THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR: CLOSING THE FINAL GAP IN COVERAGE FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE

Created: 6/19/1986

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THE KRASNOYARSK RADAR: CLOSING THE FINAL CAP IN COumAGE FOR BALLISTIC

MISSILE EARLY WARNING

Suasary

The large phased-array-radar (LPAR) located near Krasnoyarsk, USSR has been an ABM Treaty issue since It was first detected In3 because of its inland, rather than peripheral, siting. Responding to us demands about its inconsistency with the ABM Treaty, the Soviets have repeatedly argued that th* radar Is for satellite detection and tracking.

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nalyses indicate, andthat the primary mission of this radar is ballistic missile detection and tracking. Further, we believe the Krasnoyarsk LPAR closes the final gap In the Soviet ballistic missile early warning (BMEU) and tracking network that inc'inles LPARs and the older Hen House type radars.

We believe the siting of an LPAR near Krasnoyarsk was motivated primarily by the requirement to close this BMEw gap and at the same time achieve more favorable RV-impact prediction accuracy at the expense of warning-time. Although the Soviets lose some tracking time because of the inland location, track times are comparable to those of the rest of their SHEW system. We believe the

TrWe 'noe<rrfnt memorandum was prepared

office of Scientific anacontributed to this report.

Questions *nd comm-ntu are welcome, and may betnon

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NOTICE INTELLIGENCE SOURCES OR METHODS INVOLVED

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specific location of the radar was determined on the basis of logistical requirements for construction and maintenance, and construction and operations costs.

Introduction

In previous studies, we analyzed the rolearge-phased array radar (LPAR) located in the east central USSR near Krasnoyarsk-* These studies concluded that the radar's prinary nlsslon is Ballistic oissile early warning and not space-tracking as the Soviets have clained. Newlv acoulred information reaffirm, this view. |

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The capability of the Krasnoyarsk radar to fill an existing BHEW gapunction of its angular coverage and the coverage provided by "adjacent" LPARs and Hen House radars. The aziouth and elevation scan Units of these two types of Soviet RMFW radarsf"as shown in the table.

TABLE

Estinated Scan Limits of Soviet BHEV Radars

House

(deg)

55

(deg)

to 60

to 32

too rj&

Moscow Coverage

Our analysis Indicates that Moscow rv>nid hr* attacked bv futureLBMsH"

"ViXhout LPAR detection, if the Krasnoyarsk radarexist. II appearsmall, but possibly In Sovietsignificant SLBM launch area is not coveredmitations of the LPARs based at Pechora^The LPAR at Krasnoyarsk provides the required

coverage to fill this gap.

The northern edge of the Moscow coverage gap is defined by the Pechora LPAR's aziouth limitations. The southern edgeesult of the aziouth and elevation scan limitations of theon House.

A second, larger, gap rn Pechora-type radar coverage foron Moscow, (that is, one that is independent of Hencoverage) is closed by the Krasnoyarsk radarThe

northern edge of the LPAR-only gap is defined by the Pechora LPAR. The southern edge is Qriflariiv Unitedauthal-sean Unit of

tru, MtshelevLra LPAR.I

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Soviet ICBH Field Coverage

It appearsignificant portion of the Soviet's ICBH force could be attacked without warning by futureissiles if the Krasnoyarsk LPAR was not present. Potential SLBM launch areas in the North Pacific could strike ICBH complexes west of Krasnoyarsk by avoiding the Pechora and Hlshelevka LPAR coverages. epresentative of such attack; this attack region could be aoved sonewhat north or south by moving the launch area south or north, respectively.

Location

He believe the siting of an LPAR at Krasnoyarsk closes the last gap In ballisticearly-warning coverage. Of course, this is not the only location that could provide this coverage. For example, an LPAR deployment along the eastern coast of the USSR would work, but such alternative locations while increasing warninK-tine would result in sinnifJnnntlv dearadfl trarklntr

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interesting to note that the warning-tine for Moscow afforded by the Krasnoyarsk locationo-pat lble with that for other LPARs,

The Soviets aay also have been activated by deployment and support cost In locating an LPAS at Krasnoyarsk. LPAB's consistently have been deployed south of the peroafrost Deployments north of the pertiafrost, although technically possible, add significant building and aaintenance costs. Additionally, the Krasnoyarsk site Isail line; many of the othersites north of the pernafrost are not serviced by rail.

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