TURKEY: Governmeni Favored in Bisection*
The letesi opinion cons show that Prime Minister Oxers conservative Motherland Party Is likely toajority ct theeats al slake idplurality ol lhe yote in lhc parliamentary byeieclioni tomorrow
_ lead era ol the mam opposition
leltiBl Social Dnmocratlc PopuiutIo win only half as many seats as Motherland but itlll hope lornearly even share ot Hie vote The seats at Issue are widely distributed nationally, and the media, as well as the public, view the contestseferendum on the government's standing!
1 the governing psriy does notiea' plurality or the voto-onc-even lesstoajority of lhe seats, lhe Prime Minister probably will face strong pressure lo ease his atrlngeni economic policies and toate soon for the general election that Is due by 1(
PANAMA-COLOMBIA-UiVnB Drug Money
Some Latin American drug trafficker* may De moving their monoy-laundering efforts trom Panama to new regionalnoot US pressure. Tho amount ol US currency returned lo the US Federal Reserve by Panama du'lrvg'tWfitat eiglit months of this year Iserceni less thanimilar periodut US currency shipments from Colombia have more than jadrupksdl
no through Panama may notuch aa the statistics indicate Panamanian banker* probably arc disperf ng surplus cash to other countriesch it is returned io the FeOevel Reserve Panamanian orftctaJs may try to use the reduced lervet of cash returned to prove that tney aredown on money laundering to avoid changing Panama's Dank secrecy
utua; legal assistance
laws significantly and
treaty wltn the US
MOVEMENT-US: Appeal (or Meeting
Zimbabwe's permanent representative to the UN has requested that President Reagan meet wltn eight nonaligned Foreignfrom Algeria. Argentina, Congo, India, Nigeria, Peru. Yugoslavia, andreceive an unspecified mt
iThe Foreign/flinistefs a
General Assembly scssior
iThe Foreign Ministers probably intend to deliver an appeal
for comprehensive sanctions against South Africa. The final communique Irom this months Nonaligned Movement summit In Harare mandates that they lobby key Industrial countries, especially the UK. West Germany. Japan, and the US, for sanctions. The proposed mealing Is pari of an effort lo press Ihe UN Security Council lo Impose mandatoryeting that will probably be held next monlhJT"
of Iraqi Air Attack*
Increasingly effective Iraqi air aiiacka on Iran't oil refining and export systems are substantially raising the pressure orftn economy already reeling trom low oil prices end Increased war spending. With the onset of coldevere shortage ot heating oil oruLt'&ctrlcltY wouldajor blow to civilian morale 1
Iraqi attacks, compounded with weather and "comical problems, have reduced Iranian oil exports, and in turn aggravated the shortage of foreign exchange Exports since early August have averaged aboulillion barrels perelow Iran's OPEC quota.
has not been able io activate offshore oil terminals at Ganaveh or to solve problems with the shuttle system for exports.
acquire outside nxporuscpare parts may hamper exports tor several
In addition, Iraqi attacks on refiner causing shortages of gasoline Hkefy to become wi
oil prices and increased military expenditures had earlier fotced Iran to make deep cuts in spending for tho civilian economy. Acute shortages of consumer items, soaring prices for food and other
. and rapidly rising unemployment have been evident tor several montr
shortage of foreign exchange has caused wKJespieadJayotls at businesses and factories. Since early this summer^*
V .2 9
ol lood ano other com mod ilies throughout
^prices of consumer lwestern Iran were up sharply in May and Junc-J
Rlaks lo Ihe Regime
A sustained shortage ol healing and diesel fuel could cause serious unrest, particularly among the lower classes thai provide lhe regime its principal support. Tehran will meet military fuel needs first, making civilian shortages that much greater. Inadequate supplies of diesel fuel win hamper distribution of goods, in past years, shortages of heating oilhan those likely this year have provoked demonstrate
Is concerned aboul the Impact of economic problems on civilian morale, especially If its forthcoming military offensive fails. Officials have become Increasingly sensitive lo atlacks on economic polios in the Iranian press. In public statements many have linked increased economic sacrifices to Ihe goal of defeating Iraq this year. fvia;les Speaker Rafsanjani has warned against unrealistic expectations of victory, however, probably fearing an outburst of pent-up frustration if Ihe situation becomes worse-IHlaV
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Pad and CDE
Major Provisions of the CDE Agreement
Military Fxerciaea end Other Activities: Partieswtred towgnatonn* of militaryinvolving more0 menays in
O bee nation of Eaerciaea: Parties required to Invite observers from other Signatories when exercises Involve moro0 men.
Annual Calendars Parties required to publish annual calendar of anticipated notifiable activities byovember of previous year. Exercises to involve more0 men lo be hSIeO on* additional year ahead Those to involve more0 men to be listed two years in advance.
Verification of Compliance: Signatories hava right to demand on-site Inspection of territory of another stato whenever auspicious lhal exercises or olher military activities exceeding specified llmlla are occurring without agreed notification or observation. Parties must accept up to three inspections per year, but no one state can demand more than one such Inspection of any other slnole State per year. Inspections may be carried oul by air. on the ground, or both, with tne inspected stateeto over the source of any aircraft and crew.
USSR WESTERN EUROPE;
The Soviets will use lhe agreement reached al Ihe ConferenceIn Europe al Stockholm leal week to campaigntelka on reducing conventional loreet. Theycaffew CDE to consider Ihe Warsaw Pacl'ain June tor Iroop reductions. Allied responseslargely on whether lhe French would be willing lo forum^
Soviet and East European commentaries claim compromises byenabled the conferee* to overcome USdagreement. Although the agreement doea not constrainno* require troop reducti;
U provisions, particularly those requiringf exercises west of the Urate. The Sovietsocurnent that omits many ol their opening daman cs including separate non healf naval and aa- exercises
Tho Soviets have soughtmeeting with membersigh-level NATO task force to jllscuss thc Budapest Appeal and the futureoL arms control talksJ
The Budapest Appeal called for equal reductions from the Atlantic lo the Urals of NATO and Warsaw Pact ground and ai- force troops and equipment. Reductions by each sideroops would be madeear orecond cutould follow In lhehe Budapest Appeal proposes accomplishing the reductions by disbanding units rather
lhan by thinning out the- ranks, and tt provides tor weapons and
I orhe territories of lhe states
Assuming Western willingness to accept equal numerical reductions. NATO would prcsumabfy insist on more wide-ranging verification thrin the limitedjpectlon provisions lhe Soviets agreed lo at Stoikrolrn
Soviet and Warsaw Pact military leaders would be more resistant to such comprehensive measures lhan to manpower cuts on the order of those specified for the Drat atage of the Budapest Appeal. For economic and demographic reasons, General Secretary Gorbachev
Ctin*ailing ol Ctmbedian resistance leaders in Belling earlier this month to reiterate ttrong support tor thm resistance. Pretldem LI Xlennlan also seed in* mooting to assure ASCAN and tha Wast publicly that China dots not Inland to raatora to power tho discredited Khmar_pOuge or tophere otambndin atamant^
China's efforts to strengthen tha cohesion of Ihe resistance coalition ovor the past year- largely by trying to make the Kneworo acceptaWe coalitionto raise suspicion In ASEAN about Beijing's objectives. By blurring distinctions between the Khmer Rouge and the Iwo non-Communist resistance groupa. China has probably unintentionally undercut the non-Communists' elforls to develop an Independent political following in Cambodia. Because most Chinese mlOiary aid to the resistance goes lo Ihe Khmer *ouce. some ASEAN and Western oric-as blame China for the wide disparity in maiijiy tapjbn ties between thc Khme- Rouge and lhe
Is unlikely to alter soon Its fundamental strategy ofand diplomatic pressure on Vietnam. Beijing places theprogress in Cambodia on Hanoi and Moscow and expects noChina recognizee that Ils ability to achieve Itscomplete Vietnamese withdrawal and afree of Vietnamese control orby ils unwliingness to lake decisive military actionand by regional sensitivities to en overly aggressiveto the Cambodia
Beijing would view en inconclusive outcome in Cambodia over the next several years as an acceptable alternative because it would involve relatively low costs, prevent Hanoi from consolidating its hold on Indochina, and keep the Soviets committed to burdensome fid.
tnam and on the diplomaticsia.!-
V 3 4Original document.