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Director of




Gorbachev's Policy Toward the United

Special National Intelligence Estimate

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L The US Factor in Gorbachev's Policy

Agenda: Policies and



A More Activist Foreign

The Domestic Political Setting for Foreign

Soviet Strategy and Tactics Toward the United

Assessment of the



Reeional and Other

Outlook for Soviet Policy Toward the United States:


Variables In Foreign

Conclusions: Arms Control. Summitry, and

ANNEXegional Profile of Soviet Foreign

ANNEX B: Exaggeration or Duplicity in Soviet


This Special National Intelligence Estimate assesses the policies of the Gorbachev regime toward the United States during the6bc remaining term of the current US administration. This Estimate was stimulated in part by interest in tbe degree to which Soviet domestic economic conditions encourage accommodation with the United States on key security Issues. The Estimate discusses Gorbachev's broader foreign policy aims primarily aieet US-Soviet relations and does not attempt an exhaustive analysis of Soviet foreign policy in all areas.

Section II summarizes our assessment of current Soviet economic, military, and overall foreign policies and their prospects, Gorbachev's internal political position, and the bearing of these factors on Soviet policy toward the United States in the next two years. Section III gives our assessment of current Soviet policy toward the United States and the calculations shaping it. Section IV presents conclusions and the outlook for the next two years.

The discussion in Section IV rests largely on the assumption that US policies and positions with respect to arms control and regional security issues remain substantially constant We have not attemptedto hypothesize the impact of alternative US policies.

KEY judgments

The Gorbachev regime aims to re-create some sort of detente relationship with the United States to ease the burden of arms competition and, accordingly, the task of domestic economic revival Because the detente they seek reduces US challenges lo Soviet interests Soviet leaders believeelationship can help preserve and advance" the USSR's international influence and Its relative military power Gorbachev seeks to relax East-West hctfilityrotracted period-he is looking ahead through theto suspend the competition but to put the USSR in an improved long-term positionloballysuperpower.

These aims have persuaded the Soviets to pursue an active engaged policy toward the United States. It is focused on arms control (supportedigorous worldwide propaganda offensive) and on the prospect of US-Soviet summits (exploited for leverage to moderate US policies and encourage concessions on armshe Soviets strive to deflect the Reagan administration away from security policies that,6he las*lwo vears. the Soviets see as severely challenging to them and lo discourage such hostile US policies from being carried forward into the next US administration

The Soviets realize, however, that their engaged policy toward the United States risks legitimizing hostile policies of the currentby muting Western anxieties about them arid" 'seeming to show that theyound basis for dealing with Moscow. Managing this riskelicate problem for the new Soviet leadership. There are differing points of view in Moscow about how toiplomacy sufficiently forthcoming to encourage US concessions while minimizing this risk Despite such controversies, we believe Gorbachev has the political strength to forge Politburo consensus behind the initiatives and decisions he favors in dealing with the United States.

The central Soviet objective in bilateral dealings with the United States and in the surrounding Soviet diplomacy and propaganda toward US Allies and Western publics is revival of the arms control framework ofr creationimilar successor system. The Soviets seeramework as serving their political, military, and economic Interests. It would provide an important element of predictability that would ease the balancing of military requirements and economic revitalization in. And, should its political side effectslagging of overall US defense efforts such as occurred in the.

so much the better. Gorbachev Is more prepared lhan his predecessors to consider substantial reductions of offensive nuclear forces inramework for reasons that include cost avoidance, increasing interest in enhancing the quality of Soviet nonnuclear forces,esire to undermine the credibility of US nuclear strategies. The main Soviet motive for considering and negotiating about Urge nuclear force reductions at present is to undermine the US strategic defense initiative (SDI).

To be acceptable to theomprehensive strategic arms control framework that includes substantial reductions of offensive nuclear forces must provide effective constraints on the US SDI. through formal agreement that limits the program and political effects that they calculate would kill it eventually. Despite its uncertain future, the Soviets are deeply concerned about SDI because It mightilitary and technological revolution and could undermine the war-fighting strategies of Soviet nuclear forces. In the extreme, the Soviets genuinely fear that SDI could give the US confidence itamage-limiting first-strike capability. To beosition to counter SDI. the Soviets believe they must preserve large ballistic missile forces and the option to expand them. For both economic and military reasons, they wish to avoid the costsompetition to develop and counter advanced ballistic missile defenses in which the United States has the technological Initiative. Their campaign against SDI aims to deny the United States that Initiative; but they wjll proceed to develop advanced defense technologies in any event, as they did following the ABM Treaty

Despite the seriousness of Soviet economic ditneuities and the longer term importance to Moscow of easing East-West tensions to help address them, we believe lhat these difficulties do not place Gorbachev under so much pressure that he must make fundamental concessions to the United States on major security issues during the next two years. Gorbachev believes he can hold out for an arms control frameworkarger US-Soviet security relationship generally on his terms, while putting political pressures on Washington to make key concessions, particularly on SDL'

Gorbachev believes thatiplomacy appearing flexible to American and European audiences, especially on arms control, can put pressure on Washington and test the possibilities that may exist for real US concessions. More innovations in Soviet arms control positions of the sort Corbachev has already introduced are likely il he believes they can

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kelp him achieve constraints on SDI and otlicr US defense programs. New unilateral gestures, such as modest cuts in military manpower or in the officially stated defense budget, are possible.

At the same time. Gorbachev sees himself able to defend Soviet interests in the Third World, particularly with regard to embattled Marxist-Leninist client states. Heore active Soviet foreign policy overall to open up new opportunities in the Third World and among US Allies.

Soviet policy toward the United States involves two principal tactics: first, holding open the promise of nuclear force reductions if the United States accommodates on SDI; second, holding open the prospecteries of additional summits if the United States gives ground on arms control. If the United States makes the concessions necessary for this process to proceed, Gorbachev believes that it will serve the political goals of weakening anti-Soviet policies in Washington or encouraging more congenial behavior from the next US ad ministration. Gorbachev sees the popularity of arms control in the United States and Europe and domestic disquiet over the administration's foreign and defense policies as his main source of influence over Washington and Washington's eagerness for summits as his principal point of tactical leverage.

To maximize his leverage, Gorbachev will delay his decision on scheduling another summit as long as possible. All things being, equal, Gorbachev would profit politically from additional summits. But we believe he will hold out for terms that advance Soviet political and strategic interests; he does notummit for its own sakef-


Meeting these conditions and holding another US-Soviet summit would not, however, produce Soviet agreementomprehensive arms control package on nuclear force reductions. For such anwe believe the Soviets will demand codification in some form of the principle that offensive strategic force reductions must go band in hand with tight constraints on SDI. By the same token, we believe the Soviets will strongly resist principles and agreement terms that seem to license SDI by reconciling its development and deployment with nuclear force reductions.

Failing agreement along Soviet-preferred lines or publicly visible progress toward it, we believe that Gorbachev is likely at some point to shift his priorities and tacticsore concerted effort to discredit the policies of the current US administration, to iniect East-West issues into8 Presidential election, and to encourage more

-SEOtCt -

flexibility from the next US administration.hift would involve harsher propaganda attacks on the administration and the President and stand-pat negotiating tactics, althoughoviet withdrawal from arms control negotiations or other fundamental changes of behavior. Moscow would continue lo position itself to appear the party eager for improved US-Soviet relations, while trying even harder to portray the administration as the recalcitrant side. There is some basis for arguing that this shift has already taken place, but we think this is unlikely and would look for it sonierime in7 or


The US Factor in Gorbochcv't Policy Agenda

The Corbachevommitted to reviving both the domestic economic performance of the Soviet system and the international effectiveness of tbe USSRuperpower with expanding military power and global Influence. Itutually reinforcing rdatlonshlp between these two goals.eep as vital to the USSR's future statusuperpower. Soviet foreign policy pursues international conditions conducive to Soviet economic revival, while rt also safeguards existing Soviet Interests end capitalizes on opportunities to expand Soviet influence.

This interrelationship has led the Gorbachev regime to seek some form of detente with the United States to avoid dangerous confrontation and to limit the burdens of arms competition on the SovietAs In the past, the Sovietsetente relationship and arms control arrangements with the United States because they see them as serving Soviet superpower interests, restraining the challenge of US defense and other policies, and giving the USSR Increased freedom of action.

While attempting to rebuild their economy.leaders want to contain demands for greatersecurity expenditures. They want to plan and pursue their domestic objectives In an environment of predictable and, If possible, diminished external threat. Without having to give way significantly lo US demands, Soviet leaders want especially to reduce the challenge of US defense and foreign policies seen during the current administration

n alternative view, held by theDefense Intelligence Agency, that long-standmg strategic objectives, such as spb'tting the Western alliance, isolating the United States from its Allies, and constraining US defense efforts are the primaryof Soviet foreign policy toward the United Slates. The holder of tbb view believes that economic considerationsecondary role in the USSR's foreign policy in general, and in the Soviet calculus that has led the Gorbachev regime to seek some form of detente with the United States. Moreover, the holder of this view believes the importance of the economic rcvitalization. as it relates to the USSR's overall statusverstated. This view holds that Soviet leadersumber of clearto their economic revitaliiation program, but they do not view it as vital to their futureurserpower. They consider it an instrument to further strengthen the USSR's global position. Even If theelatively urjsuccessfui. the Soviets will strive to preserve and expand Ihe military capabilities and posture attributeduperpower.

5 More specifically the USSR seeks:

revive an arms control framework, based either on the agreements ofr new ones, that makes the strategic planningrelatively predictable, reduces USto strategic modernization, and thereby helps the USSR preserve and enhance iu strategic position. This framework requires some effective and lasting constraint on SDI. which the Soviets see as the most dangerous and uncertain variable in their strategic planning outlook.

undermine the policies of the Reaganthat the Soviets see aimed against them or, failing this, to fnhibit their being perpetuateduccessor administration.

gain greater respect for Soviet superpower status from the United States and its allies through lessening of US hostility to the Soviet system and its hegemony in Easterneduction of US challenges to Soviet positions in Ihe Third World, andUlingness to regard the USSR's interests and policies as

t legitimate.

gain liberalized access to Western technology and credits, whichecessary part ofeconomic strategy for modernizingand sustaining consumption levels. Theof hard currency shortfalls and concern about excessive reliance on the West will limit Moscow's commitment to thb goal for now. Soviet Interest could rise sharply, however, if economic performance proves disappointing.

lthough the USSR faces more challengingand defense policies from the United States today than it did in, until now Gorbachev has


shown no wtllingncai to pursue these goals by meansuricUmenUl lelienchmcni of Soviet superpower interests. But his airm require energetic and pemsteoi engagement with the United States, the appearance of new fleiibility on many femes ia US-Soviet idatiom. and tome degree ol real flexibility lor diplomatic credibility and to encourage US nscwneot The risk lorhat, contrary to it> aims, activeon arms control and summitry could end up confirming for the current and future USthe efficacy of hardline policies as the best way for the United States to manage lb relations with tbe Soviet Union. L

II. Gorbachev's Agenda, Policies and Prospects

the past year, the GorbachevIts overall domestic and foreign policyIt will continue to evolve, but the mainpolicy lor the neat few years have probably

Economic Policy

The Gorbachev regime has decided onong-term strategy for economic revival mod has taken Initial Kept toward Its Implementation. The key elements of this strategylacement of better managers and enforcement of greater work discipline at all leveb (the "human factors-hange in economic organization to reconcile more efficient central planning with more autonomy for techno logical innovation and greater efficiency at the enterprise level,ubstantial new investmenb in the civiban machine-building sector to accelerate modernization of the USSR's production base.

Gorbachev and hii colleague* believe Ihey are on the correct economic course, and6 exonerate performance has been encouraging to them so far. But they know their economic problems are very serious and that they have etlfflcult decisionsong struggleem lo see lasting results.

CorbacheV, strategy addresses somekey problems facing the Soviet economy,of his program will be limitedumberobstacles. He seeks to overcomethrough eshortauoo and additionalthat refine bu strategy. But we doubtwill be adequate to meet his goab in tbeSlowing giowth of the labor force, uxacasingertractmg raw materials, and depressed work)will continue to be important constraints More over, although Gorbachev has encouraged wideron economic reforms, for now hb tfrategyUrgely intact the cent rally planned economy and bureaucratic establishment that have inhabitedefheiency and technological innervationcertain elements of the new strategy rfaetf arc to limit lb success, particularly in Ihe short run. Toe shift of investment resources to the rnachincry sector for instance, will almost certainly create disruption; as enlerpruo strive to rae4o^

new plant and equipment. Similarly, some onjaniza-tional changes will cause ihcrt-tenn disruption;

II. For ill these reasons, we believe (hat Gorbachev will fall well short ol Ihe main goals ofive-Year Plan. The plan Implies an average annual rale of growth for CNPercent. We believe some improvement overxrcent growth achievedikely but do not expect growth rates to reach planned figures. To sustain the "humanampaign implies real or expected improvement In consumption levels. In our view, the upsurge inplanned6nd the continuing Deeds of defense mean overall per capita consumption growth probably will average between tetoercent for the five-year period

Suecea loriegy In the abort term, however, will not neceaaarily be reflected in the growth of CNP. Soma promising Improvements in key mrosrares will probably be registered, even though they are short of announced or Implied goab Total laborlanned to growercent per year, we would expect something morehortfall, but still substantially better thaneriod W8 cipect the negative trend in total factor productivity growth lo be substantially slowed,not reversed ai the plan stipulates. Selective improvcmenU In consumption, inch as housing,of meat, clothing quality, and services, are feasible and wouldictureismal on the average.

The key foro fortify confidence thatasically on the right track, that hb strategy can work, and. wherealling short, aflcrds option* and neat steps. We believe the chances for thb kind of success are reasonably good In the near term.factors, such as weather and oil prices, can hurt overall performance, accidents such as Chernobyl" ran affect the national mood, but ihey will not deflect Gorbachev's economic strategy untilhorough test We and some Soviet economists believe Use current Gorbachev program gaj| eventually bog down because ol the sysiemdeeply looted obstacle*

that' bis it'will lose promise, and trat dexiakHB

be faced within five toean. But both economic and political conaderetions make this rooce likely8 than during tbe neat two years.

Military Policy

Ii Although subject to adjustment, tbc basic coo-tours of Soviet military policy through the end of ibis decade have been set bv the five-year plan and long-term Soviet weapons programs. Soviet defense outlays will probably continue the slow growth seenith defense procuremcBt growing; rornewbat more slowly.

IS- We have not yet observed Gorbachev's personal stamp on Soviet military policy to the same extent as on other Issues. He certainly sees enhanced military power as one of tbe goals of economic revival While wanting the West not to believe that arms competition will break the Soviet economy, Gorbachev dearly wants to limit tbe economic burden of defense and possibly reduce it as tbe economy grows As have previous Soviet leaders, he has turned to the defense sector for talent and facilities to help civilian industry. Political measures, such as limiting the political status of top military officers, indicate Gorbachev'sto stress the party's control of the military. However, tbe prominence of military values in the Soviet system assures that military exxuideratiom are calculated io making top policy decisions.

While there may be friction, we believe most Soviet military leaders recognize that the furorepower of tbe USSR demands major improvecocnts In overall economic performance, which may require restraints on some categories of current militaryto facilitate long-term Improvements In the defense industrial base. At tbe high levcb Soviet defense spending has attained, even very slow growth during the next five years can be expected to yield an impressive flow of additional modern weapons to the Soviet erscnaL For example, witliin spending levels projected aboveamiliar overall procurement profile, the Soviets could produce the foBcmingforce mix:CBMs.trategic0ighter aircraft,elicopters. There may be some competition al the margin for scarce talent and quality inputs between planned military production and civilian goats. But the production lines for the expected output of Soviet defense industry over the neat five years arc already in place.

1 "he difficulty in reconciling the demands of live Soviet military and economic modernization seems

'to grew'toward the end nf this cleeade andhe, henvever. Soviet military planners expect an increasingly severe technological challenge. Weapon systems of theill require difficult technological advances in design andNew resource commitments to accomplish such advances will soon have to be made. The writings of Marshal Ogarkov and others suggest that Sovietstrategy Is evolvingirection that calls for more aggressiveof general purposes forces on the basis of advanced notmuclear technology. Whatever the direction and outcome of thb evolution, future military requirements will place heavy new demands on the Soviet technology base that are not certain of being met.

e believe Soviet military and political leaders alike sec the arms control process, whether It produces agreements or desired political side effects, as helping to manage such uncertainty. The Soviet leadership at presentpecial utility in arms controlthat Impede the US SDI program, reduce the site ol nuclear forces, and avoid the coststrategic missile offense-defense competition led by the United States. Agreemenu along these lines would by no means rescue the Soviet economy or even reduce Its current defense burden. But such arrangements would ease the task of moving toward the high-technology, conventional forces being discussed by Soviet marshals and avoid undesircd additional costs In tbe strategic

A More Activist Foreign Policy

n addition toolicy of activewith the United States, the Gorbachev regime has sought to revitalize Soviet foreign policy across the boaid with new faces in the foreign affairs establishment, organizational changes, new activism, and some seemingly new rhetoric These innovations have enabled Moscow to reach out more credibly to foreign audiences It wishes to influence, especially in Europe, andthe multiple Initiativesbv Gorbachev inEast Asia. Moscow alsoore active and more widely influential diplomacy in the Middle

he basic direction of his policies towardcountries and regions does not appear altered so far. Corbacliev apparently intends to continue efforts to coniolidate Marxist-Ieninist regimes In the Third World, most important in Afghanistan. Moscow'sactivist style mav increase its ability to respond to

GwbocWl "New Thinking" on Infwnolionof

Corbachev end some of hil foreign *ffaiis minionsine more emphasisanauagc that suggests that international affairs jKooH nol be dominated by the East-West struggle. Calling for "new thinking" on foreign polfcv. thU language stressesand "global problems shared by humanity" (such atnuclear power, health, economic development, and even the Issue of peace! Itendency to depolarize the Soviet picture of the world and to dilute the traditionil element of "clan jtruaale" in the Moscow's expressed world outlook Ideological reference* In foreign pofaeyexample, to the International Communistbecome leu frmueaL

The nature of the Soviet pofclical system precludes dismissal of these rhetorical shifts as unimportant; but their meaning is far from clear at present. To some extent this verbiage is Intended to enhaoce the image of the USSR In the eye* of foreign audiences Andmakes it dear that most of the "new thtaking" he calls for obliges the West, rather than the USSR, to change iu policies, for example, with respect Co arms competition, regional security affairs, and hostility to Soviet client governments and movements But this language is abo directed at internal audiences. In purpose may be to ready Soviet elite* for future policy moves of annature. Over time. Ihi? language may have the effect of encouraging sornc Soviet elites to expect such moves, whetherhe leadership's intent or not For now. we beheve that the internal purpose of Gorbachev't call for "newo license mote pragmatic foreign policy tactics and restaffing of Soviet national security organizations. One consequenceily expect tohe complain! that he is neglecting ideology from quarters whose positions are ieopardiied by "new thinking"

new regional opportunities not of its own making. Marginal shifts. If rewarded by tbe countries at which they are aimed, could lead to more signl6cant Soviet policy shifts in the future. (See annex A.egional Profile ol Soviet Foreign Policy.")

orbachev's Soviet Union still conducts foreign policyay that makes most of theattleground in the continuing rivalry between the superpowers. Recent shifts in Soviet foreign policy rhetoric toward more emphasis on mutual security anddeemphasis of ideological themes in foreignrepresent harbingers of future change in the way the Soviets view the larger superpower competition, although this Is as yet very unclear. For now. however, we believe they are intended to enhance the regime's external appeal, to Justify tactical flexibility to internal elites, and to license shakeups of the Soviet foreign affairs

Gorbachev regime is stfengthening itsaffairs staffing, bringing more able peoplepositions, and reorganizing to put the focusin the Central Committee apparatusof diplomacy in the Ministry ofThe regime clearly seeks more tacticalharmony between diplomacy andmore sophistication in its foreign policy.have helped to project an image ofactivism under Corbachev. along withstarts in propaganda and raggedness inexecution. After some shakedown period,expect the overall skill of Gorbachev'sapparatus to increase noticeably.

The Domestic PoTrHcal Setting forolicy

Gorbachev's main problems are internal,on the economy. Political opposition orlo his leadership, whether from entrenched groups or individual competitors, will be inspired mainly by the impact of Gorbachev's domestic pollcte on the elites power and privileges. Corbachev Isne-man dictator. His power Is still thateader forging consensus within the Politburo required for policy decisions. Other Politburo figures have power positions and policy views of their own. Moreover, to build his personal strength. Gorbachev must now extend his patronage beyond the central partyinto the regional powerhich hisstrategy requires him to criticize and toThe odds favor Gorbachev's winning his political stiuggles over the years ahead, although they could become more rather than less difficult.

Our insight into Kremlin politics is limited, but we believe Corbachev now has adequate power to take Soviet foreign policy in tbe directions he judgesAlthough there may be serious argument over specific moves and audible skepticism about hbapproach, Gorbachev does not. in our view,oncerted opposition on foreign policy.

III. Current Soviet Strategy and Tactics Toward the United States

Assessment ol the West

some initial hopes that the Reaganwould follow policies like those ofbut term, the Soviets concluded early thai


I 1

Gorbachev's PoStkd Position and Foreign Poiky leadership

following assessment underlie* our lodgment on Cotbachev's power to control Soviet foreign policy.

Corbachev hu established himsell as theleader in (oreisn affairs in that he has the requisite Image In the country at later and Is clearly dominant in the small froop of leaders and bureaucrats Influential on foreign policy issues. Although he mast seek Folilbu-ro consensus on major policy moves, we believe he has the power to forte consensus oo marten where he has developedclear preference.

We rcstularly receive reports about contention within the Soviet leadership over forelspi policy Issues. They frequently concern and often explicitly relate friction over the central challenge of cunent Soviet uetics toward the United States; how to use an engaged diplomacy to extract concessions without lettingclaimandling US-Soviet relationswithout concessions.robablyartisan in these controversies than their moat irnpor-tant sudhmoe and Judge; he must himself weigh serious tactical uncertainties. The ensuing arguments produce audible grumbling, however, and there probably has been opposition within the Soviet leadership lo roecific foreign policy moves proposed or taken by Corbachev. But we do not believe Corbachevoncerted opposition on hia overall policy toward the United States.

Weumber of indicators that the advisability of summit meetlnaj has been and continues toontentious Issue In the Kremlin Cromybo reportedly has doubts about themkeptical voice on the promise of US-Soviet dialogue. His doubts about summitry may stem from the lasting prejudicesongtime foreign minister. And he may be skeptical about Gorbachev's tactics. But he also appears toolitical supporter andey role in swinging the Politburo for hb election. Cromyko'i role in foreignlearly on the wane, and we see no other Politburo figure positioned or inclined toCorbachev on foreign policy moves for now. If Gorbachev believes the substantive and atmospheric conditionsummit desirable, he can. we believe, gain the necessary Politburo concensus.

Both because he has continuing struggles before him or. the domestic scene and because he sees reviving the USSRs international effectivenessrime task Corbachev sees great personal political benefits io protecting (he statesman's image. It is Important to him pollticalli how he looksie conduct of foreign policy, be il in terms of publicity or diplomatic results- He also knows that the USSR's leverage depends in some part on hb reputationan to be reckonedeputation he wants but has only begun to build.

ikely over the next few years to face serious opposition on foreign policy or arms control issues only If he proposes actions that are cither very concessionary or dangerously "adventurist" The very need lo operateolitburouard against this,as for Brezhnev. Significantto Cotbachev could arise over such domestic bsues as economic reform, party privileges, and lack of control on the cultural front, inase,hat an opposition faction would add foreign policy mistakes to their Indictment. Khrushchev was taxed with the mistake of adventurism over the Cuban Missile Crbb when he was removed, for largely domestic causes, twoere-recently, political rivals Wed to charge Brezhnev with laxity on) and excessive eagerness forn both cases the nvals were ousted from the leadership and Brexh-nev are* stronger.

S Government determined to challenge their interests more seriously than any In several decades. They lodged that the new US administration enjoyed an unwelcome degree of domestic and Allied support. Their failure to block INF deployments showed further that Moscow could not effectively respond to US challenges by simply trying to shout them downistance.

y the. the Soviets claimed to see the growth of forces within the United States and among its allies that could help to contain or deflectanti-Soviet policies. They are newly attentive to the importance of policy differences within thebody politic and to the role that the Congress can play in constraining theptions. They are also counting on what they see as the growing ability of American and European political forces to challenge US foreign and defense policies by hoisting the banner of "peace" and opposition to nuclear weapons, .tucking defense budgets andand obstructing intervention against Soviet Interests overseas. The Soviets see tendencies that may reverse the conservative political wave that hit their interests in the.

he Soviets arc also newly attentive to the vagaries of capitalist economics because of theiron lhc politics and defense programs of the United States and Its allies. They greatly respect theconomic and technological vitality. Yet they sec, particularly In the US dcBcit. economic cycles,

and trade disputes amons the allies, economic forces that can blunt Washington's policies or prevent tltem from enduring.

The Soviets see growing pressure on thisto deal positively with the USSR on aims control In Soviet eyes, the administration has so far successfully managed these pressures by feigningon arms control, while making no realConveying an element of authentic frustration, Soviet propaganda roundly attacks Washington lor using arms negotiations and summitrysmoke screen" behind which it acts to pursue its defense goals. But the Soviets believe they can make this more difficult for Washington.

Public Soviet commentaries have claimed that,8 approaches, political pressures for positive developments in US-Soviet relations will mount and the ability of the administration to pursue uniformly anti-Soviet lines will erode. The Soviets perceive that arms control and related defense policy issues have caused serious assures within the

]the Soviets

have judged that the President would sincerely like to move forward on arms control, were it not for his political dependence on the US "military industrial complex" and certain deep but mistaken convictions, such as his belief in SDI and desire to challenge Soviet aims In the Third World.

to these crosscurrents In theand among its allies are widely used byto help lustily Gorbachev's policy ofengagement and activism on arms control.same time, our evidence^

M makes clear that exploiting the political forces in Washington is central to current Soviet policy toward the United States. Gorbachev's placement of experienced Americanists in his foreign policyamong themintended lo increase Moscow's skilb In this res peel.

the current Soviet leadershipskeptical about Its ability to* reach anagreement with the Reaganmeets its chief security concerns, such asand other US military programs ineneral political objective of blunting USSoviet Interests. Thereeneral senseleaders that almost any US administrationwill be less challenging to Soviet interests andways easier to deal with, although theythat the President's politics andhim unusual power to gain support for anycompromise he might make.

indicates that thereviews among Gorbachev's advisers asproapects for an arms agreement withare xero ot merely poor but no)Gorbachev currently leaning toward theThose of the former persuasion are moreabout the political value ol summitry, andtoward policies that simply wait outUS administration, The latter viewpointthe boat tactics for waiting out therequire active engagement,might produce results and,inimum,shape the political environment8


J octroi CcAculai>om

and hbelieve that,the actual prospects, Moscow must act as thoughwith the current USiplomacy that it active andto many American and Europeanespecially on arms control, can put pressurekeep it on the defensive, and testthat may exist for real cooceislonihas guided Soviet policy throughoutsince5 Geneva Summit, despiteduring the ensuing six months, whenengagederies of actions the Soviets sawagainst them, and Soviet arms control initia-

ves found lets resonance in the West than expected.

isappointments In6 and the advice of newly influential Americanists around Gorbachev probably persuaded Moscow that It bad to add someto IU grandiose arms control proposals The result was new Soviet proposals on the ABM Treaty and START made onay andhose Initiatives probably had been In planning for some months; and some elements, such asthe withdrawal clause of the ABM Treaty, had been talked aboul by US Soviet experts lor several years. Although they were not deliberately timed to coincide with the President'sav decision on SALT,ct that they were advanced at this time indicates Sowet extermination to keep up the pressure of positive arms control moves This coincidence also heightened the receptivity of audiersces in the United States and Western Ecuope to Soviet proposals. While not -ii their unhappiness at President

decision, they tool his Classboio speech a* evidence lhat thev had made an initiative with which he would have to deal

hrough the pressure of arms controlMoscow seeks lo elicit new US arms control concessions, to broaden opposition to the idmlnutUs the absence of such rasovea. and to complicate the funding ol clefense programs Incciuse il accelerated political processes lirebut not all

of it from Soviet tfalecoeoli vnlcndedTor Western ears, ccmlended that the failure to achieve more5 was politically costly for Gorbachev and cannot be repeated. We believe that Gorbachev was satisfied with5 summit but abo wants more tangible products from future summits, less for internalrnaaoos than because the USSR cannot afford to routinlre summits that yield no concessions but rather legitimlre hardline US policies.


annex B, "Exaggeration or Duplicity in Soviet Foreign Policy Tactics'T


Gorbachev sees political value intage for asserting his rolelates-man and the USSR's toteoequal superpower Tbev drtoutUxe tbe new activism of Soviet foreign policy and the cornpetence of its leadership to foreign and domestic audience* Theyaluable means of reading Washington. The Soviets believe political pressures on the United States generated by summits can increase the probability of arms control and other agreements that serve Soviett the same time.enuinely exsxerned thatuses summitryeans to mute domestic and allied mainly about East-West relations withoutsubstantive concessions.

Moreover, lodging that the US sideigh political value on summitry. Gorbachev tors leverage In bargaining over whether and when summits occur. Soviei behaviorthat Moscow plans to Isold out as long as possible for favorable US movement on arms control beforeon the neat summit. At the same time, Corbachev and hb key advisers appear aware that they could overplay their hand Hence, tliey have not been too explicit, oenuUnt, or precise In staling their condllioos for another summit beyondoncrete results" on arms conttol

the Sovicis were pleased with the results ol the5 summit, despite its lack of concrete results.

Arms Control

he Soviet Union continues to use arms control diplomacy loange of objectives from the broadly political to tbe more specifically military and technical- Armshe key link In the logic chain of the USSR's whole foreign policy line toward the West The Soviets want the nexus of "preventing nuclearto dominate the East-West agenda, with or without agreemenb,thb tends to undermine the legitimacy ofmilitary programs and to reduce the salience of other issues where hostility to Soviet interest! can be mobillied, such as their Third World actions,in Eastern Europe, and human rights behavior.

he Soviets seek through the arms controland agreements to make their threat environment more predictable and thereby to facilitate orderly, incremental force modernization In harmony with their economic objectives. The Soviets believe (hat the political errviroctntent created bv arms control can favor them in the strategic competition because they are able to insulate their programs from political pressures that may depress US military programs, to exploit ambiguities in agreements without domestic criticism, and occasionally to engage in deliberate QoiKiriiiplunce. which the United States could not get away with. They also, however,isk, especially in, that the United States can exploit its involvement in arms control to gain political support for military programs

oviet arms control policy, especially Its public diplomacy,umber of other aims. The Soviets seek to undermine political support for US nuclear weapons, programs, and strategies, knowing that they will remain vital to US security and alliance leadership for years to come. At Ihe same time, the Soviets seek to discredit prospective alternatives to nuclear weapons In US strategy,important SDI but also rorxe prolioient nonnoeleai fences and weapons, such as those in NATO's"emeigingffort

hasumber ofin Soviet aims control policy in hisgive credibility to Moscow's diplomacy in iheto elicit changes in US policy. He has;

greater readiness than his predecessors to consider substantial reductions in nuclear


Eapresscd more willingness to consider orotic inspection to aid verification

Announced an extended nuclear testing

Made more artful appeals lo US and European publics.

Made more effort to beo have Soviet proposals on as many conceivable arms control topics as possible

the US SDI is central to thecontrol policy and. therefore, bean heavily onpolicy toward the United States The Sovietsof the great political, budgetary, andhurdles that stand In the way of thethey remain deeply apprehensive aboutwant to kill it through the arms controlsome combination of formally agreedpolitical effects that undermine its publicsupport At present, they are notany combination will work. Personalat the5 summit and sinceGorbachev of the President's deepto SDI The Soviets perceive the Presidentto shield SDI from crippling armsand. il possible, to me the armsto enluuiee Its support. Therefore theya more nuancod approach to attackingthey followed4oceding tothat SDI research In the laboratory can

addition to their general campaign toas offensive, dangerouslyi tiring, andto an escalating arms race, the Sovietstwo lines of attack:

they seek to persuade all audiences thatirectly inimical to proapects for nuclear force reductionsolitically useful because both lades have established deep ieductions as the hallmark of real arms control Butoreolitical contrivance (or the Soviets. We believe the Soviets restard expansion of their ballistic missile forcesaluable option, amongfor countering SDI and see deep reductions as risky so long as SOI proceeds

Soviei Concern! About SDI

SDI poses great technical and political uncertainties (or (he Soviet! They tee il at the moil volatile and dangerous uncertainty confronting them in tike overall tntlatair competition with Ihe United Stales tl could coneetvaMytigWv effective ballistic mtsule defense. revotutloninng the Otategie enrtrenment to Soviei rksadvaaaagc. Evan moderately effectivewould degiadr ihe calculsULltv of missile strike plans, eacepl for the anoat causative and indlseaimioate attacks, undermining Soviet Bialcgy and doctrine The Soviets worry that technological spinoffs from the pro-giam could give the Weal new advantages in military competition Despite US protests to the contrary, the Soviets see SOi as partroad effort by the United States to regain strategic superiority and to pressure the Soviet economic andaae While they do not know what shape SOI will ultimately take, lo competeand la counter SO! would imclvethev wish lo avail anddistraction, front preferred lines of mflaary modern'iat "on Smart military plans give heavy attention lo future strategic defenses. But the Soviets would muchetting In which they could pursue near and long-term lechnolocv options at their own pace while tlae United States neglected strategic defense, as was largely the ease2 until 1W3

Scyjond. the Soviets see the ABM Treaty as the best instrument for (stocking the program. They calculate that reaffirmation o( the ABM Treaty in Kmc manner by the current President wouldoll Ileal obstacle to SDI depwyment, which future US leaden would End impossible to surmount, especially if nuclear force reductions were taking place.eriod of tight US defense budgets, they could expect politicalfor the program in the United States would decline

n their campaign against SDI. the Soviets lace their larger dilemma in dealing with the United States. If they are too uncompromising, the arms control process may bog down and leave the United States relatively dec to proceed with its plans Butthat keep the process going, without an explicit retreat by theust ration on SDI. run the rbk of legitimising SDI as reconcilable with arms control and even as an "enloroer" of neaibillty on tbe Soviet side.

c current position calls fur powerful and


r^ftf t

explicit constraints on SDI in the (ormengthy suspension of the right to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, definitions that restrict SDI-type research,an on "space strike weapons" clearly intended to prohibit any foim of space-based intercept. They are virtually certain the current US administration will not agree to all of this

The Soviet View of Arms Controlofcticd Issue

r i

thatsees some room to depart from bis current position and still strike an effective blow at SDI In the longer run

oscow baa approacbed trrrtu controlIn pragmatic terms, interpreting Its treatynarrowly and stretching treaty ambigoltiesfj

ltltudea toward arms control comraUance^ contributed to the accumulationecord of Soviet raorscompltanoe over the past two daKados, In our view, prior to6 decision on interim restraint, the Soviets regarded expressed US concern about their noncomplianceuisance to them, to be dealt with by whatever means best permitted them to deny US charges and by countercliarara They charge, and also Largely believe, that US accusations of Soviet noncompliance are politically motivated devices for undermining arms control and progress in US-Soviet relations. The Soviets have seen the compliance issues as marginal to US-Soviet political and arms control dealings.

he President's decision in principle to depart from adherence to thend SALT II accords because of Soviet noncompliance has changed the situation signibeantly for Moscow We do not believe it has changed basic Soviet attitudes. But It has made Sovietore central political issue because it hasajor Soviet objective, the preservation of the arms control ftamework of thethe ABM Treaty andthe creationongenial successor system. The Soviet reaction, to far, has been to charge that the President's decision is potarger strategy for scuttling arms control and to mount political preaturea lo encourage his retreat. At tbe same time, pcrolive hints about Soviet openness lo new forms of verification are


lln our

view. Soviet leaders operate on the Idlowlng pro-cjottwm

Power polities involves cheating on the margins of IntemttMnil urrdeetaklngi by all nationslosedi i. lo get away with It better thin an open one it an objective reality loWted.

At: thingsbeing equal, cheating is not MiUiMeaUy deniable, andraonrd ol cheating eart beBut where important interests are alt b

, Justifiable. The key determinant it the Interest that requires cheating versus the USSR's ability to conceal tt or toaaata* ihe eorttequeneaa of Hi revelation

of cheating and nonoomplbiiM* must never be admitted, whether ihey relit* to pui-poaeful or load vert ml behavior. Such admissions, whatever their nature, would undermine the lo-le-ninooal aad doeaame authority ei the SovietitaeS Moreover, the outside -orlJ mart be conditioned, so far ai possible, lo accept that Intolerance of Soviet cheating behavior, teal or perceived.hreat to peace more lertoui than ihe Soviet behavior In Question

Accord.a* io an alternative view held by uwBureau of Icielliaenee and Research, (or theof State, tho intet Ignores the detailed and inierrully consistent vicvn (he Soviets hive presented on many compliancesuch as thend encryption The holder of tab view believes thedoes BOt nipcorl ihe Inference lhat la* Sovietj "actually" know thwnaal.ee to be la notation ol arms control agreements, bat rathertheir ownbelieve they are in compliance


lo raise hopes thai the future could be better so long as the aims control process progresses.

We cannot judge whether and, if so, to what degree Gorbachev and his colleagues are prepared to admit to themselves that the erosion of the arms control framework is in largeoliticalof Soviet behavior. Erosion of the existing arms control framework concerns tbe Soviets because they fear what the United States could do if US military planning is freed from the formal and indirect con Rraint* of arms limits. Moreover, theii whole foreign policy line toward the West would be undermined if arms control came to seem less central to international security. Despite these concerns, we believe Soviet attitudes and positions on compliance will not change significantly in the future.

The Director. Bureau of mtelllgcrice andfor the Department of State agrees that the Soviets interpret arms control obligations narrowly and frequently exploit their ambiguities, but holds that analysis of their adivities Indicates that the Soviets consider their action to be consistent with the letter of the SALT accords as they interpret them. The Soviets do not appreciate the nature and depth of US compll-anoe Concerns and continue to view compliancearginal issue in relations with the United Slates. Because the Soviets do not perceive their actions to bo the actual rationale for the USay Interim restraint decision, this decision has not changed Soviet attitudes toward complUnce.

Soviet policy on ofiensive strategic nuclear force reductions has both political and military aims. In our view, the present Soviet leadership does not believe that all nuclear weapons can be eliminated. Gorbachev made hbanuary proposal to gethigh ground. But we believe the Soviets are more serious generally about nuclear force reductions than they have been In the past:

Modernized but reduced Soviet forces, along with major casnstraints on US forceprograms could preserve their currentforce capabilities and perhaps improve their relative capabilities, comparedituation in which both sides carry out their strategicIratioru programs as planned

The Soviets eapect that the more controversial US strategic force modernization programs might be unilaterally constrained by political andpressures in an environment in which nuclear force levels were being reduced.

-The Soviets would see strategic nuclear force reductions generally as helping to erode the public appeal of nuclear strategies vital to US alliance commitments and leadership role.

For these reasons, the Soviets want to keep the prospect of large nuclear force reductions on the East-West arms control agenda. More immediatelythbheir best weapon against SDI

AdditionaDy. in onet Is possible that the evolution of Soviet doctrine on the natureuture general war-which sees greater likelihood that It could remain conventional for an extended period or terminate without nuclearincreased Soviet willingness to consider reduced nuclear arsenals on both sides as militarily tolerable and perhaps even attractive for Soviet military strategy. Several NFIB agencies are skeptical about the impact of evolving Soviet military doctrine upon attitudes toward nuclear force reductions. They note that Soviet militarywritings on the possibility of protracted conventionalto underscore theof robust nuclear forces for deterrence and warfjghting. they observe that the modernization of Soviet nuclear forces continues apace; and they doubt that possible shifts in Soviet military doctrine would greatly influence Sovieto reduce nuclear forces In the neat two years.'

pecific alternative viewthatthe possible linkage between Soviet military doctrine and expressed willingness to consider nuclear forceoo broadly stated. Thb view recognizes that the Sovietxamining the future threats and opportunities posed.by technically advanced conventional wrapons. which have thefor high lethality and great precision over distances. Exactly how these emerging nonnuclcarie* will shape Soviet perceptions of military doctrine, force requirements, and dependence on the various categories of weapons (tactical, theater, and strategic) is yet evolving.

The Soviets regard INFossible area for interim steps that may keep up the momentum of the arms control process where other issues proveInitally they hoped to stop NATO's deployments both toew and worrisome military threat and to disrupt the whole political process of managing

TV holder oIlhMcUwb Ihe Deputy Direct, far Inttlitenee. Cfntrnl Intelligence Agency.

The holder, of thlt oUw ete ihe Dfwetor.avnee Agency, the AstbUni Chut ol Sla* /or Mirfiigenee. Department ofv; Ike Director ofaiefnge-or,l the

.Ad lhc Direete. of InleUltence.arine


strategy within the Alliance. When they failed to do so. their calculus became more political, mainly to use the INF issueeans to generate prospects for the whole arms control process and allied pressures on Washington. Over the past year, the Sovietsthat the West Europeans became reluctant to negotiate the complete reversal of INF deployments. This has obliged the Soviets to consider interim steps, which allow some US INF deployrncnts.

Eventually the Soviet leadership wants lo use IMF negotiationseans to limit the size and modernization of French and British nuclear forces. For now, however. It plays down this objective in order to avoid onlagoolilng Paris and London.programs for the modenuZauon of Sovietand theater nisclear systems suggest lhat Soviet planners continue toole for nuclear strike systems of varying ranges in the future.

The immediate purpose of the Soviet campaignctntneheniive nuclear tetl ban (CTB) is to put political pressure on the United States across the entire spectrum of arms control Issues. The Soviets probably regard the likelihood ofTB as low. However, they do see practical benefits to be derived froman. It would block nue'ear tests they believe important for SDI and US strategic force modernization. Soviet nuclear weapons designs are conservative, stable, and in continuing production, pcrtnitting them to engage in testing moraloria and to consider an extended CTB, which would halt US testingime when they probably perceive US nuclear weapons technology as newly dynamicthe Soviets sec nuclear weapons as an enduring reality, requiring them to make nuclear weapons technology advances of their own, we suspect that the Soviets wouldTB openminded about its permanence, believing that they could renegotiate or abrogate If future circumstances gavetrong need to test.

Moscow's initiatives on limiting amoenlional arms in Europe are primarily Intended to addto its overall political stance and arms control posture- By proposing Urge-scale reductions of wide geographic scope. Including the possibility ofweapon reductions and discussion of surprise attack and doctrine, the Soviets want to persuade NATO audiences that arms control can redress any imbahnces that may exist, that conventional force Imr^iovetnents are not necessary, and that largereductions are reasonable. The Soviets hope through this to help revive tbc antinuclear movement in Europe Gorbachev has calledan on new conventional weapons whose overall effectivencsilhat of nuclearlear allusion to advanced precision and area weapons. Because high Soviet military figures believe these weapons will be vital to Soviet rniliUry posture in the future, this ploy may be intended to delay such programs In the West while Eastern technology advarsces. lately, the Soviets have indicated their belief that MBFR is virtually moribund and that somethingecond-phase CDE should provide the setting for cornpreheosive negotiations on conventional arms. The size andof the resulting forum shows that the Soviets are. for the moment, more interested in political theater than In real agreements on this front. In multiple bilateral dealings with NATO governments, bcrwever, the Soviets may express more serious interest inforce reductions, airning at such traditional Soviet goab as limitations on tbe Burrdeswehr. The Soviets might be prepared to give impetus to their initiatives byodest unilateral cut in standing military manpower.

Regional and Other Issues

he Soviets see regional securityMiddle East, the Persian Gulf. Indochina, and the conflicts surrounding Soviet efforts to consolidate Marxist-Leninist regimes in Afgharustan, South Ye men, Ethiopia, Angola, andintegral aspects of the larger US-Soviet competition Tbev see the administration as bent on denying them advances, supporting their opponents, and undermining their positions throughout the Third World. But for the present, the Soviets see these issues as peripheral to managing the US-Soviet relationship through dialogue. Blltcd and pubhc pressures, ana'arms controli


hile confronting problems in all areas of Third World commitment, the Gorbachev regime does not feel under pressure to make real concessions in any of them and would find it poUtscatl costly foe Soviet regional interests to do so. The USSR Is willing to discuss the regional Issues with the United States largely because Washington Is concerned to keep these issues part of the broader US-Soviet dialogue, and the USSR can accede to this desire without jeopardirina the overwhelming ocntrality of arms control.the USSR has its own interests to press in such dialogue without expecting real concessions to be made by either ride

Superpower dialogue and the languageend to legitimize Soviet interests inconflict situations, despite US hostility to them.


appearances could undermine public sup-pott in the United Stales foe pcaacie* thatSoviet interest* ot aid Soviet adversaries in the Third World, (ot rumple, on the Contrai.

The appearance of US-Soviet cooperation on regional issues makes US allies and cbentsMaking Pakistan and tbe Afghan resistance iservous Is o( special interest to hloscow ateven though Kabul is also made nervous.

Such exchangesorum (or airing to US counterparts the Soviet view ol Third World conflicta, that they arise from local factors or US Interference, not the hand of Moscow; bat must be dealt withhat is, with respect (ornterests

he Soviets would like to erscourage the view that active US hostility lo Soviet Interests and clients In the Third World could tcopardixe the bilateralBut they believe there are loo many inwho would applaud this effect, makingisky ploy to use forcefully. The furthest thai Moscow has gone in trying to exploit such linkage was to cancel the meeting of foreign ministers over the US strikes on Libya.C

lthough human rights, various kinds ofand trade Issues are on the US-Soviet political agenda, these too are seen as largely peripheral Issues to the current relationship In the case of human rights, the Soviets want, on one hand, to use isolated gestures to encourage Western optimism about.their policies while, on the other, making sure thatmpacts are limited. The Soviets manage the dialogue on exchanges not only with an eye to the informational and propaganda opportunities they contain, but also to minimize the intrusivericss of Western presence In tbe USSR In tbe area of trade, the current Soviet strategy is to use the political atmosphere created by the prospect of movement In US-Soviet relations totheir dealings with West European andpartners, while maintaining pressures for change In US policies on technology transfer and other trade issues that may yield benefits in the longer term.

IV.iook for Soviet Policy Toword the United

lthough specific Soviet move* cannot beinCorbachev hasnack for diplomaticmain conlouis of Soviet policy toward the United States are likely to remain In place for the next several years. The Soviets will continue to strive for their main obtcttivc. an arms control framework that constrains or kilh SDI, makes the strategic environment ofote predictable, and inhibits US policies hostile to the USSR

lthough they probably believe agreements on principles or of limited scope remain possible, they probahlyomprehensive agreement withto space and strategic arms as blurry during thetwoalf yean, lo addition to agreement on complex and controversial offensive arms issues, this wouldrompt US retreat from SDI, which the Soviets seek but cannot be confident of getting, or Soviet sanction of SDI, which they ate most unlikely to grant.

they agree to schedule7 or not. they will try to use thesummits (ot leverage on Washington.S Presidential election willlarger in Soviet calculations.

Domestic Variables

trends in Soviet Internal affairsto alter the main directions o( Sovietthe United States during the next two years;

e auticipeie that Gorbachev's political power base will slowly but steadily be strengthened

'The economy will show enough progress to keep his political position and his economic revival strategy intact.

Further cTiahges in the Soviet military leadership will probably assure that serious policydo not coarse from that quarter for the rest of the decade.

h anniversary of the October Revolution7 will provide an occasion, akin toh Party Congress, for Gorbachev lo celebrate his pragresa and to elaborate his domestic, foreign policy, andlines.

hkelv but possibleoe nosesSoviet internal front involve worse thannews, trouble within the party or withover Gorbachev's policies, ot perhapson the culturalolitburoas Khrushcliev faced7 isictory would not necessarilyI>evclopcnenU such as these wouldtemporizing in policy toward the Unitedthan major departures in any direction.


in Foreign Affairs

Cotbache.'s new activism and (be consolidation of bis Moscow foreign policy team ate likely to produce important Soviet lniiiati.es during the neat few years in several regions, for example, toward Japan. China, and Westpoaafaiy alsoIran and Israel and in Latin America. He can be expected lo make numerous foreign trips. He will pay special attention to Europe, the more so if socialist governments come to power In London or Boon, torend of West European detente that Washington must try to catch, Gorbachev has powerful Incentives to show foreign policy mercernent that influences US interests but takes place outside the US-Soviet bilateral contest. Overall, we eipect Gorbachev to be successful In protecting an Image of foreign policy dynamism and challenge toward the West during ihe next two years, although he may not achieve Irreversible gains.

We do not expect deliberate Soviet retreat from the Third World's Marxist-Leninist regimes. The Sovi-ets will probably supply sufficient military and other support to protect their stakes against predictable leveb of challenge We expect them to hold to course in Afghanistan while Intensifying their military,and diplomatic operations aimed at improvingor ewnlual viotc-y. The, pretaaU, -ill not go looking for trouble with the United States in new areas or undertake commitments involving largeoutlays, but they will not foresweareither, lor example. In the Philippines.

There are numerous regional trouble spots where crises and tome degree of US-Sovietcould upset thesen exampledeliberate Soviet Initiative is Afghanistan-Pakistan. Although averse to any direct confrontation over the Afghan war. Corbachev could find that his progress toward winning it It too slow or elusive to satisfy his political needs. Ha could, therefore, take additional measures against Pakistan that could risk suchwith the Unitedegree ofcould arise at the initiative of others, including the United States, over Israel Syria. Libya, orTrouble in Eastern Europeigh potential for producing the kind of Soviet behavior thatUS-Soviet dialogue

Ccavhnions: Arms Control. Summitry,8

ong shot, Corbachev wants an arms control agreement on space and strategic weapons with this administration if he can -et one that sharply constrains SDI. leaves Soviet modernization options relatively open, curtails the most threateriing USmoderniiation programs, and generally helps depress US defense efforts in tbe years ahead

he troubled outlook,he Soviet economy tMntribute* to Soviet interest in such an agreement and in its eapected poliitcai effects That interest may grow in the yean ahead as Gorbachev's economic strategyoots systemic obstacles and, with it, Soviet Bextt-iny on the term, may increase But in the next two years or to. neither the domestic situation nor the foreign policy outlook of the reaprne obligesto compromise substantially on central arms control ot security issues In dispute with the United States

orbachev will Iry during the next year to create political pressures that encourage compromises from the US tide. His tactics will be to hold out the promise of summits while bargaining hard about Hilling and content, to suggest the possibility of com-promlte on arms issues, and toroad diplomatic and propaganda effort, including

new arms

proposals, to depict the USSR, as the reasonable party. We believe Corbachev will stand subtantially by hb present chsectivgg But -re do not rule out further shifts in Soviet negotiating potations to eiscourage USMore unilateral gestures are also possible, foredeat reduction of Waraa- Pact military

If thb effort (alb. as time passes Corbachev is likely to shift hb prioritiesore concerted effort to demonstrate that US policies for dealing with the USSR duringaveailure, to irnect East-West issues Into the USnd to cultivate an environment that encourages more accommodating behavior from the next US administration.hift of priorities would involve subtle but important Uctlcal shifts: continued participation In NST In Geneva, but little give on substance; expressions of Inttsrest in summitry without agreement to holdropaganda line giving much more stiett to the negatite than to the promise of dealings with thb adrrdnbtration: and possibly but less likelyrevival of the Sovietof war-propaganda of theimed at heightening popular anxieties In the West.

Although demanding and fairly rigid at its core, the Mance desenbed above -ould still give Gorbachev room for maneuver on numerous secondary issues where convergence between US and Soviet positions might occur-such as an interim INF agreement or an accord limit ins- nucleara sense oftoward further accommodation might bed. with its attendant political pressures on Washing-


Moreovei. despite IIS centiat importance lo them, Ibc SovicU have some flexibility on SDI with respect lo the durationan on deploymentinimum of nine toears has been mentioned by Soviet orb cutis, vice tbeoears officiallyhe definition of permitted research, and tbe manner in which the ABM Treaty is employed to defioeThis Bexibility on SDI issues derives liom the eipectahon. or at least hope, thai acceptance of some formal constraint by tbe current US adm. rust ration will eventually leach away SDI'j political support We believe the minimum they will insist on la some certification of the principle that SDI must be con-ilmlned for lane offensive reductions to be seriously considered They will reject any arrpeoaeh that ap-peanense SDI bythat full-scale devel-oprnent and deployment of SDI-type rtrateglccan be reconciled with deep offensive force reductions.

wo alternative outlooks are possible, but, weoed deal less likely:

While prepared to bargain bard over armssubstance and summitry for what he can get. Gorbachev may be ready now lor two more sumnutstrategic offensive arms reduction agreernent, without earpbeit satisfaction on SDL In tins case, his motive would not beesperate economic plight obliges prompttoward US-Soviet amity, but lather thai tbe political effects of progress on offensive force reductions would eventually kill SDI. delecto-Soviet directions of the current admlnlstra-tion before it left office, and createclimate for further accommodatione believe thisnlikely because it would be tooamble for Gorbachev and his regime, running tooisk of seeming to reward US policies the Soviets aim to undermine.

Alternatively, Gorbachev may already haveup on changing the policies of the cunent administration sufficiently to allow acccKtimoda-tion with tt In this case, he would already be pursuing tactics tbat looklan no future summits while not publicly fcrecsoung their posslbibty. and be unwilling to cipiore serious cjxnpeomsse on arms and security issues We befaeve this alternative overstates the rigidity of Ihe Soviet side Fear ofostile administrationactor in Gorbachev's calculations, but it is unlikely. In our view, to preclude accommodation on tomething like his terms.

We believe the Soviets ate still open to the prospectummit in the winternd desire to have one if the United States makes conces lions that somehow meet iheir stated.conditions of "concrete achievements on arms control" and "ao improved atmosphere" We also believe lhat thehave not tet decided specifically what USthey -ill deem satisfactory to meet these vaguely Hated ccmdrtions They willinal decision as long as possible to see what they can get, making their decision on the basis of substantive US posUsrara and Usek astessmerit of where political pressures will take Ihc United Stales following another summit

gencies are uncertain as to where eiactly the Soviets will come down with respect to Iheir minimum conditions for the neat summit:

We believe thev are nearly certain lo come II the United States agrees in principle to reaffirm the ABM Treatyeans of dealing withspace-based strategic defensea or at^ees loTB in the immediale future

We believe the odds that they wilt come are better than even should agreement be achieved on one or mote significant arms control Issues other than Space-START. such as 1NP. CBW. and TTB. "

Than itsmall chance that the Soviets will not insist on any specific agreements, but will be satisfiedommunique that conveys the impression of progressange of arms control Issues

We believe that Gorbachev will not agreeummit In tbe face of US actions that cause himsuchS strike on Libya.

SovleU will want the United Statesthat continued adherence to the SALTa condition for another summit but will probablyif the United Slates merely refrainstheir limitsecent interval otattractive offer on mutual restraint largelywith SALT accords. Wc believe It verythe Soviets will deliver any significantIn their own compliance behavior ShouldStates actually acred the SALT limitssunuiut. the fikdibood of Soviet agreementone decreases, but does not. in our view,If the United States does eaceed the limits,will view this in conjunction with other trendssecurity policy in determiningown actions.feel the need to take some programmatic actionthat Ihe US move is not without consequences

r I |

JL Urlt'l m


lo excite public concern. Soviet political and military responses will seek to exploit opportunities and hedge acainst threats posed by the absence of arms cootiol constraints, and aho lo maximliefor the restorationongenial Miccessor frameworkew US administration.

orbachev will fed scene pressure to accept another summit in order to give the impression he is subjecting the US President'i proposalsair hear-ing and, more generally, to keep up an Image ot foreign policy mon>enrijra But he will (ear corning awayecond summit with the President having won political credibility on arms control while protect -ingSDL

orbacbev will seek to prevent tins fromindefinitely. Unless the United States makes what the Soviets regard as significant concessions on SOI or some other combination of Issues, we believe that sometime during the neatonths be will shift his tacticsore uncompromising line while stilt engaged in active diplomacy with the United Stales, aiming primarily to8 andIn deciding onhift, the Soviets would be influenced by the content of US-Sovietheir reading of US politics, and developments in NATO governments. On balance, we believe tbe more the Soviets see what they regard as "healthy forces" working In these various arenas against unchanged US policies, the more likely they will try lo encourage those forces while looking beyond the current US administration

ery Important for the Gorbachev regime to prevent, if at all possible, the current US adminis tration Irom per pet uaegacy of anti-Soviet policies Into another Presidency. This goal is atas stopping SDI and revivingrms contiol frarnework, even more so if tbe Utter objec lives arc unattainableven if hb economiceUtivelv successful, Gorbachev wantsrelief from the kinds of military and political challenges shown the USSR by the United States In. Although optimistic about hb economicGorbachev knows itsar from assured If bat eooraxnic policies arc relatively unsuccessful, be wfQ be bargainingeaker position with the United Slates and Its Allies In, on arms, trade, credits, and technology He does not want to do that bargainingS Government carrying on the policies of the Reagan admlnirtration

he USSR's domestic problems andinterests augur now for Soviet policies designed to induce change in long-term US behavior, notto it in the near term. Gorbachev wants such change to helpIn the case of thecapabilitiesuperpower.to the United Slates now on major security issues without substantially com pen satingmake theea* Imposingin the future- Hb problems at home and abroad are, isot at present so severe, nor the immediate strengths and staying power of hostile US policies so convincing, that he must move toward realnow.

A Regional Profile of Soviet Foreign Policy

Eastern Europe. Gorbachev's bask aim is thai of previous regimes, Io keep complex economic and pobticai problems from either jeopardizing Soviet hegciisony or impelling the nastv inlervertUons that hurt other foreign policy Interests. His techniques arc familiar. Bloc integration and jawboning, combinedit more vrillingness to listen to his allies than previous Soviet leaders. He is not int crested in any basic liberalization of the Soviet-East Europeanand has restated the essentials of theDoctrine: Eastern Europe is io tbe Soviet camp to stay and any moves to change thishreat to peace. Heightened Soviet economic demands,changes and other domestic stresses in Eastern Europe, and uncertainty about the exact limits of Soviet tolerance, however, are likely to cause trouble for Moscow in this region.

Toward Cnina, Gorbachev has hopes ofexpanding on the mlnldetentc that became possible because Belling became willing toorestance between the superpowers At Vladivostok he showed willingness to consider movement on one of China's "threehe Si no-Soviet military relationship near the border, an issue on which he has great room for maneuver without hurting Sovietinterests.econd, Afghanistan, he expresses flexibility, which we and the Chinese so lar regard as feigned, not real. On the third obstacle, Indochina, his flexibility is limited by Vietnam's commitments In Cambodia and fears of China and the importance to Moscow of the Soviet-Vietnamese rehUonshlp.clearlymong other objectives, tothe United Statesrogressing Sino-Soviet rapprochement in tbe context of an active Asian diplomacy. How far he can carry this now depends greatly on China. We believe China will reactbut cautiously and skeptically, and soon will find limits to Soviet flexibility. Hence, China will remain in tbe camp of challengers to Soviet interests for the foreseeable future.

oviet policy toward US Allies. Western Europe and Japan, has been both active and more stylistically appealing under Gorbachev. He clearly alms lo derive the twin benefits of increasing their ability to put pressure on the United States, on such issues as arms control and trade, and making them more flexible toward Soviet concerns Moscow also strives, through its diplomacy and new flexibility toward the West European Left, to Influence the domestic politics of US Allies,eans to further foreign policy goals. Moscow has lately begun to take relations with Bonn off the back burner and is clearly attempting to woo Tokyo. However, the Soviets have shown only limited willingness so far to compromise on the moresecurity and national issues lhat encumber these relationships, such as the Northern Territories with Japan and inner-German relations with WestThey are seeing what political benefits can be gotten at low cost and perhaps positioning for more substantial moves In the future In all cases, Soviet influence with US Allies is somewhat enhanced by the sense of promise produced by more active policies toward the United State*.

The Gorbachev regime has expressedoUsTjieasure with the USSR* lack ofin the Middle East and the Immobility of its policies in this vital region, reportedly under basic review at present Actual policy lines being followed under Gorbachev have been In place for some years, however, preservation of the key dient lelationships with Syria and Iraq: pressing for unity within themong radical Arabs, and all Arab states, if possible; testing for openings with moderate Arab governments; holding up an international conference as the main Instrument for addressing the Arab-Israeli conflict- watching for useful openings with Iran against the dayore promising post-Khomeini environment and. possibly, to contain the damage of an Iranian victory over Iraq. Moscow Is experimenting with moves toward relations with Israel, recognizing that influence with both Arabs and Israel are crucialerious politicaln the res-Ion. But the risks arc considerable and the gains uncertain.

n Afghanistan Gorbachev clearly wishes tolive prospects (or eventual Soviet success In pacifying and controlling the countryote effective Kabul regime, better military performance


the Muiahrdin. and.ombination of pi*-uures and inducements thai could chancepokaeae* The costs and risks ofeither withdrawal without regard for the survivalommunist regime or substantial escalation of military action In the country and againstpersuaded him to hold to course His announcementoken withdrawal of Soviet troops, new emphasis on AfghanistanS-Soviet issue, and protests about Pakistan's nuclear program are, In our view, political gambits pursuantonstant policy, with Pakistan's resolve the key target.

lsewbcrc In the Third World the accessionew Soviet leadership does not appear to have had practical impact on the main linns of Soviet policy. Corbachev knows, as dad his two predecessors, that the USSR cannot underwrite the econoenJc and social devcloprnent of anyery few Third World countries. But It remains as willing as previously to underwrite the military strength ol chosen clients, especially those developing along Marusl-lxnintst lines; to provide economic support where vital to their survival; and generally to use aims transfers as the mainstay of diplomacy theouglioui the Third World. Rhetorically, the Soviet leadership has some-hit downgraded the prominence it accords to Third World "revolutions" in Its depiction of thescene and placed new emphasis on nonaligned capitalist oriented Third World states. In practice, however. it proceeds largely as it has in the past for. in practice, providing arms and political support to Third World clients, particularly those pressingcauses with which Moscow- idcntif.es, is vital to Soviet superpoweretrenchment from such policies might remove irritant* in East-West relations and economise on resources; but it wouldajor element of Soviet foreign policy, which the USSR lacks the economic, technological, or cultural appeal to replace.



Exaggeration or Duplicity in Soviet Tactics?

annes laea the evidence thai Soviet foreignactics Involve more than an euggeratioo of Soviet Betlbiuty but InvolveagnScsnl degree of duobcity.

providesteal eaieublic iUtemenU lo

have been designed

to convey Soviet interestolitical arJutaorT that facilitates the withdrawal of Soviet troops.

^But. to our

knowledge, no Soviet figure of any authority has explicitly claimed Soviet Besibilily on the key issue and Moscow's top priority, the survival of therod me In Kabul, nor claimed that troophas become tbc top priority. Gorbachev's Vladivostok announcementoken troopwas accompanied by pledgee that Moscow will stand by its Afghan friends so long as they arc under attack-Moscow's effective condition for withdrawal remains outside acquiesce rice in Its victory, namely totalof rupport to the Mujahedin Soviet diplomacy clouds, but does not refute this judgment.

n human rights, similarly, Gorbachev'sto concede Italid Issue and make such gestures as the release of Shcfaannakiy have clearly been aimed aticture ol Soviet Bealbility. But other visible actions, such as Sakharov's treatment, have belied any fundamental change of Soviet policy, and no authoritative Soviet has claimed aueh change to be possible.

4 On arms control. Soviet tactics may or may not be intended to confuse the United States and iu Allies They are certainly intended toore activist and forthcoming Soviet image than the West Is used to. Moreover, we do not believe that Gorbachev or any Soviet authority genuinely regards the elimination ol nuclear weapons as an operational objectiveeal possibility within any foreseeable time frame, theanuary proposal to tbe contrary notwithstanding. But we cannot cite explicit reporting foe this judgment.

e believe the Soviets have deliberately and misleadingly inflated their flexibility on major Issues, more often by Insinuation than by outright lies, but have generally avoided explicit indications of Interest in policies tbey are not prepared to consider ot readiness (or commitments they are not Intending to keep. Whether thereurther order of dupbeitv in the policies and tactics ol the Gorbachev leadership is not dear Three Interpret at ions, not altogetherexclusive, are possible.

*^the Gorbachev leadership, aided by efforts toore appearing Image generally, Uwilling to show flexibility at the margin of issues and to follow through on Its more substantial proposah If theirelements are agreed to. but not to sacrifice those essential elements In bargaining Thus, were tbe United States to make agreements tliat. In the Kremlin's view, assured the end of the SDI program, the USSB would seriously pursue deep cuts Instrategic arms consistent with Its national security requirements If support to the Mtijihedin were ended and the rcsisunce could be expected to dry upear orthe USSH would be willing toroop withdrawal timetable commensurate with the survival ol the communist regime in Kabul.

e believe the lor eg ens it the most likely interpretation because il accounts best for tbe total

body ol our evidence, including our best interpielion

officUl Soviet positions, and withf the Soviet external end internal situation We eanitot entirely rule out the following ahernative eaplaria-tions, however, xlthough we believe they ate much less Profcabie.W

& In part because be does not expect theto satisfy him on essential elements ofpositions and proposals. Gorbachev doesor intend to follow through materially onthem and has communicated this Into tbeFurther, ift the Unitedto accede to aas taking

that promised termination of SDI or aa end to support of the Afghan resistance, the Soviets would pocket tbe political benefits of such exmcegstoos to the extent tbey could and retreat from their seemingly flexible positions, or, delay at least, further movement on their part until the next US administration- The underlying motive for thb kind of Soviet calculus would be that the Kremlin does not really want, much less expect, any real breakthrough with the Reagan administration because of its anti-Soviet legacy, (c)


T'He himself, however, could be willing to be moie"aexible on fundamental security issues If the United States and other partners create the right atmosphere through marginal concessions that help him sell further Soviet movement to hb reluctant colleagues, (c)



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