KEY THIRD WORLD HOTSPOTS (SOV M 86-20075X)

Created: 8/22/1986

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ECTOSATI OF lhTELL1GE NCI

CIA HISTORICAL REVIEW program RELEASE AS SANITIZED

Key'Third World

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At the request of the Under Secretary of Stale forMichael K. Arnacost, this aieaiorandua was prepared byof So-let Analysts. African and latin Americanfastern and South Asian Analysis, and last Asian AnalysisDirectorate of Intelligence. Connents and ouerles aayto the Chief.Office

of Soviet Analysis,

SOVX

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1. AFGHAN 1SIAK

Tht pace or combat hat Increased In recce: weeks, but Soviet ground forces nave bean consioeraoty less active tnan during the sane period last year, ctivity, however, hti expanded substantially In comparison with last year. Although the Soviets epparently encouraged tht Kabul regine toreater share of the fighting early this year, all major operation* since late tprlag have been conducted prtaiarlly by Soviet units. Kebal has made toae Marginal laprovraents la developing pargalMtary forces and Intelligence capabl1Ittes, but manpower shortages,b, poor morale aad serious defection problems persisthe Afghan araed forces. ffensives flace late Janeettentlve use of artillery bombardment and air strikes, but wtao evidence of either significant contact with Insurgent groups or the destruction of any Insurgent ttrongholdt.

Operations against Insurgent supply routes and bases In the eastern border regions and alder use of eabvsnet by Soviet Special Purpose forces apparently have coapllcated Insurgent logistics. Higher transportation costs and lack of transport hive caused some supply Bottlenecks, but the Insurgents continue to hanper the movencnt of Soviet end Afghan convoys and recentlyeavily defended Soviet ammunition depot. The Soviets have haM lone success tn Improving urban security, but Ktbul*-whlch had been relatively quiet last year--recently tits been subjectederies of Insurgent rocket attacks. Control of other urbanis Qandthar and Herat--reaaIns strongly contested. Since beconlnc head of the Afghan party In Hay, KaJIbullah has laid the groundwork for contollotting his control by raring supporters to Inportant positions, but factlonalltahe party prrslttt.

Although me hive alaost no direct Information about ho- the Soviet leadership views the progress of the air,tee *to Indication that tavolvtaent In Afghanistan bat ctited the Soviets enough distress to male then contemplate withdrawal la the absenceiable, pro-So*1et refine. He doebt that Gorbachev's recent announcement of plans to withdraw sla reglaeatstrongly positive assessor.-: o' tbi atar) robably does Indicate, however, tome degree ef confidence that Soviet/Afghan forces can maintain their present level of effectiveness and that this gesture will not underalne Afghan morale. There are tentative signs that the withdrawal of at least one antiaircraft unit hat begun.

Continued factional strife In the Afghan party tlnce the accetsion of Nallbullah, the disappointing recruiting efforts of

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I[. NICARAGUA

Sine* April the Insurgents have sustainedcombatants Inside Nicaragua And keptteady string

Ia recent weeks the rebels, operating largely lit the northwest, have successfully httarracks and economic targets such as state farm and electric power pylons. They maintain considerable local support Inhere they operate.

Mith renewed US military assistance the Insurgents hope to Increase combat activity on other frontsn effort to draw regime troopsfro* northern coabat -tones.

for their part* the Sendlnlstes appear to have inproved tfcelr tactics and comitand and control, but neverthless face continued manpower and materiel shortfalls. Sendlnlita casualties have Increased, and larger numbers of desertions probably reflect lower morale.. The Sandfrtlsti leadership, however, remain, united In Its determination to suppress any challenges to Its goal ofarxlst-Lenlnlst regime, and we eipect Internal repression to Intensify as the armed 1nsurgency--bolstored by renewed US militaryIn slie and operating areas. On the domestic political front, the Sandinistas are determined to prevent the creation of an Internal front In support of the Insurgents.

ince late June. Managua has closed the only Independent newspaper, dented the Catholic Church spokesman reentry Into Nicaragua,ishop Into eille. and stepped wo harassment of second-echelon leaders In the political opposition.

Ut also eipect the regime will use its growing Internal security capaM illargely with Cuban and Soviet Hoc ess1st*flce*-to step up large-scale sweeps In rural areas while monitoring the doeettic opposition and US presencehe cities.

Ihe Soviets remain connttted to keeping the Sandlnlsta regime afloat despite rising costs of econonlc and military neterlel asslstence. Moscow clearly believes that the advantages gained by Sandlnfsta consolidation Justify its Investment, which Is ttm small relative to Its other high-priority Third world lid programs. The Soviets probably had hoped that donestlc political pressurehe US would have cut ofr external support to the insurgents, lessening the need for Soviet aid, but nowonger term view of tht prospects for Sandlnlsti

a

(Oiiolhas tried I* Halt assistance I* Mceragai

over the past five years by urging* Sandinistas to seek of financial support. Bui with Western assistanceand co-uurr shortages growing,believe the to expand its conaltatnt to subsidize theeconewy,1 urge Its Warsaw Pact alliesaid asthai

hare increased ManaguVs credit unes est year,6 alone. Increasing roleirect supplier of aras tounderscores the continued Soviet coaaltnent to Nevertheless,elieve the Soviets coatlaiieranshtpaent point for anas destined forparticularly larger nllltary Iteas such as This year's deliveries7

TTie Sandinistas cioaci to andc J

additional ransport aircraft, douoiing the size of their air force. The Soviets have already delivered aore nllltary egulpaent this year thin in any previous year.C*

notion- win probably refrain from

sending Managua Jet fighter aircraft to avoid provotlng US Military Intervention. The Soviets are also lltely to tecp their advisory pre*ence--aboot li ellltary and ZOO econonlc advlsers--as snail and Ion-profile as possible.

transport hel Icopler I. Daljitery veniclet, and an

III. AhGOLA

aunch Its expected cvesibcr. There Is ent staging area of tack onugust lions. So far.

Overeveral avanths. luaada has undertaken major preparationsarge scale ground and air operation directed against UNITA's stronghold in southern Angola. Luanda has about

two months of favorable weather offensive before the rainy seas currently fighting aroundulto CuanavaleNI designed to disrupt tuanda's ml UKITA appears to have Inflicted

UKITA appears to have Inflicted little danage. Fighting hat also been under way since Ray around the central Angolan town of Hunhingo--whIch sits astride Important logistical lines ofKITA units have been harassing Angolan forces In control of the town.

President dos Santos, who no* appears to be la an unchallenged political position. Is coeteltted toong-tern military effort against UKITA while trying to split Its rants by holding out the prospect of negotiations. The approximatelyoviet military advisers In Angola are assigned to virtually all command and staff functions down to it least the brigade level, with responsibilities including planning, training, recruitment, political supervision, and logistical support. He believe the Soviets ignificant role In the planning of last year's Angolan offensive and are likely also heavily Involved in planning this year's combat operations. Tht Soviets hive generally avoided direct participation la combat, relying en the Cubans to fly Important air missions and handle advanced equipment. However, we belltvt thererowing chance that tbt Soviets, Cubans, and South Africans, through support to their clients, may themselves bento more direct conflict.

contlnulngic

He believe that the Sovietsong view of the situation In Angola, where they have limited military access to air and naval facilities and extensive economic and political relations. They appear totratagy Involving graduil consolidation of government political control through the extension of the state and party apparatus combined wlth

The scale, timing and suggest that they support

offensive action by Luanda oact deliberate logistical and defensive preparations have been made. However, Moscow would probably prefer that Luanda avoid precipitant offensive moves that risk exposing Its forces to South African counterattack. Over the long run. the Soviets are probably counting on Increnental government military gains, exhaustion on the part of UKITA followers, and the eventual passing from Ihe scene of Savinbt to facilitate Luanda's victory In the contest with OhIIA.

StCRTI

IV. IRAK/IIAQ

Iraq and Iran have Increased pressure on each other In tar last sla itonlhs In anticipation of najor battles thfi fall.uccesses at Al re* and Nehran this year. Its doaiastlc economic problems, and the fall in oil prices have ct.ieu' the Iranians to change thalr strategy and atteapt to end the war by Over the last two months, Iran hasarge nunBcren and redeployed troops to prepare for an offensive. Tho threat of another Iranian attack and recent nllltary defeats, econoalc problens. and declining civilian and Military Morale have weakened Iraq aore than at any tlae In the six-year war. Baghdad's Increase In air attacks on econoalc targets In Iran and tho Persian Gulf hive not deterred tht Iranians from continuing the war.

Relations between the USSR and Iran are troubled by entagonlsas that are likely toignificant Improvement in relations. The clerics' abhorrence of atheistic Coaaunlsa las reinforced Iran's historical hostility toward tussle and created deepseated suspicions about Soviet Intentions toward the Islaalc Republic. The Iranians have sought better ties In tho hope of gaining Soviet arms and the tconoalc beeeflts of Increased trade, but they een unwilling to pay tbe price of aeetlag Soviet deeends. The Soviets Insist that Tehran end the war. tone down antl-Sovlot propaganda, and cease support for the Afgnan resistance. These Issues are likely to continue to lapede laproved relations even after Khoaeinl dies.

Iraqi-Soviet relations are generally good despite periodic strains over military sales, repression of the Iraqi Communist Party, and eras sales by Soviet allies to Iran. The Iraqis renaln suspicious of Soviet aablttons in the region and still resent the USSR for cutting off arms supplies to Iraq early In the war. Iraq will continue to rely on the Soviets for the vait najorlty of its allftary equipment but will try to reduce that dependency after the war,

Iraq's diplomatic efforts are atned at isolating Iran and curtailing arms sales to lehran. Senior Iraqi officials have crisscrossed Africa in recent weeks drunmlng up support for an anti-Iranian resolution at the Non-Aligned Summit meeting next week and to counter similar Iranian efforts to rally African support at the tuaalt. Bighdad Is also seeking worldwide backing for Iraqi President Saddaa Husayn's five-point plan for ending the conflict. The Iraqis continue to press the United States, other Western states, and the Soviets to embargo eras to Tehran.

The Culf war has aot served Moscou's overall Interests In the region despite boosting Soviet eras sales to Iraq: It

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sparked the fornatlon of the Gulf Cooperation Council,to tha United States for strategic assistance;Soviet efforts to achieve greater cooperationSyria, andye; and It tended to offsetthe US for Its pro-Israel) stance among moderate si*.; I iii uy*

approximately half of Its arms from the USSB and most of Its major weapons systems arehe Soviets probably do not want either Iran or Iraq to emerge as clear victor, having longelative balance between the two countries as the best way to exert Soviet Influence In the region. ictorious Iran not only would undermine Soviet Influence la Baghdad, but also probably would make the Khomeini regime even less susceptible to Soviet inroads or pressure and free up assets that could be used to support the Afghan nujehadean or help spread Islamic fundamentalI set beyond Iranian borders. Moscow's Inability to influence Tehran and Iraq's inability to force Iran to enter negotiations suggest tht USS1 will continue to support Iraq In Its war effort, especially as long as tbe United Stites renalns locked out of Iran.

V. SOUTH YthTh

The regime tn Aden seized power ovnr sevengo, but hai failed to consolidate its position at hoae or gain more than Halted support abroad. Violent personal and factional rlvt'.rlti and policy dlsagreeaants divide the ruling coalition. No person or group has emerged capable oftable, broadly-based government. The fragile balance between factions could easily be upset as Maneuvering for power leads to renewed fighting.

The security situation, especially In Aden, remains unstable; reports of unrest, revenge killings, and continuing detrition are commonplace. The regime continues to purge suppirters of former South Yemeni President Hasanl from Its rants and Is preparing to try In absentfa Hasanl and the topeaders who lied the country with blm. Refugees are still streaming across the border to north Temen where as many0 South Temeils ere encamped.

economic problems, serious before the coup, have grown worse. The Aden refinery and ports--key sources of foreign eichange--are functioning normally, but earnings fromsources have fallen. South Yemeni envoys recantly aet with Soviet and Culf leaders to request funds, but so far have not gotten the hard cash Aden desperately needs. Aden hasumber of stopgap measures. Including cutting Imports and halting development projects, but without additional foreign assistance these moves will be insufficient to arrest economic deterioration.

The eiilt Issue renalns the main stumbling block to better relations with North Temen and traditional allies such as Syria, llbyi, and Ethiopia, who still support Hasanl to varying degrees. North Yemeni President Sallh Is providing military failing to the exiles and is threatening to unleash thea In operations across the border. Aden so far has resisted all etteapts, both Soviet and North Temenl Inspired, to workolitical conoronlse. Talks collapsed last week--the fourth such effort to fall In the last month--and the participants nay no* think negotiations ore futile.

The lighting in January reduced the ability of South Yemen's armed forces to conduct offensive operations. Host officers ind technically skilled personnel have defected to the Korth. Stocks of fuel, innunltlon, and military spare parts were drawn down significantly during the fighting and logistic support is poor.

Aden will look to Nosco* to restock Its Inventory of arms, ammunition, and spare parts, (van so, the armed forces probably can sustain routine operations for the neat few months without

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VI. nnJD1 *

Vietnam continual to focui military pressure along tho Thoi-Cembodlan border to block resistance Infiltration and to disrupt guerrilla activity. All nine of Vietnam's combat divisions and the five People'i Republic of Hamp<Cmmn eJv'i'uaW are Jcployod there. Hanoi also continues to construct barriers throughout the border region that are deslgntd to Impede further resistance Infiltration to the Interior. Chinese military pressure along the Slno-Vletnamese border, which has been limited to the strategically unimportant area near Rallpo where China0 troops, does not seen to deter Vietnam fron conducting operations in Cambodia that It deems necessary. Resistance forces, however, renaln active throughout most of the country. Tht Communist Khmer Rouge, in particular, have conducted an active Interior campaign over the past few months exploiting Vietnam's emphasis on the border area. The Khmer Rouge have launched numerous small-scale attacks against Vietnamese and Cambodian military positions, local government facilities, and several aajor population centers. Including. Pnnom Penh. Non-Communist forces also have stepped up Infiltration activities, although they still do not have an effective support network In Canbodla and artactor on the battlefield. Despite these Internal security problems. Vietnam retains the strategic advantage, which we doubt the resistance will erode appreciably anytime soon. Diplomatic efforts hold little promise forreakthrough. Hanoi continues to insist oa tht elimination of tht Pol Pot group and the recognition of tht Heng Sanrln regime while ASEAN continues to derand the complete unconditional withdrawal ef Vietnamese troops; neither sideikely to compromise In the next few years.

Tht Soviets continue to portray the Vietnamese approach to resolving the Cambodian question as reasonable and flexible, and to deny that they themselves bear any responsibility for tht failure of the warring sides toolitical settlement. General Stcrttary Gorbachev tried to finesse the Issue in Vladivostok last month.utile attempt to avoid Irritating letjlng any further, but the Soviets have made It clear slnct then that they do not Intend to tnd thtlr support of Vlttnamtse military operations It Cambodia. There are some costs la their close Identification with Hanoi's position, of coarse, butSoviets do not see their fundamental objectives served by attempts to pressure Vietnam toward changing its current Cambodian strategy. Soviet leaders might change their minds on this point If they Believed theyeal opportunity toreakthrough In their relations with China, but are not about to give up the military facilities they have in Vietnam--and those they might get inmaybe.* Moscow, at the sane time, appears to beresh campaign to woo

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Til. ETHIOPIA/SUDAN

Chairman Henglstu Is firmlyharge and Is proceedlno " it^f'ifLeninist state In Ethiopia! his

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People's Deoocratlc RepeblU" to succeed the provisional government* he has headed?

Clauds of the

constitution willolitical basis for an end to

rtii ^lnl"rJrCitt: evep- lht Erltreans hive already and autonomynlikely to have much ajpeal to the Tlgreans and most other ethnic groups. Wc believe henoistu will have no choice but to continue his pursuit of a hUltary activitye5 onths; Ethiopian forces areefensive posture and there Is no evidencelanned

1 ^itr"nsomeoSndoctetf"Ultwy operations this year, although they could move quietly to exploit government

ebels-wlth an0 effectlves-.rebuffed the regime's spring offensive and continue to control most ofrovince. The Soviets have prov ded extensive arms and advisor? support for Ethiopian

1nand has

Ethiopia/ soviet advisers

1Z1 h< C ariety of comnind andperatlonal planning, political supervision,

In neighboring Sudan; Prime Minister Sadlq al-Hehdlnot made muchonsolidating powerhe loyolty of the armed

OBorousarties andeak leadership haveovernment where few

decisions are made. The long-festering insurgencyouthern ^visionJrn IaJi!M tneflovernn.nt and the southern

? Christians who Identify with the African world. The lb.OQO-nan insurgent group--John Garang's Sudanese People's Liberationweapons, training, and logistical support from Ethiopia and reportedly gets occasional advisory support from Soviet Bloc advisers. Henglstu sees support fo> the

Irnr. <"orce OWftoini to

stop what he seesIts support for Ethiopian Insurgents. The

SPU faces some0 government troops whose logistics,

readiness, morale, ano leadership problems have allowed the

rebels to gain the upper hand across most of the south. Recent

talks between Sadlq and Henglstu failed to resolve the tensions

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between Sudan and Ethlopi

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Soviets apparently ice the nortkcrn Usurgeaclesifficult allltary problem for Add la Ababa, but not ona that, an Immediate political throat to tha Henglstu regime, f ss-jrcc: tadlcats. tSit th?* sftcn counseled Henglstu to explore the possibility of soae kind of political settlement with the northern Insurgents, apparently la theettlement would give the Henglstu reglne soae breathing space to rebuild the Ethiopian economy and expand the state and party apparatus. However, the Soviets have not applied their prtaory source of leverage on Henglttu on thisut-off ofwe expect the* to continue to provide aras and advisory support for the Ethiopian allltary. We do not expect the tensions that arose In the aftermath of the coup In South feaon--when the Soviets pressured Henglstu to ceeso allltary support for former Teaenl Presidentignificant effect en Soviet-Ethiopian relations, la view of Heeglstu's coaaltaeat to Marelsa-Lenlalsa and lack of alternative allltary and political supporters. Over the next several years, the Soviets will push for the transforation of tha worker's Party of Ethiopiaroadly-based civilian Herxlst-lenlnlstrocess they wlate by providing training to large numbers of party officials. Over the longertha Soviets will took for the party to consolidate t rule tn Ethiopia, ensure Soviet Influence there, and guarantee continued Soviet access to Ethiopian air and naval facilities.

The Soviets will likely proceed slowly toward warming relations with Sudan. While Moscow wr Iconed the overthrow of the staunchly anti-Soviet Hlalerl, It views Sadlq as coming from the sane Sudanese establishment that produced Nlalerl and questions how far1 dissociate Itself froa the US. Bering his recent visit to Moscow, Sadlq sought to revive Soviet ecenoalc projects begun In the early seventies and to bolster the new government*', dales to nonalIgnment. He also nay have broached Sudan's need for spare parts for Soviet military equipment purchasedgo and sought relief froa Ethiopia's support for John Garang. The Soviets did not five Sadlq aa especially warm reception, however, and probably told Din that Ethiopia's support for Garang was related to Sudan's support for the Frltreans. Moscow will probably continue to let Henglstu take the lead with the SPLA. though It might pressure hla to back away froa the group If It believed that Khartoum could be brought closer to the Soviet orbit.

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