Created: 4/1/1987

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by Pinochet on such matters would, in our view, damage US interests in Chile. The prospect of Pinochet as President-for-life would erode ihe reputation or the armed forces with Ihe Chilean public, provoke substantialhin the services, and increase the possibiliiy of the Communbt-dominated left mounhng an all-out insurgency to topple the regime. Should Pinochet leave office, however, wc judge that support for kftis: violence would wtoe and thai Chile wouldood chance of reestablishing stable, democratic institutions.!

|Pinochet has shown great skilltrategist and manipulator of the armed forces since3 coup that ushered in Chile's only prolonged period of military rule in this ccnlury. He has monopolized both the presidency and the office of Army commander, effectively subordinated the four man military junta, and kept tbe military as an institution out of the policymaking process. At the same time, Pinochet co-opted the armed forces by substantially enlarging both the size and budget of all the services except the militarized national police. He more than doubled the number of officers, boosted their salaries aod other benefits, filled his large presidential staff with military aides, and detailed active duty or retired officers to top posts in regional and localthe national government, and in state-owned enterprises. In all of these actions. Pinochet has consistently given special preference to the Army and its senior officers J

in our view. Pinochet seems more and more disposed to override or ignore the wuhesenior military officers. While Pinochet's position *ai temporarily strengthened by the discovery in6 of huge arms caches supplied by Cuba to Chilean subversives and by the following month's assassination attempt on the President, his attempts lo exploit these events to harass the moderate opposiitott. cow his junta critics, and buttress bts chances of retaining power9acklash even among progovernment groups and considerable grumbling among senior military officers. During recent monthshree junta crilics have bypassed ibe President and have begun to deal openly with moderate opposition leaders toormulaegotiated traniition-to civilian - "

In our judgment, because of their tense relationship with Pinochet, senior military officers probably will eventually decide to confronl the President and insist Lhat he step aside at the end of his term We believe they willally try to persuade Pinochet toegotiated transition and. if be does not heed their advice on this score, ultimately demand tbat be stop his eiTorts to run as theandidateresidential plebiscite. Wc assume lhat Pinochet will remain obdurate and expect that byenior militarythat ho could not winair vote and fearing that his continued rule would indirectly aid the revolutionary left and discredit the military-will force him from office if he persists in trying lo retain power

We also believe thai the military could move earlier thangainst Pinochet in reactionariety of possible peremptory actions on his part. In our new, the revived Lelelier case, for example, has the potential ofa major crisis if Pinochet retaliates against those who want (he case cleared up or who -know tooncluding retired military officer, with the result that be could alienate the armed forces and perhapsove by senior officers to oust him in the coming monthsany o. these arcumstaoces. however, we anticipate thatonE senior officers who plan in confror: Pinochet would be very closely held and that any move against him would catch mosturprise I

Chile: Pinochet and the Military

Chilean Military Rrpmr

Chilean armed forces arc thepower broker and constitute Prei.dent Pinochet'* primary *ouree of pou'iical id won Wc believe they will deterroirie whetherffer until the end of Im term in9 or retain* power into, as scots to be hi* uwentioa The Arrayhe dominant service, bml representatives of all four services are on ihe military junta and share

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!fte< th* imeaag UlfMI Ulllan PNaUBM Sslva-dor Allende.r, Pinochet cstabliihcd himself as tbe oltimate authority, and he hu since ikillfulty manipulated the Army and the other service* to ensure their loyalty. Nevertheless, public opposition to Pinochet has steadily mounted popularity is atill me lowjand even senii tayir^puSircTythai ihe country must moeracy in

The Break With lWc.au] the armed forceswj tradition of noninterfereoce in politics by oustinf the elected Marxist tovtrnrneci because the officer corns felt the country was headed toward economic collapse, toliti cal polarization,xeakdown of law aad order. The coup *as supported by i

in the lower classes aad otgecned Ubor. According to journalistie and scholar I, studies, moat political leaders expected the military to retain power only long enough to weed out Allende luppoettr* from the bureaucracy, dismantle various aimed leftistgroups, andemblance of order to the economy and the political lyitem before ichedul-ing new presidential and. >. mm

Ii toon became apparent, however, that the new military ruler* in tended io stay in power for aperiod in order to "eatirpate the cancer ofone junta member publiclya more politically disciplined state, sod reorder the economy along free enterprise lines. In addition, they resented their former inferior social statu* and scut political inxfeeacc aad wanted to enhance permanently the social position of the armed forces, according to several acadenue studies The military used radical aad violent mean*stablish it* new order in ibe crackdown after the coup, the tecumy services cteoited alersons,notednd either shut down or severely cuttailed the autonomy of Congress, the political

parties, universities, (he media, and nudehe lame itudlei. Military officer* ini-lially filled mostosts, bui then turnedoup of civilian technocrats to implement free market economic changes and to several conservative Catholic ihcorcuciaBS to help form elite the retimes political ideology]

several ncadcmlc experts conclude thai over the pastears the armed forces hierarchy hai developed aperceptual framework lo guide the thiakint of military personnel retarding ibeir institution's present and future role in national affairs Tbe keyare the military's:

Conviction that the armed forces, as tbe foremost exponents of Chilean rationalism and defenders of national security,ermanent mice in rnoleUnt Chile's political process.

Belief that most violence commuted by the military3 was justified and that the military should not be tried for alleged hum jo fights abuses.

Vigorous anti-Communismisceral distrust of politicians for their rale ie mismanaging theeobtical mum. combined with recognition of the need to eventually restore elected civilianin the formprotected" democracy that avoids "ciceases" of the past.

Support for0 Constitution, whicha timetable to transfer power to civilians when Picsecnct's term ends in9 while providingontinuing political role for the military.

Loyalty to Pinochet a* President and Commander in Chief tempered by primary devotioo to the armed forces as an institution aad detennioatioa toits integrity and autonomy

In our view, the government's continuous campaign lo indoctrinate military personnel at all level* has had mixed results, especially from the perspective ofefforts to perpetuate bss hold on the presidency For instance, wc believe that, while most officers arc convinced that the armed forces saved Chile from chaos and strongly supportersonalthey arc nevertheless committed to the nolloa that there mustransitiontable democracy; Pinochet is obligated lo begin tm* process no later than the end of his current term I


Pinochet's long Stranglehold on both the presidency and the office of Army commander strongly affects his relations with his military constituency. Whereas senior officers in other Latin American countries have soared power with military presidents. Pinochet has prevented the Chilean military from ikvcsopiagprocedures to debatr. much lea* decide, peiiti-

fostered the incept ihst tbcTmerUorcesarc-ihc Constitution calls themmaintaining that only the junta reviews national policy, which the service commanders then transmit to their subordinates.

Pinochet, in our view, bat shown great skilltrategist and rmrripalstor of the military. He has capitalized on the military's long tradition of discipline and respect forChilean Army prides itself on its Prussian-styleretire all of the original Army coup plotter* who might haveay in pcJicytneking. and iaforced out tbe Air Force representairre on the

Pinochet has also tightened his control over the government and tbe military by expanding the sue of tbe presidential staff aad tilling most posts with military officers, according to the press. In addition, he hat assigned active duty officers to all top regional and local government positions, and. until the, filled all university rectorships and manyschool directorships wiih military officers. Furthermore, officers occupy top positions in every government ministry and many specialized agencies For instance, according to the press, the Deputy Foreign Minister isenior military man.

lesc orStccrs lack policymakjsg authority out enable Pinochet to keep tabs on ejrilian ministers and managers. Moreover, they serve at the President's pleasure end, in their aonmihtary capacities, do aot report in their respective serviceBJBJ

Ibe Amy and Pinochet

Pinochet has been especially attentive to tbe needs of the Army, clearly Use doeninam service in Chile- Over theears the Army has growncurrently comprises nearly half ofirang armedhas received the lion's share of military expenditui

Tbt Other Senicr'

I'orce. Navy, and Carsbineioi (the paramilitarypolice)econdary role in supporting Pinochet and staffing the government, although they participated in3 coup and have iince formally shared power with the Army. In combined manpower they slightly outnumber the senior service and have nearly twice as many officers, although we know of no case in which the hierarchies of the three services have contemplated challenging the Army militarily. Instead, we believe that their size, and especially the large number of officers,eliberate policy by Pinochet to try to co-opt these services in much the same way he has done with the Army.

Air Fotct as politically ibe mca! liberi] if the tour services, as attested by Pinochet's ouster of8 for advocating an early return to civilian rule.argo number of ranking Air Force officers resigned in sympathy, the remainder of the service accepted the President's handpicked re-believe theHlvSScP?fSSS^^c^r and illustrated how easily he could cow the Air force. Nevertheless, ihis service almost certainly stilltbe greatest number of prairansition officers, and its commander and representative on tbe juntaeneral Maithei. is by farost persistent military critic

the Navy to be more conservative politically than the Air Force, but Its commander. Admiral Merino, also frequentlyof Pinochet's intransigence. As the onlyto have served on the juntaerino is its senior officer andthe juntaermanentPinochet should he die or become incapacitated. 1

Carabine-even id the

Navy's or tho Air Force's in the government, partly because its officers generally are of lower-msddle-elass background, compared to the Air Force's and the Navy's upper-ituddte-class and upper-class officer corps, respectively. Moreover, academic studies reveal thai the military establishment has traditionally viewed the Carabineros as subordinate to the other three services. Nevertheless, the Carabineros'complement is second only to the Army's sad theyigher percentage of careerand enlisted personnel than the senior service. Moreover, they are deployed in virtually allcenters, and many of their units have military training comparable to the Army'sl

believe (bat tbe discovery in6 ofcaches supplied by Cuba to the ChileanParty's (PCCb) tetrotisi affiliate, thePatriotic Frontnd theattempt against Pinochet, shockedarmed litrce* intothe 'iokace-pfonc fircal threat to

ralliednejlmTaQuickly agreed awareness that hit policies were fomenting political polarization that threatened io undermine the nation's institutional fabric. Moreover, in our judgment.overplayed his hand by using his temporarily strengthened position to crack down on the moderate opposition, cow his junta critics, and to try to buttress his chances of retaining power9 Follow-ing the assassination attempt, he:

The Ptmert of the Military

3our-man military Junta was formed, consisting of the thret armed services chiefs and ike director of ihe Carebinerot. wmtek assumed full executive. legislative, and eonsttiutional powers Pinochet, as commander of iht senior and largest service, was initially named President of ihe Junta, with the umderstandtng that this position would rotate among all Junta members, according lo academic studies Nevertheless,ear of the coup. Pinochet dominated the Junta, changed his title to Preside* Of the Ktpubtte. and took charge of executive and administrative decisions, t

Under the authoritarian Constitutionleft the Juraa. to which he appointed the next ranking Army general as his personalhe could replace as will. Pinochet rt maimed the Commander in Chief of the Army and assumed the new title of Captain General of the armed forces, while the Junta members from Iht Air Force. Navy, and Carabtntros continued asof ikelr respective strvtcts each of -nam unu exempted from automatic removal by iheThe new Consiiluiion further rtstritttd ihe powers of iht Junta tn relationhe presidency and extended Pinochets term untilith the possibility of reelection by pitbisattfor another eight years a

The fume's constitutional powers art also limited by the unanimity requirement; althoegk the Junta can initiate amendments to the Constitution, they must be approvedational plebiscite, which only ike President can convoke. Nevertheless. Oe severaloccasions the non-Army Junta representatives have called publiclyonstitutional amendment to permit direct presidential elections

a New President. The Consiiluiion specifies thai, if Pinochet dies or ts incapacitated, the lunta select! his replacement by unanimous vote. During iht selection process the presidency devolves on the most senior member of the Junta, who currently ts Navy representative Merino If afterours the Junta cannotnanimous decision, theSecurityIneludts ihe four junta members, iht Presidents of the Supreme Court ond of

the Councilc/State, and the Comptroller General-mutt choote ihe president by an absolute majority: The Constitutiondoes not Stalethe new chief executive must eitherunto memberenior line officer.

Jf?'r Army would ensure Junta representative or another senior Army general would be the nrw president.

The provisions governing the nomination of thefor9 plebiscite art Idertileal, except thai Pinochet himself willirect vote in ihe matter.

aintain an image of unity, the military will make theby Novemberwho to nominate for the plebiscite at the Junta level, rather than refer It to the National Security Council.

Other Prerogatives. The Constitution spteifiet thai tht junta must approve internationaltale of siege, and accept or reject presidential orders replacing the non-Army members of ihe Junta. In each of ihese categories, one or more Juntahave shown considerable independence during the three yearrWM

Thus. Admiraltreaty with Argentina settling the Beagle Channel dispute, claiming lhat it did no' adequately protect the interests of the Navy. Also, on several recent occasions the junta rejected proposals by Pinochet totate of siege, although It finally agreed to one aftereptember assassination attempt against Pinochet. Finally, the Air Force and Carabi-nern representatives I

Began openlywitheptember--for artotJcr

s^irioe mission to guide Chile for the foreseeable future.

These actionsacklash againstamong progovernmcnt groups andgrumbling among senior militaryinstance,

unprecedented statement repudiating the death squad killings and calling for speedy punishment of the


RamMings WUhia th, Juata ta our new, aa important development affect* eg PiDOchct'i (landing with the armed forcea was the wiliincBcu of three of the four junta members-manifested with increasing frequency during the sec-ond half ofdafy Pinochet by dealing openly with moderate oppositione believe Ihe junta members were rnccivated portly by concern over itcmfyiXomnw^^loiU to destabilize

gsflgsnsVLnslssssH meanwhile, the moderate oopou-tion parties were also iafieenccd by the recentevent* to sever their ties to the far left. For irutanee, even before the amuination attempt, the CbrUlianthe most influential oppositionthat they would end politicalw.th the Ccenmu-iuu and their prcwioknee

We believe that because mod senior Chilean officers are committed totransition bcflinning ro luerelations bei-rrn tt.nocbet and the mibtary will become increasingly difficult over (he next two years unless Ihe President unexpectedly agreesoliticalaad indicates that he plans to step down at ibe end of nil


Army, will decide that they ban no recourse but to confront him sod insist that be step aside ina our view, ibe military wtQ act in either ce* two ways, namely to try to persuade Pinocheiccept the more -honorable" and less divisivetbe armed forces and thea negotiatedor. failing that, lo demand thai Pinochet desist from plans to be reelected lor another eight-year ;eim.l

Prospectsegotiated Tiasutttea

In our judgment, moat Chileans, including the armed forces, are convinced that tbe best solution for the political dilemma their country faces is for the armed forces and responsible poUtical party leaders tormhe coming monthsormula for an orderly transition to civilian rule beginning inorueejucntly. we believe that at least for the remainder7 ihe junta, led by tbe Air Force, Navy, and Carabineio commanders andby increasing numbers of officers from all the

services, will try to reach such an undemanding with the moderate opposition parties despite Pinochet's efforts to derail tbe process We also expect chat even if tbe jams and tbe opposition agreeransitionour new. thereeiter-ihan-evca chance that tbey will dowould still befor senior military officers to try collectively to convince Pinochet to accept It We believe that at the appropriateepresentative body of senior officers would take this step In Ihe dimate of public euphoria that tbe successful transition negotiations would generate, we judge that Ii would be extremely difficult for Pinochei to reject ihe advice of senior military officers that he agree to end his presidency on schedule. If he adamantly refused their advice and ined to overturn an agreed-upon inanition formula calling for the electionuccessor civilian govern-men:n our view, he would risk aeugcoitint even thehis main source ofhis refusal might prompt senior omeees from all of the services to begin discussionsirect confrontation of the President.!

Nevertheless, we recognize lent Ihe transition discus-lions might founderumber ofor instance, they probably -ill prosper only if theparties continue to reject collaboration with tbe and their allies, accept tbe junta's mini-id evolveore by responsible leaders whom the military can trust. More ominously, ike Communists could alto diimpt the trantition die-logos, linen they would vieweccomnvedauonthe military and the moderate oppositionhroat to their plan to promote an all-out insurgency in Chile Thus, they might try to scuttle the negotta-tioni by once again attempting to kill Pinochet, assassinating senior military officers, or othcrwue sharply escalating their terrorist cae

TV Mibtary Moves.

We believe that the armed fortes' encase win,r the nextonths or so. especially if Pinochet, having rejected the advice of sensor officersegotiated transition, continues to avoid


to be renominated the uncle candidate ia9 nsebssciie. Underdrcuinstances, we believe ihai thereetter-than-even chance that byenior militarythai Pinochet could not win the plebiscite without massive fraud and fearing tbat hb continued rule would tear the countrydemand tbat be agree puNsciy to step down at tbe end of his term. In oar view, even at this point the senior officers would prefer aa outcome that provided for the President to stay in other, entil (he end of his term, hoping thereby to forestall dissidence within the armed forces and to project an image of acting to uphold the Constitution We believe, however, that these senior officers would be prcpated to cum Pinochet immediately if he reject-ed their demands and tried to cow them by the mere force of his authority ^

The military could mm* earlier ihanf Pinochet acted in total disregard of the wishes of senior officer* or maneuvered more and more openl> to perpetuate his hold on the prcidciKy-although we judge that there islim chance thai this could occur in the next few months For example, even though available evidence doss cot indicate that the turmoil nrroursding ihe revived Utelier case ha* reached the point of threatening Pinochet's hold on power any timeIt has strengthened the resolve of those who are opposed to bis staying in office beyondbelieve that it bas theforajor crisis. This could happen if Pinocheton the case and also adopt* hanh measure* against those who want the case cleared up or who "snow tooncluding retired military officers The result, wc believe.be that be would alienate the armed forces and perhapsove by teniae officer* to oust him. Senior officeri might alto move earlier in response to new intimidating acts by Pinochet against junta members determined to oppose hi* plebiscite nomination,eries of public statements thai he intend* to be the government'* candidate9 regardless of junta objections!

ptoier* will want to avoid detection WkmtanWma

BaansVAI'h<*JCh ^Cu'es at ihe Army reprrventat.ve on tbe junta, the Army Vice Commander, and emenw hardliner* within the service probably would not be atked to participateonfrontation withupport from the Air Force. Navy, and Carablneroi would be crucial, particularly because, in our view, it would be too risky for Amy officeri to sa on iheir own. NcverJteUea. we believe that any military asove against Pinochet it tof^H

Wc are uncertain about how Pinochet would tcactirect challengeroup of senior officers lepresenting all of the services, but we think he probably would either reject (heirdemandt outright or agree te principle but with (he intention of out ma-rwering his challengers once the crisis oistipaiea In our judgment, however, it is anlikelyroup of determined officers who had decided (hat they had no choice bu( to confront Pinochet would be swayed either by an attempt to face them down or an evasioneal commitment to changed policies. They probably would anticipate these maneuvers at Pino-chef* likely response, aad wc believe that they would demand ha resignation if he did not promptly satisfy thetr minimum cooditiorn f" '


Pinochet Slays in Power Notwithstanding our forecast tbat uncase in the Army over Pinochet's plans will intensify during (he acai two years,ome chance thai thecan persuade the cnsVecr corps te support him for another term. He probably would appeal to the Army by using tbe themeontinuing threat posed by theecially if the latter escaUie their violent actions in the coming months, and even pro-transition Army officeri might rally behind him at

anticipate (ha; aaymong senior officers who plan to confront Pinochet will be very closely held, if for no other reason than that tbe


temporarily.o probably would emphasize the divisions within tbe dernocratic opposition or any continuing, collaboration by the moderates with theas in staging antiregime protests duringbuttress his argument that Chile's current crop of civilian leaders is "unreliable."would undoubtedly focus his efforts on the Army, but. in our view, heo try to ensure that the other services accepted an Army decision to continue backing him. The President, ia our view, would probably then seek to manipulatehrough control of the media,electoral registration laws. or. In the final stance, outrightassure his reelection]

We also believe it isnotPinochet could persuade the Army's hierarchy to support an unconstitutional extension of hisin response to efforts by tbe junta members of the other services to block his re nomination. Under these circumstances, Pinochet might dismiss tbe junta,the Constitution in abeyance, and rule by decree and with the sole support of the Army forhis, in our view, would be anrisky course of action that probably would generate an unprecedented level of dissension between the Army and the other services and spur groups of senior officers to begin plotting actively to remove the President by force.M

Pinochet Assassinated

The teftist terrorists who Pinochet in Seplember I

re believe that it tocyever-presentnext president would most probablyenior Army general, such as junta representative Cordon or Army Vice Commander Sinclair. Either man would almost certainly crack down on theand assiduously seek out Pinochet's killers.we judge that oo likely military successor to Pinochet would have cither the desire or ability io imitate his predecessor's goal of retaining power indefinitely. We believe that, after the initial post-assassination period of repression, the armed forces

and the moderate opposition would hammerransition program to be implemented either during or afterime frame envisioned in the Con-siiluV.nn I

Implications for the United Stales

We believe that either tbe juota or the military will advance Washington's goal ofransition to democratic rule in Chile if tbey force Pinochet to accept political liberalization and commit himself to step downevelopment, in our view, would help stabilize the Chilean political scene by isolating tbe violent left, cementing the moderate opposition's decision not to work with theand lessening the potential for serious human rights abuses by the military.opularly elected civilian President succeeds Pinochei inCommunists' chances ofrevolution would dissipate and the party might eventually abandon its strategy of armed strujgle.

If Pinochet prevails io his plan to remain io powern our view. US interests could beaffected in several ways. For example, the prospect of Pinochei as President-for-lifc would undermine the reputation of the armed forces among the Chilean public, promote major dissension within the military, sod increase the likelihood of civil war bythe far-left and spurring elements of the moderate opposition to make common cause with the radicals As the most effective and well-armed subversive force in the country, tbe Communist party and its allies would seek toaodiRista-itylc popular uprising against the military regime that could eventuallyoviet- and Cuban-backed government to power inoreover, aa the discovery of huge caches of Cuban-supplied arms and tbeattempt6 demonstrate. Ihc Communists and affiliated terrorists groups are determined to try to bring tbe Pinochet regime down by force- Even if they failed to topple Pinochei, an all-out leftistin Chile probably would impact negatively on neighboring democracies.!

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