VI. E. CONDUCT OFFENSIVE (STRATEGIC) COUNTERINTELLIGENCE OPERATIONSOF NATIONAL SECURITY POLICY INITIATIVES
Counterintelligence operations have been discussed in the defensive context underSafeguarding National Security Information) and Thwarting Soviet Active Measures). These are major roles of counterintelligence and crucial to the attainment of, both objectives. The highest payoff, in the form of knowledgeeray agents within the government, comes from recruitments-in-place and induced defections.
while the HOISormidable threat against which one must defend, they also are targets susceptible to exploitation in furtherance of US national security policies. And, again, assets within the enemy camp are of extraordinary importance to the conduct of this category of counterintelligence operations.
1. Prioritization of Effort
The recruitment and secure handling of penetration agents in the KGB, GRU, Soviet Bloc, PRC, and Cuban intelligence and security serviceseen accorded highest priority In the national counterintelligence program. Additionally, capitalizing on advanceshe state-of-the-art, the mounting and exploitation of technical penetration operations against the Soviet, -CnSo vietecurity services are receiving comparable emphais. Ttiese priorities will pertain for the foreseeable future.
2. Strategic Operations
The general purpose of offensive operations is to exploit, confuse, and discredit the Intelligence Semites of foreign powers, particularly Soviets and their close associates in Eastern Europe and Cuba, by the application of counterintelligence and covert .action techniques. Degradation of the capaDilitles of the KGB-and cooperating services facilitates the accomplishments of US foreign policy. This is achieved by exposing hostile and deceptive activities of the several HOIS to foreign
governments and publics; by assisting foreign governments in discovering
specific hostile intelligence activity and neutralizing that activity through arrests and expulsions; by the provision of tailored information through
conceptualization, planning, and execution, the premium is on individuals with imagination, with an offensive mindset, and with the ability to think strategically and long range.
The counterintelligence community, with the CIA bearing the principal responsibility, will give priority attention to increasing the scope end effectiveness of offensive operations.
The first-ever, overall review of double agent operationsut deferred by reason_of highpr priority. The review recently conducted by OoO of military department's operations was for the limited purpose of assessing intelligence gain'against intelligence
loss from the provision of feed material. Given the weight of counterintelligence effort devoted to these operations and their potential to advance US strategic interests, there appears to be little justification for further delay of the overall review. Specifically:
The ancillary purposes of the review will oe to identifyintelligence requirements, assess the operationalUS HUHINT operations, and address the feasibility of greater usefromtary components of the government as well
This joint analytical program will be evaluated by the counterintelligence community at the end of one year to determine whether it should be Implementedontinuing basis.
Aside from being valuable sources of information, hostile intelligence officers who defect cause significant disruption of their parent
services. Thus, when recruitments-in-place cannot be achieved, inducement of. defectioniable alternative. The decisionotential defector is significantly Influenced by what hecan be convinced to accept--about the post-defection environment and his opportunitiesatisfying lifestyle.
Tne National Defector Program has been reevaluated in light of certain problems surfaced Dy the Yurchenko .case, and_improvements in the system for handling defectors have been Implemented. The handling, debriefing, and resettlement of defectors has been centralized under one senior officer within the CIA, and support services such as medical, psychiatric, and security have been better integrated within the entire process. Tne debriefing and resettlement processes will be more effectively interrelated and should provide adequately for the physical and psychological care and feeding needs of defectors. The Interagency Defector Comittee system, which concentrates on the provision of debriefing requirements and dissemination of information obtained froci the defector, required no change.
(NOTE: Any statement of actions which need to be taken to improve the defector program should be based on the NSC decision on the recommendations of the in-depth PFIA8 study on the defector program.)
_ jgngorcstalllng terrorist violence in j'The..'.g^priioary task of the counterintelligence division of_the. FBIJwhose parent ._
agency has lead responsibility forxounterterroHsmHn the United States) is-
combined with defensive surveys and awareness training, constitutes the CI
contribution to tne hardening of US targets.
Since there is no prospect for any abatement of St ate-supported terrorism, counterintelligence components must continue to pursue these activities with vigor.Original document.