A NEW LOOK AT PROSPECTS FOR NEGOTIATIONS ON CAMBODIA (DELETED)

Created: 5/22/1987

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New Look at Prospects for Negotiations on Cam

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SUMMARY

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urgfney to sna'oB with economic reforms, have, in our "view, imbued HanoijjonMK solution and io try to meet0 timetable for withdrawing its forces.

Various asean observers, though initially skeptical of Hanoi'salloons, have now evinced hope that progress may indeed be possible, and Prince Sihanouk's recently announced sabbatical aa head of the Cnalilinn Government of Democrats Kampuchea offers intriguing new prospects for negotiation.-Devclopmenls to date, however, have only beenetting, and the major players have not aheicd tho* fundamental objectives. Thus, even if wgouaiiom wen tc pi nder way joon. prr-nyeM ti Kkely l0 he slow and Mjhjett to sudden reversals

Winds of Chsngr_in_Hanot

Vietnam,ajor assist from the Soviet Union, il providing the primary impetusambodian settlement byaneiy of trial balloons to test and improve the diplomatic atmosphere in Southeast Asia. Sinceanoi has:

-Encouraged Laos to improve relations with Thailand and China, although little headway ha* been made.

various Western communiM parties and governments lo assist in bringing about negotiations.

-Emphatically declared that it will withdraw all in forces fiom Cambodiar sootieregotiated settlementeached)

We believe Hanoi has adjusted its longer-term policy Dn Cambodia ia the past two years toreform! aimed al rejuvcnatinc. iti flagging economy.

leadership under Party chief Nguyen Van Linn is

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attempting to resolve tht Cam Docks problem because it is an urm ceded distraction lo economic reform efforts, and keep* Vietnam isolated from badly needed economic relations with Weslem countries that are seea ai essentia] to economic progress

In our Mew. the Vietnamese have drawn heavily from the Soviets under Gorbachev, both in assigning priority toarn and in seeking to remove enema! obstacles that block full attention to reform

measures 1

VVhile Vietnam bas nol yet made formal the apparent softening of us sja^fJ^^nbodV we believe Hanoi is moving in that direction. As lateietnamese press aSaaBBwajBsaW

suggested that Hanoi was confident ihat the Cambodia situation waa irreversible* and ihat the resistance and its supporter* would eventually give op Now it* message is that national reconciliation, including Khrner Rouge elements, is necessary and. in Party leader Nguyen Vac Linh's words. Vietnam is wULnf. *to "Jmew leaf in us dealings with China andbe interest of regional stability.

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Over the near terro. we bebeve Hanoi's immediate goal iset negotiations of some sort under way Given iu record of tenacity, we do not espect it lo make dramatic coneevsion* pnor to an agreement lo negotiate. What we espect insteadackage ol largely recycled proposals, updated and'1nduce ASEAN, China and resistance elements to emeruBwasauVfackage might leaiurt national reconciliation among the Cambodian parties, deluding rank and file Khmer Rouge, but predicated on the legilimacy of the Heng Sam/in regime

jMrnggmmmmj/mY thai us overall military position will allowenjjirizable' year at an acreptaMr levelrisk Hanoi probably cadcuUtet thai such

inducements would,ninimum, put pressure on iw opponents lo reciprocate We expect Hanoi lo unveil its proposal) by tbe end of Juneeeting of ihe Indochina Foreign Ministers.

Overcoming, the Tol Pot Obaucle-

Aside from Hanoi's intimations of prater fkjJb&iy toward ihe Khmer Rouge, we have observed apparent movement on lhal most contentious issue by other major playcn. Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadie stated during his Southeast Asian trip in March ihat ihe group-minus ihe Tol Polight lo

Impact of Sihanmtlt's Gambit

China, without budging from ils public hardline stance toward Vietnam, has exerted considerable pressure on the Khmer Roup inwo years to moderate its unsavory image and lo further submerge Pol Pol's visibility

Pnnceecently announcedm ihe resistance coalitwo. in our view, enhances the prospecti for aegotiatioDS on Cambodia. Although hi) move weakens lhe enajjiion's leverage and will damage iis support in the UN. he gains pcaterealing with Vietnam withoul being hampered by Khmer Rouge and Chinese cooceras. Hanoi is almost certain to move quickly to establisheo Sihanouk arrives in France "

Sihanouk's leave of absence from the resistance coalition also may help resoive tbe Khmer Rouge issue. By distancing himself from the Khmer Rouge, we believe the Prince deprives lhe grouparge portion of its limiled political credibility, thus isolating it and weakening its bargaining power. Even China, the group's only supporter, would find it awkward to press lhe Khmer Rouge's case too hard for fear of arousing longstanding suspicions in ASEAN over Beijing's intentions in Cambodia. "

After an extended period of limiied diplomatic activity on Cambodia. ASEAN has begun ime-csl in Vie'naro's contusing maneuvering.

Mrxhiar has revived Pnnce smanou* s

oclnaUn thiswo-tiered affau in which the four Cambodian par.ies would meer informally ai lhe same tune Sihanouk would be meeting with Vietnamese officials The Prince's newly-asserted independence may breathe new he into this formal, which never gained much momentum before.

n our judgmenl. ASEAN may be in part motivated lo consider negonalions oul of concern lhal conomic forces in the repon Uutaienndermine its pobcy of keepingsolated untj a

Cambodian seillcmet involvement in Vietn Howe vet, ASEAN it! to Japan's

new bonne si in Vietnam art not as remote as once asuimed in light of the recent diplomatic atmospherics In our view, ihii perception could well undermine eflons to sustain economic pressure on Vidnamarious companies jockey for possible business opponunities there that wouldettlement While this would notelcome development from ASBANs standpoinl. iU loss of leverage by which lo sustain Vietnam's economic isolation couldmprove the negotiating '

The Thai will remain wary of Vietnam's maneuvering and are like to bc unrcahstK dernonstrati

ASEAN would be gratified by the onset of negotiations, new pressures on its unity could slow or interrupt the process. ThejTiiiunce coalition would be especiallyticul*rly if Sihanouk stands rum on hit sabbatical plans The Khmer Rouge, for example,oss of leverage, might openly revert to the odrous bchavroras generaUy suppressed in recent limes ASEAN will also have to eonsidei that the failure ofthe non-Commurun resistance thus far loredible guerrilla effortev. bargaining chips and thui relucUni to move quickly into negotiation afBSagV

Although Ihe evidence is still nol clear-cut. weossible shift in attitudes of some ASEAN Observers toward the utibty of keeping ihe resistancemu*SS Khmer Rouge dominance and QOj^ommu.usi futu:f> probably undcMe an, nxr, el

VjJOftUy. as wiihhe Soviet Union. Nguyen Van Linh's position is subject to sunn, cnauengt. uUiot abrupt reversal, by entrenched hardliner ihmughout Hanoi's ealcif.ed bureaucracy.

Sfc^ui NWjj^RN NOCON^HaCI ORf&)

AJlhough we eipcci hisine io prevail over Ihe longer term, he may be forced to toihar. htrelei on iuch fundamental mue* a- Cambodia flaaMh

APPENDIX

AGENDAS OF KEY PLAYERS

Hi" S. 'Mr!-

tone of both Soviet and Vietnamese media suggesis to us thM

Moscow isleavmg no room for ambiguity regarding its

At the same time, Moscow is deeding ASEAN and Chinese demands lo exercise its influence contending that its ability to push Hanoi to comprornisc is limited. We believe, in light of Hanoi's well-known jealousy of lis xdrpenjcr.ee. tha: Moscow rrcogruej that pushing loo bard might be

i;:r

China holds to its position, both publicly and privately, that pressure on Vietnam musi be sustainedagrees to withdraw ji, foiccs from Cambodia and permit national reconciliation there Beijinglimited direct levera- Mmmmmu^

c Beijing is sincere in itsor an independent, oon-sociahit.-ifcned Cambodia, sjee Chinese goals are no! to dominate Cambodia, but io prevent ihe Vietnamese from doing so. *tfl

ww Chmese emotions toward Vseinam run high, we sense ihat Meijmg recognizes the fundamental weakneH of us posilion. For this reason, we believe that over lime it may have to soften its unyielding lm in deference nottnam. but to lhe need to avoid beJM inilaied from ASEAN, like Hanoi, however, Beijing will make concessions only grudgingly. * "

SECRET No/oRN NOCO^TRACT OR/foN

eet its self-proclaimed goal of withdrawing il- troopsrovided il can obiain sufficient guarantees against Chinese and Khmer Rouge efforts loettlement lo their advantage.

Nonetheless, it would expect that Cambodia noiveal lo Vietnamese security and that its foreign relations respond to

Vietnam's sphere of influence.

ASEAN

ASEAN'9 basic stance, which calls for Vietnamese withdrawal and Cambodian self-drnerminationbut its posture over the past year or so baathat Vie main must make lhe firstis evidence that somev-thai the

Vietnamese are, in fact, movini

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