Created: 6/1/1987

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Iran and the Superpowers in the Golf



Jhtrxe orgcriiottoni parrx'tya'f) inormcorotior, ol Ihm BjfeMi

i laarateaa-iPrW lintl|ik^f,

aa aKHgiaia craaiViraiiai al aaini ai See* eed lnomi

Ta* Saaur, Chiat" for aacHacna.ol raa Ira. Th* paaatof ol Namama. DapBtraant of the Novy

'He AtMtaoi OM ol St of. tmrillaerKe. Dap on ratal olah Fort*

Ihe QVealoi olacoqira'ari. "Aorita Co'pi


ili. i' .I'mocuses on Iranian Intentions toward thrand the Soviet Union tn the Gulf over thell months toThe Ettlmate tarac not only the probable immrduiitwill take in an effort to head off the proposed US protection'hipwnf. but alao the probable Iranian itrategv tat*proeet llie tiled- Ir.clulreliie-.uvori of tha? roleact ion* In Iran's lircisaonraat does itof attemptamlo da-fend antral Iranian action* or the ultimate effect tveneaa

The Eatlmate addresses lhe ptobable reaction, of Siudi Arabia. Kuwait, and the other Gulf CasoiKration Council nates to increased US involvement in the Culf at various staces of rising teminn* Alio ataeurd ii the impact of the shipping war and the probable unpad of potential Iranian artioiu nn the free fow of oil The effect of potential superpowet action! on Ihe course of the Culf war Is alio noted !


The riiksS-Iranian military IticioVnt in the Cull have risen and will increase further when the US protection of Kuwaiti ihipt begjns. The level oi liipeipovtri activity and ptrssurr thin far in the Gulf is unlihrli lo dHrr Iran from attacksS-tag ship* or other U5 inlnrsti in the Gulf. We bchrvr Iran prefers lo persuade thcsuperpcnrriand Kuwait to back damn short ofmihtan claih Iran hicu-rlvcincemi In lhe United States and Lhe Gull aboul ei-pa tiding, superpower iiivolvemr-iit Tehran ia prepared for eon frontal ion if, in itt perception, other measures prove inadequate to force ita United States loback do* up

Iran will itit Indiscriminately ullacfc US and USSR targets bul will try to use terrorism, yjbolaae, ami military action selectively to serve its broader objectives The longer the superpowers' protective meaiuics remain in force, the more likely Iran will attempt lo increase Ihe cost. Tehran will moat likely usr lhe Wend of terrorism, diplomaticand conventioiual altacks lo have moiliaum effect on toverunvml and popular ofMiuon in the United Statci Earnpe the USSR, and ihr Culf state* Iranuuliarli lo directlyoreign warship |

Another rivajor factor In any Iranian decision to attack rae Iraqi action haul attacks atpinsl Iranian 1stnarc likely to Irlmtrr retaliatory Iranian strikes against Iraa andof ilt perceived allies. partkuUrl, Kuwait and IncludiiaiStates and the Soviel Union Iranian policy ha* beentrying, in separate the sJiippinf war In the Culf from Its landIraa So long as ban relruins from attacks on Iranian tankersuil fxparl futilities, we believe Tehranbe lets likelyclashes with oilierea in the Gulf. Tehran clearl> wouldcessation of military action in the Culfaior continue to eaportrevenues (tern which are vital tool thetivixreer hand in the Landit has theap-

Wehaltkrly So torairuic- sllaeki on Iranian ml tar-arts -ships and othertin- Culf because the Iraqiliis aspc; id tin* tur ia iwiSiilrralaV In the absence of extremely Ibmh uri-ssiirr In allied and frirrolU- via In. Iran la unlikely to willingly cede tlie inhuiilage lo Tehran in the GuMP


hi IhrIraqiowever. Iran Mirves USproicrlioii (orll shipping threaten* lit foreclose anand,mil, would challenge Iranian liettcinotiy innn will be more hostile tnwjid (he United Slates thanand mote willing lo attack US Interest-* aIn ihe CuW will. Moscow to counlcrlaiUnce the Unitedto (Mute the Stniet threat tven if Ihese efforts fail,emain the form of Iranian eflptti ir .educeand Influence in the

Tehran does not believe the United Stales will maintainio Kuwait inface of snnatnrd trrrnrist.military pressure to force Washington to buck Iranian leaders clearly indicate lhat Tehran seesdevelopments in the Cull and3 eventsbanon.view,with its Shiaforced ihe United States outTctWan intern.!American concerns aboutpossibly leadingoss of US resolve Iranian peroetXiomhavetung of victories aga,ml the United Stales ismake them bold in marling the supertxthreat Failure of theto meet cmmtfmeriU tn protect minping in the Coifa snmncanl poiilical victor, lor Iran and would almovlihr CCC Slates to further accommodate

Once US pruledive measures are Implemented, Tron is likely lo increase Its allucki on nonesemtrd Kuwaill shipping, including US-Bag vessels, and aho tu lay more mines near KuwaitII also probe for opportunltlei to attack escorted US-(lag ships. The Iranians probably believetlba. funhey suffer US retaliation-will the debate in Lhe Unitedon lhetodom af US lovnlv emcnt|

The hearjstened tensions in the Coll ard the chance of military.ear the warships increase the immediate threathem and to commercial ships. Most In the Cortununily believe Iran ts less likely tose Silkworm missiles against US oi Soviet naval vessels, at least until Tehran has exhausted other meoiurei In obtain its obrcctives. Others, while ihet agree that Silkworm attacks on US or Soviet warship, are less likely than on commercial shipping, do not lidicve then la ns perceive the Silkwormeapon of last resort

We believe terrorism and sabotage will br important instruments of Iran's polity ia the Gull The posslbiht. (hat Iran will conduct terrorise against USdiplomatic, andgrowing The moat likdi IS targetshr Culf and theast, particubrli in Kuwait and Ruhtaiii Time It jho an increased

threat to US interests elscwhere. Tehran's prrcepttmu of serious divisions in the United Slutrsuver policy in ihr Cull nuy well learl the Iranians to riskramnllr art that co-iId crystallize US opinionn expanded role in Ihr Culf Thr Iranian dc*utfoii making tnorru may abo ukr into acruuil thr rKk thatated Stat el mold irJhd nrratrt damage prrhapa In asattling Iraqi war rfloruj

Tehran will expect retaliation for military or trtrorigsuperpowernd will be able lo abanrb heavyIran probabli believe* ita ability to bear the pain of retaliationthan the US or Soviet willingness lo inflict il

Iran Ii almost cerlain toiponior Increased terrorism bydissidents axalml ihr Sunni dominated Kuwaitiis likely toarget for renewed Iranianof iis largely Sjilaon aod the prraence of the US

While Moscow Is warning against attacks, it is portraying Itirlfmore cautious and evenhaiaied super power It does this byfrom provoking ban.antingS attack on Iran,naval presence low. rafting lor an intemtional ar.rcementand cultivating rebt-nu with lhe Culf Hates Thisallow the USSfi lo bellei its political rxwitWi In lheif Iran forgoes attack* on Sonet targets.

The Sovieis would almost certainly inciease their natal capability in the Culf ii Iran attacks another Soviet vessel or if Moscow interprets attacks on US ships as indlcallnn tlial Soviel ships are likely targets If Iranian attacks on Soviet ship* continued. Moscow would likely coruidei sanctions against Iran (or rrluting to enter peace negotiationsIraq and impose an embargo on aims tules 'mm Eatfrm Earner |

Soviet shlpi would immediately respondIranian attacks, thr Soviets ate highly utitikrli to letaaatr against Iraaian teriltory if Iran attacked Soviet ships Moscownlikely lo lake any military action, other lhan incrraird alcrlnro. in responseS strike aaaiml Iran, but would move quickly tn In to gain political advantaiej

The CCC states are concerned that siir^rpower protection for Kuwaiti ships will piovoke Iran but will not provide adequatefor tlwm They are reluctant to raise the profile af their relations with thr United Stairs ami orr signaling Iran that lliey desire to ease tensions [

The CCC states' support for thr protection nature* would increase if thry were convinced nf US resolve, including Coagrmaoojl and popular support, bulwould still hesitate to grant basing rights or lo conclude mililan agieettienli with the United Statn, Adtlitauial

access Of basin* lights would be grunted nnly if llivie were siulaiued Iranian allacfct on CCC facilities or if Ironum forces appear poised for attack mi Kuwait or olhei Gulf

in the cent of stepped up Iranian thread ur an actual Iranian attack on US-Has shippingS warship, the CCC stales probably wouldtrong US resiwmr Thry wnuVl expect US nava' escofts lo defend coixuvt against Iranian allacki aad might pel vatpprove of US stnkesnn Iranian vhore targets Thry probabi) would notreemptive US strike against the Silkworm utes. even in response tn Iranian threat* lu employ lhe missiles If the Iranians were to attack shipping with Silkworms, hrntri-er. most GCC stales privately would uppiiivcurgical US strike nn the Sile but would oppose repelled ailucks on Ihe niiuilc sites oi other targets If the United Slates were lo abandon the escort/rrnugglna. project outright, there would br i< tl<of faith in Wathiiigtoii't ability to meet its

Despite the shipping war in the Gulf. Ihe vital flow of oil hai nnt been disrupted and lhe oil market remains culm. Surplus capacity and government ttocks provide the market with adequulr protraction from most cot en Hal disruptions. Limited Iranian terrorist and military attacks against Culf oil Dims, for example, probably would notasting effect on the market Many shipowners would eoallm* lo operate despur greater risk, and world surplus production rapacity couldoUlanlial war damage ta facilities. Induslrt sources report thatr more empty tankers are mushy at the entrance of the Guff waiting to be daartrred The Saaths. withf surplus capacKi, remain keyam disruption became thei alorc could replace rnnU Insi upphes ebrw here in Ihe Gulf In the wnrtl rusr. Iran could destroy unique oil processing and esport eciuipmcnl In Saudi Arabia and Kuwait lhal would lake month! ti> repair. Unrip: these cir cum ita li COS. there couldriioiis disruption In world oil supplies and an increase In prices.)

Iran has contingency plans tn close the Strait of tiormii? to oil exports, but dors not have the canaliilltj to do (his for more than nne to

two weeks.

The increasedn (lie Gulf is unlikely to alter significantly the overall course of llie (run-Iron warne or both of the superpowersoncerted effort to deny Iran thenic or military resources lu continue llie war. If faced with economic or mililary stranculatinn, ban would almost eerliiinly increase subversion in the Gulf and spomoi terrorism agaiusl countries supporting the sanctions. I-

Perception of the Superpower Threat

I. ThrS-li-nlaiimtil-fv iiidderu in Ihr viiill hate lisen ani will Inereoie when ihr Kuwaiti ship protection btmini States hcttlm tiw level of juprrpi" re activity and prc-su-ie Ihm far in ihr Gulf is unltlely lo drier Iran itemi, ships or olher I'S interest in the Cull. Since9 rceJution. Iran believe* lhal il hat been tncerssf ui in dealing with the rapcrpnviris, primarily bional approachot likely lo aller Itain ibc correnl yitualnn hi llie Gall P

t Another major factor in any Iranian derision lo attach superpowerhe CoH nlB lie Iraqi action. Iraqi attacks against Iranian lorgets in the CiiH wil] trigger retaliatory Iranian strikes against Iraq andinterests ef its perceived allies, particularly Kuwasl and Including the United States and the L'SSIS. far more rjrocrder* ihm Iraq on the con tinned to- ttf shipping in the Cull. Iran has been coniistml in Inine lo separate lb? shippingem inr againsi Iraq Soraq refrains from sustained attacks on Iranian tanker) and oil facilities.brltcc Tehran will be Im likely lo provoke clashes with other parties in the Gulf. Tehran clearly wouldre in Ihe Cull"ictory, allowing Iranontirwe vita! oiliportt and givingreer hand in ihe land war. where Tehran believes It hai the idsuniaor

ven In ihe unlikely event Iraq divides lo refrain from atlacklut Iranun ship* and nil facilities.l deckle that US end USSR protection for Kuwaiti shiDoina ecu litters important Iranian iniereilt An active super eouer police role in the Persian Culf would diminish the crrrllbilil> of Iranun threats tn use conventional mihlirv attacks in inlimittale the states of the Gulf Coonrratioii Council (GGO Such iniiwija. lien has been an Important elrmnnl in Irani (trilrgy tn restrain conretled Atab action in support n: Iraq|

* The fear lhal tbe superpowers, and not Iran, will be perceived as the effective power in theivet Iranian dcli-rnluyalion ID block superpower iiitcrven-lion In the near term. Iran lent that tupensmrrr prelection of Kuwaiti shipsr-crdrnt lhal will lead lo tlcadllr expanding superpower mter<er*inn on the side of Irtci ami its Arub allies. The superpower role thm Ifiii-ali'iu Iu {cardiac an Iranian victory over Iran and cicntually lo nrulral'arim of hegemony in Ihriityeclive pursued by Ihe clerks no lets Ihan by Ihe Shth IdnylozKot handily toward the Untied Statu and Ihe USSR reinforces Tehran's grostrateglc concerns; Ihe prospect of Ihe superpowers thwarting Iraniiu policies

eunisons] reaction

5 Tehnn's hittory of combative posluir in lie lace nf threats, it* lacem hostile rhetoric, and lite attackoviet vessel In May suggest thai Iran nil! attempt to bring an early end lo ihe superpowers' protection. Iran's obee lives are in

Force Kuwait tonoltnili-lary and Gruticial Mippotl for Irtq. and io preiime oshtr CCC slate* lo reduce their aipprat.

Iiitimiriate other Culf Holes hy demontfraling lhal Inermted saipeipovi er Involveinenl In the region rltktie Arabs Into iti eipancW conflict, makim ihem polenllal laigttt (orterrorism or mllllaiy action.

Protect inn's goal of hegemonyhe region bv showing lhal II cannot be intimidated by the iupei

inceannounced its intention lo seek US and USSR protection, stilemenls by Iranian loaders have focused oo Ihe ihreat lo mrwtial security poacil br increased eaprt power aelrvily ami tinrspontibillty for incrcatini regional Irraian. Even commenu by AscmlWy Sumlier Rafsuniani. nbokeeps Ihr deer alar lor tume iriiproventent ir" tebtinm withMuytw and Washinaton. taund like the militant tpercbrs after9 revolution.hen Iran termed to welcome isolation as proof of thr purity and Justice of its eime Tlie verbal attacks arr intrrdrd to influence US puhlie opinion and to provide thetrie hostile actions againsl ihe superpowers, as well ai fur increased pressure on Kuwait I

7 Weran prefers lo persuade the snpei-powris and Runs* lo back downilitary doth Iran ii acutely aware of concerns In lite United Stiles and In ihr Gull abnut citaiiadins! conflict and


suprrcnwrr in.nt.tvne-iil Trhnm will allvaip! in heighten Ihnr (Oiimnt with luiilt itrmucnudtin Kuwait, and attack* on unescorted shin in lhe hnpcof weakening US resolve and urovol it* Constrmrictkini on US ipvohviurnt. Il aho rope* to force Kuwaitrrantidrr ill trauesi fnr iiirjecptnicr protector bytmwim agi.iw Kuwait ond bv Iwbilnc il dirdomalirillv Iron* Ihr oilier CCC slate* on ihii issue Iranian shirt lunird

illayhip whenIn (hi to

The Incident ma* liulicalr llnl, Tor now Trhranto led ihe United Slates Uil not lo provokeronlM ion.

We UrKevc Iranian leaden arr eonfklnii theyble io deal wiih ihr increased involvement of lhe tunnocnrari in Ihr Pwlin Culf with ihr time iMtruioratt lhe* Itavc used before to deal wiih ihr CCC stttt* and with lhe Unllrd Slatr* ami France on hco: jetiplomacy, mllilaiy muscle fleinic. and terrorism and intimidation Iran will not indttenmt-nately attack US orarjrb bul willrTOrltm. Mboiasr. and eanvtnttotiil military action over thr iw-il few iiwnlhi lo w* IK hrrWcr poiilical

For nowikely to hr morr hoailr Inward Ihe UMlrd Stale* than Ihr USSR Tehran believe* IIhant- In etjiloll lha mrrrswrt Irrtttom In the Gulf to bargain with Moscowocdui vi.rr.di in the CuM If these coccutiom .re dtihed. Iran wilt become more oniaoniKic louard ihrn then. Ihr United States prebaUv will retrain ihr

protection of Kuwa.ll thipi, unlet. Mo-on liwilncanl-lyilitary presence In tl* re*lnn.|^

n our kidemenl. Iraruin leader* do nol believe Ihe UnUrd SUIes will miinliin in commitment lo riirnl altucU ui* Imn Tliewllthe Iranians more cnnitoiu in their ladieswill not titer Irani Uratwir perception lhalSlain I* wtxkinuilal Iriininumud nol be allowed In mruJ

ehrin alto ii calliiut for nesoilatlimiloeiid Uie thipians war. Iran would wrloaor an agreement llut separates Ihr shipping war from Ihr ground wur. Iran hope* such anirld derail UN Security Oiiocil rev-Jnlwxn cnlhnfeasefire nrd irmi rmbarBo.obv-iateiuperRowerhe Cell, ond end Irani allacb on Iranianrovins Iran free loar of attrition against Iraq on thr ground In tnv negotiations on aavrgation, wc believe Iron would demand, as ibr Em order ofah to Irtal attack* on ill ihippincuwaiti retraction of ihcir request (or superpower protection Iranian leaden nil! portray Iran as Ihe acr.rie.ed nlty willing lo Maoitore, their stralcei -ill be to maneuver Ihcir inlerlocutors iolo accepcini condition* Iran hat south! all atoms wiihoul lurrendrrlne snyUiinE beyond open-ended promiseseduced lemions and iat-nroied bilateral relation.

Th. Viawoieoghdod

he Irani* appear relieved and pleatednd -orld-allrolionihiflrd from Iron* attack on Ibr USS Sink to Ihr Iranian threat In lie Con* Ihc* ftdcomrrrceni US siairmrnts on ibnnrrd io end Iheand arr encnuraard by the movrmcnt of the peinuoeni mctnbrn ol the UN Security Coud* ell louard resolutioni on ihc war lhal irxfudesanctiors ogainsl lhe side failing lo end lhe fighting- Thcv probiUv arc In* sanguine over lhe prospect) of an ttffpcthe ami etitturm acairot Iranuick end lo Ihew

in thr face of wttained Iraninn tenmurn. awl diolcmatlc and military efforts io (orre li to hack down, limbo leaden and media comtnrnUry have drawn parallel*nti in Lebanon3 and etnrml devesoomer.ti In ihr Gulf In ihr Iranians'ay aod their Shu albfl (weed the withdrawal of US military form firm Lebanon, drnhnahumlli-ating defeat to the idea thai ihe Untiedbrnucli ihr projection of ill military forces, could influcner develop-wmi In lhe Middle Easiniaa* believe Ihryhance lo humiliate Ibe Lulled Stole* ogaln.|

ehe Iranians are awarehr drtitv rncet between Lrbiooo and tbe Pcrtlan Gulf: the loek rJ nbuBhln denial if Ihev aliaet VS ships. Ibetil oil lo bolh Iran and Ihe Weil,he risk of

M. If tsaehdad perceives lhat proBtci* on UN Seeii-rilv Council rrsolullon* and other orrssurr on Inn arc Ihr Iraqis are likely to resume allsckaasaiml Iranian ihinoioii ami factliiies. inchttting those on Khark Ulaml Baidtdad autwar. lo view *uch ainlrikn as one oi it* lew optlun* In prtss Iran lo end ihr war. Thr Irarm will be fearful itf accidrr-ully alUtking iu per power ships androte care rot to do riik of anMhre accinVnlal allaek rematcu.

aahdad. however. almoU cerUlisly is con-cerrcd lhal Iran will beiipfil il lh* uumpowrri' allenlinn ditlls away from llw liariiaii ihrrol beloretiii-nn-ni on lhe around wj. nr ol Irut aSeeiirll, lUiuiil rooluUoii with

Irr'll Tin' Irjiirt Lmmll-iruri* inilf Tji'ii Iran Kitti UimiIkIi llimi jdmliill'

lime mill tliuhllv ntlinnliu-.wri them a* R'lulliiluiii fur Iranian <nmiid jilini. dir

imrrnHtlnn ami fia kir|iiim itrii-iKilinittil Jlli-ntim Imniltd Ml Ikr (lull.

Tha *hreen lo Snipping

IB IIadin Jr.i .1 inri-i n n

hkrh lo tm riant ill I- iai imrnlnl Ut|ilaa m

thr Knaai tradrr outvrL

uaik dm da am lair aalvanlaar nfH

. r aaaa rial w. namm thaarh far

mar llau if ihr altarli laad ihrrri Stair* ami thr Cull al.-ul imnvvat-m

Tlu- oirlntrr'SMIimnmriril invrlnm. in Mirff tliHrrranian all

ll rVing Eutrat raittla. ft,)

IT. Therehriiil Infaliil IrjniimlK' Ciiuliianly for (itiiidiiinta* In allnrb llirm The Irntiinni itrnlulaV Iwlirvr- llnl a

link)', rvrn llnlrnl laul ur niri-nfl ur 'iiflor IS retaliationialal fnifcinr rdirr mihUn ImhiH- -ll iiirian iiniiAaunlliluff <Jlrvand inlr>aif> lla- lUui. inilnl Vatrv rai Ihr aad-atehran ntnli lhad nar* lmm:raknaaa

IK nfa* maU.rTeWan fee*. Iran aal hr land -ah a rhr-n het.rr-

aa Ln at atlarbac

i mi "Ii" Iran aaaald

oaalrhiiiMa-aaerrtain VW hrbrvr hrrn-rvri lhallLrh In ilnrar evjlalem mre rrln'al II Iran mttt liatiidiarai. ar la-hmr

ilhifct* mil al ctcwleil ilntolia

n alia am aUrtl al il>.

It TW rnk llwl Iiaa mil ar illaval Fnrmalahh- ihmi innl ll* Cianiuniilii I.. Iran a

hu llki'l) Iiitrl> nH Silkmiinii nuiml LS or Smart noriliii" llinu aaaiiixtliira, ai Iranilhrr inratnrit liavi' failed In nilnrvr Trliran'i uldxllvn and Iran hat luflnrrd aianificanl imilralinn

viiinnik' iiui-iv- lelliri utee lhat

SlButirnialiai'kiStar Snvlrt warlhimarr lea liki-lv llinu mi creiiiurf rial iliimniio. iln nnt brlirir (hr Iraniamie- Silkaorineopon nfirl nlia-vr Irun mat aril ulr lliil mmilr

U-fni- ii ii.(leti kiai'i'- I" nljllalaai mr

CO in jilditVm fi unlii! thrron hat Birralllinu if ii ih-iideil inS uariliip. II Kinkl

.Mtack imncr iithrr aircraft.

Hr naval iliip) Innikillrrr III illilr>

Omiluci micidc altaiki nuitu ainiafl or imaD

UkiIi Inailnl uilli rinlroairv

a. Ironoi

wad to ottotfc

poaol boni Ihli >eor.|

(aidinl InliCaCi allacLi (inH |inrt>

.Am* id tlimr tiplinni. ll tiicnuful. (imlil wirrrlt

Sslnp. "ilh hetiiy Imi nf life Such

Ah jllr.l urillkl Iibii- rlpis-iallv lirfllo|iiau'la

mini' uilh ihi' ctrmul rcBina- alinml crilaiuli louinii! Inch an im'alrnt airh-ar nUlennr nf traiuaii UKslnml-

mimeinpecrn'* in lha- Cull. I

Ihevy ond ihe RevoljlTonory Guard 21 Wr Ih'Ihtc llie Nmv ii Im aealuia in it*

minaal id lla* eh'titil riiuimv ami linn ii prnlaihlv leu nilliiai In iiiiliatv anahip I'hr rrlaMiUk

Iriitir nl thedrtl ami il* "irulriit


bonton Militaryndto 'M Prrsion Gut'

Ihr ImMm ihr rersu-

hill eUUlOl'ClW andri'hteaw limit HIIiniiiia nnUrolimi nl raiwahibijiiiiii

otnl imw.niLic rrcalts tin Ina the Nnvl itopinffieicnib" icee>ha- In pra-lineal li.lei

caalialiiilsIhrre dvsitmrn aiiJ tun- njkW-FniwtV Iriuffi Tin World Wa' IIintoae

clcUroycitnrrtna cruinr and njiiirerem reds*

Itms Nonrlhrloa ihfi dn imtlnniilly paiiiriiaiii In short win's lo th* Gull eivi rceeivti mintiKlnl aura

Th" liWum pvee ir*rhonir*lli irtaNe. bul tit pkirutii bi Irnjnenl btcaLbwm nl itrit

electronic wpmi niitoa. Including iW Dieroiunl

t the Setkitlrr annthtn missA? lit addihnn. Ine hastwi landiin ahlpa and three mupply rrorK )l

Vein one ol which eartles ar aimed hchMtMei.

The Innimhit oraoind boats, srare rl iwhic^ haw been wvd In nvent shiti altickt. Theic

boos lira iuSe> from be (orraiinnal icady ralessuited aalioraae mnr itlnJ boats aniKsa lo aKrrir thr ratio! heal"*

Iran's tivyrllmpten lo atticl ships These alsoienanlltic ship* Ii" ran aln ui* Ifce airfields all>a< andnhehr lot air operatic* amino *tp-

pint Iran's ItyabV. il nnt lull* ispreauniiil. aarrifltMiH I- JjiaSs. and

n ullu-JJUrll* Culf

Inn null ilneUuri midpinblrmi Ihsl IHnil thr hirer ill, imltheace missiles Inn mi Ik .IcttI tiM'ii are lupnnil llwii iheU Ur *ikI "it* i4 iimslmiiitiV iiiterahiiils'

The Urixliitiaars Craid nival lien bnvr itoimt tnurltneeliJt Ihehainftnmelei pmii rial! aid llitei*Kuiran Chain (wtml hiuli Thr aluminuman only rarer lhr nickel Ktrnadn .inif rther ttahl atml tlf Geantwilt Um Tin Oulnnm mlliplr rorket Immliri The Gtnrrl aho hit nssnv otltrr tinaJ hniu rubVei ulli ami els ilaan aiieiall llml auihl be innl Ur nnt'kli'al lacks, cil^taae. nr nUnina ooevalteeta

liaa hu lesTral Itunired mooied Ecr^ael ninesnnihlr hai Inttcai ant Union minti in ill Inventory The Kovy ami llewtaoliotisey Cnard prdnhlv hair

aod nieori egvlgmrnl tn

' conduct tnlntnt itti>il kt

Cnlinurd sluUgts ul roatpnteM will uie>cMUos ImprntSnt lis ciQahlltki iUbJuwII) Id Ihc ntir term. Inhnrlajriakird prtsuinet parlitttlutv lechnlciini fuilhrr eoalialnt Iranianraialnlitln. DrttJfeoUnni Iran ranaiiels


US sanltmetili makerjiee threil i" US ihliss. hut ihcrr libttleoidrnee thai Ihr Guard's naval forces air aHiny.roaue elrphanl" in iIh- Gulf Tile Instilotionaligation ol lhe Revoltiiitinarv Guard In recent rrirs has btuuahl Ciutd Itaces mncc- cIbcIs under lha centraliiltinriiv. Imtamril military ducipl inc. and led lo belter cnnrtli rial inn with Ihc regular armed forces Otherile rrrnu-nliltiE Ihe Increasing insiltulioftilnalIon nl ihr HrviJn lluoan Guurd. do nol entire! i' dtscounl the possibilityocal Rewstulixrury Guard cemmandcr mighl acl indeoendenth' lo altaekIS-aag 'hip, especialy at ans cnnfmnlalinn lusts up.1

Tha Tarrorin Throot

il VYi- U'lloe itholagr und Irtnciimbr InipttrUnIol Iraa's efforli In achievr ill


oblrctiw* In Ik* Culf For mw Iranian leaden tabcaaojr and ttfiDfiMr. -ill br thr

M* dealr/at -ilk Ku-aR udI a*

r-j'rl. nccettwi. lhr tVJI Treer-lien and wbi'Mr *Jfc* nw degree rf pUnJi*t tsrrarM UnjMr*atlAra-IkKi lor kuUmkbi hart, it an ii inline ihr precedent of Lebanon, pmliobh brbnn ire-oriini ind wbntacr are more IiIcti lhan military airm-ti ii- lirea! ihr resolie iA lhr Intel courstrlet.|

nn It almoil certain In spontnr Incrrnicd trr-i' and sabotagebr Sunni donilmitrdCntvinnicnt. onwiblr (ncludina Ihr asai ulna linn

of Kuwaiti omrtall or targeting of inaapiano aad all facOUmhuge tartl Mi waald laMUdaardrisihnr rtqaa* for lugataaiiietand rethma ig ifcrar iaB>parl lor Iraa) Iaho appear K> baaarvr leirorrtni mil (rairidivialoiu. dratabihta Kowail. and createlhr ovrilhrea of lhr Bovrmmrnl Thr rm-nlbombings bi' pro-Iranian Shim ha> atrr*lihiiiIbiU'i tensions, but it unlilrli lo threatenIn Ihr ihorl lertn

rill operatise is ill


IM Bahrain boouolsablr latjrtibvrfuon because cf id lararlr Shia ivipula-IMa and lhrof lha US UhaaV Few Farcem-in Shaas inart prceatbrr carnalerteaa araa-Htra ihraal ta rhc prakar'l ivmi' bast Ihrild cerate serwui srcisrat probatata hi ranductini

feiaticiii HiiJr lo rhr reietV bocnblnci in


heirrowing itfwibillli llut 'innoi sooittor lenwihiii tanS andTbe ihreathr United Slates iileaden wdl uttah the Impact lhal terroriston US public opinson kopi.ii In weakenfor USin lha Coat The moiltargets for IraiBar tartomm areie Prnlaotbe Middle Eailere -ill hr anto US anarrrsti aawkaw

Hal lire US ortir

Vcaaar af lhr Iraaaaa artsaaaivit usa L'S po>Hicv lhr rontmrrnIt* I'trwd Slates am protecting tu'Sitin blefr to reinforce Iranian boldness Assrmbli Spraler lulianitnl aad orhrr Irad-rri has* noted thr oVhitr inllrd Slain nvrrhr Culf. Tie Irunlan perceptimi ofdivtstons in lhr United Sutei onri policy in lhr Culf will help etrtIt an atitvuplirir lor tome dramaticastslntt the Untied Math In crystallite US rtiinion

roleill '

lha IMtadin trr Cslf, tldr latrixlti laipatt

icllUkt imI n lhrull

anrli ift*na aVuaii ai -aar aso m* thaStaanhr Calf Wr brtWshi lhr CI

jei.aeiBni. haa in Jm* anri VaoWilaetaniiBlehanfimade

lotnlrd irfeieix- in iron" iprrrtei ta thr Oiolier MS If-iihliia al il- Maw banaels in llelrvt vhlch Ihrs nrdll li luring lar Unilrd Rtiln nil of

Wrhrlnlrmtt l> la Lo-jIL -heir linn and illhair alrnali ittramstiaieil thel' ouUI.licoc" irons Srearitf alawaii hasnnra^ Uore lhr IH)bs te> rral wuian;leiauaa *ax beg Ala

i* ibaseba be asmoawa la

laaluai nr- "an to mot* aeoutsgli trrared laratitiea Tcrrcem eauht aitrrapl le hatrt aa AtnrrCaa.l or Cub* aelinr-arder aa take US exs-mensa ID raw.ili -re hilkd ouring a

Utnilai nwinlim ia Detrmtirr Itni. (hei eonld ahn HixIreutl'S miliiait asfmn iki'W "Ilh USLOKIot

Chilians wot Ilia lor USae local panaaw[

Thr nut oIwdui UI la rgrt In lhr Culf flilm afteril ai- the iMlllan- latihtei armtdrdUnited

Slates lit bahrain and. la aInan eitml. aad IV USS Aiacta are

curinUs In phi. iha tsaaikahr

UrdaV fanar laoatin

. .. IUI. L'l][ LIW i

nmhahh/ saght.


aVbUd lit AtSaaaratraOB* IMrSaAaaa tv rkeaaaand at aheear earl Dakatv. waHrkiran eoaf irttiaa ei Ira wan aBsaitaard Ssases mrn! dtiaeclW1 Mearlr HOODneatard mlliui fptuim-in Siudi Arabii. Uil lhriem Iran IraaUs Itrraran ti iwaah't dlhl. given enngenl saudi imirllt >

Iranian It tactic toower Rataliafion

17. In Oji (tjlgiirfi'l lunin n'l! -ipert

retaliation bs either af ibr tutartaawen lor Iranian

Bsdatary or Irriarsal mmhrU uanctU lhat

are di.Trth attrisutahlr la Iraa AHv-rafc Iranian

raea^idS lhr prabatle atps pi'iwii

reactm* tars prtfaattei ealialuralian 'hai hat

sideted ir-ii damagr milWaakin

at thet able lo akaarb ihe auaathanrnl lha United Stain or ihr fSSR wnatd be

hl-h ro inlsrl Vi'r brieve Tehiuicoatklrr

deUiiHilnr nimt-iablr la tie US strsir aaainat Libya


2K limits-ui uiii-nls uuv.alVul.ilr

abillii In manipulate esrnlihutrilperceptioniling of llnflUjii uidrvcHenemies; thot outlrd ihr Shall, fntied anthe US minors jertrnir in1 Inrkinvasion nl lOHfi anil innl thr laJll In Iranipercental"eat certain Inadneia Inheanal aV CCC Heart, aaal

Sov>o' Intacterri end CopotaSt-n

he Savtrlnal Imal rrVrti the arlitlun ol Win io>rlgi pnlm urairraid was tnranietsoar lot laimaa plaii-ii in ilir region

demonstrated lo the CCC llalfit< Soiicl ttflortt in recent yrirt lo iiKiuur and imprmc relit Ions iremi ituiilisreshoulder nevr rnourjiUlllm la cat ol thia ef-fott. ewn iu Ihe UnwH Mini terms lo be Hj-k*

ireond fought!

ngrafcri to lian lhal Maacew aW -ol briem

prcoeaats ba Uapeaird flaoa

aith Haa area* hlahreo aaer-rst in buhaeflng lian and inmaUat! ibr Sarin role ..

let the United Staieiot lieoing iuanre active nit In ihe Persian Gult.! uilhifice hat been limiled and where US Inter eft nod tniaenre have hrcn primary

he Sirriet leadership ilmoa certunlythia toane as mhy. but arvertl (aden ceo-mHi led (hetbkth the flut


H IraUri

Sonetbh led Moscow to be hen* that lean doet mionlrontaimri with tht USSR

The Soneli pmbntilt llilrak ihrs con manage

etTrnirrlv lla" public dimriilKin ol'

II auttt andpressures lo rrnii tn less proiccatiec

ecentattack ea ihe L'SS Sinkparticularly ihe increased US tnilitiry rule-love prubablt* increased tlie risks (or Mntcou hi locustriR attention on superpower1 iaialvcmeiil. Ihu

Cireliarlu-i alal iiiuiniis Oliillatili ilt lln*

Smsets are knvripritvil ilatnII id Suit's and that Ihr IttiH i< bntler plated In Improve ill pntilinrc

i . <un um' ill Inare nulitar) profile In

enhance us inuimiwacrmulrr" and loharp iviinriii .ith (hi United States

ThK mviaarl hr rttweianl true khmaid Iran anadlrd tun into an attach

soviet arxrptaacr ol Tehran! trojacst fee a

<aa< bs Urraali Foaigen SIssaatrr Vernatsav raoV

a uJk .ah hath sides and ^Moataa.deaae tn aaat aiaaVMatn Ktutautat

St. Vimcew trena rrhartaie In prea Maihdad tad

lo set ahead ol ihe Gulf (lain byto be too accornrnoflalmf tn Irtn Al the same lime, ho-evrr.has allrmrced to avoid provnktns Iran It has kept IU naval ptrsenre low. and linvirl nflieiiilv In iheir puWsc tcaninenli htv* lusinly

avoided direct ihrratt In lnn.f"

h Moscow Is unlikely to augment its naval forces in thr Culf solely in response tn an ln?icmrd US naval prrsrnee. The USSR may. however, feel cooipdhd idby deplayina inielligencc colkclion *hipi ct eombalants to mcnllor LSithni thef US Iorces in tha Cu etceeds lhal rsreetury tn -mtecl Gulf shipping, [

lie Iranian* may he minr-unl in luvir* ihe Smitts mediate Ihr Culf trapping nr. The limn slolrease-&ie In Ihr thipplnMis untccrprible crept as pnlomprrhemlve inwcr. Ilut ihey mighl iianiirumiwat in returnnter Sonet and intrrnaltonal ptattiire on Iran lo agree to negotialions Iraquld dernard innntt rlftetiir arms rmlurpi agiinsl IranN Securit) Council itailullnn iai llw air thai incluHn inst the tide refusing lo end Ihe fighting.

miclxins agair

preemptive nr in response In nn Iranian atIS UinoH. r- aliuoM certain Iuatiuritclirmi'iitran and the Iniltd Slate) fur ihr firoii-jWc lulmi-.n

Inn in lite near mm anil unJu'di even afier kbn-nsrini dieslso it in resnmst! mimari-

IsS tlrikr againstbul would

erapluilir lit iiwn rauii-fii!aiaimjibin anatU-niPt to -lit imllllt-ilc-aiiiliil in bun andlcsp

Sextets have indicated llieiried Statu inluuice nf aScvuritt Cixiitcil rt-st-hilion on the Iranar railingcasr-bir Mr-cow ha* Isren irlutl-inl.racier, to use wnelinm naalim lian il it refines toeJSC' ore. ^

There islim chance that Nknemi will cocoeialr with the United Stales lo prolril Cull dipping evenuliilaletal uittnurmeiii uoiitd lavv tome advantages for ihrSuvicts Such in arrtiigemenl would Improve the safcis nf Soviet ships tl little cost to thehe doniagc to Soviet piesligeucc-eufid Iranian itttrck would be shared br olNers. areaier lej-ittmaiy would be conferred on Ihr Soviet presence in ihe Gulf: and mil' aif made pubhth. would put (he mint (in Waihirialnii in justifyrefnsd Moscow thin fai has sharply rrmtraslrd its acliims in the Culf wilh US policy.r. and ae believe ihe Soviets oenill

I* rehietnnt In link their poljlifnl frwl.ines in Ibc Gulf


he USSR currently has Iheee minesweeper) ucrmiiioi in ui neur iht> Culf. Theseahitnlimiied comlul iflpobiliis and would have daftrcuhr detVnd-

ins aaainsl Iranian air or nasal SImm.-S. In addilOii U>

Ihe nilrei frigate ond cruiser retviillt joined Ihe Soviet Indian Ocean mmitroii. and are available lor duly in the Cull.!-

htotsrow almoil cerlainli would increase its naval capability in ihe Cull if Iran allacts another

SOvkt vessel The Sovielt wouldlyv lhal

the pohttcal benefitsow-profile nasal (Mest-iin-would be outweighed by ihe need to bcitcr piMect tlicir Gull srn'pptrn; Moscow probably -mild replace the iiiiiitiwecpcit with more capable ihii*it unlikely under any ImseraliJedrciuiitiancvS. to receive basing rigtilt from out of ihe Cull stales If Iran conllnuetl tooviet ships nfier Soviet protestsaval buildup. Moscow might puMkh endnrtr latmiom uicilna Iran and Impute nn riiibitgri on arms sales from Eastern

hile Soviet ships would resound imiueduilt-ly to Iranian attacks, the Siiviehrnlikely lo reluliatr against Iranian lerriltny Naval giinfin-againstl jirtlrile woukl sel back Smielmprint- ri-hiiinait wilh

Ir-pocl of the Iroraoei Power Snuggle

Xrrrvi-flu- pollticdmatonfrrmlalinnal approach In baisUn lewters in dealinc wilh the superpowers, cspccialls ihr I'nilnl States The dominant cnaliiiun led by Ralsamant while prepared for con) rout al ion. will try tn achieve

Iran's oblectives through measured irspnnsFs tnri will

(cusader Ihe viewsaw wanting In end Ihr war

illion mull aho I- lestinnsire In Otbers rrho

wouldonf rental ion with ihr superpowers in the Calf as llndlliw popular mJinrulitlir Icr-or foe ike repime. Amiollih1 sinide overall policy on Ibis issue andctional ditennllr-niixn. bul he will press fur attsresslir ptosecuiHUi of the -ar.

The Role ol Ihe Gvfl Stoiat

uwail lumjlH US and Sm-irl naval pioKciims in tli-let Iranian atudu on Kuwaii-bvurid aliippini MnenTli.and specihcjlls. attacks on Ihe rootiships inmereliaiil fleet Kuwaillieliri-ed lhal an increased I'S and Soviel presence in Ihe Cull mink induce Bastrdad and Tehrane down or even le altandou llie lanker war The ships lo be protected inchidr gas carriers and lance product earriersfiw tlir Eunrtean and Asian runt and.-airier) lhal eoo'kl be usedlaii shiilllr run if i

ot likely In Us tiipporl for Iran nr in rriiounce dt tleul in secure I'S and Sflvtrl protmlhui. dmnili1 iucreasliiR Iranlun pressun' Tre st>ivvriuii<-at'< dnitli semenee asuuisl several Sbsij

crnisSetntl in early lime for brxnbii-ga of oil fncililirt

and heiahinntl securily nieatarfs huie im-rtaiol leu-

liun between Shan andevykipanral Iran will Iri tn eiiihnt If lerrorlsin lails In thanae KuwaU's

pdit-iit. Imn mai I* prepared lo tuuneh air .links

ansiiist Kuwait Iranbo airtrallntl

IfMlSatdi ArtbiS prbuteh hat iirged the Lnlled

t lit CW anil run. hii cnil-mad lla Kuwaiti

rrflaaiinaand hashr Culf slates rnbtlit tsatuder miisliiiu llo- US eHori. Nimellu-less. Riyadh bun lhal lutrvastil suprriw*cr pn'seitte ssiiuUI bultftiwitatl inn id ihe regioo

aad draw ihr laudo ncn-v arse. Iran hastrieda-vtace litram Iran taaParfci oa Iranian thipa aad hu

ki.milalimrlim Ttiuwipovirr preiin-

'6 Other CCC mmihrri haver reacted eaullouilt lo Ihr Ittcreiird mn jolc i" thr regain Tla-

amallrr Call nain pri.alrl, hiWa*trlp protect Caff aad here radarard Kuwaai a* art vo ha* ihrt aar reluctant lo raar ihr profileah ih* Untied Stair*iiiad lhal US Ptotccuco ol Kuwallivoka lian and not provide tulttclent IS Drntrrlloa forn w, Ihey -oiiid look lo if*or .art raved aickpurl il roe fronted with Iranian dodf!

CuM Dale* ire

teWater,npmrr rrl.liona with Iran lian ta retina CCC feari lo persuade the Culf tlalri In rlittuute iiireiiseb pjnlit and Iraq, If Iran aereenrjiinl an isclatrd nr allaek igiiril laeillliei In Kuwait or In other CCC ttelet, <re bebrve ihrrrbe tub-GCC nad-oa caber ihan err, form* pahlk- protest. Kant af thr mahtanh weak CCC taatetr* Tbe CCC stairs hoamrr. peobebe, would irel (oilhn assurance!art Ifthev believedere likely lottack* | |

The CCC mates will waleh ckmlv for evidence Ihtl ihe Unlled Stitet continues to lupport therlcott nfdi Arab* and pr-aavl -add improvetba* were lhaterd Stale* -ere tmumiitrd lo gui-an'rein, nW tarnher would Hill brsiairr. loah profile bveel, nr I* aim rights to IS form nr entering into mihlan aireentrntl nllh ihe lulled additional access or batleaiuldnb If there -ree sustained Ir le-an attacks on CCC facthttei ar lln.cni

nr. Ijatll or rther Caff state.']

Mher-enlofranaiiihreattor an actual Iranian attack nn US -flat thinningS warship, tha CfX (taint prohuhh amid prbulelfice* CS response Thm would eipevl I'S naval rsrwlt lo defend convottat Iranian attaeki

and niaht privatelyf IS tllBWt cm Iranian

ahare targets. That,ouad mma prccaipnet US ana. aga.mi the Wl-wat utrv even Ji retponir to Iraniaii tbreatt In rrctuet ihr rnttailn ll llw Iranlam -rie to allncl > with Stlkncuim.

loi Kuwul. CCC tlainlo put the rrllngilus proteet In aU.ince or

mil Ihe iiumbr* nf laihneiace-mvlna mccha-toand They -ouU nrund, oocrae.WtUaa lo thrivercl Ihu -mdrf be trer mma ta Thei -mild -etcomr da.iom.twnduce Uachdad and Tehran In .bander. Ihr larder -a. nr to end the ctnOfet In ihe CuM Italet' ilea, lhat would decteolate te|lonal and permitIetl Stalctbandon ihr leOaa-of eredabmr, If lha Untied ha. there

beacniaralWaf laith

CCC alalia -nuld pmbaM, be rdaeved-ere lo quielly back oul nl itaKuwait -nuld recrel the lou of Vvaraaea parley il believet tlfrom tbe Sovtet pt-.ence

aitoedgr beta Iran and the CCCer-sr Omani officialTehran In mid-May, mulling in and in lite Sliait ul llormui amllai^ablrmalelrciimmunlealionallnh Fallowing llie .tail. Ih-rftcial mid lhal Wamirajton


nam ihe

. lakmgi aaam aaarmtatve


Trhmnuato Calf

he UAE. whichfrahh- Iranian ownmu-nlly, it insiovs lo milmitn Si Jtaeraltve commercial tlet lo Tehran An Iranian allaekAE rdbeld lai! fall npcnrd ihe Ermrilet nlnenbUiit to Iranian Utaet aed has tcadamtd thru irabihi. to can!rot* Iran Mama mat aba be moving toward aagr* tratinm with Ima nahaatn ta coacarawd thatlarger, Shi. populaliun and Ue rjmenee ol ihe US Vlddlr Eott Form maleeinte target for Iranian

al Iron willihe CCC itatei' atltmpU Ul

rrtlucr baWrwl liaalumElating tla pdwv ol hilfMlrlg'ng iamaucil Udalo larraaadr ibera ta daaance lhamarlrea Irms Irau Thru lovorahle

la mertaio and relueta-rcr lo eo

ttorae incrtward wmnaiaer nivolvetm-nl in Ihe Culf

lacerate Irtmt'i nraVeVntv Thr OilrhiHyincavaf IranianIraaearm lhati-iaiaaj a* foaur lhr Cut Vtb Bain to rtn* hrlam areata mf rvra rrrairiprraretmnaccmiuiiUHliiiaiti willi Iran Trliiin wiro lo lie inr ihet will oi* (ormodal tun.

OS. If lhr Uniied Slain ia perceived ai film.larcMja oa Hi prooa-ar loetal* nlII BV United Slam trinmn era-iaW-i'h Iran bal ladi Id tnatierairlhr CCC will blainr ihc Unite! Stair*lhe lianlraa trar andhe Cult italn irotablv will brlo keep their durance from lhr USU ratr leieiM aj| Iron, tod to-ah the

lha Thiaerl lo Oil Eapceti

Figure 6


SB. Droit i; lh* dupptrw aar in lhe Cull. Ihr vital How cf oil hat nol been dltiuptvd. and Ihe oil mtitlcl rrwalni calm Surptnt capacilv provide lhe iao--iri wtltitexllOB Iraat meat pa-ant nlerrorta aad ittabaarraaaaaai Col eel to- pnii*>ii woadd nottMltai rflrtt am IhrMean]

Pmln Calf


Capacity. Mar IM6




ihipnoare*coMi-im- I"tttilte wejler rri. and arald twrpaat prcd-etinn uparllt rOuU

ilntial -at faritr to lardHWtrtart thatr mnrert arr inaaaEi al bV raarancr af thr Calf aaaaat to be

ctoirtrrrd TV Saodn. -Ohf

sulplat luimciti. rrniaia letarir dlinintlon becauir ihei akuie could rrptnee miat leal tupulin

rlveulirre lit lhr Culf

ehran I. likely toetcaJilr iu niacin on tanker* in Ihr Culfati launehn vatt tied andi jeti am Irani oil ripen or> tera I- -cSdil-ce, lhr laeal of Iraaaaa attacktbe

IRfaaraecd bt ulferc Jrn-kpn-er li >ol Oil

peicev imtraarat Iraqi eiiortv at an mcraie inlo Iran could raitr thr Iranian thrrai loTHere/ntr. lhr Iranian threat la llVeli lo(rowincirain ri|inrti Iho fall bv uuimrapacltt through Turker. rioamiceilto lehttnled tn hr

ranaajotan cJ ripoththr Cuat. tuck a> rtm'ro tar Strait ef Hum awarta in ounrriwbttuv UaSi Hoftw. Iran hat developed cvmt>>ttr"'v plan

der-.iDl lhr ba- of oil from (hr Culf. Time ptana rcportrdlv call (ur thr utc al mail ar all ol Iran') naval Inrveinrlion of IH Airha aflort

lucli I" nicludr tiitenullc ullaclt on critical oil

iiutJI.tiiir. ihimiahou! tbe Culf. inch at ahata in Kuwait and Saudi Arabs, and lhr ar ol Sdh-orrn rrinarippma aa tkar Steal of Flarea-at We brIhr raadlioa of Iranaaval and aar form iniln it JrubtliJcaid acctaaphah Ihnr mnvin

lea* more-nlncopiivd lei

thecaa Iraa could deWisi umoue oil procru ina ami niairlin Saudi Arabia and Kuwait thai wouldittQittht In rrjiair. II ihli happened.

time iiira leiimeiillllur-CICii inil mppfiei

and ittn itwi uricetij

59 At'aal tuewli ihaUfci arr ret nwnin.

rver. la apart Lwar (amoi ua urt mtt ttstn A

liaiiali UN If if IB thr aurahririeai ofhe -ar cuJd rreitr rmnifh itinitaitiliie ma'hetl npo" priretal Irutl unreal it [

far the Iran-Iraq War

till Thr irtcreaied fJivrpnwcr tcor In the Culf li

itnlikflt lo ahrr llttnlGranllv ihrtnrrall iminr nf Ihe

liun-lroii war ivii'ra tine or both of llie (iiprrpowrri

ciittulKujflnuiapi I" denya' etuoomli or

miliiuii imini* I" cniillniH'r. Total US and

USSR success in piutccling tbe Kuwaiti ihrps

not SitaifJcantly change Iritis military petition Iraq will be able Idttacks on Iranian Alio wilh lest concern about Iranian irtillalion against ihippina. bul UKrtased Iraji alUcki on shipping alone are likely to banarginal eliett on banianports. Tcbian will compensate lot any iunease In lrao> attacks cm shipping alone, and for ban's diminished ability to attach Sovxt and US-Bagged ships in Ihe Culf. by increasing allocks on oihet ships serum Kuwait. Thocstill not affect ihewar.*-

Limited militaiy action bv the Unslad State* or the USSR against Iran, such as strikes against Iranian land targets including naval lacUltles ornululy toignlStant Impact cn ihr ground war. Such attacks, in fact, ire likely to stiffen Tehran's rated'* io eemtimie Ihe war ard lo punish Iraq

The addition of UNSC molulIoAs now uii.ler informal consideration would strengthen the so per-powers* hand in dealing nith Iran. Its key pnovinant provydt forlhrlnmal of forces to intematlmully recngnlted boundaries. Cc<isaltations have included djcusticeirovtskm for sanction* against the paur lhal refused lo comply. Tbe idoptlonesolution approved bv the United States and the USSR and containira sanciioea would enhance tlse prospects lor an effective nrms embargo against Iran. II would aho sigmllhat international opinion was turning decidedly against It.

ran is likely lo pursue thei deceived rd ihe economic or military resource) lo contime. Denying Iran oil revenues orotal arms embargo could severely limit Iron's ability iu fight the war and ultimately lotce ihe regime to reconsider its ruliry. bul Iran Mill would be unlikely toormal peace through negotiations Inn would huibaod iu resources with thr internum of continuing lo Sght Iraq as long at possible

ehran wculd br likely lo eitundefforts to promote terrorism arxlthe Gulf before It ucnild acceptmlbtary strangulation at ihe hands of Iraq orInn would increase hi nippnrt forKurds and probabb attack Uaghdad and Iraqiwith Scuds Iran aho would (nervateShia dissidents ill Kuwait and probablyamong Shin in other Gulfigh probability ofet supperranian economic orpcaaibly including lettottii0

he regime would derive tome bteaflu ifcountries atutcked Iranian linltorv At leatl initially, this would rally Ihr populace bthktd ihe regime aid probably make Iraniasfi urait willing lo continue tlie war al wtatevci

navigation and Ihe Tehran's war 6re In the ship-In rhe CuB than linn's ailhe USSReans of foteslali-

all :ndstale Iran hu Is ready to negoti-

endure hardships lopossible,

ron's call for negotiation* no free flow of oil Is designed to policy bau woulding war. Iran is more vulnerible Iraq became Iraqi attacks threilra Tehran probabhyrying todia dialogue on ihe skipping war as ore Ing US'USSR cooperation againsl talks an Ihe shipping war does not douhta al.mi continuing tbe wu ororniirrheiislie peace




nfordtoflai ond ot* ot ts* rociptont and ofV Ktr wiilumooeVto-MW boUp. Ad*ji1 VOO) moy bobylfeofi rViHsin Ihtlrtftporhvorhr

a Aiuilon* !ta'ttofy StotoDtpowtmtn. ol StorM

b, nt*Aqcw. lorOflWo o* lh* lwrtory of Diftfn*

Otr-trAi tfDOfilgtrO-o/ ft*K-Ht Or

t AmHiojM CMof ol *lOr! for rf-y

d Mm. Inttft^r. Navy

< MLfor Po>gttwo*w| Atf fort*

* iMplfji, ii,kfO/hvi Mm dTy ct. torDipFHWo>oJoev ol IwoBn^ofc

I tWtH- ol NJA.A-^ty

hMiol *SiKrVayfor1


DWvrtv for IrHafgom iorOfW* AgOmy

'f fr*Hn mj tWHl orHig in

ocsirityu Drotroroio o' Ml^nc*.

3 hH fi^cvrwanl il dl

nmi CjAt

foripltftft inyf rtMn Ithiihi^jW ho <ffI'i'Oif'jd 'Oliifttod tn PM--gf"<r. orol (hoo roloh It2

* Th. ML *r|*h* tout

Original document.

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