THE JANUARY PLENUM: GORBACHEV DRAWS THE BATTLELINES (SOV 87-10021X)

Created: 4/1/1987

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Ths January Plenum: Gorbachev Draws the Battlelines

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The January Plenum: Gorbachev Draws the Battlelines

The January Plenum: Gorbachev Draw* ihe Batlfelines

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battldmes between General Secrelary Gorbachev and those resisting fait iniliativcs were drawn more dearly at theanuary plenum of the CPSU Central Committee on personnel matters. Gorbachev moved out ahead of his Politburoew, more radical agenda for change under the guiseroad program ofTbe steps he has taken are polarizing tbe party, increasing the possibilityolitical showdown over tbe next year.

Gorbachev is attempting to revitalise the country's institutional structure to smooih the way for the successful implementation of his economic reforms- He made clear that he has no intention of limiting tbe party'sof political power or the top leadership's authority within the party. Rather, his proposals are Intended to energize the system by mobUiring grassroots pressure against recalcitrant lower level officials and by giving theense of participation In the political process.

At the plenum, Gorbachevull-court press to prevent bis program front being buried ia endless debate:

In an effort to bypass tbe Central Committee on the controversial issue of party reform, he proposed that this be the subject of an extraordinary party conference nextfirst such gathering in almostears.

To force the party leadership to come to grips with the issue of economic reform, he announced that this would be tbe subject of the next plenum.

To prevent local officials from suppressing criticism of theirhe called for legal guarantees for openness.

To speed turnover of enttencbed officials, be called for contested party elections with secret voting for posts up to the level of republic first secretary

Limits on Gorbachev's power were dearly evident at the plenum. The resolution adopted failed to endorse many of his keythe party conference and multicandidaie elections. At the same time, tbe resolutionirmer commitment to tbe needtrong military than tbe General Secretary did. Gorbachev made no secret that his program is controversial, acknowledging that many think be is trying to make "toourn" but arguing that Soviet problems are sufficiently pressing to require strong medidne

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T- oo, get an he wanted oo the personnel front, but heromoting several allies lo positions just below ihe top level tits protege Aleksandr Yakovlcv wasandidate Politburo member and Ntkolay Slyunkov and Anatoliy Luk'yanov were added to tbeThe plenum also removed former Kazakh leader Dinmukhamed Kunayev from the Politburo, further weakening the old

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Although most Politburo members agree on the need for change, there are tncreastng indications (hat some think he may be moving (oo far too fast. Second Secretary" Yegor Ligachev, in particular, while not challenging Gorbachev directly, has in the past voiced skepticism about some of thehe proposed ai the plenum.

Coivcerri over Gorbachev's policies appears to be even deeper in the Central Committee. Many members feel their job. and privileges are directly threatened, and many probably also fear the regime isroceas of liberalization that may get out of control. At the same time, Gorbachev appears totrong constituency among younger party members hoping to move rapidly ahead during this period of change, as well as those who grew tired of the ineptitude of his predecessors-'

The plenum clearly demonstrated that Gorbachev now has the initiative and Is strong enough politically to push openly for broad policy and systemic changes. By taking the offensive, however, he is heightening the riskirect dash with more conservative dements. The neat year could be cnncal in his consolidation of power. His program and his own political future are more closely tied together than ever. By promising so much, Gorbachev has made bis political survival dependent on his ability to delivera minimum, significant economic progress within the framework of continued political stability and atodicum of system reform to maintain his and the regime's credibility. Histhere is "no other choice" but to march ahead since "we do not have anywhere to retreatnow true for him personally if not for the USSR. To the extent that he succeeds in translating bis proposals into polides. and to Ibe extent thai these policies produce the result* be has promised, his political position will be strengthened. But he has left himself little room lo temporize should his program encounter political difficulty.

Contents

Judgments Introduction

Plenom't Ddiy

GortacbeVaove Trwd -Dcmoo.timjoo-Policy Direction!

Ideology

Cadre Polio

Electoral Reform

The Pany Conference Economic Policy

Policy

Cultural/Propaganda Policy

eforms

10

The January Plenum: Gorbachev Draws (be Battle-lines '

The January Fltrutm lull koyatru IO be ike plenum which tl*er on entwee lo Ihe qurnlon Are we lo reireai. or ore we run lo reirealT

Gorbachev la Jurmata ii iter

Tic January plenum, more iban ant other since Gorbachev'! election as party (eider inai bit own forum. For the liral time he clearly stepped out ia frorx ol hu Polubejto (oUeaguci loraid aiuuli on those resisting bit reform efforts in ibe formweeping prof ram forthe Soviei intern. While Gorbachev clear* l> does noi have anythingestern form of democracy in mind, bystandard* bis propoaals writ radical. Some Soviet observeti ate likening the January plenum'! importance lo ibai ofh CPSU Conircss in Iwhen Khrushchev made bis lectct speech denouncing Stalin.hii is probably an ewetslslcment. the piccum does appeal to be am Gorbachev's drncor.iolulate hisndel forth his rneaeiiplioA fui the chances he wants lo intioducc

Tbe I'Vrnum'i Delay

leadershipGorbache"*

reec-grain reportedly cauted the delay In eon* veninf the plenum. Gorbachev had initially an* pounced in6lenumailers were under say. aad Sonet

uidhc

meeline would lake place in October ortlicae dale*thereibarpdiuc'cemcoli wilhln

Ihe leadership, cspcoally over Corhiehev't delrcmi natron ta setn> that trauld lac-Jitalr Ihe removal of officii' mittinc Ini pedxies Aflei ihe

plenum Gorbachev confirmeil that prepataitorts had been 'difficult- and had ibpoessilaled thtecibe parly's rolelavarn ai lean eveiy sis mrmihi

Gorbachevascd ihe delay io put bit per-

sonal stamp on the mala report and to build lappoes for has proposals. C

J be rejected an initial draft of ibe ipecen thai bad been prepared by "Second Secre* lary" Uf acliev and bad it rewritten by hit allies, party secretaries Yakovlev and Raiumovskit

J Llgacbcv had rot wasted to so as far an rev-tun* cadre policy and that Gorbachev lobbied every luember of the Central Committee In ihe weeks before ibe plenum to preseni hii case.

was a

ash at aa ca^anced Politburo meetingeve of the plenumunearned

senior official called for Gorbachevei-anali-M. but thai Gorbachev was supported bymajority of the Politburo. At the time (hit meeting would have taken place, an alletoeiesl ankleoviet weekly alluded to tensions ia the Politburo The author deacribed Ltmn'i ranoaa iaithin the iop leadership and pcantrd oci simuarrtietthat pctiod and "what ii happenini today."

In the coarse of preparing for this critical plenum. Gorbachev appears to hare radicalized hitonfronted hit opposition directly In tbe weeks before lh< plenum he moved decUiflyumber of floats, taking steps boemrl so aniagoaiic mote caw* laoot element! ic the pnity. Iheae loduard

Hit personal role in Ibe ideate of Ar>drc> Saktiaiov flnm esile in Cot'kiy and the tub-mjuriil leloate of many other political prisoners

Therevia of lie fcrsl directof Brechncv by name

The replacement of KuaU Forty boas Kunayev wiib an ethnic Kunun.

The apparent revision7 economic ptaaforcing tome regional leaders toegative rale of economic growth because of tbe dislocation* anticipated from factory retooling andrefection of manufactured goodi that failed to MM new standards for quality.

That, by ihe time the plenum opened, the stage was setajor Gorbachev push toolicy agenda more ambitious than even be bad earlier -advanced.

'iMomVenocra lira lion "

engthy opening address to iheejliy re asdiaicd (he main lines of regime policy under Brezhnev and unveiled the most far-reaching program for change since tbeera. The central theme underlying his propos-aU was the need fornder this banner, he called for new ideological approaches and political and economic reforms that could result in major systemic change*

Gorbachev') assessment is that probtcma in tbeand political structure of tbe country arc closely interdependent. He appears lo believe thai changes in the economic mechanism cannot bewithout simultaneously undertakingreforms, and that in any event economicalone ii insufficient to bring about the bioad rcvitalizataoa of the party and the society. He believes that Ibis revitaliration is needed for the regime to maintain its power and legitimacy at home and for the countryevelopodern state capable of rr-inprting efleeiively in the international arena

Gorbachev's speech suggests ihat be is attempting to make bis reform course "irreversible" by discrediting lite system inherited from Brezhnev so thoroughly that it would be impassible la turn back ihe dock. He probably hopes his program will have strong appeal within the countryhole, that the support it oMRmasds will make it difficult for his opponents within the elite to block his initiatives, and Ihat pressures on tbe elite "from below" may even provide an insurance policy against hts rain* it Thus,probably beucreseform strategy is desirable from the standpoint both of Iheeeds and of his own political interests.'

Presumably, it was such an assessment that led Gorbachev to embark on the bold course be look a! Ibe plenum. He no doubt realized thai drawing the lines of battle more clearly would Increaseolitical showdown over the oeit year or to. but he calculated that the alternative waa to lee hii separate initiatives get bogged downureaucratic resistance that would ultimatety undermine bim pUh-iculty.

Policy i.

Gorbachev evidentlyemocr* lira lion" to serve hit broad strategic objoctiVct in several ways:

Polii'caL Gorbachev hopes Ihat bnadeaing the arena of political discussion and policy debate will enable him lo circumvent Ihe bureaucracy and to mobilire lower level support against officialsesisting hit reforM

Social. Tbe "drmocratiutioo" program would giveowerful tool for combating alirnsuon and attesting the erosion of Ibe system's legitimacy. He evidently wantsctivate and rally previously passne segments of the population and to reengage the intelligentsia, whose support will be critical lo his revtia'Uation efforts.

mie. Gorbachev has nude clear Ibai opennessffcei discussion of economic and socialate steccssary to formulate scauiious and pre-vent repetition ol put economic mittiV.csin the workplace, be hopes, would redacc cynicism artsoni the workers, coavince them that thejtate io tbe lyslen. aod encourage ibem so work enthusiastically lor his reforms.

Itutrnational Mis pro|ram would help improve the Sovietmage abroad. Altbouth Gorbs-cbev's "donocra lira lion" effort appears to be aimed primarily al domestic concerns, be no doubt hones thai it willublic relations dividend that will allow tbe Soviet Union to better refute claims of human rights abases andore attractive model for Western Communists and the Third Worldore suitable trade partner

Despite tbe far-reaching nature of Gorbachev'sthere arc clear limits to how far he is willinc to go. He made il dear (hat there will be no breakup of the current political system or diminution of the role of the CPSU his proposals do not allow for the existence of other parties. He Indicated that the party would continue to supervise public affairs, asserting thai guiding "the creative activity of ihe masses" was tbe party's paramount duly. He stressed that "control from below" will supplement, not replace, control from above, emphasizing that decisions of higher paityon personnelto be binding on lower ooes. He rmpnasirod thai tbe party would not toleiitr 'permissiveness,ot anarchy" (codewords lot Western civilalling instead for an "organic combination of democracy and discipline "

liven if all of Gorbachev's proposals should beIhcrc is wide room for interpretation on bow tbey would be implementeil The scope for genuine popular initiative could be so narrowly limited and controlled by the party apparatus that implementation would make little practical diffctence. If controls over the "democratization" process are too obvious andhowever, ihey would be counlerpeodoctive and probably increase the very skepticism and alienation ihe process is intended lo overcome

Ideology

Gorbachev's remarksesire to revive ideology as an instrument of change rather than an impediment to it. He tried to legitimize his reforms by arguing that opposition lo his policies is in viol it Ion of true Leninism. Heii nIdeas are being"sinaplrstieally" andigidity of thinking had led to -dcvis'loes" on such basic matters as self-government, economic management, and lodalisie argued that current problems stemmed in largerom ato update theoretical concepts of soeuZiim that were formed in.'1 be said, had permitted only "scholasticui'. had no practical applications while discouraging "constructiveaad the formulation of new ideas- Byast deviations from Leninism, Gorbaebev seemed to be underscoring hh intention to break with ihe iradi-tions and policies of Ibe putears, while depicting

his own reform proposalseturn to Lenin's ideas.

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By crilldzins; the theories of. Gorbachev implicitly crvucveo Stalinismand signaled his interest In resuming therxoccss begun by Khrushchev, but broughtalt under Brezhnev, He dearly blamed Stalin for the tlagnation of 'ideology, saying that because of "well-knownebate disappeared and "awhoniariao evaluations" became "unquestioned truths."Gorbachev did not mention Stalin by name,

J Gorbachev was tryingrty Congress (where KhjtnAcfccv delivered bis speech denouncing Stalin's crimes)to the presentince tbe plenum, there haa been Increasingly frank discussion in Ibe Soviet press of (he mistakes of (be Stalin era

Kfiiiiaaea. Gorbaebev't efforts to reinterpret the ideological underpinnings of (be regime are sure (o aise concerns among party conseivatives- They will view tbe rof party historyisky undertaking, because it has the unintendedof surfaang questions about Ihe party'sand its daimi to legitimacy as tbe supreme

arbiter of popular interests. TIMir concern1 -ere ippateatly riiponnbU foi ike dilute al ibe plenum's Anal lesorutiooicl op on Gorbachev's referencesiilakci of the Stalin eta '

Gorbachev* rnotc Reriblc ippeoach toausing particular concernoteai liuiopcan ofliciabC

j lop Caecbo-

mctaH accaued the Sovicti of "reviiioniam"ich-lcvcl flloc ideolot*shortly after ike plenum. Party secretaryended the teauon. responded that this oat better than

oiiey

Alihouth Gorbachev did noi- it man* reports tag-U'vted hespecific forced iclircmcnt measures al Ihe plenum, be tpoke out forecfaUy for wore rapid pcrsooael turnover at all leveh andthat party-ken mull be held lo higher perfortnance standstill. He taid the "ctatnaiictn" in the Fcutburo and Secretariat Ledin (bar ability to "ark. andued that iheechelons" of the party and state leadership musl be kept "open for an Infiui of freshe com. plained tl.it tnacy ejeTiciafa al lo-e: level-ar fin "'lortoducing negative conaecrue.xci for the entite country. He said lhat national-level manatcrt muii nevei agsia be allowed, outitplaced tentc of kindness or eics-ssive tolerance, to keep then |obt dcapite being unable io cope wiih iheir responsibilities He cipcesxaj his concern lhai party

Ofnrnilliare UiB

tpread."*

In wbai we-aWaux dcpaitttre froui tbe peison nelf ihe Bitihncv c* Gorbachev called lor an end to the practice of appointing -anyh technical back (round- Mr uid ihii bin hatthe psrly't stall aadt toointo the minutiae ol irnnomk minarcw-i

- i at toadnxaie (icater .

nil ks foeare not paly menvbe-it inee lo inp-lcvcl positions in Ihe economy He

lhai In deny talented nonparty people prueno-liemi to key poutioeisiolation of their cooslitu-tioctal lights He acioo-lcdfcd that Ihiiighly conicniions istoe but said that he thinks those "ho THrfW it are In

Since the rnoti inaporunt posts in tbe Soviei Union are all party positions, which by definition are noi open toeople, Gocbicbev't proposal would not result io any ii(eine*nt dirniotation of the party's politka! power. Bert it could imply thai heeither to reduce tbe number of jobs outside lbe porly whose occapaau arc selected by party committees, orcapaad the leti of people from which ibe party hilt tbese pOsHron- to iixlade some individuab who arc not ppnyn. Until now. making patty ntenvrcre>)uisitc for ad'ancernrntertain level in many occupations haiajor meant by which tbe party casared the at leastalletianee of professional and technical elites

before tbe

hat Gorbachev wituadaiocy rciircment age for party olHciib ofrnd thai this idea wit meeting strong resistanceandatory retirement age ofoy of Science cflxuk oa the eve of ibe paerraa-ti'thci iodtcaiion that similar measura may have been under considerationItlria the puny- Gorbachev alst f olicy thai would make it eatKi to move tearx oflVoilt teattporartly to less prcstigout "irouble-shootint" assignment!out problems. His failure lo mentionchanges

indicated he wat unable to marshal moot; lupevri for them

Secondgichev. in parikular. appejrsriprm&fdandatory retirement

iim to Siberia last May. be said that iha idea en* "urtetly limiting" ihe termi ofad been raised on the eve of (he J'tlii atiued lhai tintooi idea, once many official*,well at the lane pot* 'or anaa* jrin and thttot lb:howtd deinmiar their

irii me

Although Gorbachev may am have beenandatory iciircmenl age. be i> apparently seeking tome seal ol formal mechanism for forcing oat inef-fcctivc eafbciab. Tough measures have recently been adopted by his allies In Moscow and Karakhuan (seend Gorbachev is probably after some similar mechanism for tbeonth alter ihe plenumPolitburoroposal for limited mca-Uircs along these lines for some state officials. Even this approach wessld be highly controversial, aod some Politburo members may have opposed it, along with Central Committee members who feared they would lose their jobs.

The controversial nature of Goibacbevs view on personnel mailers was reflected by the failure of Ihe plenum resolution to include many of his key points His sharpestes ample, lo timelyof Politburo members and theof protecting incompetent seniorsoftened or dropped in the resolution. Il ts possible oe even likely thai be expected this but wanted to take the opportunity to throwarker on ibe Issue.

Electoral Reform

The most specific and potentially far-reachingGorbachev proposed to "demoiriiire" theand promote cadre turnover were major changes in procedures for selecting party and sUie officials. He argued that such measures would Increase Ihelr accounubility,ew aad important check fromn their performance

Under Brezhnev electoral reform was occasionally discussedviet acadenuc literature but dil not appear to be taken seriously by the leadership. Under Gorbachev this discussion has incrrased, particularly during the public debate of the new pany rules that were adopted al lasth Congress In the weeks priorhe plenum. high4evcl lateral ia electoralas signaled by Soviet press publicity on teveral contested elections for leadership posts in the Komsomol

On tbe pins side. Gotbiclx* called fre (arming the

procedure, foi electing officials, including ihe rirsl secretary at 'he republic level and beW. to alio- any

number of candidates. He specified that the elections should be by 'secret" ballot. Gorbachev traahncd Ins proposal by saving that (be decisions of higher pany bodies would continue lo be binding in personnel nultert. He was more vogue about the top kadersbip. saying only that there slsoald be furtherof the "central leadershipPetit-bora, Secretariat, and Central Committee.

If fully Implemented, Gorbachev's proposals would bring about major changes in the way (he party coadacts its elections Multiple candidates arcpermitted by the party rules, but sinceuch inslances have been extremely rare. Although party members can votegainst the oBscial candidate, most elections are carried outhow of hands rather than secret ballot, making il difficultegative vote

Some indication of bow contested elections might work was provided by Sense* press accountsontestegional (rayorj party first secretary In Kemerovo Province In February thai was carried out in the spirit of the plenum. While this process was controlled by higher levelselected tbe twoof the local party coenmit-tcc debated tbeir merits andoseicked iheir new leader. The accounts indicated that tots was only aa es pert meat and that new procedures had not yet been worked cart. The provincial leader who over si sr the process said in future dections candidates should make more of an effort to present tbeir own "electorale indicated thai if higher lod effieiab decoded an "outsider- should be brought in, this person should serveeriod before havingtand for election

Gorbachev was more vague on state (Supreme Soviet) electoral reform- He said that there should be broader discussion of candidateseview of current electoral proceduirs. He notedew electoral law should be drafted (his year and published for public debate but left (he detailsOne Soviet legal scholar said in aninterviewebate was now going on over she eiient of possible

Srcm-

Retirement MechanismsMoiemr

elate Gorbachev altUi la Kazakhstan and Mot-cow have rtctntly Introduced tough measures to get rid of Ineffective officials Party leaders Gennodiy Kolbln and Boni Yel'tsin umber of localystematic "cer-lificatlon" (at'csUtsiya) of iheir party organisations to remove those who fall lo measurr up lo tbe demands of their positions. Certification provides themetirement mechastitm thai Is much stronger than measures avertable to Gorbachev over the CPSUhole.

Kolbln. who was Involvedimilar process while second secretary In Georgia and first secretary In Ulyanovsk oblart. has put forward specific guidelines for Katakhstan and has moved quickly to Implement certification there II requires every cfftctal below ihe republtc secretariat or bureau level toiannual appraisal of his performance by specially constituted certification commissions. Therecommendations art recorded by the Kazakh cadre drpartmrnt and then must be endorsed by the secretariat or bureau. As head of thete two bodies. Kolbln kas the right to final approval of these recommendations, giving klm an effective tool for removing recalcitrant officials. The first bureau-level review was reported In the press inctuary.

and. while the middle-level official under scrutiny was approved In his position, the bureau noted ihat he failed "toersonal example of vigorous questioning and Imaginative approaches" tn his'

At the Kasakh plenum in January. Kolbln announced thai the certification of the highest levelCentral Committee members, republic mtnttltrs. and department heads--will begin In March. Moreover, he kas put his party orgattration on notice ihal those who do not measure up will be reastlgned or

Since becoming Moscow party chief Intl is In kas carriedarge-scale purge of officlali ai all levels. He announced al iht6 Motcow gorkom plenumertificationwas already under way in tke city party organtratlem Although there are few details onin Moscow, the dlimttsa.lt ofuarter of Moscow's district first tceretarlri and several high officials since the announcement suggest Yel'tsin Is using certification lo continue the removal of "tlme-servert" who are "not In accord with their potts."

.and thai possibilities ranged liom "minor" adjustmentsracacal" chaoges that would require an amendment of7 Constituttoa Thesaid one of the more radical reforms under consideration is the competition of several candidates for each post

Gorbachev apparently hopes he can use such reforms to put pressure on officials to follow his policy lines. The proposed chances could enable him to enforce discipline better by using the implicit threat of run ning other candidates against recalcitrant officials. By use of the secret ballot, he presumably hopes that it would be more difficult for local party booses to toouol clectiorn and ensure that no challenge to ibem developed from within Ihe rani, and file Gorbachev

Jnas indicated that he believes the espan-ston of inner-party "democracy" it needed to (cslore dynamism to the one-party state

Resistance. Gorbachev's proposals on doctoral reform appear to be highly controversial Although theresolution endorsed the need forboth the Forty and state electoral process in general terras, it did not induce Gorbachev's specific proposals tueh ji secret ballots and mullicandidate elections Gorbachev specifically appeared to differ with Second Secretary Ligichcv on Ihe question of

Secret

- Seim

party ctccuotu In the debate pieceerfiox the

Coturicaa. Ucicfcc* wrote thatc preferable lo tecret balloting (tee inset)

The Party Ccurferrwe*

To ii'ptove pany elect oral icforint and "dcroocra liu-tlon" matures. Gorbachev proposed convening an ciirsoedinary paly con/erence iaErst tweh meetinge specified (he conference should lake place before neat year's scheduledof all party olliclals up tu ihe province level, thus setting Use stage for tneni partymany members of (he CPSU Centralface electoral corneals In theute. '

Gorbachev's proposal for (be conference was amaster stroke. Since be could not get the January plenumpprove the tough personnel meat ores beafter, (helowed him additional time to build support both in (he Polllburo and the partyhole. It also allowed (he plenum to take place without the appearance (hat Gorbachev had failed to achieve hit oh relives la personnel policy. Finally, it may be possible for Gorbachevanipulate the competition of tbe party conference so that it winorebody than tbe Central Committee

Ii is unclear wbo win attend the conference. Delegates toh Party Congress lasi year could bepractice used recently in similar Eastparty conferences m

3 new delegates would be elected, givinghance toroup more In line wilh hitn bis concluding remarks to the pteatjtn. Gorbachev utd tbe Politburo would prepare proposalsuture plenum to determine the date and procedure for holding tbe conference

ibe party rules give ihe party leadership considerable leeway, saying only lhai (be Central Committee mayonference "to dtscsru pressing party policynd (hat it determines ibe procedures fot holding the conference Previous patty conferences have had wide authority to direct parly affairs Con Terences.or example,ed new pony rules, approved majoi policy changes

Eltctatal Coainit ia Eailera Eanpe

Starr electoral reforms were recently Introduced in Poland and Hungary. wfrA multiple tandldaieiarainsi roc* other. Whilendidatn favored bp ihe panp leadership have not tram In every eeue. Ike experience, in Poland and Hungary InJicalr lhai ihe auihoriliei usually can Hillecisive rote In determining the election outcomes. In bothplaces In the Parliament are reserved for lop leaders who do not have to run for contested seati.

The electoral protest It particularly lightlyIn Poland. There the authorities reserve the righl to make the final choice of two candidates and place the name ef ihe favored candidate as the lop of iht ballot. If no name is cheeked off em the ballot, which happens In many cases, the name al ihe lop gets the vote, usuallyin for tht official candidate

Vndtr Hungary's system, adoptedJ. thehave lest control over tkt telectlon and election of candidates. There, additional candidates can be propoitd from the floor esi nominationand be listed on the ballot if they receive enough support Under this arrangement. Hungarianhave sometimes resorted to packing nomination meetings to prevent candidates from appearing on ihe ballot. Candidates art lilted alphabetically on the ballot, and voters are Instructed to Indicatearticular candidate, raker than choose one by default as happens In Poland

inch as the New Ecoewmic Policy and ibe fun five-year plan, andurge of tbe parry rttetrtber-sbip. Gorbachev may use such precedentsrgue (hat neat year's conference should alsoroad mandate. No matter bow narrowly iis authority is defined, according to (he partyonferenceoreodyentral COrrtmiilee plenum

There have been some indication! ihal iberrvitc ihe pany rules ihai were adopted laiiihe 2Tth CPSU Congress These rules may haveamended to implement tome of iheIs proposing.riefing fora Soviet Foreign Ministry(hatlenum lacks (he authoritypanyarty conference canif it is so en i Ihits in

fact said ibis would be the case I .

coolrrencc would lake place bui said (hatongress can amend the rules, suggesting that (be Butbociiy of ibe conference is under debate

Tbe confrrer.ee could also be useder theof the Central Committee Although thealso unclcat on this, past pany conferencesmembers and promoted some candidatesmembershipdaitned thai

Gorbachev intends to make some changes along these liBes. If this does happen, it could make (he Central Committee easier for Gorbachev io manage.

The conference appears to be an attempt to make an end run around the Central Committee. TbeU likely lo-be an eitremely Urge body -possibly on the order ofelegatesartyit will be eitremely difficult forarge body to do much more thin ratify ihe proposals offered by the party leadership. Gorbachev ishoping he can use the conference to approve proposals that would be difficult to gel through (he Central Committee

' Gorbachev's ideaarty conference is clearly controversial. He was careful to specify (hat it was bit own proposal rather than the Politburo's. Many members of the Central Committee whose positrons could be pui in yeopaidjew electoral law are likely to be opposed lo the measures proposed by Gorbaebev. Although he indicated in his closing remarks thai speakers at ihe plenum and otherof ihe Central Committee endorsed tht idea, the resolution adopted by (he plenum lailedention (he conference. Although it may be difficult lo block the conference now thai discnssioa is under way. ihe remark! of the froWa official suggest( be Hying lo limit il* authority.

feoaoasle Policy

Gorbachev used his plenum speech to rcjCWns his de-.ei miaatson to overcome romance to hts efforts to "restructure" the Soviet economy nod to push for fuither economic reforms. To assure tint economic reform remainstop priority, be announced thai it would be the subject of the next Central Committee plenum. In an apparent effort to force tbe pany to come to grips with these issues in (he neat several months,rild-February trip to the Baltic he announced that (he plenum would (ike peace in June Il ii highly unusual for the dateentralplenum to be set to far in advance.

Gorbachev laid much of the blame for the Soviet Union's current economic dimculllcs on the Stalinist legacytrictly "cooniand" economy.mUmiernretatioJs of Lenin's Ideas, he said, had ledumber ofleveling of wages, microenanagemenl by stale planners, restrictions on (be rights of enterprises, misccoceprions aboutlabor activities,isdainful suit odecooperatives. These mi Makes had (he effect of undermining both the material and "moral" incentive to work, he compliincd. aad the economyesult

To help correct these problems. Gorbachev called for.

The eipanded use ofoiernbc-run Otgaotratsoas outside the statehelp meet the growing demand for consumer goods and services.

Nationwide discussionraft law designed to protect enterprises from undue interference byauthorities and providing for ibe "democratic" election of enterprise manigert and greaietby workers In management decisions (see insct).

Coetvocaiion of the hrsl congress of9 lo revise the collective farm charter, presumably along lines thai would funberre" farm management

4

The theftem Stele Enterprises

droit law on Hate enterprises, which the plenum approved lor metiomwldr discussion,etrrminmlon to locrrasr the role of the enterprises and limit that of the ministries In day-to-day enterprise management. The draft presumably -ill be tomewhot amended before la planned odop Him as law at, he nest Supreme Sovietprobably this spring. As currently written, however. Its language is sufficiently broad to make Its Impact dependem on bow lis provisions are ultimately impie-Far example, the draft girts enterprises tht right to make dedstons oa "all production and socialhat are mot expressly precluded by law. while specifying that the mini it net cam exercise only those [towers expressly granted by law. Al the same time, however, tke ministries are enjoined to dosely "mot-Jtor' enterprisefunction that im ihe past has led to micrcmanagement. Although ihe draft law provides the enterprises with mechanisms for redress when the mttmtttrits overstep their bounds, ihe burden of proof will be on ihe enterprises* and It remains lo be seen whether they will risk to openly challenging their superiors

The draft also responds to Gorbachevs plenumfor Increastd worker participation Im enterprise

management and the "democratic" election of man-agers. The new law provides for the election of entrrprtse directors for five-year terms and lower

level managers for two- or three-year terms atscheduled meetings of workers Voder the5 law. managers are appointed by stale authorities. Between these meetings, the workers' Interests are to be represented by an elected "labor eollecttvt'i council.which is to operate primarily In on advisory capacity but abo Is to have someauthority tn the use of enterprise funds. The actual procedures for making decisions, stack as selecting the candidates far management positions and setting ike agenda for workers' meetings, are left unspecified In the new draft law. *

tv best known Soviet experiment Im ikt election of enterpriseike Lenin Pslachlat-Bulldlng Plant Inihal the party, which tht draft law sayt will "guide tke work af tke entire collective and lit iclf-managtment organs.willtrong roit In tke decisionmaking process. At the Voronethelection commlt-slomis formedfrom representativesol'tkeparty, trade umloa, Komsomol, plant management, and leading production workers, but tht composition of thtmutt be approved by the plant'/ party com-mlltet. The commission selects Its nominee by secret ballot and them posses Us recontmcndatlom to theparty comn-Jaee. which In turn sends Its recommendationnterprise managemem

clear intent of Gorbachev'! efforuoereater leaae of nsmicipatsoodecisions aod. hence, of their ownfor enterprise performance.ost plenum editorial, workers will noablelame tbeir poor performance on a'because tbey will have elected bimAt tbe same lime. Osxbachev'i srxechclear [hat be bas no desire lo push this processand that his intent is tonot toprinciple ol "one-man management" oi

Gorbachev noted with some pride the6 bat pointed out continued ihortrcmings in agriculture, capital ooosiruction, consumer goods ouiput, and,iously. the roachi rebuilding sector. He rcemphxiiied thecritical role in fail modernization program and warned that "thewill keep coastsnt watch" over the machine-building sector

Rtiiiimmit. Got bacbcv evidently felt il was aetata iy to route his determir.it Wei la "rc-tiructuie" Ihe economy because, as be admit ted. (lie resistance to bis efforts "ras proving even moie "deeplyhan he anticipated Many people, he cooiptaiaed, were either actively Impeding bis elTorts or* forhitherreorgaeuir their work before doing so ilictnselves. He ec plained thai he fell ii necessary to reiterate bis endorsement for tbe formation of eoopcrailvea becametorn of obtta-cles" were being put in iheir way. To illoslrate bow di.'bcclf illo force maoism to adoptmetad techniques, he cited tbe recent Introduc-(ionale Quality control system, which he said had earned wort ilopcaaci in protest, at Soviei faciewtes-C

Jure party teaoenmp Has received "tricAi-tandi" of letters from Soviet plant managers saying lhai GorbacbcViproposals arenutters worse and asking (hat no further changes be made In (he economic mechanism.

Ni'localities Policy

In his Am public refeeencc to tbe mid-December IW6 noli in Kara kht tan. Gorbacbev calledeassessment of Soviet nationalities policies. Streatlrtf the oeedact"-in dealing with nationalitybe was sharply critical of those who have pretended problems did not exlti. taking toof the tlluatioo. Gorbachev's remarks suggest thai (be Alma-Ata ditlurbancet have caused him lo begin rethinking tactical approaches in his drive lo ariest the erosion of Moscow'* leverage over en-uenched elites ia non-Russian lepablics.

Al Ibe same time. Gorbachev reaffirmed the need for strong central control over the national repuMics. He wat sharply critical of the "pa lochiaethnic

'UnderipleovuiootcrdOO

raw year, eaabai unwed by "jnummi af

Sute AeerKioemVikeumi 'in im-linti ire eiprcled I* Jnllulfr evudoe*rile mar

enatafauliraefc Ri Hianid "wtrwi

uifttt Aluourk h'tHirt had eiieMr 'caunrd o* the

prcaati- ttiit ('didniiaditiaMi UW Kian tmtk

i/mirk wanke Im Taa>aehwiainit prolan lid included wortthathid

on thin one elini.

ad "ethnichai prefaced incidevtu like ihe oar at Alma-Ata. Suggesting thai he willougher line with local ofliciali who allow tach tendenciesevelop, be accused unnamed local party and government leaders of "shirking" their respoiuibilities by allowing ethnic tern to as to hare Bp-Mr made clear ihat there will be "no loosening" up on those who Bill wilh "nalionaliilic or chanvtoiltie peejeadrceV" aad that the economic concerns ef (be eniire cotintry will takever regional interest.

. Goibachev't determination IO reassert central authority over (be nationalauv inj resentment among regional officials, who during tbe Brezhnev years becarrK accustomed to operatingigh degree of irtdepcndcncc. These coocemsheightened in many areas by ibe Installstiooussian with oo previous ties lo tbe republic ai the new leader of Kazakhstan. In fad, (he iDieeuliy end timiag of (be riots in Kazakhstan may have been one factor contributing to tbe delay of the plenum io enable ibe leadershipethink Iu cadre policy concerning thebmIibi *

There were some luggestioos of differences over rationality pohcy at the picsum. The plenum resotu-iMn called for (be "exchange of cadres betweenlosely following the fcemolatioo utcd on this subject by Second Secretary Ugachcv in his ipeechb CPSU Congress last year.by contrast, said nothing about this nbpaa In hit speech and slated (hat tbe composition of cadres a( ill levels thould rcfiect the nationalure of thean effort to placate the minorities.

('ultural/IVopagaoda Policy Gorbachev made il dear thai (he regime's mrwiotron o' greater openness nlolc((a| ofmo. crulizatron"pparent that be it coiiming on press cnticfam at an additional means of by-patting Ibe Iradttional bureaucratic -hain of commandeep isbsfficial* who may be resitting hit

Sacftt*

program.is led thai "tbe people should knowecause opeaaca and idf-cniiciiin arc "prccHdy the means'* of protecting the party from "euors inorbacbev spoke out strongly on tornc now familiar ihenyn. iioocrscorlng gfeuaexitd'.mciit of hit peogrsra to lt>dcctiirute aad mobilirc the population behind bis restructuring of the Soviet society and economy He attacked local publics'iocs for foot-draggina on gfrri-oir and complainod that "many" parly committed, "continue paralyring" (be media's efforts

Gorbachev indicated that he warns to help protect ioumalitti who cHltciar officials in (wetting hbor violating new performance standard)elling. In conjunctionis proposalt to revamp the legal system, he stated that "evidently the time hat come to begin elaborating legal acts guaranteeingn ibis way. he probably Iwpciaise piotcdjve barriers for whittle-blowen andreporters, to shield them from tbe wrath of local economic and party bosses '

Friiiiani'fpennen policy- came ton for some critlcbm at the plenum. According lo an article published ia tbe Soviet pressentral Ceunmitiee rnember..several speakers a( (he plenum tuggeaied ihm tho franker discuasJon of issues In tbe Soviet press wat rfivtng aminnniliori to the enemies of the Soviet Union and was being used foi personal vendeitai.

(here

were sharp differences over opeaness at the plenum.

President Geomyko ipote oot

sharply against recent press criticism, saying thai it wasIrresparuibler and undermining popular conrtdence in the party C

J although Ugacbev did aotormal ipeeeli ai the plenum, he spoke out in Ibe corridors during the meeting against what he saw at abuse of ffactoai

t*gal

free his "democrat'rat ion" cftoris to succeed. Gocba ebe* will need to build tbe image of an eflrctrvr and impartial legal system that can protect the rights of

Qtiiena as well as (bene of tbe state. His speech it (levied aa intention to reviorr the integrity of tbe law enforcement tystem, which during ibe Brcihncv years became notoriously corrupt. He raidere can be no real deanoeraey raatsidc the law or above tbeReal dcartocracy serves every pose*,hit political and socialie highlighted two mayo' Interrelated aims: (I) itreogtheningnd-cder campaignncreasing the protection of individual righti against abuses ofby public olTiciali '

Gorbachev's remarks reinforced recent ugct of grow-ing leadership interest in reforming tbe Soviet legal syitem and orerhauling criminal and civil legblatiort. In adJition to calling for new legblation to guarantee openncu by eriiia of state aad public organs,aved (he oeed lo Increase Ibe role and prestige of Soviet courts, to assure tbe independence of judges, and to ebxirute uacigressioot of tbe pcccorscy. militia, and other law enforcement organs. One such law, now in draft, mcotiooed by Gorbachev would allow dtizeas to die cocnplainis with the courts aaair.it official malfeasance. Other legal reforms called for6 Central Comrruiie* decree are intended to eliminate biased and careless invaugalioas and court procaxdangs, aa well asWe bare received conflicting (esiimony about whether the cipected revision would significantly change the law most commonly used against political ctfcoders

Eventt inside and outside Ihe plenum Indicate the leadership is taking seriously tbe oeed to rvoraulgatc legal gwraatcca for opeaneai aad to reassess (be roles of (he various legal organs. Numerous personnel changes and caposed cases of official malfeasance have occurred at (he national and republic rntrtblries of internal affairs aad the Ministries of Justice and the Pioeuracy. New laws lo allow ciliieru to bring oflkialt to court and to amend civil law arc part of the legislative plan outlined by the So-riet Gewncaeai in6 for scheduled promulgation in

Some ^Gorbachevs move, indicate he may be trying lo use hit "Vkmocratirntioa'" caenpiijii to increase bk comix* ova the fcGB Suets ialenl was icjjcved by KGB chiefccca* ssswecestentedi.io-f vmncdoiag by one of fail sulwrdmaies io tbe Ukraine aad tiaieaieni thai the KGB would operate within the law

Kciinoaer. Many midlevel and evenials in party organs and law enforcementnduding Ihe KGB. arc likely to be threatened bypparent intention to nuke the adnuniitrauon of justice more equitable and the .sc ol police power less arbitrary. If Implemented, ibe measures he iacould aubicet their activities to much closerimmish their po-cr. torn pre rise toabout their ability to deal effectively with internal security threat. Many KGBU may be -ary of tbe corucoueoccs of releasusg large numbers of poiiticj] prisoners, and tome ec tbe rebuke of the Ukrainian KGB official asove to rdn in Ihe KGB

Soviet ipokeaman Oennadly Gerasimov, whentbe pardons granted and the review ofsentences, alludedebate by saying"thereendency nowadays" towardthesome comrades think the stricter ft

Military/Foreign Affair*

Gorbachev's speech at the plenum devoted littleto foreign or miliury affairs. In discussing the need io "strengthen defense" he focused on the human faelor. saying thai miliury personnd should upgrade their skills and improve their combatand calling foi improved diplomatic efforts.

ffeiiiranee. Therets of concern ai the plenum that Gorbaebev is norufceien.to defense. In contrail to Gorbachev's brief remarks, tbeuch sharper formulation, citing the "striving of theike imperialist forces of the US lo break militsxy-itraicgic parity and achieve nudearnd callingcomprr henengthening ofThis strong language is particularly Striking

because on mosl ortier issues the resolution softened GMt>achcVtumber of speakers at tbe plenum are involved in national Secvr.tr isaves -Defense Minister Soholov. USA Institute beadVesideat Gremyko, and Ambassador in West Germanythai this may haveubject for discaraSatnl al the flUnaua '

Since ihe plenum Gorbachev has stressed ibe need toid on defense sending, further adding to Ihe Impression Ihat be it out iu front of other leaders on Ibis Issue. Ai she trade unioa congress in mkl-Fcbru-ary. for example, be said ihe Sovietkmg ill steps needed lo ensure Soviet national security but that it will retsingle sup" beyond ihe retirementssensible, suffieien. drfense."

Potlcy Conflict

Ry all accounu Gorbacbev't speech sparkedat the plenum. One pariidpnni describingcom mealed that It was unusually livdy"clashes of opinion" look place. Privately'barn coital cts erupted

during the discissions aod that some of the basic element, of Gorbachev's program, particularlywere called intoeraestioa

The offscsal record of the pleoum left Utile doubt that sharp differences did occur. Although Gorbachev was careful lo indicate that many of his remarks had the endorsement of the Politburo, in other places It was dear that Ibe proposals be was offering were hit own. Gorbachev alluded to opposiiion, complaining that "some comrades" find It difficult Itthe importance of "deiDOCra lira

The contrast between Gorbachev's views and those ofPohiburohole was evident la Ibe ftUvrc of tbe traoluuon adopted by the pieaum to include snaay of bis ley points and that it used muchn supporting others (see insetl The

BetweenSpeech ana Ike rtcwaea RhoImWm

added language poioiini out thaiI ration" must lake placeanner that "servei society" aad -lUengihertj law andn his eaostng speech. Gorbachev appeared to be acldressing fears that "democratization" could unleash rorcea bevond the control of the pan v. sarins that aparty"loyal people- would be able to deal with anyone who tried to use "den-centiration" for selfish and antisocial pnrposcs

I.mlird Pioptsi ontatt.

Although peisonnel rnovei al ihe plenum added upefinite plus for Gorbachev, he got lest than he was after The plenum demonatrated that heuch

freer hind in tbe Secretariat than In the Politburo. With the latest changes, be has almostreshaped tbe Secretariat ainoe txeawag party leader, but oel, half of tbe Politburo members attained tfaetr positions under Gorbachev (see inset,

On the Politburo. Gorbachev fonder reducedof ibe dd guard bj rtxnewiagBut he failed to secure the promotion loof bis ally, Moscow pant boss Yel'titn,he clearly wanted to make

reported before the plenum that Vel'isin was slated

Gar backer. New Secretariat

Since becoming General Secretary Inorbachev has almost completely remade thefilling Us ranks with his allies:

Secretary

IJjxIkv

Ktr.ury; per-aad idtolat.

IMS

-

PcOrWo

IfM

and

-'rr>

Yalo-te*

IVSi

nd coo.

tsiuerteof.

Dotrynin

ItJ*

policy

LatVino.

ItlT

Deptmneoc aCtwK laduMry and recwrity

Medvnlcv

.II* socJifiii emeries

Nikon

ins

rUrinnonlb

I9M

fortatus thai was accorded bisin Moscow. Viktor Gnsbia. Velum's esdesian from full membership ai this time suggests reluctance among tbe lop leadership lo allow one of ihe most dynamic and forceful proponents of Gorbachev'sinto their tanks. The difficulty Gorbaebev is having adding full Politburo members is orsderscored by ibe fact thai no one has been promoted to ihat status since Ibe Party Congress last March

raiiy secretary Alcksandrrusted adviserorbachev,elevated in candidate membership.

VaAnvlevsnhancehorny on matters of culture and ideology. ahsc* Yakoslev oversees, and help limit tbe power wielded by Second Secretary Ligscfaev in those areas. Other Gorbachev supporters rumored tooe for promotion to candidate membership In IheDohrynin andto advance

The addition to the Secretarial of Delorutsion pany boss Slyun'kov sad General Department chief Luk'yanov streagthesed Gorbadtev's already ooeni-nam position in (hat institution. The retirement of science and ed oca lion secretary Zlmyanin leaves Via-dimir Dolgshh as the last reonainingther than GorbacheviheWitb the additionun*kov, Dolgikh's respor'.iibiliiies in the eccoomic sphere aree reduced.*

Slyun'kov hastrong advocate of innovative eecesocnic methods aad as Beiorussian pany leader helpedomber of eo>aonsic experiments. He was reportedly handpicked by Premierwith whom he worked ia Oosplan- With his economic punning caperisasee. Siyuakov may be tbe most likely candidate fo rail the vacant post of chief of (he party's Economic Department. Hit more out of Besom ills has also allowed Gorbachev toupportereplace bim there

Luk'yaoov. as bead of Ihe party's Generalworts closely with Gorbachev Severalidentify himorbachev supporter,says he has lies to Ugachev. Luk'yanoventhusiastically on self-government andlo deraocrsuie tbe electoral process atlevel. Ilia background suggests thai bea key role in legal and electoral reform, aadaces since his promotion suggest thaiwill alv> indude security and defenseLak'yanov would be

involved in all of these areas aod that be it likely so be advanced soon to the Politburo. The appointments of

.Secret

th

-Set

and Siyun'kovbe Secretariat Increase iu numberibe largest it Ui been inand makes It possible that some of its members could be movedcr posu as needed by Gorbachev.

Tbe retirementKunayev aad prornotico of SIyun"kov leaves Ukrainian parly chief Sbcberbitakiy as (he only republic party leader in Ibe Politburo. Private cornrncats by Soviet ofrtcials, at weH as continuing; criticism of Ihe Ukraineentral presi. indicaies lhai Gorbachev hat been trying to undermine Shcherbitskly. The violent reaction lo the rerun il of Kunayev in Alma-Ata. however, may force

Gorbachev to tiay his band against Sbcberbiuiiy until he has cartfallj prepared tbe groundwork in the Ukrainian pany for hb removal

Regional rcixctcnU'tba la the Politburo bat declined steadilyhen there were tii republic leaden holding either full or candidate membcrihip. Several aexi-Rusuini serving in potitiont in Moscow, three offormerly beaded repubbc parties, are on the Politburo, but tbey in no sense represent the

b

shake up the system. In hit plenum tpccch. beLaowledged (hat many thinkrying to maJre "tooorn" la policy and referred to unnamed opponefiit of bit proposals But be it openly tying, hit political fate to (he iBCceti of hi* policies.ent plenum meeting with media cJicialt, Gorbachev hinted lhai if Ihe plenum had re)ected hit reform program he would hate resigned, saying that be would not want to continue wealing under (bote

interests of (be icpublies -here they once served. H) uiU up if.owing tton-Rutiiarts to achieve top-level poiiliooi In knowlcdged the center while denying republic leaden *eali on the sharoPolitburo, Moscow Itignal to ethnic elitci that the regime it accivdiag career opportunitle* to individual ocm-Russians but It determined to prevent republic party ergaasiatiorrt from gaining the degree of -facto power (hey enjoyed under Brcihncv

Toe repeated rioainooemeota of tbe plenum, in failur

While the plenum revealed Ibe limiti ofgive Gorbachev all he wanted, and comments by

power, it alto made dear lhai hein 3tagged (hat tome of tbe opposition

must--coniinae to push for change* in policieshis program lies in the Pnlirhuro. The account* of

ire

**Oyt

personnelow clearly oat ahead ofplenunC ndicateihe Politburo and Central Committee in hisHe knowt that he is polariitng (he partya-arc that (be tukn are high in his struggle io

ibese differences arc ovii tpcobc roOcy DVKt. net Gorbachev's leadership. Moil of (lie Pnlitb-jro sp pears lo iff on (he need foi new pointy directions and changes in personnel, but there air dearly ditTer-cttccs over specifics even among those member* who attained ihelr positions under Gorbachev. TheSecretary appeared to be alludingbis when be cornplained that,in the Politburo. Secretarial, and Council uf Ministers.haveevert to epieitioeu over and over again"

Since the plenum (enlinns in tbe Im C

5 Gorbachev is oow embconuierious struggle with opponents of bis economic and political reforms Wriiingoviet weekly. Akksaedrell onood Sowci commentator, described the division in llie paity between "Soviet socialistbo ate afraid of openness and resisting chsnge and those sjppottisgrogram. He said that the conservatives have "not lost hope" of reveiiing the changes, pointing out thai they weren undermining tbe reforms introduced ath Pan* Congress by Khiusbchev and in Kosy-gln't economic reforms in

Gorbaebev's grealcst pioblem in the Politburo msr conic from Second Secretary Ligachev. Alibougli L'gachev appears so be generally supportive ofnotices, there were increasing signs of suain between ihein during tbe period before ibe plenum. In addition io the report that Gorbachev ielected tiga-cbev's draft of ibe plenum speech, (hereindVu-lions of difleicnccs between (hem over tccicl rating, mandatory redrenieni. and inter republic rotations of cadres While LigaCbcv Is aot challeaging Gorbachev diiectly. byore caulmus stanceontroversial issues raised ai ibe plenum he is poti iwt-og baaneK as ibe logical alternative is pant leader should opposition lo Gorbachev mount

0 lic'clicvtrong" andOCl position to succeed Gorbachev should be step aside ca resit*

ainoag his Politburo colleagues. These members are undoubtedly sirengthcned by the knowledge that (here are tiaervuiions about Gorbachev's coIicki within the Politburoere bat been lessin the Central Cootinktee than ia the Politburo. Moreover, its members are bkdy to fed particularly threatened by the prospect of forced rcisrerncnis or having lo Stand in contested elections t

-jlast Gorbachev is "kn.ng tbe partyesult of his bold policies and that much of (lie Central Committee,ajority, opposes his restructuring dlorts-

.There area number of ipedfic groups that see Gorbachev's program citherhreat to ibear personal interests or to the interests oftsdf. Those who may believe ihey have little lo lose in opposing him include:

Mioy regional leaders that have developed strong local patronage networki

Mi rialCscash and enterprise managers used io tbe old way of operating and feniful of the new standards being applied.

Party and stale ofliesab engaged in corrupt acsnv lies ind fearing eipCBUic.

Party conservatives fearing that Gorbachev!reforms may unravel ihe foundaiions of pany rule and wanting io nip ihern in tbe bud

Some police ofrcuh wary thateiorms would make it more difficult for ibem toh internal security problems

Many Russian elites traditionally fearing thai any firm huntint inn would stimulne leparaiisi strivings by clhrwc mirteait'es in the USSRacDurage fdoraa aaewcMKOts in" thaioviri dominanon

o be sl,onker ainoni;r, cemrat committeehin

SesTtT

Miliury od-ccrv concerned ilia! Gorbachev's eitortsoldd Ihe growth of defeose (pending will adversely affect military equities and national sccu-rity alike.'

Arrayed againit thete pocketi of resistance, however, ia all institutions at all levels of the system are people embarrassed by the ineptitude of Gorbachev's pfgafc cessors and eager to sec (he beginningeform effort (hey regard as long overdue. Moreover, many younger ambitious ohVisb clearly view enthusiastic support of Gorbachev's program as the best way to advance (heir career*,'

Gorbachev doestrong mandate (or change, but he will need to ensure that tight control is mainuiacd over the changes be wants lo iatroducc to prevent "democratiralion" from getting out of hand. Conservatives clearly fear (hat Ihis willifficult processontrol and Ihal the measures Gorbachev is proposing could eventually leaduestioning of the legitimacy of Ihe regime and ultimatelyoliticalhappened when reforms were anderukca6 in Hungary,8 in Occhoslen-skia, and1 In Poland. To allay such concerns.will need to demonstrate thai be can tightly manage (beprocess and nip in tbe bud any of the following potential developments thai would Indicate "dernjoetatiulion" is gelling out of control:

The ceotral leadership loses control over someand the "wrong" Candida lea win

Workers use lheir increased rights to demandconcessions Irom management and begin to act like Western trade unions

The release of dissidents encourages snore antirc-gime activities and demonstrations for furtherbecome widespread.

Gorbachev does noi appear to lice anysjrho claimed

a power struggle is now going on in the Kremlin and viewed Gorbachev's bold moves at (he plenumign of desperation, said it will uke another three or four years befoee it win be cleat if Gorbachev will prevail Gorbachev also appears to be woikingii-il.ii lime frame, commenting during his Februaryto the Baltic that (he neu iwoc* three years win becntscal for his prostiam

By prornising so rnocb. bowever. Gorbaebev his made bis ssoUtical survival strpendent on his ability toa mini mi mi, significant economic progress within (he framework of continued political subiliiy and alodicum of systemic reform to main-uia his and the regime's credibility. His message al Ibethere is "no other choice" but io march ahead since "we do not have anywhere to retreattrue for him personally if not for the USSR. Although be does not have lo succeed in achieving any of his goals overnight, lo maintain bis political momentum he needs (o

Most important, hold tbe party conference bein IMS.

Get approval of measures (hat facilitate cadreand change procedures for selecting officials.

Hold then economic reform in June, is be promised, and achieve specific results that advance his agenda

Promote histhe Politburo

Replace Ukrainian party boss Shcberasskiy. havingampaign to get rid of him -

Original document.

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