NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FOR 28 JUNE 1986

Created: 6/28/1986

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Reaction lo Ih* US Vote

Is using tha voto on US mid to tho Iniargmnts lo /nerease pressure on thm cMc opposition; Its actions appmar tonnoral increase In thm /ova/ tft y

" > aWpU^aaeiCrie Sandinistas' closure ot La Proms is one of Iheir

strongest moves against the opposition. Tnat end the lightened state of emergency presage further measures against the ctvlc opposition and the private sector. Oreft-oxempted Church seminarians may again be conscripted, and the regime Is liken/ to widenf insurgent supporters"

The Sandinistas will press the Contadora mediators to remain active In the negotiations to counter tho US end Its Central American allies. Managua may also uso tho US vote and tho recent World Cour dntfsto&injw.fevor toN Security Council meeting i

PLO. and channeled through tho Drum

meanest- and tho Chrlsilsn Phalange _ ry equipment la

hopei maintaining or improvingmiliary position iff Lebanon will help him retain the leadership ot Ihe Palestinian movement. Pro-Sytlan mainstream Amal leaders and estromlst Christians will continue) to fight an increased Palestinian presence in Lebanon, but theyhave only limited capabdly to alow the pace ol

'Oin'1't'at.cr-jrjJBb ^

Amal dissidents In the south. Increasingly disgruntied wtin Amal leader Barri. claim that Ihe war in toe camps is draining resources better used elsewhere and that the Syrians and Isreeils-not ihethe real threathiaebanon. Barri. however, sees the fight against the PLOhance lo rally Shia support for his leadership. Divisions within Amal are likely to intensity, with pro-Syrian members pressing tor Barri to occupy lhe Palestiniannd pro-lranlan siucmists continuing to |oln Hliballal rajaJfUQ

r

Military and Diplomatic Activity

Libya Itow priority to in Chad campaign; meanwhile. Ihe USSR It taking tentative mtept to renmw Ilea to President abre, whote political fortune* may ba Improving, ajajajjat*-

iChed and the USSR are eaagdllatrng tne reopeningSowei'Dlamnna The Embassy closedfighting

la concentrating on regrouping atlor the US raidsApril and probably Is not prepared to take dangerous mutative s

Soviets probably remain skeptical ot the rebels' prospecispower and may be seeking lo bodge their bets by0eip.tr ineolibyan leader Oedhafi

The Sikh Problem Now Dp.

Wo/enco In Pun/'b

Punjab hu generally suc-slded.eek font) curlew In lilled yesterday without incSdy

oderale Sikh governmeni

hasand Transfer Commission newly appointed by New

Delhi lo Identity areas In Punjab thairansferred in exchange 'or thecity of Criaitdignrn.eBjBatBjBjajB^

Indicates thai Slhris oulildo Punjab supportMinister 'Gandhi's efforts io resolve the transfer issueayjgpaje,

tl

i New Delhi'o latest demarche to Islamabad reflects Ilsto whal It views as Pakistani meddllnc

Radical Sikhs probably go beck and forth across the border with j. end locel Pakistani officials may provide some tratning and

weapons

Political opposition to the rttoderete Sikhsrnent in Punjabmount as the mid-July date scheduled 'or the transfernears Sikh milltania will continue efforts toChlel Minister Barnila. while Hindu groups will presstor

Toajgfecret

angerous political move, President Garcia has bogun to lash out at police and military officer* he had ordered to quell tho prison riots last week. Earlier this week Garoio announced thatolice officers andolicemen had been arrested and would be tried for executingoerrorists who had surrendered.our of one of the prisons yesterday, Garciaress statement termed tho killing ol defenseless prisonersideous crime" and said that military

ore reasonableInvolving anallow tempers to cool. Even If Garcia adopts this approach, however, his public stateeaents have focused nationaln trve security. and he will find It difficult to carni the

EC-SOUTH AFRICA: Aaroomant on Conditional Sanctions

The EC heads of government yesterday agreed In principle to Impose limited economic sanctions on South Africa If Pretoria tans lo tree ANC reader Mandela andlalpgue with South Africa's black community In the next three months

sanctions wouldan on iievWhvestrfTorTfnrTSouth AJrlcT from EC countries and on Imports of South African ooal, Iron,nd gold coins. They are to be Implemented only after further consultations among EC partners and with the US and JapanJ

Special Analysis

SOUTHal the Weal

Recent speeches by South African officials branding lha US and othar Western states aa traitors are designed to rally domestic support and to prepare* whites to go It alone. Pretoria now appears resigned to new sanctions and seas little to lose In op 'earning Its ^resentment ol Western etlarts to Influence Its

President Botha in recent weeks hasenounced Western meddling In Pretoria's affairs. Foreign Minister Botha, echoing these blasts, bTso has predicted that more sanctions are inevitable because the Western world Is sick and indlffeeeni to South Africa's plight. His recent speech to the white chamber of Parliament suggests that he fee's personally betrayed by the West. (kjatV

These criticisms are consistent wltnlongstanding hostility toward foreign efforts to end apartheid, but the recent stronger tone reflects Pretoria's teellng that it is being Increasingly pressed from all sides. The pervasive anti-Weal theme In stalemenls of top officials and government-controlled media at roan ly suggests that President Botha is encouraging this rhetoric, (tjaaaaw "3

Soulh African Reaction

The harsh security crackdown this month reflects Pretoria's growing perception thai Its limited reforms and relatively restrained use of state power will not satisfy the West or forestall additional economic sanctions as long as domestic unreal continues.

'nousillades against the West also help undercut the ruling National Party's rlghtwlng opponents, whow Botha of groveling to Washington.4JBB,*

Pretoria also Is upset about Western efforts to arrange talks between tho government and thc ANC, which Pretoria regardsarxist-controlled terrorist group. Pretoria last monthooklet detailing tho ANC's ties to the South African Communist Party, and President Botha lustlfied the state ot emergency in pari by quoting at length from an alleged Internal Communist directive on plans to use the ANC and other block groups to overthrow the government,

continued

t>3

Pretoria vented lis anger al lha Waal's refusal to support last month's attacks on ANC targets In ZamDia. Zimbabwe, and Botswana Dy claiming that Western nailons wereouble standard on the rloht ol nations to defend ihemiiolves agalnct lerrorlsm. Tho rmwllng

and ANC

President Tambo undoubtedly has intetniihed Soulh African. Pretoria almost certainly will uxwvj

political expeoiency.'

Outlook

As pressure to- sanctions builds. Pretoria Is Bkely to become moreefusing to acceie-ate Its reforms o. ease security measures. 8no even more croiehety Inhe Weal. Endemic violence and an Kvcreaalnc, sense of isolation will reinforce thc ingrained Afrikaner be. el ihat difficult times call for kragdadlghtudramatic snow of tore* Pretoria Is Bkeiy to take additional tough measures al home and to launch attacks designednflict heavier guerrilla casualtieshewhich also may cause more Inodentsi civilian oeaihv::aoalnsit ANC targets In neighboring states.

13

Special Analysis

ol Continued OPEC Disarray

II the current OPtC ministerial meeftlng raffsart Iran's demand* lot 'arc* production cuts, Tehran mrltt probably

military mnd tor roiltlmcki ogolntt Arab slates In tho Portion Gull mnd,talll bo more likely to try to win the wer with Iraqtell iolfaa*

A Saudi refusal to reduce ot production significantly would reinforce Tehran's Debet that Riyadh Is determined lo undermtno Iran's economy and Its war effort By keeping oil prices low. Iranian waders probably had hoped that attacks on Saudi shipping earlier this spring and the recent sabotage of Kuwaiti oil facilities would persuade the Saudis to reduce both oil production and aid to Iraq Without ma|or Saudi concessions, the Iranians are like.'* to conclude they will lose ail credibility unless Ihey follow through on their threats lo retaliate (or

rough on

Riyadh's Intransigence.

Iran's increasingly desperate economic situation Increases Its willingness lo risk widening lhe war. Iranian Oil Minister Aqaiadesh accused Saudi Arabia again this week of collusion with the Westdangerous game" and warned that the situation would be worse i( OPEC failed toy

Iran's first step would probably be to resume attacks on Saudi shipping. Increased Iraqi strikes against Iranian economic targets and continuing Iraqi attacks on Iranian tankers give Tehran added Incentive to strike Saudi ships In hopes the Saudis will press Iraq to desist. Iran probably would also Increase Its Interdiction In the Persian

of ships suspected of carrying Iraqi militarysat*

The sabotage of the Kuwaiti oil installations suggests Iran would increase sabotage of Gulf oil facilities and might even sponsor assassination attempts against Arab leaders. Tehran also could instigate more widespread agitation and perhaps violence by Iranian pilgrims to Mecca this August. The unlikelihood of higher oil revenues would Increase Iran's Incentive toround offensive later this

conomic difficulties will erode its military capabilities.

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