c. thwart activities of foreign powers which constitute interference in
us internal affairs or are disruptive Of the cqnpxt OF us foreignpolicy
umber of foreign power's resort'to the same means, the Soviet Unionnique for the scope, diversity, and sophistication of itsthe traditional bounds of diplomacy and diplomatic and informational activities and normallyundermine the credibility of the US government at home, to discredit and disrupt US foreign policy abroad, and to drive wedges between the US and its allies and friends. The range of activU1es--under the policy direction of the International andnformation departments of the CPSU and generally under the operational irection of thenciude media manipulation, front groups, propagandal/t/ agents o' influence, and disinformation. In Soviet parlance, these are collectively described as "active measures" andajor tool of Soviet foreign policy.
Counterintelligence forcesignificant but by no meansfor countering this genre of threat. Actions to sensitizemedia, and public at home, public diplomacy and covertend counterinteiHgencc-effmts all miaulne
Heightening Domestic . .
The Administration and the Congress have done much to accumulate source material on Soviet active measures in trie United'States. Key examples are the output of the State-chaired Interagency Working Group charged withand exposing Soviet active measures worldwide; the reports generated by several congressional hearings-over the.past four years;{the J$ major FBI study on Soviet active measures in the United States? toseveral otner agency studies.
However, there has been only United dissemination of this excellent educational material in the public domain. Some reports, [including the in epth FBI study, are classified^ Monies have not been budgeted for large scale printing of the principal unclassified reports or the editing and reproduction of extracts thereof. More importantly, as with the informational field generally, no agency is specificallytherefore, none has the requisite infrastructure inkeep the American publichole abreast of the extent and Implications of this category of Soviet activity.
To increase the American public's awareness, the following needs to be
done:
Member agencies of the Active Measures Working. Group should give priority to the production of unclassified analyses. In this
connection,[the FBI should provide sanitized extracts of its annual report on "Trends and Developments in Soviet Active Measures in the UnitedUJ
State or the cognizant Congressionalfund jointly or individually large scale printing and widest possible distribution of the unclassified report on Soviet disinformation and media manipulation activities affecting the United States which5 Foreign Relations Authorization Act mandates that the Secretary of State provide to the Congress.
The Working Group should redouble its efforts, through the public affairs officers of the member agencies, to enlist PVOs/NGOs as distribution channel; for relevant materials and as spokesmen in local forums on Soviet active measures.
The FBI should continue to providetve support
informatior to the Working Group and ensure that Its security awareness briefings in the private sector include appropriate coverage of Soviet active measures. j-
Pub! ic Diplomacy
Basicio-the countering ot ioviei active measures abroad is the prompt and authoritative denial by official spokesmen of Soviet forgeries or other overtly propagated lies about the United States and, in the case of Soviet
he issuance of authoritative statements concerning real US actions or objectives. Public diplomacy, however, should be tnore-pro-active than reactive; and thus the creation of an NSC structure to support the US diplomatic missions abroad in their Interface with and impact on foreign governments, media, and publics. The aforementioned Hording Group has been the principal tool of this national-level support mechanism; and, consequently, the bulk of its activities have been focused on the provision of materials for use by diplomats, mission public affairs officers, and the US supported radio networks. Working Group members on trips to key countries have also used materials provided through this mechanism to sensitize and share information with friendly government officials, interested academics, and journalists concerned with Soviet active measures. While clearly productive, the outreach and impact of these activities have been severely limited by the same factors (materials and money) discussed above.
Based on the experience of the last few years, the following needs to
be done:
The Working Group member agencies should coomit to their sharefunds required for the long planned seminars onto be held in Western Europe and Latin America; andfrequent travel of team members to individualUSIA should increase production and
4
Considerably more attention should be given to the anticipation of likely Soviet active measures campaigns in order to "put preemptive measures in place. Success depends on Improved analyses on the part of the Intelligence Community and more Initiative on the part of the substantive interagency comrcittees.
Covert Action
The CIA complements and supplements public diplomacy initiatives through the conduct of psychological and political, actions not attributable to
s
of exposing and discrediting active measures as an instrument of Soviet ana Soviet surrogate policy. Since these are exceptional tools and best employed selectively, their contribution is dfrectly proportional to the overall effectiveness of overt public diplomacy campaigns. For the future:
Counterintelligence Role
fwithin the United States, the fbihe primary Instrumentality for Identification and tracking of domestically conducted or docnestically based active measures; for the investigations leading to exposure and discrediting, arrest or expulsion of individuals or organization* conducting these activities; and for operations to effect neutralization by other
Original document.
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