document consistsages.opies. Series C.
East European Military Reliability
An Emigre-Based Assessment (Annex) (U)
Alexander Alexiev and A. Ross Johnson
With the assistance ol Barbara Kliszewski
approved for rf.lfasr date: 4
East European Military Reliability
An Emigre-Based Assessment (Annex) (U)
Alexander Alexiev and A. Ross Johnson Wilh the assistance of Barbara Kliszewski
may have access to intefr proper use ot Inteflioence
Neither foreign nationals nor invnfgrant mi um, hum ocnce information without proper authority. Questions TTrnrtino ffl mailon in Rand generated material should oe referred to the Rand in
This classified Annex to RAHDast European Military Reliability: An Etnigce-Ba.ied Assessment, by Alexander Alexiev and A. Ross Johnson, with the assistance of 9aroara Kliszewski,xplains the use. government inceiliger.ee report?upplement to the RAND interview database generated for theompares our findings with those of earJior classified studies and appraisals,riefly notes the relevancy Of selectedestimony to Western policy studies that explore ways of reducing NSvn? reliability.
EAST EUROPEAN MILITARY RELIABILITY: AN EMIGRE-BASED ASSESSMENT (ANNEX) (U)
CJ) INTELLIGENCE DATA CM RELIABILITY
obtained through the RAND interviews. Those' materials, however.
EJr.igre and defector debriefings conducted. government (USG) channels are generally focused on "harder" issues than those examined in -his study, although some of those reports provide data on the various factors of reliability and unreliability examined in Sections IIeview of all USG debriefings anc other intelligence itatecials available for use in this project has produced no data that contradict or significantly correct the data
provide some independent corroborativehus more attention to some "soft" factors in official debriefings may be warranted to provide additional inputs to reliability assessments.
USG debriefingsew defector estimates of reliability that supplement our respondents' views (presented in Section VI. Tne USG reports stress unreliability more than do our
ided information on the tensions between officers, sr.e ni censerr.ri sc-fcsve junior officers, on
testified to Alt UUIauUnoer' to resist a Soviet invasion
a Soviet visit to Air Force headquarters
fficera were accused of potential disloyalty, just as they
robably because estimates in debriefings are generallylie abstract. When appliedpecific military context, the implications for reliability in USG reports aeern in line with ihe views of our respondents.
For example, the
in the iai,e>
aintained that NSWP tioops are basically unreliable but would march because they would have no way to desert as long as an advance was successful. Massive desertions could result, nowever, if Soviet forces rctrcitcd. fn the view oi this Czechoslovak officer, the Soviets did not nave highho reliability cf any of their allies; they judged tho Bulgarians and East Germans to be the most reliable, followed by the Poles, Hungarians, Romanians, and Czechoslovaks.2
Occasional reports from Soviet sources also provide some indication of Soviet appraisals of NSWPoviet: serviceman maintained that in the Soviet army, "all allies were viewed with various degrees ofxcept for the Bulgarians, who wore considered fully reliable. The NPA andprior to but not. afterere considered reliable; the Hungarians and the CPA were considered mostly reliable; and Romania was considered unreliable.3
Jin conversations with western officials, Soviets have openly disparaged the reliability of the Romanian armed forces* and the "fascist" ch&zactex of the East Germans.5
(UJ USG AND NATO APPRAISALS OF NSWP RELIABILITY
(U) We could locateandful of classified studios on ssw? reliability. These studies parallel the unclassified literature sr. East. European military reliability reviewed inhe msr. extensive classified work. Army study that analyses some of the sane factors contributing to and detracting irom reliability that are examined in the present BAND study.*
(Hi The Army study concludes that the NPA would "respondall by Lhe Warsaw Pact or Soviet Union for hostile ac-icn against the West and would be particularly effective in the shortts) reliabilityonger duration conflict. or. one in which setbacks were experienced, ir.ighthe study statesliberation" attempt by the FPG would be misunderstood, would confirm Communist propaganda, and would be opposed.
(U) Similar conclusions are drawn about the Polish and Czechoslovak armies. The study does not assess the reliability of the PPA in short conflict but expresses doubts "that the Polish Army wouldeliable military force in conducting offensive actions of long duration against theIt foresees vigorous opposition to any incursion into Poland from the West, and "localised, occasionally intensive" military resistanceoviet invasion of Poland. The study estimates that the CPA would be "coerced to engage in operations against West Germanyarsaw Pact offensive" until setbacks occurred or the absenceest
6 (UJ USAREUR, Non-Soviet Warsaw PactTier2 (originally Secret;reviewed for public release) .
Senna tt invasior. threat became evident.estern invasion of Czechoslovakia would meet with strong resistance.
. Army study7 focused primarily on non-military sectors drew roughly the same conclusions regarding Polish reliability:
it is generally believedonflict of short duration would probably be supported by Polar.ci. Butong, protracted conflict were to develop, especially lone in which) Foi.inriuffer huge losses. :orJ one directedountry not recognized by Poland as an aggressor. Poland's military reliability would be lessened.
The study concludes that reliability would bo diminished if Polish units had to fight far from Poland and if Poles perceived no iirmediate threat to their homeland.
(U) Our emigre-based assessment of NSwp reliability isn line with this analysis, providing empirical support, forconclusions and qualifying them.2 Army study pointedumber of frictions within the NPA that threatened reliability, including NCO-officer conflict, lack cf ideological commitment, and lackatriotism. It stressed the negative impact on the PPA of involvement in8 invasion of Czechoslovakia and the suppression of the Gdansk unresthe lack of ideological commitment, nnd officer-ifCO frictions. Our interviews suggest that these problems have worsened since thend thus constitute even more significant challenges to reliability today.
7 (U) USAREUR. eliability Study2 (Secret)
(U) IMPLICATIONS FOR NATO POLICY
(O) Neither western studies of the Warsaw Pact (classified and unciassifiedl nor available USG defector debrief ir.gs dealing with NSwp armed forces discuss specific Western policiesariable that could affect the relative degree of NSWP reliabilityarsaw Pact conflict with NATO. American officials and specialists have recently called for explicit attention to possible Western policies that could have that effect.10
ill) it was not within the scopethe present study to consider whether nnd hew specific Western peacetime, crisis, or wartime policy treasures might impact on East European military reliability. Nonetheless, our project interviews do contain testimony relevant to Folicy studies of this issue. These points arc noted briefly below:
The subject of Western influence on NSWP reliabilityreceived little or no thought by NSWPiscussion of this issue.
Some respondents do suggest, directly Or indirectly, afeaturesATO-Warsaw Pact conflict that wouldreliability and arc potentially susceptible toreliability will be lower againstenemies; it will be lower outside nationalmuch higher in the case cf combat on national territory; it.
(rjj Fred C. Ikle, Address to the Wehrkunde Conference, Munich, West Germany, DOD news, Marchdward B. Atkcson. "The "Fault Line' In the Warsaw Pact: Implications for NATOrbls,
will be reduced oi will collapse ir. the eventrotracted conflict -
t Respondent testimony suggests chat there js considerable unrealized potential for western information sources, primarily radio broadcasting, to affect the outlook and reliability oi NSWP soldiers, in peacetime as well as in crises." western
information could reduce their senseATO threat to their own countries by making it clearer that NATO Isirror-image of the Warsaw Pact and chat, operationally as well as
it dees not threaten Eastern Europe.
could illuminate the aggressive, offensive, and anti-national characteroviet offensive in which NSWP armies would be involved and, ir. large measure, sacrificed as cannon fodder. Western media could provide East Europeansore
realistic picture of the military balance in Europe.
U) Respondent testimony suggests constraints that Western pclicy measures aimed at enhancing Soviet-East European frictions would have to overcome to be effective. Theseerception of Soviet stake and power, and American distance and relative disinterest; historical memory of Western lack of support for East European independence in thend the difficulty of offering credible Western incentives for NSWP military passivity
o the best of our knowledge, there have been no Western radio broadcasts "targeted" or, the NSWP armies since West Germany ended its broadcasts to the NPA in. western broadcasting includes very few programs on Warsaw Pact military affairs in general.Original document.