Created: 12/1/1986

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Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East; .


Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East

Soviet Policy Toward the Middle East

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he Soviets had good reason to be happy wiih theirin the Middle Easi during the decadealf since their firstwith the Arabs. They had developed strong relationships with Nasser'smost important Arabwith Syria. Iraq, and Algeria. Moscow had also steadily improved its relations with the non-Arab "northern tier" countries of Afghanistan, Iran, and Turkey

Ihcn, however. Soviet fortunes in the region have been mixed. The USSR's posilion has become far stronger in the northern tier, with the United Slates out of Iran and lhe Soviets controlling lhe dcsliny of Afghanistan But in the Arab-Israeli theater, the Soviets' position is markedly inferior lo thai of the United Stales, because they have failedakeactorolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict or toio the Arabs ideologically or economicall

Thus far in, the Sovieis have not made significantapitalizing on lhe gains they made in ther in ther in compensating for the setbacks they suffered in the Arab world cailiet in. They have been unable to replace US influence in Iran with their own or consolidate Marxisi rule in Afghanistan despite seven years of military occupation. Their increased presence in Syria, Libya, and Soulh Yemen has not balanced the USSR's loss of influence in Egypi

General Secretary Gorbachev has yet to male any maior innovations in Soviet policy loward the region- -save perhapscnlativc dialogue wiih Israel. But he has demonstrated through his military suppor: for Moscow's Arab'and Afghan clients, his frequent meetings with Middle Eastern leaders, and lhe numerous envoys he has dispatchedhc area that the Kremlin intends to be more assertive in promoting Soviet interests. The USSR's primary policy goals in lhe Middle East during the rest ofrc likely to be:

Consolidating control in Afghanistan.

Blocking any US-Sponsored Arab-Israeli peace scitlcincnl thai leaves Moscow out and, optimally,oice in lhe peace process.

Unifying the Arabsro-Soviet front by ending the isolation of ihe Kremlin's Arab clients: Syria, Libya, and South Yemen.

Stemming the drill of Algeria and Iraq toward Icwr dependence onsc: ;ti> u; d Si.rr.

Expanding influence in Moscow's key regionalnd Iran.

Eroding Turkey's security tics to the United State:

l; i

Gorbachev's bcsl chances for success seem lo be inS-sponsored Arab-Israeli settlement,odest expansion of Sovietin Egypt and Iran,consolidating control in Afghanistan:

ajor voice in Ihe Arab-Israeli peaceprimary Soviei goal in the region sincegreatly enhance Ihe USSR's ability toajor acior in ihe Middle East. In particular, ii wouldthe Soviets to block any L'S-sponsored scttlcmcnl ihey believed harmful to their interests. We believe ihat Soviei concern about the Syrian reaction has prevented Moscow from taking ihe onereestablishf relations withwould be most likely to overcome US and Israeli opposilion to Soviet panicipalion in ihe peace process. Il appears, however, ihal Gorbachev is thinking seriously about correcting Ihe blunder Ihe Soviets privalely acknowledge ihey made by breaking relationse is likely lo move very gradually io give Ihe Arabs lime to gel used IO the idea of bclicr Soviet-Israeli ties beforefull diplomatic relations.

The USSR faces formidable obstacles in increasing its influence in Egypt and Iran. Soviet officials acknowledge there will be no rciurn to the' heyday of the Soviet-Egyptian relationship. Barring majorunrest in Egypt, the best ihe Kremlin probably can hope for during the next few yearsarginal improvement in bilateral liesrowing Egyptian disenchantment with the United States. In Iran, the Soviets seem convinced there can be no significant improvement in relations as long as Ayatollah Khomeini remains in power. This will noi preclude an expansion of economic lies, however, and Moscow is certain to attempt to exploit Iranian weakness or domestic turmoil in the post-Khomeini era, which cannot be far off.

Gorbachev appears determined to stanch whai he has described publicly as Ihe "running sore" of Afghanistan. His moves thus far haveore aggressive pursuit of the rebels, increased mililary pressure on Pakistan, improved training of ihe Afghan military, replacement of ihe Afghan leader,iplomatic/propaganda campaign to porlray the USSR as flexible about withdrawing. It is loo early to tell whether this strategy eventually will allow Moscow io withdraw its forces without undermining ihe regime in Kabul, but it will lake an adroit and

determined effort to carry it off. The odds are still high that,ollapse of Pakistani will, the Soviets will not yei have consolidated Marxist rule in Afghanislan asrrive

The Soviets are likely lo continue their efforts to remedy iheir overdepen-dence on Syria in the Arab world by courting moderate Arab regimes. Moscow could become more willing lo buck Damascus' interests if Egypt, other Arab moderaics, or Israel make concessions io the USSR that they have avoided thus far, oruccessor regime in Syria proves less Stable or more friendly io ihe West than President Assad's. Even so, Syria would be likely lo remain the Soviet Union's mosl important allye Middle tasi. prompting Moscow io tailor its moves to avoid serious damage io bilateral rclalions

Soviet influence in Iraq and Algeria probably will continue; lo erode despile Moscow's importance as an arm?Baghdad and Algiers pursue more moderate foreign policies and more Westcin-O'ienled economic policies. These trends appear to be strategic shifts ra'.her lhao tactical adjuslmenis, and the USSR, in out view, does noi have enough to offer economically to reverse Ihem

Finally, the long-term nature ofnternallic rivalry between Turkey and Greece, and Ankara's doubts about the intensity <if US commitmentsurkey promise iu eor-tinus to provide Ihe Soviets openings to exploit Turkey's weaknesses andttempt to woo it away from NATO Nevertheless, Ankara, dcspnc its frictions with Washington, is extremely wary of ils northern neighbor and is likelyemain closely linked to ihe United Stales, barring an unforeseen breakdnwr. in internal ordc

Despite lire obstacles ii faces, the Soviei Union is certain io benajoiin the Middle Easl for yearsome The Soviets regard ilic Middle East as ihe most, important region ofhird World because of iis proximily lo the USSR, ils vast reserves of oil and gas. and tis economic and gcoslratcgic significance to ihe Wesl and Japan. The Middle East is ilic Soviet Union's mosl volatile borderland, ard -is ciiilosiver.css poses dangers because of the high stakes for the USSR and the Lniicd Sutes tn ihe region and the possibility thai uneonirolled events could leadilitary confroniaiioii between ihe two. Al the same time, this volatilityopportunities for expansion of Soviet influence that are noi present on

ihe USSR's other borders.


Moscow at laches considerable importance looequal of Washington in the Middle Easl, as lhe statements of Soviet leaders altesi This compclition with the United Slatesajor determinant ol Soviet policy toward lhe region. Soviei writings and

remarks of Soviet officials make il clear thaigards the increased US military presence in lhe Middle East since theajorconcern and will devote considerable efTori io counter ii

This superpower competition and the Soviet leaders' Maixist-Lcnims: "SttaiCgic view" aic common denominators thategree of unity to Moscow's policies toward the Middle East. Moreover, the USSR's position on some major regionalas lhe Arab-Israeliils policies throughout the Middle East Ueyond these unifying factors, however, we believe the Kientim docs nutgrand strategy" for the Middle Eastholeas related but distinct policies toward the widely divergent regions and issues of the Middle Easi These policies icficct specific Soviet cqt-incs and Interests in each regionach issue, as well as local conditions



Middle East as Seen From Moscow

Key Factor Competition With Washington

of Soviet Fortunes In the Middle East0


Soviet Balance Sheet Today

Arab World


Linchpin: Syria

on the Periphery: Libya and South Yemen

ol Convenience: North Yemen. Iraq. Algeria, and the PLO



of Relations


Balance Sheet From Moscow's Perspective

Northern Tier

Up Ihe Balance Sheet

ol Future Developments

Developments From Moscow's Perspective

Between Syria and Iraq

Between Syria and Arafat

Between Syria and Egypt

yf ihe Mubarak Regime in Egypteutral Regime

by Pakistan To End Support Tor Afghan Rebels

Severe Instability in Turkey




Thai Couldixed Impact on Soviei Interests

New Syrian-Israeli War

Endhe War Between Iran and Iraq

Developments From ihe Kremlin's Perspective

pamioc of ihe ft ir Between Iran and Iraq

Major Increase in Support for the Afghan Rebels

Talks Between Israelordanian-Palestinian Delegation

or Ouster of Assad

or Ouster of Qadhaft

Major Drop in Soviet Oil Production

of Treads in Overall US-Soviet Relations


of Soviet Involvement in the Middle Fast0

H-lk r

V 1

jno inc rtrao-nraeit reace


Ambassadors to Middle Eastern Countries

Numbers of Soviet Personnel in the Middle6


Soviet Policy Toward (he Middle East

of rod uc lion

iew ihat weoviei specialist on US policy toward the Middle East commented C

3 innni;

Moscow's role in ihe Middle East has been much smallerould be. given Ihe Soviei Union's interests in ihe region, its superpower iiatut. and ihe Middle Eon's location on iheouthern borders

This paper explores why this has been the case and assesses ihe prospects for the USSRete prominent role in the Middle East under General Secretary Gorbachev. Thus, the paper look* ji the decree of influence ihe Soviets wield in different countries. Where have they developed strongin ihe country's military, ruling party, and economichat influence do they have in ihe country's leadership decisionmaking, especially on questions of foreign policy? How do the Soviets rate Ihe relative importance of Ihe dilTcrenl countries in ihe region? In which countries do iheyilitary presence viial io ilic projection of Soviet force in ihe Middle East1 In which countries might they consider intervening militarily io proicei iheiragainst internal threat, external invasjpa,oi lo expand Soviet influenceew area'

The paper also examines possible new directions in Soviet Middle Eastern policy during the rest of ilic

. It pays particular attention io ihe Soviet view of US and intensions in theof ihe most important factors affecting the Kremlin's formulation of policy toward ihe Middle East, fi concludesook ai some developments thai coulda or impact ctt Soviei and L'S imcrcsts in the reeion

Tbe Middle East as Seen From Moscow

Soviet interests in Ihe Middle Easi stem fim ofiis proximity lo the USSR (see foldout9 ai back) As Soviet officials have stressedMoscow considers theoviet oorderland comparable to Latinfor Ihe United Slates One Soviei official toldUSSR

cv-siders the Mediterranean atea to be asimportant to ihe Soviet Union as (he Caribbean area is lo Ihe United Slates The Soviets repeatedly have made public declarations of (heir vital interests in the Middle Easioreign Ministry statement contended thai US aiiemptv lo establish military blocs and bases in ihe "Near and Middle Eastirect relation lo ihe security of the USSR . (which is| located in direct proxiniily" to the region In arguing ihat the entire Middle East is iheir borderland, ihe Soviets capitalize on ilic ambiguities of ihe geographic scope of the region and lis differentoviei and Western usage (see inset |

Other factors ihathe Middle East mif tort ant io the USSR include:

e region's vasi deposits of oil *ml natural gas make ii vital io the functioning of the economics of many Western ard Third World oouniries The USSR itself is self-sufficient in oil and natural gas but frequently has considered it cost effecsivc io purchase these commodities in the Middle Eaii or. in ihe case of oil.acceptaymentns. Soviet domesiic oil production peaked

' Thelrll iroi nl elns ji


TVic Soviets divide the Middle East into threeThey define lhe "Middle East"as Turkey. Iran, andthree countries afrea that border the USSR. They classify theof the Levant (Syria. Lebanon, fordast, and Israel) and the Arabian Peninsula, along with Iraq. Egypt, and Sudan under lhe "Nearnd lhe rest of Ihe countries af North Africa west of Egypt under lhe term "Northorrespondingly, coverage of ihe region In lhe Soviei Foreign Mimstrj is broken down Into one department for Ihe "Mtddlind another for the "Near East" and "Northhis paper examines Soviei policy in all three areas and, for sake of clarity, defines the entlr. region as the Middle East {scefoldout mapt the back]

borders (see figurehe approximatelyillion members of Islamic ethnic groups in the Soviet Union (roughlyercent of the total Soviet population) by and large have notecurity threat to the Communist regime since it subdued the Central Asian Basmachi rebels in. Since the, however, signs of increasing religious awareness among Soviet Muslims, coupled with the upsurge in Islamic fundamentalism in Iran, have prompted Soviet leaders to pay closer attention to the "Islamic factor" and to increase anti-blamtc propaganda, lust bow seriously Soviet leaders regard the threat of "contamination" of


ihe'impact rsiaimC'. vr'i ovic: Muslimscimuii to intervene At any rale, ncludc that the primarily Slavic


oicign policyomes tn security aiirjle and decisions about the treatmentomestic minority implications for Soviet relations with Muslim countries

Western and Japanese involvement. Dcyond itsvalue, the Middle EaM takes on added significance for ihe USSK because of the iongsiand-inc interest the Western powers and Japan have had in trie region. Theropcan colonial powers dominated Ihe Middle Gast until World War II. and the United States has been ibc predominant outside power since Turkey represents NATO's southeast-cm flank, andvarii anC North Africa be opposite NATO's entire southern Hank. The West and Japan are vitally interested in ihe Middle East because of its vasi reserves of oil and natural gas and us geostraiegic locationhe confluencesia. Africa. 3iid Europe The Western militarya primary concern to Moico

For all these reasons, we believe the Sonets regard iheasi as the most nnpoiiani region in the Third World Vet. in the context of overall Soviei lorcign policy,dlc Eastackseat to cotmol Over Eastern Europe, 'be Strategic competition with the United States, the relationshipChina, and relations with Wcsicrn Europa-.

The potential security ihreni to the Soviet homeland from the Middle Easi pales in comparison with those fated fioni the USSR'suiopcan and Far Eastern border regions The overwhelming hulk of the Soviets' conventional lorccs and all of their1 ange nuclear missiles are stationed in these artJS The Middle Cast, however, is the USSR's most volatile borderland. The region's explosivencss poses potential dancers to the Soviets because ihetakes both the USSR and ihe United States have in the area mean that uncontrolled events coulda ntiliiaiy confrontation between ihe twoAi ihe same time ihe Middle East's volatilityotential opportunities for rapidoviet influence that arc not present on the USSR's other


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Ideological Dimension

The Middle East has not proved to be fertile ground for the export of Marxism-Leninism. Only tn South Yemen and Afghanistan have Marxist regimes emerged, and even in those countries ideological roots do not run deep. The Communist parties in most of the other countries of the region have been largely irrelevant. The Soviets continue to supportparties and leftist movements in the region and undoubtedly seek the establishment of additional Marxist regimes. They have constsiently shown,that they are willing to tolerate ihe suppression of the leftiddle Eastern regimero-Soviet foreign policy

located thousands of kilometers from thisuarterentury later, then foreign Minister GrOmyko statedpeech two months after the Carter Doctrine was pronounced thai US foieign policy circles

art stressing more and more often and with greater importunity the 'vitalf the USA. It is asserted that in the Persian Gulf and. for that matter, anyplace where there are sources of oil are areas where US 'vital" aret is said thai the same "vital interests" are present in the Middle East In all parts ofof ouris lhe same thing.

Gorbachevimilar remark in5 in the Joint press conference lie held with FrenchMitterrand during their meetings in Pari?

A Key Factor: Competition With WashinBton

A leading Soviet experi on the United Statesuwaiti newspaper in

When Kissinger was dealing wiih iht Middle East, he did not consider Israel. Egypt, or Saudi Arabia, but he considered only the Unit ed States and the Soviet Union. This tt ihe view of the current US Administration.

For decades mend rid

Theellingecurity bees stale that the

We believe this bipolar perspective also has long been the view of the leaders in ihe Kremlin. The Soviets" desire to erode US influence and replace it wiih their own hasajor role in most moves theyade in the Middle Cast since the decline of Bnii'V influence in the region following World War II

ic Sv-i

retted open resent 'i claim* ibaihe Middle Em emenlviuil to Soviei >toximny went on io aid "aboul the

Despite this resentment. Soviet Icadeis clearlythat Ihe Uniied States is. indeed, vitallyin the Middle East Soviei commentaries note the importance US presidents have attached to the region dating from the Truman Doctrine of, through the Eisenhower Doctrine of, and the Carter and Reagan Doctrines of. One scholarly Soviet study of US Middle Easicrr policy inighlights President Nixon's statement to Congress tn3 that "no other crisis -egton of the world has greater importune a, priority lor tic USA than the Middle Easl

Ihe Sovicis attach vital importance to ibc increased US military presence in the Middle East thatin ihe. Ignoring US concerns over the Soviet invasion of Afghanisian and possible Sovieiof turmoil in post-Shah Iran. Moscow hasall ihe recent deployments of US forces to ihe Middle East as "bridgeheads" for the future use of US military power ir. regional states and against the USSR itself. Soviet propaganda, fur example, depicts the battalion of the US Kind Airborne Division tliat participates ir. the Multinational Fotcc of Obseiveis monitoring the Egyptian-Israeli bo'tici in the Smj:

a "shock unil of the US 'Rapid Deployment3 Soviet study of US policy in the Third World claims that the Reagan administration's goal is

ihe establishment of US mililary control over the resources of the Near and Middle East; the creationotbed of tension clouhe Soviet border; the imposition of constanton the USSR from the soul*.

Despite the self-serving exaggeration of such rhetoric, the Soviets have apparently regarded Washington's actionserious challenge to Iheir posiiion in the region. Lebanonase in point. Brezhnev slated publicly just prior to the formal US announcementontingent of Marines would be deployed to Beirut in Ihe aftermath of Hie Israeli invasion2 that Ihe Soviei Union was "categorically opposed" toove, which, if it occurred, would force the USSR "to build its policy taking this fact intohe Soviet decision io deployurface-to-air-missile (SAM) uniis to Syria *as taken shortly after Brezhnev's warning. The Kremlin probably would have sent (heven without Ihe US mililary deployment given the damaged siatc of Syria's defenses and Soviei-Synan rratioi-s. but tlie Marine deployment may have erased any doubis the Soviets had about (he necessity ofove.

The creation of ihe RDr" and later (he US Central Command (CENTCOMl appears ioarticularly worrisome dcvclfigutcji: fur Moscow

Stales and the West Europeans do noi always agree on Middle Eastern matters, thus reducing theto Washington of the West European forces in the region. Moreover, Moscow's own East European and Cuban allies have numerous military, security, and economic advisers in Middle Eastern countries who complement the USSR's presence and give the Kremlin another lever with which to influencegovernmcnis, insurgents, and terrorist groups.Washington's allies, though, none of these Soviet allies- -with the possible exception ofof force projection in the Middle Eas'


r>udia continually focus onctivities in the Middle East, parliculailyor. its alleged creation of bridgeheads foi future miliary aeiionjigair.sithe USSF

ddition to the UShis region, the Soviets also have to consider the military potential of US allies France. Great Britain, and Italy, no) ia mention Turkey The> realise, however, that the United

Oicrview of Soiiel Fortunes in (be Middle East

To evaluate the Soviets' current position in theEast, their past record in the region should be cxarrtried. especially during Ihe period since the

dcaib in0 mailt* theof the decline of Soviet influence in Egypt and in ihe Arab world in general. His successor, Anwar Sadat, did not share his view of the importance of Soviet support for Egypt and resented Moscow's intrusiveite cOiinlry.filSl tentatively, ihento reduce Soviet influence. His first step ir.! was to remove the pro-Soviet faction heailcrjjiy Ali Sabry. wbjio "cplacc

Two months alter Sabrys removal. Ihe Sovietsami lie:Km time in Sudan Tin: SudAne* Communistthe largest and most influet tial in the Middlea military coup against President Nimciri and subsequently was dec maicd after he man aged, with Sadat's help, io rcsioi control.influence in Sudan declined prccipi-taiel

Over ihe ncu few years. Sadatecisive break with Moscow and threw Egypt's loi in wjih the United States He sent most of ihe Soviet military personnel stationed in Egypt2 and deprived the Soviets of the use o' Egyptian air bases and most nivallthough Soviet weapons enabled Egypt to score early gams in tlie} Arab-Uracil war, Sada: turned to Washington ai the end of the fighting toettlement with hrae' Soviet-Egyptian relations steadily itcleiioralcd as the United States brokered Egyptian-Israeli disengage-tie it agreementsS The processadat's abrogation ol the Soviet-Egyptianand cooperation treaty6 and hisear later toace with hrad ii?nii; ihe UnileC States asiddleman hort span, the Soviets saw their premierbc Middlethat had takenears and cxttn. siv< military and economic aid to build- eiumblc and Washington pick up ihe pieces.they were unable

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fu> bfClc'tMdin ih< Middle fail priorrt arcKodii

mlti ftmtlait MuJitlt Kate. Studies in

Inle'Ulaynl AIIiiii Nvi I4 lllnliiniiHi" If* frriias llujlkifit Prcit

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The loss of Egypt forced the Soviets to shifi their support to the more radical Arabs, who also opposed Sadat's willingness to negotiate unilaterally with Israel Syria and theecame tiie USSR'sclients in the region beginning in the. Moscow alto developed closer lies lo Libya and

im on" SiKul mi lit Cuii-ijntlsitii



trade soared, and the two signed an accord on "Good Neighborly and Friendly Cooperation" in

T* *


Algeria, while South Yemen became the first Arab country to be ruledarxist regime when 'Abd al-Faitab Isma'il seized powerlthough Iraqajor Soviet arms client and signed aand cooperation treaty with the USSR,8 it had begun buying arms from the West and cracking down on the Iraqi Communist Pany |

The Soviets were unable to duplicate elsewhere in ihe Middle East the naval and air facilities they lost in Egypt (and in Somalia. Through wider use of port facilities in Syria. South Yemen, and other countries and greater dependence on replenishment at sea, however, they continued to maintain sizable naval contingents in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean.

The Afghan Marxists' seizure of power8reakthrough for Moscow in the northern tier. Soviet involvement in Afghanistan, already extensive, grew markedly under the Taraki regime. The Marxist takeover in Kabul, however, strained Soviet ties to the Shah of Iran. The cordial relations they hadinndad already begun to souresult of Iran's expanding military ties to the United States and more assertive regional policy, which oflen clashed with Soviet interests. Wiihon Ihe other hand, the Soviets managed to continue and even broaden the detente of.

9 the Soviets have improved their position in the northern tier and benefited from US setbacks in the Middle Easthole. Moscow's position in (he Arab-Israeli arena, however, bas no( markedly

The USSRtrategic windfall in thetier9 with (he demise of the Shah and the loss of US influence in Iran. An article in (he Soviet scholarly journal Narodyfriki9 stated that:

esult of ihe Iranianhange has laken place in the balance of power in ihe Near and Middle East. The liquidation of iheegime of ihe Shah and ihe collapse of Ihe miiUary-poliiical bloc, CENTO, has weakened ihe economic and strategiclion of the West, and especially ihat of the Untied Slates, in the region and in ihe entire world.

US "gendarme" in

Instead of an Iran (hat acted as the region

the Soviets noweighbor that was viscerally opposed to the United States. Moscow, however, was able to make little headway of its own in Tehran during the first three years of Ayatollah Khomeini's rule. By the springheevidently concluding that as long as Khomeini was in power their prospects for increasing influence in Tehran would remainattemptsour( the regime and tilted toward Iraq in its war with Iran. Since then, relations have remained frigid.

The invasion of Afghanistan in9 put Soviet forces in control of Kabul for the first time. The Afghan resistance, however, grew even stronger



after lhe invasion and presented the Sovieu from consolidating control, much less capitalizing through-out the region on their miliiaiy presence The mva-sum. io lad. made most Middle Eastern states even raofc suspicious of Soviet intentions and. coupkd with the Iranian revolution and lhe nuibreak of the war between Iran and Iraq, convinced somes Pakistan) lo increase militarywith the United Slates

The Soviets reaped some benefits from ihe aatt US backlash generated by8 Camp Di*id accords between Egypt and Israel and by Washington's abor tive attempt toro-US centralin Lebanon following2 invasion. The USSR and Syria moved even closer together than ihey had been prior to iheft* Theyriendship and cooperation tieaiynd Moscow qualitatively increased its involvement by sending twoAM units to Syriay1 Soviei personnel

The USSR's other main Aran client. Iheerious decline beginning2 wiih ihe Israeli invasion of Lebanon, which was aimed a: eradicating country The joll o! the PLCs defeat ledc PLOi main faction,; out between PLO leader


to help Arafal during the invasion and itsto jeopardire its relationship with Damascus by stepping in forcefully to resolve tbe Arafat-Assad feud strained its relations with the PLO chief. Arafat's setbacks led him toolitical solution to the Palestinian pioblcm through joint action with fotdan and -potentially^-cooperation with the Unitedove that further chilled Soviet-IM 0The USSR moved no closer to its goal of being included in Arab Israeli negotiations on theissue but too* solace from Washington's inability to convince othet Arabs to join the Camp David framework for peace talks with Isiae1

Libyan leader QadharVs growing fear of USafter US Navy jets shot down two Libyan aircraft over tbe Gulf of Sidra1 prompted him to grant the Soviets wider access to Libyanand air facilities That same year, Muslim fundamental-ists in Egypt assassinated the Soviets' mostopponent in Hie Arab world. Anwar Sadat The death of such an important US allyindfall for Moscow, but Egyptian President Mubarak hashis country's close links to Washington. Mu -barak has avoided Sadat's outspoken anti-Sovietism but moved much more slowly in normalizing relations than tbe Soviets had hoped. Although ambassadorial ties were resumed in ihe summerhere has bem no significant improvement in overall relations.

Perhaps one of tbe USSR's most significantin the Arab world over the last few years has bees iu improvement in relations with Iraq. Seeing no prospects for gains in Iran and fearing an Iranian victory over Iraq, the Soviets began2 to provide Baghdad with the weaponry ii required lo pursue ihe war. Political relations have improvedesult, but the legacy ol past disputes has only been put aside, not forgotten The relationship remains narrowly based on tec supply of arms, and the Soviets continue io be worried about Iraq's increasing political, economic, and miliary itacts with thethe United Siatev


similarly has been concerned over Algeria's drift Westward since President Bcndjedid look over9 The Soviets have tried hard to arrest Ihe drift but with hutc success. Ihc care and thoroughness with which Bendjedid has shifted Algeria's economy away from Hie socialm model and ils foreign policyeavily pro-Soviet "nonaligned" stance suggest ihal these ate strategic ralher than tactical moves.

On the Arabian peninsula, the Soviei Union main taincd us position in South Yemen despite the ouster of ihe staunchly pro-Sovtei Itrna'il0 and the bloody coup against his successor. Haaani. in6 The Soviets also managed to stove closer to tbe reiime in North Yemen without reducing ihetr sup port for the South Moscow and Sanaaayx arms deal9riendship and cooperation treaty4 That positive trend has beenhowever, by ihe frictions (hat ihe mosl rcccniden has generated in Sovici-Norih Yemeni relation?

Thenvasion of Afghanistan and Ihe war between Iran and Iraq initially prompted most of Ihe conservative Gulf stales tn increase security coupeta tion wiih the United States and shun establishing religions wiih ihe USSRowever, the effects of these shocks had lessened, and ihe Gull stares' disenchant meal *uh US support for lsi.ui hadrcreawd to the point -here Oman and the United Arab Emiratesatahlished relations wiih the Soviet Union The other Gulf states appear io be moving in Ihe same direction, although suspicion of Soviet complicity in Haunt's ouster is likely lo slow the process

rciings wiin Mit rrous envoys he

Gorbachev's record since assuming power inS suggests thai ihe United Slates canore aciivist and tactically flexible Soviei policy tn the Middle East than it has faced since thee has ycl to make any major innovations in Soviet policy toward the region save, perhaps, beginentative dialogueIsrael Bui Re hai OcTiotsiraicd through tat miliury support feerabaael Afghan Uterus, hrs frequent Fastern leaders, and ihe nu-dispatched io the area thai the Kremlin inicnds io be much more assertive in promot ing Soviei interest*

The Soviet Balance Sheet Today

The Arab World

TV Strategic Prize: Egypt The Soviets have yet to recoverhe Arab world from Iheir loss of Egypl. Soviei influence in Syiia. Libya, and South Yemen hardly replaces the Joss of influence in Egypt, which Moscow openly acknoa ledges, in ihc words of one Soviet scholar, as "the key arc most important country of "be Arabhe Arabs' chances of winning or eventheir ownar withjsrael without Egyptian participation are slim

Rccogaiiing Egypt's strategic importance tn theast, tbe Sonets are devoting considerable effort to rebuilding their influence there or. at least, reducing Cairo's dependence on ihe United Stales. Since ihe return of ambassadors in ihe summerhe foreirn ministers have met ai ihe United Nature; fj

c nas loneCI meuia cr iticism vi^'OOtiar. policies

OtsMcfM io Closer Rtlaiiom. Egypt's estimated SI.debt 'or past nuliuiy purchases fromappears to be the anon immediatean cspacsion of bilateral lieshave noi serviced the debtunilaterallyyear moratoriumSoviets

ha'e made 'esUvitnmherecondition for Egyptian requests for eipanocd trade and miliury equipment Moscow, tr, our view, does not espect to recover the entire debt, bv it wants ihc

Number of Soviet Personnel in Egypt (excluding, dependents)

Estimated Number of Egyptian Personnel Receiving Military Training in USSR

Egyptiansegin making al least minimal payments on ihc principal before it is willing lo engage in major new transactions Although bilateral trade is likely to expand. Egypt's growing financial difficulties aod the USSR's own economic stringencies limit both sides' ability to compromise on the debt issue and probably will constrain any significant expansion of overall trade C

Cairo's hope to use the "Soviei card" in bargaining with Washington. Egyptian leadersepeatedly stated in public that tbey arc not about to reduce Egypt's strong political, miliury. andtics to the United Sutes. Although the Egyptians need spare parts to keep tbeir Soviet weaponsinunctioning, they have made the expensive and disruptive shift to dependence on Western arms and do not appear anxious lo purchase major weapon systems from the Soviets. Such purchases would not only create more logistic problems for ihc Egyptians and risk making them dependent on Moscow again but also mighttbeir access to US arms. Cairo it likely during Ibe next five yean to purchase relatively small amounts of Soviet weapons and only tbeae types that do notizable Soviet advisory rxesence in Egypt."1

Fundamental political differences between Moscow and Cairo also stand in the wayajorin relations, and those difTercnccs arc unlikely lo abate significantly. The two sides take differentto resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute.the Egyptians endorse the concept of an tnternatiooil conference on theKremlin's petsee greater merit in direct negotiatons between the parlies (what thecriticize as "separateo pave the wavomprehensive settlement. In addilion*C

ee (be USSR's role more as oneuarantor than as an active narticipant in the formulationinal settlement.'


Moscow't ties to Syria andtwo mainimpose some limits on any significant improvement in Soviei-Egyptian relations Theprobably would lusrjfy any move closer to Egypt by tryingonvince Damascus that they were

drawing Cairo away from Washington. The prospects for major Soviet advances in Egypi during ihc next few years are unlikely to be good enough, however, for the Soviets to risk undermining their position in Syria, which has Uken so loog to build. Moscow tf less concerned about upsetting Libyan leader Oadhafi but still will not wanieopardize its growing miliury accessibya for uncertain gains in Egypt^

Moscow's Goals. The Soviets arc likelyownplay these political differences wiihjjyF .


Il appears, however, ihat Moscow, although theis not prepared to give something for nothing. Karen Bruicnis. senior Middle Eastern specialist in the CPSU Central Commiltee's lnternatioruilnoted in tn interview in* ihat the improvement of bilateral reUtions "depends more onhat view apparently holds today. The Soviets' immediate aims seem to be:

Poisoning US-Egyptian relations.

Undermining Egypt's commitment to the Camp David accords.


Achieving al least minimal progress in economic relations,

approchement between Cairo and Damascus.

Achievement of these goals would clear the pathroader improvement in bilateral ties and minimize the rjsk of undercutting Soviet relations with Syria

Military flocArag: The Tie Thai Bindi. The dominant factor in the Soviet-Syrian relationship is Moscow's willingness to provide military support. The Soviets have delivered alrnost SI? billion worth of weapons5 lo Syria, more than to any other Third World client Tbe USSR aad its Easl European allies provide Syria with virtually all of its arms and, in recent years, have ensured that it is among the first lo receive newly exported versions of Soviei weapons.

Sovicls apparently do not eipcct major progress any time soon in realizing these

The dollar value of Soviei weaponry delivered has decreased since the peak yeariobablvjull be reversed soon/

believe that Egypt, while giving greaternt ncnslignment, will almost certainly remainUS camp for at least the ncn few yearsimprovement ingyptian lies is

wdibe noAu Oiuss MnU^nsttipof thehe Egyptiansc it clear that they dc not intend lo repeat that cipcricncr

The Linchpin- Syria

Syria has been central lo the Soviets' interests in the Middle East since tbe. Then reUiraflihtp wiihfar the most powerful Arabstate opposing Israel -has provided tbem entree into ibe Middle East and influence in ibc Arab-Israeli dispute Moscow and Damascus have been drawn together by some common objectivesabove all. io prevent Israel and the United States from achieving separate peace settlements bciwecr Tel Aviv and each of its Arabwell as by the USSR's lack of alternative avenues of tnflu ence in the region and Syrm's lack of alternative sources of miliiary support. To achieve llietrIhey have had nowhere else lo turn but toward each other. In our view, it is this mutual dependence rather than affinity oi ideological compatibility that hassoiidihed the relations^

3 mo

Syiuns -in son receive theii fiiSte figureif- foidout ft cure I', al Ihe back}.

InyBnfl theoviei rutin* iv adtnd tccrniciant with Syria* forces (sec inset, page IH Ibe USSR has some independent military uans of ns own in Syria Tbe most significant were tbe twoAM units tke Sovieu seal to Syria in1 Ihere wereoviet personnel manning lhe SA-3ai Hims and Dumayr until they began leaving ,

^JJstrongly suggest that there now are Ml in llW bovici advisers andat each complex and thatwith the Sovieu ai the Syrian air defense headquarters in Damascus rimary role in the command and control of ibc missiles fina' control over firing the missiles



Military Advisory Presence

otsisi ihe Syrians In operating and maintaining Soviet equipment, at well as to train ihem in genera milnan laetict and doctrine. Moscow maintainsilitary advisers andtn Syria. They are present al virtually every level of Ihe Syrian armed forces, from battalion to general command The Soviets, themselves, assist ir manning -and in some cases esclusivelymost of ihe advanced electronic warfare equipment and ihe air defense early warning and commemdand com ml nrivgjrk in Syria

,osen or su aJmeri ana lechmcians with Syrian combat and early warning radar units in Lebanon, according to Iialton source;


addition, the Soviets provide Damascus with

... y We assume that,uring periods of Syrian-Israeli tensions, the Sovieis have passed intelligence lo the Syrians gleaned by imelligtrwrhips and aircraft deployed to ihe aret

however, probably has been turned over to theRemainine indenendent Soviet units inWf:

economic Aid. Soviet economic assistance to Syria has been highly visible but, when compared to Arab and Iranian aid, relatively modest- Since the, the Soviets have focused their issisuncc on such large-scale projects as the Euphratescomplex, tbe Tartus-Hirru railway. Ihe Syrian oil industry, and land reclamation. Today there areoviei economic technicians working in Syria. Moscow has extended about S2 billion in economic'creditsBy way of comparison, Arab government disbursements to Damascus9 have averagedillion annually, and Iran has provided an average ol SIear) Tbe Soviets did not extend any credit* lo Syria7ut the more than SI billion provided since then and ihe recent negotiations overuclear power reactor and research center in Syria are leadingignificantSoviei economic involvement in the counir

Syrian Quid Pro Quo. In return for Ihisthe Syrians have granted ihe Soviets some access lo the Syrian pons of Tarlus and Lalakia and


r ^

Arms: How They Are Paid For


the military airfield ai Tiyai. The SovietFlotilla regularly receives support fromships siationed in Tariut. The SovietsTiyas airfieldheyantisubmarine warfare and navalaircraftndso eight times sincesTon whattoegular basis.o Badgeraircraft abo deployed toJinsix times since?

Outside the military sphere, tbe Soviets receive Syrian support in international forums on many issues,Afghanistan and Moscow's perennial "peace" offensives In addition to the hard currency the Soviets earn from arms sales to Syria, the Syrians also apparently give Soviet bids on economic projects in Syria preferential consideration because ofSSR's impottanf'" ource of arm* f

Limited Soviet Influence. Despite ihe wide scope of their presence in Syria, the Soviets have little sway over important decisions made by the Assad regime.


Facttheet on Soviet-Syrian Relations

Soviei Ambassador; Aleksandr Dzasokhov /assumed post inyrian Ambassador: Muhammad Alt' Halabi (assumedpost in

Number of Soviet Personnel in Syria (excluding dependents)

Estimated Number af Syrian Personnel Receiving Military Traiaiag ia USSR


SaUh Jedid. Ihe lender of lhe radical leflfBa'th Party, who. duringjna closerbe Soviei Union

otepiy sitfrncTo^of Assad

whenne^yt look power- They learned to liveibc suspicion* re-


Both lidrs have kept each other in ihe darkSecretary of Stale Kissinger

tells in his memoirs bow Assad blocked lhe Soviets from any involvement in* Golan Heights drsengagemrat agreement with Israel that Ihe United States had7


Pcrhap* ilie mosi sirikim; example of failure to consul! were the Synan military actions60 Syiian uoops bcfan their move into6hocked Soviet Premier Kcsygn arrived ia Dairascvs Four yeanimilar embarrassment for the Soviets occurred when Syrian troops advanced in*.id the Jordanian horde; just as Deputy Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Kjm::m" wasapout to arrive in Damascus for ratification of theyrian treaiv of fnendshin and Lu^rauon

ezhncv personally contacted Assad io ask why The Soviets hart not Seen consulted before Syria look this

This lack of consultation cvidei officials frequently coinpbrra"

M in Geneva in


""tinues SovietDainas-Cus docs not discuss its policy in" Lebanon yi conucts with lhe United Slates with them. Moscow, for ns part, did not brief the Syrian* fully on ihe US-Soviet talks on ihe Middlein Geneva in

Wiih friend* like

Henry Kissinger describes in his memoirs President Assad's actions denying theole In the Golan Heights disengagement talks between Syria and Israelissinger, using "shuttlethe talks Gromyko traveled tofor the express purpose ofoice in the negotiations Bul Assad, according to Kissinger, did not want to giveoice, "as he made clear by telling me proudly and in great detail how he had prevented Gromyko from visiting Damascusasissinger sums up the incident:

I have no idea how we could have insisted on an eaclutrvrly American rnediauoa had Asadotherwise Nothing so much demonstrated lhe weaknrts of ihe Soviet position than the lact lhai Asad did not The President of Syria, remarkably, pielcrred io nceotiate without his principal ally *

Soviet-Syrian net have become closerul the Soviets still worry that Asiad. if He gets the nghi terms, will reach an agreement wiih ihe United States and Israel behind the USSR's bad

lYnirj yyia'aaii. Vmiii ;riiif Campani. Hi.'i rr t-f

Despite0i Syri. ii friendship and cooper anon treaty and all the Soviei media give 'o the dcicloptticM ufyiu. the Sonet)oo noi sec Syriaecure base of Sovietor fertile gtound for socialism The?icd in tlu pail th.ilis ualikcle toocialm system, given lhe lack o( anli li thefunity in power. Tney hue nude tt clear ihcv have noix'utkprli jpid dnrabiliiv vt socialism in Syria. They regard lla'thisi sooaliMiiharade ami ihe Syriansders and capiiabMs whose political depend.ibtliivsusncci In reed

yean, there also have been reports

of Soviet leaders urging Assad to limit capita list practices in Syria

Policy Differences. On policy issues. Soviet-Syrian differences center on the extent or Soviet military support for Syrian strategic objectives and on specific policy toward the PLO and Iraqa lesserLebanon, and the Arab-Israeli peace process. The Soviets have claimedrimary source of tension in the Soviet-Syrian relationship is the Assad regime's attempts to broaden0 treaty to commit the USSR to come to Syria's defense militarily in the event of war. Soon after1 of the US-Israeli "strategic cooperation" agreement, the Syrians beganrj

Availingimilar accord betweeneiiu tne USSK. They have also sought Moscow's backing far their goal of "strategic parity" with Israel

Syne* riruaeia Hani Alloa"

erniary Mikhail Go'baehe* Sunny.

iht"} mt/lmi in iht Ktflll

iherehe spring

lit Damascuseculc responseyrian Studyie Soviet position in ihc eventS military move bacfc into Lebanon

and past Soviet behavior strongly

SuggCSl mal Moscow is Mill determined noi io He its handipecific response in the eveni o< another Syrian-lsiacliAlthough the dispatch to Syria of Sovieinits} coitimitted Moscowuch greater degreever before, it evidently continued'Oni pulling thatncut in writing

DiHerein perspectives on the I'LO Itasx led to some of ihc sharpest Sovict-Syihn dilTercitCcSthe pa si decade Motccow has ccmiMOntly opposed Syrian .it-tempts lo dominate the organization, from the Syrian intervention against PLO forces in Lebanon6 to ihi;l .iiucfcl on Palesiiiihn camps

-lThe onvicis. however, have littlecrtlpering Synan moves against thend have mixed feelings because they havehe >ame grievances wiih Arafat."

Moscow, similarly, has had no success in convincing Assadend fences wiih Iraq and Egypt As for Lebanon, the Soviets have suppressed iheir misgivings about Syrian policy there since ihe Israeli invasionut lhe> still oppose long term Syrian domina iioo of ihc country They have made it clear thai under ro conations wouht ihc USSRhe pjiTiii-r' anoft fee the benefitreater Syna -


Process Soviei-Syrua dimcu'iies over the Arab Israeli peace!- een over ihc hnal termset tie men',ser Isov. bcil io obum those termsomprehensive settlement al an



international conferenceould chair jointly withsolution ihal would give the USSR the greatest .oice Damascus refuted lo aliend Ihc only internalsooal confetence on the tunc thai has ever beenGeneva inwould not support ihe US-Sovki call in7 for reconvening ihc conference. The Syrians have publicly expressed support for the USSR'sonference, but Assad told f 1

. miduuHui conference would be mcan-kijkjS until the Arabs unite and achieve mililary parity with Israel. The Deputy Chief of the Somi Forcitn Ministry't NearEast and North Africanl'VUin'i;-

J ihat Syria was one of theap countnesinai was not showing coniinuing inicrest in Moscow's proposed international

In our view, the Soviets cannot risk endorsing any peace initiative that does not meet mosl of Syria's objectives, even if by doing so they could achieve their maina voice in the peace process Alienating Damascus to gain entree into the peace process would be an empty victory. The Soviets wouldcat at the peace conference but no ally lo represent. At Ihc same lime. Moscow has not shown the ability to convince Damascus io soften ils position. Thus, Ihe Soviets are left with little choice but to follow the Syrian lead, and ihe Svhans appear in no hurry to engage in negotiation?

More broadly, the Soviets' overwhelming dependence on Syria for influence in the region requires them, no mallei how much they dislike il. to follow or at leastamascus' lead on mosl major issues in the Arab world In our view, as long as Syria remains the centerpiece of Sovietwc believe ti will for many years to come unless the Soviets canlose relationship withwill continue to adjust its policies toward other coun-iriet iu mesh with its Syriaa policy.l not prevent improvement in the USSR's tics to Iraq, Jordan. Egypt, or Vttir Arafat, but it will limit such doelopmcnis'

Footholds on the Periphery: Libya and South Yemen "

The USSR has devoted considerable resources to expanding its military presence in Libya and South Yemen and probably sees them as useful footholds for com pi scaling US policy and. potentially, expanding Soviet influence in the region. Nonetheless, the fact Ihat the USSR's only Arab clients beside Syria ate Libya and South Yemen speaks volumes about the decline of Moscow's influence in the Middle East since the. Doih countries arcand politically on the fringes of the Arab world and ihc Arab-Israeli dispute

Libya. Libya is one of Moscow's consolation prizes in Ihe Middle East When the grandto slip away from the Soviets in the, they attempted to exertpemate for ihe loss wherever they could. QadhafVs Libya, despite ils pan-Islamic goats and virulent anti-Communism,ogical candidate for Soviet courting Both stales opposed Sadat's Fgypi, 'separate deals" with Israel, and ihc US presence in the Middle Enst. Oadhaft saw, and still sees, ihe USSRrimary source of the modern weapons he believes he needs to achieve his ambitious goals. For Moscow. QadhatYt desire to buy aims and Libya's vast oil wealth make theucrative source of hard currency In recent years, tbe Soviets have also begun to make greater use of Libyan pons and airfields, although Moscow's access hardly replaces what it losi in Egypt Finally, Ihe Kremlin often bencfils without having to bear Ihe risk or cost from QadharVs worldwide subversive activities against friends of the United Slaie:

See "linpaei of Fularc Developments" section fee discuiuco of SovieilaAssad and af theycjiihn.uaIii-few 'ibuoa* wiih Eeypt would hair on Sunec-Synan

As wiih Sum. Iraq, and Algeria. Ihe militaryis lhe core o( lhe Sc-rici-Libyan relationship The USSR has sold more arms to Libya (deliveriesto be worth overillionhan to any olhee Third World country except Syria ind Iraq Tripoli paid strictly in hard currency. when it began meetirut pari ol its bill inince ihen Libya has provided Moscow an average olarrels ofay, which was wonh aboulillion annually before this year's precipiiatc diop in the world price of oil In addition, tbe Sonets maiaiainilitary advisers and technicians throughout Libya's armed forces Ihey have provided limited iniclligcnci and logistic support to Libya for its forays into Chad and during ihe US-Libyan military confrontations io the Gulf of Sidu ih's year Soviet pilots fly training lightsbyans. and Sosiet adviscis helpand posiibi) operate Libyan naval shipsnumbers of Libyans arc sent lo lhe USSR each yeai lor nulnjiy rramin

Sinceadhah has allowed the Soviets expanded usehyan air and naval facilities Pairs of Sovieiaval reconnaissance aircraft C

emiduci surveil-

lance mints against US and other Westernships ia the Mediirrraaeai. Sonet naval combatants also use Libyan pom -Totsrck occasionally (forand replenish men i)ripoli (for ceremonial vtsju}but ihe Mediterranean Flotilla makes far greater use of Syrian and oilier facilitie

however, lhai KGB Om-

ctats stm saw me uoyan leader as "cra'y.uncontrollable' and capable of acting against. Soviet interesisC-

Some of the Libyan leader's activities confirm the KGB officials' belief thai he is capable ofSo'iel interests QadharV

Publicly criticized the USSR for insulln-ientaid to ihe Arabs during thear and the Israeli invasion of Lebanon

ihe Soviets' military investment in Libya. Qadhafi's meteurnl personality hu prompted them iocnain distance. President Bic/hnev told Cgyp'iari Forcien Minister Fahmyhe unci's memoirs. 'That young nun (Qadhan) is ira.'v He is an unbalanced

Soviet Foreign

onKiaiS in Moscow eeiicvcd lhat Qadhafi

had cvoUed aid become more sympathetic im>id ihe Soviet Umun and, in some cases, behaved as an ally

' lheil "in ill* ill in* ml ihri uuiiihi ibyi

Has given military, financial, and political aid io Palestinian rebels bent on ousting PLO leaderwhom Moscow* still supports

Transferredran in

'unioii' withN-i. ovei which Soviei officials cs pressed concern. Icariiig that it would increase Libyan Algerian leitsiuns.

factskeet on Sovitl-Libyan Relations

Soviet Ambassador: Pogos Akopov (assumed post in

Libyan Ambassador: Muhammad Humud (assumed post in

Number af Soviet Personnel in Libya (excluding dependents)

Libyan Military Personnel Receiving Training in USSR

Umm Altioah Airfield (Tripoli)

Occasional use by Soviet submarines and submarine lenders for repairs and replenishment Used by SovietSW/navalaircraft^

Alteconomic, military,work In tke Embassy, as "ell as rnedia and traderom official Stnltt statistics,do not include all military fade



ulioviet te-hnicL'ins working at (he Tajura nuclear research center.

extensive than during past crises involving Libya. And. following the US airstrikes on Libya in April, the Kremlineeting between Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State Shultz.

Offered to intervene militarily in South Yemenof former President Hasani during6 and on at least one othervigor-

ouslyrui rcinoii ana Ethiopianto do the same, and wc assume that the Soviets weighed in similarly with Qadhafi.

Some of Libya's other actions, such as the shooting of Libyan dissidentsritish policewomanhile possibly benefiting Moscow by disrupting friends of the United States, have placed the Soviets in awkward positions C

J condemned the London snootings anaunease over the widely publicized Egyptian charges in the summer4 that Qadhafi had planted Soviet mines in ihe Red Sea, (The first ship Struckine, in fact,oviet Qtie.)f

Nonetheless, the Soviets' continued determination to keep some distance from Qadhafi was clearly evident during tbe US-Libyan clashes. Moscow was careful in its public comments not to commit itself to take any action in support of Libya. Qadhafi requested Soviet military support to oppose the US attacks, butrefused

J that Qadhafi wai incensed over Mos-w- sttand and over its determination despite the USLibya clear up iu past military debt beforeew arms*

, Soviet-Libyan relations were

ed in ibe Latteruna*

were coo-this to prob-

lems overaymcuu iua owietMoscow's unwillingness to compromise on lhe issue. We estimate lhat Libya owes tbe USSRi2 billion for past weapons purchases.

Frictions between the two have not prevented the Soviets from increasing their support for Libya during the last year. The most visible sign of this was the delivery late last year of Sovietissiles. The Soviets alsolightly greater readiness than earlier to back Qadhafi during US-Libyan tensions in January and April of this year. Theyew ships to the centrallo Libyanmonitor the movements of the US Sixth Fleet and presumably passed tracking data to the Libyans. This Soviet monitoring activity was more

The Soviets have subsequently signaled Washington that they want to sland clear ofanvTuluic US-Libyan

a Soviei diplo-


sta leun..

Qadhafi is moral only and that the USSR has no desire io get involved in ihe US-Libyan confltct Other Soviet^cflicijh repeated these remarks during Septembc

Disputes over arms payments and concern over Qad-hafi's unpredictability arc likely to remainfactors in Soviet-Libyan relations as long as Qadhafi remains inoscow abo will almost certainly continue lo avoid giving Qadhafi thecommitments he apparently wants. Besides their desire not to be drawnilitary clash with the United States, the Soviets probably feaMhat giving Tripoliommitment would harm their relations

" See "ImiMCi of Intuit Do (locus Ms"for <tiscuisioi of Sonet optiOni shouldl) die et bt Mile


with Algeria and Egypt. The USSR's unwillingness to commit itself lo Libya's defense appears to be the primary reason that tbe friendship and cooperation treatyides announced in principle in) has yel to be concluded The Soviets, in our view, have been-and remain -readyign ansimilarheir other friendship and cooperation Ifcalies wiih Third World countries that do not cany security commitments If Qadhafi agrees to this,treaty could be signed at any lime

Despite the frictions and the Kremlin's desire to maintain some distance from Qadhafi. the benelils each side derives from the relationship probably will prompt them to continue, and perhaps even rapand. theiron in thefew years. Qadhafi'i heighicBed sense of vulnerability after the US raid in April probably will lead him lo seek greater Soviet miliury backing Although to date he has restricted Soviet access to Libyan air and naval facilities, he probably now would welcome an increase in thai access because of the impression il would creatercaict Soviet willingness to defend Libya We believe Moscow desires increased miliury access but would move cautiously to avoad gmni such an impression The Soviets probably would seek permanent access for their IL Ms. greater use of port facilities at Totsruk. andto station logistic ships in Tobruk hurbor as they do now in Tanus, Syria

Tbe Libyans periodically threaten in publicmost reeeatly ingiant tbendcnt miliuryibya In fact

Tthai Al Jufra airfield.iha Sc*HU nave otuii constructing, will be an exclusively Soviet base We believe, however, thai Moscow probably would not eipcnd the resources on building independent Soviei naval or air bases in Libya as long as Qadhaf is in power Apart from the high risk of being drawnS-Libyan conflict and ihc negative impactove would have on the USSR's relations with Algeria. Egypt, and Tunisia, the Soviets would bealculate that ihe unpredictable Oadhafi could leposscsi the bases and tend Soviet forces hone omc the US threat subsided, or that he would seek to hold Soviet nctticy hostage to baseurely operational standpoint, the risks of Soviet military bases in Libya might noi be wont) the beneius For eiamplc. although Soviet strike aircraft.


Figure 5

Soulh Yemeni Facilities Used by the Soviet Military

reconnaissance aircraft at Al Anad airfield, north of Aden,ont i

a 1'niu to monitor US arid other Wcsicrn naval movements in the region (see figure S|


(YSP) fractious elements together. The Soviets may have intended Isma'il's return5seful "insurance policy" to keep llasani honest, but wc believe Ihey did nolfimujus rcassii motion of the top oarlv rwMl. As the!


Isma'il was popular with the Sovieu. out Uieythat he did notood leader, and ihey accepted Hasani as the more effective alternative.

Soviets initially welcomed South Yemen's sharp turn leftward during 'Abd al-Fatiahule They apparently rcalixed, however, that his radicalism was disrupting theas Hafinillah Armn's did infter intensive consultations wilh POKYey acquiesced in his replacement by Ah Nasir Mubammad al-Hasani in0 From Moscow's vantage point. Hasani. though not as ideologically "pure" as Isma'il. probably was viewed as loyal and more adept at holding the ruling Yemeni Socialist

The radical Marxist coup in January that toppled President Hasani usheredew and unpredictable era in Soviet-PRDY relations. The weakening of the YSP, the death of many top pro-Soviet figures, and Ihe tribal rivalries the coup inflamed have ledore unstable South Ycmcr


Factshett on Soviet-South Yemeni Relations

Soviet Ambassador: Aloert Rachkov (assumed post in

PDRY Ambassador: Ahmad Abdallah abd al-llah (assumedpost in November

Number af Soviet Personnel in PDRY (excluding dependents)

Estimated Number of PRDY Personnel Receiving Military Training in USSR



Island At Anad Airfield

Two il-SH navalircraft staiioned there

Alleconomic, the Embassy ant Consulate tAIs -ell as media and trade representatives.

flrom official Soviet statistics, which do not include all military



ihc increasingly pto-Soviciregime's* public siaiemcnisasani may liavc adopted this almost obse-quious pro-Soviet posture to head off the thecal lo his |MdershjQjhat began to arise within .the YSP in

Mauni weathered the threatpparentlysupport,as part of aend the puny faclionilism Moscowto accept ihc irturn io Aden and appoint men iparty secretariat of Ismail.

. iany orlieial adviied

hmm iinaiar.i. during ihe tatter's *mt tomn resolve iheir differences [_

We believe that Misco* had no compelling, reason to seek Hasam's ouster, did not suppcri ihe coup, andlurprised by become clear thai ihe Soviets and Masani had irsolvcd then dilleiencei ovn his opening toward the West and *ilh moOeiaic Arab states, as welli ihc PDRY* desrUcastrc with iheevel of So-ietaid thai plagued thru relationsasani was the only Arab leadeiceiiug *iili Gorbachev ai Chernen ko's funeral in* Soviet leaders did nut ineci with him at the fur run ot Brcrhnc* and Andropov?c*ncctivcl*C


Inc iovni

olicies In (act. pi* more

moderate foreign policy piteceive role ia

Oman and thedii-haua! ic relations wiih ihe USSR)

South Yemeni etpresvors of fealty io Ihc ussr

he Soviei union. I

. -1

more and more effusive dunm; Hasam's last year ine comiinmmui: from the YSI'Committee plenum in^ buOiJ'*ILjrveetween the PDRY "id


ilS. shortly aficr he was reinstated io ihe pany secretariat, and lliuii -rliaco.shed his poll as head of garecnmeni

I he Kremlin presumably eisdorsed ImIi reinstate asent io the Pohtbcio a< ihe YSP party congress ini.bul ihes also almost ecru inly backed Hasan rcclectinn as geneial secretary Sovietseatessage oaf the congress, winch inmounted lo an crtdur-setTsent ol his continuation as pany chief

ehavior dtiiag ihc coup attested lo us lackyrict media cantedannouncement on the fWsi day of thelBUllJ. that ihe "counicr revolutionaries' had beenheir ringleaders riccmcd four day* into ihc crisis. Soviet media sscre still sailing the rebel leadershortly thereati ci as the Sovicis evaluated iheu iiatioaals fiom Aden and the fighting in the rebels' fisur. the USSReutral pubhclance ind aitcrnptcil lo mediatethe two viilc, It was onlyoays into the

Sovttivo mt ceasiiij'.nif imithti*.

coup, when the rebels clearly had gained the upper hand, that Moscow threw its support to the new regime, and even then it did so discreetly^

ic oovietsiidncici roTTlicm to deny anyin the lighting on the rebels' side. Moscow's more vital support consisted of pressure on North Yemen and Ethiopia not to aid Hasani's forces.

The new regime, nominally headed by Presidentot only is beset with internal ficnonsbsm. bul forces loyalasani continue to harass ihe government from tbcir lafebaven in North Yemen, and the tribal animosities that the fightingcontinue to smolder. Soviet officials havethat tribalism is one of the major problems the regime faces. Leonid Zamyatin. then chief of (he CPSU Central Committee's InternationalDepartment,ebanese newspaper in February that Soulh Yemen is still encountering difficulties from the "tribal division ofn

oatiim Kiun imsoona ire'taV*rr taxfrrtictdW noticedx twtrwre uaportaai pom of YSPTke real pmnto ae* refiaie ipoui to to YSr* Mc-eian Geaera) Ah St >'and Secienrj Ofe.'ji Sabro SiutMinmi

important Pravda article in September echoed thb view. It also blamed Hasani for precipitating (he January events -the first time the Soviets stated (his in public

Isma'il and other prominent rebel leaders were killed in the fighting, but most of the key figures in the newBidh and Salima reputation of being radical Marxists and fervently prc-Sosiet Moscow, however, appears to be advising the new leaden to portray themselves as moderates* The regime has repeatedly stated in public that it desires good relations with all its neighbors

enruary, argued that there are numerous moderates in the new cabinet

Despite the new regime's fervently pro-Sovici tenor, there is ihe potential for Sovlel-South Yemeniover the level of Soviei economic aid and erTotts by Moscow to expand its military access in the PDRY. The South Yemenis have long beenwith the level and quality of economic aid lhe USSR has provided Many Soviei projects have taken yean to complete and have compared unfavorably with the few Western projects that South Yemen has contracted for in recent yean. Aden was particularly rankled by the paltry Soviet relief package following the major floodsoscow is unlikely to pravide sismificantly increased economic aid in lhe years ahead because of its own economic constraints and iu probable belief that Aden is securely within the Soviet orbit and therefore not likelylter iu political allegiance, even if it *c" mArab or Western assistance '

The Soviets may increase cflorta lo obtain expanded access to South Yemeni air and naval facilities and possibly even an independent Soviet military base

* la fact, ibc choicee "mod<rais" AltiicpUcc llisani as preiidctii probablyull ofeVwcndiaibr coup beiia. He"owo*'tmuincd Ihtirebels announced their choice of hint ai prwiuom! president


must reccmccurred

The most recent efforts!

Admiral uorstixov. men Commanderitti ui*ine Soviet Navy, traveled to Aden in3 to seek permission to build new naval and air facilites in Soulh Yemen thai would be controlled by the Soviets. XL.

*jThe current leaders probably would not object to expanded Soviet access lo South Yemeni facilities bul are unlikely to grantovereign base. Thisarticularly sensitive issue with the South Yemenis, whose entire countryovereign British baseears X"

Neitheraid or militarylikely to developajor problem between the two countries. Tbe South Yemeni leaders wouldmore generous economic aid but almost certainly view it as secondary to the military assistanceprovides. The Soviets, for their part, are not in dire need of expanded military facilities. They can adequately maintain their current air and naval forces in the region with the facilities now at their disposal. The pressure for increased access wouldjntensify if they decided to expand those force*

Thus, despite (he traumatic effect of the coup on the South Yemeni ruling structure. Moscowtrong foothold in Aden and is likely to continue to do so for at least the rest of the decade. The current regime is even more pro-Soviet lhan Hasani's.and YSP factionalism arc likely to remainfactors,the coup has

with the YSP at war with itself, there is no credible organized threat outside the party to vie for control of the country. The most serious potential threat could come from Hasani's forces in North


evelopment could lead Moscow to become even more directly involved in South Yemen's defens.f

Partners of Convenience: North Yemen. Iraq, Algeria, and the PLO North Yemen. The Sovieu' ability to maintaingood relationsariety of regimes in Sanaa for almostears is one of their success stories in the Middle East. Moscow has been involved in North Yemen longer lhan in any other Arabhe treaty of friendship and trade the

Sovieu signed with the feudal, theocratic regime of Imam Yahya8 was their first with an Arab government. When the Imamate fellhe USSR moved quickly to suppori ihe new Yemen Arab Republicoing so far as to provide pilots to fly combat missionsnd to provide both pilots and an airlift of military supplies infirst such Soviet military interventions in crises in the Arab worlc* f

The Soviets adroitly managed to maintain and even increase their influence in North Yemen underSalih, who took powerespite their close ties to Marxist South Yemen and indirect support for the Marxist insurgency in the North during lhe. The YAR's needeliable source of arms and training to fend off iu two neighbors. South Yemen and Saudi Arabia, induced Sanaa to seek Soviet suppon X"

Soviet interest in North Yemen stems more from iu neighbors than from iu intrinsic value. The YAR, wilhillion people, reprcsenu a

Sovieu established relations with Saudi Arabiawo years before their iresty with Yemen, but withdrew their envoy Ins and relations have been dormant ever



o Moscow's ally. South Ycmei. whch haihird lhe population Soviet mfljcncc in Noilh Yemen repicscnts someee against this ihreal f"


Moscow's pirvence it the YAR. although far icsi eueasrve tkaabe PORY.sabmniial Soviettt Lurorcaa arms comrvnr appEoitmaicly three-locrituc inventory ol tlie YAR's aimed iorcei Aboul iOO Soviet military advisers and technicians arc dinercd iu Nonli Yemen, andare prctcnilv leceivinj militaryhe Soviet IJaion In addition, mereoviet economic advisers and technician in tbeand an embassy HjIT of aboutEgypt, the second largest Soviet mission in ilic Middle Lasi The Soviets iituy see Sanaa as the ben place as jiUblc to ihcm to collect intelligence on Saudi Arabia, where tlicy have notiie largemall country

Wc are noi certain how much thiswives ihe Soviet!

some YAR nlliciaK. most noluMy mmd*ti' Sufl Isjsliin. as piO-Soviet, but lhe list isami SjIiIi Himself does mot appear to betrybaith icgimc .upports many Soviet international imiiainet

lively about ibcot accord ihe United

Moscowropag Sanaa in Octoberi treaiy to one ofsipi t

uccess byiPt'Jdf its lorpitaadinc ip ande and least binding ol all .ucti treaties lhe Soviets hivet dillers from* treaty li he pec* mmost rcceni update of the original document signedhas

A plcdie iu Consult on intern.lional problemslTect both counincs' interest*

pledge noi lo talc rvin ,i; u'mihaea rwber


duraiionather th-in live, years.

rhctc pomts arc coiiutiou to all Soviet friendship ami- HcatKS "tth Third World tXMintric*most of the oilier trcjuo.lac uoc vn;fc North YemenLtnsetSRI miliiary cooperation Moreover, lhe treaty's till (or comi>iunons on problems docs not

dm-|frr VANt* 1KlS -for* H Sme-Iii alvojiln! d) lltj'i *


Factiken en Soriet-Noetk Yemeni Hellion.,

Soviet Ambassador: Anaioliy Flltv (assumed post in

YAK Ambassador: Abd al-Uihman Muhammad [assumed posl in

Number af Soviet Personnel in YAR (excluding dependents)

Estimated Number of YAR Personnel Receiving Military Training in USSR

Mililary advisers and

Economic advisers and


Trade With YAR (million

Soviet Economic Credits/Grants Extended


Sales 'million US Jl

Facilities Used by Soviet Military None

Alleconomic military, intelligence rt in the Embassy, at -ell a, media and trade reoreuntatlves.From ogutat Soviet tiatiiuti. which da no, include alt mililary irede

stipulate that the two sides should attempt totheir policies durine ciises, as docs every other Soviei trealy bul one

Substantively, tbe trealy adds more formality to the relationship and should, the Soviets hope, help to ensure its stability. The Kremlin's aim in such treaties apparently isase the relalionsbipon legallather than on personalities, to ensure thai Soviet-YAR ties will survive Silih's departure There is nothing in the treaty, however, tbat guarantees Ihat this still be the caseEgypt's and Somalia's abrogation of similar treatiesihcNorth Yemeni leadership will nothange of heart

a number of issues limit bilateral ties. Perhaps the most important is an economic one. North Yemenesperately poor country and ii currently unable to meet the payments on ill0 million debthe USSR The servicing of this debterennial topic al meetings between high-level Soviet and North Yemeni often Is Tbe Soviets have apparently, for lackatives, resc Pedaled at least part of ihc debt bui are not willine.rite it offess Sanaa's inability to pay alto impinges on future purchases of Soviet military equipment. Moscow is unlikely to let the debt grow much beyond "hats today, the VaR is not as imporiant to Soviet interest* as Syria

The discovery o' oil in North YemenS company4 may eventually alleviate Sanaa's financial problems and ease Irictions with Moscow over the debt On the other hand, the newfound wealth might enable North Yemenurchase norr Western arms, and the involvementS oil company could lead to closer tics between Sanaa andi(loi

If weapons were available and affordable in the West. North Yemen rwgbabty wostlel op; (or them lo reduce us dependence ocl YAR militai* commanders especially in the Airbeen critical of the Soviei training progr.-rv' North

1 hc IMin

complaints were enough. midigh




Somalia *






South Yemen



North Yemen

Soviet Friendship and Cooperation Treaties Wiih Third World Countries

2 II4 It6 SI889

0 IS1


' Cfypi ab'ofiird :fr* '>6

- Somalia oA-op.i'Jt:/

Moscow reportedly was concerned enough about Sanaa's anger over the Soviet reaction to ihc coop in Aden to offer increased military aid on favorable terms (*

Ahhough genuinelyo' aboui Sanaa's intentions. Soviei leaders probably calculate thatoo heavily dejscudent on ihe USSR for arms iu down grade ihc relationship signilicanity. We believe that, if the Soviets concluded that Salrh were seriously troviag in ihat direction ihey would become e'en more cooperative abouiarms and rriwc lenient about the terms of raiymer

North Yemen's stance toward the regime io the PDRY willetermining factor in Soviet-YAR relations over the next few years. If Salih provides significant military assistance to Hasani's forces, Moscow is certain to increase pressure oo Sanaa to desist. Such pressure could include more visits by high-level Soviets, threats to cut off the supply of Soviet arms, orevival of tbe Marxist National Democratic Front guerrillas. Relations are likely to remain somewhat tense even if Salib eventuallytbe change of power in Aden. He already suspects that the radicals in the regime will attempt to destabilize North Yemen. At this point, we do not believe the Soviets will encourage such attempts short of major North Yemeni aid to Hasani's forces, but they probably calculate thai the threat of potential PDRY destabilization efforts in tbe YARseful lever in their dealings with Sanai

Iraq. Iraq is important to the Soviets because it is:

A major actor in the Arab worlderennial rival with Syria and Egypt for preeminence among the Arabs.

A rival of Iran as the most influential power in the Persian Gulf region.

One of the world's major oil producers and,ucrative soorcc of hard currency for Moscow.

Virulently ami-Israeli and, until recently, almost as adamantly anti-United Statcs.

The Soviets' relationship with Iraq has been their most erratic in the Middle East. Relations were so hostile under the Iraqi monarchy that Baghdadrelations with Moscow5 in response to Soviet protests aboul the formation of the Baghdad Pact. General Qasim's ouster of the monarchy8 brought an immediate reestabiishment andof relations, but ties fluctuated with the various regimes that ruled in Baghdad through Ihe

The Ba'tb Party's rcemcrgence as the ruling group in Iraq inremains in powerto another upsurge in Soviet-Iraqi relations. The new leaders of lhethe aftermath of Ihe massive Arab defeat at the hands of Israel in thehe Soviet Union as vital to theof Arab aims. The Ba'thadical

anti-Israeli, anti-US foreign policy andocialist internal order. Despite some differences, the USSR and Iraq drew closer over the nextdecadr

Relations began to sour again, however, by the, asof growing Sovietin Ethiopia. South Yemen, anddown on the Iraqi Communist Party (CPI) and sought to reduce Iraqi dependence on Soviet arms by purchasing Western weapons. The relationship plummeted to its lowest point8 when Moscow cut off arms shipments to Iraq at the outbreak of the war with Iran infter attempting to capitalize on this embargo with (be Khomeini regime in Iran and failing, the Soviets lifted it in the spring1 and began to till decisively toward Baghdad in tbe springhen tbe two sides signed their tirst new arms deal since lhe war began.1"

Soviet-Iraqi lies today are lhe best tbey have been since lhe heyday of the relationship in the. This Is almost entirely due to the Kremlin's decision to open up lhe arms tap to Iraq. The Sovieis have delivered military equipment worth more thanillion to Iraq since ending the embargo inaking (hem Baghdad's largest supplier (see" To maintain this equipment and train the Iraqis, Moscow hasilitary advisers and technicians in Irasj

The Sovieis have coupled the arms flowore supportive public posture for Iraq in its war with Iran since Iraqi forces were driven out of most Iranian territory inost Soviet public statementseutral stance on the war, but Soviet media arc

on oisciassioa of tbel pro-Iraqi position, we DI

Till lo-unr ffoHJoKSK aru

lian and trot, *

TWSr-icli oe supplied Iran, wiih about one-thud of us(in terms of dollar valuctsincc the war begin France is second whh over SS billion worth cf delntrie

Moscow's military support and backing for Iraq's position on tbe war has led to an improsxrnent. both politically and economically, in the icutionshrp President Saddam Husayn acknowledged in anin4 Ihat "circumstanccri" ai the beginning of ihc war with Iron bad "'caul Iheir shadow" on Soviet-Iraqi relations but that ties were nowis visit to Moscow ints firstighlightedreos-erneai in reta lionsthough il revealed continuing

The iwn countries have expanded their economic dealings. In', Ihc Soviets extended2 billion line of credit on favorable terms (or civilian proBxU. accordingublic statement by Foreign Minuter Tafiq 'Aut Baghdad has awarded Moscow major coriiracts since} io develop Iraq's Wesl Quriiili oilfield,ipeline between Baghdad and Iraq's Southern Rumaylah natural gas field, construct two thermoelectric power plants, and survey Sites touclear power plant. In addition, the USSR has sinceccepted oilartial means of payment for ihe arms il ships to Iraq."

" 'I hit nil it juiiviilcit in rsvn ways ItJQI emrlc it pumped tnitiimti itte piptlim ainsss Tvrfcev indpHkad upal ihe CiyBinrd Suudi (isdapKtcd ip in lb< Prnia*

OmM tfolual ir the'-'T. leanUK Swats Main-



Jhe Soviets received0 barrels per day) of Iraqi oil and f Saudi crude, which was part of Saudi Arabia's aid lohe Kremlin's willingness to forgo the usual cash-on-delivery terms of Soviet-Iraqi weapons trade is another indicator of the importance it has assigned to improving relations with Baghdad and preserving the Soviei share of the Iraqi market.

Fven wiih the increased Soviet involvement in the Iraqi economy over the past three years, however, Baghdad is still heavily dependent on Western and Arab trade and aid. Three-quarters or Iraqi civilian imports continue io come from the West, while aid provided by the Arab Gulfsiates dwarfs that of the

"Sea table on pirje 5

lecuhrei on Soviet-Iraqi Relaiiont

Soviet Ambassador: Viktor Mlnm (attuned post in

Iraqi Ambassador: Sa ad Abd alMafid Faysal {assumedpost in

Number of Soviet Personnel in Iraq (excluding dependents)

Estimated Number of Iraqi Personnel Receiving Military Training in USSR

oi instance, the Arabs extended approximatelyillion in economic aid to Iraq, the SovietsS mdlioi

Despite Moscow'* extensive involvement in Iraq, its record arms shipments, and the clear improvement in relations since the springundamentalcontinue to separate the two sides The minima) time Gorbachev vpent *ith Saddam during the lat-ter's vail to MoscowS. TASS's description of iheir meeting asnd the failure ofides to iciereflection of ihese differences and Ihe legacy of intense enmity between the two sides

On international rsiucs. the Sovieu aad Iraqis have long differed on the Arab Israeli peace processrc>ecied7 UN Securityhich the Soviets helped formulate Foreign Minister 'Am told former US Middle Eastern envoy Joseph Sisco in5 that Moscow pressed Baghdad hard ton thehe Iraqis noi only relused but also condemned the cease-lire following the wai3 and the subsequent peace conference in Geneva Iraq also refused to support the joint US-Soviet call in7 lor reconvening the Geneva talks and is one of lhe few Arab stales noi to endoise else USSR's more rcceni efforls to hold anational conference on the Arab-Israeli issue

and Baghdad do not see eye lo eyeumber of other international issues, including

The Row of Soviet-made arms to Iran through third parlies such as Libya, Syria, and the USSR's Last European allies

The Soviei invasion and continuing occupation of Afghanistan Baghdad strongly condemnedasion. butesponseoscow's willingness to provide Iraq with large amounts ofit has abstained from ibc yearlyhe UN General Assembly call for Soviet withdrawal (sec tabic 2l


Tbe Soviets and Iiaqisundamental distrust of each otherot easily be eroded The Sovku have seen Saddam repress the IraqiPartynd have been unable to ease the repression significantly despite repeated attemptsIhe Kremlin lias uiged the Iraqi Communists lo cooperate wiih the governmenteans of increasing (hen influence in the country. Moscow'salmosl certainly is to oust iac-JJaUn|





V.: Kl

he "Soviets realize that tne

i -can aid nave welcomed ihca Sovic: relalions wiih Saddam, thus, they arc unlikely in ihc next few years to push for hisousir:

The Iraqis are equally distrustful of theSiV.ic'.'l

lor Iraqi Kurds (seehe Iraqi leadership believes that the Soviets could end CP' subversionoment if they

Moscow and Iraq's Kurd,

to them


The level oi Soviei support for ihe Iraqiperceni cf thefluctuated with the shifts in Soviei tieshe various regimes inWhen relations are good. Soviet support has been minimal, when relations sour. Moscow pays more attentionhe Kurds Currently, the Sovieis keep their distance from lhe increasingly rebellious Iraqi Kurds. Contaci with Kurdish leadersaction af lhe Iraqi Communist Party thai is fighting alongside Kurdish rebels in northern Iraq Somdf ^Jfloim that the USSR Is providing arms to Iraqi, lurkith. and Iranian Kurds, but such reports hate never been confirmed. Moscow is likely to continue Us contacts with Iraqi Kurds to maintain lhe oplion of stepping up support

should Soviet-Iraqi relations deteriorate

Na'am Haddad,enior Ba'th official, called thelackey" partyress conference4 and said that Iraqi leaders saw "no relationship between our standthe Communist Party of Iraq and the Soviet Lnion Therefore we reject lhat this or that should have anyirjvjJ-ement in drawing up our internal policy f

Moscow's latest effort to improve the lot of the CPI in Iraq apparently came during Saddam'*S vUir_tojhe USSf

) ne Soviets convinced Suddam to meeta CPI Ventral Committee member. Saddam offered amnesty to CPI members who would agree to return from exile but on terms that would severely hamper CPI political activity. The CPI ofneial was inclined to accept the offer, bul General Secretary Muhammad is adamantly opposed to reconciliation with Saddam Thus, the Sovieu may have asask getting the CPI to unify and come to terms with Baghdad as they have had convincing Saddam to atending his repression of the parly.


Libya's provision of Soviet surface-to-surface missiles to Iran5 heightened Baghdad's mistrust oforeign Minister 'Aziz told L'S officials that Iraq has complained repeatedly to (he Sovieu. Although Gromyko assured 'Aziz in5 that Moscow hadtiff warning to Qadhafi. Iraqi officials were skeptical thai the Soviets would press Tripoli very hard {

Beyond the policy differences and the mistrust, (he USSR's interests in Iraq are limited by itswith Syria and desire for influence in Iran Moscow has longeconciliation between Baghdad and Damascus with no success. The Sovieu' stake in Syria pre*eats tbem from moving too close to Iraq, although, as Soviet officials have made clear in the past, Moscow will not give up its influence in Baghdad simply lo please tbe Assad region



in Use long run. the Soviets see Iran as moreIraq. He stated that, although Moscow hopeshaving to make the choice, it was prepared,to sacrifice iu influence in Iraq for thegain influence in Iran Although the diplomatbeen exaggerating for effect, tbehas longsee Iran as


the greaier strategic prizt

" Iran fired some of ihese miuilct ution lhe ipnrw5 and resumed niint in*


iheof ibe decade, the "soviet-Iraqiis likely toary one. based almost solely on Ihe arms supply link. Moscow might become even more ccoperatreche quality, quantity, and financing of "m% supplied to Iraq to counter Baghdad's growing lies to Ihc West, particularly the United Stalesoviet siep would be more likely should the war with Iranhich would ease Iraq's acute need lor Sonet weaponry and allow it the breathing lpace to shiftreater dependence on Western suppliers ove under way before ihc war

Boumediene Algeria purchased virtually all of its military equipment from the Soviet Union and ils East European allies, and Moscow and Algiers saw eye to eye on mosl inter national issues Thereached iu peak in, when Boumediene met with the Soviet Ambassador oneekly basis and party-lo-pariy contacts were freqiien

Even under Isoumcdienc. however. Ihe Soviets were unable to develop tbe kind oflgeria ihat they had. foe eiample, ia Egypt ir ihehe Algeriansertain distance and fiercely guarded their independence

Saddam were to die or be ousted, the effect on the relationship would depend upon ihe nature of the regime that replaced him from Moscow's standpoint, only an Iranian-dominated Shi'a legimcote Western-oriented leadership would be worsethan Saddam If Saddam were simply replaced by his chief lieutenants, which is ihe mosl likely scenario, chances arc ihey would share his distrust of ihc Sonets, although ihey probably would not alio* this to dominate Iraq: policy toward ihc USSR. The Kremlin might seekngratiate itself wiih the new leaders by offering better credit terms on arrasas well as some of the moteas beenrovide, and possibly intelligence and security support to help maintain them in power Ihe iclationihip might become less acrimonious in ihis caic bul would probably not differ markedly from thai which prevails undci Saddam


Since President Chadli Bendjcdid came to powerhe Soviet-Algerian rcteiionship has become

steadily more distant, and Moscow has been unable in reverse the trend. The Soviets cleaily preferred Bendjedid'% Icfiisi rival. Mohanicd Salah Yahiaoui, as

a leplacement for Boumediene. who died in8 >nd they do not trust Bcndjedit)

thai luflicndjcdid's


support for Yahlaom attitude toward Moscow C

The USSR has valued Algc-ia as an inia! member ol the Arab community and Third W'cmd andountry de*elppng alone aa "anti-impenalisi" and "progressive" socialist paihihc Soviets largely slaved aloof from Abjcr-asxruggle for ledepeaOencc from France. theylose relationship -nr. Algiers under us firsl two leaden. Ben Bella and HOassHI

liuimjii a* Inrcrmim ijtiivn uli 'in-

- [vw Ii moreI1MBSII


saiu uiui tnc sicaoy aecniii: in aos-ici-Algeriantons over the pasi lew yearsesult of Algiers's displeasure with Moscow's unsitllingness to provide "full mililary support" and ils aitempts io influence Algerian foreign policy In addition, the Algerians


Number af Soviet Personnel in Algeria (excluding dependents)

Estimated Number of Algerian Personnel Receiving Military Training ia USSR

Military advisers and

Eecrnomic advisers and

officials political, economic mlliiarv.-art in the fmtnsty ami ComuUlei /Amnta and Omni, at -ell si media ami "ode repreieneoiivrt

From affiant Sonet uaeiinet. vdut* do mot include all mitosr.

resent the USSR's willingness to provide their rival. Libya, with large amounts of sophisticated weapons. Bcndjcdid has:

Lessenedverwhelming dependence oa the USSR/or arms. Algiers has begun to purchase major weapon systems from Western countries, and the level of Soviet arms deliveries to Algeria has droppedarkedlylthough anew arms deal signed this spring would reverse this decline.

Sharply reduced ihe number of Soviei military adriters aad technicians in Algeria.ighhe presence is now down to800

Cariailed regular (OniullOliomt with, ike Soviets. The visit by the Algerian President to the USSR this spring was only his second since assuming office, and he has not followed Boumediene's prac-liceouf<ii meciino* with the Soviet Ajnbaisa-.

rivileged Dialogue" the Soviets enjoyed with-senior levels of thender Boumcdienching of the past.

many teniae-level pro-Soviet AlgerianThe Algerian President replaced them with people who support his policy of lesseningon the USSR.

investment,hift of emphasis from heavy to light industry. These policies were reflected in the FLN's revision of the Algerian national charter inoviei officials have commented^

Jidt (Tie new cnariertep backward ofears in the building of socialism in Algeria

ne sovieu arc seeking assurances from FLN officials that Algeria will continue to adhere to socialist economic practices.

Improved relations wilh Western countries. The

Algerian President's more positive relationship with the Lnitedaorwar* toh<most P

The Soviets have exerted considerable effort to stem Algeria's drift away from the USSR under Bendjedid, especially over lhe past twoalf years The Kremlin hasost of high-level official* in Alueria tnnr.inset)

-ZJdarshal Ogatkov. then tniel of Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces, hoped

to modify Algeria's "socialist"economy. This has included some decentralization, expansion of Ibc private sector, encouragement of foreign


Hit.hl.evel Soviet-Algeria*

MayGeorgian party thiefandidate Polt/turo member

represents the USSR at the congress of the Afro-Asicn Peoples' Solidarity Organisation (AAPSO) in Algiers Received by Bendfedid.

September then ForeignAlgerian Foreign Minuter Ibrahim! meet

while in New York for opening of fall session of Untied Nations General Assembly.

Octobercandidate Politburo member and Chief of the CPSU Central

Committees International Department-has talks in Algiers with teniae FLN and Algerian Government officials Receixed by Bendfedid.

Novembercandidate Politburo member Demichev has talks in Algiers with Minisier

of Culture and with senior FLN official Ktessaadia.

DecemberCommander in Chief of tke Sonet Navy has talks tn

Algiers wttk senior Algerian defense and other government cgfiaali

InlyNavy Commander in Chief Cherif visits USSR and has talks wiih

Admiral Gorshkov.

AuguuPrime Minister Brahimi has talks in Moscow with then Soviet Prime

Minister Tikhonov.

DecemberIvanovskiy. Commonder tn Chief of the Soviet Ground Forcet and

Deputy Defense Mimsier. visits Algiers for talks with Algerian military and political leaders

Marchmakes his second visit to Moscow as president

JuneGeneral Benlouctf. then Algerian Army Chief of Staff, visits ihe USSR and

hat talks with Soviet military officials.


has talks wiih

Soviei First Deputy Foreign Minister Voronisov visits Algiers. Messaadia and wiih Algerian Foreign Ministry officials


yaiural taiSown Biiiuont*

during his3 visit to convince theto abandon plans to purchaseamu fromthat

the visit to4 ol Boris Pono-marev. ihcn Chief of ihc CPSU Central Committee's International Department, was prompted byconcern over Algeria's continuing drift toward the West r

Despite Algeria's slow drift from the USSR, ita valuable Soviet friend. It is still strongly nonaligned and anti-Israeli and continues to differ wiih the United Stales on many international issues-most important, on how to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. The relationship with Algiers also provides Moscow with influence in North Africa beyond its ties to the mercurial Qadhafi regime. The Soviets, moreover, continue lo earn valuable hard currency from arms sales lo Algeria and still have more economic advisers and technicianshan in any other less developedWhatever Bendjedid's long-term plans arc, they will be heavily influenced by the fact Ihal Algeria's ^arrned forces remain overwhelmingly Soviet equipped.

Moscow. We believe, however, ihat the carefully planned nature of Bendjedid's policy changes indicate Ihey are unlikely io be reversed while he remains in power. The broad-based support within the FLN for Bendjedid's shift away from ihc USSR makes il likely that the policy would even survive his departure. Thus, the Soviets almost certainly will not be able to restore the relationship during Ihe rest of the decade to the closeness that characterized it underThis represents an impoitant selback toposition in the Machrcb and in Ihe Middle Easthole ^

Thehe Soviets, by identifying themselves since theith the Palestinian Liberation Organization (seeave attempted to gain:

stature among Ihe Arabs, mosl of whomountry's position on the Palestinian issueitmus test of its support for ihe Arab world.

An edge with the Arabs over the United States, which does not recognize ihe organization.

An added means of leverage on Israel.

A potential tool with which to binder aArab-Israeli settlementighl to claim forole in any settlement.

A source of influence in ijie region beyondgovernment .f" ^

Moscow, however, has never been comfortable with the ideologically diverse PLO, which depends on support from such conservative. anii-Soviet Arab governments as Saudi Arabia. As one scholar noted0 study of the Soviet-PLO relationship, tbe PLO is "far too unstable, uncertain and divided, far less Marxist and yet far too extremist to be Moscow's preferredalestinian disunity, inhas contributed to the USSR's hesitation ioefinitive stance and has led to its numerous shifts in policy toward the PLO. Despite ihc PLO's importance

ihey believeA"lgeria's growing economic prfaolems and concern about the intentions of Morocco and Libya will oblige Bendjc-did to curtail his economic liberalization, distance Algiers ftom Washington, and strengthen lies lo

Golan, the Soviet Union and ihe Palestinian Ubfalion Organl-ation. An Untaif AlHanteO*vo York: Prwjer.P 2SJ-S4



Groups Within Ibe Palestine Liberation




AW at-itahim

iOOio MM) m

re*, len.ce tFlPl"

"Atoll TuBOM.ii


I* it* LWiih. oliDflPl[Maiaawl Ha. aim Pi

<iwl Pikm,.* Duuacw

la* Patalimar Coirimennl Pin* iPCPl a, notot"Ii leu* rears, ibc PCF



Fap-U( Frewi ft. iht Liberal-coo* PiletiHMiPFI PhMjuiui



i Ms.,1

yria and Lebanon


Stiugjle F'oni |PSF1



for ihe LiberationP* tawie

hi runt

male ui


Muitba lAbu Mini)

miit u>


ibr Pile-IFie-i

Moscow, (he fact lhat il is noi an established government allowsoore tactical policy toward A

This tactical flexibility toward ihe PLO has been especially evident since the Israeli thrashing of PLO forcesbanon? The USSR's cautious reaciion to the Israeli action siraincd Soviet PLO

relations Ties between Moscow and Arafat have been funher complicated by the Soviet unwillingness to lake forceful action to convince Syrian Picsideni Assad to abandon his efforts3 loousi Arafat and gain control of the PLO Although the Soviets have made then displeasuie wiih this Syrian policy known to Assad, they have been careful not to allow the issue io jeopardizeost important ally in the Middle Eat


The Leftist Alternatite

n r


has long maintained support for theleftists, even white Us relations withgood. The Palestinian Communist Pany isclosest to the Soviets, bui its influencehas been limited. The much moreDemocratic Front for the IJberaiion ofMarxistwiih ihe Kremlin for years. FormerAndropov told' JCommumsl leader

the DTtTiTtnc PLOseaning the most ideologically sound. The Popular Front for the Liberation ofas had its differences with the Soviets Jtccausc ofjts more militant stance toward Israel.

Il does not appear thai ihe Kremlin views the leftists ai Ihis pointeplacement for Arafat

. .onetheless. Moscow probably sees the leftistsorrecitve influence on the "bourgeois" Arafat and as potential candidates for future leadership of ihe Palestinian movement. Soviet support for the leftists seems designed to reunite the PLOasis thai curtails Arafai's ability to pursue talks with Arab moderates, the United Slates,Israel. Moscow also apparently hopes ihe leftists can help mend the Arafai-Assad rift.

Sovjcls have been lorn bynterests in the Ararat-Assad dispute. Although the USSR agrees with some of the criticism directed at Arafat by Assad and the Syrian-backed PLO factions, it docs not want to see Ihe PLO come under Syrian controlevelopment would force ihe Soviets lo deal wiih the Palestinians through fiercely independent Damascus. Arafat's moves in4 looint PLO-Jordanian delegation for peace talks with Israel, however, prompted Moscow to move closer io the position of Syria and Arafat's PLO opponents. The

Soviets' primary reason for opposing the Arafat-Hussein accord was the fear that il mighl have facilitated US-sponsored talks between the joint PLO-iordanian delegationnrj, Svriaand theUSSpC

"old PLO political de-

pm iincnfTtlfcf Qaddumi during his visit to Moscow in6 that this would lead io US domination of ihe Middle East andrave threat io ihc Soviet Unio




tuny Ara-apm aia fur

trader Your Arafat during hi* tail ctHaa!


The unraveling of lhe Arafal-Hussein accord in5 and6 ha* prompted the Soviets and Arafal to once again move closer Arafat, becausencreasingly isolated, and Moscow, because itsenses lhat Arafat's weak position leaves him no choice but to improve relations with the USSR on its terms Gorbachev apparently mel wilh Arafat during the East German party congress iaccyr<jina to PLO radio am t

/This was the firstovici leaocrthe PLO chiefhe Sovieustepping up efforts to reunify the PLOicMoscow's mediationlor the PLO's decision lo send awith representatives of all the ma/ortoh Congress of lhe CPSU in February.

The Sovieu. however, do not appear convinced thai Arafal has totally -Kindoned hopes of coiUboratioe with Kmc H.


not rule out Aralat's lulure cooperationussein. He also was pessimistic about reconciliation among PLO factions Moscow's failed attcmpu in iheand fall ofio broker PLO unity

The Palestinian issue is likely io remain lhe central one in the Middle East, regardless of who wins the power struggle within the PLO. and the Soviets will

continue championing lhe cause. But the PLO's valueehicle for advancing Soviet interests in the region probably will remain much diminished The PLO's internal rifu and feud with Syria pul the attainment of Arab unity, which the Soviets consider essential, even further away. It will be difficult for the Soviets to achieve one of their primary goals in the Middlemajor role in an Arab-Israeli peace conferencewithout close liestrong PLO thai cooperates with Syria Moscow would be unablearlay its roleenefactor of the PLO toeal atonference if ihe mainstream of the PLO remains at odds with Syria and tbe Palestinians themselves remain badly divided

Friesstfly Moderates

Moscow has long sought, aspan of its broader Middle Eastern strategy, to cultivate tics to the "moderate" Arab regimes. The Soviets have had their most success with three monarchies {Jordan. Kuwait. andilitary dictatorshipnd three ostensible parliamentary democracies (Tuniiia. Sudan, and Lebanon) Although thelong-term objective it developing Soviet influence in these countries, its more immediate and realisticroding US influence. The Sovieis have had theirnotably in Sudan under Ni-mcin but on balance their patient courting has paid some important dividends Most, if not all. of these countries have.

Acknowledged publicly that the USSR has an important role to play in lhe Middle East.

Endorsed (albeit not necessarily enthusiastically) Moscow's call for an international conference oo the Arab-Israeli dispute.

Muted concerns about Soviei policies, particularly on Afghanistan.

The key to Moscow's success has been iuwiih the Arab cause, especially on the Palestinian Question The Soviets have also used arms sales to make inroads with some of ihe friendlyhey signed minor arms deals with Morocco snd Lebanon innd briefly were


primary source of arms in theore recently, ihe USSR hat rwcrvided Jordan and Ku*ai(air defense weapons, capitalizing on the US Coneress' reluctance to sell those countriesarms. Althoueh the Soviets have not sold arms to Tunisia, it is (lie one "friendly moderate" that allows Soviet naval ships tegular access to its ports.'

Trade and ccooornic assistancelayedinimal role in Moscow's relations with theseThe only exceptions are Morocco, where the Soviets have invested heavily in the development of phosphates androfitable fishing agreement, and Mauritania, where theyimilar arrange-meni to fish in coastal waters in return for helping develop ihe Mauriuman fishing industry. Recent Soviet discussions wiih Kuwaitariety ofprojects are likely touwait's joinmi the list of exceptions

Lebanon is important lo (he Soviets because of the Palestinian and Syrian presence and the US interesi in il rather than for its intrinsic significanceot haventer ens at stake there They have sought influence wiih both the central government and the various political and religious factions but have neverajor actor. Moscow's closest lie are lo the Lebanese Communis! Party. The IISSK alsoong history of dealings with such imnoi let tut groups as the Communist Action Orgs ni ratio the Syrian Social Nationalist Party, and the Muistr tun Since the Israeli invasionbe Soviets have focused attention on two of the mosl influential factions, the Druzc Progressive Socialist Parly (PSP) of Walid Junblait and the Shia Amal of Nabih Ham They have become particularly close to the PSP. providing it with the balk of its arms

Similarly, the Soviets haveplay some role in ihe inler-aiional elTortsesolve ihc Lebanese problem. This has stemmed moreesire to headS-brokered solution and find another eniree mio Middle Eastern affairs

" IVinke* RUfkHn wt

iu-i! OcCumntn

ealkeihiaUiKi ul

Man* re m

thanenuine interest in getting involved in the Lebanese quagmire. Although the Soviets do not want to see Lebanon controlled by Syria, the importance of iheir relationship wiih Damascus is likely lo prompt Ihcm lo continue deferring to Syrian interests in Lebanon during the rest of the decadr

it appears thatis also beginning i> see an economic ratiorsarc for its presence in Kuwait During the visit touly of Konstaitin Katushev. Chairman of the Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations, ihe iwo sidesost ofl> According to

nd Kuv-aiti newspapers.


A Kawatti loan to tbe USSR ofillionavorable interesl rale for Constr-fiaMatural ess pipeline between ihe Soviei Union ard Greece

A swap of oil, whereby Kuwait would provide nil to Soviet customers in Asia and East Africa while Moscow would do the same for Kuwaiti clients in Western Europe

A similar swap involving ammonia deliveries

Kuwaiti assisiatscc in oil refining. eiploraiion. and drilling techniques for joint projects in the USSR

The last deal, in particular, could provide Moscow access to advanced oil technology denied to it by the West

Moscowindfall in Sudan with the ouster of the anti-Soviet Jaafar Nimciri inhe Soviets dealt cautiously with the transitional regime of General al-Dahab. probably out of uncertainty over its longevity and in deference to tbe Ethiopians, who strongly opposed the regime At ihe same time, the Kremlin stepped up aid to tbe Sudanese Communist Party and. via Ethiopia, has been providing indirect military support to the Marxist southern insurgent leader. John Garang, and his Sudanese People's Liberation Armyccording

Although weilitary support is not extensive, thealmost certainly approve of Ethiopia's transfer of us Soviet-supplied arms io the SPLA

The Soviets rxobably will continue their current dual-track approach with the new government headed by the Unni Party'sl-Mahdi As his August visitbe USSR indicated. Moscow is likely to try currying favor wiih his government, whileertain distance so as not to jeopardize relationsossible successor should Sadiq's rule prove short lived The Soviets may offer to repair Sudan's aging inventory of Soviet arms and possibly sell new weapon systems once they believe Sadia has consolidated power, provided Khartoum fust curtailed assisiunicthiopian insurgents Ubya't lies to Sadiq could provide Ihc Soviets ar. opening, but they arc likely to tread carefully toacklash should Qadhafi's intrigues backfire

adaq's rule lead io increased instability, or should the SPLA score sigoiiicam gams, ihe Soviets would be likely to step up aid to the Communists and loies would attempt, however, to

disguise such aid io asotd harnn.ig relations with Cairo. Egypt is far more signilicani to Soviet interests in the Middle East thar. is Sudan, which is likely io remain an economic and political basket case during the neat Are scars regardless of who is inhartoum

Despite the inroads Moscow has made with the friendly mndetates.aintain goodwith Washingion. Morocco. Jordan, snd Tunisia retain important military links to ihe United States Moreover, all of the friendly moderates remainabout Soviet latcsticcs Morocco, for eiample. continues to suspect that the Soviets are aiding the Polrtario rebels in the Western Sahara (see inset)

The Sovieil are certain lo continue ihdr low-cost efforts to woo the friendly moderatesfium dependence or Washington. In moat cases. Moscow has little to lose, andhose areas- such as Lebanon where Sc-ei tics to more important Arab countries impinge, those ties will continue lo take precedence Internal instability in some of these countries is likely to offer Moscow lite best opportunities for advancement Instability in Lebanon

4 -

abat, aad the Polisario

Soviets sympathize with the cause of the Polisario rebels, who are seeking an independent state in the Western Sahara. The Kremlin supports Saharanopposed tointernational forums and sanctions the transferof Soviet arms to the rebels by Algeria and Ubya C

Jjthenas cttgerta to transfer arms that It no longer needs lo the Polisario. but not any major systems that might internationalize the conflict in theSahara '

Moscow, however, refrains from direct contact with ihe Polisario and has neither accorded it the statusational liberation movement nor recognized the Saharan Democratic Arab Republicven the staunchly pro-Moscow Moroccan Communist party {the Party of Progress and Socialism) backs the Moroccan Government's claimovereignty over the Western Sahar, C

j theno direct military support ortajcani, human! tar ion aid. Cuban officials reportedhX^ each time they have

urged Moscow toore active role In aiding ihe Polisario. ihey have been firmly rebuffed.


Theaution stems from its desire to maintain good relations with Moroccan King Hassan as well as an appareni Judgment that the Polisario's chances of establishing an independent state any lime soon are slim. In responseuestionublic lecture2 in Moscow as to whether the Soviet Union recognized theoviei specialist on North Africa from the Academy of Sciences' Africa Institute claimed the issue was "complex"because the Soviets had to "lake into account our good relations with Morocco.

_ the Soviets believed that. normal relations with the USSR to ensure that it would not siep up aid to the Polisario.

Sudan during the past three years already has eroded US influence and brought in regimes much more willingeal with the Soviets than their predecessors had been. Domestic unrest in Morocco and Tunisia is likely to grow over tbe next few years, potentially providing the USSR with fertile ground to expand iu influence or at least undermine that of the United States. And in Mauritania,ilitary-led coup occurredhe chronic instability of the central government may eventually offer the Soviets opportunities in that fa--orT corner of the Middle East T "

Wary Moderates

The only states the USSR does not have diplomatic relations with in the Middle East are the Persian Gulf

monarchies of Qatar, Bahrain, and Saudihe Sovicu scored their first breakthroughs in the region in years in the fallhen theyrelations with Oman and the United Arab Emirates (UAE*1

Moscow's primary objective in the Persian Gulfin our view, is the elimination of the US military presence. Soviet propaganda incessantly criticizes the conservative Gulf countries for cooperating militarily

a Neil net (he Soviets nor th* Saudis ever formally sewed dlplo-mat* relatives -ben Moseo- wiihdre- its emissary from Saadl Arabia in the late IvJOs Thut. technically they still has* -elMioni. bui in fact there have been no ties fee almost K) year. T


wiih Washington All bul Qatar have tome form of mililiry agreement with the United Slates ranging from lhe pre positioning of military equipment in the UAE and Oman, to granting US naval ships access to port facilities in Bahrain, to the luuoning of US AVVACS aircraftan support unit in Saudi Arabia Moscow's0 proposal that the max powers eliminate military bases in the Persian Gulf region was designed, in part, with these agreements in mind, and Soviet officials continue to tout the However, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the war between Iran and Iraq have prompted the conservative Gulf slates to be even more recenjjve to military cooperaiion with Washington

Saudi Arabia's oil wealth, ties to the United States.

growing miliary power, and influence over the other shaykhdoms make it Moscow's prime target on the peninsula Since tbe, tbe USSR has sought unsuccessfully to interest Saudi leaders in reviving relations Although in recent years (he Saudis have gradually allowed an increase in oTicial and unolhcial contacts, and Saudi leaders occasionally make public statements leaving the door open for resuming relations, there has been no significant movement in this direction The Saudis have publicly linked Ihe resumption of full relationsoviet withdrawal from Afghanistan

The Soviets have made someahrain bui ihus lar have nothing to show for their ctTorts with Qatar They sent their Deputy Director for foitrism io Bahrain inhe run visit everoviet official Bahraim Prime Minister Khalifa gave two interviews in the summer5 suggesting that Bahrain was taking another look at the question of establishing formal ties to tbe Soviet Union Since then, however, there has been mimovement toward establbhing relations'

1 "ic radical Marxist coup in South Yemen in January has complicated Moscow's efforts to conn thev.Uivc Gulf regimes. Most Gulf leaders, including the

Kuwaitis, suspected that the Soviets were behind the coup. Wc believe Oman and the UAE arc likely io move more slowly In allowing lhe USSR toull diplomatic presence in their capitals Saudi Arabia. Bahrain, aad Qatar probably will reassess the advisability of normalizing relations with the Soviet Union. The Soviets appear to be advising the new regime in Aden to avoidadical foreign policy, which would almost certainly compel the Gulf conservatives to move closer lo the United States.

While courting the Gulf monarchies, the Sovieis also have been maintaining ties to local leftist forces. Moscow backs Marxist groups opposed to the regimes in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, and Oman The Soviets provided aims via Soulh Yemen io ihe Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO) during its revolt against Sultan Qabous in tbelthough tbe PFLO has been largely dormantts members still travel to the USSR frequently and participate in Soviet-organired gatherings of Middle Eastern leftist! two other participants at suchare the Saudi Communist Pariy and the Nationalom of Bshrain Moscow funds and provides guidance to both C

None of these three groups, however, noware they likely to pose any rimemayor threat to the regimes in Riyadh. Muscat, arid Manama Nevertheless, lhe prospcci of internal unreal in these countries may offer Moscow opporiunities to advance its interests, and the Soviets arc certain lo keep the Marxist opposition groups viable to beosition so capita lire on such imtibiiit) There have been no indications ihus far that the Soviets are urging the Marxist groups to collaborate with Muslim lur.da-mcntalists ihe teal threat io the Gulf regimes. In fact, the disastrous results that Iran's Tudch (Communist) Party suffered from cooperation with Khomeiai's Muslim fundamentalist regime may have soured ihe Kremlin ontrategy Should the Muslim opeontioo gain strength, however, the Sovieis may become more receptive to cooperation as ihe best wav to increaie the influence of the Marxist forces.


The USSR'* relationship with Israel hasaradoxne. Since as far back as Lenin. Soviet Communists have intensely distrusted Zionism, which they regard as reactionary and "bourgeois" despite its socialist element. Nonetheless, the Soviets were among the first to recogniie the new Jewish slateut they have severed relations with il twice since then,T. Israel's existence and IS support for it have provided the Sovieu their best entree for influence in the Arab world; yet their self-inflicted inability to talk with Israel has put themistinct disadvantageishas influence with both sides of the Arab-Israeli confijct.'t^

The VS-lsraell Military Relationship

For years. Moscow's propaganda has depicted Israel as aVS "gendarme"in the Middle East, and the US-Israeli "strategic cooperation" agreementI only reconfirmed that view. The USSR't special concern is lhat Ihe US-lsraell Memorandum of Under standing on strategic cooperation is specifically aimed atpotential Soviei military moves in the Middle East. One Soviet official, in aid the agreement ts "an unprecedented miliiary-poltlieal concord in the domainecause il refers lo iht Soviet Union as the 'officially defined adversary r

presence ofillion Jews in the Soviei Union, many of whom desire to emigrate, and the fact that Israel sees the protection and eventual emigration of Soviet Jewsital national interestolatile factor that is not present in the USSR's relationship with most other countries. The interest of American Jews and the US Government in the plight of Soviet Jews has bad repercussions in US-Soviet relations. The collapse of the deal betweenaod Moscow in5 that would have given the Soviet Union most-favored-nation trading statusirect result of the Congress' Jackson-Vanik amendment, which required that the Sovieisertain number of Jews leave eachpledge the Kremlin refused to max*.

Moscow, in addition, has to factor into iu Israeli policy the strong US commitment to the existence of Israel and the increasingly close security relationship between Washington and Tel Aviv. The Sovieu have displayed concern over lhe US-Israeli "strategic1 but notuntiliu focus onthe USSR in the Middle East (see inset

" Anoihn iron/ of Soviei polity IsraardHal. altboug-h

Israelisad potioa tone oncer kanhcr cnliciun from

miMseini Mi.Uk Eauera

oaty teantryat ttfomis* Ctanswai Part) ken nut nfutiKtthe rjimalnads fear sear; w :o

teatand canclient lot tt*errmct

The Kremlin also has been worried by the exchange of military technology and know-how between Israel and the United Slates. The Sovieu, for example, issued an official TASS statement in6 condemning Israel's decision lo participaic in research for the US Strategic Defense Initiative. C

Lack of Relations

The Sovieis have long acknowledged j_ S and Israeli officials that itistake io orcak relations7 atnf ihe Six-Day WarC

j Some Sovieis lui.i. sjneoThe Kremlin's decision to break reunions an "emotional act" andash move "in the heal of the moment.'

At the same time. Moscow has continued7 lo emphasize lhai Israel has ihe right lo exist. The Sovieis have stated this explicitly in most or their "peace plans" for an Arab-Israeli settlement. Gromyko made one of the most emphatic Soviet

public statements on Ihis issueews ctHifcrence in Moscowhen he declared Ihat: "We do hot share the point of view of extremist Arab circles that Israel should bethis is both] unrealistic and unjust.*

Within two years of the break in relations, the Soviets were probing for ways to renew lie


nut period, soviei officials le-neu numerous stories about an imminentof Soviei.-Israeli relations. In the reverse of today's situation, it was the Israelii who played hard to get and denied in public any movement toward restoration of ties. The Camp David accords8 ended Ihc USSR's courting of Israel, althoughcontacts have continued ' - "*

Recess* Developments

There has been an increase in Sonet-Israeli contacts since Gorbachevs accession to power. The Kremlin almost certainly approved Poland's agreement wiih Israel lo open inierest sections in Warsaw and Tel Aviv. One of the most significant Soviet steps urasj toe decision to meet with Israeli officials in Helsinki in6 to arrangeoviet consularto go to Israel to review the operation of the Soviei interests section run by the Finnish Embassy and handle some consular matters. Although ihe Soviets abruptly ended the meeting when the Israel: side attempted to discuss Soviet Jewry* that an Israeli delegation be allowed to go to Moscow, the meeting servedignal lo Ihe Arab* ihat Ihe USSR has the ability lo develop its own independent

* The feme* aiiwntcrsI midihe opcaipg leas-aes ol tha. UN Geaerslke-nfl.aseisssse Minnie- Pii t> al use IsUJft seasavi aad SovietM majw cap>iali nwei oetasion-any In addition, each Mayist aaaiveiiary oT the'er Nail Crinuny. Mowdelegation lo luael and lineli leftislin ihe USSI

policy toward Israel. Foreign Ministermeeting with then Prime Minister Peres, at the tatter's request, in September at tbe United Nations reiterated the point, even though Moscow went out of iu way to criticize Israelitxjsitions in iu media coverage of the

The Balance Sheet From Moscow's Perspccliie

When Soviet leaders weigh the meriu of resuming ties to Israel, they probably calculate that, on the credit side, reestablishing relations would provide an entree into Arab-Israeli negotiations from wbicb tbey have been excluded3 Specifically, Moscow

would hope to convene iu long-proposed international conference. Israeli (as well as US| opposition has been the biggest obstacle to holdingathering.tep would probably also improve the atmosphere in US-Soviet relations and possibly even lead to anof US restrictions on irade with ihe USSR

On ihe debit side, reestablishing formal lies would alienate Moscow's Arab friends, most importantly ihc Syrians and Palestinians. Gromyko cited Ihis as the orimarv reason for nm takin? 'his

H braar-hc" the

v /Vat. Q



opposiiion prevented the USSR from restoring liesn added complication for the Soviets in restoring ticsp* time soon. More recently.ould be the opening of an Israeli Embassy in

that wouldagnet for "refuseniks"

icioned ihalois couiu noi abandon mand must consider how its friends might react.

(Sc-nei Jews who have applied to emigrate butbeen allowed to leave! and tbe Sovieiin general

Moscow's concern about Syria's reaction appears to be well founded. President Assad's spokesman saidublic statement in5 thai -nothing justifies" the resumption of Soviet-Israeli relations as long as Israel continues to occupy Arab territories. Syria's severence of diplomatic relations with Morocco in6 forisii by Peres indicates Ihe intensity with which Da muse us regards ihe issueT*

Moscow could argue with iu Arab allies thaiwith Ihe Israelis will give ii leverage overwhich could be used toavorableIt is doubtful, however, that ihcgain such leverage or that the Arabs wouldby Moscow's argument. Israel has notin ihe pus! to compromise on vilal issuesfor belier treatmenl of Soviet Jews andto begin doing so simply because itrelations with ihe USSRa did Vladimir

Polyakov. chief of the Foreign Ministry's Near East and North Africa Administration, in talks wiih US officials inT-

Some in Moscow would probably argue Ihat Ihe Arabs have nowhere else to mm and thus would have io acquiesceoviet move to renew relations, do matter how distasteful. Most Soviet officials,probably are not that confident about the USSR's position wiih Die Arabs. They arc likely to worry thai the damage in rclaiions with ihe Arabs would be deep and lasting, possibly even severe enough to convinceas the Syrians andthere was no choice but lo throw in Iheir lot with the United Slates, as Egypt did, to gel the best available deal wiih tbe Israelis At tbe same time, these Soviets probably would argue thai restoring relations is likely to encourage the*rabs io reach anwith Israel

Moscow4 that tins woulderious problem for Ihe Soviets requiring firm guarantees from Israel limiting the activities of an Israeli Embassy inJ


Israeli flexibility on an international conference and ihe level of tensions between Israel and Syria are likely io determine the pace of Soviei movesormalize relations, regardless of whether IheLikud or the more moderate Labor Party is in power. It would be difficult for the Soviets to convince Syria of tbe necessity for renewed Soviet-Israeliif Israel continues to hold io iu current positions on the Palestinian question and tbe Golan Heights or new Syrian-Israeli hostilities erupi. Moscow's ollicial-ly declared position is thai relations will not be restored until Israel returns all of the lands seizedui we believe it is likely to take further steps

toward better ties even without such

The Soviets probably wilt move scry gradually lo give the Arabs lime to gel used to the idea of better Sovici-Israeli ties before reestablishing full diplomaticAnd Likud leader Shamir's scheduled (enure as prime minister until8 is likely to hinder progress in Soviei-Israeli relations. It appears,that the Gorbachev foreign policyprodded by CPSU International Department Chief Dobrymn. who reportedly has long favored restoringdetermineday to correct the MNfsstar Moscow made' by breaking relations

An easing of tensions belween Moscow and Washing-ion will noi automatically lead to improvement in Soviei-Israeli relations, but the last serious Soviet



to improve ties occurred during lhe heyday ot detente. Tlie Kremlin probably would hope that one benefit (rom improved US-Soviet relations would be cooperation on issues such as the Arab-Israeli conflict

The Gorbachev regime's view ol the USSR's intei nal security- specifically, the externhich dissent and emigration arc to be tolerated also will color its policy toward Israel If Gorbachev continues his current tough policies toward Soviet lews, thiswould indicate that he has no real intention of softening the Soviei position onn the other hand, aa easing of restrictions on Soviet Jews would not necessarily mean Moscow was pianaing toties to Israeliberalization could be directed more at influencing policy in Washington than in Israel

l opportunity in :rn tier. Its size,

The Northern Tier

Lgypt is the heyorld, so Iran isih

the establishmentro-Sovici regimehran. its mme immediate concern has been to prevent us adversaries from achieving rucdevrunant influence tberc Soviet concern over British and Germanm Iran and bow ihoscmight use their position in ihe country to threaten ihe USSR played aprompting the Soviet occupation of parts of northern Irannd againIie Ssu^'sndeda period of more than M> years during winch the Soviets faced an externUS presence in Iran Capitalizing on this sirai'iric "ipdfall has been Moscow's primary aim tn Ira.

-vtdw truetn -bo


f is* NMn Of If-1Mik:

i iinnitisie imimi ihe xiumI km'lhaa in* via1 lineri In .iiMIiiim tiorhathchai

i.iiwrdHi ifpfmiee ul ri-nh IrTahllit

1 he Soviets have had almost no success in replacing US influence ia Iran with ihcar own Soviet-Iranian relations have deteriorated sharplyhen Moscow abandoned us efforts to court Ayatullah Khomeini's regime and tilted inward Baghdad in the war between Iran and Iraq4 Tehran has shown signs ofah io the slide, but Moscow has not been convinced of the Khomeini regime's sincerity and hasough posture toward Iran Soviet media criticism of lianian policies tontin ties almost urubitcdTbe visit io Tehranen Firtl Deputy Foreagn Minister Korniycnkc was ihe highest level Soviet visit lo Iran since the Shah's fall, but by moti accounts neither sideillingness :oon the basic issues divid mg them Smibtrly. tke vrsiis to tbe USSR in the summci6 by two ministers, rtcspiic the positiveoth, sides media, yielded few results- savc_perhups. in the energy sphere |scc

Despite this lack of success, inc Soviets probably are satisfied thatso has not been able to icestablish itself in Iran Concern that the United States wiil do so has evidently beenovcow

*i. ma>U(*iinner by 'iw.'i

Vr-Ki'ilwi I'eooettimni ol tinmnil Vine* of Inn" INdio nilion thai aji brwdejti ui Poi'in and Aieii in hart nut

e'- i ' i ' IVl* I

ianridrt b* iK SailMe Ukw(Wi^>i(

auociuo IranjdoRabat.ol ihe Hiiwj" lnv-


was mcrca>iiieiyoicniand ihal ils leaders were al heart oriented toward the Western economic system. This theme is expressed more directly in Soviei scholarly andwritings on the Islamic regime. For instance, Soviet media gave extensive coverage lo ihe US acknowledgment in November that ii had sccreily provided some arms to Iran



Soviets viewed witti considerable concern trie possibility that the United States would lake mililary action to restore ils position in Iran. He said the USSR's primary goal in Iran is tonited Sutes from regaining influence

Policy Differences. The trend in Soviei policy toward Iran2 and the continued hostility of Khomeini toward the USSR strongly suggest thai there will be no significant improvement in bilateral relations as long as ihe Ayaiollah remains in power. Beyond the basic ideological differences separating the two regimes and Iran's traditional fear of ils powerful northern neighbor, the issues hinderingrelations loday are;

Moscow's mililary support for Iraq.

The continuing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and Iran's support for ihe Afghan rebels.

Tehran's occasional hostile treatment of Soviets accredited to Iran and Moscow's withdrawal45 of most of its economic advisers and technicians from Iranian industries.

The Khomeini regime's repression of tbe Tudeh Party.

The puMic criticisms Ihe two sides exchange in iheir medi

The first two issues are the most significant and the ones on which changes in Soviet and Iranian positions are least likely over the next few years. Moscow has gone to great lengths lo improve its position in Iraq

Soviei Reassessment of ihe Iranian Rerolaiion

An article in the2 edition of the CPSU Journal Kommunislandmark in the Soviets' reappraisal of the Iranian revolution. The author. Rosttslaveputy chief of ihe CPSU Central Committee's International Department and one of ihe USSR's senior specialists on ihe Third World, slated that ihe fundamentalist clerics'of power tn the summer1 marked the end of the revolution's "genuinely people's antiimperialist" nature and the beginning of an "illusory" Quest for an Islamic Jhi'd path" between capitalism and socialism

Ul'yanovskiy claimed the9 revolution was "bourgeois democratic" and could have moved in anhat is. pro-Soviei/ direction. Unfortunately, he lamented, the complete triumph of the Shta clergy stifled theprogressive" tendencies:

The more the new organizations'% power wiih its specifically Islamic features strengthened, the more rapidly the foundations of the revolutionruly people's antiimperialist andrevolution were eroded

The articleationalization and. at the sameonfirmation of the negative shtfi in the USSR's view of Khomeini's Iran. Articles and books by Ul'yanovskiy and others emphasizing ihe same themes in even more strident J'rms continueppear in Soviet medii

2 and, as long as the war continues, is not likely to lessen its mililary support for Baghdadlear prospect for major Soviet gains in Iran were to arise. The Soviets are noi likely to pull out of Afghanistan entirely any lime scon, and the Iranians arc becoming bolder in their support for ihe rebels. Soviet media in February criticized Tehran fora clerical delegation inio Afghanistan io meet


with rebels and claimed "the Iranian officials' intcr-vention in Afghanistan'sdomestic iffair ii becoming more biatani and

Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Larijani's with Soviet officials inugust yielded no meeting of Ihe minds on Afghanistanecember, hvesnya. ia one of the hardest hitting public Soviet criticisms of the Khomeini regime lo date, accused it of cooperating with the United Slates in an "undeclared war" against the Marxistin Afghanistan and in denigrating the USSR's "miemn'innal assistance" to the Najib regime

Possible Areas for Improvement in Relations. Even without movement on these issues, however, aof the current high state at tensions ts possible wh*le Kr*omeini is in power C

^Tehran's primary goals are to lessen Soviet .miliary support for Iraq and convince Moscow to sell Iran major weapon systems. Although the Soviets have dragged their feel in responding to Iran'sand bilateral trade5 dropped lo iu lowest level since (heseeconomic discussions arc continuing Boih governments have indicated thai some Soviet economic advtsers and technicians are likely to return lo Iran in the near fuiare. Iran's Minister of Petroleum datmcd after his6 visit to Moscow that the two sides wouldhree-mooth study to assess the possibiliiy of resuming Iranian natural gas exports lo ihe

iTaWe4 Soviet-Iranian Trade

US 1

Imp*is From Iran

Etporu lo Inn



e statistx drains

rounded lo neare

million US

ehran terminated such deliveries0 because of difficulties over pricing. Even if the two could agree on pricing, refurbishing theipeline would take sii monthsear

The Sovieu also might be willing, in return for Iranian concessions on other issues, to increase then arms sales to Tehran Moscow already has allowed its East European allies to boost arms sales to Inn Such salr*edactor of six4

""Jbui dropped off again5 lice


systems probably stems from two factors they do not want in enable Iran to expand ihcand ihey wantvoid antagonizing Iraq

"ade nu imii'n ncniunefcimcnt.

AJicr Kkomtimi Mthough lhe Soviets arc unlikelythen stance on- at long as

Kkonctrti i* ia power, lacy ptobabiy wouldan* efloctuccessor regime even if il were run by olfier fundamentalist cleric* ihe moil likely deveiopitieiii (Khomeini ia aioundnil icportcd lo be in failingf Ihe new regimeess hostile polity toward lhe L'SSK than Khomeini's, lhe Sonets woaid be likely toolicy ofaimed al improving naic-to-state relations and. ultimately, increasing Soviet influence in Iian Ihey tried ihis for three years before giving up on Khomeini

uccessor regime prove to be as anti-Soviet a* Khomeini's or. on ihe other hand,ajor power struggle ensue. Moscow almost certainly would use Ihe potential levers it has both insulr and outside Iran to inornate :be csiablnhmcntro-Soviet repme ia Tehran Ideally, the Kremlin would bopees; me headed by the staunchly pro-Soviet Tudch (C'oiiimunist| Party The Tudeh. however, has

otajor factor in Iranian politics sinces, and its ability lo operate in Iian has been prauically reduced since the Khoencint regime de-riarcd lhe party illegalJ and arrested many of Its leaders, who remain in jail. The remnants of the parly leadership fled to lhe Soviei Union and Itastern Sturopc andew general secretary. All Khavari, lo replace the imprisoned Nuredin Kianun fhe party's membership, which -according

otaled no more. airnosi ecil-inly has dwindled further

The Soviets presumably rccognire lhe TudcS'sand they have been callingnited front of kflists (including thehalq.nd Paykar putties)and disaffected minorities (see inset) Not all u( these groups, particularly iheinterested inwith either the Tudeh or tke Soviets, however, and the prospects fornited front seizing powci or even wielding major influence are likely to remain slim for some lime io com

Moscow has two otherandwhich to influence Iran Iran's need (or Soviei assistance in operating key components of the sieel and power industries has alieady been noted. In addition, appraiimatclyercent of Iraas mine*is currently trartut Soviet territory, according to Iranian tradeoviet ban an iht* transit trade would

Moscow and Iran 's Minorities

The Soviet Army helped install the short-lived leftist, separatiu regimes in Iranian Azerbaijan and KordenanS. and Moscow has maintained relationships with the Aierbaijam and KurdishParties, which remain influential in their respective regions (see foldout figuret the back) The Soviets have spoken out openly2 for Kurdish autonomy, and ihe media in the USSR's own Azerbaijani Republic often issue veiled colli /or "reunification" of Sonet and Iranian Aztni In addition, reports


out of o

, rmmatma someranian Baluchistan, and Soviet media oceauomilly call for autonomy fur the RaluchZ^


Sttlttimckafjlkg <Miiiwir.ii out ofthai instability in Iran would be likely toWestern intrrveniio'

ihey would much prefertafy Iran rather ikon full control over fragment, of the country

We believe concern about Western intervention will continue to shape Moscow's policy toward Iranian minorities a< longtt imi iheehran as antagomiiu: toward Washington Should on Iraman governmem begin to turn back toward ihe United Slates, ihe Soviets probably would in to stir up the minorities an the assumption thaio an Iran that tt atain in ihe US camp.'.

create economic hardships Tot Iran, but almostnoi enough lo force illter its basic policies Moreover, by wieldingoscow risks pushim: Tehran closer io ibe Weil oui o! economic need

over han (see foldout figuret thehe Soviets haveotorized riRc, one tank, and one airborne] in the three military districts north of (ran and the equivalent of five or su divisions in Afghanistan The divisions in the Turkestan. Trans-Caucasus, and North Caucasus military districts are among theipped Soviet forces in the USSR's border regions We believe, however, ihat these lorccs are sufficient, if mobilized, to mountimited or full-scale invasion of Iran on relatively short notice without substantialfiom Soviet forces opposite NATO or China."

The Soviets have also been developing contingency plans0 for military campaigns in_lran and

i lie Persian Gulf regjon InAueust

_Jiollo*ing ihektfi completely reevaluatedptans for Soviet military intervention: ihat the

USSRoeiailed coniingency planscomplete" lakeovei of Iran In

.indicates thai Moscow hasncatcr-lcvel military command forouthwest AsiaSouthern Theaiei of Militaryons

Any of the followingur view, probabiy would leado consider mililary intcrvenlion in Iran.

Moscow perceived thai the United Siales was itself preparing to intervene.

power in Iran broke down and tbe country began io fragment

aH'Nild.inwni and aiurpuaii'Mian invasicimiediiH>ian midliv jfc--'iTvIpmiiiii ip ihie* went' nl

Pressure The presentSoviet military forces in the southern USSH and Afghani-

v. ,. '

Treaty of Friendship Between Persia and the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic. Signed al Moscow.1

Article S

The two high contacting parties undertake

(If To prohibit the formation ot presence within iheie respective territories ol any organizations or groups or persons, irrespective of 'he name by which ihey are known, whose object itengage in ocls of hostility against Persia or Russia, or against the allies of Russia. They wilt likewise prohibit the formation of armed troops within their respective territories wiih Ihe aforementioned ob/ect.

Vol tohird parly or any organiration whatever ii be called, which is hostile to the other contracting party, to import or io convey in transit across their countries material which can be used against the other pony

(il To prevent by all means in their power the pretence within their territories or within theof their allies of all armies or forceshird party in cases in which thr presence of such forces would be regardedenace to the frontiers, interest. Or safety af the other contracting pan,:

Article 6

hird party shouldarryolity uf usurpation by means of armed intervention in Persia, or such power should desire to use Persian territoryase of operations agaisvti Russia, ororeign power should threaten ihe frontiers of Federal Russia or thou of its allies, and if ihe Persian Government should not be able tolop io such menace after having hern once called upon io do so by Russia. Russia shall have ihe right lo advance her iroopx into the Persian interior for the purpose Of carrying out the military Operationsfor in defense Russia undertakes, however, to withdraw her iroops from Postal territory as soon as the dangereen removed

A leftist faction seized power and appealed to the USSR for help"

Although the USSR has the capability to intervene militarily, the decision to intervene would be an agonizing one.imited intervention intowould face fierce Iranian resistance and major terrain and logisticS military response would be difficult in this scenario, but Soviei leaders probably would judge there wouldS move lo occupy parts of southern Iran

A tun-scale invasion would present exponentially greater operational difficulties and risksaior confrontation with lhe United States. Such awould becale larger than any the USSR has waged since World War II. In the best ofIranian resistance and no USbelieve it would take Soviet forces Six toeeks io seize the oil-rich Khuzcstan region on the Persian Gulf littoral Soviet leaders would anticipateull-scale invasion of Iranajor US military response

claimed ihe Sovietsi 'he serious risks ofonfrontation.


Ever since Russia's expansion into Central Asia inh century. Afghanistan haduffer between ibc Russian, ihcn Soviei. domains and South Asu. controlled7 by the British. Moscow's mva-sion of9 changed Afghanistan's status from thatutterotential integral part of ibc Soviei imperiiim. The invasion noi only marked the

- IIiheybe

faiy ni* he) did inlhaiini partyr&iliuuli liitiijn lemioiyiw of nixinium itumi if.ill hive il* nab! io- iiiwjn

jmriiOi to- tlx pirpw oloui iSe iml.ury eotinumfoe itsbe Shah .iiiilaierally ib.on.ied'tbe treaty V3 "id ibcetime itiurjitd tbe abrojMKM in NovemberThe ScvieU haverivately of ihe entice

'. "

USSR'sccupationiddle Easicm country

tio the first expansion of Soviei eonlrol in the region since the reconquest of Central Asia dunng and alterivil *ar In addition, Ihc invasion rescued the only Marxist regime other than ihe one in Souththe Middle bast.

The Soviets' occupation of Afghanistan has enhanced their ability lo exercise influence beyond Afghan boiccrs. They ateetter position to put military pressure on Iran and Pakistan Thus far. Moscow has conducted only limited raids from Afghanistan into Pakistan and Iian against Afghan insurgent taigcis. and Soviet forces in Afghanistan as now constituted doajor military threat to Pakistan or Iran Morcc'ci, hefoie the Soviets could ctTcClivcly use their presence in Afghanistantaging base for laigc-scule military operations beyond AfghanIhey first would have to quell Ihc insurgency and make massive logistic improvements (roads, airfields, fuel lines,onetheless. Iran: k'< i two.r ontend for ihe firsi limeoviei militaryts border, and Soviet tactical airpowcr

has the potentialoveilometers closer lo the Sirjit of Hormii7

Al ihc same lime, ihe Soviets' invasion anc: continuing occupation ofadtem in the icgion and beyond.iddle Eastern. Islamic, and misaligned nation has sparked resentment against Moscow from each of these constituencies (rnosi Middle Eastern slates arc members of all three? liven some of ihc Soviei Union's friends tn ihc icgion. such as Syria. Iraq. Algeria, and the PLO. were disillusioned by ihc invasion,ihc most pari--they ha>'C muted their displeasure Perhaps even morethe Soviet move has made some regional states more recepiive ioincreased US military presence in ihc rector

The S'loaiion today Before the Soviets Can even contemplate capital:!in? or. their military presence in Afghanistan. Ihey mm: firs! establish ciinuol over theoal they appca' to be lntlc cic-crchieving ihaii when iheir irooos first entered the


TbcSo'Ki Withdrawal

The Soviei leadership hasecisionill officially announce today.

By the endixlank regtmenl. two motorized rifle regiments, and three antiaircraftwith iheir established equipment and weapons will be returned from Afghanistan lo the motherland IApplausej These units will return lo the regions of then permanent deployment in the Soviei Union, and inay thai all those for whom this may be of Interest may be easily convinced of this

Sacccfc by MiUuil

Piwr io



frown ured nne lefitmni iMRRfatih iMot botialiuni of aimortd pcrtonntl



MKHv.ul) <mc bnulionof aimoiod penonnelun (AK'i)aidlioni of tracki

5 eintfand (initial demean arr>rcd by II A* tun)


MRU -uti






Ye.' Ckiob,.

Ait detente rtatmcat Kabul

Yn9 Oewber


dele me rtf imcm ShindiBd

Air dricnvf rniment Kondal


Yes. Ceremonyeiober

living in this city (KondutJ todayeremonial farewell to the last of the six Soviei regiments being returned home tn keepingoint decision by the governments of ihe USSR and Afghanistan

-Mow* rASS inctober


Over ihe pall two years, lhe Soviets have attempted to tedieai the situation by augmenting (heir forces in Afghanistan,ore aggressive strategy against trie insurgency, sleeping up military pressure on Pakistan and Iran, improving training of Afghan military and political cadres, and replacing the Afghan leader. The USSR hasen in Afghanistan, up aboutercentmong the moat significant additions have been four more battalions of special-purpose forces, more fited-wing aircraft (up fromnd the deploymentan motorized nfle regiment to the Herat region near the Iranian border. None of thetotalingMoscow withdrew from Afghanistanjbcr was critical to the Soviet war effort (see

The more aggressive Soviet pursuit of the insurgents has led to higher lhan usual casual lies on both sides. Although Soviei forces have fought more effectively, and at least some Afghan forces have shown tenativc signs of improvement.regime remains unable to stand on its own f

Im/or the Lang Haul. The Soviets, despite ihcir minor troop withdrawal in Ociober. appear io teprcnaredrotracted tlruaglcin^fsihanisiars^

I hroughoui tne Soviei party,> thereeneral resignation io ibe fact thai lhe USSR would be in Afghanistangeneration or

^Soviet olTkials often cue lhe fledgling Bolshevik regime's long fight against the Central Asian Basmachl resistance as an indicator of Moscow's capacity to persevere against thensurrenis. Gorbachev himwir -

of withdrawing said the conse-Irawal would be even

mwWi ne boviei domestic media have given ftiu'cnextensive coverage to the war during the past two years, which suggests the leadership is trying to prepare the publicong struggp


quencesremature with!

A Reason To Hang Tough

Tie Sovieu probably believe thai the international costi at staying in Afghanitlan are diminishing with time. Despite tkt continuing broad support for ihe annual vote inV General Assembly calling for lhe withdrawal of 'foreign" troops from Afghanistan, most countries that condemned ihe invasion or even imposed sanctions against Moscow have returnedusiness as usual with the USSR. Oriental Institute department chief Gankovskiy told VS Embassytn5 lhat US involvementassing whim of ihe Reagan administration. Although Gankovskiy probably was exaggerating for iff eel, and the Soviets are still quite concerned with US and other support for the insurgents, on balance most Soviei policymakers probably would agree with his basic point: US involvement is not likely to last indefinitely because Afghanistan is not of vitallo the Unitedit is to the USSR

more caUsirsWbic than those of failingjo^ntervenc in



r[Jinvoiveo in Aignanistan beheve that oovki icaocrs would see it aa "too shameful" lo pull out. The Sovietrestigeuperpower would be tarnished

The ideological rationale for not leaving isovietaior factor behind tbe initial invasion was (be desire to avert the collapsearxist regime An article published in Sovoye Vrtmya shortly afler Soviet forces moved in asserted that; "To refuse to use the potential which the socialist states possess |to aid lhe Afghanwould mean, in fact, avoiding an internationalisthe Soviei Ambassador to France,peech inaid the Soviets could not "permit the transformation of Afghanistanewhere (he Marxist regime of Salvador Allcnde was toppled3 and (he Soviets were powerless to

il The Soviets probably fear thai allowing the Mai nit goseromeat tn Afghanistan to collapse wouldangerous precedent and raise quest ion about their willingness to support Maoist regimes else-where

Despite the reasons to stay, some Soviet officialsindicated to Western and Pakistani sources that the Kremlin would seriously considet withdrawing its forces il reasonable terms could be worked out that preserve Ibe nature of the Afghan regime Some of these officials have actually claimedecision to withdraw has already been made They may have been referring lo Gorbachev's July announcementimited withdrawal We doubtecisionull withdrawal has alieady been mad

The conllicting signals coming Irom the Soviets mighi simplymokescreen lo cast international pies sure or the USSR to withdraw C

3They could alsoairsie more aggressive strategy against theihe replacement of former Afghan leader Babrakith Naitb. and Moscow's more Petiole approach to ihe UN "proaunity talks" with Pakistan will eventually leadesolution of the Afghan problem that wouldithdrawal of mosi Soviet forces If so. the Sonets are likely to sue*ii* this policy course, which would probably lavolac

aggressive attempts to eradicate rebel bases of support within ihe country and across the border in

Pakistan and Iran

Intensive training of Afghan military snd politica! cadres, coupledroader campaign to win domestic acceptance of the Najib regime

Diplomatic and subversive efforts to weaken outside suppori for the insurgents (especially in Pakistan} and >iden international acceptance of the Maisist regime

Skillful implementation ofolicy cnuld. in our view, lay the groundwork for the Sovietsubstantial part of their forces wuhm two to three years, prossded ihat Pakistan could be convinced to end its support lor iheeiceedmgly dilfi-

Cllll lilt


cv'dcntls honeschieve in Afghani-

it. M.egime as re as the one in Mongolia If the iccccd. they will have emended met impelium and enhanced rsc influence in South and South st the neai few years, however.

Afghanistan is likely toajor headache for the Kremlin, whether or not lhe Sovieis withdraw their forcer


Strategically, Turkey is lhe most important couniry in the Middle East from Moscow's perspective. Il is the only stale in the region thaiATO member and lhat grants US forces permanent basing rights. The Turkish armed forces are by far lhe largest in the Middle Easl, and Turkey controls the choke point to the Blackecent Soviet study of the Middle East claims that tbe United States has given Turkey:

the rolesolating lhe Soviei Union from territorial contiguity wiih lheof the Arab Easl and from direct accesshem, fandf the role of NATO's "guard,"lhe gate leading from lhe Black to the Mediterranean Sea.

Undermining lhe Link to Washington. Moscow has attempted to take advantage of Ankara'swiih lhe level of US support since. Turkey's anger over Washington's willingness to bar-gain away US missiles based on Turkishconsultingthe Soviei missiles Khrushchev placed in Cuba2 and over US condemnation of Turkish moves during the crisis in Cyprus4 led to the first warming of Soviet-Turkish relations in the postwar period. Moscow similarly capitalized on the US criticism of Turkey's military intervention in Cyprus4 and the resulting US embargo of arms lo Turkey. Turkish-Greek disputes over Cyprus and sovereignty in the Aegean also provide opportunities for the Soviets, but Moscow is constrained from moving too blatantly in using these disputes to woo Turkey away from NATO because of Soviet interests in cultivating Greece.

Soviet concern aboul Turkey's security ties lo the United States has grown since the. When Washington and Ankara were renegotiating their Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreementrasnaya Zveida warned lhat in the event of another war: "Turkey,ubstantial number of

US military installations arc located, could undergo the tragedy of Hiroshima.'C




the Soviets have issued the same type of warning to Turkey in their media over Ankara's alleged desire to participate in research under the USoscow also has shown concern over Turkey's potential usefulness to US military efforts in the Middle East. In3 Vasiliy Safron-chuk, then chief of the Soviet Foreign Ministry's Middle Easl Department, criticized the reportedof US "Rapid Deployment Force" bases in Turkey during an interviewurkish

Current Status of Relations. Despite the harsh Soviet criticism of Turkey's security ties lo the United States,andsucceeded intable, if not always cordial,with the various regimes in Ankara during the past two decades. The height of Soviet-Turkish cooperation came8 with the signingPolitical Document on Good Neighborlyhe military takeover in Ankara two years later ledooling of relations thai lasted4

Moscow and lhe Turkish Straits


Bosporus bireu.OP'api

Ptitatr. /nanA

/IwiAow snip posiri unSc tkr

over the Turkish Straits has been anof Russian rulers since Ttarist Russialack Sea power in Ihe laie tilth century liceven after ike Russians won the right from the Ottoman Turks4 to navigate the Black Sea and past through tke Straits. Russia's southern fleet was confined to the Black Sea for alt but two brief periods unilt lhe Treaty of Lausanne1 Great Britain and France awarded Rutna the Straits and Istanbul on paperecret trtaiynd ihe USSR asked for ihe same in talks with Germany0 to divide up Europe and the Middle East Stalininal bed for control of ike Straus at ihe end of World War II through appeals to his Allied partners for revision of lhe6 and. when those failed, through direct pressure onunsucctisfu,

Turkisk control of the Straits places restrictions on ihe movement of Soviei warships in and out of the Block Sea in peacetime and could bonle up Soviet naval and merchant skips in times of tensions or hostilities The Monireux Convention requires lhat ihe Sovieu provide lhe Turks eight dayt notice before sending any warship over tQ.QQO tans through

tke Straus, and only one may transitime No Sennet aircraft corner or tub-tonne may tranut esxepi. tn the case of lhe tatter, for repairs Soviet civilian, but not militarv aircraft are allowed lo overfly ihe Straits

flown rr. iiviUon lhe Milly bee-restrict

Despite ihese restrictions. Moscow has managed to llreich and someiimes circumvent the Convention'sFor example since ihehe Soviets have maderactice to declare transit! of wanhipt. whether or not thev intend to use Ihim This allows them lo augment their Mediterranean Flotilla more quickly in limes of crisis Moscow also haithe Turks havtits Kiev-class aircraft corners are actual!,warfare miners thus enabling it tothe ban on carrierhelio have

rrafi claiming theyo rcuipply clients in

The Turks haveimited basis, posst-rf Moscow's capability io




o Ankara-ihc Antoviet kadci inecade-put the relationship backote cooperative course, although tensions remainedia commentary on the smelly bilateral aspects ol the lelatiomhip has been morehonov visit, is reflected moti recenily by iheir favorable coverageme Minister- Orals Julyvuithe USSf

The economic sphere histo-cally has beenrea*Soviet Turkish relations Thes of Tikhono.'st"PsigningicelorvO petiod thatlion in wal ttade between the twa cromnes Bilateral tiade increased byKrccnl5lkul Soviet uadc statist*

Menem- has estended Ankara moret--ihan any country To dale, furkey has drawn only aboutn.ll.or. of thrs used ibe aid to develop some impomnlf us economy. Soviet assistance has been crucial to cot.ii-ci.on of the UKnderun iron and sicel(tlic largest inbe Sevdisehi. iliilMlP'-1- sl refinery ine* IJOO economic ad-iscis and technical* wo-kme al

,hese and other sn TurkeyFcbtuiry ihc ,wo sides signed anatural gas ag.eemcni; .hat ells to. ihe USSRideeakmm tauVue meters annnally by IVWo-ld equal almostereen. of* needs andercent ol us eneigv needs


Ace, 4amontend ihn Moscosv was behnd much oi tU thatTurkey ,fl .he middle .ind"

issal ine

sfrcsak and us allies ire supporting "he eastern

l 3

We believe thai Mo.<ow maintains contacts wuli .arious rwftM kf.-vng a* Kurf.skups and has provided and probablyrough.iierr^saricsC "j

aui" COUP of

nere is

Aw evidence tliat tnc Bulgarians nave in the past smuggled small aims into Turkey, almost certainly with Moscow's acquiescence if not support. Although profitmakingotive and many of the arms apparently fall into the hands of righiwiiig terrorists, we believe the Sovietslittle risk or cost to fuel opposition to the Turkish Government

he Soviets are likely to put moreon improving stale-lo-state ties and less onduring the next five years, unless the internal situation suddenly deteriorates. They will continue to cultivate their clandestine assets, bothedge to the futureeminder lo Ankara that they can cause trouble. The Soviets almost certainly recognize, however, thai Turkey continues toulwark of NATO on the USSR's southern flank, and they are likely to act with appropriate restraint

support, however, appears to have beenlow level Moscow, pursuing iu traditional dual-track policy, apparently wants to beosition to Stoke the fires of Turkish internalis indigenouslyithout damaging its stale-lo-statc tics to the Turkish Government andonfrontationATO tnembe*

The evidence of Soviet support for (he Turkish Communist Parlyn contrast to theevidence of support for terrorist groups, is unquestionable. The USSR is lhe prime financial backer of the TKP, which follows the Moscow party line. The party, which has been illegal in Turkeyas its headquarters in East Berlin Wilh Soviet funding and technical assistance, the TKP operates iwo clandestine radiour Radio" and "Voice of the Turkish Communistut of Cast Germany that broadcast in Turkish to Turkey andr-i. urkey and hasiny followinga minima! ability to influence events ihcre

Totaling Up Ibe Balance Sheet

This Survey of Soviet policy has shown that the USSR's position in the Middle Fasi today is strong in ihe northern tier and much less strong in the Arab Israeli theater. Whereas Moscow has the edge over Washington in all of the northern tier except Turkey. Ihe United Stales rciams greater influence than the Soviet Union in most of lhe Levant, the Arabian Peninsula, and North Africa

Moscow's influence in Syria, u* well as in Libya and South Yemen, has not balanced its loss of influence in Ifgypt The rclalionship wiihUSSR's most important in theole in the region's cennal issue, ihe Arab-Israeli conflict. However, the Soviet position in the Arab-Israeli ihcaicr will remain inferior to lhai of lhe United States as lorg as Cairo maintains close lies io Washington, and it seems likelya major political upheaval inlies will continue to be strong during the rest of

the Dual-Track Policy, lhe long-term nature of Turkish internal unrest, West Luropcan criticism of human rights abuses in Turkey, :hc rivalry between Turkey And Greece, lhe Cyprusand Turkish doubts about the intensity of the US commitment to Turkey promise io continue to provide the Soviets wiih openings both to exploit Turkey's weaknesses and io try to woo it away from the Western alliance Wiih the success the military re gimc and :hc subsequent civilian government of Prinzeal havel:il>iliring Ihe country

The USSR is lecogiii/efl as an important actor by mosi of lhe Arabs. w':ic value itsalestinian state. The pro-US Arab slates also sec relations. Oi al least contacts, with Hit- Sovic:seful tcol to ensure that Washington does no' lake them for giamed Foi moot of the Arabs,the USSR's alheistic ideology, aggressiveefloris. and invasion of Afghanistan are ample

reason Ioertain distance Even in the pro-SovietPDRYpatties arc cither proscribed or thoroughly tamed, and the Soviets have show-nettle ability to sway the internal political order

In the northern tier, the USSR has been able to exert major political influence Only in Afghanistan. Despite decades of trying, the Soviets have had no success in the postwar period in steering political events inside Turkey and Iran. The Communist parties of both countries arc illegal and havetheof the Tudch in theplayers in Turkish and Iranian politics

Military power remains Moscow's strongest card in the region. The military forces the Soviets have deployed in the southern USSR opposite ihe Middle Dasi. tlieir naval and air operations in the Middle East, their willingness to use force in Afghanistan and deploy their own air defense forces in Syria, and their provision ol large amounts of modern weapons to their clients al) indicate that the USSR willorcee reckoned with in the Middle East for years to come

Beyond the northern tier, however, the Soviets still cannot match the power-projection capabilities of ihc United States and its NATO allies, and, in fact. US improvements in this field since their. leave Moscow even further behind. The Sovtci Union lack* the aircraft carriers or access to regional an bases necessary to operate fighter aircraft beyond the bordering regions of the souihern USSR. Without fighter cover, ihe Soviets would not be ableontested deployment of ground forces to the region or protect their Mediterranean Flotilla and Indian Ocean Squadron from Western carrier-based aircraft The Soviets are working to remedy these deficiencies by developing full-fire aircraft carriers and thefor long-distance air refueling for theirIhey are likely, however, lo have only one of these new carriersnd Ihey arc Siill years aw" from perfecting long-distance fighter rcfuelini

l:om>nuca!ly. the USSR con limitsAg far behindesl. Japan, and now even increasingly active South Korea in ihc Middle Last lor Moscow's

clients or countries such as Iraq, which arcstrapped for the hard currency to pay for Western goods, Soviet economic aid and bilateral trade aie important. Even countries as close to ihc Soviets as South Yemen and Syria, however, have been dissatisfied wiih the level and quality or Soviet aid and have been looking to ihc West and Japan to provide the consumer goods, technology, hardand know-how thai the Soviet Union generally lacks. Thus, the gap between Soviet and Wcslern/ Japanese/South Korean involvement in the Middle East is likely to widen.

The Soviets still have trouble turning their mililary strength into commensurate political influence in the Middle East They remain frozen out of discussions to resolve the Arab-Israeli dispute.oice in the peacewould signify acceptance by the United Slates and ihc regional stales involvedajor Soviet political role in the Middlecontinues to be one of Moscow's major goals (see appendi.he USSR's prospects of realising that goal in the next five years are not gcod]

Impact of Future Developments

We believe the USSR's primary policy goals in ihe Middle East during the rest ofre likely to


Consolidating eontioi in Afghanistan

Blocking any US-sponsored Aiab-Israck peaceIhal leaves Moscow out and. optimally,oviei voice in the peace process.

Unifying the Arabsro-Soviet front by ending the isolation of Moscow's Arab clients; Syria. Libya, and South Yemen

Stemming the drift of Algeria and Iraq toward lesser dependence on the USSR and closer ties to the United Stales.

Expanding Soviet influence in Moscow's key Middle Eastern targeis* Egypt and Iran

Eroding Turkey's securiiy lies to Washington


We have luettfd Moscow's prospects for achieving these tasks and have concluded that in most cases ihey are not promising. Gorbachev's best chances for success seem to be inS-sponsored Arab-Israeli settlement, expanding influence in Egypt and Iran, and, possibly, consolidating control inWhat remains to be examined are some developments that wouldajor impact on Soviet policy in thewell as important implications for the Unitedprompt us to alter our assessments, f

PositiTc Developments From Moscow's Perspective

Ripprcebcsncui Between Syria and Iran

The Soviets have attempted for years to get Assad and Saddam to bury their differences, but with no succcsrC

J. flatly

ruledyrian-Iraqi reconciliation so long as both Assad and Saddam remain in power. Abclwccn the two would be likely to strengthen Ihe hardline Arabsis Israel andS-sponsored settlement of the Arab-Israeli question. The Soviets, too, would hope thai Syria could draw Iraq closer to the USSR, although both Damascus and Baghdad would remain fiercclyjiroiec-tivc of their independence from Moscow

Rapssrceastsnestf Between Syria andSoviets have tried even harder to bnni Assadto no avaU. Thisalmost certainly end US hopes ofof the Palestinian question withoutSoviei participation. It also would be likelythat neither Jordan nor Egypl dominatedAn Assad-Arafat rapprochementlead to closer Soviet-PLO ties andthe Soviet proposal for anon the Arab-Israeli question Thatstands no chance of going anywhere as longMoscow's closest Arab ally, and the PLO.of theis being

negotiated remain at :cd-

Rapprochement Between Syria and Egypl

A Syrian-Egyptian detente based on anti-Israeli. ami-US policies would give moreoos! lo Soviet fortunes In the Middle East than any other single development.econcilialion. although unlikely any lime soon, probably would leadignificant improvement in Soviei ties to Egypt. It would not only end US hopes ofettlement of ihequestion without Syrian and Sovieibut also probably would lead to ihe unraveling of the Egyptian-Israeli peace settlement and revive Ihe-two-front threat to Israel *"

Repbcesneni of tbe Mubarak Reglnac in Egypteutral Retime

evelopment probably would leadharp reduction or possiblyessation of US-Egyptian military cooperation and might result in Egypt's abandonment of the Camp David accords. Either siep wouldajor windfall for the Soviets, whether or not they were able to replace US influence in Cairo with their own. Moscow would step up iu efforts toward that cod, possibly offering lo settle Egypt's military debl to the USSR on favorable terms and provide Cairo with major new weapon systems. The Soviets probably would encourage Syria and Libya toositive line toward ihe new regime in Cairo, hoping ihis would case tbe way lo better Soviei-Egyptian relations. If Damascus and Tripoli balked, however. Moscow would not be likely lo be deterred from courting the new regime The benefits from increased Soviet influence in Egypt probably would outweigh, in Soviei eves, the costs of incurring Syrian and Libyan wrauK

Decision by Pakistan To End Support for Afghan Rebels

This wouldhattering Wow to the rebels. Although the insurgency would be likely to continue for atew more years, ihe Soviets probably could quickly ensure that the rebels would be no moreuisance Moscow would be likelyring ihe bulk of iu forces home, whileizable contingent in Afghanistan. Iran probably would sharply curtail its support for the rebels, not wanting io hear ihe brunt of Soviet wrath aionc


re Instability ia Turkey Moscow probably would aiiempi via Bulgaria to resume funneling small arms to Turkish leftists, step up financial and propaganda support, and criticize the Turkish Government's elTorts to control suchand US support for Ankara's efforts. The Soviets, however, would act with prudence to avoidajor US response

Developments That Couldined Impact on Soviet Interests

A New Syrian-Israeli War

This wouldild card for Moscow. Washington's relations with the Arabs would stand to suffer unless they viewed US pressure on Israel as responsible for ending the fighting. The war would offer the Soviets the opportunity to bolster their stock with Syria and the Arabshole by providing timely military resupply And. no matter what iheir actual bchavioi during ihe war. the Soviets would move as they have after past wars to restock the Arab military inventory and increase Arab dependence on Soviet weapons. The Syrians might even agree, as they did after their defeat in Lebanontation Soviet combat forces in Syria.

At the sameyrian-Israeli war would entail major risks for themost serious being a

lullCtl :u. M

has always sough; to avoid. Slightly less serious, but potentially more humiliating, wouldlashSoviet forces sent to Syria and Israeli forces The Soviets probablyealthy respect for Israeli military prowess.

Moscow would also stand to lose if the ArabsSoviet support to be insufhcicni. as they did in2 wars. Quick resupply of arms io ihe Arabs after the danger had passed rescued the Soviet posit ion inscs. but ihcrc is nomat this strategy would work again Moreover.

there is the risk that, should the United Stales prove successful in bringingease-fire, the Syrians might come io view cooperation with Washington -as the (Egyptians did afterhe best means of obtaining what they want from Israe

An End to the War Between Iran and Iraq

The Soviets consistently have called for an end to the war. but they would be likely to view its cessation with mined feelings. On lhe one hand, they probably would welcome an endajor and unpredictable war on their border that has already had some favorable repercussions for the Unitedegotiated settlement would:

Reduce the significance of one of the prime irritants inani anweapon sales to Baghdad

Probably make the Persian Gulf states less nervous about Iranian expansionism, decreasing their need and willingness to cooperate militarily with the United States.

Possibly improve prospects for an Iraqi-Syrian rapprocliemen

An end to ihehowever, would also carryliabilities lor the Kremlin:

We believe Iraq, without aseed for Soviet weaponry, would accelerate its diversification of weapon suppliers

Iraq probably would further improve its relations with the United State* as it looked to rebuild its economy after ibc war.

ramatic improvement tn Iranian ties to Washington isemote possibility, Moscow-might worry that the absence of the unifying factor of ihe war could weaken the present fundamentalist regime and bring in moic pr.igmaiic clerics, who might not be as averse to deabrg with ihe United Slates.

Iran wouldreer hand to increase aidghar insurgent-.


would have to worry thai ihe new leaders could turn toward the West, which has the economicio rebuild lhe war-damaged Iranianictorious Iran would undermine Soviet influence in Baghdad and probably make the Khomeini regime even less susceptible to Soviet inroads or pressure. Moreover, lhe Kremlin would not want io see an anii-Sovict Iranian regime, whose Islamic fundamentalism might potentially attraci adherents among the USSR's Own Muslims, spreading its influence beyond Iranian borders


Ncgatirc Developments From the Kremlin's Perspective

A Marked Expansion of tbe War Between Iran and Iraq

The greatest risk in this scenario isajor threat io Ihe flow of oil out of lhe Persian Gulf could prompt US military intervention. Such awhether protection for convoys of oil tankers or. in the most extreme case, occupation of Iranian territory-would pose significant difficulties for the Soviets. Beyond the immediate problem of deciding what kind of military response Ihey would have io make, the Sovieis would face the longer term prospect of an expanded US military presence in the Persian Gulf region. The conservative Gulf states almrvu certainly would look to Washington for protection

The Soviets, in our view, also would not want either Iran or Iraq lo emergelear victor. Moscow has longelative balance between ihe two countries. If either state gained predominance, it would make il more difficult for lhe USSR io exert influence in the Persian Gulfictorious Saddam would almost certainly be apt lo act even more independently of Moscow than he doesefeated Iran would look for outside help. It mighi seek Soviet assistance, but, if the Khomeini regime collapsedesult of losing the war, the Sovieis

A Major Increase in Outside Support for tbe Afghan Rebels

This would compel the Soviets either to abandon their current strategy of shifting tbe burden of the lighting to the Afghan military or to risk the Marxist regime's collapse, which we believe they are not prepared toajor expansion of Soviei involvement in the war against the rebels--possibly includingcross-border raids intocarry significant political and economic com. Moscow probably would come under heavy criticism from West European. Middle Eastern, and Third World governments. The increased Soviei involvement would especially complicate Soviei relations with China and India, notention the further chill it would have on US-Soviet relation.'

US-Sponsored Talks Between Israelordanian-Palestinian Delegation

Although such talks today appear unlikely following (be split between King Hussein and PLO leader Arafat, lhe two leaders could quickly reconcile. US success in workingettlement of the Palestinian question without Soviet participation would be the most significant blow to Moscow's position in the Middle East since its loss of Egypt. The Kremlin, in our view, would go to great lengths to block the achievement ofettlement. Soviet efforts would center on backing Syria's moves to intimidate its neighbors against reaching an agreement. Moscow probably would even provide military support for Syrian saber rattling aimed al Jordan or Israel, bui (he Soviets would advise Damascus against moves


that wouldull-scale war wiih Israel or push Amman toward closer security cooperation with Washington. If these Soviet and Syrian efforts failed toettlement from being reached. Moscow almost certainly would work to subvert the accord. Even if the accord held together, the Soviet* would not be likely to drop then opposition andS fait accompli during the next five years '

or Ousterad

Soviet-Syrian relations have been close for overears, and Moscow should be able lo maintain ils influence in Damascus after Assad's departure,the Ba'th Parly remains tn power. Any Syrian regime would have as its top priority the confrontation with Israel, for which Soviet military support is all bag icdispcrisibie. Assad's successor probably would come from tbe miliurytherefore would be all tbe more likely to value lies to the USSR T

Assad, however, has broughtears of stabilityountry that was previously unstable, and the Soviets would fear that his departure might lead to more instability. Assad's regime is bused on the small Alawi minority, which minht not be able to continue its dominance without his commanding presence. Astruggle for power tn Syriathe accession lo powerroup thai is not favorably disposed toward Ihe USSR would seriously jeopardize Moscow's long-term investment in Syria and,he overall Soviet position in the Middle East

is scarce on whom among the

current regime the Soviets regard as their favorite to succeed Assad. They have had long experience,dealing with the mosl likelyof Military Intelligence Ali Duba. Chief of Air Force Intelligence Muhammad Khuh, DefenseTalas, Chief of Staff Shihabi. and Vice Presidentprobablv rould adiust quicklv to any of them as hear! of Svria

the, he

hashinly veiled anti-Soviet posture, and Moscow is suspicious of his extensive Western

around the same time that the Soviets were pressuring^ Assad not to allow Rif 'at lo assume any significant post because they cannot work with him Al aRif 'at's accession to power wouldajor degree of unrerrainty to the Soviei-Syrian

Dealb or Ouster of Qadbafi

Moscow's relationship with Libya, more thai any other in tbe Middle East, is dependent oa one man. Qadbafi has revolutionized almost every aspect of Libyan Government and society and refashioned them in his own unique style. Without him. the odds would be againsl this system surviving for long in anything like ils current form. Whether the Soviet position in Libya would survive the upheaval likely to follow Qadhafi's departure is an open question ag Soviet officials have privately acknowledge!

The one current Syrian leader Moscow probably would noi want lo see succeed Assad is his brother, Vice President Rif "at Assad. Soviet officials have oficn noted their distrust of Rif 'a;

As with Syria, the Soviets almost certainly would noi be able toibyan succession, bul thearms relationship will give whatever regime


thai comes lo power in Tripoli reason to pause before reorienting ill policy away from Moscow. For lhai reason, the Soviets probably would hope lhat aman replaces Qadhafi ^

Tbe Soviet-Libyan rcUtiooship might survive the succession relatively well should Qadhafi's de facto second in command. Major Jallud, assume the reins of power and hold the country together (seehe Soviet* have dealt with Jallud ionger and owethan with any other Libyan leader^

jlhe Sovietsrredlud because hemoderate and predictable than Qadhafi.the Soviets no longer jut such highthat his acces-

sion to powei(voneiheless be welcomed bv Moscow

j he would prcler Jalluduccessor.

A Major Drop in Soviet Oil Production

The slight increase in Sonet domestic oil productionhichwo-year decline, all but assures that the USSR win notet importer of oil during the nest five years. The Sovieu. however, have already increased their purchases of Middle Eastern oil in recent years (see tablend are likely to obtain even larger amounts throughout the rest ofr

I ii payment for arms and

Should the USSR's domestic oil production drop off much more sharply than we anticipate, the Soviets might become major consumers of Middle Eastern oil during tke next five years.evelopment would give the Middle East even greater importance for Moscow and put the USSR in competition with the West and Japan for Middle Eastern oil

" In most cases, the Sonets ucepii lesrll Iihclr oil cutiomf t

The Soviets would face major problems in coping not only with decreasing hard currency earnings from oilaboutercent of total Soviet annual hard currencyalso in coming up with the countertrade or.ast resort, hard currency to pay for oil imports Moscow probably would attempt to increase arms sales to OPECto finance the oil. but those countries can only absorb so many weapons, and their hard currency reserves have drooped markedly since tbe6 decline in the world price of oil. There are few other commodities the Soviets could offer io trade for the oil, but they might attemptxpand theirin economic development projects in Ihe Middle East^accepting oil as payment for their services.

The USSR would have added incentive lo improve relations with Iran and Saudiof the countries that have the reserve capacity for meeting the oil needs of ihe Soviets aad their East Europeanhe Sovieu might decide toore conciliatory policy toward Iran even while Khomeini remained in power, and tbey would be likely to work harder for normalized relations with Saudi Arabia. This need Tor oil would not force the Soviets to forgo opportunities lo increase their influence in ihose countries and erode that of the United Slates. But Moscow would be likely to pursue those opportunities rnore cautiously whileriendly postthe Iranian and Saudi Govern menu

Wc do not believe tbe Sovieu* need for oil would prompt them io try to seize Middle Eastern supplies during ihe next five years. Even if such considerations as the military and economic costs involved inIran, for example, and the risks ofar with the United Sutes arc put aside, the cost of ruling the country would far outweigh that of buying

-IV Sotw em prucMuaaihard. All bai RemindId-

.PBJfJ Pal hI

alio* thru allM'io CvOaptc and *osld hate so keepir ol-



Soviet Purchases of

Middle fcastcm Crude

mo mi im im Mt

libra 14 H


Algeria 0 0 29

Sun!. a 0 48


4S |j


Own 0 0 2

Till TS 8S

The most directS-Soviel detente is likely to have on Moscow's policy in the Middle East is in prompting the Soviets to intensify Iheir efforts to be included in regional necoiiations. The USSR almost certainly would center its efforts on convincing the United States to returnoint US-Soviet iailiative to resolve tbe Arab-Israeli dispute, preferably aa international conference chaired by Washington aod Moscow. To obtain US approval forourse, thethesebe willing to reestablish relations with Israel and attempi ioince Syria and Ihc PLO to attendonference.

In an atmosphere of detenie, the Soviets might give greater consideration to ihe impucl their arms sales could have on regional stability. The USSR refrained from giving Ihe Egyptians ill (hey wanted in thend might do so again with it* current regional arms clients if il believed that the salearticular weapons system risked sparking an Arab-Israeli dash tbat could damage US-Soviet relations and ifelieved Washington would act with similar restraint Tbe Soviets probably would be less worried about US-Soviet tensions over ihe Middle East than about the efleet this might have on other, more important, areas of the bilateral relationship They would want to avoid, forepeal of Ihe effect theirof Afghanisun9 had on East-WestIt lilted the balance in Congress againstof the SALT II Trcaly and steeled NATO's determination lo proceed with the deployment or in termed iate-range missiles in Western Europe

Moscow also would be likely toost of proposals designed to limit superpower arms sales and miliury deployments in theas the Brezhnev Proposal0 banning miliury bases in the Persian Gulf reison. ihe plan to limit naval deployments in tbe Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean, and schemes for nuclear- and chernieal-weap-ons-Ircc zones Of course. Moscow would design such proposals to have only minimal restrictions on its own miliury activities, but il might agree to some lumu-ttons if an overall agreement hindered USto deploy mililary power in the Middle East


Soviet behavior in the Middle East since the decline of detente in lhethe invasion of Afghanistan, deployment of Soviet air defense forces lo Syria, sate of increasingly more lethal armsegional clients, and constant fanning of anti-US and anti-Israeli sentiment amongasterngives an indication of the types of actions Moscow could take if US Soviei relations deteriorate further. The Sovieu, for eiamplc, might press harder for Syria, Libya, and South Yemen to grunt permanent naval and air bases to Soviet forces. They also might provide those countries and other regional clients with Ibe latest and longest range versions of Sovietcomith all of the most sophisticatedthey often withhold. In addition, they could urge OPEC states to embargo oil sales to Ihe Wcsi and step up aid to insurgents and opposition groups in pro-US counlriof

Soviet behavior would still be conuraisscd by objective factors, such as the rrsksajor Arab-Israeli war. Israels military superiority, and US advantages over the USSR in deploying forces to most of the region.eriod of deteriorating US-Soviet relations, however. Moscow almost certainly would be more apt toather than work to control regional crises

Appendix A

Overview of Soviet Involvement in (he Middle Easl0

When the history or Soviet and US involvement in the Middle East is compared, it is easy to sec why the Soviets often vie* the Americans as upstarts. The United Slates has been directly involved in theEast for roughlyentury; the USSR and its Russian predecessors for moreillenium. The first "Russian" involvement in the area occurred,ievan Rus army briefly laid scige to Constantinople, the capital ol the Byzantine Empire, which encompassed much of what is today the Middle East "Russia" and "Turkey" battled each other many more times over the centuries.6. alone, the Russian and Ottoman Empires foughtars During the same period, the Tsar's also fought three wars with Irarj

Beginning in theh century, with the decline of both the Ottoman and Persian realms. Great Britain became Russia's mam rival for influence in the Middle East The Russians and ihe British, in seeking io expand and proieci their empires, vied for prcdomi-nani influence in Afghanistan. Iran, and the Ottoman Empire, which held nominal sway over the Levant. North Africa, and the western rim of the Arabian peninsula. The growing power of Germany in both liurope and the Middle East prompted Russia and Britain to cooperate in the region during Ihe last decade of Tsarist rule, but the iraditionalmcrged after ihe Bolsheviks took power

Despite Ihe Bolsheviks' rcvoluuonary rhetoric about igniting the colonial East against its "imperialisthe USSR under Lenin and Stalininfluence only in the northern tier borderlands. Khrushchev claims in his memoirs thai Stalinihe Arabritish sphere of influence Stalin believed thai the USSR was too weak militarily ir. the regionBritish hegemony, and indeed it

World War II, however, created new opportunities. As the captured German documents from Nazi-Soviel negotiations of0 indicate, Moscow hoped to supplant Great Britain as the predominant power in Ihe Middle East At the war's end. Stalin used lhe Soviei Army's occupation of northern Iran to establish "people's republics" in ihe Kurdish and Aieri regions He also attempted through direct threats io obtain fromilitary base on the Straits and the return to the Soviet Union of two provinces in eastern Turkey that the Bolsheviks had cededtrong resistance by the Iranian and Turkish Governments and by the United States and Britain foiled each ailcmpt and piomptcd Stalin lo returnonservative straicgy in lhe regior

The most significant legacy of World War II for the Middle East was the weakening of the main colonial powers of the region. Britain and Krance This dcvcl-opmeni eventually led to the emergence ofand strongly nationalistic regimes in the Arab world lhai distrusted the West and were willing to cooperate wiih the USSP


The Soviets were no; ready to :akc advantage of this openingy then Stalin and his ideological aversion to dealing wiih local nationalists in the Third World were gone,onfluence of interest had emerged among the USSR. Egypt, and Syria aimed at undermining lhe alliance system the United States and Britain were establishing in theBaghdad Pact Egypt! Nasser opposed the pacihe saw it aimed at splitting the Arabs and isolating his regime The Soviets opposed it a* another link in the Westerntem along iheirand as an impediment to the expansion of their influence tn the Aran world Khrushchev was prag matte enough to tie opportunity and devise

..uff. i e Soviets developed link* lo most Arab countries in ihcOv bul. at one prominent Wciiem scholar ol Soviei Middle Eastern . uinta, the keyoviet stccess in theii nfierwas noi

a "correci Wjhhi lemnistor loam or credit* nor very cunning diplomacy

Moscow did not gatecrash: It wa% inviteda,o* Middle Eastern power Si

Egypl and Svria

The Soviets patiently increased their influence in the Arab world5hey were aided by such eventi at the Anglo-Frenchh Israel in attacking Lgypt6 and the anti-Western bul! i'l ihas fueled among the Aiabs. and the overthrow of tbe pro-British monarchy in Iraqbach removed the only Arab couniry from ihc Baghdadhe radical new regime ir, Baghdad appearedime to oiler the ben opponuniiy to the Soviets (or leflisl. perhaps even Communist,in the region, and Moscow moved quickly to

- Wibcf Lhkii Ikt<J>c-cw hWi Ibtl. a ^

" Atcr Iraqi tseBWai ila rtf,e at iSa Ceatril

aiMa*wtir. lr,m

ioird Sua

court theto the displeasure of Nasser, who considered ihe Qasimajor rival By the, however, ii had become dear that Marirst influence would not last in Iraq, and Ihc Soviets accordingly paid more attention lo cultivating Egypt and Syria

la Ihc isonhern tier, tbe SovieU abandoned Stalin's heavy handed attempts to expand Moscownfluence and instead developed relatively extensive tics first to the Afghans, then the Turks, and finally to the Iranians Ankara and Tehran remained closely linked to Washington but were receptive to improvingwith their powerful aortben neighbor. The regime in Kabul,ouniry thai wasisolated and without links io another great powci. was ripe for Soviet cultivation Afghanistan remained nonaligned but was drawn closer and closer to Moscow

The massive dcfcai ihr Arabs lullered al ihe hands of Israel in the' war prompted ibem io move much closer to the USSR. Ike trendnosl pronounced in Egypt, where Nasser pui aside his earlier reservations about the Soviets andein to rebuilt and retrained forces

The Egyptian facilities the Soviets were allowed to use2 gave Moscow the widest mililary access io the Middleas ever enjoyed The



Mediterranean Squadron gained extensive access to Egyptian ports and anchorages, and Use Sovietsin Egypt their only naval aviation unit at tbe lime outside the USSR The unit eventuallynaval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, intelligence collection, and strikeenhancing Moscow's capabilities to monitor US and NATOhe Mediterrancar

. the Soviets exerted more influence on Egyptian domestic policy than they ever have, before or since. Former Egyptian Foreign Minister Ismail fahmy claims in his memoirs that the Soviet Ambassador in Cairo at tbe time playedore influential role in Egypt than even Lord Cromer had during the early years of British Colonialhe Sonets looked favorably on the "progressive" changes Nasser implemented, especially the growing influence he gave the ruling Arab Socialist Union, which was led by the staunchly pro-Soviet All Sabry. Moscow may have even believed, judgingtudy on Egypt by two of the USSR's leading Middle East waichers, that Nasser was giadually moving in his last years loward acceptance of "scientifichether oi not he was. bis death in0 made the question moot and marked the beginning of ihe decline of Soviet influence in the Arab world.


Appendix B

Moscow and lhe Arab-Israeli Peace Process

Soviei officials recognize thai lhe Arab-Israeli conflict hai been and is likely to remain lhe central issue in the Middle East Wc believe the Soviets do not view the Arab-Israeli peace process as an end in itself buteans lo enhance their influence in tha. Middle East, especially at Ihe eipenve ol ihe United Slates Moscow realizes US support for Israel is the major obstacle to improved US-Arab tics and that-te Arab-Israeli dispute increases lhe receptivity of the Arabs to Soviet military and political backing The Soviets do rot necessarily want toroblem that has brought them substantia) benefits but aJithtt certainly wouldettlement (hat salished their Arab allies andoviet role us lhe region

The Soviet Union hasarticipant in the peace process since the creation of lhe Israeli stale and the first Arab-Israeli war. As the USSRits presence in the region from then. it played increasingly influential roles in negotiating the cease-fires lhat ended the Arab-Israeli conflictsespite these efforts, the Soviets have been unable lo sustain their influence in the peace process much past the end of each war. When the Arab states that Moscow had armed sough: to develop the cease-tire* intogenuine political settlement, tbey turned to the United States because of Washington's leverage with Israel

Moscow's specific diplomatic goal has been ioeal al (he Arab-Israeli negotiating tableoequal of Washington It achieved this brieBy. in1 at (he Genevaand--onan agreement with Ihe United States inegainingole would be an acknowledgment by the United Slates and Ihe states in the region of Ihe Soviet Union's "legitimate role" in the Middle Easl Moreit would enhance the Soviets' ability to block any U'S-spontoied sciilemcnt Ihey believed harmfulheir interests

The Soviets repeatedly call both publiclyeturn to US-Soviei cooperation on the peace process andeconvened international conference. Senior Soviet Middle Eastern specialist Primakov's most recent book displays indignation at"betrayal" of ihe agreement between (he United Slates and lhe Sonet Union in7 to reconvene the Geneva Conference on the Arab-IsraeliASS commentator noted that President Reagan's omission of the Middlean address al the United Nations in5 -from his lis; of regional conflicts that the superpowers could jointly resolve was indicative of Washington'sdeparture from "ihe jointiddle East settlement

The Sovieis have issued numerous Arab-Israeli peace proposals over the years Their4 planlhe most detailed elaboration Moscow has issued of lhe mechanics ol an international conference (see inset) Tbe provisions closely follow the Kremlins plan for the Geneva Conference of3 but


4 Soviet Proposal foe an Arab-Israeli Peace Setllememt

The following six "principles" should be negotiated at an international conference:

I Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territories seized7 and after: recognition of inviolability of new borders: dismantlement af Israeli settlements established on Arab land

appear aimed al preventing what happened then, when Washington on (maneuvered the Soviets and brokered separateIsraeli-Egypt Ian and Israeli-Syrian agreements

The views of iu Arab alliesajor constraint on the USSR's maneuverability with respecteace settlement Moscow has made some attempu in the past to moderate the positions of its allies:

Creationalestinian state on the Wist Bank and Coxahort transition phase during wkiek the United Nasi oat administers theis acceptable; the new note has the right toonfederation.

J. Incorporation of East Jerusalem into lhe new Palestinian state.

ll states In the region guaranteed the rightecure and independent existence and development.

5 An end to the state of war between Israel and the Arab states,ommitment by all parties to respect each others sovereignty, independence, and territorial Integrity and to resolve disputes peacefully.

uarantee of the settlement by lhe permanent members of the UN Security Council or the Councilhole. The Soviet Union is ready to participate in such guarantees.

The conference would be attended by Israel. Syria. Egypt. Jordan. Lebanon, the PLO. the United States, the USSR, and byther states from the Middle East aad from -areasapable afpositive contribution. "

' Mdlejmtt rue ih Sonrrst4l

ISSetuenUw IMI

laims tnat tne Soviets were genuinely tryti* tu influence the Arabs toward agreeingeace settlement with Israel in Ihend.

Indicates lhat lhe Sovieu tried repeaieuij7 loSyria to accept UN Securityasis for resolving the Arab-Israeli dispute. They were similarly unable io convince Damascus to attend the Geneva Conference) or support iu reconvening


prcssea bagndad nard in theo accept UN.

Senior PLO official Khulil Wrnir noted in an interviewuwaiti newspaper in6 thai the "Soviet Union has8 to recognire"nd


inil use .vn.ct* suggcsicc that PLO recognitionright io eaisi would facilitate attairiraeniobjectives in ihe peace processcontinue io advise the PLO leadernd


The USSR, however, has shown il is not willing to press its Arab allies too hard or get too far out in front of than in the peace processor curapk. Egypt tentativelyN proposal for indirect negotiations with Israel, and the Soviets informed ihe United Slates that this framework might beio theui.C

.JWhen Nasser subsequently changed his mind, Moscow similarly reversed its position in discussions with US official.

The Soviets, if theyignificant roleeace conference, might again attempt to moderate their allies' positions. We believe, however, that the Soviet Union does not possess the leverage to make Syria and Ihe PLO sign an agreement that did not meet their objcciives, and it would noi tisk damaging bilateralwithpushing them too hard on the issue

Tbe Situation Todaj

The agreement between Jordan's King Hussein and PLO leader Arafai on5 looint delegation for peace talks once again threatened to leave ihe USSR on the sidelines of the peace process. The Reagan Plan of2 caller* for justoint Jordanian-Palestinian delegation to enter dircci peace talks with Israel Soviet criticism of the Arafat-Hussein agreement was direct and strong, and Moscow loudly applauded Hussein's abandonment ol the agreement6

first raised


3 givi* formal paWie ee-cfc,tLrn his speech IO the United Nations in September f" '

vleai iocs' on tuticrMralory

Among Moscow's Arab friends, the Syrians, as usual, have been the coolest lowatd Ihe scheme Although Soviet media staled thai Shevardnadze and Syrian Foreign Minister Shara' discussed the Soviet proposalreparaiory conference during iheir meeting al the United Nations in September, Syrian media made no mention of il. The key stumbltngblocks forremain the participation in any conference on tbe Arab-Israeli dispute, whether preparatory or not, of Israel aad Yasir Aralat's wing of the PLO The Soviets are no closeroosening the Syrian knot. Until they do. there will be no internationalalong ihe tines they propose, even if Israel and ihe United Stales acquiesce in ihc Soviei plan

Kremlin may lie encouraged by ihc wider support its plan for an international conference has received Now virtually all of iheLibya andendorsed the idea, although with wsdely varying degrees ofcn the United Slates and Isiael have dropped their total oppositionttending some form of international conference ai which ihe USSR is present. The Soviets, however, remain skeptical about Washington's and Tel Aviv's change of hear

Moscow's latest scheme for getting its foot in the door of Arab-Israelia preparatorytor Ihc lomijl internationallikely to gn ihc way uf rusi Soviet gambits The idea


[ ]

1 '


Appendix D

Soviet Ambassadors to Middle Eastern Couniries


(Aauiarrf Pas"





Visiliy Rykov

hu in

It ia


diplomatic relational

GrmradiT Zhiwi'lev

Vil Botdstcv

Vikw Minn*

l?Sft Aleksarrd' BtlonawlIM*)


Analoliy BukovskoH


Ion! in







bloke relations inl>

a It kin Wi Zinihuk


Vasiliy KoWiuifvi

Piigm Akupuv

Lewd Konwioro"

Malik Fazykw

AlckSAiSOf Zinclmk



Aksundr Sokfoio-O'Ml


Now.-nbei IM6 Iran1


December IMJ Ve-aemy StitswS1

First jmftaviador ijwJordan:ordan)

diplomau< irlmicMI



(esidem ambassador Wicel

Vcveemy Musiyto

A kb andi Dowkho-



Fcliks f




Vemcn. Norifi

Yemen. Snuih

Feliks ^edoia*


Al ceil Ricftkov


fiiii amBuiadc

July IW


VUdnla. Zhulovl>


Appendix E

Estimated Numbers of Sosict Personnel in tbe Middle6


(Not Indudme Drpeodemi)

md Tccaniciaasi

bI Technicians)








VJ iJ*. r

1 rhuftiin






. j k. 1




oil. Arabia





In addition, inert are awon runty tomb,-

in Alenn-iitoin. and thu? art

iliary uniu in Syria and WD in Monti Veoiri *AMioufh ilieie are no<itlki-il .Sgw: ik.'trii'McniinMW Ma.vco> Paifi.trcStK edritiriodni Church has aor ioatl'^oti in leruMlem ill- mn. irm-Oie prunenicieldlie igihceoiurv C

^T. indkMtet ilu:fcci via ciiliccit

1 11




1 ull il


Original document.

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