PROSPECTS FOR LEFTIST REVOLUTIONARY GROUPS IN SOUTH AMERICA -- INTERAGENCY INTE

Created: 6/30/1986

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

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Prospects for Leftist Revolutionary Groups in South America

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CONTENTS

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KEY Jt

CufifntLfflitl RemluliVinan 9

irurtnlvilirig In Lrfuait>

Iiwesied Political UliluflV

Serioui Economic N

Eipindfd Eilrrnal Support

Tne Soviet

The Cub-n 15

The LArvan

The Nicarigusn Role

Tne QuntiOn o( Regional Coopeialion

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Anti-US

Continued Ealemal 20

ANNEX: Revolutionaryountry Profile*

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SCOPE NOTE

This Memorandum surveys the nature, and seriousness ofactivity inouth American countries-uvana. and French Guiana are not included, because they are usually considered bv the US Intelligence Community aa part of the Caribbean region.

The survey is broken down as follows:

Countries where revolutionary groups are currently active, namely Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador, listed in order of the seriousness of the problem,

Countries where no revolutionary groups are now active but where existing radical groups may have the potential to turn (or return) to violence within the next few years, namely Argentina and Uruguay.

Countries where no Insurgent groups are active and existing radical groups appear unlikely to develop into trueorganizations, namely Bolivia, Venezuela. Brazil, and Paraguay.

In all.xtremist groups with revolutionary Inientlons ate described, ranging from the formidable, several-thousand-strong Scn-dero Lumlrvoso of Peru to the remnants of the Brazilian revolutionary groups of the. All are leftist groups. Nowhere In South America are rightwing groups trying to seize power, although (as briefly described in this Memorandum) in several countries rightwing cxttem-isu employ tenorist tactics for counterrevolutionary

In addition, this Memorandum:

Addresses the effects of the political and economic environment on pice peels for these Insurgent groups.

Describes the nature and sources of external support upon which many of these groups depend.

Examines recent efforts to foster both national andcooperation among these groups.

Estimates the impact on US interests of likely developments among these groups during the next few yean.

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JUDGMENTS

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Th! Irvrl of leftist-inspired politically motivated violent, activity varies enormously in South America, from Chile, where such activity is endemic and incessant, to Paratruay, where there is virtually no leftist political violence In four countries, the extremist groups are strong, active, and determined enough to be called revolutionarythese countries, however, the violence varies

country not currently suffering from insurgency orroup likely to developevolutionary organization Is notsafe from rebellion. Bolivia falls into this category, for example, yet history tells us not lo expect much political stability there. Also. Paraguay has been politically quiet for decades, but it has been the calm of repression rather than contentment. Moreover, porous bord en between several South American countries enable insurgents and arms lo move freely across national boundaries and create the dangerpillover of revolutionary

Nevertheless, recent and current trends In revolutionary activities in the various South American countries appear to offer the best clues as to their likely stability in the future, as well as lo the prospects that US interests In these countries may come under violent attack. J

Status of Re-vcJutionary Violerice by Country

Leftist revolutionary groups are active In four of theouth American countries:

Inhe Communist Party and its affiliated terrorist group, the Manuel Rodriguez Partiotic Front (FPMRI. along with the Movement of tbe Revolutionary Leftre takingof the increasing isolation of the internationally discredited Pinochet regime and the continuing fragmentation of tbe domestic opposition to raise the level of revolutionary violence.

In Peru, the formidable Sendero(SL) has expanded its urban terroristassassinations offorcecontinuing Its Insurgency in the rural highlands The much smaller Revolutionary Movement Tupac Amaru {MRTAl continues its own urban terrorist operations, often directed against foreign, especially US. targets.

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In Colombia, as anticipated,4 true* between the Belincur government and moil of the leftist guerrillas hu gradually unraveled, with only ihe largest group, (heArmed Forces ot Colombia (FARO, continuing to obsene the cease-Ireiri'i'V Tne Cuban- andb of April Movementnd oth,*r. smaller groups have renounced the cease-fire and resumed insurgentwe eapeel ihe FARC to do before another year passes At Havanai urging, cooperation among Colombian insurgent groups has been growing. Revolutionaries fromand possibly Peru have >oirved with elements9 lo form the Americamall international guerrilla Force operating (without much success) in Colombia near the Ecua-dorean border.

In Ecuador. Alfaro Vive, Cararolhich surfaced as an urban extremist group,the tutelage and with the assistance of Colombia'sits operations to rural areas and undertaken operations of increasing intrepidity,and violence. In recent months, though, after ajiurribcr of severe operational setbacks, it has been ralhe: quiet pEggfal

In Argentina and Vruguav. tl* remnants of former insurgent groups such as the Monloneros and the Tupamarot have been takingof thetolerant atmosphere of civilian rule to rebuild and reorganize, while their members debate whether to integrate into tbe legal political process or to prepare to resume armed action in the future- In ihe other four countries of SouthBolivia, andrevolutionary groups are active, and no existing radical group* appear likely lo evolve Into significantthreats during the neat fewn the other hand, tome of tiietc countries are used by foreign revolutionary group* and their supporters as safe havens, staging areas, conference sites, and smuggling channels. Sites in Brazil. Argentina, and Bolivia, for example, have been used by Chilean insurgents and their Cuban sponsors, sometimes in collaboration with local radicaUggtQB

Contributing toviolence

The luccess of the Sandinista revolution In Nicaraguainspired would-be revolutionaries all around South America.to this demonstration effect, we see four other factorsaiding the spread of leftist revolutionary violence in'

Increasing poliiical latitude.

Crowing economic disarray.

Expanding support from external patrons.

cooperation among Insurgent

In Peru and Ecuador, the increase in revolutionary violence has coincided with trvosterisilslyu-Teni of dcmceratizaliOfi. This demonstrates that, whi'e democracy ronyocietv attains! revolution In the long run. In the shortiberalized atmosphere may make it easiefforradical groups to organize, recruit, propasandlze. and raise fund-M

In mart South American countries, adverse economic conditions have led to declining living standards and government spending cutbacks for both social and security programs. The pool of deprived and disaffected citizens from which insurgents are recruited is being enlarged, while tbe ability oflhesfFected governments to cope with extremism Is being degra h ^QjgH

Tbe Marxist'Leninist revolutionary leaders ofended to guard their independence Jealously. They ratcly cooperated with other leftist groups, and in many cases livey rejected support from Cuba and the Soviet Bloc rather than accept tbe strictures that came with it- The leftist revolutionaries of today, however, tend Io be linked rather closely to the Soviets and their Cuban and NicaraguanIn some cases, with theexternal trainirjst^rvd material support have become vital to their survival and growth H

Their patrons, however, are demanding in return not only that these groups Improve their effectiveness and make real progress, but also that they cooperate with one another in working toward their mutual goals. The America Battalion Is one result Apart from these efforts to promote leftist solidarity, in Colombia some guerrillas (notably from tbe FARC) have begun working with narcotics traffickers IrtorrJer to draw upon Iheir financial resources and smuggling networks |

Sources ol fslarnd Support

Foreign help of one sort or another has been received byin every South American country except Paraguay, where there have not been any revolutionaries since Stroessner took power:

has been the principal source of aid for South American revolutionaries Although Havana currently appear* to be giving more priority lo the support of revolution in Central America. In the past. Cuba is known to have backed revolutionary groups and fostered wider cooperation among radical Uftitti in every South American country save Paraguay and Peru With the

exception of Chile and perhaps Colombia, however. Cuba appears to be holding support for active Insurgencies inwhile concentrating on political gains through diplomatic and commercial initiatives.

Thenion has maintainedrelatively low profile, cicept in Chile, providing political and moral backing but scant material aid We suspect, though, that the Soviets may channel much of their aid through the Cubans Tbe ScakHs openly advocate the overthrow of the Pirvsrhet regime and make little effort lo hide their support of the leftist opposition in Chile.

Nicaragua has provided training, safehaven, and politicalto Insurgents from Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, and possibly Peru. Sympathizers from most South American countrieshave participated with the Sandinista forces fighting against the Contras.

Libya has supplied arms, training, and funds to Colombian, Chilean, Ecuadorcan, and possibly Peruvian revolutionary groups.

Elements of the PLO provided training to personnel from various South American insurgent groups before tbe Israeli invasion of Lebanon_drpve the Palestinian forces from their bases thcreH

Outlook

Imurtenli More Capable. Sincehere have been substantial changes In the nature of insurgent movements in South America. The skill levels of leftist revolutionaries are often much higher now,onsequence of the training and guidance they have received. The quality of their weapons and equipment has alto improved, since in many cases tbey are supplied by patrons and no longer need to be scrounged or captured Some of the leftist revolutionaries of loday have also begun using more lethal and less discriminatory weapons, such as car bombs and rockets All in all. they are rnojeforrnidaMe adversaries than their counterparts of IS toears

Sccuriisr Forcei Belter, Too. Al the same lime, however, the capabilities of the counterinsurgency forces In many South American countries have also Improved, in some cases even more than those of the guerrillas The countctinsurgency forces of today typically employ sophbticalcd modern tools such as electronic surveillance equipment and computer data bases and they are often equipped with advanced

ransport, and com muni cat ioos equipment In moat countries they have been moreatch for (heir domestic oppor cnd^B

iendt point toward ihe following deoelopmtnlt during ihe ntil feu: yean:

tt evolutionary violence will gradually oCnL.tr In Chile while continuingoderate level tn Peru and Colombia andower level in Ecuador Revolutioeanry violence may resume in Argentina or Uruguay or even In other countries, such as Bolivia, where political Instltutlory* are particularly weak

Soviet, Cuban, Nicaraguan, and Libyan support (or South American leftist rcvohtktoartes is anljkely to diminish and may grow in particular cases, if the insurgents appear to be making pr ogress.

While leadership rivalries and ideological disagreements will continue to constrain in-country collaboration among tevolu-tlonary croups. Insurgent cooperation across slatekely to grow somewhat along the lines establishedcuador's AVC. and Peru's MRTA.

Collaboration between insurgent groups and narcoticsorganizations Is likely lo increase in Colombia and possibly

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InlimiaUud. Rjghtwing elements In countries beset or threatened bv leftist revolutToriaries are hkelv to continue to respond sporadically with terrorist attacks against identifiable leftist targets, although such death squad activities will probably be more limited than in the past. In general, rightwing government elements will be less likely than In the past to respond to left wing estremism by wholesale abfogatioo of civilceussequexice of the development of intrmstiorud human ruhtsorganuntjotst drilled at eapoairag andruch " Wf

No Succeuful Aeoolutioru likely. Despite the expected extent ofactivity, oo leftist revolutionary movement Is likely to come to power In South America during tbe neat few years. Relative to the resjiroes they are trying lo rupplsnt. currently active revolurionarv organizations arein some cases declining. The evolving democratic political processes In most South American countries will continue to attract widespread public support, while insurgent groups generally will not. In addition, many of tbe radical elements within tbe

Roman Cutlioiic Church In South America- are likely to abandon the more eatreme forms of liberation theology at civilian rule becomes institutionalized- Finally, cooperation against leftist revolutionaryhas been improving, among Southeovrrnmenti. Thus it will become increasingly riiificuii fw> im'jrtifoU to prey upon one country from sanctuaries in neighboring countriei-B

Implication* /or the United Slain. Increased activitv on tlieurban terrorist groups such as Peru's Tupac Amaru would resultfrequent attacks against foreign, especially US targets, whichbe concentrated in urban areas. The attacks would probably'of bombings, armed attacks (srsootirsgsX and kid na pingsSpectacular events of duration, such as the seizure ofor diplomatic Installation and the taking ofcannot be ruled out. since they generate more publicityother type of terrorist act. Such operations appear lessIn the wake of9 occupation of the ColombianJustice, which ended In catastrophe for both

Terrorist attacks directed specifically against US Government officials have been rare in South America during the past few years. Cood security practices by US officials have undoubtedlyari in frustrating tome would-be attackers, but we suspect the main reason hasack ofeatremiitt have been rebelling against their own governments, not the US Government. It is likely, moreover, that foreign patrons, such as Cuba and the USSR, have counseled against attacking targets such as embassies and diplomats.

Nevertheless. US policies or actions that have helped to thwart the aspirations of revolutionary groups, such as providing counter iruur-gency (or conn tern* rooties) advice and assistancearticularhave in the pasterrorist response from the affected groups or theirnd haveattern likely to be replicated in the future. In other words, US efforts to limit or reduce leftist revolutionary activities over the long run are likely to stimulate anti-US terrorist attacks in the abort run.

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DiSCUSSIO"

Leftist revolutionary violence in South America bu increased significantlyh*victory in Nicaragua began to. *bewh*rr in Latin America ind tbeAt that time, only Colombia and Venezuela were eipcricoeing activeIn which armed leflist opponents ol the regime were regularly cngraaing the security lotce) or attacking personnel or Property. The Venezuelan insurgency was on the verge of eallnctton, and the Colombian Insurgency was not particularly menacing. Since then, however, the Insurgency In Colombia has upended considerably, "hlk new Insurgent forces hai* emerged in Peru. Chile, and Ecuador. Violence against nel and properly has Increased dramatically

attacks against US targets inhare increased In frequency sincethey constitutemall proportion olcf revolutionary violence- There wereterrorist incidents5 compared withIncidents0 Most of ihe0 occurred In Colombia. Chile,Including all but five of those In IMS.Paraguay are the only South Americanagainst USlergeU were recorded last

Current levels ol leftist RevoMiorsory Violence

be Communist Parly of ChileIts affiliated terrorist group, the ManuelPatriotic Front (FPMRJ, along with theMovement ot the Left (MIR1 arepolarised domestic atmosphere and usingrased foreign assistance to raise th* level ofviolence None of these groups,appears capable of directly challengingstronger security forces: thus they havelimited their armed attacks to bombing softas electrical towers, railroad lines, andInslaliBisona. Th* FT MB is, nevertheless,an effective terrorist capability In Chile.to generally reliable sources, Ute FPMRstrong material and moral support fromand lis allies. The level of ihtt support isIhat received by leftist jjuurgenb anywhereSouth America!

eowing; threat loresence In Chile Trrrorulsa efliliaiod entitles aboutomparedilh only once3 [reported la* year thai, asncial aid,rocm-ben of lh* MIR entered Chile Ute in IMS -Ilh plana le enact, the US EmbassyS official The groupUndoned the plan at year end because leaden believed tl had been compromised. In the future, though, lh* MIR might resume such pkvilng. The MIR It currentlyebulUlna phase If It rweceeds, we brliev* the,threat it presents will Increase sign 'I

n Peru, accunty forces are stretched tMaj aa they face two active revotutsooary movements, Sendero Lummoao (SOembers and the Reveaatieasarv Meseaneer Tupac Amaru fWRTA)an estimated ISOembers Tseainnlrt*9 the government declared Hates of emergency In aevcr-at highland departments so facilitate counter! mu'ieni operations against lb* SU4 the securtlv forces mounted an ambitious ajili-SL campaign but failed to destroy the SL'i rural base or to prevent SL terrorist attacks In urbanLima Th* security liiuation has deteriorated since Carcfa took office in July IMS- Urban terrorist attacks Interulfled In6 Presided Cardstair of emergency in ta* capital in February, but to link avail SLI military eGeen.and publicural governor Al lha sans* bote, SL appeared to be eipanding Ib^waJ insurgency from Ayarvcbo Into Puno as

6 Long the region'i oieat Insular group, St has Bnally eatabtished some fordgD links, even Utuugbelieve Itdeclines assistance from abroad In the lorm of arms or training and dees not colli borne In any lorrnal war *tlh any other South Amnvan insurgent ceiaorntson. In4 SL publiclyledgling Maoist organ Ua lion, th* Rrvolutien-arv Internationalut Movementhow current milling addrtas ta ia Loodca and Includesoot West*rahe Near Cast and Asia, the Caribbe-an. aad lb* Ualtecl Stales. We have no evidence thai either th* RIM or any of Us members receive suppert from anyrt

dent uuult) onrtualtt

eal stnpe hardly invite wch assutarvc. INeilher o( the two other South American member* of DIM, both Colombian eTOUps^jecri to be involved In the Coiom* burn fruurgc

e are nut oiittmlMK thatovern' merit will develop an effective and comprehensive response toevolutlonar* violencewe fudge that neither Si. nor the much unaller MRTA hat any peoapect* al taking power in lie neat few yean. The governeneat would and itto copeore unlArdchanenge. There Ii liitle evidence, however, that the (wo groupa coordinate their activities, although Important atuit-venarles and events in Lima have often prompted Ihera lo conduct nearly itmultaneuui tn .in actions there]-

ioUi croups have attacked US targets For the moat pari, these attack] have Involved bornba thrown at US diplomatic. commercial, and cultural (xditia in Lima. Including the LS Fmhasay and Oomula'e The threat to the US presence In Peru has escalated Since the virulently anti-US MRTA lifted iti tWmonih moratorium on the use of leiroriat tactics tailLot December, (orMRTA iprayed the US Embassy -I'.SGreH

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9 In Colombia. truce* reachedt between ihe Betancui government and mosi of the Colombian gueirilla groups' failed toeleriorallon In the overall accurtty ritual Ion Insurgent groupa are divided overto continue to observe the reaae-|re with Ihe gcvrsraraerl Th* FARC favors reainlain-Uig the truce, but most ol the other, smaller groupa oppose il What little remalna of the peace proceaa may not last another. ibe guerrilla groupad tried hardest lo court, renounced ihe truceince then II has rpearhraded the form* Hoe. of the National Cuemla Coaedlnatlnt. Boardoce* alliance of Cotoenbian Kwvraeots cippceed lo tbe truce The aniance't Intemallonal "Ine. Ihe America fWiuUon. with an estimated ZSO eueir.-lai Including membera of ibe Ecuadoreao Alfaio Vive, CaralolC] and the Peruvian group Tupac Amaru, recently launched anaialiut fineriimetu foeeei In southwest ColombiaB bnatl. of 'final victory 7 ci" be discounted aa the bravado af an orsaniaaiaei known (or Ms dramaile media the anMniee guerrilla* air .Ir-ir,to petSUt ialheir aggressiveheirelrure of the Palace of Jurtlce in Bogota In Novemberthe muhinc ihooioui with Colombian lecurtty (orces leli moreead including II Supreme Courtwell as Ihe Arneriea BallaUoraa rural operaliuee. On the ether hand,9 eentilwea loin losses ol learlen and combal penonnel at ihe rate evident during (he put rear, it* dan effective Inntrgent group are

he FARC I* tbe only UaniScanl Iraurtent group till] formally committed lo preaeritng llie truce yet we believea also gaining at theaperue Bcouae the FARC I* 'he lirten houtoI group In Colombia, rt haa thelo Intimidate the government lecurlty forces and la lorce thelo tolerate some of it* activities in the countryside Die FARC's political front group, the Patriotic Union, engage* in legal politicalgroup won minority relon In Congress but March and prandidate lor iheand carries out tnr.njnd propagaoda efforts In rural nr^|

nduding the FARC the guerrilla groupathe government may be able toany0 aimed combatant* With their presentand tvllh Ihe FARC barely observing thethe Columbian armed lorce* are itrong enough to maln'ain control over most of the country, although ihey cannot peeveot individual lenoriat act* If the FARC were arddenlyure lo open hoatditiea or to loin Ibe other groupa in tbe CMC. the govciruscrrf would be hard prcased to provide urban lecurtty. much les* maintain control over rural area*the victory of the establishment. Liberal Party candidate In the presidential electlom In May, ihr FARC may decide to abandon (he cease-Bre. Ihereby finally ihat-lerlnai President Betancur'i dream of pacifyinghaveeports that ihtontem(listing Isinlni the other aroupaeaJitMo of guerrilla torcca. but we do sol &nd thee* OsavUvOne-In the past, theae group* frequently clasSed ai they vied lor control of lerfllory. andovidence thai they have changed iheir basicallr eom-pelillve approac)

Su'iilt American Revolutionary Croupi (continued)

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Although not anvertg the more ipeetacular ooee-illonsuerrilla action* agauw* US target* have born pari of the increaaed leftu*umber of USncfodir, oil and conslructson COTIdaisy oflSciab and mimonar-irs were kidnaped for ramoen by various Colombian revolutionaryI9 and Otber iroups also placed bomb* al ibe USi,ulturalnd IIS businesses In several rilvriB

nha leftist reveJuOooarv element* do not appear to beoog as thoae In Chile. Peru, and Colocabta. afchouads thewuaoer-ableuts the undrrtrauvad wccrlry forceaB. AVC cpera'loto proprwd steaduykllllul publicity campaign through rucvcsdsl arms raid* and bank robberies, to kidnaping* di'cct challcngei to tacurlly forces, and Initial operatioiu in

tu.it area* AVC'i oerionnelbeen trained, ed, and materially supported b. ihe9 of Colombia, given safe refugeB-conlrolled area* of ColombU. and acted9 personnel In operations In Cotombi* and Ecuador. There are abo report* lhal al lea"VC guerrilla* receivedire.nma in Libyi.

fourvder Mirlo Flimenich (romIniends lo try him for lerroriun |

JaeinSere InAmerica.believe the potential security problems be not In the Indigenous radicalappear weak or. In Paraauai'l raw.In how these countries are being used isarras hy foreign revolutionary

'-mj tome recent reverses,

however The government hasonsiderable and, lately, successful evuriurlruurgenct eflocl In which severalC looVn have been killed or captured Moreover, unlike ita counterparts le Chile,C does not appear lo be gaining popular lupssori President Febres-Cordeto appearslo achieve rapid Improvements in Ihe militarycounter Insurgency capabilities, although hih id let lonal diipulea between the poLre and the military could coetinue lo hinder count erlniurgency operitionsC conducted minor bombing attacks against ihe US Embaiav In Quito3ai notubstantial campaign against US niea,t lei. or personnel in Ecuadc

n Argentina and UtiguAy, groups loemerly engaged in Irwiriencles until suppressed by mililarr governments are using the more tolerant alnvphere ot* civilian rule as an octorturJty to reform, recruit, reenance, and debaleto pen>cipal* la the political ceoceaa or to prepare lor future armed ac-lioeu. These groupa include ihe Peroout Monlonero* and the People's Rerolutvonary Army (EBF) Inai -ell aa ihe Tu pa mart* (National Liberation Movement) in Uruguay.t meeting In Havana, the McoloDCro and ERP leaders reportedly agieed lo coeperaie in Infiltrating labor unkmi and pot trial parties In order to nudge these organizations leftwardear later, despite Its Troukytte celarlns. the ERP agieied to Wo the peo-Sovyet Argentineit PartyForum for National Liberation" Us target propaganda against "impetlaUins" andcum panic* According to source* of varying reliability, the Cuban* have also been encouraging the Tupamaroa lo pursue itrnllar political itralrglesto ciploll the country's nconomkhe Tupsmaros have been calling on the Sarcjlnetu rrov-ernanem te repudiate Uruguay's foreign debt (aCuban ploy; la neither country, however, do these group* icera snuous yet to lake on ihe securityn the caae of the Munloncror, thu reluctance has been relnlorced by the fact that the Argentinianhaving Obtained the citradllion ef Monlonero

In Jtorlote. there is no viableent Inowever, the armed force* irponed'y turned up evidence lhal over ihe previous tae years, apparently wtlh ihe help of local lefl.au. al leadsar-Seatlae area* ahipntenes had been made fromeftu* revoiutronariea In Chilej

In flroslf, the militarylors the activities of thectobernd the Revolutionary Communist Party cf BraaJ (PCBR)i( the two groupa have decided lo pooleager resources, as mihlary leaders reportedly believe, ihey do not pose muchotentially more serious problem ii that Draiilermeable border wilh four countries wbeie there *ie active or talent Insurgencies. Report* from varioui aources over theo yean indicate lhal revoluUociaric* from Peru,and other cewoarSea haverale-haven* in Braiil la* re prorata -lives fiom-rcupa In st* South American countries and from the Government of Nicaragua reportedly met in Porto Ategre. Bra-riL to dUcuaa eiUblbhmcnlultinational revolutionary 'Coordinator" targeted against the Pinochet regime. W* have no inJcemattoo indl-oucg thai thu initiative advanced beyond that stage, considering (he Lackommon border with Chile,ighly unlikely thai Braril would be usedase of operation! agalnsf theunc 1

tri^jr^orted^

wo small clandestine subversive rvtan-iauoe* Bandera Bob fRed Flag) and the rabscure New Rtvosutst-tary Coordinator (NCR1 receive some limited Cuban support and are of concern to Veneiuelan security officials Al-tbouah Bandera Bos* haa disbanded Hi urban isolt and tn rural unit haa not been active, the irocp ha* aaa renounced armed struggle and some member* reportedly cooperate withM-1M

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Pata/uny. Irftul revolutionary groups

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foelori Contributing lo Revoljliooorv Violence

IT Much of the Insurgency inccurringhe lice ol ihe presumably countervailing current of democrat! is Hon. Logic suggests tint the replacement ol inilllirv dlctatonhipa bv popularly elected governments,more legitimate eutleU forrievances than their predecessors, would undeicut popular[or the insurgencies. Over lime thi) concfusfon may prove correct, but in the interim the elected governments must cope with sagging economies thatem to ariopt unpopular economic policies. Moreover, the skill of leftist groups in cspVoitiru- an open poliiical climate, the demonstration effect of the Sandinista revolution, and lha beginnings of effective collaboration among some of the groups are eomi Ing and threatening ihe democ rati ration i

IrKreosed Politkof lotlfuda

oliiical llberallrailon has-glven Southrevolutionaries new opportunities to attractraise funds, piPpagiridiie. and build front groups. Throughout most ot South America, il is no longer inherently dangerous lo belong lo an orthodoi, nro-Soviet Communist party.uch par-Has were legal only In Bolivia, Colombia, andal present they are outlawed only in Chile and Paraguay. Moreover, in addition lo the universities and labor unions that have often been vehicles for leftist or revolutionary agitation, revolutionaries have reached out to human rights grstaiU" rations and other middle-class M

adical Christian activists, particularly Roman Catholic adherents of bberatlon theology, are also encouraging colts bout ion throughout Latin America between Christians and Marilsts. These activists, along with numerous national and International human rights orgsniiatiora created in the past decade, have been prominent among public critics ofledly sometimesof security forces toward leftist acti-isls and (heir sympathizers

Serious Economic Oisorrtry

n many South American countries, economic conditions have deteriorated in recentlimate conducive lu imuraencses Popula-lion pressures, hoih unemployment andrates, hcav, ril*rnj debt burdens, and other economic problems hav* caused some governments to cut funding lor fecial proa rams andrvuMrlesack of economichas coniributeJ to Ihe vemth of lh* illicit narcotic industry, such as Peru and Colombia, some insurgenu has*AflneJ forces -iih inlhckers lor mu-

he standard of living In th* region has aciuillv droppedhis has led some persons to cooperate -nh insurgents out of sheer economic need Perne Colombian group attracted recruits byem monthly sUarie* one-third higher than ihe minimum -age. Accordingaptured member, the AVC has promised half th* proceeds (mm bank robberies to those willing to loin and participate in such acts for ihe orgs ruts lion. Even members of the securtlv forces are not Immune to such Inducements The AVC has been able lo recruit prlsoo guards to facilitate lailbreaks of raptured9 has bought the services of some_retired Colombian officer and enlisted >

" Support

he Soviets. Cubans. Libyans, or Nicaraguans hav* eorHrlbuted some form of aid to re volution ariesry South American country eicept Paraguay The level of effort appears to be greatest in ihose countries with active insurgencies, eicept for Peru, and to be little moreoken In oalure In -here Urgency it Inactive (see table)

HaBP

Tho Soviet Role

irect Soviet Ik can be documented only in Chile. The USSR hardly uoublea locooceal its hostility toward Pinochet in the apparent belief that it risks incurring very Blue international disapproval.

propaganda broadcasU beamed to South America by Chilean eiiles openly call For violence against tbe Pirtochet regime.

Moscow finances and provides guidance to the PCCh. -hich closely follows ihe Soviet line.

Luis Corvalan, head of the PCCh. Uvea In the Soviet Union ind is totallyo Soviet directionrobably at Moscow'she announced resumption of ihe armed

strugglr inhe irprtlcd this anriouiieerrvcttl during nil litp lo Scandinavia In Mas IvO.

Soviets and iWr Lul Eirrcoean allies hav*

rrportedti petwidrdtraining, ind onancui

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mgenerally rduk*ISO Chilean villas recentlyrban marine training in Algeria. Za* German* Cuba, Ntcara.and tbe Soviet Union and are being, roamed lo Chile. Snan* o( thempaled in the recent

H Elsewhere Soviet lupporl Is not well rfcxumeni-ed- Beyond rnoraJ encouragement, there are wme icalleied Indication* oi uo-arl financial aiiulantc te certaint teems likely that ihe Soviets channel much ol their aid through ihe Cubans, so ai to conceal their Own rottj

or moreecedea. Cuba hai beeneiternal aource of support lor Southleftist revolutionaries laubanCarioa Rafael Rodcigueravanaceamrmtmcnt -Sen he Hated lhalhas pnemaMal'i baric alow Itaerthroughout latin Arnertca Mereayver.nterview -'lhUSConaresimao,emphasised lhal Cuba coruiden all ofpari of the revolutionary process andthai CKlU.iPeru,and Bra ill would evenluallv all have

ince tlie Sand) iievolution, however, we believe Cuban support lor South Americanhas been limited by two faeton.

The more immediate priority given by Havana to Central America, rmpt (or Chile and possibly Colombia

The perception in Havana andof oppm-lumtSri ro rnah*ir* In South ArnrrSea

d taaaanirtialives.

hile tt ute one South American country where Cuban policy now appears to locus on supporting the ained overthrow of lh* govvrnmern Castro has staled publicly and privately that he atlachea speciallo undermining the Pnincriei regime, bothof Its strident anil-Communism and beciusrihe Cuban-bar!llende governmentbelieve Havana ealeulatrs lhal lh*become anpaiah -mearurg:.aa minimal political coats lor proenotlngthat doeaasstle condition* rea-

der ChlW Ho* (or revolution In thai coni..i. Maauel Pineiro, th* head of Uw Cuban Comu^aU Party's Americasf. admitted to US3 lhal Cabs waaupooriiBgt CM* as -rl aa in FJ Salvador aad Guatemala Other aourcea of varying latlibtlll* IndV-cat* thai daring lh* past year ifcu auppori has included infiltrating numerous Cuban (rained terrorist! ir.io the country, prodding th* MIR to resume armed action. Kepplrai up lb* shipmenl of arms and Brumal aaau-tance. facilitating the movement of Gule-ii levolu-tionarles training oulrsd* lha regpon. and providing more frequent tactical guidance lo several Chilean far left

n Colombia, the Cubans have maintainedconnections with both the NationalArmy (ELN)ncouraged by the Sandinista victory9 and embittered bycompetition that caused Havana to lose lis bidN Security Council sealuba provided Irs mint arms, adrice. and safehaven9 In the, according lo reliable sources.9 force that had been mined and organized In Cuba attempted lo land on ihecoast and was innihilgted by Colombian armed forces. The embarrassment led Castro to curtail arms shipments, although he allowed other forms of aid99 agreedruce wiih th* governmentnS, months9 denounced tbe truce Pineiro admitted lo US officials9 personnel were Bill reluming to Colombia after training In Cuba. Pineiro claimed that this did notuWn egort lo subvert the Colombian Government. lBj

lsewhere In South America. Havana has beenore circumspect approach. In which limited support for potential or actual opponents of the ruling party Is coupled with an outwardly cordial effort to court the resprne. For rumple:

In Ecuador, accordingeocrafty reliable source. Cuba provided guerrilla trainingmall number of members of the radical Ecua-dorean Socialist Revolutionary Partynd

a* '4

VII In llir rieeetation. 'bus unfulfilled lhal Ihr- ti.nii -ould initial* vMfd actions in late

n addaptured AVC documents po.nl I* Cuban* pio>id* "iinrni add*.Onel pcrashedl lift ji few* soughtT the

upgrading of diplomaticil-ihed

under led*h* US 7mbur report! that on hblo Ifa-aiu lo3 eonwrvstive Prrslderilero waa Impressed wiih Castro'i disclaimer ol involvement Inor and his pledf* lhal h* would counsel Ecuadoiean Ullisli toward Bvoderalinn

la Per a. Cuba's Etrlalasa wWb r. Bin Cawro's4 if airmen!S Cocapeumen thai Peru'icould be solved only "by revolutionary movements-and It Radio Havana'si to th* MRTA. Nonetheless, In8 lh* Car-da lovernmenl agreed lo upgrade diplomatic relations to the ambassadorial level

In Argentina. Uruguay. IflaH and Veneiuela th* Cubans are encouraging radicalpartly through Baartcial backingto rebuild their urengih. yet are also pursuing diplomatic gains To innt* degree they ar* counting on short memo-lei Despite considerable past Cuban aid lor Rrinliangroups, lor rumple, the Bra illian Foreirm Minbtet haa tipressed to US ofBciiU hU conBdence thai Castro would not inleifere in Braullan affairs and thusthai Braiil reestablish diplomatic relation*

In Bolivia, under President Sdes, lh* Cubans established lull diploenatic retatsoru and gained significant rnBuece* with mm* members of his adminutratiort Since President Pas Fsienrsoro replaced Sties, bilateral relation) have cooled.ml Cuban IriBuence in the.governrrjerilbeen almost completely

Tha libvon Rota

9 the Sonets and Cubana rrsxirtedry began reess ng lh* Palesllne Liberation Orgs ru 1st ton (PLO) guerilla groups loore active role lo Lann Amerka. During the eailv tWOt Braiiltana, Bolivians, and Chileans were among South Amerlcara rel'ably reported to have been trained In PLO camps, mainlt in lebanon. Afier ihe Israeli Invasion ol

t* in Crwernment has been InvokedldC'ranging progiamrain, arm. and fund subver-sitr and tr-rnrlst org*nl rations throughout Latin America. OadhaB once said lhal he v. anted loeachhead for insurgency in Latin America. He may have been deliberately trying to supplant Cuba as ihe primary sponsor ofii-ar iCaribbean revolutionary pic

h* Caribbean is clearly Lib.sidocumented acllvitiea are alto under wayand South America Libyan support loitself active In supporting rebel groups incomplements Tripoli'i broader rflortsthe region Within South America,Have promised and la some cases havefinancial aid and arms lo groups laEcuador, and possibly Peru.notably membersavein Libya in mililiii andacticsIT members ofVC guerrillareportedly havetraining in Libyause of automatic weapons, eiploaives. andterroeist UctKa Tripoli has provided Haloinglo th* Chilean MIR to help upgradecapabilities Libya has attemptedeople's Bureau

In Veneiuela. butilr^-veM, dijejo eBeettv* countermeasures by Cararaif

th* Nkorogvao Roat

he Nicaraguaftt have supplied training, and in some casta ami and financial assistance, lo the MIR inn Colombia; and AVC in Ecuador^!

V efiaeaiy between South Americanand the Sandmislaa has been eipresaedumber al ways.'. rev-durlcnaries from every Southcountry eacept* aided ihe Sandinistas politically or militarily. Leftwlng Insurgent treupt have staged violent attacks In support of the Sandinistas In several countries In countriesbootnsurgencies, inch as Br aril andpro-Sandinista eierrtrno have held demons!tloru- Some South American revolullonaries have Arm-onstraled their solidarity In person by participating ndinlitattng agsirul ihe Conlras.

ujlt of intrrawd eiicrnal supooei.

Sou1revolullonari (roup*

become more com pelapable Tealairajinamps latMSJof and "he Mirtd* Fan ind coanbelmined itpci IheeJmlwi Inhave Ml Iniuraent) more preparedcountries* milium and security force* Inrevolutionary groups have acquired moreand advanced communication*the IOuuimanr fevolutionary

leaden Jealously guarded their independence and choae note ckaefy alined with Moacow. Maiist revotutlocueica now tend to be bnked to 'he Soviet* or

their Cuban andei._Ooveriainina and

maierul ruoeort help sustain themH

The Question ol Regicool Cooperation

fOiIi|iorjj

no South American country UliuurieM croups aa eujse asow layor ured to be la Nicaragua. So lar. there jlb American eQuivaleiu lo the threeunitedinirfe Director ale oor loMam National Liberation Frontinclude* five. SaUadorao fuenilla gioupaequivalent appears to be CNC. ihaInsurgent* in Cctombia led by Mil

Ecuador, ether eitreme leflirt partiesreporled lo beooper trior- withTheerrdero Luminoao la Peru haspublicly treognlicd the reveJuiteesaryTupac Amaru Elsewhere in South America,of levolutionaries proclaim thenagainst Imperialism" and occasionallylerrorUt acti In that cause, but because ofor the memcaka of old ouar'cb they doefiectiveiy with other revolutaseuuiaa tocourtry. each group roarcnes and ce--rJetio Ri

he conceptrsror.itoLvarsao army" hai loni been advocated by South Americanccording to various unconfirmed icporrs. the multinational Ameelca Battalion that waa foamed In Colombia under tha leaderihlp ofalrmed penoneel in Marchhave kacltsdcderieiuelans. Panama nana, and eves* North AmericaMore real-able source* however, can confirm parlliipa'lon only by member* of Ecuadori AV'C and Peru'i Tupac Amaru. In additionuring the puM several

-nHyrr.Copi on Source! ol

There are uaaln abaui rlw

ri mei-wl ucwri la Vwa* Sawvn* hm-

pn>

apwr re ItftUt irmluiUTUitortH hiui dinel buiI ihanivlru*

ihiwijS other rourirlei suchCuba ind Vieaiaaua*

el Ltfaev Do Hi-ina

and Marr aerec on - Aamcu

are rm) mtrwibir la

llmw i>ar* Irsa

af (uemSa fout* la eownrrw* aa South America ihia In Cemral AmeiKar An there counlrlei In South AmerWa where thrind Cubam areowatalent are Libyan and Nlearacuan aMl pro-

l-imi emrllruilnf -Hh either ihe Soviet* or

iu*lalU'*IMa

erlenaf rmwi9 or Havana iha vJrunale airtHor of MIS,hHaw do Miarw or "nun (acthlale malaria bfwaen

South Ammcan irauraeeti and ihetr rDuniemnj In Central America?

reiuWd". To whal edeiil dor. the

So-lit arau luopty relsilonihip -ilh Paru inhibit Ssvlet and Cuban sopoort lor lellwina inauraanu

laAre the kauea of aceesillna lorrias arpporl aad oTibJU-Slaa 'Qponal Un lubarco ol

debateaia? Are ihere SL

lactlona lhal may break with ihe malivKne

nd rwabliui (oeeicn lirjj* How doe* SLIn ihe Bevolwtionary

Moveovenl b acllrtlPD In Prrv?

months thli imall cucrillla force has clashed frequent ly with the Colombian Army In and around the city of Callouthwestern Colombia. The ikt'.ji reportedly have wefl-onanlced columns armed wilh aaaaukoru.-i.ew rerMOaashe OJoovhun nubtary.etermlrrad to eradicate iheBarulron. ha* .reporled InC-ictlruj heavy earualiles on eiementi of ihe ballabon It ha* been able to draw inio combat but has not yet barn able to dHlvdae the main force of the fuerrlllai Irons their mountain

BS&SaBr^

m. IB lei

publicly cbimed to hive contacts withIn Peru and, accordingource whose repotting has aoroetlmes been substantiated, privately claimed limilar contacti with tbe Chilean MIR.lo South America, 'evolutionary organization] based outalde Chile occaiionally are reported to be rovtdlna: rupport to either the FPMR or the MIR

Outlook

ver tbe neit tew years, economic and political conditions In South America appear to favor the continuation of Insurgencies In Chile, Peru, Colombia, and Ecuador. Thereome chance of the revival of atow level of armed revolutionary violence In Argentina or Uruguay as well as In countries where currentlylhere are oo active Insurgencies, such as

hroughout South America tbe asm hi nation of government-kin posed austerity and persistentriving tower- and even middle-class families Into poverty, thereby contributing to the pool of potential recruiti (or the violent left Because of their economic problems, some government! may be forced lo cut back militaryat conaeouently there may be further reductions in tbe size, capabilities, and morale of their fo

it Collaboration between South Americangsoups and narcotics traffickers may ipreaw. The FARChe two largest Colombian Insurgent groupa have already been implicated with the drug trafficking, and other South American groups may succumb to tbe temptation The Ecuadorcan AUC, for eiample. might come to emulate the drug liirTicliris practicests principal mentor. The reported ad hoc anaiygeroenti between Sendero Luralnoso and drug traffickers in Peru could aboore permanent form. Elsewhere In Southew of the inactive Insurgentinandire narcotics money as ihe Gnan. cial key lovils button. We believe tliat in-creued cooperation between inaurgenti and drug leaf. Scken wvukl coeedderably complicate the probienoHv the security forces, which have had enough trouble trying lo cut" with the heretofore separate challenges poaed by ihe insurgenis and the drug

chal tcnge* Pged

tra (filler

additional area of concern is theof rlghtwjng terror-id organizationsTyplcailty. such groups are staffed by activesecurity force personnel and sympalhclicReportedly, righlwlng terrorists are alreadyperceived subversives in Chile, Peru.Ecuador, and Argentina. As in Centralviolence will draw sharp criticismhuman rights organisations and. In our

sjist .leftwing eiiremisa in their recruiting.

Anti-US Terrorism

recent yean, South American insurgenthave become increasingly urbanised, abelieve will continue, as lefllstwith one another and emulate iheirstiles In Central America in trying tohis will lead to an InlenslScallonagainst norundigenous targets. Includingwhich tend to be concentrated InAs In the part. US personnel and facilitiesto be frequent targets of radical Vllitfi icestrike at the United States, either for Its own taketo them jl symbolises cand "imperi-

H

terrorism directed against US Interest!In tbe main, to take the foCowingkidnaping! for ransom, assassinatlooto seize'.ale US Socage*.perhaps stagedof solidarity with revolutionary groups Inorprobably continuechiefly of low-risk attacks on US diplomaticfacilities or blnauooal culturalusually produce few casualties but attractmedia attention. Kidnaping! fur the purposef und* havooccurredoauerilly iaalthough not all of Ihe kidnaperside variety of both localswill continuee victimized,US dtueru. because US companies have

RIeMwMuj caramll.tan Icmininl Ire-

ind Crnlral Americarcailwii lo Ihe

i Iktt*ml IrflW ihieaU Ctaaii lo br <bter-l-

l thr *atv> nunncwxptratlnn Iron the intal subtledecree* o(i'^ Iromforce* Many peopleIBaan lai-craWr foraui puauhnacru lor agenu

der. Some fovernmeraa. hawevrd li such facton at cumbersome or erupt swSVval irOemi aidthai Ihey cannot curb tut union and armed violence from the lell uflng strictly legal meawret,

welcomed Ibe ad.enl ol Ihe arvaaywsout riihtwlng

death sauaeb. -tth ihe plaudbU daaaal ihey ofler.ol energetic hitman rlgh'j atuajaaloniafir-rr over ehe bit decade,

however, hai (really raSed tha icutlil coat. Inadvene oublidry, lor (overnrnexaa thairuth rightig vlgtbatUm. NcvertSrletvreeeot eipaiu.cn ol itfilB liiiiaail adlvtiySouth American countUr*,

appeared on the eiitemc rlahi

Inember! ol the teeut>tv (onm ham teoeat-

edlyd riahlwing lamum.4

iheierom nrtou* ooastrn that Ihe National Information Cenier (CNILun br

military often, murdered several aafl eitramlaU

while they were Hying to surrender or after they were In custody. More eipUltlt. Oilcan AMI Communist Action (AChAX whkh hu been In cahteixe rlnce thend probably hai Unlu to OtfWjn securitypublicly claimed lo have tuSod one bllwlng eilieiDbC and Hai threatened leveral human rights acQvuti wjihhey do not crane theirrnment Bctivytlea In addition.Engf virr'* reuablllry. active duty tod retired carabtnerco were rrmoraible foe ther^Whn* of ihree Chilean Communis Parly

la Coliirruaa, (he vHHante (roup Death lo(MAST, formerlyl and

twin) dsathmase

i lieu-Jo- -atttui 1

In Ecuador, various kind of rndeaee lidkatnhe police lorve oi Cuaynoull may have setV*ih sgaad lo deal rummariJy with both criminal] ind Insurgrnu In Mareh. Bi Imllvlrhiah accuard of criminal

acil.Iile> were found murdered. Abo In March, wall

slocana charbrannt AVC (Mlany Uveal) by Implyingirror Imaai orgs ni rationere found In several parti of ihe city. The methodical, unhurried aay an which both activities woe carried wt imiilied poGoenIBAS. two AVC membera captured In CuayaQull be police ohlb betac iriruported betv

he Randai Campeainoa,rural civilian auill-Uriel thai have been parsed DUO service to aid the regular security forces, have sometime* ihown brutality aialro* sndjvvJah-Jjuipected of

brlna SL memben orB

I*e brtSevrumber of small*

scale bembrnp since5 have been the work elell ai teflaint larora No rifhewina croup has been Identified, althoue* the mort Hkery candidate would be whatever remalna of the Arerntla* Aral-Cornmurust AltUoce {AAA) foonded3 by the (hoc MlnUter of Social WeJfare, and rasmpoaed of retired military ind powoc takVer* lu actlvliks durln* the "dirtyaalrot lubveriloriiieoirrenity under

InveHiaallon by AryxnllncH

In (Irueuay. muD areupi of die far rigid arr reporl-edJy nranlloring (he aciMiSe* al the naD grouca of the far left,ir there haarom eilher end of the aoertrutnl

a pattern of paying rimom Neither stnaticm attempls nor the aelrjre of public building* with US hoaUgea have not been coeouaartriplaoe lo South America during theohhough we believe this has been partly bemuse of Improved official US security. We eapect the threat of such attack* against US ofTkiab to remain rasoderale:

In Colombia, we cannot rule out tbe posiibility of another terrorist spectacle9 to recoup lost prestige. High-profile US rxrsejrsnel such as the Ambaindor or other senior officials are likely target* In any future hostage-barricade action. Toovernment counterattack similar to lhal staged al ibe Palace of Justice and create the condition! for guerrilla9 hasannounced plans to Includeuturesituation.

There isighofnalions in Colombia, where narcotlr* rratbcken as well a* guerrillas have threatened lo assassinate US per-stirtnel Tbe apparent alliance between some guerrilla group* and drug traffic lie r* compounds

the danger to L'S Government personnel,US anllnanutKi or ecu nlerort to tbe Cclunbun Government raise* the US profile in Columbus.

In Fti- aaeruns thai willUS

targets The SL will aasoontinuing threat to US Interests, althcaaarb II lends to focus III efloelsoa iheomenl HlssS

Coniinvad Enter n .

r

e tee little llVelihood over the neil few yean that Cuban and Nlcarajuao aupporl (or SouthUuurflenU will diminish. Castro'i hostility toward Pinochet will not abate, nor wjll hla dele roil nation lo further revolution In South America. In Colombia, andeaser esteni la Ecuador. Havana and Moacow hope lo reap lalrai froa the ongoing Insurgencies Elsewhere, are ciped the Cohans to continue lo try to make diplomatic fains while quietly building up their assets Lo teftlitn Libyan support Is likely to continue or even

espite all these problems we see no South American leftist revolutionary group taking power in the neil few years Certain developments are lllely loie ability ol* niu.ng South Americanlolh ihe iruurirnlotably

fwcei around Ihe eontlnem arr be-Cuming more sophisticatedt relive.

o'cd irain-ng. equipment, aad tsaeV'iMp

Most important, lh* democratic pr countries ciUoy widespread publ revolutionary alternatives do

Aa Irdkarion* ol ealeenal lupporl ol southInsurgencies and regional Insurgentart recognlted throughout ihe heml-ipbere, South American security forces will be more likely to collaborate eliectlvely with on* another and to accept help from lh* United Stall especially In the form of Increased training

Wa Velleve that the Roman Catholic Church In South America, which has allowedChurch aecteei to collaborate with Leftist revolutionaries and to innperSlae with charges ol US eump'klty with military regimes, wtD begin to distance Itself from liberation theology and Iruu/gant aetlnlles ai government! return lo civilianatieeially If US policy works toward using lha latin debt burden

ANNEX

R'vohjMonar/ountry Profiles bv Cote-gory

i

annet dl-idts the ln eon-iiites nfInto tin re categories act-ording lo the status-tlhln their hordes wPm Colombia, andu lavingWi categorise Argentina indcountries where lefliat revoluticnarr groupspotenllil to develop Into active insurgencies.B'titi. Venfiurro. Paraguay, and flc-fiour aawhere (here arc neither cunenlany eilitlnt groups that might piearnt anthreat during the near few yean It ihouldthat the weakness of politicalin Bolivia, coupled with tta economicthataace wherr^re-ofuttowrycan Dare up iu-

Counlriei With Active Revolutionary Movamantt

active revolutionaryefinedarmed opr>ealUon that regularly engagesor attacks Hate property Lnanner aatba stabilityn-nnratCroupa ai this leys', ami laidir|^B

n Chile, revolutionary groups building upwith ilgnlUcant foreign ruppurt continuefor armeddcspliclo favor of ao acceleralrd transit Kmrule.ombings .rvrreasedaad they rssriHrroed atn higher raleFacedarge aerurtrv fore* jWtdictatorship and cooatraincd by anRale of toiergcocy. lh* revolutionaryforced to operate clandestinely, lor theroups publicly formed a

looae poliiical alliance, the Dernocralir Popular Move-meu* {MPDJ, oaferaibly to preaenl peaceful.pgsoOttoninochet. The following groupa were mrsasben of th* MPD. which eafj cotla-ed by thern*rvl la

The Chi fPSCh/A

The Commuolrt Parly of Oul* {rXXh)

The Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIB)

Socialist Pertv/Alroevd* Faction

n our view, ihe proSe*Mi FfCh 'liainidomiciles the MPD and rxaea the main revolu-liooarv threat to th* regime- An advocate of armed struggleh* oartrembersti.ni youth wine, PCCh members ocganli* political ossioslinai -such ai strikes and national pro-teal dan-through ih* MPD. By5 the PCChommittee had reportedly moved to improve lh* parly's organisational capabilities and eiert lightel control over those promoting armed action by rrrvirnl/ig aeolor eiHed leaden le Caaue InS, according to an oflee rubaaniiaicdhe PCChhipeacM ol ic-irl irwlrfrom Cuba for distribution lo regional parry units to lhg_Manuel Rodrigucr Palriotlc Front CFFMR,

The rTMH, which receives support from both the USSR and Cuba, was formed tnnaklng it tbr newevt element if the developing rrvolutionary movement It often oprraica icdcpeodently. but the PCCh hasattempted to assure* eoaCrol by placing trusted mem ben In FPMP Inderyhao pori-doru The FPMR's actionsaused at least three blackouts In the capital and bombings in vaitou* cities ii well as disruption of rail transportation Alter It bombed government-owned Isuildings during theprotest day lahepublicly praised bv Radio Havana for ita "ban pur-poae of lathingn September laffJS. the Chilean Ccmmunbt dally published an FPMR mam festo thai advocated armed opiscalUon to Plrvocfart and eipresvd aolldarily with th* Governments of Cuba and Nicaragua plus auptvji for the 'Salvadoranand their sirqaieH

Tha Cubari-lisarocraced MIR, alutouah reneatacCy weakened by aecurlty fore* castrations, ramaaaacommitted lo overthrowing th* Pinochet raglm* by force. The MIR, whichyear barter, of rubvenive activities,errorist campaign1 untilhen security foreea killed several militants and leaders, demoralising the aaove-baant. By Marchough, the group let-srsesfly had decided lo return fo violencermlt of Cuban prodding. According to various reliable rrourcaa. the MIR Is training revolutionary cadre In Cuba, who are

I3 ihe MIR conducted several leTrorlit Kt'oro In coruunction with the FTMR. beefed up Hiind be-in lodivehu-armi unuggicn, iMt'Ura to rapport. Uorts. the MIR. like (he PCCh. ha* rcponcdlt been bringing its cities home, accordingenerally reliahae romr In addition. It hatecrultrnenl drive, aecklng member) from imoi the urban poor. rtudrots. and the unemployed. Currently, the MIR reobebJy hatembers In Chile. The roup as led bv Andres Pascal Aliersde (nephew ol the late Salvador Allendel who has lived In Cuba since ihe.

guerrilla terrorismapUal. cauung fiiggggnl poweruaging altaeaa or military aaa* rulingin funecar huroba TV SI" effarta loan In Ul* lauV. however,hvand arrests of keyAt grat, the r. wt. mXkticuntinurd military contidl ewerin rural SLbut aa DecemberSitedemergency u- the northern

highlands In all but lour provinces taowever, leriurlatind bombings in Lima caused ihe Garcia government lotale of emergency " B

6 Thebest financedroup of the Socialist pasty originally lormed Inthe PCCh and MIR la their political front, the MPD. Named after Its principal leader. Oodotalro Aaneyda. and numbering00 mi ml"any stiD in ealle, ibeormally advocates armed Rruggle, but, according to anuch of the leadership tend) to prefer politicalwhile allowing elements within the party to cotlabarate In PCCh-iporuorcd violence Like the MIR and PCCh. it it believed to reeeive^upport from both the Soviet Union and C'/luH

Peru, recsrritv forces are stretched thia asface two active revolutionaryrural-based Sendero Luminose (SL) andurban-based Revolutionary Mo-emcutfMRTAJ While the SL continues to poneserious threat lo stability, (he MRTA may posethreat to US facilities andIndependently

^Rational events often raoropt terrorist actVoos In lima by both groups, bast no evfdence of coordination herwrvn rhe SL and Tupac Amaru has come to lislitjJJ

Cirrrnan began lo organise ihe SLdrawing Its rasesnbershlp mainly frontpopulation. The rigidly Maoist group daimithe only true Communist Party of Peru, Taewith anstrong bases lo remote highland areasbecome an urban terrorist threat as well LedImproved performance of the government'sforces to change Its tactics,roup emended from its highjacksAyacucho Department4 and beganits operations. For one thing, Il escalated its

II. Altar ttneratng Inhe small (several hundred members) bus aardsiilom Tupac Amaru began uatng car bomb* aaS. In addition lo taking over radio aU boras. Interrupting TVand employing Robin Hood tactics 1st Lima's duns Tit* Peruvian press bmupacentral Commute* docuroorat thai defines tbe grouporking clan,t Lenin sr. rvatxnal hberatloe erg*r'ra'toe baiod oo rrvemaCiociarY iolerna-ttcoaltSrn and Inspired by tk* Cubaa aad Nicaraguaa revolutions to train tha 'snuggle for ikar casnatruenoa of worldhe group has bnru pvlilciy ap-pUuded by (he Moscow line Peaurtaa Communist Parti

Ita rides Ine press confereoee onupac Amaru announced aof armed aettorrs against the new Carcta government The revoeutsonary group remained critical of the Caret*ail ration,In lateb cUocresOoe magazine, Vrnorrernoa. published an editorial that charged that tbe government engaged in "state aerrortsmirty war against th* oeople" Inupac Amaru resumed ib terrorist campaign in Lima, and Inupac Amaru puheacsV announced thai it bad rent roroe giserrillas to Maled America Barlalico in southem Colombia. Tupac Amaru hastrong (deoaogi'sl afPnltyut II seems unhkefy tbat the two groups will expand their orxraOorudstneat MRTA guerrillss In the America rsattalkon rersortcdly suSered heavy casualties Tupac Amaruotentially larger threat lhan suggested by Its current ill* and activities because Itisciplined and organised, appeals lo students and urban ossemploved, ike SL appears more open to foreign support.

9

3 In Colombts re Ivuiruorgrnt

TV Revorut.oevarT Armed Force* nf Cnlomhu (PARC)

nfM-weroeritVI HT

Threr.Uo- Anxi ill:.

Th* Popular Liberation Army (EPLI

Amongnly the FAJIC continues to id here even nominally Io the truce linedIth the go-emmes* dualrg the temoaeruerrilla violence hara gradually Increatrd dm-in* ihu truce, and new revolutionary groupso emerge. The peace accord* broke down In June IfkUI urulato-aDy wlihdie- from the ceate fire aarieernee.r, claimingSmaller revofuttonary groupa fc-lowcd mil.9 haa alnceooar alliance composed of group* oppcaed to anr dialogue -ltd the government Soma mco'ben of ihu iThuwarned out Wuit ruerrOa actioaa, and CeaVambua pence ir.:ellienor believe* the alliance tarban action* Both the FARC and Stjrjapuearave some-contact with drug Ir .1

Formedbe FARC ti baScallr the armed -inc of tht eetinsoB proSr/vset Colombian Communist Partynuiliatioo la headed by Pedro Anlooto Marin, abo known at Manuel Man, landa Velex. wlso curt roily advocate* refriegratlon of the group Into Colombian aocfety Of the countryajot fuerriij groupa, the FARC appear* moatlo the truce, but haa tain, advantage of the cease Br* toen Hi abeady formidable combat force. The FARC haiy at tea* ne third during the pest two year* and byate now number* ISO)arhtert; CeOembuua mlllUrv Intefllgetioe trcrntty csalmated its itrenglbrmedincella deatre to participate in nationalba FARC haaegal political party, held peacefulandidate foetlooal eKeloo, and won minority reweiesstalion In both houaei of

ifi Even under the truce, however, tbe FARC haa cemUnued to aim and rcourtnd It hai employed armed propaganda to obtain rupport for iti political front, the Patriotic Union, Element* of tbe FARC still carry out ktdnaptrags, robberies, indreportedlysorttoc. of the prcceodi to rupport the poup'i politlcaJ aeJlvlUes The FARC abo derives Income troaa ihe drug mdiiatrs. liwou-aKion of roc* in Hi own field* ai weH a*

ron* traffickersmealei than mow eterncnti of FARC aaagboti- i , although

im uetatU up II

orined0 bul Inactiveeeetluggie*ln Jaime bateeaan> death In IMS tU atreearth hai been estimated al up, bul tha* force has probably been reduced.ornequence of leaser tuSered an ctaahes with genrmmentemains the couratrr'i areord-brgeri aad erroat aettrvr revotUlioaary groop and ihe one meat influenced by Cuba- Inflee repealed claihea "lib aecurlty forees In weralMuUicrr broke ill irucatbe goverrv meni AJlhough tba group suferedla rubae-auenirajaalmg Lie deathooad tignlEcantlr taiujaruvad R* combat capobillUe* by lale iiunmes. Sbrcea* are-iewed between luicen and defeat. Initialing armed actions but meet'ng itrong resistance Irom theboajor thraat te Internal security- Laa* November, for9 force occupied Ihe Palace of Juitice and look Its occupant* hostage but hatf IU best fsgJstcis lo the gowmment Iroopa who rtcemed the buJdmg m

19ihii letbaclt lo form tbe National Cuerrilla Coordinating Board (CNCXcoalition of anlilruce guerrillas. The CNC'i primaryao eofumn known a* tbe America Battaboa. which Mriudei move guerrilla* from tha Ecuadorean AVC, the Peru-urn MRTA. and peaalbly otherroup* recently keaached an offeniive in iouthwe**rio Colombia. Indmll-lack on ibe city of CelL Tha military lenpoodad to atreearth. caDjo. in arveral brlgadea lo didc-ia- th-

hile the auerrUUi hava leooriedrr ruffe red heavy loaaet In ihe rorsaotthe Impact of theae loaaaa oa the CNC. aa weC ai tba rearot yat nkaax. In aptto nf tsaese r. I.opurnih*Ben*ja to ihe gove^imaett. at treatotential leader tn future cocedtnateali ii According to murcea of varying reJlabntV. MI9 now recetvea gaopey and tra.nlng troea Libya, arms Irom the AVC, and various aortappr*rt Irom Cuba and Nicaiaanm Whileai leportedry aperV ennedvrnr over the poaiibllily of returning lo nrgo(iit>ora wlib tbe government. Carto* Pliarro

Iron-Corner, in newrty electid leader, bhardline idculomic ikets tor. i'.ici'

my (ELM fu.mrd

vb prd sliranrirr" Roman Cat< Clui'ih *uiv-iat* Al "llhbr- South American imurgrnl DOopv Ih* ELN hat* cblltrd Hi loeuircera year* liom mamli rural murban area* Ewionie* olo ai many aa BOO Al-.hough l" ELN front* haveine* wtlh ihr gOvmnrnanjjrKei^cfcrrieriUeportedly ayfned

jffB9fl

II. Inh* amall Maolil PovukrLiberation Aimy (EPL) tolned the anlltruor CNC eilabliihedB Tbe EPL hai probted does ibe Iruce by tilling IU coffers with proceedi from robber-lea and eitorUoni and bvecrunmenl drive thai, wr believe, doubled IU rrurmWnuSip lo around BOO Ahbooadb the (roup waaChinese In oriental" when loranodT. it received arem iblpeaenU froendiio a*

Often lubitir'.aled rwrrM

vade, tbe young, middleclaaa,Alfaro Viwe. Carajol (AVC1 led byIU- fTcamal', until be wn killed(creel Inairomhandfuli faced Ino SCO acii-Uti and haiiructure lo funhnaims Tbe AVC haa movedampUetnd bankUs arm*be earner of four* aiiupi.-dH

The AVC already baa achieved leveeal ofoutlined In raptured document*IrHeDlarence brtievc* lu neat obiective*hidnapllie*.support fromural guerrillanidlevel AVC leaderold group membeei tbat the organization woulda new phaae of terrorist violence. Includingionovernment official. <ou pleda Hum campaign lo gainTbe tmpuiteay. government lecurltycomuhationthrfr Peruvian andable to counier thu threat,In recentices have hurl

the AVC badly. UBarag or capturing AVC leaden, raiding salend breaking up lenoriiti

If Some AVC membmserved9 euerrillai In the America Raltal*n. Their apparent objective* were Inaviieal alliance9 and acquire coanbal eipervence. Several hair died. however. ua rbih" -iih ihe tnlnmbUn military

Counlrie* VVrrh Poienflcf Iruirc/ancie/s

elhal only loo South American coun-trie*|nfs tku* category; Argentina and Uuguay.

n Arai-nfita. leektng lo eipkMI anf economic cbrhcufcy and the eapanded (reedom of actionivilian regime, two former reveetiMoa-arythe Peroedat Mooloneroa and the Peoole'i Revolutionary Armycurrently In the mldal of an Internal debate over wbriber to rem me armed atruggle or reHrkcl theinielve* to pertk-ipalion In tba Legitimate political procea Thosetoward purauing armed struggle may beby the.deterrotnatlon lb be lough on lerrorimack of public rapport (or political^

Both group* are being supported by Cuba, which has revencouraged them to cooperate in pursuing their goat* through nonviolent mean* under Ihe country'i new governmenteeting in Havana Ini.o groupa agreed ton infiltrating labor unions and political parTie* to try lo Induce them lo move Irflwirdear later the EBP oubbefy joined lb* pro-Soviet Communbt Party inForum foi Nationalhich aimed at combating "impeHaium and

Whether working Individually or In tandem, neither the ERP nor the Mooloneroa appear* Orong enough to pone any current threat to Ihe regime The ERP haa perfaam HO member* lb principal leader. EorvQuee ta MNMlafati Tbe Mceiiemeroa are believed too SO0 Mariorimary leader and founder, wai teceni-iV eitradlted (rum Brazil aridljlni-bon In Argentina

awaiting ttbsl for InrMijmHj

afwov. (he Topamaroa (lormally. ihe Uru-riavan Nataoraal UberaOoo Movrroenl) have taken advantage of lb* Inataiatloovibao government inS te begin lebuddiiag iheu dome-lc crganiaaiion. Under the new ro-snmenli grneril amneHy iwoap-am, manye

from person, while iVlrfnaltmaed la return fliini

rsllr without lear ol utitsccution In addition, ihebeaan recruiting new iwmlr" nai heldecmvenllon. Cur rentls. the TuNnurmembers In Uruguay, with mam

-ttv-rv ftifl in eiilr. ITle lerrtiui i i-

Itvided overand whenum lo siolrnee.

iliSc^fc tome Tupomarus< Hunted !mm eiilr Have beam trying to reconstitute the groupdimles-hn* ttrweture Meanwhile. Paul Sendie, the top Tupa-mam leader, hai pnWicly railed loi repudiation of

oreign debt (probably at Cuban instigation) and issuedil poverty plan In in effort lo appeal to tbe ecmomlcally disadvanlag

Countriei Without Active ftevolwlionory Movementt

The remaining countries of South America are not troubled bv insurgencies, altbough In all of them but Paraguay theregroups or ihe remnants of mch groups. These countries are reverthelesi important In the context of South American revolutionary activityeieept forare often used as staging areas and safehaverts by foreigngroups from countries such as Chile. Colombia, and

In Bolivia, leftist politicalNational Revolutionary Movement of the Left (MNRU the Movement of Ihe Revolutionary Left (MIR1 and ihe Bolivian Communist Partyhavewith leftist groups, including Insurgent groups, in other South American countries MNR1 factions have the moattensive connections Elements of the MNRL aided by some Argentine Mcnlonerca. served as enodults for Cuban aid lo radical leltlsts In Chile. The Coban-inBuenced MIR traditionally has had close tics to tbe Chileanuban- influenced rplioter group of the PCB that advocates armed rtrugglc as part of the overall revolutionary process Is reeling International recoji.it ion from other latin American Commamis! parti

he death of Cbe Cucvera7 ledyear laps* In Cuban interest and activity by Bolivia.owever. Hernan Sires Zuazo of the MNPJ was elected Ptesideni. reportedly with the help of funding Irorc Havana. Sites renewed diplomatic relationsBolivia and Cuba, although ambassadors were not exchanged. During the Sites administration, the "palace group" of presidential advisers led by Fell* RropULosi in conjunction with Interior Ministry ofB-eiab who distrusted tlie military, were reliablyu> lradre tinned in aorvnlls

warlire taclics in Cuba to protect the MNPl's Interests la and out of other. fcXtoVnc*ariety ol sources Indicates that ihe palace group may have brew connected wiih ihe "naaslicsdiscrweted in rkwniiiW> troaa which Cuban-supplied irrus had beeni Intoaptured documents kadi, cute that at leastrms shipments had been made lo taabvenive groups during thr pteevdhwyean Under current Presarlent Pat Estcniuxo. Bolivialo maintain dlploerwlk ties to Havana, hut relations are much cooler jj|

n Braill. since the return to civilian rulehere have beeo rumors Ihat violent leflwing groups willesurgence- The security forces squashed the revolutionaries of, but ihe remnantshe Revo*tri Ion*ry Movementctober (MR-eT) and the Revolutionary Cuuirnu-enst Party (PCRL reaaarfaced In the. Caoarly asonitored by ihe radltary. however, ihey appear to Significant threat, ever, ifork loarth-

3t. The milliary Irtes lo maintain security In (he Interior, but w* doubt It can fully control the country's long and porous border. Brarll borden on twowith active insurgencies (Colombia and Peru) and another two with potential Insurgencies {Argerattria and Uruguay, At least four foreign revolutionary groups have ul III ted parts of StazJl'i vast territory to support subversive activities In other countries. Brazil has been usedafe haven by Insurgents from Peru and Colombia. Uruguayan tubverslves with ties to the Tupsmaros reportedly operated an illegal armsnetwork in Brazil In. represemta-tJves of several Latin American groups and theof Nicaragua reportedly met In Porto Allegit lorevolutionary coordinator" for th*against Plrwehel J

n vfgroups are tiny and inactive, although some coordinate with and support Colombian Insurgent group* The security forces are efleetive. ando popular supporl for iratsraess-ey. The two cbndcstsne subversive groups thai couldecurity threat over the longBora (Bed Flag) and the New RevcJullorarv Cooroam-tot fhrCR>-are botherhapsoembers each) and poorly led although thev appear to be cotenstfylng their organizational efforts Bandera Rosa, the more eipeiienced of the two. Is struggling to maintain Its military apparatus, having dismantled its urban unit inh* group, which assy receive some Cuban funding, is beset bv facile

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