THE USSR CONFRONTS THE INFORMATION REVOLUTION (SOV 87-10029)

Created: 5/1/1987

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A Coofritoct Report

The USSR Confronts the Information Revolution

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The USSR Confronts theRevolution

onference, convened undo: Ihe tuspices of Ihe Director of Central Intelligence, analyzed tbe implication* of tberevolution for the Soviel Union. The conference brought together distinguished experts from the academic, business, and public policy communities:

Selin (conference chairman) Norman Augustine

Carter Bales Michael Brunner

LeoCherne

Diana Lady Dougan

Robert J. Eckenrode Seymour Goodman

Jan Herring Erik Hoffmann

Jack F. MaUock. Jr.

Chairman, American Management Systems

President and Chief Operations Officer, Martin-Marietta Corporation

DUectot.ompany

Executive Vice President. ATAT Federal Systems

Vice Chairman, President's Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board

Ambassador, Coordinator,Communication andPolicy US Department of Stale

Executive Vice President, Nynex Corporation

Professor, College of Business and Public Administration, University of Arizona

Former National Intelligencefor Science and Technology

Professor, Department of Political Science, State Uoivenity of Now York at Albany

Ambassador, Former Specialand Sentor Director torand Soviet Affairs, National Security Council

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Ii the "Information Revolution"?

oology Ingredients

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Do the Soviet* View the Western Information Rrmjlutiont l

and Criticism S

Ate the Goal* of the Soviet Information Revolution? Where Are the Soviet? Starting from?

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Fan Will the Soviets Progress io the Information Revolution?

Ingredients

Application* Whm

uai vviu dc uc wniequenecs lor tneoovieti?

Tbe Economy and the Military

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Political System

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The USSR Confronts the Information Resolution

economic, military, and social development it being increasingly

influenced by the advance and application of information technologies. Microelectronics, computers, telecommunications, and software areexplosive growth in the availability of Information in all aspects of Western life. Rapidly expanding applications of Information technologies are supporting fundamental change in Western economies and societies, affecting relationships among individuals, interest groups, institutions, and countries.

Judging from their writings and statements, Soviel officials view Western developmentsixture of concern and admiration. They recognize the growing contribution of information technologies to Western industrial and military might and the difficulty of playing catchup inapidly accelerating technology base. They also recognize the potential fortechnologies to undermine state control, both through greater peneiralion by Western "propaganda" and through the growing ability of Soviet citizens to independently obtain, analyze, and disseminateAt the same time, they admire Western innovation snd dynamism, which they usetandard to evaluate (and rebuke) their ownand industry.

eriod of drift and lethargy in, the Soviet Union under Gorbachev has embraced information technologies as critical ingredients in efforts to maintain Soviet international competitiveness. Soviet officials expect information technologies to:

Provide an important impetus to restructuring the economy andsustained high growth through. They expect substantial productivity dividends from rapid growth in tho application of computers, instrumentation equipment, robots, and advanced machine toot! and will concentrate these applications on modernizing the industrial base,

Support development of considerably more capable weapon systems and their manufacture, in more efficient factories. Advances in tensor, signal processing, and battle management technologies are Increasinglyweapon effectiveness.

io an improvcmeni io the quality of life and the development of al least elementsestern "informationhe Soviets arcassive computer literacy program but expect to move very slowly into the realm of consumer electronics. They express confidence that they can increase information technology applications without fostering significant social or cultural change, or suffering loss of state control.

The Sovietsot of ground to make up to attain their goal of equaling Western technical, economic, and military strength by tbe

Western experts generally hold that Soviet information technologies lag those of the West by five toears or more. The Soviets have donein major hardware development than io the development of support technology like computer peripherals and software In information technologies they have dependedarticularly great degree on Western advances.

The Soviets lag the West to an even greater degree in applying information technology. They have achieved considerable siweess in certain military applications but have csublisbed only islands ofin industry and have made inroads into tho home only in the form of state-sanctioned entertainment media.

Conferees believe that tht major roadblock to Soviel progress Is the /allure to establish an economic system that effectively rewardsand application of Information technologies. An In/ormationcannot be Imposed from the top. Soviet progress will depend in part on the extent to wnich tbe Sovietsospitable environment, which risks at least some loss of central control. Conferees concludeddespite signs ofSoviet Union will not movearty-dominated command systemore pluralistic system. They predicted that:

Tho Soviets5 probably wilt remain five toears behind the West In information technologies, doing relatively belter in areas that lend themselvesnational program" approach (for example,and relatively worse in areas thai do not (for example, software),

The Soviets will preferentially apply information technologies io the military, government, science, industry, and,eans to an end, education. Applications in economic planning, battle management, and

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internal security will support ihe maintenance of centralized control. Industrialcomputer-aided design and computer-aided manufacturing will aim at improved quality and (especially)Entertainment applications will spread, but personal computers are likely to make few inroads into tbe home through at least the.

Conferees judged that even tbose modest objectives would bef tbe Soviets choseubsisnlially reduce iheir historically high dependence on Western information technology. Continuing resort lo Westernmight afford some Western leverage over Soviet development, but, in the light of diminishing US lechnical advantages, only If Western allies acted in concert.

Conferees agreed that the new, more pragmatic Soviet leadership will be more effective than iu predecessors io making information technology work for productivity growth and military advancement. Al the same time, materially closing tbe gap with the rapidly advancing Western target would require substantial change in tbe Soviel system to make it more hospitable to innovation and growth. Conferees judged that such change was unlikely, even to the degree achieved in then China. Thus, they expect steady if unspectacular Soviet development, with little change in the governing political and social Instilutions:

Most doubt thai Gorbachev will transform tbe Soviet Union Into an engine of economic development, achieving his goalercent annual growth io. There is at least as much skepticism that Soviet technology and products will become competitive wilh tbe best Western alternatives. If Ihey do not, the USSR will continueave an export profile like thathird Worldmainly raw materials.

Western program* to develop "smart" conventional weapons, advanced reconnaissance and battle management systems, and systems associated with tbe Strategic Defense Initiative may place (he Sovietsevere disadvantage if Ihey do not keep pace with the West.

To make matters worse for ihe Soviets, information leehrsotogies (like high-density integrated circuits) are difficult to reverse engirseer, thus, tbe traditional Soviet answerheircrash programcquire andof limited value-On the polilical and social front, many Western analysis expect ihat there willradual moderation of party-state control of Information(mended, nnd partly unintended:

Over Ihc nest live yean, modest challenges io conirol could einerEc from direct Western broadcasts, ihe glowing availability of consumer enter-lainment media (especially vidcocaticuc lecordersl, and increasing access

Inhe Soviet "computet culture" may take bold in earnetl. when millions of Soviets will be computer literate and domesticshould support widespread industrial applications and the beginnings of widespread private ownership. Security authorities then wouldgreater problems in tnotiitoring telecommunications use nnd access to dalo bates and efficient, blah-speed produciion reporting systems. Soviet economic authorities will see their chronic bailie against data falsification move to the information technology frontier and will be hard pressedvoid at least isolated iniUnees of com peter crime and even sabotage

Conferees nevertheless judged thai such polcolial threats lo state control could be contained, albeit noi without forfeiting some of the potential benefits offered by unfettered information technologies.

The conferees concluded that by thel tbe very latest the shortcomings of the strategy lo close the Information technology gap with tbe West may force ibe Soviet leadership lo reevaluate ill approach. Tension may increase between adiocstn of greater economicand advocates of tigtt political control. Although there hi room for compromise and innovative management, conferees concluded that Soviet leaden willremium on maintaining political control, which raises the prospect of conlinuing and posvbly intensifying economic and lochnioil shortfalls.

If this happens, the United States mayoviet Union inven funnel from its goal of achieving equality with the most advanced Western countries in trims of economic and technicaland citizens' welfare. The Soviet Union may be forced to rely to anreater degree on military power to maintain its influence in the world, Conferee) did not address the consequences of dealingsick bear" but noled that Soviet progress in the "information revolution" will significantly influence ihc severity of the bear's illness.

The USSR Confronts Ihe reformation Revolution

Advances In nd communications promiseransform global society Int century. The massive, sustained Increase In the capability to acccsa, process, analyze, aad tiansmitmounts of data has emcr|cdajor force iaey dctcr-iinant of national economic health. Information technologies have remoldedindustries and created entirely new ones. Cheap yet powerful computer* have dramatically etpanded informilioa available to the ordinary citizen and aimuitaneousry plaecd bis privacy al risk. Miliury prograrns like tbe Strategic Defense Initiative call for successful Intcjritton ofnd Communica-tions activities of unpcrx**drnted (cope and complexity.

This paper draws togctber published research and coeJerencc finding* to assess ibe promise andof information technologic* in tbe Soviet Union. Ii beginsrief overview of the to-calved information revolution in tbe West and summarizes Soviet reaction to It. It tbea ana lyres where tbe Sovieli are today and enumerates their published goals for the future.ssesses likely Soviet progress and the potential consequences of thisfor Soviet ecceotnic OCveloceneot and political control.

YVbai II the 'I.forawPevolution"!

Advanced Western countries art eaxeriencing eapto-arve growth in tbe amount and availability ofnetscmcnon lupported by rapidly expanding appllcailoot of computing and eommunkatloniariety of public, corporate, and academic loatltutloeta have contributed to tbe rapid devtloprnenl of what has been termed tbe InformaUon society. By measures of product development, cost trendi, snd applkatlons. the key attribute of the Information

industry and broader information sockly his beenoreover, despite eccaaional fitful progress, false suns, and dashed especuticeo, the advance of the information industry Is contributing tostructural changeat era economies andSuch chaoge is affecting rclaticeiihips among individuals, interestnd countries and threatens lo do tbe same for tbe Soviet Unko

Most experts hold that Western progress hasIn large partoBpiUblc eccesocruc and social system that provides both support and incentive Fierceanddrives progress. liffective government generally hai (I) providedd" money to support fledglingeither through acoaisilioa poL'ciei (suci as ikosc for defense) or outrightliminateds In tbe US deregulation of the telecommunications industry;tayed out of the way by exercising relatively little control of information dissenaiaatioo or social change Development of tbeupport iriff*inocture (such a* education andndhas been generally balanced and mutually reinforcing. This has surpwted the very rapid spread of applications and the developmentearly universal user community.1

Technology laspeetfeot*

Tbe information revolution Is dependentandful of interrelated technologies.

Mfrwlecfrnafes, Advances In semiconductor oianu-fv'lvriag have iacccatscd capooentlally the density and performance of Integrated circuitsbasic Ingredient of all modern computer andhardware Some IC price* have remained stable, but ma ss production of tntaptiuuve,urpose Id has resulted lo the proliferation atcomputing and communications by ihe military. Industry, and the public. Continuing

advance* In manufacturing methodi ensure thai this Ucod will coniiivuc. Globally, rJccltonJc* Ii0ear business lhal it expected to triple by Ibe'

Cempaieet Although advance* in Ihc power, rpced. and efficiency of lane cnainlrernc computed vrcre fairly predictable, the surge in (he use of miaicornptji en and pcraonal computers (PCi) wai largely uriforc-seeo.} US businessainframes forillion,0 minicomputers were soldS billion. Sales of minicomputers are wpectod to growi an annual ratercent foe theof the decade, while galea of mainframes are projected to growercent. PC talesS ttood at S3 billion worldwide and arc expectedlowercent ioodestly priced PC typically used in ao office today often outperforms ibe large, costly mainframe computers used at recentlyecade ago.

Tttr<emm*xitalioni. The advent of digital transmit sroa and switching systems hasially reduced (he ccai of voice cotrunuckalioos and has peraitted eew ta rices, each as teleoonfcrcoring and facsimile transmission. Advance* have also supported high rare data communication icivices, linking computers and data bases in commerce, government, and Industry.3 tales of connnunlcationses communications satellites, cable television, cellular radios, video data systems, and local areatotaledillion worldwide and wereto dimbillion1 one large telecommunication! network was baledomputer terminals andainframe computers to operate,'

Software. Perhaps Ihe most rapidly growing and changing component in (he information Industry is (he to ft-are thai generates Ihi myriad instruct loos that operate, link, and apply core peters and tcleoomrnoni caticms hardware. Global sales of softwareillion5 and weret an annuel rate of more thanercent. In tbe United States alone, PC software talcs have doubled annually0 end now account foi one-third of tola! software taleslllon.0 business is projected to spend ooce on computer software lhan on hardware.'

Software irvrrcaiingly diterraiaet (he functionof digital systems, enables hardwareever tnore generally applied, and terves assyiiecn of national and localand in formation networks. Development ofartificial intelligence will stronglyin meeting major US in forma tion -fMOcessieuch as SDI battle management aad

Applicatloni

Intensifying global technological and economic com-petilioo rnakes the rjectrve exploitation of these ir.formationey factor la military aad eccracaiuc turvival. Most modern weapon, command and control, and logistic systems, for example, depend on Ibese technologies.

In formation technologic* already pervade Western science, industry, and society, aiding analysis and decisionmaking, Qunaging industrial captations, and providing convenience aad entertainment for theSciential! use large, high-performance ton in-frame computed to access and analyze enormous stream of data, while engineers routinely useto grapple with more modest problems end employ PC networksare iofc^rjulioo- Desktop terminals and PCs provide executives and wblie-collai workers in government and industryapidly growing capability to access and analyze itatiiiia', financial, andata. Advanced telecom maatcatjooj hnks within and between rxganiUttoru support high ipeed iaforitxilton actwoeks used to ac-eesa oe there information, (hereby enhancing aproductivity and competilive position.*

In industry, Information leehfiQlogiet hive moved onto the plant floor. In the United States, purchases of factory automation systems doubled0 andtIS.lare expected ro double againinicxrnputers aad maCrcoccn-putet* roulirvety control manufacturing procevscs.tools, and robots. Flexible manufacturinglink maebtnt tooli and programmable robots under the supervisionompuier to funhermanufacturing processes, local atea networks

integrate produciion scheduling, procurement, nnd material handling. Computer-skied design letrainah wilh complex sod often ipccUllrcd toflwaie rackages create in hours designs thai would require months to complete manually. Many larger manufacturers are developing computer-inlet rated rneou factoringthat will eventuiliy Integrate many of these functionsolly automated factory."

Information leehnoiOfies have rapkliy erpaoded tbe variety and quality of services available to private aUxens. "Smart" appUaneeu, pocket calcalators, automatic teller machines, and laser acaas at itorcs and supennarkeu save lime. Cable television and videceassettes provide high-quality entertainment and in tome areas even make II possible to ahop in the borne. PCs and telephone modems that can be liaked to remote data bases or to local and national networks enable professionals to workborne, help Undents with their botnework, allow hobbyists to readily share infeexnatioe, and host videobe application of information technologies la medicine created more precise, noointrusive diagnostic toobonitor ineti vidua] health, linked service paramedics to diagnostk eeruipeneai at heapitalt, aad allowed for the fanpUau-tioe of pacemakers with built-in microchips. Fire and police depart menu increasingly control their vehicles -ith the aid of computer networks, and local govern-menu ose office automation lo apced customer services.

Impact

The impact of advancing Information tochncdogics on US economic productivity, growth, and international competitiveness is debatable. Some analysts argue that productivity for while-collarof the US laborno greater than it wu in. They hypothesire thai managers and workers either have not yet learned how to use computers properly (if atr that tbe burden of meetlcg more Intrusive government demands for tax, fiscal, and labor relalioni reporting has twerwhelraed productivity gains. Other assessments point to the advantages major airlines aad financial service firms hare gained over dornestlo and foreign competitors by raising produclivtiy through oflke automation. Thereonsensus that the Introduction of Information

technologies hat streamlined US manufacturingrenewing growth even In mature indunriej like those for automobiles and aircraft.

Nevertheless, manufacturing productivity galas in Japan- even In critical elements of (be eteouoolc*outstripped growth in the United Stales, inducing fears thai America is Ictiagor example, in theS firms totally dominated the market for intcgraled circuits. Today, tbcae firms account for J9 percent of the value of uks bj aoa-Cottumstritt countries, while Japaa scooonu forercent and Iu share Is laereasiag rapidly, she Ugh cost of developing new lectaotogiei has forced many US companlea out of the market, whereat Japanete companies generally have ready access to substantial financial resources.

Information technologies ore Increasingly itaporUot in weapons development and production. Superiority in "smart" murUlions, aviooks. missile guidance, tire control, and surveillance aad corn ma ad and control iiCtca rooted ia advances incrccoenpuieri. and softwidely viewed as

technologies offer Uemeodous iiaprcevjcnts iaaad biding targets and ore eomamicg ever-increasing portions of development costs. GMspuler* and soft-are accounted for letsercent of developmenl cotU forhantom, tbe maim lay of ibe US fighter Inventory duringnd. The corresponding percentage forS wai overercent, and that for8 was greater thanercent.5 the Deasartment of Defense4 million for Ihe very-high speed integrated circuitroject, wilh ihe goal ol achievinghundredfold increase in tbe density and per fcenur.ee of siliooii-beted ICsa The Peat, goo reportedly baa plant lo use tbe first genera ikat of VHSIC tbip. inajor weapon systemsilitary toft-artbo be fueled byomputers estimated to be la"

Computer and com muni cat iocs securityital concern throughout government, business, andgiven the danger of espionage and sabotage. A

recent survey of more0 computers used In the Department of Defense concluded that one-half required better access control. DLufleeted engineers or programer* couldew lines of code among the millions of lines of operatingargemay use and severely disrupt the machineinformation oo techniques for illegally accessing computers on some of theomputer bulletin boards Operated in this country. The question of how to proceed against hackers has raised unprecedented issues in jurisprudence.

Tbe Lnfonuation revolution is also placing, at least potentially, the privacy of tbe individual at risk. Some estimate that the individual is referenced on average in roughlyocal and Federal Government agency files and in about the same number of private-sector files. Tbe Internal Revenue Service is obligated to pass its records toifferent government4 Gallup Poll revealed ihat two-lblrds of the US pcptilation believed that they had tost or are likely to lose aomo3 Harris Poll revealed thatercent of tbe dtiienry felt it was possible for tbe government to use available tnfonnatioo to persecute its -eoeoucs."0

Although there appears lo be general agreecnenl that tbe information revolution is likely to bring about sizable changes In the world's economies, the ques-tsoeu of bow much, how soon, and in what direction are hotly debated. Some analysts make tbe point that it is difficult to forecast the effects of these new technologies because their application will be heavily deterrniocd by economic, political, and demographic eooditiocs. In any event, the importance of product "foteflectnal content" Is likely lo Increase the dorrti. nance of the services sector In national economies. Diskscatioos of workers in aging smokestackhe semiskilled,col. lor workers mayubstantial force as *tIL

How Do the Soviet* Vkw the Western la/ceuaslioa Pr^olaek-iT

Tho Soviets closely follow developments In Western Uformalloo technologies and applications. Aa In many other aspects of the Bast-West competition, two

themes frequently arise in their statements andconcern over tbe potential threatarefully crafted balance of admiration and criticism as they move to emulate Western progress. Althoughfactions in tbe Soviet establishment may place varying emphasis on each theme, nearly alltoe the official line: Western development must and can be matched, borrowing positive aspects andthe negatives. Soviel officials, however, arc ai odds over where applications will provide Ibe greatesi benefit.

Concent

SovietIbe danger of lagging Ihe West in tbe development and application of informationThey have criticized tbe lethargy of. Implying that the Brezhnev leadership failed lo act on ihe promise of information technologies and tothe pace and consequences of Western advances. They have specifically criticized overreflanee onWestern advancer. OScUls have noted Ihcof reverse engineering, as well as theWestern progress in many of the key technologies. Tbey express concern over the prospect of asnd possibly mcreasiDg lag.

The eccnornk consequences arc frequentlySoviet leaders and orfictats talk about achieving international competitiveness In manufacturing, both In the high-technology products themselves and in the many productvehicles and machineapplies lions of information technologies greatly affect cost and quality. Otherfrequentlyabout tbe importance of maintaining prestigeirst-rate technical power.

Mora broadly, Soviet officials cite the contributioo of informalioo technologies to productivity growth and economiclt advanced Industrial countries. Noting that productivity Increases must fuel virtually all Soviet growth for the remainder of the century, ihey have argued that the mastering of information technologies fa essential In iheir efforts to match Western Industrial might. Internationaland consumption levels. They believe economic

competition between ihe twooremoving into ibe scientific and technical sphere and will be decided precisely in that sphere. They also acknowledge Ibe "bandwagon" effect in thethe tendency of advance* in information technology to rapidly promote furthera way ofIhe danger of playing catchup.

Military concerns also surface. Generally, Sovietand political leaders have acknowledged ibe raletrong economy in supporting military power. More specifically, Soviet military leaden have cited the conuibution of information technologies toWestern weaponrecently in imart conventional weapons and SDI. Western improvements in command and controlovietcausingconcern. The Soviets note that progress In infor-matke technologies is essential to emulate and, in many cases, also to counter."

The Soviets also voice concern over the effects of Western information technology applications on the Soviet populace. Western broadcasts convey Western viewpoints and values and, accordingly, have been jammed for many years. The Soviets recognize that tbe advent of direct-broadcast satellites vrlfl make Western propaganda more readily available to the Soviet citizen. Although Soviet official* do not openly admit H, their efforts to lightly control means of information production andcopyingfear over the coitsequeoces of Western computer, telecommunications, and video technologic* falling unrestrictedly Into the hands of tbe Soviet consumer.

AaWrartoa aad Criticism

Active Soviet proponents cf Information technologies and applications, probably encouraged byadnvonition to confront and acknowledgespeak and write favorably about Western accempluhtneots. They are impressed by Western dynamlim, particularly in rapid Industrialand mess production, and admit that they were caught by surprise. The Soviets cite Western costfor esomple. Westerncosting In the hundreds of dollars with ihe

it Agat, costing upubies. They have praised Western Innovators like Stephen Woiaiak, the cofounder of Applend some have even acknowledged that Soviet systems like the Agat are modeled after Western systems and basically use Western-developed components.

Open criticism seems to come from two quarters. Some officialsoted Interest criticize aspects of Westerndecentralizedare incompatible with Soviet approaches. Other writers in the popular press frequently use Western eiperience with informatioo technologies to criticize the capitalist system. Informatiooare variously accused of causing bankruptcy, unemployment, alienation, and invasion of privacy and of supporting Western militarism and espionage."

Soviet officials reassure their people that socialism can teap the benefits and avoid the pain: "We, of course, do not have these problems and cannot haveariation of the tame theme. Gorbachev staled thai "we can and must cope with acknowledged problems,"

Conferees concluded that Ihe Soviet Union under Gorbachev is determined to confront and respond Io the Western information revolution. Soviet leaders believe that information technologies can radically alter industrial competitiveness and the militaryThey particularly fear the West's growingto increase military effectiveness by stressingand management of weapon systems rather than quantity. They seem ambivalenttrategy of copying Western advances. They recognizeuicko Soviet Industrial productivity and military capability, but many fearollower strategy will relegate the Soviet Union to aneeonomk backseat and cause it* RekD capabilities to atrophy. Yet many Soviets either do not folly undesstand or reject implications of the political root cause of WesternInteractionrivate, decentralized, high-reward entrepreneurial economic system and the development and application oftechnology.

Soviel leaderi probably do not believe itui adopting Western Information technologies willed llieir ability io control their people. They probably intend to- decentraluallon of control by forBeaxit certain applications of electronicjuorocomad pi inters. Many uses in tha Weal-for example, hsulJog and retailing- evecd cot be ejlcmively pursued in tbe USSR. Theo protaabty have faith In the ability oftete security aod ceatrtliied ccorsoer to control the more restricted industrial applicaiions tbat they intend to pursue. Soviet leaden, however, clearly rear the spreadtern political aod social view* and fear that (he "dem'onslratioo effect" of Western Bring aUndard* may lead Sovietto demand more rwruumer arrseoities.

What Am (be Coal, of the Serin Itrforasattea IWetioa?

I

Gorbachev has embraced the informalion revolotioo.has called for tbe -technical rcstructutlrn" of tbe Sovietand tingled out Informalionand their supporting industries for highestdcvdorjcoeni Ln tbe USSR and Easternoets to recharge the Soviet economy as information and other advanced technologies reverse Ibe long-term decline in tbe growth of Sonet labor prodnctrrity andoal made more urgent by the protccct of very utile increase in tbe Soviet laborverall, he wanta to launch tbe Soviet Unionew development course and holds out the hop* that It wiU behe ume league as the United Slates and Japan by Ihe

Gorbachev's goals for information technologies, while ambitious, reflect these moderate efforts lo reform ihe Soviet economic ayilcm. Information technologies aic to help make centralized planning and control viable, not obsolete- Aa in the West, tbey are to help modernize the Soviel economy and maintain miliury power. Tbey are to help remedy perceived loweuaWuxg tbe Soviel Union iotrong.

The

foster great social and cultural change, ind any impact on ibe quality ofo beontrolled birproduct of their general impact ondevelopment.

Gwbacbev has set ambitious economic roryru for ibe suprdicrt of informalion technologies, and prominent olbculs raxenite tubtUatiel gains from tnfcatnaiioo lecfcncaogy applications:

Production of computer equipment is slated lo grow IS percent annuallyy lhat lime (he Sovieti are toillion personalafter producing virtually none until the mid-

Output by tbe main producer of ins tj-umeou lion eonipmeot is to grow byercent per year ineriod, up from t> percent ia the previous nre-yeaj period.

- Compa redtS production, ptoctoctjou of robots inxrlod is io more than douole, NC machine tools almost double, and machining center! more than quadruple.

domestic policy initiative* related lo these goals rrs>reaentrevolutionary-reform. He It tawkioc and letting immodiate pins by cahslrng greater worker eaxjtmitment- He isoward crvuiaa roaTrieeriog PAD and rxodiKlioet, tourers of much dual-use techeoloay, In the hope lhal technology advances wilt tun* in long-run prodeciirity and tjuallty Imrrrovement In all tee-tori. Including ibe military.

Tbe conference concluded that, unlike tbe West, where information teehncJogles have had Ibe greatest effects .o ! lectors, the Soviet Union can obtain tbe greatest benefiu through induiinal appb-eaiiottL Tba Soviets cano improve industrial plan level nanicipauen In ihe process. Their priority objeo-tWes are to increase HAD pfoducUvity and tornodernlin thalr menufaauting infrastructure. They are counting on flexible nu nurturing aytlema

and oibcr computer-aided machinery lo provide ihe necessary peeciilon lo meet the design requirements of advanced military lyiiems, Including lubsystera min-Uturizallon, Increawd itruclural strength, andweight.

Inhe Soviets bad hopes or creating industries totally linked by computer rsctworks. They have begun to backrom thai objective and, for the present, appear coouol to create islands of auto-matioo within industry. Nevertheless, inttalUlioo of computer-aubled design and manufacturing (CAD/ CAM) equipment it increasing dramatically in RAD and productionpUmUiic Soviel oflKiah have claimed that CAD aysienu will shorten producl development times by SO lo SO percent (Such gains have been realised in USther official) have claimed thai automation In engineeringwill at least double labor productivity and that auicenalion of continuous procesilng can free up to one-half of Ihc laborers.

Specie Soviet military goah arc Less clear.vident, however, that ibe Soviets have aot become any lest aggressive in meeting the challenge ofWestern weapons technology. As weapon costs skyrocket and tecbjaoiogy brtakthroughs offer large performance gains, there arc indications that the Sovici miliury is pressing harder than inor weapons of belter quality, even at tbe cost of reduced quantities. Continued developrrient of SDI. in particular, will Induce Ihe Sovieti to give prioriiy to the development of the senior, signal processing, and battle management technologies necessary for devel-oprnent of comprehensive, countermeaiures or asystem. Information technologies arc central to Soviet miliury lUategy, both in the weapons and in the factory"

The authorities alto promise aa improvement in theift andimooth transition to the new Information aocieiy. Oorbacbev has come down force-la Uy In support of changing tha Inforrrutioa cohures in bures.cracy and tocaely. Perhaps because of this tnipport. Ihe Sovleu are beginning to print more atatbtica on sensiilveoore open and frank eraluatroni of (he performarrces or officials la all rnieaucraciti. and mora open cr liiciims of bureau-crallc and socialsuch aa withholding

informalion and lying about production fulfillment. In the near lerm, Ibe regime will emphasize education and training; for trample,andatory course on Ihe basicomputers and computet prostraming was begun for 9thhhe SovteU ar* planning to supplyersonal computer* lo (he icboot)ercent of toulillion, by the year MOO. Mast eoemmuaieation terviccs, at well as bonne pcrsooal computers andn expected toand improve. Advocates claim that eiiiteas' live* will be enriched and creative force* unleashed throughout aocieiy.eading Indicator ofpolicy, the national press bas shown anopenness (hat contrasts sharply with (be conlinued conservatism or ihc local press,

Gorbachev also real ires lhat be races oppositionids tpoctrum of society, including segments of (he party and sute bureaucracies at all levels. But, like his contervative opponents, be has given no indication that he endorse) any fundamental reduction in nationileedfeciioa- by'

conuincd. An architect of theprogram has promised tbat information lectWogit* "will change our lire, making it fuller, wiser, more leniible and, in the end, happier ihaa now."

The Soviets have several options for developingtechnologies, all pro raising progress bul none offering much prospect of overtaking the. West by the end of ihe century. They are poorly positionedup the domestic sources thai fueled WesternThe Sovietsroad mataaaxl base, having geared their industry to military rseeds. West-era commercial applications of consumer electronics, for example, have dri-er, progress and rapid growth cJ the electronics Industry. In the West, riefee* epp-ca-lions of ICs account for onlyercent ta* the vahtcercent of the physical volume of IC production Tbe conferees also concluded that the Sovieis are unlikely to Introduce measurers that would substantially Imrtrove the effectiveness of their met-aire RAD hate In serving the needs of prod tree n.

The Soviets probably will continue to rely heavily on Imported technology. They will favor the acquiiillon of production technology with both military and civilian applications, including turnkey facilities, and will eschew reliance oo Western countries forsupplies ofheir effort* win be hindered by hard currency ahcetagca aad by tb* growing diAeulty of rcrenc engineering latere* singly topbis treated information technologies. Moreover, the greatestyftcms engineering, and loftextremely difficult to aatiify through Imports without active Westernsomething constrained by export control regulations. Moreover,uoceuful follower it rat egy probably would condemn the Soviet* to being at teast one technological generation behind.

Tbe Soviets will probably focus Ibe appikaiko of inform*lioe icebnotogics on industry sad the military. Irtercaiiag industrialhe meat pre**ing goal. Military leaden arc aware that production technology advances are necessarytrongaad they will posh for modernization of the defense icdustrial baseradually growing em-phaiU on quality over quantity la weapon acquisition On the social front, tbe Soviets probably will move only gradually to increase tbe supply of comumer electronic* inch aa VCR*.

Where Are the Sorter* Starting From?

Soviet and Western observers generally agree lhal the USSR trails considerably behind Western nations in the development and application of informationhese lag* havend in some areas Ia massive ccenmiimeat of reaources to Information technology RJtD dating back to. Today law USSR has thesubiiibmeoi In tho world and has achievedluocen In many areas of acience- WhDe tbb competence has enabled Moscow to erc-Je ceruio Western leads at tho laboratory stage, familiarIn leduttrlal Innovation and application have hindered Soviel progress. The ma litre ilic of Ihe Soviet RahD effort, coupledailure lonarrow ibe technological gap with the West.

suggest! an ineffective RrkD managementiagnosis with which Gorbachev has openly concurred.

Technologies

Western esperts generally bold that Sovietcomputer, and telecommunication* techno) -ogies lag those in the West by five toear* and, in some cases, by even more, depending on the specific lech, nolon general, the Soviet* probably fare better In major hardware development than in the development of support technology such as computer peripherals and software.

Whereore amenableassive, fccuseda* in certain lekcomraunl-calions and ratcrcctrcoit developmentSoviets do relatively better and the Western lead may shrink; where advance depends more on coordinated and mutually reinforcing developmentost of inter relatedas in computers or computer-aidedWestern lead is more likely lo be sustained or even increased:

In microelectronics, the Soviets are at least two generations (approximately five years) behind the United States and Japan and are following Western approaches. In part because of their late start, the Soviets have built their micrcekctrooks industry primarily by copying the West and using Western equipment.

Soviet computer* are by and large copks of Western computers and are at least one generation behind.

Tbe Soviets have an archaic telecommunication, system, but one thai is being modernized and made more effective with heavy InvcslmenL

Software has alwaysajor problem for the Soviets. Their systemsrimarily of Western origin. Application software is their Achilles* heel, becauseob specificifficult to modify for mother area cf operation.

AciOSit (now,logici. .el |cntt have depended stgrutVcaniry oe iotported Of llolen Well cm

In the list leveral yean, Soviel officials appear to hare become more acutely aware of the need for much-improved eoordiriaiioa of Interrelatedtecfanolof iu. Supportuciiph-eral equipment, ojiatenaoee. and user trainiaf -bar* repeatedly been sins;led cart as (he most teriousonet leaden havo responded by creating organise Uons to coordinate development and foatcr com pa Ubt lily among the hundreds ofproducto date, Ihc response appears to bo largelyoversight committees, expanded technical Handsrdt, and formal qualiiy ccrttucatioo.

Moreover, to obuln hardware, software, and olber support, the Soviets are trying to capiuliie on Ibe resources of tbeir East European partners in tbe Council for Mutual Economic Assistancehli also is notdevelopment (initially the Ryad Series) was the first major product of CEMAof PAD in the. Recently, CEMA anncemced the0 program, singling out key InfcemalJon lochnologies for mueh-capanded cooperative development efforU. Soviet or-ganiutfons will manage these devclcceneat efforts and try to direct them toward areas where East European countries are technicalhey will also gain by using Eastern Europeonduit forfoem t'-ioa tcchnolouj.

A polk* lions

Aeaawding io Soviet official data, informaUon tech-rtologies are being applied on aa iacreating sea lc throughout Ihe economy. RAD and indtatrial cuitom-ets are receiving prefcreoco In tht allocation of corn* put en. for example. Mainframe eoanputen used for inventory control, payroll, aad eitherupport functions are fairly common In large plants, while minicomputers are applied txlcnilvcly Incontrol. Soviet aod Western lathers, however, claim that Soviet ecsnrputm era rrmeralT) used leu Intensively then those in Wettera firrnt.

Western authors hevc described the Soviet telephone sytiem as primitive by Western tundards sad aeaiori-ousx-crcality irtnircissioo and unrdlability, even ihough Sovici tr lecomrounlc*tioci has followed US arcbitectaral Krategy. The plan5 called for increasing the level of existing network aulccna-lion twitching of long-distance calls without the aunUnce of an operaa mereercent. Tbe Soviet* alsoarge but uiLtophiitscBtedsatellite network. They have launched six time* as much payioad weight as the US Intelsat lyilem but bar* less than one-fifth the commonka-tioos capacity. Leading-edge technologies such as optical hbers for data transmistioo, nctwotk control prog re mi, and digital twitching currently appcat io Soviel literature as problem) that must be solved before wide-scale use begins. At tbe tame time, the Soricu mate more modest demands on ibeirsystem than is typical in an advanced Western country."

Tbe dmlopeaeat of tbend telecommunications industries allowed tbeIn ihco begin introducing automated management system) (ASUs) on the plant, regional, and national levels. They use ASUt for economic, admirttstntcve, inventory, prod act -planning, andcontrol apphcatioris.5 the USSR reported it bad UuuOedSUa. Difficulties in applying Urge-scale ASUf apparently have convinced Ihc Soviets to dermphasire ministerial- and enier-prise-level systems in favor of lower level systems for prod action control and information processing, as illustrated in ihe tabulation below: '

Io general. Soviet and VVeatern analyiUthat in range and Intensity ol* applications the USSR retruioibehind the Weat. The Soviet* have hi,My aatc-oi* ted ficjtoriea. bul many are tilandiea of taint* Industrial pUol- Uneveniaalto contributedailure to achieve dei ired gtlnt ioven when technology doe* not Uneaten ttate control, the Soviet* hive not moved ajgtessrvely to exploit the potential forgrowth. For csample, they could tupply their engineers with lubatantial comber* of docne*tic*lly manufacturod hand-held calculators, but they cboote to produce only imelt numben of elcateoUry model*.

Tho Soviet lyjlem Itielfnterest inlewibe bfor-matioa age. whether be provide* or eact infearoatioa tervtccs. Thereuge dtiIncentivepply auloma-tioo in the tt-Anagcmeot itructarc of the Sovietand until therehange In the incentivefew iubitnolive change* cancted. Soviet author* id sow ledge that these ibcelooraingi tigmneanily reduce the economic benefit* obtained from automated managementoreover, they recogniie that tbe Soviets do not require tlateof-(he-art tcchrtology lo realiie lubtUntial gains

Conferee* concluded that the Soviet* have beenin luting dated technology to create competitive weapon tyitccnt bul will rnove lo use coniiderably more advanced technologies in future generation* ofore ejteeulvo mllilary application* of in-fctrnationspeesally In coatunaad and control- may require change* In military doctrine and tactic* a* the Soviet* move away from relyingrwbclming numbers of men and weapons. This could causend social problems, and these would be lotensified If greater reliance on Informal ice technolofies drove up military eapesseUrure* Theprobably have little choice but to move In this direction. Information technology promises such huge increase* In nsiHiary capability that (hey would be increasingly hard pressed to compensate with cumber*.

Inforaatioohave had varying impact In the hotttejind have made limited inroads Into thehe USSR hit significantly upgraded and

cipaaded Iu television andSoviet surveys reveal that most dllreas obtain an increasing share of their information frommedia al the capcate of print media and lectures. Vidcccastette record- it are in gteat demand; anre already Inersonal computer*o have made the least Impact, because of shortages of equipment, maintenance, and training."

Inform*tioo technologies also have the potential to be usedjsm cf political and social control Wesiern analysts have assumed that the privileged position of Ibe KG B, police, and Communist Party apparatus would assure (hem ready access to tbe best available technology far communication* Iatereept and rurvcilltoce.

How Fast WUI the SeeteUi thetloc Kcoktlceil

JudgmenU about the pace of Soviet progress depend oa assumpejons about how Moscow will cboote be-

partially iiKornnauoleost author* agree that Ihe centralLred. socialist Soviet system creates an iabcepi table covirontneat for tnaxitni-irig advance in in formatechnologies and iheirThus, as one author (Res Malik) puts it, tbe Soviets face aa "agon.ringbaUndng the lainsofricnt with ihc risks of losing political and social control.

Eipccu differ, of course, over where (he Sovieu will end up along this continuum and what Ihewill he for their position in (be world. We lumrnarixe below the key elementsoriaensus that seem* to emerge in IbeSoviet* will "muddle through" but will not reach tbe levels of leading Western oatsoos by the*

Tb*i

Evenorbachev, most Western expertsthai Soviet infeemaiion twhriologies woo Id continue to advanceealthy rale, benefiting from

ihc traditional Impeluj ofmassive resource commit-menU, ex plot ut km ot* Western deveJcpmeriti. ind leadership attention. Gorbachev bastroeg tooet io Ibe rwc*rans, expects Uy ia terms of lesrserces Even to,observers expect the Soviets to narrow the gap1 iy. except possibly In aornc ipecialty miliury applications. Most believe the USSR wilt remain five toean behind in mealthat is, in IMS ihey will have about the tame array of technologies available that the United Slates bas today. Moreover, rest expect Soviet progress to be faster in inforrnalioa tcchtic4oajen that lead them-servesotiioett program- approach (for example, tclccommonk*lions) than in those lhat do not (for exatmple, aoflware)."

These judgincntt are predicated on the widely held belief thai Gorbachev is trying to mod cm ire the Soviet system but will not fesdanventally change itviagarty-dominated command systemore pturalitiic, decentralized tyttem. He is moving agjrrciiivcly on weal:sciencehe needs of production; stressing services, maintenance, and computer literacy; and generally (lying lo create an environment that encourages individual initiative and creativiiy. These measures, together with efforts to alter the informs licet cultures of the bureaucracies and society, tie moderately reformist. Although rainy Soviet officials supportoderaie policyost Westerners believe tba Soviciapparatus and society will resist or delay advances in infortiniiiin (eehnology "

The conference endorsed these views and concluded lhat prospective Western advances In Information technologies will nuke it bard for the Soviets to remain only one or two generations behind Conferees fell thai the Soviet* couldeneritiori in certain ink-nut ion tcchoologict, like micrceteetrcti-ks, but only if they can obtain rnajor help from other coon tries, like Japan. The teJeCCCnmunrCatsoo lyslemthe greatest chances for substantialmainly through Ibe heavy Investment in tOreign teehoolofy. Software, especially for applications, la likely to continue tonajor shortcoming. The microelectronics and compuier industries are unlikely lo obtain luffcicot rtaoiireta to doatt tbe gap with ihc West,

Th* Applications

Western and Soviet eiperti teem lo agree thattechnologies wVl be applied preferentially in tbe military, government, science. Industry, and,eans lo an end, la education. Conservative Soviet authorities write of Ihe need for "unified state con-Iron of information technologies, and even ihc most vocal believer* ia these technologies generally write about the provision ofod service*.

In tbe government, rolior. and military eataUub-meots, iafcn-mstioo irclsocaogies are likely lo beexlraxrvely to rapport Iha maintenance ofcontrol. For ecocoenic rnanageanent, cocnputers have been described as the Tail great hope of centrallthough early dream*airing" the entire economy have been aoalcd backcomputet! are likelyind Increasingly vride-tpread use at all levels la planning ptcductioo and rupply. Tbe confereea judged thai the Soviets are capable of doiug moat ofey wish lo do with Iheir cutting telecommunication lyitcen, and thai programed improvements for autoenalrd daU links will increaic Moscow's ability Io collect Information and convey insi ructions. In the rnlllury, information technologies will continue to be incorporated insystems, but tbe real frontier Is command and control. Soviet military literature eilollsnd most experts believe thaitechnologies will be more extensively applied in combat modeling, operational planning finerarling re-eonruiitaacc and fire tepportX and atrategic battle ntrugemeti Conferees preausoe lhat the KGB .. opd recotdkeepiegut doubt thai tbell iuppert truly iDeoccenpaotrig measures of control at kail by ihe

In tbe economy, meat etperu expect thai (be Soviets will apply informsikie technologies exf eniiitly In informalioo dissemlaatloo, product design, aodprccesa control, Tbey have keg inverted large turns In acquiring and diiaerninaung technical Information, and ihey art moving lo automate this process more extentlvity. Access to Western dau

i

bales will be aggressively pursued SovietsWestern expertscomputer-tided design willigh priority at the Soviets move Into components and systems that are either impossible or prohibitively expensive to develop by other means (for example, very dense integrated dr-cutis and hlgh-perforroaocecenputer-aided manufacturing probably will be pursued the most vigorously, because It Is so important for reaching Gorbachev's productivity and growth goals. Many Western experts believe the Soviets willin produciog large numbert of robots, automatedtools, materials handling equipment, andcomputers, but will not develop an effective Integrated systems approach Islands of automation will spread, but continuing deficiencies in software, roatotenance, technical tundards, and incentives will Impair comprehensive advance and efficient use.

lo the home. Western ex peels expect substantial progress In entertainment applications but see little prospectcomputer culture" comparable to thai In tbe West. Mass communication tervioes already permeate Soviet todety. Given the rooeprivity of Soviel dti-ens lo radio and (especially) television. Soviet officials probably will try'to improve the quality, timeliness, and variety of offerings, if only to compete with Western alteniatrvcs. At the same time, information technologies arc likely to be used in jamming or other meant of Inletfering with these Western alternatives. Ownership of videocassettcand possibly video cameras will become more vrideapread as Western systems and Soviel product* become incrcasiogly available. The apparent Soviet concern over (be Impact of these systems makes il difficultorecasl how rapidly this processp of persc-ial teMnwcf willbut most experts believe thai even by (het will not reach leveU pievalenthe West in the. Finally, most Western experts teem io believe that personal computers will reach Soviet citizens In relatively smallhe priority of applications In the computer literacy program and in industry, along with restrictions on bnporU, makes il unlikely that large numbers will be available lo the Soviet consumer before the. Deficiencies In or unavailability of peripberttas printers orfurther restrict personal ampliations.

The conferees concluded that the Soviets would fall far short of raceiing information technology targets If they chose lo rely on indigenous resources. Thus. Ihe West may have some leverage over Soviet advance, primarily through the denial of technology for dual-use applications. US leverage is eroding, however, as tbe Soviets become increasingly able to obtain its^formation technologies from otherand especially Japanese, sources.

Whai Will Be the ConseqiseeKes for the Soviets?

All conference partidpanls agreed that the new. more pragmatic Soviet leadership will be rnore effective than its predecessors in making informationworl for productivity growth and military sd-vancemeot. At the same lime, developments In Iheleast in terms of quality nnd effectiveness-are moving forward rapidly and in some areas are probably accelerating. Conferees judged thatclosing Ibe gap with tbe Western moving target would require tub-laeiial change in ihe Soviet system to make it more hospitable to innovation and growth. Tbcy judged that such change was unlikely, even to the degree experienced in then China. Thus, the conferees expect steady if ursspectaeular Soviet development, wilh little change in thepolilical and social institution!.

If Ihe Soviets do indeed "muddlehe Soviet Union ofDI not bo much different than It isrepressive society still trying to catch up to the West, bul still dangerous militarily. ProgTcs* and change will be constrainedoviet tysiem that resembles the current model. Of course, the scenario assumes lhal the West wilt continue to hold the Soviet Union at arm's length io Its quest for high technology and Influence the evolution of Sovietand social systems mainly by the provision of information.

The frke-aoeny and Ibe Military Conferees atreed that improved worker effort,infusions of RAD and investment retirees, and selected lechnology transfers would raise Industrial

productivity, buibly not enough to meet Soviet goab. ThU. In torn, mike* it unlikely that tbe Sovicu will roach Western level, of per capita production and quality of lift by the year JOCO.oilling torecise focecaat, mott doubt that Gcebachev wiB iranafcein tbe Soviet Unkas into an engine of econcunic developrwnt, achieving hu goalercent annual growth ia.t least ai much ikcptlcbm that Soviet technology and product- will become competitive with the bestalternatives. Tht Sovku probably will continue to have aa export profile like thathird Worldmalaly rawootinua-tion or wceseoiog of tbeosition in those markets would Impair iu abafity to rely on (he West.

fiovlet priorities and the organiutkei of the Soviet system are likely lo ensure that the most rapid progress in information technologies will be In the enililnry. Arsna control agreements or Gorbachev's civilian ac-odcrnixation programs could lead to drver-aion of aeane ml Me r, mo us trial rcacasroca. Buto sign of any fundamenUl shift in priorities, and the military evidently recognizes that they stand lofrom advances in Industrial information teehaol-ogiea likelocution. Soviet weapon program nsanagement lechn-qac* serve to concentrate high-quality ivjsotrrees. including inspected or stolenucirvok>gy. oo weapon programs. Tho Soviets have generally been lucceasful at deploying linproved weapons oo schedule, thereby cutting aekctively Into Western military technology leads in fielded tnflilary systems.

At tbe tame time, the Soviets also *it! be aimingoving target in the (miliary arena. Weal onto develop smartveopons, ad-vaaend reconnalsstnot and battle mioagtment tya-lorna, andtssoclitod with the StrategicInltiatlvt suggest that annot anInforms ike, techoologlea will be driving much of iha Wnslcra adratvce- Coeueree* Kdged that the Sen-lets would do weB to keep pace with the West over the next decade.

These pesslmbtle exclusions are based on the fact that progress In the Infomttknf all technologyparticularly Irvccenpatlbie with

key features of the Soviet-style locUlbt, command economic system. Development of informaHoo Indus-Iriesoordinated advanceroad from of interdependent lechnologiet and the orovisloo of supply, support, and financial seevkct Spcaauneity. -kotloo-ap- creativity,noentiVea, and lecb-nkal support provide the Impetus for change, and flexible management, well developed horizontal com-munkallons. and material support accommodate change. The Soviet lyitem, even moderatelyfarnishet virtually the oniithesb of thb envi-ronmeai. It is pcodttoua. cumberteene, verticallyand penalliet ianovatioa To make matters worse, information uchnologitri Ukctrcuhs ore difficult to reverse engineer, thus, the Soviets' Irsdiliooil answer lo (heircraab program to acquire andof limited value.

The redtkal Systaat

At the same time, the Soviet leadership has reason to worry that in mcreasingty eeenputcr-Ilierata dui-enry may develop (he ability to obtain, manipulate, and

On ihe politka! and tccial front, many Western analytu expect that there willradualof party-state control of Information techno!-Oglea -partly Intended, and partly unintended.coznpalga sets the stage for greater ledividual iccesi to infeernatioo tyncnas. His induslrisl auceBaisoa tlrtve and his effortsge ird.-ridaal aad local -quire tome moderation,eipoosibflity for dec* and possibly more sharing of authority wilh regional and local otheials. Moreover. Soviet otTkiaU have acknowledged that the incseasingly sopbiiticated and demanding Soviet crtirea mast be catered lo. and indeed ore Wotom .wtfcoe (Wilsoohai tht Sovietbe ibe driving force behind any loosening of control, nnally. the tcchnrdofic* thetrstej-rcs can work both vrayt; tome at least potentially aopport irxrratsed natc rorvtUUnce, but many (especially in the factory) are compatible with more decentralized i

IS

Uerurnit unamhocired Infcrfmatloo. whether at borne o* on the job Even witUa lb* bounds of ikeyuem, informalion technologies cand-Moscow can use Ibem lo ceotnliie and peneirate, bul local auilioriUca oa* use Ibeeo to deceive. Moreover, aexordinj lo Acsdetny of Scsencea Vice President Yevgcruj VeJisnoy. Soviciaden-liita are alio 'coking Into possible conaequences of ibe Infonualioo revolution thai have been disponed in Ibealienation and reduced peer contact' There are also hints of concern over workerIf not uaemptoymeot.

Cbalicnges lo coolrol are likely lo arise. Several areai otTer ihreau and opportunities over the nestyears:

tiitrnoat likely lo become increasingly accessiblerdinary oiitcns- tuV Ihougb increased jsmming ex Soviet cable television could check thisoreign radiobroadcasU like Radio liberty and Radio Free &wope have forced the Soviet leadership to be more forthright wilb iheir populace over* jieh Issues ai thencident and Ibe CWnofayl'disailer. Ia thevOi direct-beoadcaai utcUites for television could carry Western programs and advertisements, illus-trating what is available lo the Western consumer. ParsdoiicaDy. lolhe reported cetttsteatulion of party eirrscials. even Soviet television ma; have ainfluence.ajor entertainmentndermining the elfectrveoess of polili-cal lectures aod other, more traditions! means of conveying propega nda. The conference concluded lhat jamming of foreign radiobroadcasU. especially Western broadcasts, con be eipecled to continue

The trowing availability of consumeradia, especially vldeocasstilts, both Western origin and blank tapes" Tha Soviets tear procaiga-liort of "antlaoeiar values and behavior--crime and moral defeneration. They alio rear thai such access may feeler'growing eartstirrierlirn, uoekrmlniag ef-forts to promote continuing saerUlce toup Gorbachev" growth ilrategy.

Telecommunications Increasing access to leie-pbonea (and possiblylus iorgjsrenrerneai io ibe national systems, increases control and iuntil-lance problems for ibe KOB.ystem timilar Io iheI" telephone system, an Idea that cameoviet pa tern, could be used by the KGB lo monitor personal ormoluoni and fa dilute tracking.uiorlof iriternational direct dUling illustrates tbeir arUHogness lo take drastic ascasurcs. In any event, ihe Hale'a burden wiD be eased by the fact lhat Sovici irrfrjrctiailon oetworki ire and will continue to be considerably narrower end rnore focused ihaa Western networks.

Beyond the neil five yean Ibe Soviet -computer culture" may ukc hold In earnest. By lhal time, millions of Soviet dtizens ihouM be computer literate Soviet prcdurtion of personal computers andlyticmsbe adequate to lupport widespread industrial appliuticrts and at least potentially the beginnings of widespread private rywnersbip. At lhat lime Soviet aocurity authorities could confrontof monitoring telecommunications use, data base access, end acceaa to efficient, aishepced report production systems Soviet economic acib-xiiici will see Iheir chronic battle against data falsification move to tbe Informalion technology frontier, aod Sovici esperience auggests Ihat tbey will be hard put to avoid at trait isolated instances of ccaaputer crime and even Hbotage.

The confetenc* judged lhat such potential threats lo ilate control could be contained, albeit not without forfeiting tome of tbe potential bencflu offered by unfettered information technologies. Confereeshowever, lhat alternative aornarioaby Western authors raise the rjcatbtlUy of more serious conflict or disruption within the Soviel system;

One scenario heads lhat Soviet authorities may underestimate bow quickly and how seriously spreading Information technologies may chalkngc

state conttoi Ax information technologiescrossover point" owhich developing insUlUtioos and networks over-wheloi ihe ability of ccolrola."

Another scenario raises the pcaiibilityolity crisis. Tension may grow between "conservatives"odern liert" as one or both sides become dissatisfied wilh trends in Soviet economic progress and political control. Disagreement could lead to an abrupt change in policy, with ramificationsbeyond the world of Information tochnologlea. It couldramatic liberalisation of the Soviet system,onumental Internal crackdown and external belligerence. Malik, perhaps tbean In of tbe writers on this topic, concludes tbat "werackighly dangerous situation."

On balance,xpect Gorbachev'sapplied to information technologies, to foster some moderation of polilical and social control over tbe nextears. Yet iho Soviets probably will notbioesc-stylo track-off In which central control Is substantially relaxed to improve theeconomic position. They also are not likely to resort to Westernextensive reliance onruly hospitablefor information technologies. Moreover,of ihe Soviet leadership will try to buck any moderation, while the technological Innovators push for mote mode rat Ion.

The conferees concluded lhal by ibet ihe very latest tbe ihcutcomJngi of the strategy to dose the information technology gap wilh the West may force the Sovieteevaluate its approach. Tbe conferees expect growing tecsioo betweenof greater ecoooer.fc ekcrninitiation andof light polilical control, but do notrisis developing. Although there is room for some compromise and for Innovative methods of leadership and management, Soviet leaders probably willremium on maintaining political control This raises ibe prospect of continuing and potslblr Inlcsxifying economic and technical ihortfalli.

If this cceuri, the Soviel Union inuy be even farther from lis goal of achieving equality with the most advanced Western countries in terms of economicechnical development and dtixens' welfare. Ii may be forced to rely to aa even greater degree on military power to aaalniain influence in the worldas the tconcnisi put it. an -Upper Vesta withonferees did notihc coc^eouencex of dealingsickul noted thai Soviet progress to tbe "iofoenutioe revolution" will significantly influence the severity of the bear's illness.

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