PROSPECTS FOR SOUTH AFRICA: STABILITY, REFORM, AND VIOLENCE

Created: 2/1/1987

OCR scan of the original document, errors are possible

memorandum to holders

prospects for south africa: stability, reform, and violence (si!

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CONTENTS

Page

SCOPE I

KEY

Black Unrest and

Impact of State of

Outlook for Key Black

Government

White

IA 24

24

The Economy and

White

Direct Impact of the Unrest

Role

and

Channinp Character of the

After

Alternate

Imputations for the United

SEC

scope note

Black unrest in South Africa has continued over the pastonths despite increasingly repressive government couotermeasures. This Memorandum to Holders of. Prospects for South Africa: Stability, Reform, and Violence, published inocuses on new developmenu in South Africa, such as the impact of international sanctions, and changes in our assessment of the probable future course of events and their implications for the United States over the next four years, gej

Critique5 Estimate

The main focus of5 Estimate was the growing problems of Ihe white regime in South Africa and its strategy and chances for survivaJany of the Estimate's key Judgments have held up well, particularly consider ing the highly fluid nature of the South African situation and the complex interplay of key issues that affect it The Estimate correctly noted that, although black militancy would increase, violence would be episodic andcall that ran against much of the conventional analysis in the media and academia at the time. The Community's expectations also were met when Pretoria instituted more repressive measures and enhanced its security forces to counter the unrest The Estimate even outlinedressigorous expansion of the police force, and mass detention ofthe government has indeed taken Much of the analysis on the reform issue also was on tbe mark. Pretoria has been unable to persuade influential blacks to participate in its newest political initiatives, but has continued nonetheless to move ahead with its own agenda of reforms, albeitlower pace since tho introduction of

Tbe Estimate could have better assessed three factors with policy implicationshe scope of black violence, the timing of the government crackdown, and the full nature and impact of probable sanctions. More specifically:

While the Estimate correctly predicted that blacks at times would grow weary of tbe violence and discouraged by tbe overwhelming power of the state, the language in the most probable scenario suggested periodic lulls that understated the degree of persistent violence that has smoldered in theand left indelible marks

(he reader well for the government'*6 crackdown, tbe Community did not foresee lhal the government would allow the violence to intensify and spread for nine months before it would Institute much tougher countermeasures. In retrospect. South African Government officials probably believe that their initialreflected (heir hopes of the violence ending without the use of harsher security actions that could accelerate internationalworked against their interests.

The broad judgments on the likely impact of sanctions remain valid, but the Estimate neither gave this issue adequateto convince the reader nor provided enough warning on the multitude of actions by foreign governments, firms, and banks that have had or tbat will increasingly have an adverse Impact on South Africa- felall

key judgments

SinceS. Prospects for South Africa:mform, and VtoUnet, was published inlack unrest hasthe government hasationwide state of emergency, foreign companies have withdrawn from South Africa in record numbers, and additional International sanctions have been ImposedSouth Africa. The level of black unrest overall is likely to fluctuate in coming years, but antigovernment violence In the black townships isersistent feature of white-ruled South Africa. The government's program of limited political reform will neither resolve the country's racial tensions nor satisfy foreign critics. Although these conditions have created an enduring crisis for the South African Government, Pretoria's economic, political, and military resources will remain sufficient to avert the collapse of the white minority regime

Kay Factors

The following are key factors that affect the white regime's ability to maintain power0 and determine what we anticipate to be the course of events in South Africa0 and beyond:

White morale. White emigration may increase, bul white morale will not break unless current economic strains become much more intense or an epidemic of attacks by blacks against white civilians occurs.

-Black muscle, rretoria's security forces most likely will keep tbe black opposition generally disorganized unless blackand radicalize!ion growuch faster rate than expected and result In sustained, regime-threatening nationwide civil disobedience campaigns, work boycotts, and violent demonstrations.

Security resources. Pretoria's security resources probably are adequate to contain upsurges in black unrest unless South Africa were to overextend itself militarily in the region, for example, by becoming lockedrotracted wareighbor, such as Angola or Mozambique, backed by Soviet Bloc and Cuban

forces.

Government support and cohesion. The ruling National Party is likely to retain strong support in the forthcoming election this

*?WTBACt/OBCON

year but could become paralyzed and ill prepared for new crises following an unexpectedly strong showing by oppositionudden presidential succession crisis, or another major, formal split in the National Party.

Ongoing Developments

We believe that conditions conduciveajor racialoccurring in South Africa sometime0 will persist and deepen because of Pretoria's political intransigence, continuing blackroubled economy, and demographic factors. Despite the general effectiveness of government security measures, Pretoria wiE not be able to reverse black politicize!ion during the next four years. Government actions to weaken opposition groups such aa the black organizations associated with the multiracial United Democratic Front willacuum In many communities that often will be filledore militant black opposition. As the black opposition becomes more radical and opts for harsher tactics, we believe white fears of life under black rule will grow over the next four years. Pretoria's most likely response will be to resort to draconian countermeasures that will check the growth of revolutionary organizations over the short term al the cost of movingore authoritarian-style government andtougher international sanctions |

Anticipated additional economic sanctions will damage but not cripple the South African economy. The impact of trade sanctions will be Limited by the composition of South Africa's exports; overercent of export revenue comes from gold, platinum, and other strategic minerals. Financial sanctions will limit Pretoria's ability to expand the country's economic base, but those effects will not be felt during the time frame of this Estimate South Africa will also evade some sanctions by using front companies, falsifying shipping documents, andgoods through third countries. Pretoria will probably respond to additional sanctions by the Frontline States with an escalating series of countrrmr-aMires, including cutting transport links to neighboring slates, expelling most foreign migrant workers, and sabotaging alternative transportation routes, such as the Beira Corridor that runs through Mozambique. Furthermore, thereun-even chance that South Africa will retaliate against new Western sanctions byleastflow of some strategic minerals. |

US relations with South Africa probably will continue to worsen. The current downswing resulting from the adoption of sanctions last year has only been offset slightlyewfound, tentative receptivity among black activists to reassess the motives of the United States This

M>OrV

shift is likely to be only temporary because most blacks continue to vastly overestimate the ability of the United States to influence South Africa. The altitude of most white South Africans toward the United Suites has changed from ambivalence to resentment The Increasingly pervasive "go it alone" mentality in Pretoria will harden following anticipated successive rounds of new sanctions, and the greater trucu-lence will further frustrate Western efforts toruitful dialogue between the white government and its black opponents. Pretoria's more prickly attitude toward Washington also probably will result in: the blockage of some US programs aimed at the black community, tbe denial of landing rights to US military flightsdiplomatic missions In tbe region and expulsion of the Pretoria* based defense attache aircraft; and the harassment at times of US officials, for example, by denying or deliberately slowing their visa applications.

Moscow appears content with tbe direction of most trendsSouth Africa, with the exception of the warming relations between the African National Congress (ANC) and the West. Moscow,will continue to view tbe ANC as the principal vehicle for change in South Africa, and will not fully exercise its considerable leverage over the group for fear of severely damaging their close relations, although it will make efforts to Impede ANC contacts with tbe US Government

Soviet attention to South Africa recently has Increased, and the installationro-Soviet regime In South Africa remains an important long-term Soviet obiective. Despite the recent turmoil, Moscow appears to believe the South African situation will change slowly; therefore, Soviet inroads will take time We believe Moscow's primary longer term goal is tbe promotionro-Soviet ANC-dominated regime, but Soviet omclals have Indicated they do not believe tbey will achieve this obiective for atecade. Moscow's snort-term policies include ensuring an ANC role as the leader of tbe South African opposition, maintaining Soviet influence inside the ANC, and using the South African situation to burnish Soviet credentials in the Third World on an issue where the United States has been discredited for Its alleged backing of the apartheid regime

The Soviets identify the ANC as the leading oppositionin South Africa and, along with their East European partners, provide virtually all of its military supplies and much of its training The ANC Is Moscow's primary long-term ally in South Africa- The Soviets apparently have ruled out material support to other opposition groups for fear of disaffecting the ANC, but will probably use Communist party, intelligence, and surrogate channels in Africa to develop contacts with opposlUonisU outside the ANC, including the Pan-Africanist Congress.

The Soviets will continue to use propaganda and disinformation extensively to demonstrate Soviet solidarity with black African positions and lo discredit the United Statesacker of apartheid. Moscow has already used its propaganda and disinformation capability to play on the Frontline States' fear of Pretoria in hopes of increasing Soviet presence and influence in the region. Wc believe Moscow will continue to exploit Frontline State concerns over South African aggression by attemptingto expand arms supply arrangements with these|

Violence has declined significantly since the Impositionationwide stale of emergency inut will continue to fluctuate. Nonetheless, we believe there is an even chance thatduring tbe next four years violence and political protest willew peak and resultecord number of both nonwhite and while deaths. The current temporary lull in the unrestesult of the large-scale security presence in the townships combined with the onset of an apparent war weariness among many blacks. Even this environment, however, continues to actentrifuge, driving more blacks toward militant positions andwindling number of moderate blacks center gaaaaaBsHj

Despite important gains made6 in raising the political consciousness of blacks and establishing more community-based groups, most black organizational activity remains shallow, tenuous, andto government counter measures Through mass detentions,of meetings, and restrictions on marches, publications, andPretoria has stymied black efforts toohesive movement capable of conducting sustained, effective, nationwide protests.

The outlook for the most Important black groups will remain mixed-

Tbe United Democratic Front, including its most militant affiliates that are only partially under its control, has been damaged by the state of emergency measures, but It will continue to demonstrate some resiliency. If the organization were to rebound dramatically, we believe Pretoria would ban it. It probably then would go underground andeduced but still prominent role in the townships.

We believe that the ANC recognizes its chances forthe South African Government in the near term are poor and that its greatest short-run strengths Ue in its ability to broaden its base of international and domestic support. Thebility to garner widespread support, however, isto be matchedommensurate increase in its ability toevents Inside South Africa.

- Many black labor unions will succumb to pressure from non-umon groups during the worst periods of black unrest to become more politically active. Most will remain reluctant to engage in direct, lengthy conflicts with Pretoria on political issues for fear of government countermeasures. The government will detain individual black union leaders it views as too politically

Chief Buthelezi, moderate head of the influential Zulu group Inkatha, will be hard pressed to stem the erosion of his support as young Zulus become more militant and Pretoria continues to balk at major .political reforms. In particular, Pretoria has resisted the establishmentultiracial government in Natal

The South African economy will probably grow atercent for the next several years despite Western sanctions. Growth wlB be constrained by low business and consumer confidence, which will increasingly be affected by political and psychological factors Unemployment will increase as population growth continues to outstrip economic growth. Pretoria's initiatives to improve the black standard of living will not be extensive enough to prevent growing outrage with conditions in the townships. ^

Despite growing concern among whites over the economy and the continuing unrest, the ruling National Party willarge majority of white parliamentary seats in the forthcoming7 general election Pretoria's continuing slide toward authoritarian government has not gone unnoticed in South Africa, but appears to have the backing of the majority of whites. The government's tough stance toward the black opposition and international critics also will help it stave off any challenge from the right^

Theretrong possibility that Presidentill retire from office during the next four years. Minister of National Education F. W. de Klerk and Minister of Constitutional Development and Planning Chris Heunis are the current front-runners In the succession race. The top candidates differ on the preferred pace of limited reform, but none would be likely, during the period of this Estimate, lo take steps (such as engaging in earnest negotiationside range of black leaden) that would be necessary to art est the country'spolitical situation. They would probably continue the Bothaof suppressing opposition activity and dictating reforms that will not threaten white control of national affairs or white essentials, such as legal guarantees for residential and school segregation. fl

7

SEcafr

Alternate Oullooki

Profound changes in one or more critical factors could alter drainahcally what we anticipate to be the course of evenU in Southand could threaten the continuation of the current system of government. Although very unlikely, white control of the government could be jeopardized within the next four years if: white confidence were severely undermined, the trend toward greater black militancy accelerated, unsustainable pressures on the state's security resources developed, or the white government's ability to respond to threats were darnaged by internal dissensionore credible rightwing challenge

Conversely, changes in the critical factors could lead to possible but unlikely, developments that probably would allow Pretoria to make considerable progress in stabilizing the domestic situation andnotinternational pressures.could devastate the black opposition by adopting extremesuch as banning all antigovernment groups, increasing detentions, and imposing martial law. Or. Pretoria could Institute reforms (for example,lack house In Parliament) that would unexpectedly give new hope to black moderates, greatly undercut the blackand pave the way for open-ended talks between the government and black representatives.

SECRET

NOf ORN/NOCQWRA CI/ORCON

discussion

Since. Prospect* for Soulho Willy, Reform, and Violence, wet published inlack votes! ha* persiKed andreflecting, an unprecedented level ot black: anger at the government's apartheid policies and repressive securityore organized oopod-licn. ai welt as growing frustration over deteriorating economic conditions in the townships. The state of emergency imposed in5 (which initially affected only areas near Johannesburg and in eastern Cape Province, bul was extended to the Cape Town region inid not prevent theand protest activity from intensifying and spreading. Pretoria, nonetheless, lifted the state of emergency inntending to replace It with new, sweeping security laws before theinxof the Soweto riots. When it became evident that the laws would not be enacted in time because of opposition from the Colored and Indian houses of Parliament, the government onuneationwide state of emergency that so far has proved more severe snd successful than iu predecessor.

Pretoria, confident of its security resigned to and oelbgcrent in the face of international condemnation, has continued to rely on repression rather than negotiation to stem black unrest The

reform program hu lost most of Itsesult of Mack rejection of ib limited goali and white unease over Us direction and efficacy. Pretoria now behoves that only white capitulation would satisfy Its Internationaloreignhave withdrawn tn record numbers because of effective dianvesfroenl campaigns in Europe and the United States, additional internationalnd bleak economic prospects foe South Africa. Theythe conflict will only wonen because of Pretoria's refusal to make significant political concessions |

Factoei Affecftng (Aaof the whire-controlled system ofwill depend primarily on the interactionInternal factors, principally:

While morale.

The level and scope of black violence.and organization.

The security resources of the state.

Tbe ruling National Party's support among whites (whiteell as the degree of unity within the

Economic performance and exogenous factors,international sanctions, regionalnd Soviet influence with and support of nonwhlte South African groups, will not prove decisive la the next four years but will be important insofar as they affect and interact with tbe critical internal factors.

Block Unrest and Protest Impact of State of Emergency

Pretoria imposed tbe second, nationwide state of emergency after buck unrest and protest had risen to unprecedented level* in the springhe Increasingly harsh security measures have ledignificant decline In violence and have stymiedby black opposition groups, led by the multiracial United Democratic Fronto organize andationwide protest campaign against the government. The emergency measures, however, areore and are treating only the symptoms of South Africa's complex racial maladies- The black opposition has been weakened but not broken. Black political and occcomic discontent has remained extremely high in many areas, providing fertile ground for acrlvuis as they struggle to adapt to changing condition* by developing new protest tactics.

Violence. Antigovernment violence in theisersistent feature of white-ruled South Africa. Although the emergency measures,the large-scale presence of security personnel in the townships, have reduced the violence substantially from the levels reported immediately before tbe's reim position, Incidents of general unrestwhile the rate of terrorist attacks has increased

nd

r+CVORN/NttOWBACT/OICCON

unite! hu persisted near Cape Town and Dor ban as woH ae In some ratal towssthips, but Sowcto end township* In eastern Cape Provincetin ibe worst affectrd areas. Much of the violence prior to the latest state ol etwreeocy consisted of riots and protests Involving huodiedi or even thousands of blacks. Manyoccurred when security forces Bred ai large crowds. These types of Incidents now occur loss frequently. In parteported war wearloeai awe* many urban Macks as weD assecurity measure* '

IceWic and communications problems, reportedly exaoerbatcd by Ihc stale of emergency,erial of damaging- government actions last year against ANC cells in South Africa and wishbonag states. Pretoria claims tbat it ceptuied orlleged ANC gucrriuaj between January andhe ANC leadership is planning to meet In7 to discuss methods for working around thr emrrgero restricno.-j. ^

ttacks oo black collaborators and their homes, property, and families wiH oot stop daring thelour yean regard Ices of government countermeasures. Pretoria claims lhat black oo-bladi violence has been rosponeibkt for more than half of tbenrest-related deaths sincettacks oa black local euthoritle* pofaeemerv ind bailosnnun still occur dally and actentrifuge, driving many previously apolitical blacks toward more militantwhilewindling number of vulnerable moderate* In the center The moderates ere flanked oo ihe political right In many townihfips br substantial numbers of militant blacks known as "fathers'" Or "vlgilantM- The police often grant theseree band, or even assist them, bt pitched battles with the predominantly younger, antigovernment blacks known as|

Foraur* axnpiriwnaxt aWu in ANC IKUa, see, rk. Ah**n* Nationalf Sewik Attn* Oei.sMHw, CesseeaaeslJon-Ttrm rrmmiai. My

building in Pott EJiubethhe structures, consisting of street ex block commillees grouped under area oom rait tees and reporting to civic aasocUtions. were modeled after African National Congressplans drawn up3 In anticipation of tbe ANC being banned UDF-efrUiated civic associations, some of which have provided services such ssschools and legal arbitration, proliferated during the first halfheir surging popularityPretoria's fears that it was losing control of the townships and helped prompt theore thanercent of the detainees have been UDF members, and many restrictions appear tailored to disrupt the civic associations' activities Despite the government's focus on these "alternativeome reportedly continue to operateI

espite tough government restrictions, black schools have remained at tbe center of organized protest activity because Pretoria has refused to provide the massive funds necessary to significantly upgrade the black educational system, snd improved educationoo priority for blacks of all ages Most black groups inside South Africa, including tbe UDF, want blacks to further their education as well as to remain in school to facilitate organizational activities. Many black classrooms were empty for much of last year, however, because of widespread dissatisfaction over the condition of the schools, tbe growing militancy of black youths,rovocative government decision to close black schools affected by unrest and low attendance Late last year sn0 black students were boycotting schools in eastern Cape and Transvaal Provinces anddditional black students were affected by government closures ofchools. School boycotts are likely to continue but will vary in scope and effectiveness Over tbe period of this Estimate. teBBBBBBB'

Ourloo* for Key Block Groups

nited Democratic Front Despite Pretoria's efforts to neutralise the UDF, It has remained the roost important nonwhite, antlgovernrnent political force inside Sooth Africa- Its continued effectiveness under fire reflects lis widespread popularity in the black community and Its diffuse leadershiproups affiliated with the UDF. representing moreillion individuals, have demonstrated an ability to sustain local protest and organizational activities even during periods when government actions have paralyzed the UDF'sleadership. bjjjjjj

. The UDF's long-term psospects, nonetheless, remain dim because of Ms vulnerability lo more extreme government counterrneasures- UDP officials privately admit that the state of emergency hasthe group, including the most militant affiliates that are only partially controlled by the UDF. Last December almost all UDF leaders were In detention or hiding. Pretoria's move last year to forbid the Bow of foreign funds to theercent of the UDF's revenues came from other countries) probablyrecursor of even tougher actions. The government is aware that banning the group could backfire because of its domestic and international popularity.if the group were to rebound from its recent setbacks, wc believe Pretoria would ban it. The UDF probably would then operate underground andeduced but still prominent role in township protest and organizational activities, aejajhea

frican National Congren We believe that the ANC leadership recogiuzes that its chances for overthrowing the South African Government In the near term are poor and that its greatest short-run strengths lie in its ability to broaden iU base of inleraational snd domestic support. Tbe international recognition accorded lo the ANCepresentative of South African black political aspirations is likely to grow, as is its popularity among South African blacks The ANC's ability to garner widespread support, however, is unlikely to be matched by aincrease In Us ability to influence events In South Africa. I

SEprfel

fpCONTlWCT/OffCON

pfobablr will result in more while crviiiao casualties then In the peat The tongiund,ng auianoa between the ANC end the Sooth African Communist Part* (SACP) most likely will continue, at will thermsklernble Influence over and eaten-live and widespread presence in the ANC'i organiza-'tonal and cWeissonmatring structures. This in Sua nee. however, will remain constrained by non-Communist ANC leaders and fell short of complete domination or control

uxlng the neat four years the ANC probably wtH continue to seek improved relations with the West, but not at the expense ot* Its significant ties to the Soviet Bloc- Most ANC leaders will suspectmotives for moving closer to the group,redominantly Communist factioo within the ANC hierarchy can be eapeeted to look for opportunities tothe recent opening to the Wi

Chen the likelihood that Nelson Mandela's detention will continue, the sudden death of Preitdent Tambo, who isad in poor health, probably wouldrofound Impact on the organization. Taaibo reputedly is tbe glue that holds tbe diverse ANC membership together.elatively moderate non-Communist who favors Improved lies to the West. Hb sudden demise at the least would caecerbete tensions between the ANCl Communist and non-Communist factions, as well as between its relatively cautious leeajenhlp end Its Impatient more militant rank and file.ecognized SACP member such es ANC Secretary General Nso were to replace Tambo. natton-alists could break away, or the group's delicate power balence could Uh toward the SACP.

nkatha The neat few yean wQJ be crucial to the pontics) career of Chiefhead of the Zulu orgaDiiatHMi. Inkatha. whichillion members. Buthekiis support among young urban Zulus has eroded ta recent years because of bis moderate stance and his posttWe as Chief Minister of KwaZutu homeland. He will be hard pressed toeven hit- current level of support if Pretoria continues to balk at major politicalthe "KweNataT leJUative (seeIf blacks become snore militant 1^

m

Urapcoil

K-oNoad Irdobo- Negottatino;Pow^afi^ipjiaultiracial Imiaha (ihe Zulu ward lot meeting] that loetuded rcpreacntalites from more thanoliuoal, eoanomis. and social groups liora Natal Province Laa Novemberlanc<wtlluticaBlly baaed multiracial provincialtnlnlea Natal ami dtc KwaZuhi honsekad UaaW ibeplan, iha KwaZuhi basnelaed wcedd etasr lo tiiJi and one central provincial government would lepiescMt all racial nouns. InOaba organizers hate presented the plan to Pretoria fea consider anonIndabe sponson intend toeferendum la Natal lo dement rest widespreadfor the pro-paeils In NataTs whale and Indian CTmmenfltet,for tbe plan may have slipped beontM iht Icgtslanva proposals Uel<while veto provtuon

The lo-olkd KwaNatal eeostliwionel inehaler

a bkanveralwith powers over rewnae collection.and bousing

ember lower chamber elected frosn IS eonstilwneles with universal tuBcrage.

A SO-ewmbar apptr chambn coauvtoed efisembess Iran each of four mainroups (black. Indian. English, and Alrfiaoer) ende presents livesonethek "Southroup (for thost net wishing to ctawe est gsaaaa aaaaaalaal

a prime miMsSci who Is leader of ihe majority parly in iha lower chamber

a provincial governor, appointed by Ihe etaie PicUdenl wilh veto power over legUtabon

a taS al rig hu aaeaaaa.

Although the fndaba propesah run counter to ctoitntpolicy.nlihcty lo resect them outright aad rkk snubbing KwiZulu Chief Minuter CetaWa fcilbekri While Pretoria may evenieaDytira*ed po-ershartng between Natal and Kwa-Zulu. Il Is unhid, lo allow thel

lack tabor. Black labor unions have not only survived but also prospered In recent years despite massive and growing black unemployment Blacks now represent more than half ofillion trade union members In South Africa, and an estimatedercent of the "organiiable'* black labor force is unionized. Black unions still enjoy Ucme-ndousfor expansion in the civil service and In

agrieuhuie, where ihey have so far scarcelyent. Organized black labor's rapid growth has led to increased strike activity, which will continue loproduction. perticuUrrv in South Africa'smetal and mining Industries NinihsLre.strikes probably will be rare bece-isc most black industrial weaken cannot afford to stay of the Hb for moreew days, and employer and govei runent tolerance lor such activity is minimal J

ost black unions probably will remainto shift toward direct, lengthy conflicts with the government on political issues. Black union leaders appreciate that sustained political protests (suchengthy general strike) would provoke an even harsher govern mem crackdown aad include the likely banning of participating unions Black rank-and-file unioaibts, who successfully pushed reluctant union officialsgreater political ectirinn. reportedly have grown more cautious. Many blackow ever, will he unable to focus solely oo narrow economic issues because of pi enure from nonunion community-based groups Their pressure already has grownand will intensify during tha worst periods of future black unrest

he Cowgreu of South African TKsaU Union*eoVratlor. forrned5 that nowembers, ll probably will continue lo pursue worker benefits mora vigorously' then black political righu during the seat four yearsreaking polo! davelous lo tbe struggle between the government and the black opposition. COSATU will try to mcJIlfy Its more militant members by seising some(for example, aimlveaaiies of events such as Ihe Sowelo riots) to fulfill its pledge last October lo wage joint actions with the UDF against arasrtheid and the state of emergency. COSATU'i aBtigovetrtmeiitalso Is likely to become even harsher as the group tries to burntsh Hs activist creelerstiab while stillaling in Pretoria's system for settling labor disputes. Pretoria will rerrtaia hostile toward COSATU end seek new ways to weaken H, short of banning It Militant leaders In the COSATU hierarchy will remain prime targets for detention. COSATU members alreadyfor overercent of labor activists detained since last lime.

he founding but year of tha rigorously mooer-ate United Workers' Union of South Africamember amor wing. Inettwirs thanoas for Factional violence at the workplace. In addition to its Natal Province stronghold, UWUSA Is makingin Transvaal and Orange Free State Provinces.onsidering expanding its activitlei into Lesotho, the biggest single supplier of South Africa's foreign black mine labor. UWUSA hopes eventually to Hwllenge tbe powerful National Union of Mine* ork-reOSATU affiliate, for control of black miners, but we regard UWUSA's chances In this as sHm The current rancor between the UWUSA and NUM leac.etih.ps will grow as clashes between tbeir mem ben become more common.H

Government Agendo

The Interplay of factors such at black unrest, repressive security measures, unprecedented media attention. International sanctions, and an alreadyeconomy has created an enduring crisis for Pretoria. Its dornestic agenda bas ehanged markedly since (heiewed limited reformeant not only of co-opting blacks but aba of opening new doors to the region and the world. Government official, today believe tbat only black majorityto most Soulh Africansatisfy most foreign critics. Pretoria, therefore. Is resigned lo harsher sanctions, although It will try to slow the advance of unctions bylering Its regional ecotsonuc muscle* Theabo wants to oonsolidate its political power through elections and enhance its security resource* by bringing mote rsonwhite* into the police and army.

retoria still hopes toovo rehiring formula thai satisfies roost blacks while guaranteeing white control of the governmenl, butlmost no chance the government can convince most urban blacks to accept Its concept of limited reform because of their growing demands for apartheid to berather than revised. Pretoria,nlikely to searchew approach to rectal reform as long as It can limit the impact of black unrest and international pressure i

Security

eetter-then-even chtoce thai the state of emergency will remain In force during ihe neat (our years. Pretoria, well aware lhal the lifting of the first state of emergency backfired (seerobably would only rescind meet of themeasuresengthy luD In aMIgovonroetUwenlikely. The rougher security actions taken since last Jane rrtect Pretoria's shiftolicy of hctdadieheldramatic show of force) to control unrest- Thelenient measures before last June have given way to an usaurge In detentions and harsher media and school

Unrest Death Rate7

Dail,

Rile

January7 March (lu Kite o( ctwnenci)

No iuk ol

ioetHu.tr*Mc c*

coaioUedbt Iha Somh African Imlntucof Barn! FteU

rivate, latnadedit adrsiti the Itorti air

nc eVSrnrl*

restrictions. The trend Is likely to worsen in reaction to future upswings In violence- The state has vet to use the fuD scope of Its coercive potential In the coining years, as more comprehensive international sanctions are enacted. Pretoria probably will feel even less constrained In banning key opposition groups,martial law, or adopting other more repressive measures Should violence rise lo levels taxing security forces to an unsustainable extent, Pretoria would resort to extraordinary measures such as establishingcamps and Isolating and starving townships civilian matters. Although civilians outnumberpersonnel at every level of the System, military and police officials chair virtually all component committees. The System, nonetheless, provides achannel for cutting through the ubiquitous red tape tn South Africa's convoluted government (see figuret also serves the National Party as so indoctrinational tool because it hones the survival instincts of tbe bloated, predominantly Afrikaner white civil service by forcing Its members to focus on security matters.

Tactic* Security measures to counter unrest have proved somewhat effective In the short term but are doing severe damage to the government's relations with urban blacks- The atbitrary nature of some securitythose involving security forces Bring haphazardly into crowds, booses, andpoliticized many longtime black "fence sitters" into government opponents. Restrictions on meetings, marches, speeches, strikes, boycotts, and even funerals have convinced growing numbers ofnot yet aantviolence Is justifiable because It Is the only means of protesting apartheid. Moreover, many of South Africa's overcrowded prisons almost certainly arerermrttingand training grounds for blackH

Management. Although information is sketchy, the South African National SecuritySystem (see annex A) appears recently to have become more prominentecisionmaking body and Intelligence channel. The System, headed by the State Security Council, is designed to weave almost the entire country Into one security net by having its moreational, regional, and local components coordinate government actions that affect security In their areas of responsibility. The brainchild ofBotha, the System was set up9 to rectify problems, such as duplication of effort, arising from the country's tangled web of intelligence services and government departments. Government officialsadmitted, however, that much of the System had been inoperative1

lthough tht System's recent higher profile has sparked controversy tn South Africa, Pretoria will continue to nurture it, and its influence probably will Increase. Many whites are concerned about the aecountabiliiv of the rtceselecred civil servants and security personnel within the System, who reported I. are making decisions with potentially explosive ramlfi-cations Critics also have attacked the System for giving security force officials undue Influence over

Aided by the severe impact of South Africa's economic recession on blacks, police reportedly arc investing large sums of money to recruit new sources and are pressing detainees to become agents tn order to repair the informer network that had been badly disrupted by the onset of attacks against blackinolice have publicly offered large cash rewards for information leading to the convict loo of persons who plan or pertklpate In broadly defined unrest incidents Police have also obtained informal ion by interrogating and sometime* torturing blackClandestine swwaaisment opcratloa* deatgned to sow distrust among black activist* and groups continue to be effective al tinea despite an awareness among urban blacks that the security services are adept at these ploys.lB

Groscino/ Police The government has launched an ambitious program to expand the police so it won't need to use live military lo control domestic unrest. The South African Policeational, paramilitary force, currently0 members, but is rraected lo grow0he military permanentiy took over most SAP border duties tohich freedolice for township duty. Black auilllary police forces also have

seqGet

}M

ni

ii

ni

il

i

1 i

V

ii

been expanded. Pretoria hu employedack "municipal policemen" to serve the town coon-oils, andecruitingorelack "special constables" are servingew fecee desucned to supplement police patrols in tbeThe black opposition also considers the militant exnuexvatives In tbe townships <the "lathers" oras police auxiliaries because of the active, progovernmenl role tbey frequently pby.sbsajta

Many urban blacks have been angered byincreasing reliance on the relatively inexpert enccd black anxillary police Regailar SAP recruits undergoeeks of Initial training, and someercent of them recently received training oo riot and unrest situations rather than basic police skills.polke and special constables, however, are trained for onlyeeks, respectively, before entering township duty armed with shotguns and pistols

Despite the growth of national and local police forces, the military ts not likely to be relieved of Us internal security duties. It is an integral part of the National Security Management System and probably will continue to gradually assume greater influence end control over not only the System's day-to-day workings but also its general direct ion. Any incident* or periods of widespread unrest calling (or disciplined trooos will require Defense Force participation- |ss*satj|

White Elections

political power is anothergem on Pretoria's agenda. President BothaIn7eneral electionwhite parliamentary chamber will boay. He will do hi* utmost to prolongin black unrest until then 4m

he National Party is determined to exploit widespread while anger over recent Western sanctions byingoistiche early election also probably will benefit the National Parly because the appeal and organizational capabilities of tbe rightvring parties most likely will grow doling the oeit few years. Moreover, tbe official opposition, the Pro-suesrive Federal Party, has been weakened by the unexpected resignation last yeai of its leader Frederik Van Zyl SUbbert and probably will have trouble maintaining its current number of seats In Parliament (sec

he National Party roost likely will emerge from the election with fewer parliamentary seats but

' ThtoaedHtffO. him Miritftr Vontct fed Ibe Kufcxul rmrtyi bvwatofioo'i potty at ibil lira to-ud Swlh Alrto.

will retain control of tbe government and betronger position overall The rigfalwing parties could gam op toote seats from tbe National Party, mostly in districts in northern Transvaal and Orange Free State Province* Nonet he kc, the National Party will have met and defeated the righlwing threat while gaining at least another five-year term. Morefot President Botha, he would be able toew mandate for bis tough stance toward the black opposition and his program of limited reform J

Reform

imited reform will remain on theageoda. but probable change* will neither resolve the country's racial tendons nor satisfy foreign critics. The impact of Pretoria's reforms toas eliminating the black passbook system andColored* andbeen severelyby:

Pretoria's steadfast refusal to bodge on the issue of icUrxjuishlitg political control lo ihe black rruuonty.

The anger of many blacks over their exclusion from the multiracial Parliament establishedlacks increasingly view social and eco-oomie reforms as window dressing.

Pretoria'* breaking of several reform promises. Including5nd forced retnoveb of black ccrnrmutl'iet

Pretoria! tactics Usually the sovernmeol has lotted reform ideas publicly before submitting (hem Io comnuations for lengthyy ihe tune the Ideas are adopted and Implemented, their no-clty has faded and blacks have regarded tbe changes as song overdue

Major reform breakthroughs under the Botha govern men! are highly onllkely. President Botha has become Increasingly angry In the last couple of years because he believes he has done mote than histo advance black political, social, and economic rights and yet he fa stO the target of unprecedented eSeaJejai and deeatatic crilicuan He fa publics* opposed to some reforms now being considered, such es an overhaul of ihe Croup Areas laws that raciallyresidential and business tones, because he believes more rapid reform would leopardize hi* visiontable, neoapejlheid system He also Is averse to losing more support to thecejtlex Botha pledged Late last year to put certain unnamed reform proposals to the votersuaxetfingational referendum for white* may be held We believe the referendum would be carefully molded to guarantee strong approval for the government'* policiea and to provide Pretoria with adequate leeway lo Implement changes aa it ch*2oae^

retoria's acor-omk initiatives lo improve tbe black standard of living will not be extensive enough to prevent growing outrage at conditions In theThe provision of economic incentive* and the creationarge black middle class have always been the ccarwrstocac of the National Parry'* coaptation strategy Preeoria. however, lack* tbe will aad the wherewithal to Impiememl Its Strategy.ecurrent theme in government speeches has been theor white* to make sacriiVrs during the diSicult period ahead. Pretoria hu not seriouslya Marshal) Plan for the township* el white taxpayers' eaperwr. Pretoria's tcorsctwJcoreover, will worsen fa) the years ahead, making lergo-acale blaci development schemes incicaxingly unlikely. H

The Economy and Sanctions

outh Africa's troubled economy and thethreat will remain key items of concern on Pretoria'* agenda. Tbe economy is poised for afrom the deepest recession Inears, butgrowth during tbe period of this Estimate will

be (tow and erratic Ah hough manyand economic analysts fcaeca* growthercent rate, we believe that real CDP growth will likely be onlyercent, while iautation wiB remain In theoercent range. These numbers will fail well short of meeting employment demands, ei paservices, or basoytng Investor cooEdencr. Unem-ptoTmerit will fakcrease with blacks bang hit hardest, a* population growth cootlnuea to outstrip erxmoeaic growth (see figureeal CDP growth rate*ercent will be needed to errata lobs for theew workers who enter the labor force each year. With economic activity currently at very low levels, consumer and business confidence are the key* to starting the recovery The external sector will come under Inctxatsing pressure as South Africa repay* rt*illion foreign debt in an environment of sanctions and disinvestment. External factors, such as the price of gold, will be critical in determining the short term prospects for the economy, fm

eepte low real interest rates, ^nlgh current account surpko, and record prices and trade volumes on tbe Johannesburg stock exchange, bunnest confi-donce lemalns at newi-record lows, and we do not

Figure 7

S.olhtt asShare of Bed Gross Darariik6 86

Soulh

50

Soulh Africa: Real Gross Domeilic

ims m 45 70 li so 15

Bin ma

It to Improve ogoiScsntly during tbe next (our yean However, burinee* actively hat Improved reewnt-ly. much of Iheercent increase In domestic expenditure In iha third Quarter6 weeto borlneiiea reatocklrtf. badly depleted InConsumer spending, winch accounti for over SO percent of GDP. will probably remain erratic and will reflect fluctuations bt consumer confidence, which wlB Increaairaiiy be affected by political and1 factors Recent ccwuroerIndicate lhat most whites believe their economic poeltions will improve in the Deal year, but moat blacks rxheve their economic fortunes will continue to deteriorate-real after-tax Income has only iocs easedercent over tba bat five yean, and has fallenIn per capita terms with wrotes being hit the hardest. bbbbbbbbI

he told price will remain theeat important eUernal lector affecting South Africa's shorl-lerm economic prospects South Africaigh propensity to Import during times of eipunnon Withggegag of manufacturing geared to capital goods,oipoesible without rising Imports of these goods. Because South African access to Iruanetiooai financial marketa has been stgrUtkant-iy curtailed, rt* ability to pay for imports depends almost wholly on It* eiporl revenues. Cold, whkh accounts (or everar cent of South Africa's annual export revenue, rxeoosne* Increasingly important under theseach flO Increase In the gold price translates0 million annual Increase In esport revenues At peanut levels of production, we estimate0 per ounce gold price will provide sufficient foreign exchange revenue to service South Africa's foreign debt without forcing cuts in Imports of vital capful soodx Oa the otherecline im theprice0 per ounce would wipe out the expected current account surplus and force Pretoria to either cut Imports drastically orewoo debt repayments

anction* Threat Despite Pretoria's efforts to insulate the economy, sanctions can damage South Africa more lhan both insiders and outsiders think However, tbe real impact will not be felt lor several years and even thee will not cripple the economy. In the short run,actax, as Imports are boughtremium and exports soldiscount. Some short-term disruption will occur as production shift* from embargoed goods lo those sttl freely traded (bbssssss.

he limited range of goods and service*under sanctions, and South Africa's proven ability to evade embargoes, will meet likely limit tbe impact of cabling tanctlotn The sanctions Imposed by the Unitedanada, Japan. Hong Kong, andEurope prohibit imports of selected Soulh African products and restrict new financial transaction*.these sanctions have had little impact to Iu,

current trade restrictions could directly reduce South Africa'sillion export revenue7 by as muchillion. Fori her more,ertain

to be some Indirect impact, as South Africa lowers the

price of embargoed goods In order to attract new

bbbbbbp

outh Africa has responded to Iha current round of mnotions by implementing several measuresto ensure the continued sale of productsembargoed These measure* will most likely succeed la blunting the Impact of Ihe current round of sanctions. To date, South Africa has:

ecretariat for Unconventional Trade within the government to coordinate sanctions evasion activity.

Stockpiled coal at free potts In the Netrmlsnd* and Belaium for reeipori.

Establtshed front companies in Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Hong Kong

Transshipped goods through third countries and need (aba bbeb, such ss "Made In Swaziland"

: future, which ards.1

Souiffltrica

Irtcial sanctions that prohibit new direct inveatment end new loan* lo South Africa wiH have little oe no immediate Impact Over the longer term, however. Ihe loss of international finance will prove to be the worst kind of sanction. South Africa is not yet 'mmmW* of generating tufaVsietat sarins* Internally to finance the Investment commensurateigh growth rate-esult, it has turned lo thefinancial market to Up the sccumulated sarins of advanced Western nations However, continuing domestic: vloknce and ihe country's tenuouswith Western beaks following5 debt repayment moratorium have reduced international Investor confidence, brought foreign direct investmentalt, and curtailed access to International financialith outside investment blocked, domestic Investment must compete with consumption expend! turoa As long ts financial sanction* remain In place. South Africa will have to chcaa between meeting currant consumption needs and satisfying those need* in the future^vrioch enuilsa secrlBee of present living standards.

ries will face (rrcreasfngly severe Hade sanctions during the course of this Estimate, but. here

again, tbe imiiw-iutr eBecti will be limited. Despite Soulb Africa* relatively narrow trade bue, the ability and willingness of the international community to impose an effective embargo of III exports IsOvereroant of South Africa's annual eiport revenue rjosnea from gold, diamonds, and strategic minerals, tueh as cdalinum. palm, rhodium, and chromium. Tbe high value-to weight ratio ef these comnvodBiee, their generic physical characteristics, and their use In sophisticated racial alloya found in many Western defense) systems male them nearly unmuWr to cm bargo However, the Sooth African economy it vulnerable to effective trade sanctions.he growth of reel CDP has been retardedecline in the ratio of eipocu to CDPeakening In the terms of trade. In addition to reducing exports, sanctions will further weaken the terms of trade as the lei effect of sanctions raises the price of imports and reduces the price of eiporttotal trade embargo is unlikely, South Africa could weatherajor cutoff In foreign economic ties for several years, but It would do souch lower level of economic activity and welfare.

SO. Despite Its extraordinary mineral wealth, which includes virtually all of ihe essential natural resources (except crude oil) neededodern Industrial state. South Africa Is also vulnerable to ihe km of foreign exports. Over ihe past decade for each SI of final product in ihe manufacturing sector there has bee* so input rvqutrernerst ofents ol raw materials. Inter-mediate seeds, or capatal ecuiptnenl. Althoughpolicy of prcenering Import suboUulion and of stockpiling vital Industrial Inputs has moved South Africa closer io industrial self suftsclencv. it has not bees universally succeaxf ul For example, iheot large enough toomestic capital goods sector and therefore lellet oo Western exports of vehicles, macrunery. and eoobhtloated electronicompletely effective embargo Is hfgbry unlikely. however, given the variety of alternative sources end South Africa's demonstrated ability to circumvent sanctions -Illustrated by Its successful eva-sion of the oil embargo begun In

lrirrveatment, particularly by companies from tbe United States and tbe United Kingdom, will notlgnificant ahott-tena Impact Most foreign firms that have pulled out have told their South Africano their local managers, whoproducing tbe parent companies' products under license or franchise airaratement Typically, these transactions do not result In the lots of empioyrseot in South Africa. These transactions are actually profitable for South African* because foreign firms eager lo leave often sell their attettraction of their actual value.

Soulh Africa'i foreagn currency reserve* are net reduced by Uacae sale* because the prcoredi must be repatriated by using financial read* (bat have a

heavilyexchange rate In (he long run,

however, tbe withdrawn! of foreign companies will hamper South AiricV* accent to newieehivnieeles, productnd skilled icivxirel i

oulh Africa alao reJIc* on Imrniaratioo to solve it* chronic ahortace of skilled labor. Althouajh the emigration of skilled labore Utile unuxniltte impact, the continuous outflow of talent wouldseriously exacerbate the shortage of menage's and other raWeetVciakt Much of tbe emigration that occurred bt IBM waa the result of English-spearing profesaeOrasW taking advantage ofopportunities abroad. Wliik tome emigration of manatee* and professionals wilt continue, govern met* measure* aimed at raising the coat of such moves, and the movement of Afrikaners Into the managerial and professional ranks, will limit the losers. |

AWoie

howe

Jlbough whitencreasing and white confidence ha* been damaged by persutent antlaovernenent violence, the army'* role hs thehe troubled economy, and politicale believe thai the government will oonllnue to have the firm backingajority of white voters,orale wii not break over the neat four years. That bloc Includes blind followers of the National Party as well as many who believe thai both the moreand the more pioursuve parties do not offer viable solution! lo South Africa's proutran* The rapid pace of developments will continue to energize, whiteiii. on the left and right of South Africa's political spectrum and aggravate thelready serious migration trend* (see figurend sane* BJ The National Party's multitude of longtime, predominant-ly-Afrikaner stalwarts, however will lecnain strongly supportive of the government!

Direct Impoc' of the Unreal

he unrest so far has hadimited direct Impact on moat whiles. The violence has continued to occur primarily in black lownships rather than In bunneas center* and while residential areas.media restrictions abo have ensured that roost unrest has remained outside of the dally purview of the vast rnajority of whites Nonetheless, results of opinionhe growth in nongovernmental white security groups, booming sales of arms and ammuni-

-I I I I | |

ii n as tt ts

. ISM.

ing Oernand for riotuggest

stroncly that while* are eipeetiog and preparing for worst time* ahead. If, as eirsected, ANC attacks result In more white casualties lhan In theould further heighten white concerns HH|

anton attack, by blacks on white Qnlians were Infroauenl during the early months of the unrest, but they apparently have occurred sotssewhat more often since then, although no firm statistic* are avail-able Youths throwing Honrs have al time* turned several road* travelledues into gauntlets. While* alao are concerned over soaring crime rates In their residential and businesshenomenon linked to the commitment of aa estimated SO percent of policemen to duty in the black

' Tlx South AM, aa Social HUta fMiaance Anonalion SASPIAl,Math- by tke auOm laeaunea bw aad laa tswaw awat, wa* eri aa9 laflnilnarine*maftaat sorux <Un*aae co 'was* SASRIa eeaf eat lease MS mil lice m

kehS wnI tint and Inly ISM gejJBBl

ecret

AnrkortscWption rVvOv*eit*nt

he Email bul vocal untd-onscjipiluii movement In South Africa, currently headed by the End Coo-leription Campaign (ECCX could become Increasingly troublesome lo the government Tbe ECC formed3road front of groups opposed to white coascripoori haa it> regional branches and claimed last year to represent some SO member organiia ticca. The ECC haa attracted media at ten tioo lu South .Africa by specooring riiaet, dlatrlbotine propagate* and ccflectjog persbore Since last June Pretoria rata intensified ib harsusDeo* of the ECC by detaining aboutembers The group has responded by operating more clandestinely and by adopting mere strident anUiovernroent rhetoric ffj

anticonscTlptlon movement does nottoubstantial following, but itscampaign has proved effective Insectors of public opinion against militarygenera) and township duty In particular.indicates that many conscriptedprivately complained about township duty,not on moral or political grounds Theprefer fighting Insurgents la theborder area because, irotucriry. the doryhas huardout snd living coiidicioosbetter than io the township* |

Afrikaners Adrltt

divlstooi continue to wrack thethat have served as gyrrjacopes for manyduring troubled times In the past. Afrikaners,aboutercent of the whiteconfused by the rapidly changing nature ofand their Inability collectively loguideline* for tbe future. Tbe roosthave Included tbe following:

The National Party, th* architect of (rand apezt-held. beganague program of limit-ed reform in thend was riven2 when members broke away to form theParty

Tbe Afrikaner Breeder bond (Afrikaner Brother-hoodl the sernlsecret group that has longey role in shaping Afrikaner political opinion, hasore reformist attitude. It was weakened when many of Its more conservative, antlreformltt members established the rivalVolkiwag (Afrikaner People's Cuard)

The powerful Nederdulue Cereformeerde Kerk (NCR: Dutch Reformedf which overercent of all Afrikaners are members,many conservative whites when It decided last year to open Its membership to noowhtte* and by reversing in doctririe that the Biblej sparlheid

numbers ofill turn to tbe ursoompromising Afof the rightwing partiesifelineturbulent period of this Estimate and rjayoodof militant rightwing groups such asandabeweging(AWB: Afrikaner Armedwhose recent Nazi-like rallies havemedia attention, alio will continueWe believe, however, that the slow seepageNational Party's Afrikaner support couldif Pretoria continues to lash out athit the black ocsmritioa hard, andreform process Such posturing, however, bte lead to agmScant detection* of liberalihe parly H

Soviet Role

appears content with the directiontienda involving South Africa, with thethe warming relations between the ANC andMoscow, nonetheless, will continue to viewas the principal vehicle for change Inand will Dot fully exercise Msover the group for fear of severelycaoae relations, although it will mak* effortspede ANC contacts with the US Cove moment

oviet attealloo to South Africaincreased, and tbe ustUllattonro-Soviet regime in South Africa remains an important long-term Soviet obiective. Despite the recent turmoil, Mosoow appears to believe th* situation will change slowly and that Soviet Inroads will take time We believe Moscow's primary longer term goal it tbe promotionro-Soviet ANC-domlnated regime, but Soviel official* have Indicated ihey do not believe they will achieve tha obtactive for alecade Moscow's short-term poiicie* la the regloa are pttanaruy aimed at ensuring an ANC role es tbe leader of the South African opposition, maintaining Soviet tnCiTfethe ANC, and using the South Africa issue to burnish Soviet credentialsupporter of Thud World poaitkuu and to discredit tbe United Statesacker of aputheld. Moscow ha* mad* no dramatic breakthroughs In the last year but has effectively continued policies aimed at furthering these goals Bfxtjkj

he Soviets continue to identify ihche leading opposition ceganixatioa to South Africa and.their Eeat Europeanrovidell ol tb nidiuty tuppliee and much of Its tralnlnf. The ANC Is Moscow's pilmaiy long-term aDy in Soulh Africa. The Soviets apparently have ruled out material support to other oppositioo groups for fear of

aJaroatlog ihe ANC but wiB probably use Communist patty, intelligence, and surrocate channels In Africa to

develop contacts with opDOsitlonisls outside the ANC, including the Pan Alricanist Congress. We expect thai Moscow also willow profile in Its overt

lines to the ANC ao aa not to deter other groups from

accepting the ANC as the seeder of the South African

opposition.

he Soviets wlU continue to useand disinformationto demonstrate Sovietwith Uses African pcerfjOMto dlsr^it t^ United Statesacker of apartheid The Soviets have continued to report black African criticism of South Africa In tha Soviet press. Moscow hat also accused the United States of selling arms to Pretoria and ma retaining doar eccrxrnkc links to Sooth Africa deaptta recent sanctions, which have repeatedly been described aa ineffectual in the Soviet

prrvi coverage olc-ail. which has m. In<!rd accusations of Soulh African involvement, paitlcularly in broadcasts aimed at African audiences, wasto stir up black African fear of South Africa We believe Moscow will continue to exploit Frontline State concerns over South African aggression byto erxand^arms^ supply arrangements with thev governments

Outlook

Unretl and Protest

espite South Africa's coortnuixx crisis, we believe that Pretoria's economic, polilical, andresources remain sufficient to avert the collapse of the while regimeevels of black unrest wtTJ fluctuate in response to sovernrnent actions and other devekorimer.ts affecting the black community We believe, however, that chare la an eves chance that sometime during the next four yean violence and polilical protest willew peak and resultecord number of both nonwhite and white deaths.

pejceahoo activities will continue despiteerscldowas, but repressive tactics will continue to prevent sustained, nationwide, regime-threatening protests Pretoria's reliance on harsh security tact lea. however, will further harden antieoverruoeni attitudes among blacks, particularly youths The government's efforts to weaken groups such at the UDF willacuum In many oommunities that will be filledore militant black optsotition. Urban black youths are already on the brink of adopting new tactics, suchationwide school boycott, that would undermine the InBuenoe of moderate elements in groups such as the UDF. These groups will End it increasinglylo irifluence young militants emanating largely outside of any organization and bent on using violence to bring down the white regime

believe tha! oondiiiocu conducive to aconflagration occurring In South0 will persist and deepen due topolitical intransigence, continuing blacka troubled economy, and deiruxgraphicthe genwunent't security forces mostbe able to keep black opporitkou groupsduring the next four years. Pretoria wlU notto reverse black pcJiticization As tbabecome* more radical aad opts forwe Delleve white fears of life under blackgrow and while emigration may increase,morale will not break over the next fourmost likely response will be to resort todiacouian rounlezmeasuie* that will checkof revoharlonary oxganlitiioea over theThe costs will probably be tougherandoregovernment. H

economy, aided by anticipated higherwill probably grow byercentthe neat several years This growth rate,not be sumcient to provide sobs for all whowork force each year, addles to the poolInflationto remain high, limiting the growth in ecruumer

purchasing power. Real personal Income wiD show Utile gain, with whites also feeling the effect, and the number of poor whites Is likely to increase. The government, which employs nearlyercent of Afrikaner breadwinners, will come under Increasing pressure to assist Ihe white population!

6ft Trade and financial sanctions si in aunusrbecome more widespread and possibly more severe Their severity will In Urge degree depend on the political climate In developed nations. Sanctions will undoubtedly reduce eapert revenues and> lower CDP growth rites, bul Pretoria's car-cumventkoo efforts will blunt some of their impact-Reduced profits for busineesrseduction in the quality ofharsh sanctions could cause even in the shortshake white confidence, however. Disinvestment will continue as foreign firms face meager economic prospects and growing political pressure al borne. Nonetheless, the negative impact of disinvestment wID not be felt within the time frame of this Estimate. Theby sanctions, disinvestment, and low Investor and consumerbe unable lo support any comprehensive government programs to ameliorate conditions in the growing urban townships, which will probably add to the number of blacks inclined to loin tbe protest activity

uring the time frame of this Estimate, South Africaiobably reirxmd lo tddiTKCil sanction bi unpouier mme cousiettestctfcoes. Although Pretoria has attempted to ward offhe past byouth Africa's valueeliable trading partner, this approach has had limited success The South African Cervernnsenl. increasingly frustrated by the actions of Its international critics, eventually is likely lo reach the conclusion tbat It must throw down the gauntlet oo the tanclloni Imue Pretoria's reactions will differ between. and the West:

Regional South Africa has eitetuive economic links to neiahhotliai slates tbat could not be disrupted without costs to both tides.esult. Pretoria will probably respond initially toImposed by neigh boring states by imposing matching countcrsanctlorta, while at the same time maintaining other eceasauik lass. Neverthe-kras. If unction* become too draconien. (such as the uticnahxatior of South African assets In Zimbabwe) Pretoria will probably respond by cutting Irarasportationomenting additional political dissent, expelling most migrant workers, and intensifying pressure on alternatelinks such as ibe Beits corridor through Mozambique.

Westetter-than-even chance that South Africa will retaliate for additional Western sanctions byleastthe flow of some strategic minerals We believeikely lo target the platinum group metals, some of which are vital for theof catalytic converters. This group coratl-tuteeery small share of export revenuesercent) Civen Sooth Africa's concern about Its reputationeliable supplier,disruptions aimed at the Wast will probably be temporary and could be canted outanner that affords Pretoria plausible denial, such as increasing rediape or pleading technical difficulties In production or delivery. |

Chonging Cnoroctee of the Government

outh Africa's tilde toward authoritarianb likely to continue, especially if the National Party receives strung electoral support tha year, but the etructurearliamentary democracy. If not the subeurce, will be retained. The government hasts Inctesalngly repressive and authoritariansuch as ibe recent heaviern the press and Increased use of Ihe National Security Management System (see annex AL by citing growing thraalt to South Africa fromand abioad.is using its control of the media io reinforce the belief held by many whites lhat the countryt war nol only with black revolutionaries, butisinformed, naive international community J

espite the popularity of Botha aod tha Nation al Party, we beaaeve there are limits to what ihe wS.tr. constituency wiH endure with regard to the central governccretion and use of power. However, Pretoria probably would have looreign policy debacle In the regionerious domestic scandal involving topbefore It would be taken to task by white supporters over the issue of its increasingly authoritarian

Alter fcotho

trong possibility thaiill retire from office during iha neat foure Klerk, the Minister of National Education, chairman of the white Ministers Co-joclL and head of ihe National Party's powerful Transvaal Provincehe current front-runner In the succession raceeading conservative in the party. Chris Heunis, tbe Minister of Constitutional Ovelopm-nt sod Planning and head of the National

ape Province Branch,lota second He may be Botha'i own choice became ihev are both Capelanderi tod ihare manynother lopit Minister of Education and Development Aid Cerrlteputy leader of the Party'sBranch and one of the meat reform-minted ministers In the Cabinet Minister cf Foreign Affairs R. F. (Put)eading; darkhers* candidate, i* ertiernely popular among moderate whites buttrong. Independent noUiical base.

Botha does step down, we would notsuccessor to deviate significantly from hutop candidates differ oo the preferred pacereform, bul none of them would bethe parried of this Estimate, to take stepsengaging In earnest negotiationsadebeach leaders} that are necessary te arrestdeteriorating political situation Theycontinue the Botha program ofactivity and dictating reforms that willwhite control of national affairs orsuch as legal guarantees for lestdentlalsegregationore reformist andsuccessor to Botha, such as Vllicen. were tofires of the black opposition by raisingand easing restrictions onha political support would quicklywould be forced by conservative pressurePertv ranks aa weD as from the electoratetake strong measures to defuse the situationhis office |

Alternole Outlooks

changes In one or more critic*]alter dramatically what we anticipate to beof a'i'ewU in South Africa and could leopardminority control of the government Amongileveiopments, the following arebut of sufficient possibility to be noted:

Pretoria and Its security forces could prove unable to control nationwide and sustained black unrest if South Africa were to cverextend Itself militarily In the region; for example, by becoming lockedrotracted war with Angola or Moiamhirjue, backed by Soviet Bloc and Cuban forces

Black organisation and redtca lira Men could growate much faster than expected and result ia effective and sustained work boycotts and violent antigovernmentationwide civil disobedience campaigns, as well as theof militant antiwhite sentiments, and the establishment of an extensive ANC underground network Inside South Africa

CT/OrtCON

White morale could plummet in the face of runaway location brought on by profligatespending or severe economic setbacks resulting from coordinated, comprehensivethe collapse of the world gold price;ore militant, politically active black labor movement

The government could become paralysed or seriously weakened and therefore ill-prepared for newresidential successiontrong showing by opposition parties in the upcoming election, or another maior. formal will in the National Party could all be serious blowi to the govern met

changes in the critical factorsin the following unlikely, but possible,that probably would allow Pretoria top'ogres* in stabilizing the domesticandnot necessarilypressure*,

Pretoria, perhapsrsdsMe victory in the upcoming election, could institute reforms, (for example,lack house In PsdiamentX that would unexpectedly give new hope to black moderates, greatly undercut the blackand pave the way for open-coded talks between the government and black representative*.

In response to an oosurge in vioUrsoe, Pretoria could devastate tbe black exposition by aitiema security measures such as banning all anllgovern-menletaining greater numbers,martial law, mstrtuting strict curfews, setting up roadblock* outside til townships, or widely distributing arms to progoverntneni blacks

implied ions for the United Stoles

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relations with South Africa probablyduring the period of thi* Estimate. Th*resulting from the adoption oftactic supported by the ANC, UDF.other blackonly been offseta newfound, tentative receptivityhe motive* of the Unitedhad long regarded US policy towardai being strongly pro-white. This shift itbe only temporary because most blacks continueoverestimate the ability of the United SlatesSouth Africa. |

S sanction* against South Africa and the acoef-crated departure of American firms have reduced the

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limitedf the United Stela* over Pretectal dotnestic poiicie* The attitude of most whitt South African* toward the United State* ha* chanced from ainbivaloncc to resentment The government hopes that the itate of emergency will minlmlw black umest and that propemeota of mnction* eventually will viewrcsseailure. ftetorte. however, it neather counting on nor inclined toward unlieleraih- wot-irincramatic improvement In relations.im" overrtalrty aall hardest following future round* of international aanc-

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tlone The gteater trucolence will further frustrate US efforts toeaningful duuogue between the while government and its black opponentsore prickly altitude toward Wemington alsowill result im ibe blockage of some US program* aimed al the black community, ihe denial of landing right* lo US military flight* supporting otplccnaric minion* In tha region and eapulnoo of the Prctoria-beaad defense attache aircraft and ihe barastnaect at time* of US cSciik. for ttsanujis. by denying or deliberately slowing their vita application*

ANNEX B

While Emigration ond Immigration Trends

current white etrugrttion and immigration Ircndi do not *ugur well for South Africa's economic future. Since World War II. there have beenighlighted by cceeiornic down-twines, docnesttc Turmoil, and net lours of South Africans. The current vyalence and economic recession have contributod to another cycle ol Inaeased emigre-lion (see chad onhat mav prove much more damaging than earlier one* South African private and public-lector employeriea* campaign12 to recruit skilled workers from abroad, resultingarge increase in immigration, but they probably cannot duplicate that effort today because of thedeteaioratlraj political aad economic situation

The migration trends aie important because the relatively small pool of whiles in South Africa supply the economy with crucial lechnical and rrsanageruJ expertise, and white Immigrantsignificant proportion of this pool. The total number of whites In South Africa Increased0CC o' these -ere immigrants More thanercent of South Africa's current white residents are Immigrants who have not yet taken out South African dtUenship H

A huge proportion of recent emigrants have bean highly skilled Industry represent* ti vet are concerned that an increasing shortage of technicalparticularlyseverely hampergrowth During the period January throughrofessional andorkers emigrated,otal of0 engineers remains employed la South Africa, but moreosts for ensdrseeitvacantewerngineering students graduate annually, many of whom arcJobs overseas- Among South Africa's pool of0 computer yrolerstooaU,eftnd moreigrated daring the first half of -

WhBe concern over tbe unrest and the political future of the country appears to be the leading cause of the exodus. The first net scat fa white migration nnce8 occurred in5 when the gcrvernrnenttate of emergency. Oneeipatriale who left South Africa at that time explained that if "hoary old Afrikaners" wereenough totale of emergency. then it was time for him toecond leading cause has been the severe economic recession. South Africa's conscription laws, exacerbated by the army's role fa tbe townships, are IA* (Aire* leading cause Each year0 whiles are called for compulsory military service. The aniKontcriptlon movement in Southclaims thathite youths emigratedo avoid service. The number probably has increased4 when Pretoria provided for the automatic future Ii ration of all immigrant)the ages ofndfter five years of permanent0 young immigrant*became South African aniens liable for military MTvice when tbe taw was passed InsateBBl

Upillion whites fa South Africa either have foreign pauperis or arc cntided lo claim them, which pearly facilitates emigration Last year aboutercent of South African emigrants went to either Australia or tbe United Kingdom; most of the lernafa-der entered Zimbabwe, the United States, West Car-many. Israel, or Canada-M

White* who would like to emigrate confrontobstacles. Including unfavorable exchange rates and emigration laws. Each emigrantllowed to leave the country withouth African rands figured at the financial rate, orer family. The recession, tbe low value of the rand, and the unrest, moreover, have taken huge bites out of tbe savings and Investments of most white families. Following the5 imposition of emergency measures, house prices In the Johannesburg areaplunged as much asercent Totheir disapproval of apartheid, scone state* also are adopting tougher immigration rneasuie* aimed specifically at Soulh Africanustralia, for example, decided last year to refuse entry visas through IU diplomaticouth Africa, re-Quirirsg South Africans to go to third countries to obtain vita* to enter Australia In addition Australia has begun screening South African applicant! to keep out those with "racist attitudes-

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