SOVIET FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE

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Soviet Foreign Military Assistance

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SOVIET FOREIGN MILITARY ASSISTANCE^

Information7 mod in ibe preperailan of Ihii Memorandum.

CONTENTS

Page

SCOPE

KEY

Evolution of Soviet Miliury Assistance in tbe

Third

Growth of the Military Assistance

Value of Military

Value of Economic

IVrsonnel Involved in Soviet Military and Economic

Function of MACs in Soviet Military Assistance

Planning and

Role of the General

How tbe Soviets Gain and Maintain a

Fostering

Stratcgems To Perpetuate tha Soviet

Problems Between Soviet MACs and Host

LDC Efforts To Limit Soviet

Military Assistance to Third World

Latin

Cuba's Unique Role in Soviet Third World

Africa. South of the

Page

The Middle East: Including the Meditenanran. the Arabian

Peninsula, and the Persian

The

Arabian PeriinwU/Persian

South

North

Asia: Around China's

North

Military Assistance Advances Soviet Foreign

Political

Hard Currency

Diffusing Western Military

Other Soviet

Soviet Military

Soviet Arming and Training of Terrorists and Revolutionary

Soviet Access to Western

International Support for Soviet

Stability of Regimes Friendly to tbe

Factors That Inhibit Growth in Soviet Miliury

"The Burden of

The Value of Economic

The Value of Military

VII Soviet Arms Sales for Hard

VIII.elopments in the Soviet Military Assistance

Program Over tbe Next Five

In tlie

Elsewhere in Latin

Pace

Africa- South of the

South

The Mediterranean, the Arabian Peninsula, and the

Persian

Soulh

North

Asia: Around China's

North

IX. Implications for the

V

SCOPE NOTE

This Memorandum assesses ihe role and significance of Soviet military assistance programs in fiuthering Moscow's foreign policy in lesser developed countriest describes the institutions and mechanisms involved, the impact on recipient countries, and the benefits and costs for the USSR. Finally, it estimates the prospects for Soviet assistance and its significance for US interests over the next five

years.

This Memorandum is the first attempt by the Intelligenceto evaluate the overall significance of Soviet military assistance in the Third World to both Communist and non-Communist LDCs. It describes the Soviet Bloc effort, including deliveries of militarythe functions of advisers, the training programs for LDC personnel in the USSR and other Warsaw Pact countries, and what these efforts have and have not brought the USSR. Where necessary, this IIM

Soviet military assistance. Ihe IIM was I

by the

Technical Considerations

versus Agreements. This IIM discusses military equipment actually delivered rather thaness useful indicator because: we have little detail on most Soviet arms agreements, major agreements are signed periodically butumber of yean to fulfill, and specific evidence is often lacking on numerous follow-on agreements. Finally, some agreements are not completely fulfilled, and thus give an inflated sense of an arms relationship.

values of arms deliveries provided in thb assessment are in current US dollars, unless otherwise noted. No inflation factor is applied. I

In this assessment Cuba, Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Mongolia, and North Korea arc considered Communist LDCs. I

KEY JUDGMENTS

The USSR's military assistance efforts lo date, and those of its partners in Eastern Europe and Cuba, have been impressive both in the amount of weapons, training, and assistance provided and in the coordination among these donor states. Their efforts pose majorfor US and Western interests, especially in Central America and southern Africa. However, thereimit to the benefits the Soviets can accrue in the more developed and independent countries of the Third World.

Highlights of Soviet efforts in the Third World include:

The USSR and Bloc countries have delivered5 billion worth of arms over the lastears.n estimated one-third of total military aid was grants, including almost all deliveries to Communist countries in the Third World; tbe remainder was sold.uarter of the arms sold was financed by credits

The Warsaw Pact has sentillion worth of economic aid in the last five years, mostly to Communist Third World countries. Almost three-quarters ofillion ato shoring up the economies of Cuba and Vietnam. The remaining quarter is sent to non-Communist Third World countries to support many objectives of Soviet foreign policy; some of it is paid back In hard currency.

Moscow's carefully coordinated military assistance programs play an important role in advancing its overall strategic goals:

Influence. Soviet efforts have helped the USSR gain significant influence not only in the Communist countries of Cuba and Vietnam, but alsoumber of Third World Marxist countries: Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, Nicaragua, and South Yemen.esult, Moscow is able to exert influence in key regions of the Third World: Southeast Asia, southern Africa, tlie Horn of Africa, and the Caribbean-

Hard Currency Earnings. Sales of anus Io Third World customers are repaid in Western currencies, oil, or other valued commodities.3 such activitieseak and accounted forercent of all Soviet exports for hard currency. Hard currency is critical to Moscow's purchase of agricultural products and advanced technological equipment.

Access to Military Facilities. The Soviets' military assistance program has helped them gain access to naval and air facilities in Libya, Syria, Angola, Ethiopia, South Yemen, and Cuba, andase in Vietnam. This access extends Soviet military presence and reach, complicates and hinders Western defense planning, and diverts some US attention from Western Europe and Japan. But the access isin Vietnam do the Sovietsull-scale base. Use of naval and air facilities in the other countries is limited to military logistics,and antisubmarine warfare (ASW) patrols. The USSR has lost its access in Egypt and Somalia.

The Soviet's military assistance policy has brought them significant gains, particularly in countries thatigid socialist orientation andignificant internal or external threat. But many other countries have managed to stay out of or to castlose Soviet embrace while continuing to receive Soviet arms. Soviet expansion and influence face limitations:

The amount of arms the Soviets deliver seems to have little relation to the amount of influence they ultimately gain. While the Soviets have sent over the last five years closeillion worth of arms to Iraq, Syria, India, Algeria, and Libya, Moscow does not exercise significant control over the foreign or domestic policies of any of these nations. Moreover, Soviet attempts to modify the policies of client states by cutting arms supplies, as in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq, have proved counterproductive.

On occasion Moscow has turned against longstandingThe Soviets have not only shifted support (as they did from Somalia to Ethiopiaut they have also been involved to varying degrees in the overthrow of governments in Afghanistan9 and South Yemenesult, some Third World countries are wary ofarge Soviet presence.

tramtng of LDC militaru personnel has often produced mixed results. In some poorer countries, mainly in Africa, Soviet military training is sometimes the only type available, is valued, and can win friends and influence people. However, the trainees often resent the political indoctrination, rigid format, and limited hands-on training that characterize Soviet military instruction. They also experience tbe racism of Soviet society.

Soviets arc reluctant to supolu advanced weapons to LOCs because they fear technological compromise to the West, are concerned that their systems will not perform credibly in tlie hands of Third World operators, and because sales of advanced weapons tend to slow modernization of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces.

Soviets have failed to protect client regimes. Over the last quarter century the Soviets have repeatedly beento project their military power against Western military forces in the Third World or even the forces of some well-armed Third World states. Western opposition has become an Increasing constraint in Soviet military relationshipsCs. The application of direct Western force in Grenada, Libya, and Chad, for example, must have dampened Soviet willingness to provide direct military backing to suchThe Soviets, however, will note the Contra controversy of67 and the effect it will have on Washington's willingness to support insurgencies in Angola and Nicaragua.

the most compelling factors thai will constrain future deliveries of Soviet military aasistance are ec<momic. The fall in energy prices and the decline of the dollar have reduced the capability of energy-exporting countries such as Libya, Algeria, and Iraq to pay hard currency for Soviet arms. Also reduced is the ability of conservative Arab states to continue subsidizing the arms purchases of states such as Syria. Beyond the decline in the price of oil, other factors constrain Soviet arms earnings: shifting needs andby independent clients and competition from the West and from Communist suppliers outside the Warsaw Pact.

To counter these factors. Moscow will search aggressively for new customers. New agreements will probably enable Moscow to prevent further decline in hard currency earnings from arms sales; however, these earnings will probably not rise significantly over the remainder of the decade, and live hard currency return to Moscow from these sales will probably remain at6ear.

The decline has raised the question of whether Moscow will be able to sustain the economic "burden ofver the last five yearseconomic assistance has totaled aboutear, and military assistance amounted toear. We believe this burden is, and will continue to be, affordable.

Outlook and Implications for the West

Corbachev has projected an image of foreign policy activism by use of increased tactical skills, better harmony between diplomacy and propaganda, and more sophistication in foreign policy. Although the Soviets remain willing to provide economic supportew clients that depend on it for their survival, the mainstay of Soviet diplomacy in the Third World is still arms transfers.

The delivery of military weapons alone has never given tbe Soviets significant leverage with most non-Marxist Third World countries, and there is nothing inexorable about growing Soviet influence and presence in the Third World. The demise of colonial regimes, economic factors, cultural antipathy to the USSR in the Arab world, national interests, concern of reigning groups for their own continuance, and tbe interplay of world politics will remain predominant influences in determining tbe policies and orientation of LDCs. Thus, it is going to be much morefor the Soviets to use their military assistance to make significant new gains in live Third World.

This does not mean that the Soviets are not going to make gains in theare. In particular, their efforts in Central America and southern Africa will prove to be extremely troublesome for the United States. They will also find customers for increased arms sales, possibly in Algeria, Jordan, or Kuwait They may gain significant influenceew reginaes, and tbey may expand their use of air and naval facilities in some countries lo which they already have access. But tbe

because of their inabiluy lo extend substantial economic aid. the increased Western support lo some insurgencies challenging Marxist regimes, their inability to project power against significant opposition, and declining hard currency earnings from armscoming up against limits to the benefits they can accrue by providing military assistance.

Moscow's difficulties in earning hard currency raise thecosts of aiding its client states and may reduce prospects for new giant aid or credits to non Communist LDCs. Gorbachev knows that the USSR cannot underwrite the ecoriomic, social, or military development of anyery few Third WorldCuba and Vietnam and now, increasingly, Nicaragua. In some countries tbe Sovietsixed economy with foreign investment from Western nations. Thus, even in states where Soviet influence is strong, the West will maintain an entree.

Soviet limitations are particularly evident in their lack ofto expand military access In return for their military assistance-Even in nations where theretrong threat to an embattled regime, the Soviets and some major clients have been, and will continue to be, wary about increasing the Soviet presence:

Moscow will wish to take no actions that would give Ihe United States an excuse lo bring ils superior air and naval power to bear In Third World settings.road scale, ihe Soviets will continue to militarily strengthen their allied regimes through measures that stop short of Soviet confrontation with the United States. Thus, even though an increased Soviet presence might be welcome in Cuba, Nicaragua, or Libya, the Soviets are unlikely lo Increase their military access in these countries.

Syria probably realizes there are limits to the protection it can eipcct from Moscow. This stems from shortcomings in the performance of Soviet weapons, Moscow's lack of willingness to directly engage US or Israeli aircraft, and suspicions that Moscow might back revolutionary groups in opposition to the current leadership.

The best prospects for Moscow's expansion of Its access will probably occur in Vietnam and southern Africa. Over the next

five years the Soviets will probably increase iheir naval and air capabilities in Vietnam. In southern Africa the Soviets could increase their periodic deployments of Bear reconnaissance aircraft to Angola. They could also sendSW aircraft to Mozambique again, but such deployments would probably be sporadic in the near term

Despite these serious limitations, the political dynamics of the Third World, particularly in the poorer countries, will continue to provide openings for the use of arms transfers in support of Soviet policy:

Revolutionary groups seeking power, leftist governmentsoff revolts, and countries confronting the West will almost always turn to the Soviets forfor the political statement such ties imply.

And the Soviets will almost always provide arms to movements and stales, particularly those on an anti-Western course, and will benefit from sustaining the movements as long as Moscow's commitment and risk are not substantial

The Soviets will attempt to maintain their markets and to remain competitive wiih Western rivals. We believe that the Soviets will provide at favorable prices orumber of advanced weapons such as,. and helicopters, and will improve the air defenses of selected countries. Because these advanced weapons and improved air defense systems will require more training, the need for Warsaw Pact and Cuban advisers in LDCs will probably increase somewhat. Libya and Angola are already expanding Soviet-supplied air defenses, and Nicaragua will probably do so In (he future. The number of Third World military personnel being trained in the USSR will also increase. In addition, the Soviets will beef up the defenses of countries that perceive active threats from across their borders.

Moscow will also continue to supply arms to countries that cannot pay in hard currency when this action could increase its influence and help destabilize states leaning toward the West Thus, Soviet military assistance will continue to pose major problems for US and Western

interests, (specially in Central America and southern Africa. Inthe Soviets also have the potential to gain in other regions if the West fails to provide significant economic and security assistance:"*

In the Philippines the Soviets may be able to make imoads.

Prospects for the Soviets would also improve in Algeria.and especially Tunisia, if any of them perceived that the United States or West European countries were unwilling lo provide vital economic or security assistance.

Insufficient Western security assistance to African countries could have adverse consequences for several US interests and policies; for example, facilities agreements with Kenya and Somalia would be at great risk, the containment of Libya in Chad, Niger, and Sudan would be damaged, and the nuuor US effort for economic policy reform by African governments wouldajor blow.

This information is

Figurecumin US 5

New and Old Estimates of

-"VahieotSoviet Anm4>di?eries, -

15

New It.iiiti:'

Tha Value of Soviel Mifitaryecalculation

dollar value of Soviet miUtiry assistance exports has recently been recalculated Community estimate* ofmilitary deliveries based on this reevaluation resultpercent increase,reviously estimated M6 billion to *T5 bUbon,26 (see figure JJ).

The new estimates also Indicate thai tbe grant portion of Soviet military aid is larger than previously thought. Estimates of tbe Soviet's hard currency earnings from aims sales, however, do not change. I

[The reeanmaK Is based on

more definitive ustcuJeenceT

| the increases arc most

jfilitsry ei ports aSecledalues; no changes have been made toor types of equipment

fa) this paper, military assUtanee data beainninc0 reflected the new caWlatiom. I

AnBoTaT

Vietnam. Cuba, Syria,

of these countries has been at war ot involved In conflict during this period, and each has received substantial imports

DISCUSSION

The Evolution of Soviet Military Assistance in the Third World

Soviet military assistancethat currently provides militaryservices, training, or direct operationaltohird World countries. The programan invaluable tool of Soviet foreign policy:

For over three decades Soviet arms delis-cries have provided the entreeoviet advisory and military presence in Third World countries. Combined with aid from Eastern Europe and Cuba, Soviet deliveries of arms and deployment of advisers to Central America, Africa, and Southeast Asia have proppedumber of Marxist-Leninist regimes, broadened Sovietreach, extended Moscow's influence, and contributed to the destabilkation of countries boroertng Soviet-oriented LDCs.

Since theoviet deliveries of arms for hard currency have been an important prop to the Soviet economy.0 hard currency arms sales amounted to0 million. Hard currency arms sales peaked atillionut declined6 billionhich was still aboutercent of all Soviet exports for hards the Soviet Union looks for ways to offset its decline In hard currencybrought on by low world oil prices, the pressure for increased Soviet military sales will Intensify and will probably resultore aggressive search for markets in the Third World.

Growth of the Military Assistance Program

number of factors spurred thegrowth of the Soviet military assistancethe lastears:

breakdown of colonial empires and the increased instability In the Third World resulting

s wnetime* difficult to appreciate the crucial rolemall amouM of hard currtaev earnings olayi in ibe SovielSo-kt bard iunency raining* reached Iheir neatest height34 withillion per rear.inute (oniiBred IuoouWriei, yel Is .ttal to themport igriculiural products and Western technology)

Valuesifiiou ue rounded to tbe neareMillion ere rounded to the nearmi million.value is given. OA and DIA taurines are the same orof tbe two was taken. When two valuta are riven. CIAesnmatcs vgrted br overercent lot major recipientsmillion) or by overercent lor minor recipient*.ar* given

Thb able

from the creation of now slates, many of which faced interna) and external enemies.

he .mrwUIingnoss.of -Western arras suppliers-to upset Third World power balances bv shipping sophisticated weapons, or to sell them on terms LDCs could aSord.

Soviet willingness to offer arms to manyat low prices and on favorable terms of payment.

The OPEC cartel, whose price escalationsseveral Thirdroducingto purchase large amounts of Soviet armsash basts.

Moscow's exploitation of the openings provided by the retrenchment of US military activity in the Third World following the Vietnam war.

ne reason for Moscow's success was tbeunder which most developing nations achieved independence. The new nations were Inclined to adopt anti-Western positions at home and abroad because of their experience with colonial rule. The USSR,uperpower, had neverlassic colonial power and was therefore not as suspect in Third World eyes. The Soviets were quick to exploit this opportunity to acquire clients, most of which, while remainingin their domestic policies, tended to become dependent on their patron for military assistance.

oviet militaryttractive to many Third World leaders because weapons are readily available at attractive prices- In addition, Soviet miliuryprovides them:

An opportunity to receive crucial weaponsrapidly iu crisis situations

An ability to assist embattled allies and Insurgencies-

An alternative to Western supplies when these are unavailable for poJitlcal or economic reasons.

In some cases, an organizational and security structure that aids them in maintaining power.

ast experience Indicates thai Soviet client states need not always continue in that status. For example, Egypt, Indonesia, andmajor recipients of Soviet militarytheir Soviet advisers and turned to more balanced foreign policies Other Soviet clients, such as Angola and Mozambique, would bo less likely lo remain so if external threats were eliminated.

.Broadly-speaking, the.id pra gram has evolved over the pastears as follows:

The Soviet program that began in theas definedrowing Soviet determination to compete with the Western powers5 the Egyptians began to purchase Soviet military hardware wilh Czechoslovakia acting for Moscow. Soviet military and some economic aid was extended to other Middle Eastern countries without many militarySoviel advisers began to be deployed in Third World countries in small numbers in theo provide training and assistance. The Soviets first deployed large numbers of military personnel to the Third World0 military advisers and combat forces were sent to Cuba to setallistic missile force. After their setback In the Cuban crisis, most of the troops were withdrawn andrigade remained. The next major Sovietof advisers was to Egypthe June war of that year resulted in heavy Egyptian military dependence on the Soviet Unionrge rapid increase in the resident Sovietpresence to0 menntil it was expelledhe Soviet Military Assistance Group (MAG) in Egypt not onlya large aid program, but also was instrumental in overseeing the deployment of Soviet air defense troops and in establishing several Soviet naval and air facilities

fa theoscow expanded Its criteria for providing assistance to Include receipt of hard currency whenever possible- This phase wasajor push by the rise in of) prices, which enabled the Soviets to increase arms sales for hard currency and to send their own advisers and those of their surrogates (Cubans and Eastto LDCs. The Soviets abo demonstrated their continued interest In exploiting newcreated in part by the cutback in arms exports by the United States and by regional conflicts. New military aid commitments toand Ethiopia were quickly consummated, and other advisory relationships that had begun In, such as those wilh Cuba and Syria, were expanded.

At the beginning of. Soviet activities began to be cliallenged by Western and Chinese

support of ni'ii n's' against Soviet-becked client regime* Soviet and Cuban performance in counter!munrencv operations has not beenimpressive

In tbehe USSeVt hard currencyand purvrsasua; power began to fall becauseprices for Soviet ra] and gas extortsweakening of the dollar, which reducedof odproducing Third World countriesarms The decline In Soviet hardcombined wtth an increased potentialaction against Sen-let clients. Is goingsignificant problems for tbe Soviets into maintain their influence in somecountries and lo improve their military accessThird World. Moscow will note, however,investigations within the United7 and the effect these wiHWashington's wiDuarness to supportAngola and

Value of MXtory Aid

he amount of military aid delivered by tbe Warsaw Pact countries over the lastean has been significanl. Together, tbey have delivered5n arms In recent yean, an estimatedof total military aid was grant aid, mduding almost all debveries to Conununist LDCs, and the remainder was sold Of the arms sold,uarter was financed by credits.hows the types of major Soviet equipment |

Value of Economic Aid

he amount of Soviet economic aidmall bul important complement to military assistance. Whereas Soviet and Warsaw Pact deliveries of military aid in the26 totaledillion, economic aid was about half,illion. Almost three-quarters of the economic aid,6ear, went to prop up the Cuban and Vietnamese economies. The remainder was sent toLDCs. Economic aid supports many objectives of Soviet foreign policy by:

Gaining access to markets for new equipment and strategic commodities.

Increasing the dependency of LDCs for follow-on support.

Earning bard currency from the sale of Soviet goods and associated technical services. In the lastears, the Soviets alone earned0 million from all non-Communist LDCs for such technical services; about half of that amount was earned by the USSR in oil-producing stales bv providing development services not necessarily related to aid projects.

Figure 4

Number of Soviel, East European, andAdvisers

Communist and Non-Communist

Placing large numbers of Soviet economicin recipient countries, sometimes inpositions

Personnel Involved in Soviet Military ond Economic Aid

o carry out Its Third World activities, Moscow actsnd often directs its East European allies and Cuba (seeince thehis cooperation has increased dramatically:

The number of military advisors from tbe USSR. Eastern Europe, and Cuba deployed to LDCs reached0 (excluding Soviet troops In Afghanistan) (seend figuren the last decade the number of Cuban military advisers has risen dramatically, as has the total Warsaw Pact and Cuban presence.

Economic technicians now numbermore than double the number of militaryfigure over four times the5 (seeast European

Ml

countries have relied more on economic tics than military assistance to sustain their relationship with LDCs. and this is reflected in the large rise in numbers of technicians abroad. Their pledges of economic aid have been designed almost solely to finance sales of equipment; these economic aid pledges exceed East European militaryby almostillion

LDC personnel receiving training in the Warsaw Pact under the economic and military aidhas increased to overtriple the numberecade ago (seeercent of these received military training. This training enables the Soviets to identify and sometimes assist the careerof pro-Soviet personnel who may ultimatc-ly assume positions of leadership. |

he Cuban role is wrticularly significant.relationship with Havana is probably the closest It has wilh any country in (he Third World. The Cubans have provided Urge numbers of combat troops for Ethiopia and Angola and, since the, a

Number of Communisl and Non-Communist bDCPersonnelSSR and Eastern

military advisory presence In Nicaragua. Al thisCubans have0 combatmilitary advisers, primarily in; andSoviet military assistance and economichave made it possible for tbe Cubans toeconomic advisers to countries in pursuitHavana's and Moscow's revolutionaryalso hosts0 trainees fromMozambique. Guinea. Naniiota, SouthGhana, and Nicaragua.

II. Tha Function of MAGs in Soviet Military Assistance Policy

ilitary advisory groups generally administer Soviet military assistance In those states where tlie programs have become fairly extensive- The discussion below will examine the unique functions of MAGs and bow they further Soviet national security objectives.

In some key states, where they see potential for greater economic ot strategic gain, ihe Soviets

Soviet Direction of Allied Moris in IPCs

nweCtingOOh-SSthared

among Bloc countries and Cuba, but fiom their conduct it Is clear that the Sovietsivinon of respoaastbthliaa. Cuban combat troops and advisers are more accet'aUr in some Third World countries than are thrae ol the USSR The East luiopeara, in coiiuaff. have assumed virtually no combat role, nor are they likely to In the Iulure In addition, we believe they do not provide any giant aid: their aasutanue is primarily for profit and for greater influence In the Third World.

In con (last, tbe Soviets probably provide litdeto Vietnam, which acts primarily in its own interest North Korea's arms sales are also probably no! coordinated with Moscow. In fact. P'yoitKyarw's sales generally compete with the Soviets I

seek toargn, widely skilled group of advisers who structure ihe clients' armed forces, oversee and support client military operations, and look after broader Soviet security interests in the client country

Id many cases the Soviet goal is to establishof sufficient alio to guaranteein some cases evenstate's armed forces, and therebysecurity

MAG* are tightly integrated Intocommand structure, not just to maintainover any Soviet presence on foreign toil,lo allow for their direct use by higherIn some LDCs ihe Soviet contingent!large the advisers have broad responsibilitiesto the point where they constitute acolony in the dient

Ptorvvng and Administration

for planning andadvisory groups lies with the Tenthof the Soviet General SUff and thefor Foreign Economic Relationstwo organizations share resrjoruibility forminasemml of advisory assistanceWorld countries Apparently, tbe Tenthdetermines policy and prepares forrllents while iheesponsible forestablished

he process thai leadsormal military assistance contract between the USSRhird World state will vary depending on ihe extent of supplies or services contracted as well as on the sense

n general, the process unfolds as follows:

Afterequest for assistanceotential clientirective from the Soviet political leadership, the Tenth Directoratea feasibility report on military assistance to the requester. which include economic andinformation as well as an assessment of the client's military status Tbe CKES providesInformation on potential financial andconsiderations of the proposed deal.

With this information, the Soviet Government, usually led by the Defense Minister, enters into discussions with representatives of theclient Any political conditions associated with granting military aid would be discussed at this time

When preliminary agreement is reached, tbe request forubmitted to the Pobtbuio for the first time Tbe Politburo passe* the agreement back to the participating agenciesirective. At this point, according to theof former Council of Ministers Chairman Alcxoy Kosytrin,tems or requests arc comidered in detail by all the agencies thai have an interest In particular:

The General Staff stipulates the effectiveness of ipcdbc hardware and advisory aid proposals for the client.

GKES provides its consideration of the specific economic costs and benefits of tbe deal for the USSR

The Military Industrial Commission provides an appraisal of the agreement's impact on Soviet defense industry capabilities.

The Mlriiatry of Foreign Trade and Cosplan assess the impact of the proposed military assistance on the internal Soviet economy

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Inter rational Department of the Central Commit le? provide an assessment of the internalimplications of the proposed agreement

iPcoiiiniendations of those agencies arelo the 1'outburo, which consideis theecond time.

formally cleared by the politicalthe proposal is presented to the client and

negotiations begin between high-level and mililary leaders of the twoAs Moscow's point men. the Ministry of Defense and the CKES hammer out tbe detailed contractual arrangements with the client

decision that emerges from these discussions is submitted to theinal time for approval; In turn. It Is submitted lo the client government for its full review and approval. Any further contractual details are subsequentlyby the Tenth Main Directorate and the CKIiS I

Role of Ihe Gantroi Stofl

functions of the Soviet GeneralMain Directorate in military assistance fallmain categories: planning, program review,Its planning reaponsibililies include:

Review of the mililary aid requirements of the client.

Preparation of military aid studies for tbe Soviet leadership (supporting both negotiations withdelegations and visits abroad by the military and political leadership)

Preparation of military aid plans as inputs Io annual and five-year economic plans, as well as inputs to annual, five-year, and longer-lermplans.

Directorate'* program responsibilitiesreview of military aid requirements ofeffectiveness of Soviet military aid programscountries, overnight of contractof equipment deliveries, andof aid-related activities of other{Intelligence, press coverage, and soDirectorate adminbten the selection andof personnel and the selection and trainingnationals In Soviet military

IS. AD indications are thai the Soviet military leadership follows the pokUcal authorities Inwhich countries are to receive military assistance-Trie military then pragmatically attempts towhatever military assistance program has been agreed upon. The military does evaluate clientin terms of their strategic Importance (foraccess tout. in general, it does not gel involved In the larger foreign policy implicationsoviet presencelient country.)

Today ihe largest Soviet military advisory groups are located in Ihe key stales of Afghanistan, Angola, Cuba, Ethiopia. Syria, and Vieoiam.The inir^rtarioO of the Soviet commitment tb theseis reflected in the number ol advisors, rank of the MAC chiefs, and supply of military equipment.for the Soviets can be high In Vietnam the Soviets have bartered substantial military assistance and an expanded MACajor military base in aimportant area In Cuba. Soviet advisers haveelationship with the Cuban military that allows them to work effectively together in several Third World countries such as Ethiopia and Angola. Finally, in Afghanistan, the Soviets dominate tbeirrmed forces even mote than they do those in Eastern Europe.

umber of countries, insti action -provided by MAGs oo tbe use and maintenance of Soviet equipment, operations planning, and counsel oninsurgency methods or restructure of ibe armedMoscow to reap benefits both overt and hidden. By working lo increase the dependence of the client armed forces on its advisers and technicians, usually In conjunction with large deliveries ofweapons, Moscow has frequently been able to deploy greater numbers of military advisers, to send other kinds of advisers (such as intelligence specialists from the KCBX and to extract other concessions as well. These include

access to air and

Communications facilities and naval facilities

Increased sales of weapons for hard currency

Use of MAGs to provide intelligence, garner allies, and read the pulse of military discontent In states where the military coup Is themethod of political change Such relations have provided tbe Soviets links to officers who might scire power in the future.

Manipulation of local politics Advisoryprovide unique access within the hlerar-chiea of dient governments.

Evaluations of Soviet and Western military hardware.

Extension of sr-rwees to insurgents amenable to

Moscow, such as the African National Coociesa and the South-West AfricaOrganization through the use of their MAGs in dient countries such as Angola

indoctrination of dient armed forces. Because of the close relationship between high level officers in the client LDCs and Soviet advisers, the Soviets can make contact withycadca^ The .Soviet MAG norrtinales. dlent'milifary officers for long-term"study (three to five years) in the USSR, and the Soviets attempt to win their allegiance during their stay by manipulating the process. | |

t times, there Is conflict within the Soviet military leadership over the extent of support of Third World clients. Conflict generally arises over:

The wisdom of providing advanced Sovietsuch as late-model Soviet aircraft, to countries whose air forces are not well trained or where thereossibility of compromise of technology. Objections such as these areovercome by the Soviet need for bard currency and the need for Third World clients such as those In the Middle East to have aircraft capable of matching aircraft provided by Ihe West to neighboring opposing countries,

Tbe military or strategic value of any dient that cannot pay for weapons versus the gains the Soviets may make In Increasing influence in any region or in gaining access to air and naval

How the Soviets Gain andoothold

hile military supply relationships between the Soviets and Third World countries have commencedariety of economic, political, and military circumstances, the development of large MACs usually has resulted from the heightened sense of military' need associated with an internal or external threat to client countries For example, tbe large MAC in Syria has been the direct outgrowth of tbe Arab-Israeli conflict. The MAC In Cuba has prospered from the perceived threat from the United State* and the MAC in Vietnam built up after the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia and the subsequent (Chinese attack oa Vietnam9 Iraq to an exception: the Soviet MAC there has not grown significantlyesult of conflict with Iran because Moscow tiled0 lo cut off arms ddiveriea to show its displeasure with Iraq for starting the war with Iran. Since the embargo was lifted, the number of Soviet advisers in Iraq isto have returned to IU pfewai level Imt lias not grown, despite large arms shipments.

Fostering Dependence

eryependent relationship develops between armed forces of the client and their Soviet

advisers, especially when the advisers are assisting with ongoing combat efforts. As Moscow responds torgee* requests for

arlviiers and technical personnel increases and the Soviet foothold typically grows. New weapons. In lum, require more training and maintenance assistance, and larger Soviet contingenU may require more developed cocnmunKabons and logistic support In most cases, the increases in MAC personnel are likely to endure even if the need for training decreases.

Stratagems To Parpatuale the Soviet Prastne*

oviet policy for arms transfers and advisory services is developed and carried out with theofoviet presence in tht client country, rather than promoting the self-reliance of the ehejittesull, no Soviet MAG has yet been voluntarily disbanded- MAG personnel seek totheir stayountry in order to position themselves to make additional gains Several major aid recipients have contended lhat the Soviets intentional ly slow ibeir training regimen and introduce more sophntu-4trd equipment from time to timeeans ofontinued large Soviet presence The USSR hat removed IB advisers when explicitly told to do so. as wa* the case with Egypt in thend with Somaliaut the Soviets prefer lo adapt their services rather than reduce tbeir advisoryFor example, despite the increasing skill of tbe Cuban military there has been no reduction in Soviet advisory strength there-1

oscow also manipulates these relations into increase its polilical penetration of (he client government The Soviets especially seek liaison In the intelligenceccess lo the host country'sorganization allows the Soviets to penetrate the client military and thus neutralizes one of the client government's check* un Soviet subversive jctivitles.

Problemi Between Soviel MAGs and Host Governments

ecause of these conflicts and Soviet strategrms there is frequently tension between supplier andThere are local issues as well. One Is (he aloofness of the Soviets, another is the chronic, often acerbic, ciitictsm of (he host country's military forces by the Soviet advisers. (Al one time or another officers in most Third World countries have reported Soviel disdain and racist attitudes) Finally, the performance of SoviH MAG personnel hat often been foundby the countries they serve. But all of this rarely affects tbe relationship if Ihe clients' arms needs are great enough and il Soviet lerms of assistance ate moie favorable lhan those given by Ihe Wcst[

LOC Efforts To Limit Sovici Penetration

many Third World countries arelo obtain Soviet arms because of iheirbetter prices or availability, few wish lo hostmilitary colony in their country unlessrtreurraUnces to do so Numerous LDCsihey can bring in Soviet military advisersibeir services lo Improve their ownbut effectively isolate the Soviet* andinfluence. Some clients. like India. Algeria,are quite successful In this effort, somefor example, the Soviets are heavily involvedplanning and policy in South Yemen.and Angola. [ |

III. Soviet Military Assistance to Third World Countries

latin America

objectives in the region are loinfluence and, in the Ions term, promotelo revolutionary change Moscow Isitself for the future by supporting Ihe regimesand Nicaragua by supplying arms, training,lo states and revolutionary movements, andinricmerRal advancesariety- ofand cultural spheres

or the near term, the Soviets will concentrate iheir efforts on Cuba and Central America Although ihe removal of the current constraints on Sandinisia expansionism would raise South American fears of Soviet influence in ihe region, most governments would abo regard such developmentsignificant setback for Washington. |

niVjan KulV In Soraet Third World Policy. Over the last quarter century the USSR-Cubanjehtlionihip. has cvqlvcd.lnio the. dpsest t^ .Soviets^hroughout the Third World. The Soviet military presence in Cuba began0 Byn addition to deploying medium-range ball otic miotics and Ugh! bom ben. the Soviet* had established four mobtle armored combat groups- Full air defenseof the island was provided byuideline sitesolled, ii not cornplelely manned, by the Soviet* Byoviet pilots manned1 Ftshbeds. which Sew air defense cover for Cuba, and Soviet air defense troops operated an air surveillance radar system without CubanAt tbat time, the Soviet Navy also nsatsttedomar-class guided-missile palro! boats and at least lour Samlet coaslal defense cruise missile site* Alter2 missile crisis, the Soviets shipped tbe missiles and bombers home and turned most of the remaining mililary equipment on Ihe island over to Cuba,

oviet MAC almost surely cabled in Cuba before2 missile crisis, it probably was relatively small and consisted ot erfficen assigned to the Ministry of Defense and service headquarters in an advisory capacity.s the Soviets withdrew manynd combat support units and turned over their equipment to Cuban replacement units, the MAC cocnplrtnrtit and activities apparentlyTbe Soviet brigade probably bas been maintained there since ihe

he Soviets- tocontingent inn the MAC:GB. CRU. and military serviceintelligence installations Soviet pilotsnd2 alrctatl lhat deploy toihe USSR to monitor US mUitary activity.values Cuban territoryase foragainst the United Stales The Sovietsthe strategic benefits discussed in section

6hen Cuban pilots were sen! to Angola and Ethiopia, Soviet pilots Bow in Cuba to maintain the operational strength of the biter's air force. The maximum Soviet conlingent probably con-sisted of appcoxunatdyilots

eliveries of new types of weapons to Cuba depend on Cuban needs and Soviet perceptions of the readiness of the United Slates lo respond toarmaments deliveries by Moscow. The USSR appears committed to strengthening Cuba's capability to defend against an air attack or possible naval .blockade, but it presumably understands that the delivery or deployment lo Cuba of weapons lhat the United States regards as offensive woulderious crisis, as it did2 and.esser eitent.0 (when the Soviets deployed barges there capable of servicing Soviet nuclear-powered submarines],

oviet militarymost cases,fluctuated, but,as amounted tobillionhas transformedinto one of the largest and bestin the ThirdBut the coats

to Moscow of its relationship with Cuba are much higher. Over the last three years the Soviets have had lo subsidize the Cuban economy with an average5 billion each year. In the future the Cubans cannot countootinued expansion of Soviet largess, especially in the economic arena. The economic costs of Soviet support to Cuba areerious concern lo Moscow, and it Is likely that Moscow will place strict or limits on this aid, pressing Havana to make much noeded Internal adjustments. Military deliveries, which generally have not been linked to

economic performance, are expectedbb andthe ptesunl modernization

. .To-dale. Moscow baa raliorsaliaed its eoorvanlc aid costs Although Cuban spending and economic piobloms have created tome friction between them, we seevidence ihat either country is backing off ftorn ils commitment to support key clients or to exploit new outiortunitie* in the Third World as tbey arise. Indeed, both Corbachev and Castro haveiheir willingness to bear tbe increasing burden of maintaining their influence In the Third World,regarding their allies in Angola, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua. Cuba and the USSR mutually benefit from their cooperation in the developing areas and still view supportovements of nationalnd consobdation of Marxist regimes in power as integral to their struggle against ihe West (autro'slarge role in world affairs aad his ability to cause problems for the United States in the Third World will continue to rest on massive levels of Soviet economic and military aid. In fact. Cuban dependence bas grown to the point that we believe Castro would be hard pressed tooviet request to tend military personnel lo an endangered pro-Soviet regime in Ihe Third World.r

It nil, and, lo date, ifierc has been no credible evidence ihat the Soviets have participated in actual combat op-rations Soviet personnel still' and Tight utility airplanes delivered to Nicaragua and!lv the helicopters after assembly. But reporting suggests that Soviet technicians have not undertaken the norma! maintenance and repair work with those aircraft beyond the warranty period (turning thii (ob over to Cuban maintenance

he Cubans, however,ignificant military assistance contingent in Nicaragua

Cuban military personnel are attached to some Nicaraguao units, and their presence is well established at training centers and support bases.

They have participated actively in combatundertaken by the Nlcaraguan units to which tbey are assigned, they are not solely performing in an advisory capacity Currently, however, their participation tn combat Is rare.

Wc believe Castro't revolutionary zeal and more aggressive pursuit of socialist "internationalist" goab will continue to be conditioned by Moscow's desire toerious confrontation with the United Stalesegion that it peripheral to vital Soviet Interests Castro has, at limes, chafed at Soviet cort-straintt on his policy options, but. in ihe final analysis, he recognizes that he hat accomplished far more In the Third World with Soviet assistance than he could have without it Civcn Cuba's deep dependence on the Sos*iet Union, we do notum Soviet-Cuban fissure over Third World issues In the near future.

icaragua. Tbe total Soviet presence inIt quite limited about SO toilitarycivilian technicians, and somearge shipments of Soviet arms fordelivered on ships from Algeria. Bulgaria,Since then, the Soviets have made directond.elivered in their own ship*majority of all military materiel

ven though the number of Soviet military personnel in country is low, their contacts with Nicara-guan counterparts could afford tbem an opportunity to influence the Saodinista military establishrnent. Soviet-Nivaraguan relations are formal. Fraternization

the end6 the Nlcaraguan Airreceived al leastelicopters, includingrssault transports anduntbips. From5ost ten of theirndor various reasons, some of these helicoptersby Cuban pilots Nicaragua will ask Moscowthe

the fallicaragua'sLeo titers haverowing contribution toeffort against anti-Sandinista insurgents Theythe government's mobifity and firepowermade it more difficult for the insurgents toand hold towns, even temporarilyproblems, command and controldifficult terrain, and bad weather will continuetheir effectiveness. If the Insurgents learnmobile SAM* effectively, Ihe helicopters'would be further reduced. The bcucorXerstall inadequate to tnect afl m'htary needs, but itSaodinista tactical flexibility. We believe

Soviet and Cuban efforts will continue lo improve Nicaraguan euuntcrimurgency capabilities. However, hdicopters and other advanced equipment will require

even icirjlrr Nicaraauan dependence on Cuban and

Soviet aid and technicians.!

oviel deliveries of military equipment have been heavy over the last four years

Only substantial Increases of Soviet deliveries ul cocr pontic aid. Including oil. have averted the collapse of the Nlcaraguan economy. Even though Moscow lus indicated that most ol its deliveries are covered by credits, cash-short Managua probably will be unable to make any substantial payments on its debts to the Bloc countrtoi, and the Soviets probably do not raped lo be repaid any time soon Warsaw Pact economic aid has grown from less0 million20 million6 Even though the Warsaw Pacthave granted new credits, they will not be sufficient to hah the decline In Nicaragua's economy Moscow's support will probably have lo continue to replace tlie reduction of aid from Western nations.1 Western multilateral and bilateral aidotal of0 million. It Is expected to decline lo less0 million by the end

Peru. Although the United Stales servedprincipal source of Army and Air Forceand training throughoutnd most ofthe military government that ruledtridently naUotudlstlc, Thirdforeign policy, which severely strainedwith the United States Relations wereby tbe US refusal to sell tanksfishier aircraft to Latin Americaseiiure of US fishing boats resultedutoff ofaidl ihe same time, Perurelations with Ihe Soviet Bloc and inIts 6rst Soviet military advisers amiof

he Soviet mihtary assisUncc program gained momentum androwing Peruvian arms dcpendeiK'e on the Soviet Union even as Peruvian-US military relations were improvingo date Peru Is the only South American country to have purchased major Soviet arms, to send its military personnel to the USSR for trainUtgince thend to have Soviet military advisers in countryhe most visible aspect of the Soviet-Peruvian relationship Is the extensive Soviet military sales and technical assistance program. Tbe Soviets have provided about half of all Peruvian military deliveries5 billion, all of the weaponry lias gone to the Army and Air Force.

o far, we believe that the Soviet assistance program has not provided Moscow with anyinfluence over decisionmaking in the Peruvian armed forces, and the current working relationship between the Soviets and the Peruvians is slrained. Soviets are often perceived as uncooperative and insensitive to Ibe Peruvian interests The Peruvians have gone to some lengths to demonstrate theirHowever, we believe severe budgettbe relatively low cost of Soviet arms, the lack of alternative sources for snore parts, and highlyfinancing terms will continue lo make Soviet weaponry attractive to the Peruvian military.^

ip Troop corriar hafccoplert oi the Peruvian Afrko. South of tne Sohoro

In this region the Soviets and the Cubans are facing some of their greatest challenges At the same time they have an opportunity to exploit and. in some rases, generate instability in tlie region; to foster Marxist regimes; to gain greater access to commodities for internal consumption or for barter for hardand, potentially, to deny or cause disruptions of the deliveries of strategic materials to the West, fn the. the Soviets focused on Guinea. Mali, and Somalia. Over the last decade they have concentrated on Angola. Mozambsque. and Ethiopia

The Cuban role in Sub-Saharan Africa gives Soviet armsew dimension Africa has given Castio tlie opportunity t0 become an importantactorlobal scale5 the Cuban presence there has grown rapidly and includes0 military and civilian personnel The presence of Cuban combat troops in Sub-Saharan AfricaCuba with opportunities lo exert influence on the Internal politics of the host countries andilitary presence on the continent, limited numbers of which could be moved to other countries that might request assistance Cuban intelligence and security advisers sutloned in numerous African countriesHavana with prime sources of Information and influence. | |

Angola. From the time of Angola'sin52 ihe size of the Soviel MAC grewen Over the last three years, it

Air Forca sit in Atghr-reody positioneruvian oWfieia^|

has cipanded further toen Tbeassistedast Germans and amilitary contingent (including sometroops) thai lacks the Angolan Army,bases, provides essential support services, pilolsand frees an equivalent number offor Held operations.

The role of Angola's key backers has grown sincehen tbe National Union foi the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) took the town of Cangambaajor defeat for Luanda that shocked tbe ruling Popular Movement for theof Angola (MPLA) leadership. UNITA. advances challenged Moscow's aedibililv as an ally and military patronesult, the MPLA requested more Com munisl mililary assistance. Soviet arms deliveries lo Angola then rose sharply. Since then deliveries have includedlogger andiller flghler-bombert (aa well as additionalishbed fight en andind attackubstantial quantities of antiaircraft and SAM equipment, and Urge numbers of tanks, armored personnel carriers, and attihVry pieces2oviet dVJiv-eries amounted toilisoa|

Functions performed by the Soviet MAC through tbenclude:

Planning, coordinating, and supervising theof all Soviet military advisers, technicians, ami air transport assets in country.

facilities lo advance ihc Soviel contrlhu-lion lo the (raining of insurgents seeking to gain

. power In. Namibia and South Africa.

testing ground for the Cubans on newsystems prior to their introductionI

Hard currency for arms deliveries. Until the drop in oil prices. Angola paid Cuba and the Warsaw Pact countries aboutear in hard currency for aims, training assistance,combat forces, and otherrastic cut in Angolan earnings hasoratorium on Angolan payments for arms lo the Soviets.

the Angolan Ministry of Defense,and maintaining the operational readiness of Angolan military operations and training.

Assembling, testing, and maintaining equipment too complex for the Angolans or for which they have not yet been adequately (rained. T

ey role In setting up the Angolan air defense system, which incorporates radars,suiface-to-air missiles, and late-model fighter alicralt

Probably monitoring the training of AfricanCongress (ANC) and South-West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO) insurgents in Angola.] I

oviet and Cuban support for tbe MAC has provided Moscow with Important benefits

A foothold in southern Africa and access Io Angolan ports for Soviet naval vessels, naval repair ships and replenishment facilities, and to airfields for limited employments of Soviet long-range reconnaissance aircraft for patroLs over the South Atlantic Ocean

An opportunity to educate Large numbers of Angolan youth and to indoctrinate those lodged amenable to ideological commitments

The Soviet position in Angola Is strengthened by the almost total reliance on Soviet-supplied weaponry and by the Cuban garrison, without which theregime fears it would fall lo Ihe UNITAIt is difficult lo assess whether the Soviet and Cuban roles in Angola are so pervasive that they couldurn to the West on the part of the Angolan leadership. The leadership itself seems lo believe that If it would hazardurn, the Soviets and Cubans would Immediately pull out, leadingNITA victory.'

MoMitiourur. Tbe Soviets began supporting the Front for the libera tioo of Moxambique (FRE-LIMO) insurgents against the Portuguese In the. Upon coming to powerKELIMO began to transform Itselfarxist-oriented bodyarxist-Leninist vanguard party on the Soviet model. The Soviets extended substantial militaryandAC bynd the East Germans formed and trained the Indigenous internal security service Tbe Soviets provide/and political advisers to help form and run tbe government Moxambiqueriendship and Cooperation Treaty with the USSR within two years after independence and abo has treaties of cooperation with East European

Soviet advisers are assigned to principal officers of the Armed Forces General Staff, the military commanders of each of theozambkan provinces, the nine ground force brigades, air force/air defense units, and the major military training centers. Tbe largestf Soviet advisers/spcclalists isassigned to ground force brigades.

24

Jrei

hengaged,umber of activitie*country lb main duties arc to

Supervise, organizea Mozambique's militarylong Soviet lines.

Plan combat operations against thend monitor tbe performance of government forces and the course of war

Arrange the assembly, turnover, andof Soviet military equipment provided to the government

Arrange for selection of qualified local personnel to be sent lo the USSR fot training.

Administer and fly Soviet transport aircraft for intra-Mozamblcan shuttle flights.1

Although Ihe late President MacheJ signed Ihe Nkomali Accord with South Africa in4 in an efiorl to weaken the RENAMO oppositionNational Resistance) and lo expand lien to the West,ittle likelihood lhat Mozambique will soon be able to reduce its military dependence on the Sovieis. RENAMO corrrinue* loerious threai to the regime, and Mozambique must rely on the Kremlin's military assistance. Although the Sovieis were stunned by MacheJ's signing of an accord wiih Soulh Africa, they continued military assistance, wtlh no apparent reduction in cither the roles orof the

Although tho Soviets have providedillion worth of arms7 and have deployedilitary advisers of their own. tbeir position in the country weakened soroewbat Afterears of socialism, further underrruned by the growingMozambique's economic crisis has reached nearly unmanageable proportions; Industry hasand export earnings have fallen0ears long as the iizsurstencv continues, the economic and political ratuatton In Mozambique will remain precarious. Q

The new leadership probably views tbewith Moscow as essential, being based on Sovietto provide anas, lo train andLuge numbers of Mozambicans, to furnishnd communication services, and toodest amount of economic aid Bul Mozambiquerecognizes that total reliance on Sovietmpossible because Mozambican problems are loo formidable and the Soviet responaet iriadequate Ma-chel'f successor, President China no. bas soughtiddleaccommodation with Soulheconomic aid from ihe West, and militaryfrom other African states, while stillilitary rebtjonship with Mosonw.|' |

The modest Soviet econrarriic aid has had littlei on reversing the economic slide, and Soviet weapons and tactical advice are largely Inappropriate to Ihe guerrilla war being waged in the countrysidc-N'ocictbeiess. the Soviets havelow of arms to Mozambique and preached tbe standard ntnaage on "South African and Western potential forn5 the Sovietsair ofSW aircraft to Maputo These aircraft Bow no operational sorties from Mozambique, andday deployment ofas not been

Moscow's expectations over tbe near term are probably modest The Soviets are counting oncontinuing need for Soviet military assistance to maintain Iheir position, although the level ofassistance has fallenRELIMO's search for alternative sources of military support has yielded Utile so far. Certainly, the small training program granted by the United Kingdom, Ihe modest offers of Portugal and France, and the important but still small contribution ofroops from Zimbabwe do not add upiable alternative lo Soviet arms, advisers, and training programs. In the current difficult situation mililaryssentia!

imbabwe. Until recently Harare's relations with Moscow bad been proper but restrained. Prime Minister Mugabe's suspicion* of Soviel Intention* in southern Africa, and Moscow's dose Ue*ival nationalui party during the war for Zimbabwean independence actedarrier to improvingZimbabwean-Soviet relations have improved, howevei. as the Sovieis have cut their tics to the oppoiition and as Mozambique's security situation haspite Mugabe's wariness cf Ihe USSR, hb commitment to keeping the railway, road, andopen through Mozambique (the Beira Corridor) and hb growing fears of throab from South Africa and RENAMO guerrillas In Mozambique have prompted him lo seek Soviet military aaslatanoe. In latehigh-level delegation went to Moscow to negotiate an arms purchase for Zimbabwean force* nghtim; inMirgents in Mozambiqueoair defenses Recent reporting indicates that nestolialtons have been difficult, with the Soviets apparently unwilling to offer Zimbabwe concessionaryimbabwe has also been considering purchases of Western arms, f

Soviet Miitory Awilonca to 'he African Nalionul Congress

poller toward South Africa meshes withof other toutbern African states whoieare generally sympathetic lo the AfricanCongresshe moil prominent of theattempting to oveithruw (he Southortion of the Soviet

military assistance to aome of those stale* isthe arming and training of the ANCoften retaliate* against itt iseiglibart forto die ANC,erceived need**lf-defense and military assistance; this Uthe Soviets can exploit

The Soviets probably calculate that tbe ANC will be the principal vehicle for change in South Africa and view the South African Communal Partyptotesr of the Soviet Cornraunut Party, which fundi ami guidesa Rood mean* for influencing the ANC Despiteoscow has treated the ANC as Its "natural ally" in the region, deservingunc la I. polilical, and military lupport However, the Soviets suspect that the ANC leadenhip is ideologically unreli-

Soviet support to the ANC is across tbe board and through multiple channels and seem* designed both to enhance the influence of the SACP within the ANC and to maintain Soviet influencethe broader ANC leadership The Soviet Bloc provides much of the military aaautance received by the ANC mainly small anas, landmines, and other traurganeyut ks much Sen gcoDom regarding inuunililarv aid In both cases, we cannot estimate specific dollar amounts of this animnoe. V

Mali. The Soviet military presence in Mali has turnedarriage of inconvenience for ib hosts. It began Innd peaked in tbe mid-I'/Tik2 someillion worth of arms has beenby Ihe USSR. Aboutoviet military advisers assisted by civilian technicians have been Involved in constructing and maintaining airfields. These fields could improve Soviet airlift capabilities, via Mali and Algeria, to western and southern Africa. Recent Soviet construction has lengthened alislrlpa in the countryenough to accommodate Urge, high-performance aircraft Mali use* (be airfields to maintain its own air communicattorus. P

he Maligna complain thai, although apart of their military assistance is paid forgold production, the Soviets do nottechnicians oo tbe repair andfor tbe missiles and aircraft tbeyThis makes the Marians unnecessarilyupon Ihe Soviets and it costs the Maliansextra hard currency.

Although Mali has ei pressed an Interest In acquiring Western arms, the expense probably makes any significant acquisitions unlikely for tbefuture. Soviet interest in access to Malian airfields for contingency purposes makes it probable thatwill try to provide aid at terms very favorable to Mali. Mali will continue to rely on Soviet militaiy assistance, but the government remains nispicious of Soviet intentions In Mall and in West Africa as a

Guinea. In the heyday of Soviet Cuineaninbe Soviets enjoyed significant access for their ships to Guinea's ports, and Bearaircraft persodicaDy deployed to airfields there lo return the Sovietsubstantial amount of military aid. developed bauxite mines within the country, and greatly enUtged lite fishing industry.

orien i

ihe Soviet MAG was expelled dom Somalia inhen the USSH refuted to support Motadiihu io in war with Ethiopia, n* rote therelaasir case history of the evolution of Soviet mifcury asaattirar*hird World country9oviet military admen played an important role, and in tliat period the Soviet MAG apparently operated ia Somalia with little or no control or interference from the Soviet Embassy, r I

The authority of the Somali Government over the MAC was abo minimal Soviet advisers could ceanc aad fjo at tbry wished beeausr neither passports or vim were required. These immigration mechanRrru might hue tiorn useless in any event because MAC personnel were said lo arrive on Soviet aircraft at the Soviet part of the international airport al Mogadishu EvenStad wa> said to be unaware of ho* many Soviet adviscri were in Somalia The MAG continued to opeeaieucrainng degree of autonomy even after tbe months ol Iranian that led up to the beginning of7 Ogaderi warf^

Theoviet advisers in Somalia helpeil tupport Soviet naval and air operattoni from faaliilrt there The USSH constructed several (acititks in SomaUa. inchadim some in Bcrbera to tupport the Indian Ocean Squadron These consistedfaWk storage and KindlingOL storage depot, an aiibate capable of accommodating all type* ol aircraft,ival communication* facility. The Sovieti staged

ay ASW aircraft from the aiifield atTU-W5ircraft once vluled an

Durirut the time of thereeminence. Sornalia was abocat completely dependeiu oo the Soviet Union for spare parts. iiaUilnj, and periodic rnairttrrtance of virtually the enttre inveotory of Somali military equip-caent In addition, Soviet advisers provided training at schoob in the USSR and within Somali units.

During their May in Somalia, there wa* onlycontact between Soviet miUlary personnelSomali counterparts Contact was inhibited bythai the MAC personnel lived In [acilit mthe general populataXL The Sovietised private cart andortionublic beachsolely foi them, and soeiillied with each otherlike tin "Human Club" locatedho lack of Ira ternira tion and theattitude had engendered Somalitorgiee lhat Soviet nattonab bad togroups at night fer fear of attack,

The eipubaon ef the Soviets7 contributed to Soman*efeat by Ethiopia- The ad rum bad been on important element of the Somali logistic andml em. and their removal hampered Somali military operation* In addition, Soviet advisers had provided tecure communication! 'or the entire Somali military '

Soviets appear confident that Conakry's turn to the West will not jeopard ite their Importantaccess to facilities, landing rights for Soviet mililary air transport (VTA) flights, andimports of Guinea's bauxite and fish. The Soviet-run bauxite mine pays for nearly half of6 million debt to the USSR and supplies one-eighth of Soviet bauxite needs. In view of4 collapse of Ihe bauxite Industry. Guinea is no doubt happy io have the USSRarket for its production. Moscow recently provided Guinea with Its largest economic creditsmillionassuage some of Conakry's previous complaints on the lack of Soviet assistance! |

/he overthrow of Emperor llaile Selassie by Ihe mililaryhe subsequentof once-strong US-Ethiopian relations, and the Soviet shift of priorities in the region led to the Soviet movement in Ethiopia The Soviets turned down the first Ethiopian requests for arms5 because of uncertain!ies over the staying power of tlie military councilear of upsetting their longstanding patronage of neighboring Somalia. But by the end6 the Soviet* were convinced that Ethiopia was loo attractive an opportunity to pas*mall initial arms deal was followeduccession of others, marking the principal avenue of entree for the Soviets. The Soviets began to send military advisers to Ethiopia7 even before they were expelled from Somalia. Mcnglstu'i purges of his more moderate colleagues in the ruling council, and the elimination of civilian opponents in the Red Terrorstablished Mcngutu at the sole leader of the country and gave further impetus to the movement toward Marxism Ethiopia Is now one of the USSR's stauncltnl Third World ]

he Soviets provided arms to Ethiopiand ibe invasion by Somalia in that year led to urgent Ethiopian requests for more arms from the USSR. Tbe Soviets responded with air and sea lifts and arranged with Castro for the dispatch of Cuban combat forces lo.Ethiopia. Massive arms deliveries and ihe Infusion

ol Soviel military advisers nnd Cuban troops turned back the Somalia. [ |

oviet miliury adviarn assist in planning major Ethiopian mdilary operations against Kritrean and Tigrean irisurgents In the north. Ethiopian miliury leaders frequently criliciie or sometimes ignoreadvice.esser eatent the Soviets arc involved in an advisory role al the major headquarters in the Ogaden. Soviet MAC personnel almost certainlyclosely with tbe Cuban mechanired brigade in the country and provide the infrastructure thatthe Cubans to remain there The effectiveness of Joint Soviet-Cuban effort was amply demonstrated duringgaden war. Byoviet and Cuban advisers were eUcetlvely in control of Ethiopian strategic andlanning during the climactic stages of tbe war; Cuban combat units were the key lo victory, and Soviet advisers accompanied units on combat missions. [

In Eritrea8 Soviet adviserstactical, and logistic operations. SovietIn dally combat operations wasreduced following the Ogaden war8 campaign against guerrillas inSoviet advisers continued to accompanyunits Into combat until the spring ofalthough Ethiopians appear lo be Inof their units fighting theeturn lo close Soviet controldiscounteduture

hile the number of Soviet military advisers in Ethiopia has Increased moderately since the, ol is traditional in the expansion of Soviet activities, the number of Cubans has been significantly reduced

fter Soviet and Cuban efforts had helped Mengistu repulse the invasion fromthereoviet military advisers In Ethiopia, as well as00 Cubans (Including combat troops);

By ihe, the number of Soviet military advisers had grown to atnd the number of East German military, but the number of Cuban troops and military advisors bad been reduced lohis change has resulted from theof the ihr rat from Somalia, the need for an increased Cuban military presence in Angola, and Cuban unwillingness to net involved in fightingorthern insurgent!.

to

thiopia's relationship with the USSB is based In partontinuing strong need for Soviet arms. Soviet deliveries of military equipment averaged over WOOearut dropped off significantly in

The sharp drop may reflect the large amounts of equipment sent In previous years. Ethiopia has the Largest military force In the region, but II aboarge military debt withbillion.

he Soviets have put considerable effort into their patronage of Ethiopia and undoubtedly believe they get Important benefit* extended military reach, consolidation of their influence in the country, and the undermining of US strategic policies in the region:

Tbe Soviets have acquired virtually free access to Dehalak Dcset (Dahlak Island) off the Bed Sea coast of Ethiopia. This helped offset the loss of Soviet naval facilities In Somaliaahlak.mall luiiport facility, is strategically located al the mouth of the Hed Sea and is useful to the Soviets for repairing ships and submarines of their Indian Ocean Squadron

Timare attempting lo consolidatein AddU Ababa and lo foster close tiei between Ibe reel nut and Moscow They are countingontinuing Ethiopian rieed for large-scale military aid to afford tbe time required to indoctrinate Ethiopian cadres and establish the basisanguard workers party.thiopian youths are undergoing technical, academic, and poubcal training in the USSR, andre in Eastern Europe andhe Soviets expect thatnumber of these trainee* will be more ideologically attuned to Soviet alms and interests, and will move into official positions in Ethiopia

The USSR is using its influence in Ethiopia to attempt to undermine perceived US strategic policies in Ihe Horn of Africa area. The Sovieis arc counting on projecting an image of nalron reliability, military force, ami permanentin Ethiopia in order lo intimidate US allies in the region or to persuade them that Sovietcarries greater advantage) than Is patronage This policy has yet loesounding success, but Somalia, where Ihe United States has access to military facilities, ts seeking betterand some tangible aid from the USSR- The post-Nimeiri government in Sudan, where the United States has pre-poationedxploring closer relations with ibe Soviets|

rom Chairman Meraglttu's point of view,with theridbpensable.upon the flow of Soviet arms toon the insurgencies In Eritrea and Tigraydissuade the Somabs from another Ogadenpaucity of Soviet economic aid has not affectedwith tho USSR. Minor aid deliveriescountries are well publicized, but theof the West Is rarely ackisowledgedhas used famine for lib own poubcalHe diverted some food from ils intendedto feed the urban populace and thedistribution to arras controlled byforcibly removed many northern Ethiopiansfood distribution centers to remotein the west and south of the country f

lthough the Soviets are determined totheir foothold In Ethiopia,hallcnclna undertaking

irrsureency In Eritrea and Tigray continues, and Addis Aluba shows no sign of ultimately winning.

However, many Ifhlormri ituttrcrtt liave directed to Werlem Europe altri completing imoini in eawerr. hurorw awl the ussh

The feeding of the population has depended on Western largess over the pest two years.

The cost of supporting the Ethiopian economy continues to rise, and Moscow- lias had to stive the country oil subsidies and cted

To help run the government the Soviets also maintainivilian technicians in Ethiopia, with some at the highest levels of the economic establbhment. In an attempt to exercise directover economic decision making. Yet Ethiopia's economy continues to deteriorate. Moscow has refused to join international efforts to assist Ethiopia's millions of starving refugees and has even demanded hard currency payments for Soviet technicians transporting Western donations to refugee camps, although the USSR dbtributes Western-supplied food withinin its trucks and aircraft

Over the years there have been instances of disharmony in the Soviet-Ethiopian relationship over issues such as the party, strategy in the insurgency, economic aid, and policy toward South Yemen. The cultural and personal clashes between Ethiopians and Soviets, especially in the military, and theill-mannered behavior of the Soviets toward Ethiopians have marred but not seriously threatened their relationship. With the emergence of Mengistu as the autocratic ruler of Ethiopia, the only Ethiopian attitude that really counts is

Madagascar. Thishe largest, most populous, and most strategically located of theIndian Ocean island states. Soviet military assistance began there Innd tbe Soviets have since sold, donated, or leasedighter aircraft and ground force equipment Byhe number of Sovietand technicians accompanying these items had risen to an. Since then, their number has been reduced toalagasy decision toore nonaligned posture. After moreecade in power the often unpredictable Malagasy President, Didier Ratsiraka. has become accommodating to the West out of sheer economic necesslly rather lhan any fundamental change in ideology. Madagascar's need for financial aid thus provides the West opportunities to counter Soviet influence in the region.

'bo helped aibtidw ethiopia tripoli

-ii-lli-.'ii oi cuh mlftidinj-livrrni

aid. these tubodies stopped4

and wui probably nol be rcanned unless oil price! rise tubstanuallr

ruchrllet. The Seychelles aichipcltigotarget ol Soviet interest soon after II6 President Bene came to poweras the resultoup, and since then iheexperienced several coup scares, ain which Soulh Africans were involved, andarmy mutinyZ The Soviets havesupmled Rene- Soviet military8 and totaledby the endaking Moscow Rene'sof arms In addition, the Soviel Navy has madeol purl calls to Victoria al Rene'sduring times when lie was out oland fearful of attempts lo depose him.for this support, Rene has permitted SovietAeaoflot aircraft to use Seychelles as aon fiighh lo southern Africa. Sovietalso restoredon capacity oilat Victoria Although use of these tanks byvessel* has not been confirmed, theybe available in an emergency.

The Middle Eosti Including the Mediterranean, Ihe Arabian Ptninvola, and tho Persian Gulf.

he Gorbachev regime is understandablywith the lack of impact USSR policies have bad in the Middle East However, the specific policy lines being followed under Gorbachev have been in place foi some years: preservation of the USSR'* key relationship wilh Syria, support of most objectives of the PI.O, tlie effort lo improve relations withAtab governments, and support lot anconfeience on ihc Arab-Israeli dispute In the Gulf region the Soviets maintain relations with Iraq while seeking to develop openings to Iran Finally, Moscow is experimenting with preliminary move* towardrelations with Israel, recognizing thatwith both tbe Arab stales and Israel are necessary forentral political role in (he region

The. Mediterranean. Although ihe Soviets have been active in the region since thend have delivered more military aid to countries lln-ie and In (he Red Sea and Persian Gulf than lo all other regions combined, there Is no country in tho area lhal llie Soviets can claimeliable ally. Islam, the oil wealihumber ol these countries, theirfor Western goods, and historical ties to tbe West have.umber of cases, worked against the Soviet efforts to translate (heir military assistanceermanent entice

Nevertheless, (he Arab-Israeli dispute, USfor Isiuol.Paleslinian issue, and endemic intia-Aiab rivalriesituation of no-war/ no peace, instability, and the potential Inr large-scale

in Shield ocqutiltion rodor exported to Syrio in ibe foil1

conflict. As long as the Arab countries have ihe money lo pay for arms and permit the Soviets some access to air and naval facilities, Moscow willole to play but will continue to stay clear of direct conflict with superior Western and Israeli mibuiy and naval power The two most important countrieshe Soviet Union in the Mediterranean are Syria and Libya,|

irnio. Although Soviet-Syrian lies are strong, relations have frequently been strained. Tbe arms supply relationship goes back7 and has survived Syrian governmental changes and military defeats over the years Broad Syrian and Soviet goals in the region are similar Both cuunliies are primarilyin limiting Ihe US role In tbe region while enhancing their own position and Influence- For this reason, both slates have opposed the- Camp David agreements, the Jordanian peace plan, and ihen-PLO Amman Accord. They consider theseto be "separatehich preclude Soviet and Syrian Involvement While the USSReneral conference on the Arab-Israeli dispute, Syria pays only lipservlre In (lie idea, and Damascus and Moscow have significant differences over the specifics ofonference. The (wo countriesdisagree on many other issues, in particular, over the rose of, and support to, the PLO, and Syria's support forhe Gulf war Over the years, the Syrians have taken foreign polity stances that have been directly opposed to Soviet interests, and Soviet attempts to manipulate military assistance to influence Syria's position In (bese nutters has largely failed:

Syria refused Moscow's urging to attend (he proposed US-Sovlr(-sponsoredhich uiKlciliiied the fundamental difference between Moscow and Damascus re-gardins: negotiations wilh Israel

ap ia

Syrian President Assad ignored Moscow's objec-lions lo Syria's intervention in Lebanonespite Soviet threats to stop arms supplies to

Syria. In retaliation Damascus reportedly ened to bar Soviet use of the port of Tartus. Ultimately Moscow resumed arms shipments without Syria having to withdraw

Assad sought to improve relations with theStates49 in the face of obvious Soviet displeasure.

Recently. Soviet-Syrian relations have been strained over Assad's policy toward the PLC* of undermining Arafat's leadership and blocking Soviet efforts at Palestinian reunification; Syrian support for Iran in the Gulf war; and Syrian activities in Lebanon that threaten Soviet allies there, primarily Assad's support for Amal against the Palestinians In the ongoing camps war. (

he Soviets also know that without Syrianthey would have significantly less influenceMiddle East peace process. Thus, theon Syria for presence and influence inEast probably is at least as great ason Soviet aims. For this reason.acquiesced to some Syrian policies onthat Damascus considers vital to itsSyria promotes Soviet policies as long as theyconflict with Syrian

The quality of Soviet military training ofhas been described as only adequate. Syrian officers at branch schools have complained that Soviet instructorsery rigid lesson plan and arc unable (or unwilling) to answer questions that do not exactly follow that outline- Freewheeling discussions and innovative ideas arc not encouraged Nonetheless. Soviet ground training has improved the Syrian Army's combat capabilities, though not providing It with the tactical flexibility emphasized in the Israeli army. Lack of flexibility, which is partiallyto Soviet training, exacerbates overall Syrian command, control, and communications and informa-iii.ii shortfalls, and sigiiiiieanlly degrades Syrianat tbe battalion level and higher. Soviet pilot training tends to concentrate more on aircraft safety and on ground control intercept procedures than on air combatesult, the Syrian Air Force is hopelessly outclassed by the Israelis.

Soviet MAG relations with the Syrians arebut strained:

While Syrian officers generally recognize the need for Soviet technicians lo assist Syrianwith new equipment, they will ignore Soviet advice on the tactical employment of forces. The Syrians believe that the. few Indianand Pakistani Air Force advisers who served with" their forces prior6 were far better pilots than the Soviets.

Many Soviet advisers are known to have aof their Syrian counterparts and ofgeneral. This attitude has been perceivedby many in the Syriantheir part, Syrians are distressed withincidents of Soviet drunkenness,

Moscow upgraded the rank of tho MAG chief in Syria in4 from lieutenant general to coloneltrong Indication of the MACs importance The MAG is very rank heavy, withercent of its military personnel in the rank of lieutenant colonel or above, including up toeneral officers Thegarrison has generals from the air forces, ground forces, tank troops, motorized rifle troops, and air defense troops, and there are several other garrisons located in various Syrian

There areoviel military advisers In country.f these work with the Syrian Army and reportedly are present in all tank, mechanized infantry, artillery, commando, and air defense artillery battalions, and probably wilh tbe surface-to-surface missile systems such as theoviet air and air defense advisers are at theomplexes, in tbe other SAM battalions and brigade headquarters. In all air defense artilleryand at all electronic warfare and radar facilities and interceptor squadrons The remaining advisers are found in aircraft assembly, maintenance, and logistic support facilities throughout the air and air defense structure. I-

92

and4 the Sovietsf their own air defense troops operate and maintain ihe SA-5In Syria. The value of the Soviet manning was twofold: to bolster the Soviets' imagegreat power" protector and lo deter large-scale Israeli air attacks over Syria itself. Dut the SA-Ss have not been fired at any Israeli aircraft flying over Syria and probably will not be, short of an Israeli invasion of Syriairect attack upon the complexesI

he Sovieii have provided Syria wiih overworth of armi since ibr beginning ol (helhan halfven so, recent Sovielhave dMhnprJ

of thb drop reflects the drastic

decline in Syrian foreign aid receipts As figure IS shows, these are protected to fall by half from the high of7 ball tonlthough Warsaw Pact dehvenes have recently been In decline, Syria was the first recipient outside Ihe Warsaw Pactumber of weapons including thendAM systems,urface-to-surface missiles, and one of iheir most advanced air defense command and control systems, the Vcite II

n return for then mililary assistance theused Syrian airfields1 tollvthenot deployed bombers or alr-lo-surfaceaircraft lo Mediterranean airfields sincetheir access to those in Egypt. TheNaval Squadron abo uses the portfor replenish mm! and minor repairs;berthed in Syria enable tbe Soviets to extendrime of iheir ship* and submarines In

espite frictions, the Syrian low opinion of Soviet training, and the declines in Soviet military dcliveries, tbe Syrians will remain dependent on Soviet arms to maintain and upgtadc their armed forces. Of greatest importance lo Syria Is lhat an aims leUtionship with the ussn holds the only hope of achieving their elusive goal of "strategic parilv" wiih Israd-f-

Figure IS

Syrian Foreign Aid

Million VSS

Soviets ond iho PnUtlinlont

The USSR has longtuunch supporter of the Palestinian cauie Under Moscow| guidance, the Other members of the Soviet Bloc have abo aided tlieAlthough Auh slim provide most of the financial underpinnings to th* virions Palestinian guerrilla groups, the Soviet Bloc provides much of the military assistance and training (along with other forms of aid soch ii academic leholanhiwl The training is inonventional andilitary technique! The fragmentation of the PLO thathe waie Of tbe Israeli iravaraoei of Lebanon presented the Sovietsroblem, because lb potkeMt are based on

1 kuul 1' " '

try to paperUse split and lo urn- theagent! have been murdering each other alland the Middle Pail) lo submerge theirfor the take of the Paleaiinian cause. Tbetrying to try lo eniure that, if some factionwins the internecine ilrugglo. Mukow would beterms with that faction. Mowmv hat continuedvarious elements In the dispute, therebymuch of the leverage Us tupport might

bva. Although Libya frequently does not acl in concert with Moscow's wfches, its policies and foreign activities often advance Soviet goals. Examples abound:

Support tp revolutionary groups and terrorist factionsumber of states (whose activities cannot be directly traced to Moscow).

to the Soviets olccess lo naval and air facilities.

1 he potential threat Libyan armed fores prae to

Western Beets in the Mediterranean.

Libyan eflorls lo reduce Western influence in various countries.

Libyan eccawtnic subsidies ol" overillion given to Syria, Ethiopia, and Nicaragua In IheH

n the other hand, the Soviets re*lire lhal Libya's support of terrorism, Hs incursion into Chad, its subversion of Tunisia, and its "gifts" of arms to Iran alienate countries in ihe West, and Soviet clients such as Iraq as well. Libyan isolation, along with Soviet concern about future L'Sthe riskoviet confronution with Ihe Unitedthe possibilityoup in Tripoli have made the Soviets leery oftronger security agreementl-va Nonetheless, under certain circumstances. Moscow probably would deUver more arms to obtain greater access to Libyan air and naval faon'tie*.

ibya hasotal ofof weapons from ibe Warsaw Pact. SinceSoviets alone have delivered almost IS billion.base declined in the last few year*thefrom non-Soviet

Warsaw Pact countries-buys

Western arms- bUEon worth of deliveries in the same five-yearo train ibe Libyans and maintain equipment, tbe Soviet)dviser* in country at the endupplementedubansastUntil recently, tlie Soviets abo had upivilian personnel In Libya working on proiect* worth about 85 |

he Soviets have been Indbpensable in building up the Libyan armed forces; Soviet advisers are currently assisting the Ubyans In completely reorga-niring the Army. Not only has Moscow supplied weapons, maintenance, and training, it has constructed an eitensive air defense system there and hasole In Libya's foreign confrontation!

Pairs of Sovietaritime patrol aircraft have deployed periodically to Umm 'Aitioah airfield sincehese aircraft and Soviet naval elements have acquired intelligenceon US naval forces in the Mediterranean

In, the Soviets logWically assisted the Libyan occupation and buildup in tbe Aozou Strip bul have avoided providing aid within Chad itself.

By Ihe end6 there wereibyan combat aircraft assigned to Libyan squadrons.ore were unaligned and another

itei arc oetended byAM uunchers.

By tbe end6 tbe Soviets had abo delivered enough equipfnerit to create twoomplexes and the supporting command and control system Altbougli these systems are manned by Libyan troops, Soviet advisers will probablyajor role in maintenance and training, at least in Ihc short term f-

ibyan oil has made it one of the mostLOG consumers of Warsaw Pact goodshe major LDC employer of Fast European personnrlhe largest source of hard currency-services earnings for most East European governments.ere were close0 East European workers In Ubya under several billion collars ofcontiacls financed under Libya's current five-year plan Further growth of Soviet and East European economic protects In Libya may be curtailed by. among other factors, Tripoli's current revenue squeeze, which has already delayed the startumber of peiwccts that were scheduled to use Soviet equipment and technical assistance Libyan foreign exchange reserves have dwindled fromillion1illion at the end1

here seems to be general dissatisfaction among the rant and file of the Libyan military with Soviet equipment, training, and protection against US attacks Thereerception Ihat Soviet advisers generally regard Libyan personnel as incapable of operating Soviet equipment without constant Soviet supervision Many Libyan officers view the Eastmilitary personnel in Libya as providing security for Gad lull from hb own military and actingas

paore recently, iheb probably disappointed that theto intervene in Libya's defense against theAnd Oadhan knows that Moscow wouldcertainly not take risks thai could lead to acoofronUtknuture US attack.

onetheless, from (he US airstrikes in March snd Apriladhafi may have drawn several important lessons about tlie Impact of the Soviet presence in Libya on US tactical planning He was almost certainly impressed by several factors:

US press reports that, In March, Washington directed its foices to attack only theadars so as to avoid casualtici among Soviet advisers believed to be in other parts of theomplex.

In April, US aiicraft attacked TripoliAirport rather than the nearby Umm Aitiqah airbase. which had dozens ofnd other military aircraft. Oadhafi probably believes that Umm Aitiqahoretarget, bul he may conclude it was left untouched because of tbe presence there of three Soviet naval aircraft

In April the United States attackederiod when the Soviet command and control ship was absent.

These factors could convince Oadhafi thatderive increased protectionargerevenoviet commitment todefense.

lgeria The Soviet MAC in Algeriane year after that country'sfrom France The Soviets recently havetbe MAG in Algeria, aligning its structure with the various types of equipment being serviced In tin* country. |

Soviet military advisers generally do not serve with Algerian tactical ground units. Their main functions involve training and include instructing In Algerian military schools and providingsupport. The Algerians have been careful

Jag agogaaa

Wf3

lgeria wai the first country outside, the Warsaw Pad to receive the SA-fl su>foca-to-o*ystem.

ensure ihat suuscicnt Soviet advlaen remain to maintain Ihe readiness of the armed forces It has been reported that without the aid of Soviet advisers, the Algerians would not be able to keep theirndircraft flying.

-Soviel advisers aboital role In training the Algerian Navy in submarine operations. In thehey trained Algerians to operate two Soviet-built Romeo-class submarines. It was reported thatercent of the sub crews were Soviet, and that the Soviets manned all essential duty stations. The Algerians now cornidcr tbeunreliable for submersed operations, but may soon obtain new Kilo-class submarines.

he Algerian Government has probablySoviet MAC advisers to have contact with Algerians except on duty; they are also prohibited from having contacts with other advisers In Algeria, including those from Eastern Europe.!-

Algerian complaintsMoscow include lack ol responsiveness to requests for spare parts, political indoctrination of Algerians receiving training in the Soviet Union, Soviet boorfsh-ness, and dissatisfaction with the quality of materiel provided by Moscow. I

onetheless, the Soviets haveercent of ihe military equipment of the Algerian armed forces;6 the Warsaw Pact had delivered4 billion of militaryOver the past Eve years, the Algerians have receivedbillion worth of arms from the Warsaw

Pactwith loss0

million from the West, and have paid cash for all

Not withstand ing, the Soviets are concerned about the future of their relationship with Algeria and have indicated their displeasure at Algeria's attempts to diversify arms purchases In addition lo reducing the lire of ihe Soviet MAGighn theo about 8O0nd seeking Western and US military equipment and technology, President Bendiedid has improved relations with the West and has replaced senior Algerian military officers with men who are strongly nationalistic and more Western in their outlook, tastes, and style.fforts to improve Its nooaitgised credentials along with its more rnoderate voice in mtcnunonal forums, as well as its concentration on domestic development, are leading it toward closer cooperation wilh the West ontransfer and trade issues. These factors, combinedack of significant Soviet economic Initiatives, are eroding Moscow's Influence in this key nonallgnod state. | |

Inendiedid went lo Moacow. but (he visit appears not lo have affected either Algeria's strong support for Arab goab or its slow shift toward genuine no naligr. men! During hb trip.did not endorse Gorbachev's proposal for (be removal of both superpowers* naval presence in the Mediterranean On the other hand, in line with Its long-held position, Algiers is working with Moacow to achieve Palestinian teiindication I

the next 6vc yean unless the Soviets severely undercut the Western market. Algiers will still want to buy sophisticated military equipmentower cost than is obtainable from the West, as well as maintain Its stock of spare parts. Although hard currency payments from Algiers to Moscow could drop if Algerianfrom the West increase, the Soviets wiH stillajor supplier of weapons.6 Algeria and the USSR reportedly reached an agreementew arms deal that may2 tanks, BMP-2fighting vehicles. Kilo-class subrnarincs, newand possiblyAMs. Thus, Algeria will likely remain dependent on Soviet military assistance (or the near term I

The Arabian Penlniula-Periian gulf. Soviet and Warsaw Pact military assistance policy In the region is focused on protecting Its entree in Iraq and South Yemen, trying to maintain and increase Warsaw Pact arms deliveries to North Yemen, and attempting to improve relation* with Iran. Above all, it attempts to prevent the United States from expanding Its military deliveries and presence In the region.the Soviets have provided billions of dollars worth of weapons, they haveignificant toehold in only one country: South Yemen, the poorest of the lot. I I

Iraa. The overthrow of the monarchy8 opened tbe door to the Soviet military assistance program.oscow's Eastallies have provided Iraq with5 billion worth of arms, and the Soviets have sentillionotal ofillion. Shortly after Iraq invaded Iran0 the Soviets put an embargo on arms deliveries to both countries. The resultIraq continued the war, and Western and Chinese arms suppliers moved in to further erodence preeminent position Even though the Soviets restarted deliveries to Iraq, and during the period26 they deliveredillion worthtbe arm* deliveries of the West (primarily of sophisticated aircraft) and China rose considerably, and together they wereillion. The Sovieis still delivered the bulk of ground equipment. | |

IU. Having achieved no gains in Tehran, while angering Baghdad, tbe Soviets resumed deliverieshere was no evidence that Soviet MAGwere then attached to frontline Iraqi army units.

In recent years this has changed margtnaiiy, but there is little evidence of Soviet participation in Iraqi high-level military planning. Contact with Iraqi nationals by the Soviets or other foreign personnel, both military andiscouraged by Baghdad, which closely monitors the movements of Soviet MAG personnel within the country. The Soviets are required to have all travel approved by Iraqi security organizations.

The Iraqis must rely on MAG personnel to repair some of their newer ground force equipment, especially tanks such asnoviet advisers are attached to the Iraqi Air Force. Most perform repair and maintenance for the large number of Soviet-supplied aircraft. Includingransports, bombers, and helicopters. MAG personnel are responsible for assembling and testing Sovietand Soviet advisers serve as Instructor pilots at Iraqi Bight schools and sirbases. Soviet and East European deliveries over the last five yean have averaged overillon a

There are anoviet MAG personnel in the country, as wellastIn addition, Soviet and East European countriestrong economic presence in Iraqconomic technicians. Soviet experts are responsible for planning, awarding subcontracts, procuringand handling the finances for IraqiIn the oil and power Industries (of which the most recenthe appointmentoviet to the position of general manager of the trans-Iraqi pipeline. The Iraqis probably will agree Io cooperate with the

USSR and ils allies on more dcvelopmenl projects. Rfiftxltjl will nevertheless keep expanding itsIns u* ihe United Stales Ixcause.lhp Iraqis, "value technology of ihe United States p

lthough Iraq has undertaken an effortils sources of arms, il is likely lodependent on Soviet military equipmentIraq owes Moscow more than S9 billionthai have already been delivered; despileIhe USSR is likely to continue toto Iraqthe

war with Iran continues-1

is playing on Moscow't concerninfluence with the Iraqis will erode iflo capand its lies to the United States.some of Baghdad's requests, the SovietsFrogfoot ground attack aircraft In

ulcnuns in late

andn his visit at ihe end5 President Saddam probably renewed Iraq's request for theencer, which has greater range, speed, and radar capability than Soviet or French aircraftIn Iraq's inventory Prospects for its export, however, are

toss. The Sovieis regard Iran as Ihe kev strategic country in the region. Al the beginning of the Iran-Iraq war the Soviets initially tried toeutral stance and Hopped arms sales and deliveries to both Iran and Iraq This was done primarily to improve rotations withwas far moreon Soviet weapons. At the atari of the war,mall proportion of key items in Iran's ground forces and none of their Air Force or naval equipment, had been supplied by Warsaw Pad countries When relations with Iran did not improve and Soviet-Iraq relations were damaged, Moscow resumed armsto Iraq.esult the Soviets have no military advisers or technicians stationed in Iran, and they havearge portion of tbeir economic advisers from the country. Even so, the Soviets continue to sell equipment such asnot In significantthey permit other Fast Europeanto sell munitions and other military supplies to Iran for hard currency.|

One reason ibe Soviet arms cutoff failed to influence Iran was because Tehran looked primarily lo Western countries and North Korea and.o China as wellowever, non-Soviet Warsaw

Pact countries had increased their deliveries. East Germany accounted for half of all Warsaw Pact dehseties whileoviet desire for continued East European sale* to earn hard currency for Ihe Warsaw Pact, lo maintain an indirect entree to Iran, and to hedge Moscow's betsis Iraq without direct Soviet involvement.

Soulh Yemen. The tenacity oflo maintain its presence and military assistance in South Yemen derives from the country! strategic position athwart the sea route from the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean and the fact thaihc only Arab Marxist state Moreover, ib proximity to rych Persian Cub' oil countries as well as lo the Horn of Africa givesey role in the Soviet strategy |

Soviet ties lo Aden were an outgrowth of the leftist coup In South Yemenhe stale was reconstituted as the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY)arxist-oriented regime. To support the country ihe Soviets provided5 billion worth of military aidnd we believe Moscow abo5 millionin balance-of-pavraents support In addition, most of South Yemen's oil debts to the USSR have been rescheduled and probably never will be repaid. |

Soviel advisers perform training, maintenance, and logbtic supportoviet advbert assist tbe South Yemeni armeden in6 before then addition, thereuban military personnel wbo train the mililary and the militia, and possibly some East Germans attached to South Yemeni internalrobable that the Soviet MAC commander coordinates ihe activities of these other foreignpersonnel.

The Soviets have been able lo translate their military assistance program in South Yemenange of mililary and political benefits lo the USSR. Specifically

Aden has supported subversion in neighboring ecuninr-i

Anoviel military personnel are involved in operating

Soviet access to facilities In South Yemen (and Ethiopia) supports the USSR's efforts to monitor

and potentially ihrcaicn Western ten lino of inimnunlcation through Ihe Red Sea, ihe Bab e! Mandeb (itrailj, and ihe Arabian Sea Access to naval ana* air facilities tn South Yenseo'enables' tbe Soviets to conduct reconnaissancr and intelhathering activities in the region and helps to provide logistic support to the Indian Ocean

The South Yemen regime hai rupported virtually all of the Soviet foreign policy goals. Aden could be counted on to reject any US-identifiedto resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute, lo support the Soviet presence in Afghanistan, and to join wilh Moscow in denouncing USCFNTOOM activities

The status of South Yemen as the only Arab Mariitt stale is usefulonduit from the Soviet Communist Party to some Arab parties

The ei tensive training programi maintained by the Soviets in South Yemen and in iho USSB, together with Cuban and East Germanrovide access to the nest generation of South Yemeni leaders along with opportunlliei to te-cruit agents and collaborators.

oviet MAG personnel week closely with Southilitary forces

adviseis were reported to have given limited help in logistics and communications lo support South Yemen's military operations against North Yemen in

fouth Yemeni ompnfclou* vessel j

port to South Yemeni- based raiding partiesin the Dhofar region of Qman| [

hen President All Nasir took powerouth Yemen remained in general accord with Soviel policies Alioves to Improve relations with South Yemen's neighbor* meshed with Soviet desires to promote belter relations with states in the region. When AH Nasir ousted hb predecessor, Abd al-Fattah Ismail, the Sovietsom fori able place of eaile for Ismail in the USSR.4 All Nasir acccplcd the return of Ismail lo Aden, andosition for him In live patty. On his return Ismail became Involved In longstanding party factionalism, leading lo heightened instability In the party.)

lthough the Soviets reallied that the feuding parties in Aden were contemplating armed action,o evidence tu indicate that they took steps either to avert or precipitate the coup in6 The Soviets were not known to have taken any military or political precautions

During the initial stages of the lighting, the Soviets tried to limit the damage to their position by trying to mediate an end to the dispute

As the situation deteriorated, the Sovietsmost of their civilian advisory personnel.

eventually shifted their assessment of the situation as ihe rebels gained strength

military personnel probably also have provided support to South Yemen in several confrontations between lhal country and ils neighbors.or instance, Soviet military personnel (members of tbe MAG, the Soviel Indian Ocean Squardon. or both) provided sup-

oviet failure at the outset to give strong support to Ali Nasir and Moscow's subsequent pressure on Ethiopia and North Yemen not to intervene con Iributcd to Aliownfall After Ali Nasir left the country. Soviet military advisers became directlyin ground and air combal operations against

the loyalbt forces. The Soviets clearly decided to take steps to protect their long-term stake in South Yemen. and they switched sides in time to hack tlie winners.

he new regime wil) have difficulty dealing with tribal differences. Aden does not have sufficient fighter aircraft, helicopters, or pilots to deal with widespread guerrilla attacks. While the newmay be able to bold the capita] and the home areas of its tribal backers, its control over the rest of the country is tenuous. [

orth Yemen. Moscow has been involvedben itriendship treaty withfirst such Soviet accord with an Arab country. Moscow's presence in North Yemen has always been small but significant. Soviets have served in North Yemeni military units, and inook part in combat operations:

,Many

North Yemeni* believe that Moscow's "import was instrumental In preventing the Saudi-backed royalists from winning in the civil war that followed the Republican revolution.

he Sovietsarge level of aid to this country because of its strategic position at the mouth of the Red Sea and the potential pressure it can bring to Saudi Arabia. East European countries0 million worth of arms to the country and the Sovietsillion has come in the last five years. To train tho Norlh Yemenis, and to contest US efforts to bulk) influence in the country, the Sovietsilitary advisers and techriscians, as wellconomic and other specialists We estimate that moreorth Yemeni military personnel are also training in Ihe USSR. Moscow also offerscademicear lo North Yemenis to study In the Soviet Union, andorth Yemenis arc studying there now Mot senior North Yemeni military officers have been trained in the USSR, and scene probably have been recruited by tbe Soviets, they could work to erode President Sahh's military support if he threatens Moscow's Interests.

rictions have arisen between Moscow and Sanaa over North Yemen's0 million arms debt, and over Sanaa's disjatisfacijon, withuality of Soviet military training and equipment North Yemen is reportedly investygating alternative sources of training and support for its Sovietincluding East Germany and India. In addition. Presidenl Salih's perception of Soviel complicity in the6 coup in South Yemen has probably heightened his distrust of the Soviets. For their part, the Soviets reraoelodly informed Salih thai shipments of military supplies would cease until Sanaa's relations with Aden Improved However, recently the USSR has made some arms dehverics, perhaps as an Interim measure lourther deterioration in the relationship. J-

Asioi Around China's Periphery

Soviet military assistance program Inkey countries in theand Northbased on Sovietshore up its own borders, contain China, andBecause ihe Soviets have allied themselvesthat all have uneasy, hostile, or confronts

ttonal relations with their neighbors, Soviet efforts with their clients alienate iheir relations wilh other

The Soviet military aidAfghanistan began6 whenillion of Soviet equipment on creditto modernize its armed forces The Afghanpurchase of techracally sophisticundamental reorganizationforce, which soon became dependent onpersonnel In the Afghan Army, there wasgrowing Soviet orientation, and Russianthe technical language. Afghan militarysen! to the USSR for training, andourse of military Instruction |

s Soviet military deliveries to Afghanistan continued to grow, so did Afghan dependence onan Soviet MAC. and Soviet advisers were placed directly in all of the most sensitive depart menu of the Afghan Ministry of Defense (MOD) Soviet advisers were Installed in operational army units to provide operatiooaL logistic, and technical support. While the MAG ofticen In Afghanistan continued toow public profile and lacked operalional authority, the presence of Soviet officers in the MOD and armed forces units gave Moscow significant levetagef

than

68 tbe USSR trainedfgluio military officers In the Soviet Union and

delivered

T.

tance. Thusn meilitary coup, they had achieved extensive influence in the armed forces.!-

ollowing tbe roup, the Soviet MACeriod of explosive growth. Soviet advisory personnel were assigned thiougbout the Afghan Armed Forces down to the battalion level, with each Afghan division receiving approximatelyoviet advisers During thisthe8 Marxist coup until tlie9 Sovietindependence of the Afghan armed forces from Soviet authority was lost.

Shortly after9 Soviet Invasion, the MAG became the essential dement in the Kremlinampaign to train an Afghan Army capable ofthe count erimurgency role that Moscow currently performs. The MACsormidable undertaking under the best of circumstances, has been greatly complicated by three major difficulties: widespread desertion cf Afghan soldiers, dependence onreplacements oflnn Impressed off the streets, and continued factional strife among Afghan officerssuch dihWuhies, the MAC has continued to insert Afghan units into combat whenever possible. In the Initial stages of counter insurgency operations in, the Chief of the MAC and Irisoviet advisers commanded0 Afghan troops and were responsible for coordinating joint operations with the thenuu0-manh Army. |

n seeking solutions to the military stalemate me Soviets have hied different tactical approaches, looking for the least costly and most effectiveof manpower and weaponry to achieve their ousecttves In recent years, tbey probably believe fliat an influx of advanced weaponry would cut downand would allow them to increaseUcatly witharginal Increase Inand give the Sovietniquelo test new weapons in

hus during the past two years, the Soviets have made relatively minor increases In their ground combat manpower In Afghanistan, but since the fall4 upgrades of major ground force weapons and the deployment of helicopters have substantially increased both the firepower and mobility of Soviet forces. The resistance has reacted by shifting more of iheir supply activity to nighttime and dispatching smaller supply caravans over varied infiltrationheee forces also place more emphasis on cover andtechniques and keep their own units as small and as mobile as possible Consequently, although the insurgents have lost more supply trains to Soviet irgerdictloo, they are generally better supplied now than lo ibe paat| ]

n the last five years. In addition toown combal forces there, Ihe Soviets havebetween H5illion worth of armsDeliveries consist mainly

of coiuuenables such as munitions and replacements for leal arms To counter ihe effects of the insurgency costs0ear in grant ald-They will continue to try lo wear down Ihe resistance, to close the insurgents' supply routes from Iran and Pakistan, and to train enough Afghans (and kill ersough of those resisting) to ultimately setiable pro-

Soviet government. If they could do this, thebe buttressededuced contingent ofUke .those in Eastern Europearge MACo thishereputed to be sending more0 Afghansto schools in tbe USSR for further training.have also placed their own economicthe Afghan Government to exercise directeconomic decision

India.esult of the longstanding Indo-Sovlet aims relationship the Indian military is heavily dependent on Soviet weapons. Someercent of the combat aircraft,ercent of the tanks, andercent of the warships in the Indian arsenal are Soviet in origin. We estimate that atndian officers and enlisted men have been trained in the USSRndovietusually arc present in India to help maintain Soviet-built equipment and assist in the const ruction of Indian cor Deduction facilities and military bases. ^

There is no formal Soviet MAG structure within India and the number of Soviet personnel in-country supporting military assistance is relatively smallen. New Delhi's sensitivity to both the form and substance of the Soviel military presence is drawn from an awareness of the potentialarge Soviet presence couldesire to maintain India's statuseader of the Nonalbjned Movement, and the intention not to view the Soviet Union as an ally. Thus, India has consistently refused Soviet requests for joint military exercises and access Io naval and air facilities. Indian policymakers argue thai their nonaligncd foreign policy would require the extension of similar privilegesther great powers if New Delhi agreed to Moscow's requests I

Nonetheless, the continuing Interactionin manufacturing, updating, and operating Soviet equipment in India hasrofessional rapport betweeii Soviet and Indian officers.ilots of theave recendy legun io rise to the lop levels of the Indian Air Force Command. The younger generation in all services has been trained on Soviel equipment and, in some cases, develops pro-Soviet attitudes early on. Not only may thb interchange contribute to positive attitudes, but abo the long-term reliability of Soviet arms deliveries, especially during crisis periods, has made anon Indian military professionals. It Is the general pcrceptioti of the USSReliable "friend inwillingness lo deliver arms and Io deploy Soviet forcesrisis to deter potential Western or (Chineseis the most successfulof the Soviet effort to influence the Indian military.

To restrict ihe overall Soviel presence in India, New Delhi hasrocedure whereby learns cf Indian specialists are sent to the Soviet Union for training on Ihe use and maintenanceiven piece of Soviet military cqupment such as2 tank, thec. or theircraft. Upon completion of ihe training, the Indian learns return and train other Indians in-country.ndian officers and enlisted personnel from the various services attend training programs In the USSR on an annual basis Moscow has resisted this Indian approach. The Soviets appear to provide only superficial instruction toteams lhal train in the Soviet Union and to stress (so far. unsuccess(ully) the need for direct

Despite frictions. India remains one ofmost highly prized Third World clients. Arms

NS Ronjit is the third Soviet Mod-Koshln destroyer pure based by tha Indian Navy.

h* Inchon Array hoi Acquired large- numbers2rom tha USSR, ond if OisembiVsg the lonk with Soviet technical otiittonee. [

with India are still made onterms, normally featuring very longschedules (averagingowercentX and. often, discounted prices. Asthe Indians have acquired overillionarms over the past five yearsand

a total of wellillion since tbe Soviets first started delivering weapons. The country differs from other major Soviet arms customers in two fundamental way?

he only maim arms recipient permitted to purchase weapons in soft, not hard currency.

Kb theIK" that has extensive coptoduc-tion agreements to manufacture Soviet weapons.

oviet invasion of Pakistan, the Soviet-Indian 'special reUtjonship" will probablyover thb decade- Although recognized as the stronger military power In Soulh Asia. India wants toubstantial margin of military superiority over Pakistan The value of undelivereddhon and includes orders of major piece* cf equipment from both the USSR and the Weal.

ndian negotiators will continue to useof Western technology lo wring more out of the Soviets. Despite deliveries of theowever, it is uncertain India can exert enough leverage lo pry deliveries of aircraft with the most advanced Soviet engines and electronics. Indian demands for advanced Soviet weapons and selective purchases of Western technology will be countered with stiff Sovietand substantial efforts to retain its role as India's primary source of armsJ

Vietnam. Soviet deliveries ofillion worth of military aid In the lastears have made Vietnam the strongest military power in Southeast Asia This assistance, coupled with substantialaid, enables Vietnam to sustain its occupation of Cambodia and strengthen its forces along the Chinese border. Soviet deliveries also provide Vietnam with limited capabilities to defend offshore Islands and oil exploration sites and to gradually modernize ils ground, air, and naval forces

Hanoi's relationship with Moscow is rooted in their shared deep distrust ofonvergence of foreign policy goals, and the absence of any present alternatives to the Soviets. Neither side fully trusts the other, and there are some potential vulnerabilities in the relationship. Soviet advisers in Vietnam frequently have been dbcouraged and disillusioned by their experience in working with Vietnamese Armyand, according lo some sources, the Soviets have had great difficulties in recruiting personnel forassignments in Vietnam.

The Hanoi regime would likeevive its mismanaged economy, but that obiective is secondary

lo Ib national security goals thai Include maintaining dominance over lodocbJiUL Since thehen the Western governments withdrew support forand Western lending institulsons refusodostile relations with China have drawn Vietnamight client relationship with the USSIt. The key event was the limited Chinese invasionhich ledassive military and economic aid package from the USSR.'

A regime on China's southern flank ihat bChina's earitrttion of influence intoand draws China's attention andfrom the Sino-Soviet

be steady Soviet military buildup at Cam Ranh has substtJitially increased Soviet capabilities to monitor the US and allied naval and air activity in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean and to threaten regional sea lines of communications (especiallytraffic passing through Ihc Strait of Malacca> It lias also improved Soviet capabilities to augment their naval strength in the Indian Ocean quickly in crises.

From the Soviet respective.orth ihe considerable sums of aid and associated political ttabihiiea The Soviets enjoy the following tangible benefits

Unrestricted use of naval and air facilities at Cam Ranh Bay. which supports the Largestof Soviet combat ships and aircraft permanently based outside of the USSR.

Soviet involvement in some phases of Vietnamese military training helps the Soviets cuIUvale ties to the nest generation of Vietnamese military leaden

Vietnamese dersOTdeoce upon Soviet weapons, spare ports, and technical services.

The services of0 Vietnamese laborers to tbe USSR and Eastern Europe, limited amounts of raw materials, and the potential for mutual sharing of oil production if tbe current esploratory programs succeed

he access lo Cam Ranh Bay gives Moscow its first major overseas naval and air base since it was forced to leave Egypt2 The Soviets continue to renovate tbe port facilities at Cam Ranh. upgrading and conducting new buildings for POL and missile storage, barracks, and other facilities In addition

The overall defense of Cam Ranb has been improved with tbe deployment of missile-equipped naval combatants, fighter aircraft, and the deployment of mobile surface-to-surface coastal defense missiles.

The Soviets appear to haveomposite air regiment at Cam Ranh composed of two to fourSW aircraft, two to foureconnaissance aircraft,adger bombers and support aircraft, andogger fighters

The Soviets conducted tbeir first Urge-scaleeseresse from Cam Ranh Int included simulated attacksS aircraft carrier battle group Ihat was operating in the region

North Korea's inability to pay in hard currency.the Soviets and the North KoreansIn tbe Third World arms market.Kortt'

Soviet designed arms to Middle Eastern countries in exchange for hard currency0

n the. Soviet-North Koreanimproved, and the provision of arms andresumed.26 the value of Soviet deliveries was0 million. The Soviets have deliveredFkggcrs. giving North Korea the first qualitative improvement to its Air Force in many yean; the Soviets also have providedhips from tbe two countries have exchanged port visits and air and naval forces of the two countries recently conducted their Erst known combined military exercise. In return Pyongyang has

In an emergency, the Soviet* could probably deploy even rnoce strike aircraft to Cam Ranh on short not Ice-1

6 tbe SovietsVietnamJ IhIIhhi in military aid

I They have aho sent0 million worth of arms to Cambodia0 million to Laosotal of nearlyillion worth of military assistancendochina In the past fiveoviet military advisers support the military assistance program in Vietnam andoviet military personnel man iiistallation* in the country. In addition, thereoviet advisers in Laos ando Kampuchea The advisers have enabled Vietnam to modernize its Army through assistance in training, maintenance, and organization; advisers also instruct on military strategy, tactics, and doctrine-l |

Despite frictions, the Soviet/Vietnamesewill continue To hack up theiroviet Foreign Ministry official said5 that the USSR would double its economic aid to Vietnam in the neat five years. The promised aid was tied toundertakings to increase production and to the export of raw materials to tbe USSR,ood part of the aad will apparently go to the oil sector.

sortlt Korea. The Soviet Union made major provision* of arms to North Koreahen deliveries were sharply reduced. The reasons fordeliveries of weapons were Soviet reluctance toew conflict on the Korean Peninsula, Moscow's disapproval of Pyongyang's close ties to China, and

;nd it has

increased its support for Ihc USSK's nuclearinitiative and Moscow's call for an Asian security conference.!

IV. How Military Assistance Advances Soviet Foreign Policy

ilitary assistance plays an important role In advancing Moscow's overall strategic goals:

Polilical Influence. Soviet military assistance efforts have helped give Moscow significant influence not only in the Communist countries of Cuba and Vietnam, but aboumber of Third World Marxist countries: especially Af' ghanistan. Angola, Ethiopia. Mozambique,and South Yemen.imited degree, large arm* sale* have also increased SovietIn non-Marxist countries such as India, Syria, and Libya.

Hard Currency Earnings. These accrued from sales of arms to Third World customers that are repaid in Western currencies, oil, or other valued commodities3 such activitieseak ofillion, and arms sales accounted forercent of all Soviet exports for bardHard currencyritical component of Moscow's efforts to pay for imports ofproduct* and advanced technological equipment. In this regard, hard currencyarticularly critical role because it can beto eliminate bottlenecks (through purchase of spare parts) and to lead modernization efforts (through purchase of turnkey factories and new technology).

Diffusing. Western Mililary Capabilities, By gaining access Io ait and naval facilities, the

planning, and io divert some USfrom Western Europe and Japan.ajor US-Soviet confronlation, US contingencywould have Io consider ihe buildup of Cuban air and naval capabilities, the deployment of Soviet fotces Io Vietnam, and the threat these forces pose to US bases and sea lines of cornmuni-

Other Soviet Benefits

uits; Military Accent. Through theirassistance programs the Soviets have gained access to naval and air facilities in Libya, Syria, Angola,

Ethiopia. Scnilli Yemen. Cuba, andase in Vietnam. Deployments of naval reconnaissanceto Libya and Syria are lolrrmiltenl but taken Iwtetber tbey serve tooviet naval air prrjeoce' virtually continuous in the Mediterranean Sovietto facilities In Ethiopia and Soulh Yemenoviet naval presence in the Indian Ocean (albeituch smaller scale than in the Mediterranean^ | |

The Soviets also erdoy benefitsls China by their presence Ineinforces the image of ihe USSRlobal power, helps deter large-scale Chinese military action against Vietnam, curbsinfluence in Southeast Asia, andonstant reminder to China that it is encircled by unfriendly states. | |

The USSR Is also using its political andinfluence In Ethiopia to attempt to undermine perceived US strategic policies In the Horn of Africa The Soviets are counting on piosccting an image of patron reliability, military force, and permanentin Ethiopia in order to Intimidate US alliea In the region or to persuade them that Soviet patronage carries greater advantages than does Ihat of the United States J

oriel Arming and Training of Terroristshe Soviets have no compunction about supporting foreign insurgent and terrorist groups; the primary consideration is whether tbe activities of these groups further Sovietey factor, however, is whether Moscow's efforts can be camouflaged. The Soviets openly support only select Insurgent groups, mainly thoselaim to political legitimacy, like the PLO or SWAPO. By contrast. In dealing with most other foreign political eitremist groups, they try to work with and through allies and radical states. Including several Marxist regimes Since some of these governments engage in terrorism or support terrorist groups on llielr own accounts, the precise Sovietbscured.

In the Middle East, some Soviet militarysmall arms, rocket propelled grenades, and shoulder-firedto Syria. Libya, and Southassed on to terrorist groups.

In other parts of the Third World, particularly in Latin America, where violence has long been the normal way to achieve political power, the USSR and ItsCuba. East German v. andtraining, weapons, funding, guidance, and other forms of support toMarxist insuigenl and terrorist groups. Chief among the target countries are Chile, Colombia, El Salvador, and Guatemala. Typically, tbeand East Europeans advocate revolutionary violence only when ibe prospects seemng; tbe Cubans and Nicaraguans are moreviewing violenceay to bring about rewarding pfosoects.1,

Soviat Acceia to Western Technologv.pinoff of lis military aid to India, Iheell positioned to acquire technology. The large official Soviet presence there reinforces bilateral cooperationumber ofeconomic,andprovides an excellent cover for clandestine technology"

The Soviet Union acquires Western technology in Indiaariety of mechanisms, including legal and illegal purchases, cooperation and exchange agreements, and Intelligence operations We have no evidence that formal trade agreements themselves promote Illegal technology transfer, but tlie continued well-established, bilateral cooperationroad range ol scientific disciplines enables Soviet scientists to profit from access to their Indian counterparts Many scientists In India were trained in the United States and have retained informal contacts wilh US colleague" in high technology fields. We believe these conUcts which the Indian Governmentgreat scope for technical data diversions that are almost impossible to monitor

nternational' Support for Soviet Policies. Recipients of Soviet military assistance are influenced to support Soviel foreign policy positions, particularly in the UN. Moreover, Third World countries that have emerged from the Western colonial experience arc generally predisposed to support Moscow's positions in situations where their own interests or ideology arc not

tability of Regimes Friendly to the USSR. In the countries where Moscow haseasure of influence, the Soviet presence haseasure of stability Soviet and Bloc assistance to many LDCs has enhanced their internal security forces toegree thai tbey have been able lo survive extensive internal strife and insurgencies. In other countries, particularly Cuba. Libya, Nicaragua, and Vietnam, tbe Soviet-assisted buildup of military forces has strengthened lliese countries so other Third World countries ate deterred from threatening them Not content merely lo deter. Soviet aid has helpedand Vietnam to challenge their neighbors, while

taa- TVSewi Retr fa hlerrwNeaa/ TrrrorUm and SleraWancaaiy VsoJeic*

r

abililyiliury role In North Africa stems largely from huge Soviet arms transfers to it over tbe years. I

V. Factors That Inhibit Growth in Soviet Military Assistance

here is little tlmibt that the Soviets believe ihey have made significant gains from (heir military assistance policy, and, by any objective standard of measurement, ihey have. Particularly noteworthy are gains in countriesigid socialist orientation and whichignificant internal and/or external threat These countries include Nicaragua, Angola.

Cuba, Mozambique. South Yemen, Afghanbtan, and Vietnam. Many other countries have managed to stay

out of or castlose Soviet embrace even as they

continue to receive Soviet arms. Such countries Include Algeria, Guinea, Egypt. India. Libya, North Yemen,

Somalia, and Syria. Soviet expansion and influence are

s.il'*vt to limitations

amount of arm* the Souse's deitotr teems to have HttU relation to the amount of influence they ultimately gam. During the26 the Soviets sentillion worth of arms toillion to8 billion to India,aibon to Algeria, and SS billion to Libya. While none of these stales directly cntVrixe Soviet pobries and most give vocal support to them, tbe Soviets do not exercise meaningful control over the foreign or domestic policies of any of those countries- In fact, except for countries where Soviet or Cuban military forces are dominant, for example,and Angola, no Third World country" faces the risk of sacrificing Its sovereignty to Soviet control

SovUU have failed to protect clientOver the hut quarter century the Soviets have repeatedly demonstrated an unwillingness to protect military power against Westernforces in the Third World or even the forces of some well-armed Third World states

- Moscow's most serious setback was In Cuba2 when tbe potential of escalation with the United States prevented the USSR from setting up medium-range ballistic missiles capable of attacking Ihe United States.

t the request of the Egyptianthe Soviets deployedersonnelefensive role against Israeli

air attacks. But Ihc Soviets look no offensive action against Israel itself. |

esult of these setbacks, tlie Soviets have been careful to avoid situations in the Third World that could lead to escalation In, Moscow faerped set up new air defense sylkems and trained pilots in both Syria and Libya. When these airwere challenged by Israel and the United States respectively, the Soviets limited their own Invotvc-ment. They responded to subsequent criticism and repaired diplomatic rifts by providing more advanced weapons, |

oscow has on occasion turned againstclient regimes, shifting support from Somaliai'nd overthrowing governments in Afghanbtan9 and South Yemenesult, the enthusiasm in some Third World countries forarger Soviet presence into thelt territory has been soured. Third World countries have noted otlier detriments Io Soviet old:

training of LDC military personnel hot often produced mixed remits. In somecountries, mainly in Africa, Soviet militaryometimes the only typealued, and sometimes wins friends andpeople. Often, however, trainees resent the polilical in doctrinal) on that accompanies thetraining. Among more eieed trainees, even tlie militaryisdained becauseechnically unsophisticated, rigidlyand provides limited opportunity for hands-on training. Trainees also experience racism from Instructors and Soviet society.

Sooteti have mixed feelings In supplying advanced ueapons to LDCs. They want their clients lo do well in confrontations, bul they are reluctant lo provide their most advanced systems for three reasons: tbey fear technological corn-prombe to Ihe West, they are concerned that their systems will not perform credibly lo the hands of Third World opera ton, and sale* of advanced weapons tend to slow modernization of Warsaw Pact forces Norsetheaeas. the Soviets aril] need to sell more advanced weapons both to earn currency and to retain markets In key countries, such as India and Algeria, againstariant of theatest tactical fighter, will probably be sold abroad In some quantity. In doing so the Soviets will probably accept economic and security trade-offs Similar to tbose of the Westnd Tornado aircraft to LDCa.[ |

espite all of these difficulties, it would be very hard to dislodge the Soviets from their most

valued Thud World countries. As previouslythe West will have little success in states such as Angola and Ethiopia as long as the regime* rely so much on Soviet aims; trafning. logistics,!afid security Moreover, such resumes may believe that any attempt to rid tliemselvcs of Soviet control would resultoup:

continuing attractiveness of low Sovietubstantial grant aid. and easy repayment term* oo most military hardware is bach to preserve Soviet military assistancelthough states such as Algeria and Peru flirt with Western hardware supplies, and probably would prefer Western systems, they have not. thus far. found the Western financial terms sufficiently attractive to warrant significantly diminishing their tie* to Moscow

provision of spare parts, training,ajor part of theassistance program. Spare parts, andwho provble needed ex pert be,Soviets with continued entree over an

ecause of the Soviets' concern oversecurity for their advanced technology and over their own rnoderruzution rieods, there are certain weapons which we believe the Soviets will not deliver lo Third World countries in the neat few yean:

I Foxhound. When deployed inhis aircraft will be the primaryagainst cruise missiles launched fromt embodies too many technical secret* for the Soviets to risk (ti export.

encer D. Thecuddy- ab-refueting capability and wasdesigned to be able to pcrscirate tmny air defenses and attach ground targets. It has new avionics as well, including TV' and/or forward-looking Infrared (FUB*

late-modeluch as theheladiaror. and thecarermard.

Advanced electronic* end ftre controlon selected modern weaponry.

VI. "The- Burden of Empire"

n the yean since World War II the Soviet Union, in it* struggle for influence beyond itsIt believesorlda number of dissimilar socialist allies and has established aid relationshipsumber of other countries As noted previously, these countries receive extensive military assistance as well as economic aid andonsiderable economic burden lo ihe USSR Thb burden has increasedime when Moscow's export earnings are falling because ofoil prices and the decline of the dollar.wc judge thai thb burden is, and will continue to remain, affordable.'

The VoJue ot Econornk Aid

oviet economic aid to non-Cornmunbt LDCs amounts to aboutercent of total Soviel economicb likely to remainow level. A* shown inhe bulk goes toLDCs, with Cuba by far the largest singleAid requirements lo Cuba and Vietnam will continue lo run al6ear.| |

The protracted deterioration in the economies of Third World Marxist clientaising the ante for Moscow. Future aid requests from Nicaragua will probably amount to al leastillion dollars annually over ihe next five yean and Ibe war in Afghanistan is costing Moscow0 rnilhon annually, according lo some sources. | |

Moscow's economic aid has boon primarily fashioned to penetrate the economiesew key states;ot designed to address Ihe basicneeds of Third World countries In spite of the resources Moscow bas devoted to it* program in recent years, friends and foes aUke have been critical of Soviel aid. In order lo stem tbe further deterioration of

riots. Mosoow will erscourage the^manipulation' of Western economic assistance while counting onassistance to maintain its status as these countries' principal patron:

Among Soviet client states, Angola andhave encouraged increased aid andfrom the West, and Fjlnopia uses Western-supplied food to selectivelyopulationeing deliberately uprooted (andselectively starved) to prevent dissent

Socialist countries such as Congo, Guinea, Mali, and Madagascar are turning to the West to rebuild their economies

South Yemen's economy has been shattered by the conflict in6 and the demise of much of Its trained and educated leadership With little help from the West in sight. Moscow will have primary responsibibty in iiirrapgaaj up its economy.

Although Moscow has typically relied on military programs to preempt Western influence and maintain its own, we behave Moscow's ion of credibility in tbe economicegatively affecting Soviet interests in these countries!

Iha Volue of Military Assistance

s noted above, Soviet economic assistance to Communistigh, and to noti-Cotnniunistow. Therue for military aid Figurehows that mkUtary assistance hasittle overlllon per year26 lo Communist LDCs. It will probably remain at lhat level in ibe futureSoviet military assistance goes to non-Communist countries; debveries lo these stales peaked altlrsooesult of the emphasis (which began in) placed on hard currency earnings. While grant aid and attractive credits continued to be offered to Moscow's poorer arms recipients, financial concessions to major custom-en such as Algeria and Libya largely disappeared. Moreover, sincehe Soviets have generally demanded hard currency payments for spare parts and rtonlethal equipment such as trucks and transport helicopters sold by the USSR's civil exporters.r

VII. Soviet Arms Sales for Bard Currency

espite the difficulties described in thesection, the mdliary assistance program has pro-

ggarai

vided ihc Soviets wiih significant hard currencyIn fact, even though these earnings have declined in the past few years, ihey still constitute overercent of all Soviet hard currency eaniings. Total Soviet earnings from arms sales (including freight and Insurance charges) In the last sixof which consist of hardas follows:

US 1

Ijirrliminuryl

oscowumber of constraints in its efforts Io retain its share of Ihe arms market Some are cyclical, for example, tbe normal period of coraolkda-lion after the signingajor contract. Other ctmstraints, however, appear to be longer term and will In future years reduce Moscow's ability Ioils market share6 Soviet total hardearnings declined to0 billion due primarily to the fall in energy prices, which decreased the earning! of Soviet oil and gas exports and reduced the capability of other oil exporting countries lo buy arms and lo import goods. Beyond the decline In ibe price of oil, other factors will constrain Soviet arms earnings

Shifting need* and expectation* of recipient irales Many cbents have become more demand ing as they encounter protJems absorbingalready received Some, such as Algeria,

unhappy wilh Soviet arm* und *oek boiler or more sophlitiiated equipment Others wantiversifyarms^sources for pohtioal rrasons

competition from the Westsuppliers, including the United State* and Wealern Europe, have been Joined by new ones, such as Brazil and South Korea, In aggressive and tucceasfu] marketing efforts. In tbeven Egypt delivered0 million worth of anna to Iraq. Includinganks. This has cut into what might otherwise have been even stronger markets for Moscow.*

competition jrom Communistoutside the Warsaw Pact China, North Korea, andholders of significant inventories of older Sovietinroad* on Warsaw Pact arms sales Dunns-the, those Communist countries exportedillion worth of arms.

In carder to retain its market share, Moscow may give some traditional cash customers such as Iraq and Libya .ml man hai amounts of credit

oscow's insistence that most of its customers pay for at least part of the arms they receive means increased weapons deb votes will tend to generate Increased liard currency earnings even whencredil is given. Soviet attempts to maximize hard currency earnings, particularly from arms sales, will resultore aggressive search for markets In the Third World. This sales campaign will beon OPEC members and others that have had large hard currency surpluses with the USSR, such asand Argentina. Despite declining oil revenues, (here areew opportunities for expansion, and Moscow could decide lo offer state-of-the-art arms gs an incentive. Tbe Soviets will probably sign additional agreements with countries lucb as Algeria, Jordan, and Kuwait These will probably enable Moscow lofurther decfane in bard currency earnings from aims sales; however, these earning will probably not rise significantly over the remainder of tbe decode-.

greatest challcna* lo Soviet salai of advanced aircraft to UXi comes from France I

VIII. Probable Developments in the Soviet Military Assistance Program Over tho NextYears

.hile the fall in oil prk" and tight finances in Third World countries will continue lo constrain Soviet sales of arms lor hard currency, these factors, in themselves, will not basically affect tbe overall Sovietit ion in the Third World. The number of Warsaw Pact and Cuban advisers and technicians In LDCs wiD probably Increase marginally because of the need for greater technological assistance lo service advanced weapons. The number of Third World personnel being trained ia Warsaw Pact countrieso increase. Overall, Moscow will look for states in needilitary supplier ihat perceiveo liettcr option than the USSR.

nother major group of countries that will continue to receive assistance axe pro-Soviet Third World couratries facing external threats orWestern and Chinese support for insurgencies against Soviet-backed regimes will prompt the Soviets to continue their large deliveries of con vent tonalequipment, particularly military helicopters.and Afghanistan received large numbers of heh-copters in thend,3ngola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Nicaraguamany more. In addition, the Soviets will beef up tbe defenses of countries such as Libya, Iraq. Angola, and Mozambique, which perceive active threat* from across their borders. V

be Soviets will continue their indirectfor terrorist groups Tbe coats of supporting terrorists via intermediaries appear to be slight,In terms of money, reputation, influence, or risk. The Soviets will work with and through alliea and radical states that engage In terrorism or support terrorist groups on their own accounts, thus obscuring the precise Soviet roie.1

In the Americas

eliveries of military assistance will go to

Cuba. Although Soviet military aid to Cuba has given Castro some offensive capability in recent years, Cuba's military Is still primarily aforce geared to making an attack by the United Stales on Cuba as costly as possible We believe lhal tbe Soviets will continue toCuban air defenses and naval units but will not send weapons that tbe United State* would

injiihe Soviets have nol sentinters orissiles that could challengelights (equipment tbey have delivered to other LDCs) and probably wiO not. botK (or reasons of cost and potential provocation. The Soviets will also continue lo moderately expand their own assets on the Island and to Improve Castro's capacity to support revolutionaryand movements abroad.

Nicaragua. Despite Moscow's desire toeiling on ib commitments, Warsaw Pact military aid continues, and economicoing to bo an tiKreasing burden to the Soviets. The Soviets and Cubans will continue tn support rcunterinsurgency operations and improve air Menses Ground based air defenses probably will br upgraded during the next IS months as tbe Sandinbia regime expands its air surveillance tracking network, acquires more modern(such as thentiaircraft gunsX and gains experience. The lack of trained Nicara-guan operators and maintenance personnel means that additional Cubans will be needed to staff and maintain ihe radar network. Despite the fact that tbe Soviets and their allies have trained or are training up tofcaraguan pilots to flye believenlikely that Moscow will provide let fighters in the near future. Provision of irt trainers such asowever, ba possibibty.

Peru. We doubt lhat Peru's lies to the Soviel Union will expand significantly during Presidenterm, but Peru will corrtinue to be attracted to Soviet weaponry Despite efforts lo reduce dependence on the USSR (for example, by purchasing0 fighter-bombers from France) the Peruvian military, faced with severe budget restrictions, continues lo purchase Soviet weaponry because cf highly favorable financing terms, the relatively low poor lags oo Soviet arms,ack of alternative sources for spare parts. Soviet arms sales probably willc'liiiilerinsurgettcy equipment for the Army and helicopters and transport aircraft for the Air Force. Because of poor high-altitude performance, the Peruvian Air Force maytome cf Itsook and MISwith Mlip Hsrade would lequirr the dispatch oi more Soviet advisers. ,

Elsewhere in Latin America. The Soviet Union wiH continue efforts to improve relations with other Latin American democracies. Economic relationships with Brazil and Argentina may expand, and the Soviets may even succeed in selling military equipment lo other Latin coun tries I-

Africa, South of Ihe sahara

oviel attention ro southern Africa hasIn recent years, and the Soviets and Cubans are pursuing long-term obsecrjves there thatix of motivations Critical variables will affect the course of Soviel policy, but the unfolding of events will provide Moscow and Havana with severalto expand their influence and undermine US interests In ihe region. Moscow's efforb will bedirected to stieisgtheming ib two clientsSouth Africa and reinforciqg the Soviet position in the Horn. Angola. Ethiopia, and Mozambique have often complained about the Soviets' poor logisticnetworks, insufficient stores of fuel andInadequate training, poor crnititerlrisurgency strategy and tactica, and the general shoddiness of Soviet equipment. Nonetheless, we expect ihe USSR to remain the region's principal supplier of military assistance Few if any of the most advanced Soviet military systems will be deployed; ihey are not rsccded In Ihe types of operations that will be ootid uctedj

he Soviets will abo emphaslie their assistance to instirgent groups such as SWAPO and the ANC. Developments expected in specific countries include:

Angola. The Soviet determination to hold on in Angola and lo neutralizelain.cf mililary equipment have been heavy in the last three years, and, at limes, there is an apparent urgency to the Soviet effort. Theof Soviet transport aircraft flying military

cargo mliatoni t> Ihe highest3 when ihe Soviets and Cubans coosobUled the MPLA in power, tbe deliveries of the most recentlytxthter'. the'locfja C. aad the Soviet-supplied, Cuban-manned SAM best across southwestern Angola comphcate future South African tactical air sorties and resupply flights to UNITA. This Soviet commitment il expected to continue, with expanded air dcfrjiuos to complete the SAM belt in southeastern Angola, butill probably not be sent

the South Africans inflict serious damage on Angolan Government forces, pressure would almost certainly grow on the Soviets and Cubans for expanded involvement In air-to-ground and air-to-air operalsons. We believe that Moscow would prefer to avoid direct confrontation with Soulh African-piloted aircraft. However, we cannot ruleoviet combat role In. air operations If Moscow believes that South Africa's activityirect threat to the viability of Angola's military forces Ifhroat does not materialize, the Soviets are not likely to expand their involvement to include direct participation In combat actions, but Cuban air activity may increase.

We do not envision new MPLA policies over tbe next year that would violate what the Soviets perceive as Moscow's fundamental interests. In fact, wetrengthened MPLAlo the armed struggle against both UNITA and South Africa, which, in the MPLA's view, is not inconsistent with participation In the talks on wllhdrawal of Cuban forces.

Moiomtioue. While iirnitirig risks and costs, Moscow wants Maputo to returnore orthodoxiTiist. pro-Sovietand tha Sovietsentral role in influencing Mozambique's foreign and domestic policies The Kremlin will work to undermine Western influence by emphasizing that the West is not to be trusted, despite the fact that Western donors have provided economic aid and minor amounts of military assistance. The securitywill continue to deteriorate, and tbe FRE-LIMO government may lose control of some key urban areas

If this scenario comes to pass, Moscow would probably Increase its military support to Maputo by providing more fighter aircraft, helicopters, tanks, artillery, and advisory support In exchangeozambkttu pledge lo limit lis lumor for on agreemeiit to increase Soviet naval and air access to Motamblcan facilities. Moscow might abo take this step in response to Western or increased South African efforts to aidoderate increase in Sovietaid would not be enough to turn ibe military fade against the rebeb, but it could reinforce the Soviet position in Mozambiqueeasonable costT"

Ziaaba bice. The cool relations betweenand the USSR are improving somewhat, but military, economic, and partv-to-party ties to Moscow and other Communist governments will probably remain Bmitod. Mugabe might increase bis reliance on the Sovietsource of security assistance if Harare becomes bogged downeemingly unending military commitment in Mozambique, or l( (here lire more South African cross-border raids, or if other sources ofdry up Although negotiations have so far been difficult, we believe Zimbabwe and the USSR will eventuallyilitary aidlhal includes the provision of air defense equipment.

South Africa. Tbe senior Soviet leadership see its South African programsong-term effort. Several Soviet afficiab have spokenyear lime frame before the ANCeal prospect of coming to power because Moscow judges ibe Botha regime as still firmly in power. South African Communbl Party (SACP) and ANC programs lo encourage, probe, and exploit disaffection will be encouraged by the Soviets. In the Interim, Moscow will keep up Its across-the-board but low-level support.

n6 the Sennets signed|anna dead with Tanzania Moscow bos also authorizedse of Soviet sveapons for operations inside Mozambique, believing it to be an effective way to supportto curry favor with the other stales adjacent to Southusing Soviet lories

Guinea. Guinea and Ihe USSR have signed new military assistance agreements, bul ihey do not appear tohift in Conakry's increasingly pro-Western stance- f

Somali President Siad's recent effort lo improve relations with the USSR ts designed to deflect domestic criticism oi ha dose tie* to the United States, to explore the possibility of gaining Soviet assistance In bis continuing talks with Ethiopia, and to offset anticipated cuts In US military aid. These Initiatives are not likely to enfoy much success, however, because ofdeep distrust of Siad and its unwillingness tots relationship with Ethiopia. The Siad government probably believes that the threat of improved Soviet-Somali relations can win it more assistance from Washington.Siad is not likely to abrogate the military accea agroement with the United States, he may express his frustration by nutting restrictions on the use of Somah facilities for operational exes-die. or logistic activity'.

The Soviets will continue to deliver to Ethiopia the same type* of military equipment as before In return, the Soviets may expand their use of military facilities there. Soviet interest in such anrobably heightenedtbeir access to airfields and ports in South Yemen may be affected by the continuingIn that country. Soviet naval air operations from Asmara airfield will probably not behowever, until the security situation abo improve* in Ethiopia

lgruocant reduction In the Soviet military advborv presence innhitch/ in the foreseeable future Mengistu appear* determined toilitary solution to the Eritrean and Tbtrran insurgencies and needs Ihe Sovieti lo keep hb armed force* combat capable, bat neither the government nor the inturgenb have the capability to decisivelythe other. In tlie unlikely event Mengistu were overthrown soon, weuccessor military resume might move to eliminate or al least reduce the Influence ofntrust institutions in an effort to attract Western*upport and to rally domesticupport. Bul Ethiopian security interests will all but guaranteeigh degree ofwith almost any new regime thatIn Addis Ababa.

Iha aaaovtstrrorwoo, the Arabian pan.nvjo, ond the rvston Gulf

n response lo increased Western competition (and lo security tlireats to theirhe Sovieis have moved to make some of Ibeir more capable weapon systems available- Syria obtained SA-Ss. andraq has receivedyria may get it soon, and Libya (which received) could get it later in the decade. BeginningA-lSs andave been delivered to Jordan, Iraq, Syria, and Libya. To retain valueduch as Libya, Syria, and Iraq, Moscow has been willing lo reschedule payments in the past few yean. Bul we believe major buyers of arms for bardowe Moscow at5 billion foresult the Soviets may now be less willing to sell or give away arms to these countries unlesslear need, a* in Iraq, or unlets they can obtain political gains in return (or easier temu-

oviet efforts to gain greater Influence in the region through arms deliveries are probably stymied. Few Arab countries in the Mediterranean willigruncaot increase of Soviet arjvisen and technicians in their countries. In the Arabian Peninsula, roost countries are apprehensive of what ihey perceive as the Soviet role in Ihe coup in South Yemen. The aftermath of the coup will make their relations with other countries there more difficult The Northare already openly suspicious of Moscow's behavior In the crisis, and the conservative Persian Gulf stales are more convinced of the dangers of opening too much to Moteow Should South Yemen pursue policies designed lo undermine ib neighbors, the Soviettn the region would be adversely affected:

Syria. The Soviet Union will continue to supply Syria with some of its more advanced military equipment It will do so to demonstrate ib commitment to tbe Syrian regime shortirect confrontation with the United States or Israel and to attempt lo gain greater access to Syrian air and naval facilities. Moscow's refusal to risk escalation will nonetheless preclude Soviet pilots from flying fighters or bomber* in arole from Syrianewer weapons the Soviets could provide to Syrian forces over the next five yean include9 andircraft, tanks, and kilo classI-eoi likely candidate* IncludeAMs

SMs But the amounts of luture Soviet dehveeie* will dependumber of factors: Soviet perceptions of the tbreats to Syria, Syrian progress on debt payments, and Moscow"sover Syrian actions lhal could lead to unwanted escalation.

- The USSR's economic reUtiorohip wilh Syria has been subslantlally upgraded over the past few years Moscow has provided more than SI billion in new financing as well as planning onof nuclear research facilities anduclear power plant The protects neatlyDamascus' dependence on Moscow for follow-on support Moreoviet and East European technicians are already working on development protects in Syria and, If these programs continue to grow, (he number ofFactikefy to double. Inyrians are studying In Warsaw Pact countries, and, if current trends continue, this number could easily0

Althoughirmly entrenched, hblso of concern to the Soviets If he were tooderate chance of this occurring In the nest twoiveSoviet position In Syria could erode, though we believenlikely andftlle chance that Syria would align itself with the West.

Libya. If oil prices stay at current levels,arms purchases will remain depressed. The Soviets have provided support to automate andbyan air defenses, but (heyew years before providing advariced arms such ashendm rangeoastal defense cruiseThe Soviets are likelyontinue to rebuff Oadhafi'i requestselease agreement, but will attemptatch over differences with him to gain greater influence over Libyan politic* and tbe choiceoanble successor. Deliveries will probably be earned outase-by-case basisorce Libyaay Moscow its back debts.

Although Oadhafi knows ihat (he Soviets will not directly Intervene il the United Stales should mount further attacks against libya, he probably believes that an Increased Soviet presence in the country would help deter potential US attacks or limit the resultant damage Oadhafirepared to allowoderate increase in accessibyan ports and airfields, above tbe current rale ofhip visits and four to five aircrafl deployments to Ubya per year Soviet ships and submarines could also Increasingly rely on Libyan ports instead of on some of the offshore anchorages where they currently rest and replenish. Dul tin- Soviets would almost certainly not deploy Soviet-manned bombers or Interceptorsbya as long as Oadhafi rules the country.

Moscow's willingness or ability to influence any succession innknown Tbe Soviets mightait-and-see approach, believing their interests would be preserved In any case by continued Libyan dependence on Soviet military assistance. To strengthen Ubya'i dependency, the Soviets might offer additional weaponry lo the new regime al concessionalew government could be cool toward such an offer because of reduced enthusiasm for more arms purchases or because other weapons might be available from Western suppliers.

Algeria. Algeria's decisions on weaponsare influenced by it* perceptionack of US response lo Ms weaponsall in the price of oil and gas that greatly reduced its capacity lo purchase arms, and Its concern over (errsions in the region. All of these factors favor continued purchases of Soviet weapons.eed for continued access to sophisticated military equipmentower costbtain-able from tho West, Algeria will remainIn Western weapon*ilitarywith the United Stales

The Soviets have offered an attractive arms package to Algeria including2 tank.issiles, and advanced aircraft The Soviets might be willing to provide early models of (beencerew yearsone-range penetrator. tbeould add significantly to Algeria's capability towo-front war. It would be especially valuable against Libya, where long distances and heavy SAM defenses must be negotiated to attack key (argets

Iran. The Soviets ate determined supply Iraq with the weapons necessary to survive Iranian attacks. Thus, they will continue to provide the type of* weapons they have in the past in addition to new types ot aircraft, such as the MIChe Soviet? have stepped up their deliveries of arms, in particular, tanks and around attack aircraft Baghdad will nevertheless keep expanding Its lies to (lie West because the Iraqis value its technology

Iran. Soviel-Iranian relations will remain strained as long as Tehran keeps up its anti-Soviet rhetoric, gives support to Afghansuppresses ihe Tudeh Party, and keeps up other behavior that is hostile toward Moscow. Nonetheless, tlie Soviets will probably not ic-straln continued sales of munitions und small arms by Eastern Europe. Depending on the changing dynamics of international events, the Soviets may even encourage an expansion of sales from East European countries

Crowing Instability in Iran may abo increase Soviet opportunities lo cultivate contacts wiih leading radicals and among Iran's minorities and to Intensity support for leftist opposition groups If Moscow were to sec opportunities forexpanded Soviet influence and Iranian concessions on key issues,ease-fire between Iran and Iraq, it might consider relaxing its embargo on the sale el major weapon systems to Iran.

South Yemen. By using its MAC forces to intervene In the aftermath of6 coup, Moscow protected Its slake In Soulh Yemen. Any South Yemeni government will be dependent on Moscow for most military and economicand, in return, the Soviets will be able toprasriblycapacity to monitor US and Western activities in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean through ibeir intelligence facilities there Improved Sovietlo South Yemeni factories would probably focus on maintaining their naval aircapability and even upgradingby substitutingircraft for. But Moscow's first priority will be to restore stability in Ihe country.

Sorlh Yemen. President Salih has not been satisfied with the quality of Sovietorscerncd with the potential for subversion. In tlie wake of Soviet support for the rebeb In South Yemen, be has probably moved to reduce North Yernen's reliance on the USSR for military aid and training North Yemen has already replaced some Soviet advisers with others from Jordan and Egypt The discovery of oil in North Yemen will enable It lo obtain greater economic and military trade wiih Ihc West over the long term. And in two lo three years Salih will be able lo achieve greater balance In hb relations with Moscow and other countries. NonetrmIres, North Yemen's sigiiifieanl debt0 million) to ihe USSR for pastof military equipment and its recent renewalrirridship and Cooperation Treatyfore* Salih to continue to corxsidcr Soviet polio concerns North Yemen could reduce ibeof Soviet advisers in country if Jordan and/or Egypt were lo send replacements [

Asio Around China's Periphery

oviet arms to Asian countries will continue torucial role in buttressing the USSR's foreign policy In the region:

Moscow clearly wishes to increase the prospects for eventual Soviet success inand controlling ihe countryore effective Kabul regime, better militaryagainst the Miuahedln, and,ombination of pressures and inducements that could change Pakistan's policies. Tlie costs and rbks ofwithdrawal without regard for the survivalarxist regime or substantial escalation of militaryup to now, contributed to the decision to hold course The sham withdrawaloken number of Soviet troops, declarationsnilateral cease- fire, and pressures on Pakistan are designed to reinforce these efforts Erosion of Pakistan'sey goal

Even thoughncreasing lis arms purchases from thefighters from France, an aircraft carrier and Sea Harrier fighters from tbe United Kingdom, andfrom WestDelhi willlo rely on Moscow totrongrole in Indian defense strategy. Reporting indicates lhat Gandhi's government continues to see the USSRtrategic counterweight Io China and the United States. In our view, New Delhi will continue to pay tittle attention to Soviet naval deployments In the Indian Ocean, which normally operate in the far west, dblant

Oo-dkiu medium-range attack submarine.

Indian shores. The Indians will alsoloow-key approach to the Soviet military presence in Afghanistan. We estimate that India will continue to depend on Moscow for spare parts, training, and major new weapon systems such as theircraft and Kilo-class submarine* Deliveries of Soviet military equipment, under major arms agreements signed In tlie early lOHOi or now planned, will not be completed until thend willincrease India's estimated payments to the USSR. By then almost half of India's combat aircraft and more than half of its armored vehicles and maior warships will be SovietHowever, the6 decision of tbe Indian Government lo purchase theet engine for ils own Indigenously designed let fighteraior blow to Moscow's efforts to limit tbe Western share of the Indian market.

Vie fas* am. Over the long term, there are some inweaknesses that miglil cause the Soviet/ Vietnamese alliance to unravel. Then Include the evergrowing debt lhal Hanoi owes to Moscow for aidapprocbemenl by either side with China However, these issues ate not likely lo be overly troublesome In the nest five years.will continue to deliver tlie same types of lea* modern military equipment it has sentTo back up its military commitment the USSR has pledged lo double Its economic aid to Vietnam in the next five yean. Wc believe tlial the Soviets' efforts In Vietnam are directedunproving the capabilities of their base to better support iheir forward -deployed composite group of naval ships and military aircraft.

fiorlk Korea. Wilh the accession of newIn Moscow, Soviet-North Korean relations have Improved dramatically over the last three years, particularly in the strengthening ofcooperation. The Soviets realize, however, that Pyongyang has an insatiable need for arms and economic aid. In return for increasedof military equipment. North Korea could let Soviet planes stage flights from North Korean airfields. But relations are not likely to grow too much closer, and the Soviets will probably not deploy their own long-range aircraft to North Korea. The marginal increase In range that such basing would provide Soviet aircraft would be more than offset by the negative reactions of China, Japan, and the United Slate*!-

IX. Implications for tho West

orbachev has protected an Image of foreign policy activism by use of Increased tactical skills, better harmony between diplomacy and rxropaganda. and more sophistication in foreign policy Although the Soviets remain willing lo provideew clients that depend on it for Iheir survival, the mainstay of Soviet diplomacy In the ThirdtiU arms transfers

he delivery of military weapons alone has never given the Soviets significant leverage with most non-Marxbt Third World countries, and tliere binexorable about growing Soviet influence and presence In the Third World. The demise of colonial regimes, economic factors, cultural antipathy lo the USSR In the Arab world, national interests, concern of reigning groups for their own continuance, and the interplay of world politics will remain predominant influences lu determining the. policies and orientation

of LDCs. Thus,oinge much more difficult for the Soviets to use iheir military assistance to make significant new gains in the Third World. I

does not mean lhat the Soviets areto make gains In tbeare. In

particular, their efforts in Central America andAfrica will prove lo be extremely troublesome for tbe United States. They will abo find customers for increased arms sales, possibly in Algeria, Jordan, or Kuwait. They may tain significant influenceew regimes, and they may expand their use of air and naval facilities in some countries lo which tbey abeady have access But theof their inability to extend substantial economic aid. tbe increased Western support lo some Insurgencies challenging Miirxisl regimes, their Inability to project power against Ugnificant opposition, and declining hardearnings from aim*coming up against limits to the bench ts they can accrue by providingJ*taQce.[ |

difficulties in earning hardthe opportunity cost* of aiding its clientmay reduce prospect* for new grant aid ornon-Communist LDCs. Gorbachev know* thaicannot underwrite the economic, social,development of anyery fewCuba and Vietnamincreasingly, Nicaragua. In someixed economy withfrom Western nations. Thus, even inSoviet Influence Is strong, the West willan entree,

oviet limitations are particularvident in their lack of opportunities to expand military ace aai in return for their military assistance. Even in nations where theretrong threat to an embattled regime, the Soviets and some major clients have been, and will continue to be, wary about Increasing the Soviet presence

Moscow will wish to take no actions that would give the United Slates an excuse to bring it* superior sir and naval power to bear in Third World settings.road scale, the Soviet* will continue lo militarily strengthen their alliedthrough measures that slop short of Soviet confrontation with the United Stales Thus, even though an increased Soviet presence might be welcome ia Cuba. Nicaragua, or Libya, the Soviets are unllkelv to increase their military access in these countries.

Syria probably realizes there are limits lo the protection it can expect from Moscow This sterns from shortcomings in the performance of Soviet weapons, Moscow's lack of willingness lo directly engage US or Israeli aircraft, and tuspielons that Moscow might back revolutionary groups into the current leadership

The Ileal prospects for Moscow's expansion of its accesi will probably occur In Vietnam andAfrica. Over the next five years ihe Soviets will probably increase their naval and airin Vietnam In southern Africa the Soviets could increase their periodic deployments of Bear reconnaissance aircraft to Angola Thev could ubo sendSW aircraft loagain, but such deployments wouldbe sporadic in the near term.| |

espite these serious limitations, the political dynamics of the Third World, particularly In the poorer countries, will continue to provide openings for tbe use of arm* transfers in support ol Soviet policy

Revolutionary groups seeking power, leftistfending off revolts, and countriesihe West will almost always turn lo the Soviets forfor Ihe politicalsuch ties imply.

And the Soviets will almost always provide arms to movements and states, particularly those on an anti-Western course, and will benefit fromthe movements as long as Moscow'sand risk are not substantial

he Soviet* will attempt to maintain their markets and lo remain competitive with Western rivals We behave thai the Soviet* will provide at favorable price* orumber of advanced weapons such as. and helicopters, and will improve the air defenses of selected countries. Because these advanced weapons and Improved air defense systems will require more training, the need for Warsaw Pact and Cuban advtsci* in LDCs will probably Increase somewhat Libya and Angola are already expanding Soviet-supplied air defenses, and Nicaragua will probably do so In ibe future. The number cf Third World military personnel being trained in the USSR will aho increase In addition, the Soviets will lieel up the defenses of countries that perceive active threat* from across their

oscow will abo continue to supply arms to countries that cannot pay in hard currency when thb

57

-imp WriiL.

action could increase its influence and help destabilize states leanins! toward the West Thus. Soviet military assistance will continue to pose major problems for US and Western interests, especially in Central America and southern Africa In addition, tho Soviets also have tbe potential to sain in other regions If tbe West fails to provide significant economic and security

In tlie Philippines the Soviets may be able to make inroads

Prospects for tbe Soviets would also improve io Algeria. Morocco, and especially Tunisia, If any of them perceived that the United States or West European countries were unwilling to provide vital economic or security assastance

Insufficient Western security aulstance locountries could have adverse consequences for several US interests and policies, for csample facilities agreements with Kenya and Somalia would be at great risk, the containment of Libya in Chad, Niger, and Sudan would be damaged, and the major US effort for economic policy reform by African oovernments wouldajor blow.]

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