkal
benefits from the USSR and Eastern Europe.
Direcior oTihe MCy. tuninet the peenpectiA-iri esse/ihe nailthree yean, loceiher ii tc* (he United Stalea Oar MM roimntiea MlF.SM. aadlcddari af la Junelot*can the Undlhat Ml developed (iace r _ before ae rattyt"
.
doubts in Hanoi and New Delhi about Soviet
iiiinwu. National Seetirny fSSMaaaaeeT Ike Iiheir IraplKai (hhIucI* e* the' Ihey *tre prWaecd befee*Tunyimree^
unce ofCencfal S<
For the USSR, better Slno-Soviet relations arctoe
Diminish the leverage It believes ihe United States enjoys in the triangular relationship.
Permit some reduction of military forces along the Slno-Sovict border.
Promote an cipaoded Soviet role in Alia.
Provide additional momentum to "new thinking" in foreign policy and helpore favorable image of the Soviet Union and its leader.
Progress to Date
Much progress has beea made in Sine-Soviet relations since the Chinese changed lactks and became more receptive to Soviet overtures for better relations in Ihe, bul ihe process has gathered meresince Gorbachev took over5 ticc inset. "Recent Firsts in Sino-Soviclhe two sides arc beginning to seriously address politicalbetween them. The Soviets have already moved part way to satisfy China's demands on ihe three "obstacles":
Efforts io resolve the CambodianproNrm are under way. and the Chinese credit Soviet pressure on Vietnam for Vietnam's recent show of flexibility.
About half the Soviti troop' in Ajttianiuen as ofay have returned home, and the remainder are espeded lo begone by next February.
-Rural Finn I* Sino-Soriet Prlatimxs
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Slno-Soriei trade, static forecade. Prj.ni to Increase, dramatically Two sides resumeaad spons txchanttt. suspended since the
/Wfll.ljt H.
2 Two sides resume political talks at deputy fixeltn minister level, suspended since Invasion of
'wo sides begin second series of political talks on Iniernaiional tsiilislatso at deputy foreignlevel, j
Mw si I'll'I-
Two countries'foMgn ministers meet at Unitedfor first time .v'nee China's^H l
Premier A'khlp<
First Deputy Pnrhfer
Initials series of agreements lofaciliiateties, highest ranking visitor sinceKosygin ,
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5 orbachev receives Politburo member and Viceing ai Chernenko's funeral, first Chinese officialoviet generalWW* lory since Premier Zhou Enlal
China calls USSk "socialist "forfirst time |Hi!- i'l
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Chinese National'Peoples Congress stndsfim parliamentary delegation io USSR In'X years.
.First Soviet briefing uf Chinese tm iheirnegotiations with United Stales.
3
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llburo member and Vice Premier Yaa Yilln iprocates Arkhipov visit, rim first five-year trade agreement ineaneparate aicttrd on technical cooperation. j-
Soviets publish firsi favorable media comment on, Chinese reforms.1
August im
I Soviel iradeunion delegation visits China for first lime Inean.
October im
[Supreme Soviet delegation visits China forime inears
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Soviet Friendship Society delegation visitsor first lime in overears.
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Chinese First Deputy Premier Song Ping stops" Moscow en route home from Easternand sees Gosplan Chairman and candidatevro member Talyiln, ;'
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i ITWvj sides sign agreement permitting resumptionross-border trade, which had been halted In. .
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Firsts in Sino-Soviet Relations continued/
jr 'li
Marc* /M6
Inaugural session of Joint Economic Commits/on.
Gorbachev sets forth his Asian policyajor speech in Vladivostok and makes first1 moveio- li'j ward resolvingemands on the three I .jf obuacles. . jBJ.fiili.'i , [f I t
ISGA consultations.
September)
Candidate Politburo member Tolytln. firstvisitor to pfljtng since rXosygtninalizes agrrtnienis onconomic projects to be undertaken by Soviets In China, j :
L^ilil' ffiiill'lfji Mili)'hi
Polish General Secretary Jaruselskl becomes first1 of five closest East European allies of USSR to visit China ana reestablish pany-to-party ties; the other four Easi European generaleauenlly follow in his path.
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Two sides establish first committee to oversee
Joint development of boundary rivers.
itii)!'tr 'tlri!Wi-'<' lii !i
Soviets end clandestine radiobroadcasts to China.
Febewah IftTf'y
Stno-Sovitt border talks,.suspended since, June
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/I* fGeneral Secretary Zhao Ziyang visitsEau Germany, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria, thus complrilng normalization of relations with USSR's closest allies.
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Soviet consulate in Shanghai and ChineseIn Leningrad, closed during Culturalreopen.
First policy planning talks since, j :1
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Soviet Defense Minister Yazov sends greetings to Chinese counterpart, Zhang Aiping, for PLAfor the first time inears, alt hough China falls to acknowledge it.
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First CPSU congratulatory message to.
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First Chinese delegation to Sovietestivities i
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Chinese publish first interviewoviet general secretary In two decades.
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Soviets publish collection of Deng Xiaoping's speeches. i
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Two sides bold Foreign Ministry eonsuliaitons on
Latin America.
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III
The tw6 si economic ref
root actses still work against each other on many foreign policy issues. Moacow and Beijing have also' moved away from tbe ideological rigidity of the past aar4 found Icomirronatou'nd in the diKUition of their:rm erTortsr! 'j
Cll hold, their flrsl iolnt seminara December.
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Journalists and academics incafcff <aafltry-arelady applauding tbe other's reform efforts in orderto further advance ibe cane of their uwnmfcWeifbrts. Soviet reformers! for example1 recogniic the limitations of tbe USSR's eccnomV reform effort and would like to see tbe USSR emulate .someof China a" agricultural and. ind reforms, ohersas Chinese intellect'ials1 are est watching Soviet political reforms to provide just iii cation for political reform in Chink:
These contacts ari, 'taking place on a
irvdtidini::
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meetings of the foreign ministers at the United Nation* and cf deputy premiersiscun economy relation..', " T|
at the deputy foreign minister level on btlater-
.inset,
al and ioternalional issues (primarily the threes well as the border dispute (tee in "The Sfno-Sovief Border iscussions between lower level foreign ministry officials oh an 'expanding range of issues suchN affairs, tha Middle East. Latin America, and armslesumed parliamentary, academic, scicnUric. am cultural exchanges.
Oo the economic front, ihe changeseen moreoth sides arc no- -illing to admit that trade can facilitate accomplishment of their respectivereform efforts:
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rade roughly quadrupledery lowSee
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ides arc once again signing long-term tradeprobably will meet the goal ofotal trade turnoverillion by ihe end of the current live-year agreement
Cross-border trade (tbat Is. trade tbat is negotiated by local oRkial* in the border regions at opposed to trade negotiated by central miniftries in Moscow and Beijing) has resumed and grown rapidly. The (wo sides arc developing tbe infrastructure (that is. building new rail lines, expanding rWerine port capacity, establishing; joint ventures, and so forth) lhat will support an even greater expansion.
a The two sides have also successfullyew series of blanket economic accords under the terms of which Moscow ultimately hopes to send several hundred technicians to China to refurbish aboutof the hundreds of factories built during the heyday of Sino-Soviet collaboration and provide crediti and personnel for the construction of
SOviel merchant and fishing ships are bemsIn Chinese harbors.
The two sides have exchanged more thanroups of economc specialists and agreed in principle to undertake other cooperative projects in agriculture, fisheries, meteorology, nonferrous metallurgy, pet-roc hem kali, machine building, oil and natural gas, and railways.
t the prc-peef ror
see DlAwoament SO* ST-IOONX (Se-
RtZmPTjnrt tU'h. in
'other is substantially Jess threatening decade .W
De-pite this improveraent. the relationship is still more adversarial thanooperative. China si ill
uses the obstacles to modulate theof improve-,
meat in Iks to the USSR, to ckmomtrate its eorjcem over Soviet actions thltc, affect China'sd; also to preveni Sino-Soviet. relations from adversely1 affecting its relations |wilh the Uniied States.art of this strategy; China ihiisfar has stalled on;Soviet aiiernpts toummil. exchange visiu between foreign minUiersandr resume party-tc-party ties. (SU Inset. "Si no-Soviet Ccooera
| lion in Conteiti.")
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Factors Likely To Affect Srao-Sorkl Retallorr* to Ih* Nnl Two to Three Year*
Sottet Internal Scene-The Role of Gorbache-Gorbachev has already demonstrated an ability lo modify long-held Soviet pesiikMU elsewhere in the world, and he also appears to be moving in thisis China: , j
fast Sir*>Sovieim will improve in the two to three yairs will depend on internal Mats In both China and the USSR, coRlinti tt effortsesolve longstanding Chinesea* symboli-ed by the threee flexibility regarding Ihcse grievances, the of US relations with both couniries. and theof other countries ewer which ihc two ad*er-saries have bui limited influence.1"
In a
peech io Vladivostok inorbachev ifirsi signaled his intention to improve relations, eniage Ihe Chinese leadership directly, and deal wiih China's obstacles. (See insel. "Gorbachev's Statements on
has replaced most of his predecessors' keyho were more interested inpropaganda points against the Chinese than in
flexiblemistakesand recognized ihc need toto halt China's drift to lhe ad--'nd on Gorbachev'sandi
noted above,as moved at least part way to raohre China's demands on the three obiucles.:'
The reatills of lhe sooo-lo-be-completed surveyhe SiBr>Sdviet border could provide Got bachevace-saving way to show further flexibiliiy on ibe
Slaolailii- Ch'Bts* KrornVnoloBiMv lile ihWmncrnaiKar.XMad Carat thwric* -bwi the boh.vtor of, ilamfe -Mliw.arertaseribr-e Iww. twlitJy the-aai-wrr* lo be dm the Uf iheir respeeinM
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Sebcet
Tbe Simr-Soriet Border DHif. m
Chinese had Ion* resented Russian territorial aggrandizement at Iheir expense Inh cenia* ty. hut It wasuntil after the turrets ofhinese Revolution and the downturn in Sino-Soviet relations In thehai it became seriouselations between Moscow and Beijins. Tbe Soviets were greatly alarmed bp Chinese territorial claims, which they sawundamental threat to the security of the Soviet |Chinese claims werea major factor precipitatingtheSaviet military buildup opposite
hem^Chimfsclaiau6ritChina was demanding that Moscow aekneywi' edge lhat ll had lunjuslly" acquiredillion squarrhllometers of territory in Central Asia andAmur River, Basin inh j'lhe relurkftfquare kilometers in the Panilrs,n Ike AmurUtsurl Rivers, and several small-er trocts of land In the Sino-Seriri-Mongolian triborder area that China rtaln^edTlnrUSSR had acquired In excess ofh-century treaties.
first round of talks was held shortly before Khrushchev's ousterri. but then Chinaon the Cultural Revolution, and there were no more talkstint It after lhe Sine-Sovietborderclashes9he order talks served as the only dlrtctchdnnel afXamba^sadorltil co*|
two sides.oscow, fearing that China was only pre-senltng^ttst"on the territorial question.
steadfastly refused to acknowledge theh-century treaties A' the first roundhe Soviets agreed In principle to use the thalweg Imaln naviga'hn channel)principle toresolveihe rlverinr border dispute, but they tried lo retain ownenhip of two key islands opposite Khabarovsk by mamiatntng that the main navigation channels of the rivers flowed south and west of the islands imtead of north and east as ihry In fact do. China reportedly offered4 to relinquish its claim to lhr Pamir_ area but later withdrew lhe offer/
The current series of negotiations resumed in7 after Gorbachev went puMic with the thalweg offer and the plans for Soviet troop withdrawals from Mongolia were announced. In Ihe negotiation! that have taken place start then, the Chinese hove mt raised the unequal treaties of the lest century, and the two sides agreed once again to focus first on trying to resolveree-ments on the-nvenne- border. Despitepereh. there Is still some uncertainly regarding Moscow's Intention! on the islands oppositeThe Soviets may eventually be willing to acknowledge Chinese ownership ef thnieut will probably withholdontrssion umil China seems more willing to make comprtimiscs in return, such as abandoning Its claim to the Pamir region. The Soviets will also probably be careful to claim thai Ihe natural flow of the river has changed the border In order to avoidrtcedenlfor tythrr disputed territories along the USSR's border!
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Rtctnt Mttttmy i
f <eow jomr JOO.ftXJloboui Si divisions) 'stint- anillionese troops (about SI divisions) along tht Sino-Soviet border and in Mongolia.
integrating tome of them Imo the group armies and modernizing their armor and artillery.il will take years for China to acquire all Ihe advanced wtapont It needf to ensure these divisions canull-scale Sonet assault
Gorbachev took over in IMS. the Soviets have continued.odernize ihe equipment of the forces they have stationed there and htnttwo more mobilisation divisions to acmealbeit at low readiness levels. Soviet faeces, though substantially ttss numerous than those of the Chinese,onsiderable edge in mobility end firepower. We estimate they ore capable efhinese attack into the USSR end ofuick counterattack.apable ofimited offensive intoChina To take end hold ell cf northeastern China, however^ would require Ihe doubling cf the force or the usttof nuclear weapons. We believe thai the Soviets would be highly reluctant1 to Initiate Ike use if nuclear weapons against China, for limited objectives because of the dangertialletory strike.
Beijing, which foe years planned to defend China by luring iken deep, now plansovltt tnvasionfrom thefirtl defensible terrain. Accordingly, since ihe, China has been reorganizing and rteaulpping its forcesore conventional combined-arms defense.ome Si Chlneie Maneuver armies [have been . Wganiied intoorepowtrfut Combined-arms formations called "groupnd China has strengthened Iii IS border defense divisions by
The Soviets want to reduce the militarywith the Chinese before China completes modern!jaiton of its fortes. Toward that end. ihey have repeatedly proposed agreements on nonuse of force, military confidenct-building measures, end/or force reduction talks. China has repeatedly rejected these proposals. Since Gorbachev took over, the USSR has taken additional unilateral measures, such as the withdrawalivision from Mongolia and tht planned drstntction ef itsorce in Asia. We cannot confirm but do not rule out Ihe validity of Minister of Defense Ya-toe's recem claims thai they have also reduced their forces along the Slno-Soviel border^
/China recognizrT
thai none of these actions has as yet substantially reduced ike Soviet military threal and thus far at least has eontlnued to reject Soviet proposals on military confidence-building measures and/or force redueilon talks. China could agreeialogue, however, if thereino-Scniet border treaty or If it came lo believe lhat thtre would be no significant cost in Items of its relations with ihe Westf
unlikely in the time frame of this Estimate, both wo and the Chinese believe that Gorbachev's ouner'wouM diminish the procpecu for continuing mprovement in Sirvo-Soriet relations. Both we and the Chinese also believe that, if Gorbachev hhe almost certainly would be replacedender more cauUoua about domestic reform andeiibsc on foreign policy.hange, nsoreoyer, would cause the Chinese to review their assessment
he
about the direction of Soviet policy and perhaps significantly dampen their inclination to deal with USSR.
Cainaw InternalRole of Oe-g
While Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping has been an important obstacle to more rapid Improvement In Sino-Soviej.ttes. some Chinese are now saying that he
Cooperation in Context
irer'.<
Theand ecohonucfcffi comparedjo iheSuch contacts throughout the second half ofat!
would like io cap bit career by taking part into complete the "normaliation" ofebtionijjuit ai he completed theof Sino-t'S relationshisDeng's ailHudeesults frorrj lhein US-SovirJt relations and his ChangedGorbachev^ While Deng initially thoughthis policies represcnicd nothing morewine In new! bottles, he has gradually dome tdthai Gorbachev is serious about reform,prolonged internaUonal breathing space, andedncesitoni' on issues Importanthina.Deng eipecli that ihe Soviets under
Postpone thebaestjlVniiliu^
Uniiednd seek par tj a: lower farce levc
through -'mi,coatroJ. j.
SeVet
hr USSR accounted for nu-re than half of China 's foreign trade ard China accounted for one-fifth of Soviet foreign trade:he Soviets accounted forercent of Chinasthe Chinese forercentrade.
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> of Iheolanned Sino-Soviet eat-
cooperation projecis will not belhe Chinese plant managers were freeequipment and did. Even ifother factories lo rrplaceproject! In China will be dwarfeduch projects China hatwith the i,
The potential for continued growth in Sino-Soviet economic lies is limited by both sides' desire to export iheir better goods to the West for bard currency and by China's concern nol lo give lhe USSR lhe leverage il once enjoyed over economy.
Reduce reliance on military power a* the primary Instrument for expanding the USSR's influence.
There probably wouldemporary slowdown in the process of improving Srrro-Sc*>ct relations if Deng were lo die within Ihc time frame of this Estimate, but we believe it more likely than not ihai lhe succession will gosrnoothly and that Deng's foreign and domes-licies will survive him. Nonetheless, given mod-history and Ihc problems accompanying -omlc and political moderni-ation efforts,ule out the possibilityharp shift in poliey toward the USSR once Deng goes. In even if China opts for more emphasis on
At Vladivostok InoeboehoMoscow 'tt plant lo broaden In overall economic^and political role In Asia and stakedlaim for ftce Soviel Involvement Insian security ittuel. But his main message was/or ike Chinese. Gorbachev Indicated lhal;
smitl'.j
hal-
(rill
TheScrtetsiftrtprepandtoaece^ weg (the mam ncrvigailon channel, principle to resolvevwiW border dispute,'thetyby in. public that hMoscw nvu)Blgtiu;ant Islands opposite Khabarovsk:
hdt had
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btockett dgrityient In the past
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Announced that the USSR wouldmall number.uj' troops from Afghanistan and wot engagedInialks with the.Mottgollans about Mihdrawiing troops front! thai country.
Although the Soviet withdrawal fromwot'ham, and the Mongolian withdrawal cam* onlyubstantial strengthening In tht Mongolian armed forces, ll was the first time any Soviet leader hadhow,esponding io China'sonthe three obstacles.1
Gorbachev, hmvever. failed to address the Issue that most concerned the Chinese:acking for Vietnam's occupation yCmr^
In on Interview with the-Indonesian]cm the first, anniversary of theleaderwillingness toovifi INF agreement, thustheadditional'j,! lil'T
Improving relation, wiih the USSR, wc would not eapoct Beijing toenuinely equidivtuni posi-lion oci*ccn Ihe Uniicd States and the USSR or change the prevailing Chinese view that Moscow poacs the great cm long-term threat to China's aecuri-ty. Any likely successor leadctshlp, moreover, will sec the open door to ihe Westseful counterbalance to Moscow and ai the main source for technology needed for economic and military moderni/atton and thus would continue lo protect China's Western tics from loo much improvement in relations with Mos-
External Influences on Slnc-Soiiet Reunions Although not as important as the internaldriving each state, other countries have had and will continue to have some influence on the evolving bilateral relationship. The United States is the most important of these players,umber of other countries on China's periphery also loom large!
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The US factor. Improving Sino-Soviel relations may limit US leverage in the triangular ictaiionsbip, but US influence depends more on US bilateral relations with the USSR and China ihan on reunions between Moscow and Beijing (see Inset, 'The Evolving US Relationship With ihe USSR andiven China's more extensive lies lo the West, the United States has had and will continue to have somewhat more influence on Chinese nolicj thanv.fi policy.
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in Washington and will bly calculate that lificam improvement of the recent warm-
Until recently, China's fear that developing tooelationship with Moscow too fast would endanger Western assistance for its modernization effort led the Chinese leadership to draw out the oormaliration of lis relations With the USSR and downplay itsNow that US-Soviet relations have improved, however, the Chinese seem to feciisadvantage in the triangular relationship and are moving to right the imbalance by trying to upgrade their own relations wilh Ihe USSR- The Chinese are still concerned about
il adverse illy, bul they Washington will accept eyenino-Soviet relations ing of US'Sovicl relations
Igor A. Kogneke*|
oreign MinisterMinistry of Foreign AJJain Senior Sim-loginJ |
Trained SimJogm from Institute for Oriental Studies Key piajcr in implc-mrnung and rcrhar* even furmulaling Soviet ChinaWdl received by Chinese inormerly. Chief, MFAs First Far East DipillMHIhief.Southeast Asia Departmenthief. China Desk. Blwjepartment. CPSU Central. Served inashington. Speaks fluent English and i' , i! I
Olet A Troyaaoetkiy
Amtaiiaatifr to Chinai. j j
Career diplomat* special assbtanl to both Khrushchev and Kosygin and has long cspeiicmce ir United States, having aiicndcd high school and one year of college here jli Wreceived byermanent Rcnrcwntalivc to United Nationsmbassador to. Trained al (Design Isasgaugc institute inpeaks IJiclbh. Japanese, and :';
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Zeagpei
Vice Farrign Minister far Sarin and Eatt European AJfairt tuner
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Hcadt biannual normaliMiion and border talk* withoviet affairs specialist who studied in. USSR, served in Chinese Embassy. Former, Ambassador lo Yugoslavia.. Produce, informed, Speaks.
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Hongliang
ll- 'l" I' '" til :
Entire career' devoted to Sovietlayed direct rote in easing tensions as head of MFA's Soviet aad East European Affairs. Sent toas special ensoy2 to offset impact of Sino-USugust
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The trot'i't US Relationship Wilh the USSR : jl,|
The US relationship milk China and the USSR has passed through three distinct phases:
lfthlui"- 1 '! j Until the Slnc-Scniel rpilt tmrrged in thej open, the Semen utter In the strongestbeeamse ihe. United Siattt had. no rein-tlonshlp(ai
Chinese.'. . i! i
USSR that now hadrtpartfor the
tSllltywoj/ Wit wa'l j
"ivi
Now that StnoX "Otiet relations are Imp it has become more difficult for any one of the
against
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three countries loIheath oiher.(
Then the odvavtlage shifted to the ilnJied States, because! In accepting the reality of the Slno-Sovitl spill okJ.Oitfmt to Improve,ons withht United StairsHngctnirtedbjbenh sides and It wosSSR that now had to prepare for the jjji f mi
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Conflict Over Cambodia. China has long made,this utuc the number-ooe obstacle to belter Sirao-Soviet relations and the litmus test of Soviet intentions. After, nearlyja dccadclof conflict, however, theof all parties in the dispute appear'io be in flus and the prospectsolitical settkmehl have
improved:
bri' ij 51
The USSR Isettlement ih order to
improve relations with China and other East Asian countries as well Jut reduce the burden of aiding Vicinam. Moscow-appears
eadyuri more risk of friction with Vietnam to accomplish these goals. Moscow, moreover, probably could live wiih athai allows real powerew Cambodian regime. j
China, which wants lo aaokd appearing obitroction-totj.has'eshibited more flexibility,o demand ttlfult withdrawal of Vietnamese troops and the dissolution of the Vietnamese puppet regime in Cambodia
Althoagh ibc obstacle* in the wayettlement arc mil formidable, the Chinese appear to have redefined the Cumbodinn obstacle soietnamese timeia-ble toorces before Ihe endO svoold satisfy Chinese demand* for progress and pave the wayi no-Soviet uammil meeting.*!
ii |
The Impact of the Afghan Settlement. Afghanistan
; was always tht least Important of the threerom Beijing's perspective. Nonetheless, the beginning of Soviet withdrawals probably helped convince the Chinese that the Soviet* were, as they claimed, really pressing Vietnam to resolve the Cambodian problem. Completion of the Soviettlhdrav.al may encourage
i! China lo further upgrade the Sino-Soviet political dialogue.
On the other hand. China resents how Moscow, intheew years, has exploitedconcerns about China's growing tics toStales lo enhance its influence inChinese expense. China is aho disturbed bysuccess in gaining overflight nghis fromthat enhances its intelligence capabilitiesChinese forces in the region as thepro quo for providing aonhisticatedto P'yongyang China will try to keepbelow the flashpoint, however, lest the ! |i' i
aut-mmmkepecialMdtwiwc IWMUK.SMI.mtHMtia rrrnptriimil i
inptrnmoHe aejrulihnTe |
Aavr* Korea. The Sinn-Soviet rivalry 'or influence incuts both oayt.Onihcone hand. Moscow and Beijingommon desire tn moderate North Korean behavior, arc both uneaihuuaMic about North Korean leader Kim Il-song's plans to have his !ton succeed him. arc developing trade and other tics to the South, and will go to the Seoul Olympics in spile of Pyongyang's opposition Moreover.could be trie venue for the highcsi-lcvel -if largelymeeting in nearly two decades1 if President Gromyko travels there for Northh anniversary cekotaisom neat month and meets with his Chinese counterpart. Yang Shangkun.
tm
Sestet
While theSovicU and the Chinese will continue to compete for influence in Western Europe and in ihe Third World, there is no one country that Is likely to have the same kind of impact on Sino-Soviel relations ai the countries mentioned above.
(Sino-Sovici
influence in lokyo lacled afterfaiiod to prevent the eoncluauonl of the peace treaty between China' arid Japannd prbbab .will not reeriverge tnjlbe. Efforts by theourt Japan lag.far bchind.lheir dea mgs
i
Other Acio*i. Rdiiions could alsoec led b> _
other internationali
'Ml' f fil I!
Intensified eonllct in the Spratly Islands wouldMoscow'sjefforu to balance) Relations be-tweea Hanoi and Beijing.
China proUbl^lould bold Sino-Soviet retail hostageessation of any Sino-lndian confila.
Indo-Paktstani hostilities would lead both Moscow and Beijing to encourage moderation by theirallies IrV order to prevent juris issue'fr'omoviet relsu
i hi >rnlthough (he Ihb Estimate, desk aga'ln
relations! ""
: against it during (he course of menu In Easiefnownturn'iji Sino-Swiel
tWori
jllh
Prospects foro.lri Relations Oier lheo Three Years
ii*
The USSR and China have almost always been rivals and sometime* adversaries, even when they ostensibly were friends. The Sino-Soviet relationship ofas the historical exception, nol the rule, ll Came into existenceesult of China's isolation and iu fears that the Uniied States would seek io overiurn the Chinese revolution. Now that these fears have disappeared and China Is stronger and no longer isolated, the Intelligence Community judges lhal there is no chanceeturn to ihe kind of superior/ subordinate relationship thai prevailed in, Even Soviel officials admit this. Developmentess hostile, more "normal" relationship, however,irtual certainly. The issue during lhe time frame of this Eathnatc is how far and bow fast the (wo sides are likely to move.
Until recently, the Chinese response to Gorbachev hasairly cautious one. Wc believe, however, thai Chinese attitudes toward the USSR arc changing and lhatabout Gorbachev's Internal position, encouraged by the Soviet actions lo satisfy China's demands on the three obstacles, and anxious loerceived imbalance in the Sino-Sovict-USon ihe serge of or may have recentlyecision to accelerate il^disloguc with the USSR.P
17
i.ny ksc ot the vans. We |i
Important indicators of progress wilt includeeiulis of (he planned Sino-Soviet discussions on Cambodia, the annuel meeting of the two countries' foreign ministers at the United Nations,an' Interaciion between th* Soviet* and the Chinese. September anniversary festivllle* lii P'yongyang, think therecticr-than-cven chaMe thatesult of all thesehe iwo sidca will agree to go forward With the long-postponed exchange of foreign ministers* villi* they1 agreed to In rlrinciple5 aod then never scheduled. The first nichcould com* tbii fall, but probably not until afler the US Presidentiali" Nove^ber|j |
If it |'| iHI'ii1'* I'll* i I|:
Whether the China* then decide to exchange visili by the iwo countries' premiers or opt directlyummit probably Will depend to tome extent on'their assessment of the probable reaction In the United Slates. Given the fact lhat Gorbachev hascl with President'Reagan^our limes, however, we think it more likely than not thai the Chinese will use the foreign ministers' visits to begin laying the
ill
Esti mate..the t
A Sino-Soviet summit would be used by the two sides to make further progress toward resolving the three obstacles and the border, dispute. Whether any of these Issues will go' awayesultumtrilt It much less dear.ine-Soviet summit probably would end with the Issuance ofdocument | that would acknowledge the improvement in relations that has taken place1 andatummit might also result in formal reestablishment of pan>-to-partyal'wouidj ihak'e it easier for'the two'sides lo' exchange party as avell as government delegations, although we think this less likelynt meeting The Chinese would be concernedossible negative reaction in the United Stales and might opt to reserve this conecssioaater meeting.i'.tt
- lU-'i'-jlljBy the end of the period of thi
rjy mcut
sidescouldjagrcejtp;open talks to reduce forcesalong! the border.'Therekalsd some chance, lhat they will reach agreement on'tijeir border d'
Even under the best of circumstances, however, wc bclioc thai Sino-Soviet relations are wr likely to progress to the point where Chino movesruly equidistant position in the trilateral relationship und (lops competinglh Ihc Soviets elsewhere in the world. Past disputes, lingering distrust,rivalry, and conflicting national ambitions will continue to bound the reconciliation and promote
There are some places in the world new whereof the Soviets and the Chinese arc closerothers thane to the United States.of these cases, appearances arclargely rhetorical positions on Nicaraguadebt question are aimed mainlyhirdto demonstrate China's independenta number of UN issues and armshowever, w* expect to see some increasemultilateral forums as overall'!
China has already purchased limited amounts of.some dual-useas passenger aircraft,telecommuncations ecuipmni. andfrom Moscow aad its East European allies. And we expect Sino-Soviet'military contacts In develop In parallel with the expanded politicalthere are reports that Soviet and Chinese border troops are already holding weekly meetings. But.o not believe that the military contacts will result in rnajor arms sales, advanced technology transfer, or genuine military cooperation. The Chinese hope that, by sclectivrly purchasing US military equipmenl and know-how, ihey will be able lo catch up with Soviet technological development. Wc think, therefore, that Beijing would be reluctant to risk its nascent military* ties to the United States by engaging in significant military purchases from the USSR. And Moscow, for its part, while desirous of slowing the developing Sino-US military relationship, probably would be reluctant to provide the kind of high-technology equipmenl ihc Chinese would likely seek.
iM'tlFJ!
Sei^et
for th* United Stain
'l r
Continuediimprovcmcnl In Sino-Sovict relationsncrease Sovtet and Chinese leverage in relations with! ihe Uniiod Stale* and idd lo Gorbachev's imageeacemaker. The already minimal potential for Sino-Sovkt military conflict will recede even further. This will increase the pressure on the United States1 to "articulate its polkfcsore challenging politicalnvironment. In addition, tbe more rapid Ihe pace of improvements in SinoSovlei relations, the morewill be Iheir impact on US freedom of maneuver in East-Asia. For esampfc, in anof triangular dclente. Japan probablyjwfll be under greater pressure lo improve lts|relaliotK.wilh the Soviel Union. Moreover, if tbe Image Of the Soviet military threat in East Asia is dinunished, US allies may see less need to spend money on defense or
permit US military access.
The Improvement! in Sino-Soviet relations envisioned in this Estimate will not, in our view, fundamentally threaten US interests over the next two to three years:
ll ,; I
ummit and/or resumption of party.to-partyill make.itfor the two sidesib' coordinate actions where their, interests coincide, .But they will remain competltoea pursuing iheir own very different geopolitical interests.
Resolution of the border dispute and initiation of an arms control dialogue would make it possible for the Soviets and the Chinese to draw down forces along their common border. We believe, however, thai those forces would not be redeployed to measurably augment ihe threat to NATO or to US allies in the Pacific. The Soviets can. nonetheless, be expected to use any reductions to press the United States and its allies into accepting similar cult.
i If improved relation* arc perceived a* threatening. Asian countries may seek greater US support.
Increased Sino-Sovici economic and scientific and technological interchange will increase the chances that Moscow may gain access to Westernnow denied it. Because China does not want to Strengthen iu primary adversary or jeopardize its own access to such technology. ii will act to limit Sovkt gains. Any technology leakage from China will be less significant than that taking place else-where in ihe world, particularly In Western Europe and the non-Communist countries of East Asia.
I .1
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IB. !
Original document.
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