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Nearnd South Alia Review


Implication? ot an Iranianr |r>

jd reinforce Iran'sxpori iu Islamic revolution, strengthen ihe position of Iranian radicals wiihin the retime, and encourage Shia militancy throughout the* L.

Iraq's Soldiers: Plodding Through the War*

countty ai long a;

Iraoi soldiers fight loyally lor iheir country and are capable of performing their assigned duties. Mit iheir performance Is impeded by poor morale and incompetent lezdftshlp. Nonetheless. Iraq's soldiers probably will go on fighting for their COuntry_ai long as ihey believe (ranhreat that can be resisted.)


- b2

will *

Despite its desperate need for manpower to oppose Iran. Baghdad does not rigorously enforce ihc draft because ofill antagonize potentially disruptive elements of society. TOide of protest over lu inequitable draft policies. Baghdad wjl probably lighten up on student deferments this sjjmmeri

Succession Struggle in Iran; Iff int You Don'r Succeed ..

Assembly Speaker Rafsanjani probably engineered lhe selection of Ayaiollah Monta-eri as Khomeini's successor before Khon*inrs deathorestall and io allow Montaieri to consolidate his position, but key leaders and groups in ihe regime oppose this choice and may try to force the namingeadershipafcei Khomeini diet. MM I


F-gypt: An IsUmie Alternative?*

Egypt's economic difficulties have become so serious as to raise doubts whether President Mubarak or anyeplocement can successfully extrkate thc country from its downward spiral. -Should secular rule founder on ihe economic issue, it is possible that an Islamic fond amen tali st-inspired regime could come to power.

an Itlai

DccHiiuix Security in West Beirut and tbe Future of the American University i"

The continuing power struggle among Lebanon's Muslim militias is transforming Westthe major commcrciaL intellectual, and tourist center of the and still the honie ofmerican University ofa lawless, militariied tone cornered by confessional and ideologicalimmt

Near East and South Asia Keiiewl


single-minded belief in the tightness of their cause that motivated their campaign to oust the Shah. As In thai campaign, the Iranians believe they can prevail against all odds without compromising. Saddam Husayn has replaced the Shah and the United States as the evil that good Iranian fundamentalists must battle.

Several factors explain Iranian fanaticism on tbe war:

were the aggressors, so the Iranians' believe justice and right are on their side.

secular regime In Baghdad deviates from

/ IslarrTs true path and. therefore,rime exampleorrupt Muslim regime that all true believers must oppose.

The Ba'thist rulers arc Sunnis and Arabs, the traditional enemies of the Shia Persians. These longstanding animositiesationalistic fervor, even though Tehran offieblly disavows such motivations.. . .

Kbdmeini and his followers remain bitter over their expulsion from Iraq by Saddam8 to appease the Shah. Thus, the war is personal, as well as religious and nationalistic.

Iran's Strategy

The Siee-by-step strategy Iran is pursuing doesuire the Iranian Army to conquer all of Iraq in one sustained offensive. Iran's leadership probably hopes firstain Controlajor slice of territory in southern Iraq, including an importanl city such as Al Basrah, and tohia-dominated Islamic republic.


In assessing whether Iran can defeat Iraq andotions threat to other regimes In the region, it is useful to review some of the post Judgments about the clerics thot led to significant undereitlmailoni of their capabilities. These included such assumptions

The clerics' Hold on power it weak, and lhe Army is demoralised. An Iraqi invasion will sweep theregime away and end the fundamentalist threat.

The absurdity of the idea thai an anachronistic cleric like Ayalollah Khomeini can overthrow the Shah.

Khomeini, after he has overthrown the Shah, will retire peacefully to Qom. where he will gently prod Ihe gonrnment along the Islamic path bui spend most of his lime contemplating lhe finer points of Islamic theology, leaving moderate secular politicians to govern.

Should Iran achievearge bridgehead, It would at firstefensive posture against Iraqi forces and consolidate lhe power of the Shia to win the loyalty of ihemajority of the IraqiIranians probably would avoid the excesses tbaffollowed Ihe clerics' leiiure of power in Tehran and cmphasiie efforts lo broaden the new regime's support. Iran would aiiempt'to convince Iraqi Shias in the conquered territory ihai their Shia religious identity takes precedence over their Arab ethnic identity and that ihey should go wifh the winner. We believe this strategyeasonable one. Many Iraqi Shias might be willing to accept Iranian

hegemonyess onerous choice than continued loyaltya'lhisi regime that the Shias have never -really liked.

Once Tehran fell satisfied abaci the security of the new Shia eniiiyT if would renew militaryagainst the severely weakened Baghdad regime, confident that more fighting would fuither demoralise the weakened Iraqi Army and lead finally lo its disintegration. Tehran would work hard to convince the Iraqicompriseercent of thedesert. The emotional appealventually freeing the Shia holy cities of Karbala and Najaf from Sunni rule wouldowerful incentive to the Iraqi Shias to join the Iranians and would boost popular morale in Iran. The Iranians would hope the dissolution of Iraqi resistance would pave th, way for the establishmentro-Iranian regime in Baghdadinimum of additional fighting.

An Iranian vkiory*long these lines would permit Tehran to cause trouble in other parts of the Cuir by freeing more resources to devote to this mission. Moreover, the defeat of the Iraqi Army would revitalize the Iranians' commitment to the violent export of iheir revolution. Victory over the despised Ba'lhists would reinforce thc Iranians' belief lhat Allah, lime, and truth are on their side.

Radicalism Revitalized

Any hope that victor, would favor moderate trendsignores the fundamental impulsesibeand their perception of recent history. InIhey*

Overthrown the US-supported Shah without compromise.

Held lhe US hostages forear without compromise or retribution.

Triumphed over their secular and leftist rivals in the anti-Shah coalition without compromise.

Rcpeiled an Iraqi invasion and laken lhe war into Iraq despite minimal international support.

Confronted the full might of the US aad Israeli militaries in Lebanon and forced both lo retreat without compromise or retribution

PUycd midwife in Lebanonhriving radical Shu movement, Hiibaibth, which continues to gai* ground at the expense of more moderate Muslim groups and is well aWg toward the establishment ol an Mamie republic in Lebanon despite opposition from Syria and Israel.

If the Iranians add lhe Iraqi notch to their bell, ihey will be emboldened to continue their caport of Ibe revolution, rather than pause to concentrate on internal economic problems. Iranian moderate! wbo mightomestic focus are likely to be overwhelmed by radicals arguing that ll would be blasphemous foi Iran to turn aside from.Allah's chosen path, when its string of viriones has proved the righteousness ol ill cause The radical clerks would emerge stronger than ever, and theyor going after the next target, lhe moderate Arab reglmca in the Gulf. Tbe war has restrained Iran's subversive efforts in lhe Gulf. Tehran has hoped to iimil Arab support foreven toedge between them aadcultivating good bilateral relations wiia lhe lilioral stales The defeat of Iraq would remove this restraint.


An Iranian victory over Iraq is certain to Imprest ihe Shiai in the Gulf. Mote Shiai will be attracted to the fundi men Is list cause, fl will encourage pro-Iranianis is in ihc Gulf lo press their cause more openly and actively. In somemiliia.its could attempt to overthrow the government The Iranians, even If theyegree olould fear losing credibility if they eitcmptcd to ;ein in thc activities of the large number of milium "Shiai they have trained from throughout the Gulf.


Iraq's Soldiers:


Iraqi soldiers fight loyally for iheir couniry and are capable of performing iheit assigned duties, bui few arc driven by lbc fanatic ual of their Iranian counterparts Tbe moat serious impedimenti to their performance are poor morale and incompetent leadcrihip. The seemingly endless nature of Ihc war and Ihe loss of Al Faw probably are causing many soldiers lo become increasingly demoraliicd and disillusioned wiih Ba'lhist rhetoric Nonetheless, in ihc short term, iheir strong sense of national pride wjli continue to motivate ihem

Who Is tht Iraqi SoWier?

Almoai all Iraqi males who arer older are required by law to serve in tbe regular armed forces for ai least two years. Tbe length of the war and Iraq'* limited supply of manpower have made it difficult for many Iraqi men to avoid extended service. The government grants some deferments to students if they maintain ihcir grades aad tuts had difficulty conscripting Kurds About ihe only other wayealthy Iraqi male to avoid service isave connections in lbc regime.

Why Does He Serve?

Wc believe lhe Iraqis continue to fight outtrong sense of nationalism and becauseraditional and deep-rooted animosity fot iheir Persian neighbor.

Some soldiers volunteer for service jo_ receive the substantial benefits that Baghdad offers to recruits and their families and because they realize thai they eventually will be required io serve anyway. In addilion lo monthly pay ranging from SO dinarsrivateeneralTl dinar is equivalent io_ aboulOldicr and bis family arc eligible to.ariety of service rewards. Although the government, because of economic difficulties, has discontinued some benefits it n'lered earlier Init still provides families of soldiers killed in action free bossing and schooling for ihcir children. Veterans arc given free medical care, public transportation, and admission to schools and colleges and are allowed to purchase i

Iraqi soldiers sufTci from pooi leadership. Allhough there are exceptions, (or the most pan junior officersto be indecisive aad inexperienced. Although; Iraqi troops probably are wiltingo inio bailie. ihcit leaders fail to imbue themufficiently aggressive spirit and confidence In their own abllilies. The regime also hasolicy of continually switching cBxm in lhe belief that lhe primary loyally of the troops should be lo Saddam Units onsequently cannot benefit much even if they have capable commanders "

We believe ihai Ihe regime will be unable or unwillingesolve morale problems any time soon. Efforts lo inculcateBnhUln<

be insufficient. Ba'lhisl ideology appeats to have Mule appealost Iraqu. and in some cases Ba'lhist

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Iraq's soldiers probably will go on fighting for their couniry as long as they believe Iranhreat thai can be resisted. War weariness and sentiment thai Bagbdatd'sutile, however, appear to be gradually eroding support for Saddam and the Ba'ihisu. In May. Baghdad began what it calls its new "active mobile defense"Iran ai several points along Ihe border and seizing some territory. We suspect thai few frontline troops will be fooled inio believing thaitrategy willifference or thai their lot in lhe war will change much. Most troops probably will coniinue to tee themselves caughi in an endless and unwinnable war, and continuing high casualties will reinforce this vie*.


Drmfl Avoidance in Iraqi

3ly will tighten up


Despite ill despetjte need for manpower la oppose [ran. Baghdad does not rigorously enrotce the draft because of fears it will antagonize potentially disruptive cicmcauof tocKty. Someand college students, forbeen able to-avoid service with little or no punishment.particularly thccompelled to perform multiple tours of duty al the front. The regiiemand sacrifices from ihose ii believe* il can coerce. while sparing others wiih political clout Toising tide of protest over its inequitable draft policies, flaghdad probably will tighten up on student deferments this summer,

Iraqi Cameriptioa

Iraq has found it difficult toandrge military force to fight the Iranians The country's population5 million is only one-third that of Iran, and ihe regime has been forced to use conscription to assemble an adequate army Iraqi males are required by law to serve two years of active duty when they reach IS. After that they arehc reserve fee aa ladchr.iic period. <

In theory Ihe draft it nondiscriminatory, but in practice individuals and whole seciori of Iraq's society have managed to evadeaaWssfSaV some dvilians beat thc draft by having iheir jobs deelaicd essential lo lhc war effort. Others volunteer fee alternative service. Members of Iraq's ruling BVih Party, for example, join the party's militia, the so-called Populars militiamen they perform tuppori duties that release olher Iraqis

it lhc froniis filled with "portly Ba'ihuti parading aiound in uniform -So oewiossly have never been la bank

The iwo largest draft eiempt categories, however, arc college students and Kurds. Students are deferred from the military so long it ihey maintain acceptable grades in school. The Kurds are not required to serve

Students tmi ibe Drift

The governmeni't pointyinting deferments to students Urnrenwlv liberal. laBhaaihJatflBMM

ffJPJkjgavV Moreover, many students tale advantage of thc policy by deliberately prolonging iheir studies to avoid service. It Is not uncommon. aajBJjJMgfjjjaBa

fjtj mm in his early twenties io tiill be ia -

Iraqis tend their sons abroad to siudy; an Iraqi may remain abroad studying for up lo fivemm*

The goveraaKari hberal policy oo college deferments appears to be motivated by concern about the repercussion of lighter polic

The Kurds and ihc Drafl

The governmeni officially exempted Kurds from military service1 after repealed attempts to draft ihem had failed. An ethnic minority, lhe Kurds have liule loyalty to thc Arab nationalist regime in

Baghdad, and. raihct than submit to conscription, thcv formeduerrilla bands.JBaghdad decided its efforts draft thc Kurds were only swelling ihe guerrillas' ranks and granted thelanket exemption. 1


Unable to force thc Kurds inio the Army, thc governmcni has tried, tn effect, to buy Ihem off. ll has formed Light Battalions made up entirely of Kurds, and these have proved relativelybecause service in tbc battalions Is remunerative.

Baghdad has discovered, however. Ihai there arc drawbacks lo employing lhe Kurds as mercenaries. They tend to be extremelyBaTaTJHHBiB battalion commander revolted'lasi month after the government tiled to press him to supply more fighters. Baghdad eventually used elite Republican Guard units to quell this insurrection.

Drafting Shias

Thc reluctance of important segments of lhe population to support the war has forced the regime to turn to what formerly was Iraq's most underprivilegedShias. Before the war, Shias in Iract were discriminated against by the dominant Arab Sunni community. The Shias, however, have shown themselves willing to accept military service. Some support the war out of hostility io ihehe Arab Shias* traditional enemies, while others lack influence lo avoid conscription. I

The regime has heaped rewards on the Shia community to Compensate them for Ibcir sacrifices in lhe war and to win their loyalty. For example, it has

promoted numerous rehabilitation projects in Shia-arcas ll rebuilt the ShisBaghdad and renamed it Saddjm City- ll has refurbished Shia motques and ihrines. andalthough aworships nvihta to maintain Shia support. Perhaps lhe biggest concession to thc Shias has been to include them in thc lop rank of the Ba'lh Pally. Previously the paity was dominated by Surlnit. but. under Saddam, several Shia politicians have assumed high government posts.



After the lecem disastrous defeat at Al Faw. Baghdad is under pressure lo expand lhe number of recruits available for military service- The heavy losses inflicted iherc have alienated many of ihe Shias who ate lhe mainstay of the Iraqi forces aNHMtTjumr

little people" are growing restive because they perceive injustices in the regime's draft policies. Their principal complaint Is that, while ihey are perfofming successive lours of duty at the front, others, who have been'exempted are safely walking tne streets of Baghdad fJBB*V |^

i policy of employing I

We do not believe lhe regime can coerce thc Kurds into performing Army duty. As long as the Kurds have their mountains io hide in. government attemptsonscript them are unlikely to succeed. Instead Baghdad will continue its policy of employing Kurdish tribesmen as mercenaries.1

ic's policy of granting liberal students will soon be ended.



reports arc circulating in Baghdad that students will be required to aitend special military camps this summer. The camps supposedly will be two lo three weeks in duration and will provide basic military training. The camps, in our view, represent the initial stepovernment plan to gradually call up students for military duly


bt b3

Succession Struggle in Iran: Ifirst

You Don'! Succeed .

leadership succession in Iran willontentious issue after Khomeini dies Assembly Speakerositioned lo be Ike real power in poat-Kltomeuii Iran. probably engineered ike selection of Ayatollah Montazeri atucceuor before Khomeini'a death to foicatall challenge! andllow Montareri to consolidate his position. Key leaders and groups in the regime, however, believe their interests would be belter servedeadership council and may tryorce lhe selection of one after Khomeiniouncil would increase ihe factionalism ihat has already brought Use regime to an impasse on mayor social and economic legislation and increase tbc likelihood thai thc dbputea would turn violent I

Rafsaajanl'i Maneuvering

Tbe issue of who will succeed Khomeini is crucial to the stability and legitimacy of tbe regime. The Constitution allows the selection ofingle outstanding Shialead tbe countryeadership council of ihr re or Eveast fall the Assembly ofody of '0 or so elected officials designated by lhe Constitution toucceuor. met and chose Ayatotlah ttd^araieri. fjpjf*

We believe Rafsanjani. Iran's most powerful political figure after Khomeini, masterminded thc Assembly of Experts' selection. Rafsanjani has long backed Montazeii as sole successor, almosi certainly because he expects to wield lhe real power after Khomeini dies,eak Montazeri acting only as titular leader. Montazeri lacks Khomeini's popularity and religious stature and does noi command ihe political skills of either Khomeini or Rafsanjani

Khomeini has not publicly endorsed Montazeri. but we believe Rafsanjani had Khomeini's private approval for the move. Khomeini may be withholdi public support until he assesses Ihe degree of 01 agjaajgv

The designation of Montazcri strengthensthat the transition followinginitially will go smoothly. The move adersh^p^ jJ^

credentials and consolidate hisselection, he has

received many more Iranian and foreign political visitors than Khomeini. Moreover. Moniazcri is sicpping up efforts to place supporters in key positrons throughouuhe government. Nevertheless, we believe Montazcriong wayuo go to establish tbe of power base he needs to rule effectively.

Opposition lo Montairrl

las long opr


Key lenders and groups in the regime almost certainly remain opposed to the choice. Although no government leader has publtcly challenged ihe choice of Montazcri. Presidentragmami associated with bothfavorontrol of theconservewani lo give the privatereea rival of Rafsanjani. has long opposed the selectioningle I

some isiues

Many radicals are opposed to Montazeri's selection. Although Montazeii espoused radical views early In the revolution, he has adopted moderate positions on key issues oversn two years lo appealonservatives, such as bazaar merchants, whose support will be crucial. Moreover, radicals probably see the selection benefiting Rafsanjani. who has sided

icart probably worry thatick Ot prestige and rcligtout stature, would prompt him to

with moderates and conservatives on

Io keep secret. Iranian society probably would become highly polarized as members of the council solicited the support of variousas bniaar merchants, factory workers, orenpromote their own poueics oxr those ot"on the couaol. Moreover, the abilitytogie ladrriduai to aa decisivelysiabliih policy oresorve an impasse beiween ihe factions would be greatly reducedeadership council in which three or five leaders, all with equal authority under the Constitution, would hove lo-iryecision.

consul' leadingof whom arckey issues. His ctToris noilienate ihc conservatives would sircng'.hcn iheirh ability to advance their agenda.i

Many conservative clerics, on the other hand, oppose ihe choice of Moniaieriombination of theological and political reasons. They see the choiceuccessor as ratifying Khomeini's concept of rulereeminent Sbia theologian, which they consider heretical. They also view Moniarcri as tacking the religious statute needed to make authoritative prceyounceencBis. Moreover, the conservatives fear that his adoption of their position on tome issues is merely tactical and that he will show fcji radical cokvrs once he has assumed Khomeini's mamlc ajaaaka ijj^jSJ

Both radical and conservative leaders are likely to try to reopen the succession issue after Khomeini dies and push for the selectioneadership council. The major factions realize they arc unlikely toonsensusingle cleric as an alternative, to' Moniaieri and will argueouncil it necessary to adequately represent each of the Important regimeenior cleric In the Assembly, with close lies to conservaiive circlet in Iran's holy city of .Oom. has publicly Indicated he considers the selcctioc of Moniaieri asomination and has said that ihe issue must be addressed again following Kbonseini's death. The faciioes probably will allow what they consider ainterval tost ia deference to Khomeini's preference for Montaecri and to avoid destabilizing the regime. Both sides will be gamblingeadership council will belter allow ihem to advance their respective political agendas. In addition, thc conservaiive* probablyouncil as helping to undermine the principle of ruleupreme cleric.


Impacteadership Council

A leadership council would intensify lbc already deep and bitter divisions within lbc leadership. Ideological differences would be compounded by personal rivalries. Factional disputes now handled behind lhe scenes would be pushed more into public, view, because council deliberations would be more difficult


An Islamic Alternative?

economic difficulties have become so serious as io raise doubts whether Presidcni Mubaiak or any near-term replacement can successfully curtate the country from its downward spiral Should secular rule founder on the economic issue, it is possible that an Islamic fumJimentalist-inspired regime could come to power. In our view,overnment would possess, at least initially, inherent strengths that would make It more capable ofweeping economic restructuring ofovernmeni

better chance of slaying in power and mobiliiing society for lhe difficult challenges ahead if ii is identified by the population imore fully Islamic in nature.

The Near-Term

Egypt's acute economic difficulties, drastically worsened by plunging world oil prices, have heightened concern over Ihe vulnerability of tbe Mubarak government to political instability.hange of governmenirstinct possibility, it is more likely that Egypt will muddle through (his economic crisis. Significant new offers of financial assistance from major international donors may yet develop over the course nf this year as ihe political costs of an unstable Egypt are weighed. Inarefully constructed package of economic reforms ibat puthe* the moal difficult adjustments bcyoqd the currenl year may be sufficient to win IMF endorsement and release of further multilateral assistance, as well is bilateral deb; rescheduling

Yet. no matter whether Mubarak staysilitary-backed successor lakes his place, one central fact remains: Egyptociety lhat il slipping ever deeper into an economic morals. Ilountry whose .

consumpiior far outstrips its capacilyay. Moreover, it can no Longer finance its spending through reliance on international borrowing.

Even more worrying for Egypt's leaders, the gap between demand by the populate for goods and services and available resources wiUconiinue to grow for the foreseeable future.illion new Egyptians every nine months, demographic pressures alone will ensurewidening gap. Even in the absence of such pressure, lean urbanoniinue to compare their stagnant living standardshe affluence of North America and Western Europe Thwarted expectations will fuel frustration nnd anger, which in turn will yield chronic poii'-saf and social instability.

Hence thc near-term dilemma of any Egyptian gee re ment is how to reoticM society away from Aonsamption and toward greater savings, investment, and song-term economic growth. The problem hi managings how io implement economic reforms oileducing whai would be perceived by Ihe populace as an unacceptable rise in ihe cost ol basic goods and services. Efforts lo revamp Egypt's economy along lines more conducive to sustained growth continually flounder when Ihe political leadership coojjronis ihe seemingly insoluble task of reconciling economic reforms wilh what are considered lo be ihe prerequisites for political liability.


Tbe rOOIS Of Ihit political and economic diVemma

appear so originate within thc termsWsocial Contract that has enveloped between (he people and Oo-ernmeat of Egypt Itlamic ceneepu obliging (he ruler lo provide Tor the welfare of (he community as well at more modern Na sir ill precepts thai stress the


responsibility to provide affordable goodi and services io ifae public undoubtedly underpin much of ihii contract Even more relevant, per hi pi. arc Ihe expectations crealcd following Sadal't endortemeni of the Camp David accordsl. In reiuin for virtual ostracism from lhe Arab world. Egypt -is to reap the materia! benefits of its relationship wiib thc United States Right or wrong, many Fgyptians came to view theii government's lies to the Uniled States al guaianieeing the economic progress Ihat Egypt so badly needs. In effect, in (he absence of other strong souicca of legiiimacy. the regime has come to rely on its ability to deliver an acceptable standard of living as denned broadly by Egypt's middle and lower classes.

The eaistenee ofocial contract makes It difhcalt for tbe Mubarak government or any likely

near-term successor to deal with the challenge of economic reform. Any significant move to rallonaliie and invigorate the moribund Egyptian economy must, of rieccasiiy, strike at thc heart of current economic eipccuttons, including consumer subsidies aad guaranteed governmcni employment Serious reform meatures. while economically imperative, could rob the current regime of much of ils legiiimacy and,ery real sense, leave it politically vulnerable.

ll it possible thai the Mubarak governmcniuccessor could govern and enacl reforms by relying on force alone.overnment strongly backed by ihe military should be able io implement reform and maintain social order Yet. Egypt is not Syria or Iraq, and it is questionable whether, or how long, harih secular military rule could endure within Egypt. The Egyptian military, atefection of tbe society from which il springs, and. givca (he moderate,ending nature of the society, wc doubt junior- and middle-grade officers,ay nothing of enlisted personnel, will relish imposing harth controls for any length oftrong, charismatic leader couldule uccessfully, but, in thc absence of such an individual. Ihc regime would have to establish its legitimacy in thc cyct of the military tank and file.

The FtWMSamrautisI Aiferaalix

A possible aliernativc. should secular rate break down, would be ihe accession io power of an Islamic lusi-inspired regime, either civilianivilian military_coalitionegime ma^poiscss. at keati initially, inherent strengths that make It more capable ofweeping political and economic restructuring of Egypt. For one. ils stronger Islamic credentials would probably lend fir greater moral authority to its edicts, at least within thc lower-middle and lower classes, the social strata most likely to be alTectcd by economic ausierily. Second, and perhaps even more important, ihc economic expectationsegime generated would probably be lower than those associated with the current government. The populationhole, given ihe changed nature of the legime'i authority, might be more willing, al leastoneymoon period, to accept austerity and lowered economic expectations if the regime was perceived as having eliminated ai bigh levels.

egime would face from Ihe veryopposition, not ju" ie Copticfrom secularisedthe middle and

upper classes. This wo particularly true if the new Islamic regime alter adical redistribution of wealth through confiscation of assets and/or punitive taxes on large business earnings. Military opposition could also quickly develop if the officer corps believed its economic and social standings were diminishedesult of Islamic rule.


. ^ujttnaW^aaanatVaH he negative aspects of Islamic rule would outweigh the advantages in terms ofuitable vehicle for economic reorganization in Egypt. The strong social welfare concepts inherent in Islamic ideology appear in tome Muslim countries to have restrained private-tector development and perpetuated the riisiencc of' inerT.cicrt state-run companies Istimic banking practices have confused domestic and international bankers alike and addedrivate-tec tor uncertainties. Any attempt lo ihronlc private sec lot



envelopment would undoubtedly leadrivate capital flight and an exodus of entrepreneurial talent, elements critical to any economic revita lira lion. The stagnation of the Iranian economy under radical Islainic rule, perhaps mote than any oiher event, serves to underscore the deleterious effect of allowing religious fervor to dominate economic decision making.


Despite ihc many problems tbe prospectundamentalist gowThmeni.egime need not mean the end of economic reform or accelerated economic growth.irongly fundamentalist government in Cairo, given thc less radical tendencies of Egyptian aocieiy, would probably be far less extreme lhan Iran under Khomeini.egime may thus be less likely io reach for radical social and economic solutions. Moreover, siaunchly Islamic regimes in countries as diverse as Saudi Arabia and Pakistan, where official encouiagemenl of ihc private sector has led io impressive economic growth (particularly inemonstrate thai Islamic rule and enlightened economic policies are not incompatible.

The most ctitical determinant of success or failure in coping with Egypt's economic problems will remain the Quality ofleadership- whether secular or Islamic. Strong, unequivocal suppoit by Egypt's political* leadership of growth-oriented economic measures will be ihe key io any sustained effort to revive lhe dormantemains lo be seen whether any political grouping can generate ihis lypecf leadership. Buieadership mayar belier chance of remaining in power and mobilizing society if ii cloaks itself more fully in lhe garb of Islamic legiiimacy.

Rrvjilf Sid'A



Declining Security jn West Beirut and ihe Future ofmerican

continuing power straggle among Lebanon's Muslim militias is Irinsforming Wesi Beaulhe major commercial, intelkctual. and loerisi center of lhe Arab world and still lhc home of (he American University ofa lawless, militarized zone conicsted by confessional and ideological facliom Tuff battles, terrorism, rampant Street crime, and Ibe tack of centralized authority have made the area dangerous for both local rcsidcnti and foreigners. The deep schisms between members of the same sect or religious affiliation are giving rise to eitremisi organizations such as the Shia Hizballah nsovcmer.t. which is beat on irinsforming West Beirul center for Shia fundamentalist activitiesba

hasteady decline in security and safety not only for the remaining few foreign residents, but for ihc rest of the popuUiton as wcllgaajagaa

West I -ui todayaiccWoik of small areas loosely controlled by confessional ajvd ideological militias and many gangs. Thc Shia Amal and Ihc Druze militias are the major conterders for power in West Beirut, but smaller, sometimes more extremist groups constantly challenge the authority of the major miliiias. Many fighters are uncommitted lo any single militia and will serve any cause or leader In return.for

The proliferation of competing militias contributes to increasing political fragmentation and shifting politicalsituation that alfnotl certainly will ensure thai West Borui remainstate of conflict for the foreseeableaction appears to be gaining too much tuif at ihe expense of Otherealignment quickly ensuesirtual parity between combaianudfaajatx*

The incrcast-rrg^wjessAess in West Brhas markedly curtailed social and economic activities of Western institutions and at Ihc same lime hai made them more susceptible lo blackmail.'


Since tbe Israeli invasion of2 and Ihe subsequent departure of ihe Palestinian fighters from Wesl Beirut. Sunni, Druze. and Shia militias have been aggressively vying for control of the area's nelghborrioods. The traditional sectarian neighborhoods are blurredesult of the continual changing military fortunes of the militias. The result

("ontrndris for Power

Thc Camps War betweenmainstream Shiathe Palestinians is enabling the radical Shia group Hizballah to carry out Its campaign of terror against both Lebanese and thc few remaining Westerners in West Beirut. Thc growth ofole came aboutesult of last year's Camp Wars, which pitted the Amal militia and its supporter, ihc Lebanese Army's 6th Brigade, against the Palestinians in Sabra. Shatila, and Burj Al Barajinah camps.I


Theho traditional'}olitical position second only to the Christians, arc now at the mercy of others. Defeated and politically disorganized, the Sunr.ii of West Beirut, both moderates and extremists, are gradually losing control of their neighborhoods to other militias. Hizballah gunmen are growing in strength in traditional Sunni areas.

The defeat of the Sunni Siath of .February Movement ia early June helped Amal gain control of strategic Sunm territory near the Sabra andcamps Amal military leaders are eager to consolidate their( grip on Sabra and Shatlla in order to link up with the sprawling southern Shiamove that is likely to be opposed by both the Druze and thc eitrcmist Hizballah, who arc adamant about preventing Amal fromhia minitiatc inside WestTaaaE..

Thecontrol significant turf around the former American Embassy, the American University, and the winding beachhead south of thewant West Beirut to remain free of domination by any single militia. The Druze Progressive Socialist Party has attracted many Sunnis and Kurds to Its ranks in thc last year because those communities have no strongi their own and want to fight Ihe Shia Ukcovcr daaaanw

The war among the confessional groups in Weal Beirut often manifests itself through car bombings, kidnapingt. and political assassinations. Each of lhe major militias is believed to be holding several hundred hoststcs from other confessional groups The release last month ofolitical prisoners by'lhc

Christian militia in East Beirut did little tohe deep division between East and West Beirutfact led to tba kidnaping of ChristianMaiar from lhe American University byunknown Independent Movement forof the KidnapedTWrtrclteve aajaj

movement is an ofTshoot of the Hizballaha*

No resident or visitor is immune from the rising tide of violence in West Beirut. The foreign community lives in constant fear. Political assassinations areaily occurrence with attempts frequently directed at Armenians, other Christians, and any other politically active faction.'

The Americanamp Setilt In. Danger The American University of Beirut and the American UmversityTlospitaPare two Western instiiutlons that banc endured despite lhe rapidly declining: security around


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Wive* ofuolau. and threats against university and hospilal personnel have drastically reduced ihe number of both foreign facully and foreign students. Tbe campaign it aimed against the university's role in promoting Wesiein democratic

epentcd strikes by university and hospital personnel have failed to ga) ihe release of kidnaped faculty and staff, but ihey have succeeded in publicizing lhe plight of thcHMr

The violence against the university goes on. but the major militias in Beirut want lhe university's servicesontinue and have openly condemned the faculty kidnapingt.'Orute leader Walid Jumblau and Shia leader Nabih Barri have repeatedly supported

dramatic decline of the Lebanese

in teceni months and Ihc constant presence of militiasloitering on hospital properly arc preventing, paying g patients from unhung thccmceiadjfjaja, JaH


No improvement in the security situation in Beirut is

in tbe cards, bui lhe lack or oiher&edibie educational

institutions ineirut will ensure continued

support for both the American University and ihe

Univcriiiy Hospital by local residents. The decline of

security around the campus, however, will hamp*'

efforts by university admin lit rators lo keep it

functioning normally. We cannot assess specifically

impact of declining sccuniy on ibe daily activities

in classrooms, bui ii can only be negative.

Nonetheless, students, faculty, and stall generally are .

striving lo safeguard the university's IcgacyflSMfe


Turf bailies in Beirut will continue. An entireeared in civil war condition is coming ofest Beirut Many roung militia membersno otber condition Fightinghemajor part of everyday life Tbc accelerating economic decline will most certainly encourage the dwindling middle classes to join ranks with street lightersar

Tbc extremists almost certainly will continue to gam at the ciperue of thc moderates Militancy, particularly in the Shia community, is likely lo spread as thc political and economic crisis drags on.'

Much of West Beirut willontested arena, with ihc Druze and Amal lhe leading contenders for power. Realignments and constantly shifting coalitions wilt rnost likely ensure that no single militia willit-chaotic segment of.ihe city Beiralis have grown accutiomedhc daily noieoce around them and are likely too react to declining security by retreatingheir neighborhoods for protection. In this environment, the American University will face an uncertain future al be*

Muslim leaders probably will remain afraid to denounce extremists for fear of retribution. taW

Hizballah's power in West Beirut is likely to continue to grow unchecked by Ihe other miliiias. Hizballah's strategy includes Ihe purging of Beirut of foreign influence, lhc avoidance of prolonged military entanglement wjjhajther local miliiias, lhc weakening of Amal, and thc weakening of leftist militias such as the Lebanese Communistlash between the Communists and Hizballah elements last February endedraw, but Hizballah continues to carry out assaxsinalions against Communist leaders and their supportcn iMaW

SH Ijfiks: Terrorism on Ihe Rise i

three years of guerrilla warfare. Sri Lankan Tamil insurgentsucking ibe predominantly Sinhalesenow untouched by ihe fighting. Sri Lanka's capital and other urban centers offer the insurgents potential targets for terrorist attacks that couldmize -economic costs lo the government and inflict high Sinhalese civilian asualties, j

[Sri Lankan ttesidcni Jayewardene has weathered two months ofombings with minimal damage to his politicaltanding. Nonetheless, the government's failurerevent the bombings is likely to raise opposition from the Buddhist clergy and other mcmbersofJayewardene'sconstituency.aaW

" :=

New Tamil Strategy

Seven bomb explosions in the Colombo area during-lhe last two months have killed or injured.

Tamil insurgents successfully used explosivesan Air Lanka plane, the Central Telegraph office,food processingiiykkstsaw,two trains.of more-bombingsmany schools, businesses, and tome offices, and haserious blowof thc mainstays of thehave alsoraumatizing effect onmajority and mark, in ourew strategy by some Tamil groupsthe governmeni to accede to an independentstatessfaag|m .

suspects thai

the Liberation Tigers of Eelam (LTTEj


since it began opera lions in the, thc LTTE appears to be relying increasingly on attacks in the "

Sinhalese south m"

ibe norlh and theeast. Tbb shift probably reflectsTTEs growing resourcesesire toreater damage on the Sri Lankan manufacturingourist industries and greater casualties on'vilians.l

The new strategy may abo reflect an attempt by'the LTTE to disrupt Indian-brokered ialb between the government and Tamil moderates.'

as the preeminent'

Another major insurgent group; the Eelam Revolutionary OrganizaiiaV of Students (EROSnjgsae--.

Has iridiliortally relied em'bomb atlacks. EROS claimed responsibility for an attack last monthoint Srinkan-Japanese cement factory in eastern Sri

Delhi has been rclueuni lol, mg the LTTE and olher hardline groups in thc negotiations, largelyepetition of last ailed talks between the government aad all major insurgent groups. We believe the LTTEto bioek any negotiated seiikmcnt that filis short ofchieving an independent Tamil stale and will not" surrender its self-appointed role as lhe Mccmincnl' -representative of Tamil ir

Lanka and has publicly threatened to attackssets of multinational corporations operating in Sri Lanka. Increased operations by EROS Suggest it Is eagerrove ils capabilities amid growing signs of LTTE dominance of the Tamil insurgent movement. EROS may also calculate that attacks against economic targets could give members of Sri Lanka's




Colombo, iht capital ofargest tily in Sri Lanka, is Ike irnttr of Sri Lanka's tourist and menttfociunag industries aad ike hub for international and domestic transportation. Th* eity grew around Colombo Harbor. Srt Lanka'sprincipal pen. omdajor refueling and supply point for merchant skips transiting the Indian Ocean from Europe and ike Middle Etui to East Alia.

YasemA'aX Future

Given ihc successhc recent attacks, Tamil insurgents oil! probably continue to pursue ihii new strategy, aiiempiini further bomb attacks in Colombo and oihec heavily Sinhalese areas. They probably ave ihe means and sufficient explcVte* tu carryuch attacks Sri Lankan police investigators, (or eaamplc, uncovered plans for widespread Tamil sabotage and have revealedticks of gelignitewere receaily smuggled into Colombo,!

The capital will be particularly susceptible to Tama -

insurgent atlatAs.bccause it offer* targets with

greatest potential impact on the largest number of 'eople and on the economic well-being ofSrle believe key Iransporiaiion-and economic facnities are particularly vulnerable;

The municipality af Colomboopulation4 percent of SriloO percent of Colombo'sercent Sri Lankan Tamil, andIndian Tamil-

Tne mom business section of Colombo, known asTransportation. Trains and stations along major rail

Fan area-Itortuguese fort In th*-particularly ibe Colombo Fort Railway

- centurythe focal of man, ofS;which is lbc busiest rail center, buses

commercial, banking, ond government functions.Colombo's congested streets; highway and

main residential areas art south and southeast ofbridges over rivers and canals; facilities and

business area. The Peiiah -the mostj,a; Katunayaka International Airport. JJ

damaged section of Colombo duringorth of Colombo, and Colombo Harbor

is Colombo's traditional bazaar area and ll in the_ pori facilities.

oldest section of thr 4aW**

: increasingly vocal laborretext for.h, iTduJ'L i a - 1

.Economic, Major tourist hotels located in lhe Fori

and along the coasi to the south (including hotels of

nviiiic latllll

oearihc^irportatJJsw' 2

ramponaiion and hotel faciliiics. in'our view, especially vulnerable

' e believe thai the emergence of lhe LTTE/EROS strategy is significant for several reasons. First, ll signals lhe decision of tbe groups to use their demolitions capability,lready well established agaimt governmcni fotces In the north, against human and economic targets in Sinhalese-dominated areas Second, it indicates thai some Tamil insurgent groups can operate in thc Icsf* hospitable environment of Sinhalese-dominated areas Third, it highlights the inability of (be government to thwart theeightened security measures and public awareness notwithstanding fl)Btf

increasingly vocal laborretext for not -

Utilities. TTiec-iliIk power station, and the

Gove mm em, utility, jrf cj-nrnunicj.tlons

which are generally less accessible io the insurgents. Allhough lhe capiial will probably be the focusalio become vulnerable,insurgent activity outside of iradittoOal Tamil "

areai, (wo other urban areas in the soulh may beLocal and notional govrrnmtni atlacks: - s -

presidential palace (JanadbipathiGalle, located on (he southern coast. Is ilic second-

National Police Headquarters; the Colombo. Town largest port in Sri Lanka andrid four militaryNavy, and

Air Force Headquarters and the Military




kottc, locatedilometers from lh< Colombo* V

Fori. because Sriew parliamentary

ipieunder conn rumbe

rniocaied there. Kotie iierceni Sui^leseafluV-

.. 'i

Pre*foe New DtM

Preu reports of hi ah civilian casualties, including foreign tourists, arc likely to bring increased intemjiionjl scrutiny of New Delhi's links lo tbc insurgents. Indian youmaliltl have already putnubalof insurgent base camps in ihe Indian stale of Taanil Nadu, and Western press coverage of the conflict is increasing. Unless New Delhi blocks insurgent arms smuggling from south India to Srimove not likely until Colombo and Tamil moderates arc ctoacr to aaccusations of Indian support for terrorism are likely to become increasingly embarrassing io New Delhi.


The increase in terrorist attacks and the failure last monthajor government offensive against insurgent sucaigboJds in the north haveayewardene and bisrom the Sinhalese community.*!

I Unless Jayewardene can slow thc insurgents' successesrhis'eloctoral base' will weaken, making hima'J. negotiated settlement and fueling possible Sinhalese' lilical opposition lo his government.

The publicity absented by lbc attacks .is likely ro

encourage lhe insurgents so coniinoe iheirtrategy Their recent succcaaea will probably lead lo increased contributions from Tamil expatriates and may attract additionaljg^

attemptsxtort concessions onis ire likely to spur the government id.

Jayewardene has so far shown no signs of bendingnsurgenti The attacks

launch more military and will probably leadacrcased fighting in conn the neat several monll

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