Soviet and Cuban Objectives and Activity in Southern Africa8 pi
Nationalimalc Memorandum to Holders
this estimate is issued by the director of central intelligence.
the national foreign intelligence board concurs.
The following intelligence organizations participated in the preparation of the Estimate:
The Central Intelligence Agency, the Defeme Intelligence Agency, the Notional Security Agency, ond the intelligence organizationthe Department of State.
Also Participating;
The Assistant Chief of Slat? for Inlefcgence, Deportment of the Army The Director of Naval Inteitgence. Deportment of the Navy The Assistant Chief of Staff. Intelligence. Deportment of 'he Air Force The Director ol Intelligence, heodquorters. Marine Corps
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5
soviet and cuban objectives and activity in southern africa through
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contents
Page
SCOPE
KEY
The Regional
Combjectives and Commitment
Important Problems Remain
Motives and Key Variables
Angola
More Likely Scenario: Steady Pressure. Limited
Less Likely Scenario: Major South African Escalation
I-ong-term Strategy
Mozambique
More Likely Scenario: Indecisive
l.css Likely Alternative Scenario: Rapid
Second Alternative Scenario- Gradual
South Africa: Long-Range Approach
Other Frontline
Implications for tlie United
SCOPE NOTE
This Memorandum lo Holders updales our assessment of Soviet and Cuban policies in southern Africa in light of the events of the past two years and looks ahead two years. We have expanded somewhat our consideration of the Cuban role in the region and of Soviet Bloc long-range objectives and policies toward South Africa.| ]
The main focus of5 Estimate was the challengesthe Soviet and Cuban position in southern Africa at tliat time. The Estimate captured those challenges, which included the Nkomati and Lusaka accords, Angolan and Mozambican economic problems, UNITA military success, and the US-brokered negotiations and predicted Moscow's responses quite well. For example, the Community expected the Soviets to point up the futility of negotiating with South Africa while wailing (or Nkomati and Lusaka lo collapse due to their "internal conlradictions" and relying on their allies' military dependence to guarantee continued Soviel influence. The Soviets successfully followed this approach as tlic last two years have shown. Also, the Estimale noted Ihat the USSR would use its leverage to discourage tlteesponse that the Soviets played out in subsequent months. Key questions of interest tohow the Soviets would respond to Lusaka. Nkomati. and the Namibiaand how they would seek to expand their influencewere answered in the Estimate. | |
Critical analysis of5 Estimate indicates that:
The range of alternative scenarios in ihe Angolan case was. in retrospect, too narrow. Tjie Estimate considered theof further UNITA military gains and ofamibia settlement and some level of Cuban troop withdrawal. However, it did not look at the possibilityetermined Soviet and Cuban-backed MPLANITA underestimation of itsituation that materialized later
The implications of failure of US-backed regional negotiations was not explored in sufficient detail, perhaps since this was treading too close to US policy interests at ihe time.
-MCftTr-
We may have overestimated Cuban interest in at least partial withdrawal from Angolat is equally likely, however, lhat there was indeed such interest at the time, and thatore recent affirmations of his intent to keep forces iu Angolairtually open-ended periodirect and persona! reversal of policy on his part.
Then as now. naps in intelligence coverage, especially on the military situation in Mozambique and Angola, made it difficult to raise the confidence level of our analysis of many aspects of Soviel and Cuban policy in the region.|
]
KEY JUDGMENTS
Change in Ihe Regional Outlook
Short-term Soviet and Cuban objectives in southern Africa have remained consistent over the past two years. These objectives, which tbey will continue to actively pursue over the nextonths, include:
Supporting their clients. Angola and Mozambique, against internal and external threats, albeitonsiderably greater commitment to Angola than to Mozambique.
Preserving Soviet military access in Angola and Mozambique.
Increasing Soviet Bloc influence in other stales at the expense of the West.
Extracting maximum propaganda value from Westernwith South Africa.
Undermining any Western initiatives that would threaten Soviet Bloc influence in the rceion.
Improving their position lo take advantage of developments in South Africa and toro-Soviet regime there using the ANC as their preferred instrument.
Since5 Estimate, events in southern Africa have alleviated some of tbe challenge* that confronted Soviet and Cuban pursuit of theseS-sponsored accord reducing Cuban presence and Soviet Influence in the region, especially Angola, failed lo materialize; the West did not offset their influence in Angola and Mozambique by providing significant economic aid; and South Africa did not impose its political and military domination over the region in the aftermath of the Nkomati and Lusaka accords. P
Moscow and Havana face many factors that still work to thwart So viet and Cuban achievement of their goals in theAfrican military predominance, ANC and SWAPO operational sveakness. Soviet and Cuban inability to help their clients in Angola and Mozambique overcome insurgencies or build their economics, suspicion on the part of many states of Soviet motives, and the wider diplomatic and economic connections of ihe United Stales and the West. However, we believe that, on balance, Moscow and Havana are more confident now lhan in
hat trends in the region arc not running against them. While economic constraints may affect somewhat the resources they devote to the region, their commitment to pursuit of their goals in southern Africa will remain consistent. As the security situation in the region worsens, Soviet and Cuban opportunities to expand their influence will grow.
Soviet attention to southern Africa has increased in recent years, and the Soviets are pursuing long-term objectives in Angola and South Africa. Soviet objectives and policies in southern Africaix of ideological, state interest, and opportunistic motivations. Criticalthat will affect the course of Soviet policy in the region include the security situation of the Luanda and Maputo regimes; South African willingness to Intervene militarily in Angola, Mozambique, and other Frontline States; the success of Western policies in bringing about change in South Africa and the South African internal situation; anddomestic economic constraints and political considerations. i
Angola
While Angola has been the major priority of the USSR in southern Africa since the, its importance in Soviet eyes probably increased even more over the past year due to US intervention on belialf of UNITA. Angola offers the USSR an opportunity to respond to this challenge under favorable military and political conditions:
Our most likely scenario sees live Soviets continuing to build Angolan military strength while encouraging Luanda to keep steady pressure on UNITA through graduated offensiveIn the event of limited Angolan-South Africanthe Soviets probably would encourage Cuban units to help the Angolans, but probably would not substantiallythe role of their own advisers.
In the eventouth African escalation of the conBict that threatened major Angolan formations, we believe that Moscow's preferred option would be to have Cuban troorM assume the burden of helping Angolanequest to which Castro would probably accede. The Soviets might also expand the role of some advisers to include combat functions and increase the quality and quantity of military deliveries, but we believe that they are highly unlikely to use their own combat formations in Angola.
Moscow's and Havana's long-term strategy iu Angola appears to rely on the extension of Angolan air defense capabilities and increased military proficiency to restrict Soulh African ability to resupply UNITA and damage Angolan forces, thereby enabling
the Angolans gradually to bottle up the insurgents.Soviets seem to believe thai the insurgency will, for areasons including the diminishing of external supportbecome less viable over time. Fidel Castro inhis commitment to keep Cuban forces in Angola onown-ended
Mozambique
Though Mozambiquereaty .of friendship and cooperation with the USSR andonsistent supporter of the Soviets on international issues, Moscow has not made the kind of commitment to the FREL1MO regime that it has to the Angolans. While Maputo's military plight remains serious, Zimbabwean military intervention slowed insurgent momentum and relieved the ruling FRELIMO party" and the Soviets of having to deal immediatelyear-term RENAMO threat to the survival of the regime. The insurgents will continue to retain substantial momentum, but we do not see RENAMO posing an immediate military challenge to FRELIMO's political Surviv-all |
More Likely Scenario: Indecisive Fighting. The Kremlin will continue its military and economic backing of Maputo, though arms deliveries are down and Moscow may well keep the scale of its aid at relatively low levels over the next few years in view of Mozambique's dismal economic situation, inability to pay. and inability to absorb new military equipment. The Soviets will almost certainly continue to encourage and assist African efforts to help Mozambique fend off the insurgents. This option reduces Soviet Bloc costs and exposure and opens possibilities for better relations with Frontline States such as Tanzania and Zimbabwe, The Soviets will seek to extract political andadvantage by playing up their support foraction against RENAMO. Al the same time, they will probably seek to discourage Mozambican participation in anymilitary arrangements that would threaten to reduce Maputo's dependence on Soviet advisory support. [
Less Likely Alternate Scenarios: Rapid Deterioration. We see two other less likely scenarios worthy of comment. It is unlikely that RENAMO will pose, over the span of thisirect threat to the survival of Ihe FRELIMO government. However, if FRELIMO resistance were to disintegrate quickly and the rebels beosition to take Maputo, tlie Soviets in our judgment would be unlikely to escalate
s
their involvement and shoulder the high costs of preventing the takeover themselves. They would probably generate an international clamorolitical solution. The Cubans would likely follow the Soviet lead in this instance. |
Second Alternative Scenario: Gradual Deterioration. In the somewhat more likely event that Maputo's security situation continually worsens over the next two years, we believe that Moscow and Havana would respond 6rst by encouraging Maputo's Frontline neighbors to increase their support. Second, they would increase their ownradual pace consistent with Mozambique's ability to absorb thehelp Maputo protect key cities and roads. An increased Cuban troop presence might wellart of this expanded support. Any significant augmentation of the Cuban military presence would greatly increase risks of large-scale conflict with South Africa,
Namibio/SWAPO
Namibiaow Soviet priority now that the prospectS-bro-kercd deal has faded. Moreover, the Soviets appear to be concerned about SWAPO's Ideological reliability, cohesion, and military potential. The Soviets and Cubans will continue to provide SWAPO with arms, training, advisory, and propaganda support, but probably will not increase their aid to themilitary effectiveness isthe Angolan situation stabilizes!
South Africa and the ANC
While the Soviets acknowledge that their current ability toevents in South Africa is limited, they anticipate that the eventual breakdown of white rule and the emergenceevolutionary situation there will open the wayro-Soviet government using the ANC as their principal instrument. We expect the USSR to continue its current actions of supplying arms to the ANC. championing its cause in thearena, funncling support to the South African Communist Party to ensure its influence within the ANC. backing Western and Third World antiapartheid campaigns, and promoting the ANC as the leader of the antiapartheid movement inside South Africa. The Cubans have made longstanding opposition toore central issue in their foreign policy, and will probably continue to encourage the ANC to step up military activity inside the Republic of South Africa. They may also increase the financial backing and number of advisers and trainers they provide to the ANC.P
Other States
Moscow most likely will try and build on the past yearsin bilateral ties to Zimbabwe by closing an arms deal and.the Cubans, supporting President Mugabe in his role asthe Nonaligned Movement.however, thai
the Kremlin is proceeding cautiously-j
warv of hping
used bymatched by Zimbabwean suspicions of tlie Soviets The Soviets will also probe the interest of Frontline States Zambia and Botswana with offers of arms for defense against South Africa, seeking to use new arms deals, as they have in Tanzania, toflagging political
Implications for the United States
Moscow and Havana continue to demonstraic their long-term commitment to their Angolan ally even in the face of US aid to UNITA and are probably willing lo escalate that support as necessary to contain the UNITA Ihreat. While tliey are probably less willing to increase their commitmenl to Mozambique, open Western support for RENAMO would probably lead the USSR and Cuba to consider upping the ante there as well. Nonetheless, they appear far from being able to help their clients overcome the insureencies in tlie foreseeable future.^
The Sovicls will almost certainlyinor economicsouthern Africa. The political benefits the West obtains frompredominance will probably vary directly with theof aid it is able to give to states in theopen new opportunities for the USSR in now
While the USSR will pursue targets of opportunity inthrough arms offers, economic constraints will probablyto be less generous than in the past on credits andThis will almost certainly limit the attractiveness of theirmay generate resentment on the part of those whoterms in ihe
The Kremlin most likely will be willing to discuss southern Africa with the United States in bilateral exchanges to obtain information and intelligence on US plans and proposals and may also put forward regional initiatives of its own. The Soviets will strongly oppose US diplomatic initiatives or any regional process thai excluded them or promised to reduce their influence, especially any Western attempts toelilement in South Africa thai did not leave the ANCtrong position. I-
We believe lhat any confidence that the Soviets and Cubans may have that the white regime in South Africa will, over the medium term, turn inward due to its internal problems andess active role in the region would be misplaced andisreading of Pretoria'sto pursue its regional policies and its determination to support UNITA. Also, while some Soviet observers acknowledge UNITA's intrinsic strengthiable political force, we believe that Soviet and Cuban policies nonetheless continue lo underestimate the viability of both Ihe UNITA and RENAMO insurgencies
Any Soviet and Cuban failure to appreciate tire potential of UNITA and RENAMO to remain viable over the long term would present them with some polity dilemmas in the next few years Their apparent strategy of gradually building the military capability of their clients while avoiding substantial costs and risks may not prove_ sufficient to prevent substantial insurgent gains.rj"
Moscow and Havana will continue to have several opportunities to expand their influence and undermine US interests in tlie region:
The Frontline States may be open to expanded armswith the USSR, especially if South African military pressure intensifies.
International and African audiences will be increasinglyto Soviet propaganda accusing the West of supporting apartheid and portraying Moscow as the natural ally ofSouth African blacks
-The external prestige of the ANC will probably continue to increase even as ils internal capabilities will remain limited, enhancing the Soviet imageongtime backer of the ANC.
Any improvement in the military situation of Soviet clients Angola and Mozambique will offer opportunities for Moscow to upgrade support to SWAPO and the ANC.
A sharp decline in Western economic aid could strengthen hardline pro-Soviets in Frontline Stales at tlie expense of more moderate leaders.'-
discussion
Regional Dimension
ihc previous Estimate was publishedthe Following events and trends have unfoldedAfrica:
The United States hasrogram of military support for UNITA, directlyoviet ally. At the same time, the US-sponsored regional negotiations collapsed
The African National Congress bas attracted increased support on the world stage whileoperationally weak inside South Africa. Meanwhile, the importance of apartheid on the African. Western, and international agendas has intensified.
Angola and Mozambique have not obtained the levels of economic aid thev were seeking from the West.
Frontline States, fearful of South Africanhave sought arms from both East and West.
ariety of reasons. Soviet arms deliveries to one of their allies. Mozambique, have dropped off over the past two years, while those to Angola have continued at high levels (see table I)
Insurgencies against Soviet client regimes in both Mozambique and Angola have not abated despite Soviet and Cuban military assistance.
Consistent Objectives and Commitment
attention to southern Africa hasrecent years, and the Soviets arc pursuingin Angola and South Africa. Sovietand policies in southern Africaixstale interest, and opportunisticThe significance of the region in Soviet evesrisen somewhat over the past two years ason behalf of UNITA magnified itsas an arena of East-West competition.
he Soviets and Cubans continue to workclosely In southern Alrica in pursuit of the objectives specified intlimatr supporting thero) ewdmniU regimes in Angola and Mozambique against internal and eMernal threats, preserving Soviet military accessew countries, increasing Soviet Bloc influence in other states at the eipeme of the West, eatractlng man mum propaganda value from real and alleged Western asaocialion with South Africa, and undermining any Westerninitiatives that would threaten their influence In the region. Over the knig term. Moscow and Havana are seeking toro-Soviet "government in Pretoria using tbe ANC as their preferred instrument
the previous Estimate, we Judged (hatHavana faced significant challenges to theirin tho region. Since then, some of thehave reduced Soviet concern thatwould offset their influence in Angolaandredominant diplomaticin the region. Moreover, Soulh Africa hasto Impose ils political dominance onMozambique at Soviet and Cuban eipense.possible aftei Pretoria signedwith Luanda and Maputo
Important Problems Remain
factors still work to thwart Sovldachievement of their goals Soulh Africathe area's strongest military power, anddifficulties mav make it more rather thanto strike or foment dissent inThe military capabilities of both the ANCarc minimal, and Namibia has receded onagenda. Although the militaryAngola has improved somewhat, it has notMaputo's military prospects remain grim.and Havana have not been able lo come upapproach capable of defeating the insurgentsAngola or Mozambique. Both of thesehave serious economic problems, whichbeen unable or unwilling lo resolve. Also, intheir willingness lo accept Soviet Bloc military aid
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dealing wilh Soulh Africa. Frontline Stales suchZimbabwe, and Zambia harbor suspicionspolitical motives Finally, ihe Unitedto play an active role In the area and ISsuperpower thai has contacts wilh all ofnational players, pro-Western aisdalike.
e believe thai, on balance, Moscow andare more confidenthan they were In5 that trends In southern Africa are not running against them. We expect the USSR and Cuba to continue, and, wilh brightened regional tensions,Iheirpropaganda, activeechnical and political education, labor union activity, and party-to-party contacts'iheir Influence and presence in southern Africa and to try lo undermine lhal of the West. Economic constraints In both countries and regionalwill affect the resources each Is willing to devote to the region We believe, howevef. that the commitment of both Moscow and Havana to their obicctives in southern Africa will remain consistent for the foreseeable future!
Motives ond Key VorloWes
oscow's policy in soutliem Africa leflects most of the motivations Ihat underlie Soviet involvement in the Third World. South Africa is (he most Important country because of its central economich capitalist countries and because of ils anti-Communist policies backed by regionally dominant military capabilities. In Angola, we see ihe idrolospcal imperative of defending self professed MarxiU-lcnin nt stales against "imperialist ncoglobalismiargon for US foreign policy, Including thr "Reaganwilh ihe Soviet slate Interest in supporting an ally in an area ihat is of strategic importance due to its economic potential, mineral wealth, location along important seand lies lo the West In Mozambique, the key motives of Soviet policy appeal to be fundamentally conservative, as Moscow tries loreviously gained position while avoiding significant new commitments andElsewhere, wr see the USSR ctpkMting new opportunities, seeking entree in Zimbabwe andrelations with Tanzania on the basis of llsese countries' fear of South Africa.
variables allcctlng the interplay ofand the Kremlin's policy choices inAfrica include
The security ol the rlsent retimes in Maputo and Luanda
The extent of South African svillingnri* tomilitarily in Angola and Mozambique and lo strike al the ANC In other Frontline States
The success of Western policies aimed alabout change in Soulh Africa
Soviet domestic economic constrain It andconsiderations. [
Angola
Angola has been the mawr priority ofin southern Africa since then Soviet eyes probably increasedover tlie past year dm; lo Moscow's perceptionintervenlion on behalf of UNITA. AngolaUSSR an opportunity to respond to thisfavorable military and political conditions.be noted that in our estimationuanda's oil revenues (which wereas gone lo the USSR and Cubanscurrency payment for their militarypayments almost certainly declinedalling oil prices^
More likely Scenario; Steadytmited Risk
5 military offensive,(he government's position, the Sovietsto build Angola's military strcouth,in the area of air defense. We believe ihatfavor and may Indeed have recommendedAngolan military strategy of keepingon UNITA through graduated,operalioers. an approach that enable*control the tbks of con floatation wilh Soulhcostseasonable level, preservedcfiendence on ihe USSR, and denyIhat might attract Increased outsidehis pert. Castro has personally underscoredto Angola by reiterating; that he willCuban military personnel, whichntil Ihe conditions he siiecibcdindependence for Namibiaend of apartheid in Southfulfilled 1
niwirl Economic Aid loiot-ponnain commend,(secret rjfncoc1 marchetailed dhcinuon ot" these activites. | |
II. In our judgment, ihe Sovieis are stronglyto confront South African forces directly, and most likely prefer thai the People's Armed Forces lor Ihc Liberation of Angola (FAPLA) avoid majorwith the South African Defense Force (SADF) as weal In the eventimited FAPLA-SADF engagement, Soviet advisers in Angola would probably not go beyond their present support and advisory functions -the Soviets probably accept tlie facl that South Africa will deal FAPLA some local setbacks. However, they might encourage Cuba to commit its combat formations, which generallydefensiveo engage in offensiveI
Change in the Untied States' policy of supporting UNITA in tbe aflermath of the Conlra diversion issue and the prcsidenllal and8
Tlie Soviets, in our lodgment, may be overestimating Ihe effects of these factors on UNITA viability.troubles may. as we hate noted, lead Pretoria toore active military rob: in the region, while UNITA is likely to survive afler the departure of Savimbi We eapect ihe Soviets and iheir allies lo continue their diplomatic, propaganda, and active measures activity aimed at discrediting UNITAool of Pretoria and the West in an effort to promote the thiid of these factors
Likely Scenario: Major South African EKolation
ajor South Afileun attack that threatened the viabilityarge PAI'LA formation could lead Moscow to consider allowing Soviet pilots and.oilier advisers limited participation in combat operations, though we believe tlut Moscow's preferred option would again be tn encourage the Cubans to assume the burden of rescuing FAPLA. Castio pmba-bly would accede to this inrisis situation We continue to believe lhat the Soviets are highl> unhkriv to use their own combat formations in Angola. ^
Long-Term Strategy
Ii Over the long tun. the USSR is rxobably count ing on the extension of Angola's air defense network and increasedroficiency to restrict SADF freedom of movement over Angola and limit iu ability lo rcsupplv UNITA and to damage Angolan forces on the ground This in turn would enable tlie Angolans lo contain UNITAhrinking pocket in the southeast with reduced risk of South African retaliation.Moscow will look to Ihr following factors to reduce the viabdily of ihe insurgency over the nrtt several years-
South Af ilea's need to concentrate on mounting internal troubles, which could reduce theand resources it can devote to backing UNITA.
The eventual passing from the scene of Jonas Savimbi. which willa (of element of UNITA cohcsiori and strength.
Moiombique
hile Mozambiquereaty ofcooperation wiih the USSR and remains asupporter of the Soviets on internationalhas not made the kind of commitment toregime lhat il has to the Angolans. Thisto Soviet perceptions that FRELIMO bto dose lies to Moscow and lolhan is the MPLA, Maputo's economicdealings with (he West and South Africa,overall cconornic and military vreaknesa.
hile Maputo's military plight remains serious, Zimbabwean military intervention slowed insurgent momentum and relieved the luting FRELIMO paity and the Soviets of having to deal immedialclyear-term RENAMO threat lo the survival of the regime The insurgents will continue to retain subslan tial momentum, but we do not see RENAMO posing an immcdiale military challenge to FRELIMO'ssurvival. Moscow's primary near-term objective In Murambkiue is to help the regime defend itselfincurring significant new costs or commitments and lo encourage the new Chissanoevitalize Mozambique's pursuit of socialism at home and close ties lo tbe USSR.[
More likely Scenario: Indecisive Fighting
Ifi The Kremlin will continue its military and economic backing of Maputo, though arms deliveries are down and Moscow may well keep tbe scale of Its aid at relatively low loek over tbe oeat few years In view of Mozambique! dismal economic situation, inability lo pay. and inability lo absorb new military equipmenl (tee table I) The Soviets will almostcontinue to encouiage and assist Afncan efforts
ll
9CCMT
help Mozambique (end off the Insurgents. This option reduces Soviet Bloc costs and exposure and opens poaubihttcs for betler relations with Frontline States such as Tanzania and Zimbabwe The Soviets will seek lo extract political and propagandabv playing up thcit support forprimarilyaction against HF.NAMO. At Ihe same time, they will probably seek toMoumbican participation in any multinational military arrangements thai would threaten In reduce Maputo's dependence on Soviet advisory support
Less likely AHernotivc Scenario: Rapid Deterioration
e see two other less likely scenario* worthy of comment It Is unlikely dial RENAMO will poor, over the span of thisirect lltreal to the survival of the FRELIMO government However, if FBE-LIMO resistance were lo disintegrate quickly and ihc rebels beosition to lake Maputo, the Soviets, in our judgment, would be unlikely to escalate their involvement and shoulder the high costs of preventing the takeover themselves! They would most likely generate an international clamoroliticalTlte Cubans probaMy would fallow the Soviet lead in thb insiance.'l
Second Alternative Scenorki: Gradual Deterioration
n the somewhat nsore likely event lhalaccuiily situation continually worsens overI wo years, we believe that Moscow andrespond first by encouraging Maputo'sneighbors to increase their military suppoil.they would increase llieir ownradual pace consistent withto absorb thehelp Maputo protectand roads. An increased Cuban troopwellart uf this expanded supportaugmentation of (he Cuban militarywould greatly increase risks of large-scaleSoulh
Namibio/SWAPO
amibiaow Soviet priority now ihat the prospectS-brokered ileal has faded The Soviets appear to be concerned about SWAPO's ideological reliability, coliesion. ami military potential, and the USSR would probably peeler that SWAK)elatively low profile so as not to complicate tbe situation in Angola. Tbe Soviet Bloc will continue to supply arms, (raining, advisoiy, and propagandalo SWAPO bul will ptubably nothewhose militaryise Angolan situation stabihrcs Cuba has been pressing other nonaligraed states to provide material aid to SWAPO, and Castro, wlime commllment to Ihc movement has no! flagged over the years, is likely lo maintain Cuban support at current irvrb
South Africa: Long-Rongo Approach
he USSR's long-term goal in South Africapromotionro-Soviet regime using theits principal instrument Over the next decadeMoscow Is looking to the breakdown oforder in South Africa and tbe emergence ofsituation lhal the ANC. by virtue ofappeal and access lo arms andwill lie in good position to exploit Overfew shears, Ihe Soviets will most likelycurrent mix ofarms forfunnrling support lo tlw South AfricanPaity lo ensure ils influence wll hin IheThird World ami Westerncampaigns, championing the ANC inand castigating the West forupto promoteas the leader of South African opposition,points against the West, and portrayas Black Africa's true ally,
oviel officials have acknowledged that their current ability to influence events in Soulh Africa is limited While Moscow has considerablehe ANCesult of East Bloc supply ol aboutercent of its arms and ihc piominent leadership role played by South African Communist Patty (SACP) members, there are ANC leadership elements ihat are opposed to direct Soviet inBuence. and the ANC itseff does not base direct control of the antiaparthesd campaign inside the ItcpubJir of South Africa. Soviet writings suggest concern thai ihe ANC mayplit between pro Soviet hardliners andelement* willing to consider negotiating with the white governesult. Moscow willose eye on ihe ANC through tbe KGB and SACP and could use ihe leverage that it does have to try to prevent ANC movesoderate direcltnti |
he Cubans have reportedly encouiaged ihe ANC lo step up military activity inside South Africa, perhaps in the belief that this might help Angola by deflecting South African attention Irom UNITA. On the political side.6 Castro increased the tempo of his longstanding opposition to apartheid and Ite may incrementally increase training and other assistance lo theDar cs Salaams lack of alternative military suppli-ers to ensure continued influence (here, and in6 Tanzania's perceived need for arms lo defend against South Africa led it loew arms deal with Ihe USSR. Moscow also has provided logistic support for the Tanzanian mililary contingent in Mozambique. The Cubansimited intelligence and security cooperation agreement with Tanzania
oviet-Zimbabwean relation) havethe pastonths, as Preaidenl MugabeMoscow fot the first timeigh-profileFor their part, the Soviets appear to havethe option of supporting anti-Mugabe elementsconcentrating on their longtime objective ofties to Harare by eiplotting Mugabe's fearAfrica, his alignment with Mozambique, andinclinations The Soviets and Cubansextensive financial help forovement Conference and supported mostNAM positions advocated by Mugabe in his roleHavana is setting up medical andei change programs with
oscow and Harare are currently involvednegotiations for an an drlense packagehelp Zimbabwe defend against Soulh
| Moscow sees Harare as Fairly well off financially and Is also probablv wary of being "used'" bymatched bysuspicions of the Soviets. Thus, the Soviets will probably notigh price in credits or other concessions to improve relations with Harareihey and the Cubans will continue to offer polilical support and probe for opportunities to expand their presence and influence in Harare, including otTering to support Zimbabwean intervention in Mozambique Mugabe, meanwhile, will pick and choose among these offers bul ts unlikely to allow major gains in Soviet or Cuban presence and influence unless South African mililary and economic pressure increases dramatical-ly.j
Other Frontline States
he once warm Soviet lies to Tanzania have deterioratedesult of Tanzanian unhappiness with Soviet mililary and economic support. Moscow relies
we
see hide prospect ot stgnibcant Cuban gains there Generally Western-oriented Zambia and Bo time no have eipressed similar frustration with their Soviet-supplied arms and neither has yet returned to the USSR for more military support While ihe tupof all of these states is obtaining economic help, the Soviets wiH look for opportunities to play on iheir military aid needs and will abn seek openings lo revive iheir now moribund positionotho. Increased influence in any of ihese countries could improve Soviet ability lo support future ANC activity, but would alto expose these stales to South AfricanThe Soviets stand little chance of gaining even an opening for influence in Malawi in the near term.
Implications for Ihe United States
he Soviets and Cubans continue totheli long-term commitment to their Angolan ally even in the face of US assistance to UNITA and are probably willing to escalate their military backing as necessary to prevent UNITA fromirect threat to the MHLA regime While they are probably less willing to increase their commitment toopen Western support for RENAMO might lead the USSR to consider upping the ante. In spite of their extensive military aid and apparent long-term strategy of strengthening Angolan and Mozambtcan military capabilities, tlie efficacy of Sovici and Cuban efforts lo help theli African allies end the insurgencies remains in doubt.j
lie Soviets continue toinor player in the economic sphere. The USSR has nol provided even its closest African allies with the economic aid needed by their ailing economies, and alt of the black-ruled stales of southern Africa, including Angola andlook lo the West for economic assistance The polilical benefitt (hat the West stains from ilseconomic role in Ihe region are likely to vary directly with the overall levels of aid that the Wesl is able lo give,harp rJecfine in economic aid could open new opportunities for the USSR in presently pro W'estcrn countries f-
he USSR will pursue taredvin southerni aims offers,will probably contribute to greaterlo be generous on credits andTVm will almost certainly limit tbeol their offers and may generate resentmentpari ol ihose who received favorable terms in
The USSR most likely will be willing to discuss southern African issues wilh the United States in bilateral exchanges in order to obtain information and intelligence on US plans and proposals Moscow may also put forward proposalsegional conference to polish its credentials on regional issues and avoid ceding the diplomatic initiative to the United States. As they did during the US-sponsored Namibiatmwevcr. the Soviets will push their clients not lo accept any US diplomatic initialise or other regional process that promises to exclude the USSR or reduce Soviet and Cuban presence and Influence In soutliern Africa. Any Western attempts toower-soaring arrangement in South Africa that did not leave the ANC as ihe dominant political body would be especially likely toarget of Soviel ptopa-ganda, active measures, and
We believe that any confidence ihat the Soviets and Cubans mav have ihat tbe white regime in South Africa will, over the medium term, turn inward due to its internal problems andess active role in tlie region would lie misplaced andisreading of Pretoria's capabilities lo pursue Its regional policies and its determination lo support UNITA Also, while some Soviet observers acknowledgentrinsic strengthiable polilical force, we believe that Soviet and Cuban policies nonetheless continue to underestimate Ihe viability of both the UNITA andO insurgencies. |
Any Soviet and Cuban failure tn appreciate (he potential of UNITA and RENAMO to remain viable over the long term would present them wilh some policy dilemmas in tbe neat few years Their apparent Strategy of gradually building the military capability of (heir clienls while Avoiding substantial coals and risks may not prove sufficient to prevent substantial insurgent gains
Moscow and Havana will continue to have several opportunities tn expand their inOuence and undermine US interests in ihe region:
The Frontline Stales mav be open to expanded arms reUtionsbips with the USSR, especially if South African military pressure intensiBes
International and African audience* will bereceptive In Soviel propagandatbr Wot of supporting apartheid andMoscow as ihe natural ally of oppressed South African blacks
The external preslige of line ANC will probably conlinue to increase even as its internalwill remain limited, enhancing the Soviet imageongtime backer of the ANC
Any Improvement in Ihe military situation of Soviet clients Angola and Mozambique will offer opportunities for Moscow to upgrade support to SWATO arid Use ANC
A sharp decline in Wrstern economic aid could strengthen hardline pro-Soviets In Frontline States al Ihe expense of more moderate leaders.
Tabic 1
Sovici Military Deliveries tQ Selected Sub-Saharan African Stales
S I
table h
utile b
Original document.
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