Created: 6/1/1987

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Soviet MilitaryQ

WorninQ Notiee Intelligence- Source, or Method* Involved (WNINTEl)

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORAAATION Unauiho'iicd Duclowv Subject lo Criminol Sanciiom


Miotakm toFwaan Ha-w,

No* HiiiniBWhCo To Hon o>

Cov*"Qr- fiopfntary

I)and culiociiori ot IfifortWiO"

Confcoiod I, Or

IM -i'kioWi Hoi Beenlor Rtleau)


ONVI0 .ROM Mdttpta

A mkroficha copy ot mil oVxunwrt ii ovotobVromreqjoj*

to uwld CPASIMC).




Tb. lull ku of ihk MtaoMooUm i,bljfwd


uied ha it, Dtnariimr,, Mtahxai-luni. approved

loi publidlM. oaiyby iht Cb.ii nun e* ih*

Ntitoml iMritaencc Oiunnl

scope note

thi) memorandum is ihc second infirst wasinthat establishes an interagency daia base on iheof soviet strategic and general purpose weapon systemsfor the. the weapon systemsare virtually all of the most sisntficant hems ofin terms of both ihc extensivencss of their deploymentpolitical ond military implications they possess. there isinteragency agreement on both general and specificeven so, in many cases we have major uncertainties becauseevidence there are, however, systems for which theagency and the defense intelligence agency (and on amissiles, the bureau of intelligence and reseajckstate) differ in their estimates of production.

key judgments

Soviet defense. Industriestability and momentum that has resulted in lewis of weapons production that are extraordinary by any standard.

This year's Memorandum provides production estimates forilitary systems, as compared withystems found in las) years MM II alsoonsiderable effort by both CIA and DlA to improve and refine then estimativeI

oilier things. ClA and DIA also more ih.nproduction estimates for theStyx) antiship cruiseBoth agencies also

enanged Iheir estimatesnks and infantry fighting vehicles onof new information and more detailed analysis. Estimates forvehicle program* increased, such as forank asfor thend forolderCfA and DIA. as the result of close consultations over theare in greater agreement than ever before on theirfor Soviet land

CIA and DIA have agreed upon ycar-by-year production estimates for overercent of ihe systems covered in this Memea-and.irn

I the Soviets during the period

o produced;

-CIA)DIA) intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) amiubmarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMsl DIA lodge* that the Soviets have produced subsuntially more ICBMs0 than does ClA.


DIA) inter mediate-range ballistic misulra (IRDMs)


0 manned and unmanned military otpace launch vehicles

0 cruise missiles.

rew-served SAMsiand-held SAMs.

0 aircraft, includingtrategic0 fighters,0 helicopters Aboutercent of Ihc fighter production and someercent of tbe helicopter production was delivered to Soviet military forces; the rest was either exported or delivered to the civilian economy.

jOO new ships and smaller naval craft.ubmarinesajor surface combatants.

0 (DIA)0 (CIA) modern tanks,0 other modern armored vehicles0 ol their most important held artillery, antiaircraft artillery, and multiple rocket launcher systems. Betweenndercent of the tanks and artillery produced by ihc USSR were delivered to Soviet miliury forces

0 stand-alone radar systems.

illion trucks for military use. includingeavy trucks

In every major military equipment category, Soviet productionthat of the United States Depending on tbe system,rates are as much as seven times greater than US ratesIn5he Soviets producedtimes at many ICBMs and SLBMs as the United States, andmany nuclear-powered submarines During this period,RBMs andtrategic longrange bombers, whereas the United Statesedium-range ballistic missiles and onlys andV In addition, the Sovietsseven times as many crew-served, land-based SAMs as theihiee times as many tanks, and over five times as manypieces

*TWad hi thrw mniMhr USufbac

Even tbotiirii we have CIA and DIA agreement on the production estimates (orercent of the systems covered in this Memorandum, we emphasize that this agreement should not be taken as an indication that we liave high confidence in these estimates For some we do, for many we do not Our confidence in these estimates laiiges fromwe are confident we are withinercent of the actual productionthe larger systems that areor take long periods to construct and are easily visible, tocould be off byercent or more from the actualgenerally small, mobile systems

Although Soviet weapons production rates remained extremely high throughouteriod, as indicated in last year's UM, we continue to assess that there have been significant reductions in Soviet production rates in several areas during the period, as indicated in figurehere was

A general decline until then the annual production of ICBMs. and some categories of stand-alone radars

A general decline in the annual production of major naval surface combatants.

A sharp decline in helicopter production68eveling offimilarly sharp decline in SRBM production through thendeveling ofT thereafter; substantial decline in SI.BM production since thend some upswing beginningnddecline in yearly production of fighter aircraft, submarines, and armored personnel carriers0

In contrast, there has been substantial growth in the production ofcruise missiles and steady growth in the annual productionbombers and heavy trucks. In addition, there was also ain annualroduction rates into thef view as lo the trend in more recent production. Tanksliows no clear trend and production remainsighfluctuates as model changes

Several factors probably are largely responsible for the downward trends described above;

Soviets decided to introduce more complex, sophisticated, and capable weapon systems into production. More complex systems embody substantial improvements in performance and can often replace older systemsess than one-for-one basis. Thus, the Soviets may have deliberately reduced theirrequirements for fielding the newer systems.

Wilh respect lo tbcsc more sophisticated systems fieldedby the Soviets, the roost prominent advance* have been in the areas of electronic systems and solid propulsion Cor missiles In those areas, the Soviets have experienceddiUiculties and delays in development, which have postf-ncd or interfered wilh intended serial production One result of these difficulties and delays has been lower production Programs that should have entered production sooner and begun deployment in this period will no! reach their full momentum until later in.

The advanced weapons fielded duting the period also have required greater resources and effort and, lieticu, have been more costly. In the CIA view, ihough II has no concrete evidence, the burden of these higher costs in some cases may have contributed to Soviet decisions not to sustain ptoduction at historical rates. In ihe DIA view, while highest unit costs of weaponry no doubt concern thell available evidence points lo decisions concerning Ihe number* of weaponsand the timing of such production continuing to be based oti other factors such as military policy, doctrine, and strategy

The Soviets have responded to these technical challrnces by modernizing (heir defense manufactunni hair. Wc haveariety of new materials and manufacturing processes being iitcorporat-ed in the aircraft, missile, shipbuildirvg. ground arms, and electronics industries.umber of programs have recently completed,oon will complete, their lest phases and will enter serial production. Ilrcent growth in defense industry floorspace indicates that produciion capacity lias been increased in anticipation of these and other new military programs These dramatic increases in production floorspace in the strategic missile, spacecraft, aircraft, shipbuilding, and tankall indicate that the Soviets will continue to produce substantial numbers of weapons and other major military equipment over the icst of the decade and into-


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