Soviet Short-Range Ballistic Missiles and the Impactan on Long-Range INF Missiles!
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SOVIET SHORT-RANGE BALLISTIC MISSILES AND THE IMPACTAN ON LONG-RANGE INF MISSILES
InformalUblc tu ofied ID Ihe preparation ol* ihi* Aueumenl
This paper assesses the current status and future prospects of the Soviet SRBM force, and it also examines the possible impact on this forceS-Soviet arms control agreement that substantially reduces or eliminates the Soviet LR1NF missile force. LRINF missiles are generally considered to be those land-based missiles possessing an operational rangeilometers; the Soviet Union currently fieldsndissiles in this rangeT
In the event of an elimination or substantial reduction of LRINF coverage of Western Europe, the Soviets would attempt toompensatory targeting scheme. To completely cover the targeting responsibilities of the LRINF missile force would require the useombination of delivery vehicles including ICBMs, SLBMs. SRBMs, long-range cruise missiles, and aircraft. The Soviets would, in an LRliMF-free environment, have numerous targeting and force structure options available, and it is not possible to predict confidently the mix of delivery vehicles and targeting assignments they would select under these circumstances. Nevertheless, the Soviets could use the current SRBM force to absorbmall portion of the existing LRINF mission set,onsiderable augmentation of the SRBM force would permit the Soviets to use it to compensate more substantiallyargeting substitution scheme; those observations and the technical capabilities of the Soviet SRBM force have led officials in theof State and Defense to request this assessment. |
The Agencies participating in this Assessment were: Theof Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency; The DefenseAgency; and the Bureau of intelligence and Research.of State. Q
' LRINF lotoo abo include aircralL butue nut Included in iho cu'i-enl INF arrni control orotXKibol ihe Soviet UnMn c* the United Slates thin, an analvnio! LRINF alio nil hai col been included
The Soviets' short range ballistic missile (SRBM) force is becoming an increasingly important component in their operational combat planning against NATO Developments observed in recent years reflect both the greater role the Soviets envision for their SRBM force against NATO, and their efforts to make this force even more capable In carrying out its mission. These developments include:
Tbe fieldnf neweras thend in small numbers thelaunch units opposite NATO.
The developmenteries of improved conventional munition warheads, each with tailored antimaterial and antipersonnel characteristics to maximize their destructiveness against specific NATO targets.
An increase in the number of refire missiles held byaunch units in East Germany.
The ongoing restructuring of Sovielorces in Eastand Czechoslovakia by removing bunch battalions from divisions and forming them into army-level missile brigades
A robust research and development program currently under way that is designed to improve SRBM accuracy, develop additional improved conventional warheads, and incorporate new missile technologies to enhance performance and rehabil-
These improvements to the force are designed, in large port, to expand its effectiveness in conventional operations against NATO. SRBMs, however, continue toritical nuclear delivery role in Soviet fire-support doctrine, and their improved accuracy permits the Soviets, among other things, to use lower yield warheads to carry out strikes while maintaining acceptable probabilities of target destruction. The expanding role ior SRBM operations in fire-support plannins will motivate the Soviets lo continue the modernization of their force through further deployment of newer missiles, and fielding priority will continue to be given to those launch units opposite NATO. The
pace of modernization, in the absence of arms control constraints, is generally forecast to be gradual For example, we protect thatven opposite NATO, there still will be more FROCs thannd more Scuds than, the older missiles will be the dominant force component east of tbe Urals as well. The availability of these newer missiles, however, will permit some growth in the overall size of the force (tooviet SRBM launchers opposite NATO,uch launchers east of the Uralss older systems "trickle down" to forces projected to be established, or to other units whoseof launchers is forecast to be expanded.
Should an arms controleached that reduces sultsian-tially or eliminates the long-range INF (LRINF) missile force, we believe that the Soviets would attempt toompensatory targeting scheme that maintains most, if not all of their nuclear targeting coverage of Westernomplete absorption of tne LRINF targeting mission would involve numerous deli verythe extent that they were not constrained by other arms controlintercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),ballistic missilesircraft, long-range cruise missiles, and SRBMs. Indeed, we judge that the Soviets could cover all the time-urgent targets in the European theater bymall percentage of their ICBM warheads to the theater.| ]
With respect to SRBMs, theystem, from positions now occupied in Eastern Europe, has the range capability necessary lo reach most of the targets wc judge are currently assigned to the long-range INF missile force; theRBM, if moved into the forward area, would be capable of reachingmall percentage of ihosc targets. Regardless, the number of warheads onndaunchers in range of NATO currently is lessercent of the number of suchndRINF warheads now deployed in the western USSR; and the Sovietorce opposite NATO currently is projected to grow by only someaunchers over the nextears (although the number ofaunchers in the Soviet force opposite NATO is expected to expand more rapidly loaunchers by tlie
We cannot determine the compensatory targeting scheme the Soviets would select to substitute for LRINF targeting coverage, but we judge it likely lhal they would incorporatetliendesser degree theoth of which are insuch planning. Any plan that would in the main employ SRBMs to cover LRINF targetingcourse of action by the Soviets that we judge toonsiderable enlargement of the SRBM force structure facing NATO's Cenlral
evelopment (or which we currently have mi evidence.argeting scheme also would require significant changes In the Soviet1 command and planning structure. Although these changes would be disruptive over the short term, we judge that the Soviets would be able to establish an SRBM force, command, logistic, and planning structure to prepare and carryodestly expanded nuclear targeting roleew years. Large-scale expansion of thendorces toonsiderable share of the targeting duties currently held by Soviet LRINF missiles would take at least several additional years and probably would be detectable by the US Intelligence Communityear after deployments had
Since the, tactical missiles and rockets have constituted the primary nuclear striking arm of the Soviet Groundarly missiles andas thendwhich compelled the Soviets to develop and deploy nuclear warheads with yields of os-er JOO kllotons for these systems to compensate for their Inaccuracy. In the, newer missiles and rockets becameas theodcud B, andhad improved accuracy and system reliability. By the, these systems had been widely fielded with Soviet forces opposite NATO and in other theaters. During this same time, nudcar warheads of lessilotonsigh-explosive warhead were deployed, thereby providing Soviet snorl-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs) with low-yield nuclear and limited conventional capabilities against large and soft targets. The primary mission for the SRBM throughout this period, nevertheless,the delivery of nuclear fire in support of ground force operations. (Seeor past trends in deployments)
Beginning in the, two forcetrends were emerging that made possible changes in the role of SRBMs in Soviet combat planning. First, nuclear artillery became available for the Soviet Ground Forces commander,ore effective means of delivering proximate, low-yield nuclear fire in support of maneuvering troops. Second, more accurateas thend,heegan to be fielded along with improved conventional warheads. This enabled the Soviets for the first time to regard Iheir SRBMs as duai-capable systems in terms of their delivery role, and toomprehensive SRBM convenllonal strike mission as part of their operational planning
Soviets use thecier lo mucin subordtruie to tank and oiotorUcd riOe demons, and the term "operiilHirial-ikdical missile" to refer to longer isngc missiles sxibor-dUitte to (ranti and anntM. It* US liuelliacnoe Community clawibes allwilli rangeiilometershort-ranee ballfotKgainst NATO. Thus, we fudge that the Soviets'on the operational role of the SRBM noweduced requirement for close nuclear strikes to support maneuvering troops, and an expanded mission for conventional attacks throughout the depth of the enemy's |
The SRBM force Structure ond Performance Chorocteristics
orce Sfnicfwre. The Soviet SRBM force today is equipped primarily with ihecud B, andhe SRBM force is Urge in terms of the number of launchers fielded, as table 1although its overall size lias remained largely static during. The limited force growth of Ihe past four years reflects the phasing down and termination of older missile production, the FROC and Scud, by the, and the limited Geldings of newer missiles, thendince thai time.
heissile is forecast lo replace the Scudnc-Ior-one basis in selected missile brigades primarily opposlle NATO. The Scud missile is fielded throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in army and front missile brigades thatS, orssigned launchers The inlilal operational fielding of theccurred in the western USSR5launchcr brigade. I
Juggests that a
secondrigade may soon be operationally fielded. The relatively slow pace oficldings may be the result of developmental or production problems with thewas begun in thealthough there is no evidence to confirm that tin's is the case. | |
caw of operation under baltlefield conditions (see figuren SRBM must possess the improvedoffered by the newer systems in order for it to carry out conventional fire strikes successfully against NATO point target In addition, thereater range than the Scud, which permits it to be used against targets positioned more deeply in NATO's
RBMhe Soviets currently have variety of warheads available for their SRBMs.
hes fielded in four launcher battalions assigned to motorized rifle and tank divisions In Eastern Europe and ihe western USSR;
hes fielded in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in front/military district missile units containingraunchers.
7 In addition lo launchers assigned lo operational units, the Soviets alsomall number of launch-en with training units and al missile lest facilities. There could, in addition, be olber launchers kept in long-term storage.]
8 System Characterittict. The primary lechnical upgrades in newer SRBMs are accuracy, lethality, and
Projected Fielded Soviet SRBM6
e assess that (he total missile per Launcher ratio for thecud, andould be as high asnd probably is not less than lftl The ratio for tbes assessedecause of more limited unit missile lift and transport capabilities, and because theissessed as restrictedto nuclear deliver* These ratios include retire missiles held with the launch units, logistic units, aod at the central storage depots '
oviets are increasing
the number ol retire missiles held bynd possibly Scud launch units in East Germany.
lorrei oppoale NATO Includeioned in Fan Germany. Poland. Ciechcefovaku. Hungary, and theBelo-rusaan, Carpathian. Moscow. Leningrad. Odessa. Klev.Trantcauca-nn. North Caucasus. Ural, and Volga Miliary Din run Additional SRBM launchers held by tbe nan-Soviet Warsaw Pact forcn are indicated in the parenthetical notationi
'Soviet forces in other theaters include those In the Turkestan. Central Allan. Siberian. Trantbaikal. and Far Eail Military Districts.
in tbe number ot relire miadles held by Soviet launch units In East Germany is indicative of the expanded conventional role Soviel planners envision fot these forces in combat operations against NATO.|
The future of Soviet SRBM Forces
orcet protect that the modern-iration of the Soviet SRBM force wiih thendill proceednoderate pace through the, in the absence of any drastic change in other theater nuclear systems Onceroduction is fully under way. for example, the Soviets could deploy two brigades per year by the, and three per year tberealter This estimate reflects tbe likely patterns ol unil converiion and trainingand il is consistent with historical patterns. Tbe large size of the SRBM lore* prevenls dramatic or swift changes to its com position, and even anpace of moderni rat ion beyond that currently projected would still take years lo implement widely. Equipment modernization, however, will permit some growth In the overall size of the force as FROC,Scud, launchers are assigned lo unitsto be established and are used to increaseof launchers in some units.
in the past, SRBM forces oppositereceive priority in modernizationheill continue to replace thewe proied that6 FROCs willSS-2ls. Theelding pattern islo be gradual but steady as the Sovietsreplace the existing Scud forcef the force opposite NATO shouldScud-eouipped, and thetohelf life of ato remain in the SRBM force well intocentury. (This Is possible becausemissiles can be refurbished on an ongoing basisa long serviceven withof thehe Scud would stilt haverole in Soviet military planning,the delivery of nuclear strikesobehind NATO's frontline. If thean improved guidance system on the
they could prolong its useful operattonal life and thereby not have to replace the entire force with the more expensivesee figure
Soviet SRBM force in other theaterslimited modernization and somethe nextean; it still will he dominated by
older systems In the.ieldings arc projected to proceed slowly because new deployments arc expectede concentrated In forces opposite NATO; less than one-tenth of the current FROG force in other theaters is protected to bequippedeignificant increase In the number of Scuds fielded with Soviet forces in the Asian theater as Scuds now opposite NATO are replaced by thend "trickle down" to units projected to beor are used to increase Ihe number of launchers in some units. At the same lime, brigades located in Ihe Asian theater are expected tomall number ofaunchers (see figure 5XJ
he Soviets are expected lo develop andlass missile with improvedincluding better accuracy, andsire of the force of this class of missileto expand by almost half over ihe nextas this new missile is deployed. We baseon the expectation thai ihe Sovietstherigades thai were movedwestern USSR into Eastern Europelass missile system would not reachcapability before the, andthat new Geldings will be focused onexisting unit holdings. Tlie Sovieis could thendisplacedodo reconstitute thebul il is also possible that Ihey will letiiemissiles and form additional units using theonce all existing units arc completelyIf they choose the latter, then thetheorce would not begin to occur.
ystem CiWacrensrit* Wc judge lhatSRBM accuracies through the developmenl of terminal guidance systemsaneuvering reentry vehicle is one of the Soviets' most important SRBM
research and development object ives.
Improve substantially the capability of SRBMs to execute successfully both conventional and low-yield
mproved SRBM accuracy abo increases the lethality of nuclear weapons, permitting moreuse of lower yield nuclear weapons, and il is possible that Ihe Soviets would reduce Ihe warhead yield required for strikes against certain targets if they were delivered by more accurate missiles. Foroperational reasons, the Soviets almost certainly would wish to employ the lowest yield possible in nuclear deliveries while simultaneously maintaining acceptable probabilities of target destruction. Ingreater SRBM accuracies would enable theto develop extremely low-yieldihey
have done In their nuclear artilleryto destroy small targets without the collateral damage orareas oi contain inah'on that accompany large nuclear blasts P
yields would beuseful in striking targets in areas wheremay soon be operating, or where there arethe Soviets plan to capture largely
he Soviets could also choose In the future toultiple independently targetable reentry vehicle capability for (heirRBM.
SRBM Targeting Responsibilities
urrent Role. The Soviets currentlyvariety of NATO targets to their SRBMs. I
I rimary junction ot
i,rit.r, iu,. of NATO'sweapon facilities and delivery systems Inhowever, the Soviets now reflect aon their SRBMs to attack these targetscm nana/ operations using improved
e judge thai SRBM force trendsihe lSSQs. Including the fielding of(he robust research and developmentto improve SRBM accuracy and produceconventional warheads, and ihe increase inof retire missiles held by SRBM units Inare manifestationsoviet plan toweapons more extensively in conventional
2S. The operalional advantages offered byon SRBMs lo fulfill fire-supportconsiderable The SRBM can reach deepquickly than any other Ground Forcesmissions with high system reliability,even heavily defended targets withsince NATO currently has no capabilitiesballistic missiles Thesecritical when attacking the large number oftargets (he Soviets plan to destroy Withof improved conventional warheads, Ihecould tailor attacks to maximiie theirspecific types of targets In addition,are truly dual-capable systems that can beconventional ami nuclear operations. Suchflexibility improves tbe Soviets'atrntegy by permitting them tu use SRBMsoperations while withholding part offor nuclear strikes
he SRBM, nevertheless, retains Ils rolerimary vehicle for delivering nuclear strikes against NATO in Soviet operational planning.
circumstances, Ihe SRBM will maintain this critical fire-support function in Soviet operational planning.
uture Force. We project that the expanding role for SRBMs in Soviet conventional combat strike planning against NATO will necessilate growth in the force- Force expansion, in the absence of hardb forecast to be gradual; il will be largely accomplished by retaining older launchers In the active inventory while newer systems are introduced into operalional units. This would enable the Soviets lo establish additional launch units and increase ihe number of launchers assigned to existing units. The end of older mmile production and the moderate pace
ol deployment projected for newei systems, however, will prevent substantial short-term increases in the size of ihe overall SRBM force. The Soviets* program io increase the number of refire missiles available per launcher might lead them to expand the size of the launcher force more gradually]
Assumption ol LRINF Nuclear Targotine/ Coverogo
Thrattr^ltatetic Targeting. SRBMs. artillery, and aircraft are the primary nuclear delivery means ofSoviet front commander The front is responsible for developing and executing 6re missions associated with the accomplishment of its obiectives Thesetypically will be locatedilometers of the most forward positions of Soviet frontal lurces. The targets falling within frontwould br- adjusted as the course of conflict produced significant changes In the geography of operations* Soviet theater-strategic forces would be responsible lor targets located beyond this range The Soviet General Staff would be responsible fornudcar targeting for both frontal and theater strategic
The Soviet LRINF arsenal availableeyond the frontal *one in nuclear strike operations consists of bombers and land-based and suhmaiinr launched missiles. The land based strategic missiles available for use in theater-strategic targeting of NATO include thehe SSI and some intercontinental ballisticnd SS II Theorce comprise* the Largest number of delivery vehicles and warheads in the Soviets' Iheater-atiatespc arsenal Wc estimate that the Soviets cunentlv have plans toaunchers (with three warheads per launcher) against NATO, and all targets in Europe arc within their range. |
SO 'riie Soviets also are developing auntround-launched cruiseThis system, which Is projected towithin the next year, could altack hiedmobile targets In tbe LRINF mission setindicate that any LRINF armswould include CLCMs as well asthus, this system would beompensatory role in an LRINr"-ftee
31 We csllmale.l
that the Soviet ihealcr-stralc-gir targeting base inEurope includesixed and mobile targets that can be roughly divided into fourNATO's capability to wage nuclear war; NATO's capability to employ nonnuclear forces, the military-ecorwrnic establishment, and.control lust over half of these targets probably would be consider ed by the Soviets as timebe attacked promptly at the commencement of large-scale nuclear operation* because they are critically importantonflict The vast majority of (he targets in NATO Europe are "soft"vulnerable to Ihe effects ol nuclear
liu:iy arc Colocalcd]
f the theater targets assigned to slralegic forces,ixed targets could be considered time urgent. I
(orcet lie eirecltdutr In dlrret battle -ilhwcm. movliiH actus enemy leiithin ptest-ribedn pmrnhed liene periods, and al ptettribed tain ul advance loipn-iK> immediate, and wnieiivetil nbaeilivei |
StrMrgKlour, air eeaaniaed amo thr SlrMeaDe RociM
the An Foam aead the Navy and are bataal ia peaceme In it. USSReean of ranee lioai thotr that on arudtheater laraen on the USSR's pcriphni io ihoae lhal Car. altar* both peiiphnal urartt and large*.
al inleriemlInentnl (ana* In thii timr.it. Ihr (attribution ol
OraieRic ufirmn itstemiimdirntod (larutei onte uai ihe "thearni ur.tearic"
argeting Reauirtmenli Under Phased he-duetiont We have calculated ihef head requirements for targeting lime-urtenl targets inboth under the current INF levels, and under levels that might exist under phased INF reductions, fornd zero LRINF missilesomiiaio (lie number of warheads on LRINF missiles lhal would be available and reliable under these different INF levels with the number lhat would be needed to meet Soviet requirement* against fixed targets, as well as to attack suspected operating areas of dispersednd CLCM units.
3S, Shortfallhows that,2he number of availableLRINF warheads is adequate to attacktargets beyond the area of frontaland operating areas ofdAs LRINF systems are reduced,Sovietshortfall In LRINFthe final leduction level, zeroaunchers,risesarheads. Al eachhowever, the Soviets can eliminate tbrreplacingith other systems, at shown in
oviet planningowever,would necessitate tbe allocation of more weapons to meet targeting goals than depicted in table 3|
ilumeteis) Many other combinations of systems are postible to replacend make up Ihe shortfall, depending on the course of ihe conflict und the available nuclear reserve Even if theorce is reduced lo /era. the reallocation of about NO ICBMs and SOrCBMsRBMs. could achieve Soviet damage goals against all time-urgent targets in NATO Europe This retargeting, however, could adverselv affect the fulfillment of missions currently axiagned to the reallocated systems. |' ' |
ther solutions are possible through shiftinglo available alternate weapon systems, suchaircraft or SLBMs against someor through adjustments in operationalpractices by concentrating ihe attack onImportant targets. For example, the Sovieistheir attack against Pcrshing-Ils andsubset of targets in the NATO targetoperating areas for these with aboutnumber of warheads needed against fiied
hb analysis suggests that, in the absence of other arms control constraints, even if the USSR gives up all of itsn exchange for the elimination of all Pershlng-lls and GLCMs, ll would still be able to cover the NATO lime-urgent target Set by reiving on other systems. The Sovieii could meet their targeting requirements by allocatingercent of the current ICBM warheads to the theater, or less thanercent If the shorter rangendre used lo cover some of the closer tune-urgent targets | 1
hether or to what extent such reallocations of weapons would upset overall Soviet nuclear targeting plans, however, is unclear. Although the substitution of ICBMs and SRBMs for LRINFimple to conceive, il may be difficult for tbe Soviets to execute In some operational situations. Allocating Urgeof ICBMs and SRBMs to strategic missions in Europe, for example, could be at Ihe expense of Soviet capabilities lo complete intercontinental or frontal missions, especially if the Soviet arsenal were severely damagedarge-scale US and NATO nuclear attack. Nevertheless, tbe fact that the Sovieti have proposed reducing LRINF missiles In Europe to zero sui?gests lhat they have though! ihrough theproblems associated with offsetting shortfalls In2
ompensatory Targeting Schemet The etist-ini: SRBM force, by itself, could only partiallyfor LHINF coverage because many targets lie beyond Ils range, and Ihe Soviets would have to rely
Illustrative Allocation* of Soviet ICBMs and SRBMs To Offset Reductions in Longer Range INF Missiles: Attacks Against Time-Urgent Targets in NATO Europe
CurrentBallistic Dallulle Minis*
VVu- Warhredi Re-
r-oauU.Axibble owed AaaM
Allocation, ol ICBMs and SB BMs To Compensate lor
number of allocated -nrheaifanoi easily matchshorrfall because targeting with ICBMs and SRBMs isasUttering vahSSZOs
The* reouUemonti are (or the ma.imum number of time-urgent tartets In Ihe European target let and thui represent ihe upper tMind ol Soviel requirement. **
on other delivery vehicles Io compensate fully for lost targeting coverage. Moreover, the number olonndaunchers in range of NATO currently is lessercent of the number of suchndRINF warheads now deployed in the western USSR. The type of compensatory targeting scheme the Soviets would choose would depend on many factors, including whether an arms control
Eliminated or only reduced the LRINF force.
Affected the SRBM force, such as by freezing or reducing its size or mix of systems; or if it constrained only certain SRBMs, for example, by regulating missiles with rangesr more kilometers.
Limited ICBMs. SLBMs, or heavy bombers.
Affected the availability of other nuclearsystems, such as tactical aircraft, tbat also could be employed to attack NATO largets.
n compensating fully for lost LRINF missile coverage of Western Europe, live Soviets would have lo use strategic systems to reach the most distantargets. Although the Soviets already target some bombers and probably some ICBMs and SLBMs against Western Europe, we cannot determine what additional percentage of delivery systems, if any. they would be willing to divert from intercontinental and otherillingness toignificant number of strategic systems to theater attacks would depend in part on how such systems are limited by an arms control agreement. Tbe Soviets might want the Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF) to retain targeting rc-sponiibllities now assigned to LRINF coverage | |
se of SRBMs. An assessment of the locations of the targets included in the Soviets* theater-strategic mission indicates that the majority of them areilometers of Ihe borders with the Warsaw Pact states. Forward-basedissiles would possess ihe ranee bul not the number of warheads on launchers necessary lo cover many of these targets in an initial strike from Warsaw Pact territory. Theould be targeted only from forward deployments in Eastern Europe against the small percentage of theater-strategic Utrgets that fall upilometers beyond the forward position of Pact forces. Because of their range limitations, the Scud.nd FROG would be unsuited to cover from home bases largets currently contained in the theater-strategic mission. |
targets, greatly improved accuracies and new nuclear warheads for SRBMs would, therefore, not befor ihxs force to conduct nuclear strikes now assigned to Ihe LRINF missile force. | |
"SS-IBsDot oVplovedSonet foioo In Fasein Europe beginningex*>nse. accordinx tn Soviet oftlclDls, to US Pershing.II and CLCM dcplnvmeat) in Westernnlinenits were icdcployed Irom tbe USSR into East Cermanv and OaechoOo-BkiaQ
In using the SRBM force to substitute for LRINF missile targeting coverage, Soviet planners would have to rely almost exclusively on then using this missile, however, the Soviets would probably design attack plans around East European-based42only launchers positioned there could reach theater-strategic targets from home bases (seehe Soviets may abo believe lhat some opportunity might esist prior to the onset of combat to move USSR-basedo Easternare anotheraunchers in the western military districts of the USSR. | |
The time required for anrnit to redeploy from the Weslem USSRastern Europe would depend heavily on the sense of urgencyby the Sovieis to tlie move.inimum, anrnit could complete the redeployment in six days The movement ofnits from the Asian military districts to the Western USSR wouldinimum of two weeks, depending on Ihe peacetime location of the unit. Thb estimate reflects the time required for the unil lo prepare to vacate Its garrison, proceedail station. load equipment on the train, complete the Journey, offload the train, conduct equipment checks and maintenance, proceed to an operationaln, and establish operational readiness.
ugmenting SRBM Production f
lhal many Soviet defense industry plants normally operate at much less than their total production capacity. This iheorcticallylanl Ihe capacity lo increase production substantially: however, without increasing subsystem production, the Soviets would be able lo maintain this increasenly relatively short period ol lime. II thr Soviets decided to utilize thb additional capacity, live increase In production would be initialederiod of several months, probably by increasing ihe number of work hours per employee and by using reserve plan! space Problems Inherent in lite Sovietas slow supply ol raw materials. Buctuating quality control, aod social problems like drinking on ihewould probably restrict the actual production capabilities of these production plants to something less than the estimated total capacity. | |
is The Soviet)i*-di-lious reasons, to gel as much Immediate Increase out of the existing component facilities and missile assembly facilities as possible, perhaps by as much asercent during the brti year after an LRINF agreement is readied. Any significant increase in pioductionhowever, would involve considerable effort andonger period of rime An Increase in production
ofercent might be reached after the first two years,urther Increase loercent in an
his Increase ofoercent in SRBM pioduction would probably have lo be done In one of two ways:
Production facilities for missile* and missile aaaociated equipment lhat are banned by an LRINF agreement could be modified for SRBM production Thiseat ion would involveof the production lines and retraining of the labor force. Lines lo be modified would include those for guidance and controlmotor case and canister fabrication, solid-propellanl rocket motor production, production of other misule components, and missileas well as production lines for missile-associated ground support equipmettl. Wethai this process could take anywhere from one to two years, depending on Ihe compleiity of the components bring pioduced and iherequited to produce them.
New assembly buildings could be built and fitted out. This would typically take three or more years If newrod net ion areas were also necessary, then an increase in missilewould be constrained by longertimes (five years) for more complexproduction areas such as those tor solid motor production ^
ore* Structure If the Soviets were forced to rely exclusively on their SRBMs to compensate fur lost LRINF missile targeting coverage, there probably would he considerable changes In the SRBM force structure compared wiih lhal protected earlier,eduction in tbe number of targets that could be covered because of range restrict Kim on SRBMs Changes in the SRBM force could include:"
significant increase in theorce beyond lhat already projected Currently, theorce, unconstrained by aims control, is protected to increase toauncherspercent increase) hy the, and equipment rnodcrnixalioii will occur as anntroduced
basing of an expandedorce probably would be concentrated in the western USSR Currently, only onetationed In this region, and we project the Soviets wul reconstitute ibe units that were redeployed into Eastern Europe4 In addition, newnits could also be created
aunchers could be added to rusting units in Eastern Euiope. or newnits could he established there unless an arms agreement restricted such actions. (Tbe Soviets already have stated thenits will be withdrawn from Eastern Europe back into the USSR upon the signing of an LRINFhe establishmenl ofrnits in Eastern Europe would require four to six months of coral ruction to build new inslalUtions lo house iliem Tbe Soviets currently haveunchers stationed in the forward area which, given theIs3ilc-per-laurKher ratio held by launch units, couldinimum cfissiles for use against both time-urgent and non-time-urgent targets.
"The loliowmrt Judgment! aredependenti lieol any LRJrYP agreement, narlicvlarlrany limits on thendorcei, or onli ranees ol leublooieler.
A substantial growth in the number o(cfirc missilrs Thr availability ol laige numbers of retires, and the taw oi reloading SRBMis practiced regulaily bythat the Soviets would cover some NATO targets with retire missiles in follow-up strikes, particularly those tbat are not timeTo the extent that the Soviets identified additional non time -urgent targets in NATO, there would be leuequirement fortheauncher arsenal
Command of theorce might revert back to the SRF. When originally fielded in, theystem was subordinate to the SRF. Inommand of Ihe system wasto the Ground Forces If theorce were eliminated or substantially reduced, it Is possible that Iheould wish to reacquire theecause of its suitability in delivering theater strikes. The transfer of the SSorce wouldignificant alteration in the SRF command, control, and communicationsespecially if units continued to be based In Eastern Europe
If theemained with the Ground Forces, those opposite NATO's Central Region almost certainly would be directly subordinate to the High Command of Foices in ihe Western Tbr-ater iney function of ihe High Command is lo plan and direct fire missions throughout the depth of the theater. The success of attacks involving SRBMs, air forces, naval forces, and perhaps olher strategic deliverywould be dependent on iheir coordination and execution. The theater commander, Inwith Soviet General Stall guidance,would be best suited to plan and direct this activity
Becausetationed in Easl Germany and Czechoslovakia could reachmallof the targets assigned lo LRINF missiles, it is possible that the Soviets might devote some portion of the force for thb purpose Theowever, isrontal system, and its limited operational range seriously inhibits its utility against such targets. Therefore, we Judge that fewould be assigned to fill in fot LRINF missiles If they were used in this role, the missiles probably woukl also be under the direct superviiiou of ihe theater commander.
Although we eorisider it unlikely. It is abothat,ubstantially reduced otLRINF missile force, the Sovieis mightloew or modified SRBMange between thendissile would be able Ioreater portion of theater Urge! coverage than thend il would allow theo be used exclusively in frontalthe Soviets originallyIn developing theonger range SRBM also would permit the Soviets moreflrxlliility and not compel them to rely primarily on Ihcn fulfilling SRBM theater fire missions
he extent lo which the Soviet! would rely on SRBM forces to cover theater targets previouslyto ibe LRINF missile force would be difficult to determine immediately If the Soviets chose to use SRBMs to assume coverageizable number of theater targets, we would anticipate seeing several developments that, over time, couldood indication of the SRBM's role in the revised targeting scheme These probably would include:
An Increase in the SRBM force structure end the table of organization and equipment of SRBM units Significant changes in Ihe SRBM force would become apparent relatively qutcklv
An increase in the SRBM-associated nuclearlogistic, and transport capability to support expanded nuclear delivery missions
An increase in SRBM missile and tounchcr peo-ductlon through increased output at existingthe conversion of existing plants lo SRBM production, and the construction of new SRBM facilities. |
ver the slsorl lerm. adjustments lo ihe SRBM force to accommodate expanded targetingwould be disruptive. Some planning problemsifficult lo overcome easily, such as the greateras perceived by So* letforward-based SRBMs to attack by NATO when compared with USSR-based strategic missile systems. We judge, nevertheless, thai thewould be able lo develop th* SRBM force structure and oprrational planning returned to carry oultargeting responsibilities effectively. *^Original document.